Volume 4 No 4 - Air Power Studies

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other forms of struggle such as terrorism. The assailant’s postwar casualties due to terrorist attacks might be even higher than his field casualties in war. In brief, the enemy’s psychological effort and morale should also be dealt with to prevent such after-effects. 74 43 THE PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY MEANS AND STRATEGIC PARALYSIS When it comes to practice, strategic paralysis has many limitations. At the grand strategic level, military means may be unsuitable for some types of war, especially wars of belief such as religious, ethnic, and ideological conflicts. It is a fact that human beings may continue to fight from generation to generation for their beliefs. Strategic paralysis is not an exception to this According to Sun Tzu, a true victory is one that can change the enemy’s longterm strategic intentions. Defeating the enemy in war may not be an absolute victory if there is still a potential for subsequent war limitation because it is a military means. According to Sun Tzu, a true victory is one that can change the enemy’s long-term strategic intentions. Defeating the enemy in war may not be an absolute victory if there is still a potential for subsequent war. The grand strategic calculation implies that without tao, one may be unable to win a war even against an inferior enemy. In other words, there are wars that may not be won by a particular side. In such situations, states capable of conducting strategic paralysis may be unable to exploit such a capability to achieve their objectives. The fact that strategic paralysis is not always applicable despite its potential should be regarded as its greatest practical limitation. At the military strategic level, there may be some political, economic, legal, and/or other constraints that prevent the full application of the strategic paralysis concept. According to Sun Tzu, all available means should be used to achieve the objectives of war. It is a fact that some wars may not be won solely by military means, or may be won more quickly if the war efforts are enhanced by other means. To apply non-military means successfully, some constraints may have to be imposed on the application of military means. Consequently, military planners may be unable to apply the entire theoretical concept of strategic paralysis in practice. For instance, the assailant may be unable to isolate the enemy by blockade, or may have to exclude some sensitive targets. The partial application of the strategic paralysis concept may reduce the campaign effectiveness or could lead to a failure. In addition, there is the argument that strategic paralysis may not be feasible without an effective nuclear deterrence. 75 The argument is based on the assumption that the enemy would be deterred from using WMD to counter strategic paralysis because of the fear of nuclear retaliation. Even small states may have a capability to employ WMD. 76 Without a nuclear capability, the assailant might be unable to deter such counter-attacks. On the other hand, the
strategic paralysis capability itself may have raised the credibility of conventional deterrence to a degree that it could 44 effectively deter the use of WMD. At the operational level, there are many complicating factors. First, the availability of forward bases may be a factor. A strategic paralysis campaign may require some suitable forward bases in third countries. The bases may be unavailable to the assailant, or the hosts may impose restrictions due to political reasons. Though long-range operations may be possible, there are many disadvantages such as higher operational costs, fewer available sorties, and aircrew fatigue. 77 Second, the deployment phase that normally takes quite some time may create difficulties. The enemy could use this opportunity to strengthen his defence and prepare counter-attacks. 78 The enemy may also seize the opportunity to launch a pre-emptive strike against the assembling forces. The assailant might have to delay or abandon the campaign if the enemy succeeds in destroying his key assets. Third, there may be no suitable targets for strategic paralysis. If the enemy is a non-industrialized economy, his basic infrastructure and industry may not be as critical to him as compared to an industrialized economy. Striking such targets may have little effect on his war efforts. The enemy may also disperse his assets so that they become inaccessible, or are no longer high-value targets. The use of smart weapons may be unfeasible, or become excessive and less cost-effective against such targets. Fourth, the campaign may be ineffective if the enemy’s vulnerabilities or weaknesses are incorrectly identified. 79 The COG may be different from state to state. The assets that the assailant regards as vital may not be that important to the enemy. Targeting can be very difficult unless the assailant knows the enemy inside out. Attacking a wrong COG may lead to protracted war and excessive losses for both sides. Fifth, the environment may not be ideal for strategic paralysis. The assailant may be unable to isolate the enemy physically due to unfavourable geography or other reasons. It is also a fact that airpower, the primary instrument …there may be no suitable targets for strategic paralysis. If the enemy is a non-industrialized economy, his basic infrastructure and industry may not be as critical to him as compared to an industrialized economy
