Volume 4 No 4 - Air Power Studies

NOTES
1 Council for Mutual Economic Support; institution promoting economic
cooperation among socialist countries under the former Soviet Union
‘protection’ (1949-91).
2 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Russia’s Air Power in Crisis, Smithsonian Institution,
1999, pp.15.
3 Ibid, pp. 39.
4 Ibid, pp. 34-43.
5 Su-25 (Frogfoot) ground attack, Su-22 (Fitter), fighter-bomber and Su-24
(Fencer) tactical bomber aircraft.
6 Mi-24 (Hind) attack, Mi-8/17 (Hip) transport/utility and Mi-6 (Hook) heavy
transport helicopters.
7 An-12 (Cub), An-22 (Cock), An-26 (Curl), An-124 (Condor) and Il-76
(Candid) transport aircraft.
8 152 L-39 and 94 L-29 jet trainers and several MiG-15/17 old, first
generation jet fighters.
9 Some of the L-39s were configured to carry two 250-pound bombs or two
rocket pods each for 16 unguided 57mm rockets
10 Alltogether 4 mobile ZSU-23/4 radar and optically tracked anti-aircraft guns,
6 ZU-23 and DShK optically sighted machine guns and some SA-7/14
Strela and SA-16 Igla man-portable SAMs.
11 Many of the Chechen commanders and fighters were graduates of Soviet
military schools and academies, skilfully adopting their knowledge of
Russian tactics, using the same weapons (left behind Russian units
withdrawn from Chechenya in 1991).
12 The average amount of flying time per year for frontline ‘combat’ pilots for
four years prior to the Chechen conflict was well below 30 hours.
13 Bridges over the Argun River, presidential palace in Groznyy, former Soviet
ICBM silos used as ammunition stores, etc.
14 N.N. Novichkov: The Russian Armed Forces in the Chechen Conflict
(Moscow 1995), pp.10.
15 See also A. Hills: The Airpower Taboo: Dialouge Across Perspectives?
Airpower and Urban Operations (Airman Scholar, Spring 2000).
16 Precision guided missiles and bombs (mainly the AS 12/14 laser or TV
guided missiles and KAB 500L, 1500L, 500KR laser and TV guided bombs)
were used in some cases against bridges over the Argun River, industrial
infrastructure, defensive positions of the rebels and their military leadership.
17 According to Russian sources 6,000 Chechen civilians died in the
conflict; Western sources indicate the loss of 20,000civilian lives. 27
18 The RuAF lost two Su-25s, one Su-24; 26 aircraft sustained battle
damage and the Army Aviation lost ten helicopters and every forth of them
were damaged.
19 ISTAR – Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance.
20 Driven by the enormous political pressure from the Kremlin under the
leadership of Prime Minister Putin, the major candidate for the presidential
elections held in March 2000.
21 The majority of Russian casualties were due to forcing unprepared soldiers
to fight the guerrillas in Chechen urban areas.
22 Michael Orr: Second Time Lucky? Evaluating Russian Performance in the
Second Chechen War; www.ppc.pims.org/Projects/csrc/JIRArticle.htm
23 G. Arbatov: The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons
Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya; (The Marshall Center Papers, No.2;
2000).
24 See also: G. Arbatov: The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine:
Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya; (The Marshall Center papers,
No.2; 2000).
25 Military Balance 2000, Russia ,pp.124.
26 It is almost 30% of the fleet, namely the Su-24 Fencer tactical bombers; Su-
25 Frogfoot close air support aircraft and the first batch of the MiG-29
Fulcrum, Su-27 Flanker and MiG-31 Foxhound fighters, further reducing the
number of effectively available air assets below 2000.
27 Like the MiG-MAPO aircraft manufacturer’s future multirole frontal fighter
known as ‘Article 1.42’ (MiG-35); or the Sukhoi Design Bureau’s forward
swept wing interceptor S-37, which in the lack of funding are remaining only
in a form of ‘technological demonstrators’.
28 In 2000 weapons’ export achieved the level of $4bn and is steadily rising.
29 For example US defence budget is about 3.5% of GDP in FY2001
($305.4 bn).
30 Little prospect for small-scale introduction of new generation combat
aircraft.