Page 1 and 2: THE ROYAL AIR FORCE AIR POWER Revie
Page 3 and 4: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ROYAL AIR FORC
Page 5 and 6: Keen students of military history,
Page 7 and 8: REVIEW ESSAY BY GROUP CAPTAIN PETER
Page 9 and 10: 2 and men who formed the vast major
Page 11 and 12: Nevertheless, when he had had his s
Page 13 and 14: proactive in seeking to improve the
Page 15 and 16: The aim of this paper is to examine
Page 17 and 18: Russia had been trying hard to form
Page 19 and 20: In 1994, the RuAF Central Research
Page 21 and 22: Air operations were conducted mainl
Page 23 and 24: adar or inertial bombing through cl
Page 25 and 26: integrated with the advance of grou
Page 27 and 28: 20 KOSOVO, CHECHNYA AND THE NEW MIL
Page 29 and 30: - counter terrorist operations; in
Page 31 and 32: platforms, including nuclear and co
Page 33 and 34: 26 Cook, N. ‘Russian Air Force is
Page 35 and 36: SUN TZU STRATEGIC PARALYSIS and SMA
Page 37 and 38: The term ‘paralysis’ was used b
Page 39 and 40: 32 The operational effectiveness of
Page 41 and 42: eventually get what he wants anyway
Page 43 and 44: decisions are made by commanders an
Page 45 and 46: 38 In ‘Employing Air Power in the
Page 47 and 48: To paralyze the enemy system, Warde
Page 49: increases, and as the timeframe is
Page 53 and 54: attackers arrive. Employing airborn
Page 55 and 56: for war. The accomplishment of the
Page 57 and 58: 50 THE APPLICATION OF STRATEGIC PAR
Page 59 and 60: For example, states contesting a te
Page 61 and 62: minimum resistance. The goal is to
Page 63 and 64: Sun Tzu’s concept may make it pos
Page 65 and 66: Liddell Hart, B.H., Strategy: The I
Page 67 and 68: 31 Ames, p. 120 (The Art of War Cha
Page 69 and 70: First, Strategy Second’, Strategi
Page 71 and 72: Air Power Versus a Fielded Army: A
Page 73 and 74: However, in the wake of the Gulf Wa
Page 75 and 76: 68 The exact relationship between t
Page 77 and 78: 70 …many aircrews launched on mis
Page 79 and 80: These tactical innovations by the U
Page 81 and 82: In developing the air plan against
Page 83 and 84: 76 A Tactical Air Control Party (TA
Page 85 and 86: 78 BDA Source Tanks APCs Artillery
Page 87 and 88: identify, and fix enemy forces as w
Page 89 and 90: 82 clearly defined. This quality of
Page 91 and 92: training of the aircrews, the platf
Page 93 and 94: support Air Force operations. Thoug
Page 95 and 96: 88 Pape, Robert A., Bombing To Win:
Page 97 and 98: 50 Major Phil M. Haun, A-10 unpubli
Page 99 and 100: What was the Impact of the Luftwaff
Page 101 and 102:
94 …Germany was keen to prove the
Page 103 and 104:
96 …when the Stuka was at last co
Page 105 and 106:
from their nuisance value, [they] a
Page 107 and 108:
In April 1942, ‘tip and run’ at
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102 days later doing the same again
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destroyers, two large landing craft
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acknowledging that 70% of the total
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All of this still did not alter the
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operations, and only five separate
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112 and run’ attacks expected on
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114 What then of the value of the
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116 NOTES 1 In 1943, this extended
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Air Power Taken to its Limits, and
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AIR ORDERS OF BATTLE The RAF’s 5t
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122 Among other items in very short
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A few words are necessary at this p
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Six squadrons of RAF fighters, with
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At 1.pm the crew of a Bristol Fight
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130 “Below us lay a small aerodro
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Throughout the battle there had bee
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134 NOTES 1. Johnson, J., “1918 T
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New Zealand’s Fast Jet
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138 …the NZ media reported that M
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140 ‘…I would rather have six [
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and you needed air. And probably so
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In the early 1980s the Skyhawk forc
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146 MISSILES When the customary eig
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Seven RNZAF Skyhawks have been lost
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EW READING NEW READING NEW READING
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UNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REU
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