Volume 4 No 4 - Air Power Studies

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We then go further back in time for an excellent review of the role of the Royal Flying Corps in the Battle of Amiens. Dr Alfred Price has become a regular contributor to the Air Power Review and this article is a further example of his historical prowess. The final article per se is by Nick Lee-Frampton and chronicles the demise of New Zealand’s fast jet force. The deliberate move towards making one potential component commander the permanently supported commander is an interesting one. It is not consistent with our normal understanding of command and control doctrine in which circumstances will dictate which is the supported component. Trenchard probably shuddered in his grave at such a move and his distinguished Kiwi successors in the pantheon of Royal Air Force senior officers would have recoiled in horror at the removal of the offensive element of a nation’s air power. D Def S (RAF)
REVIEW ESSAY BY GROUP CAPTAIN PETER W GRAY RAF Bomber Harris, His Life and Times Air Commodore Henry Probert MBE MA Greenhill Books London, 2001 ISBN 1-85367-473-7 Sir Arthur Harris had many nicknames and epithets over his Service career and during his subsequent years of fame, or infamy depending on one’s viewpoint. He was totally indifferent to many of these sobriquets, only objecting to ‘Ginger’. Air Commodore Probert uses ‘Bomber’ as it coincides most closely with public perceptions and common usage. Yet in his own day, Harris was almost uniformly known as ‘Bert’ – by his crews, colleagues and by the likes of USAAF Generals Hap Arnold and Ira Eaker. On the face of it, one could be forgiven for thinking that the exploits of Bomber Command, and its irascible leader, have been more than adequately covered with a surfeit of books, television programmes, journal articles, theses and the like. Indeed Probert makes this point at the very beginning of his book in the opening sentence of the Preface. Arguably, however, the very proliferation of material is good cause for the administration of an occasional douche of common sense to bring the debate back to serious levels. This authoritative biography on Harris certainly meets this objective. It also serves to highlight the previous lacuna in the field and should make many academics, commentators and authors review their earlier material for balance, content and the risk of preconceptions. Harris did not write a full autobiography, understandably preferring to chronicle his views on wartime matters in his formal missive – Despatch on War Operations 23rd February 1942 to 8th May 1945, (published with a preface and introduction by Sebastian Cox, Cass, 1995). This represents Harris’s own testament to his tenure at the head of Bomber Command; it was not published at the time because of what Tedder, who was CAS when it was completed, called ‘insurmountable security objections’. Harris acquiesced in this decision, but drew heavily on the work to produce Bomber Offensive (Collins, 1947). There was then a considerable gap until the only hitherto authorised biography on Harris was completed by Dudley Saward in 1984 (Bomber Harris, Buchan and Enright). Saward had been the Chief Radar Officer at Bomber Command and had proven his literary skills in writing The Bomber’s Eye (Cassell, 1959) describing the use of radar by bombers in World War II. Probert suggests that he would also be highly likely to complete the work under his master’s supervision and be amenable to direction (page 403). Harris forbade publication until after
Page 1 and 2: THE ROYAL AIR FORCE AIR POWER Revie
Page 3 and 4: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ROYAL AIR FORC
Page 5: Keen students of military history,
Page 9 and 10: 2 and men who formed the vast major
Page 11 and 12: Nevertheless, when he had had his s
Page 13 and 14: proactive in seeking to improve the
Page 15 and 16: The aim of this paper is to examine
Page 17 and 18: Russia had been trying hard to form
Page 19 and 20: In 1994, the RuAF Central Research
Page 21 and 22: Air operations were conducted mainl
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Page 25 and 26: integrated with the advance of grou
Page 27 and 28: 20 KOSOVO, CHECHNYA AND THE NEW MIL
Page 29 and 30: - counter terrorist operations; in
Page 31 and 32: platforms, including nuclear and co
Page 33 and 34: 26 Cook, N. ‘Russian Air Force is
Page 35 and 36: SUN TZU STRATEGIC PARALYSIS and SMA
Page 37 and 38: The term ‘paralysis’ was used b
Page 39 and 40: 32 The operational effectiveness of
Page 41 and 42: eventually get what he wants anyway
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Page 45 and 46: 38 In ‘Employing Air Power in the
Page 47 and 48: To paralyze the enemy system, Warde
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50 THE APPLICATION OF STRATEGIC PAR
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For example, states contesting a te
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minimum resistance. The goal is to
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Sun Tzu’s concept may make it pos
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Liddell Hart, B.H., Strategy: The I
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31 Ames, p. 120 (The Art of War Cha
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First, Strategy Second’, Strategi
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Air Power Versus a Fielded Army: A
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However, in the wake of the Gulf Wa
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68 The exact relationship between t
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70 …many aircrews launched on mis
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These tactical innovations by the U
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In developing the air plan against
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76 A Tactical Air Control Party (TA
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78 BDA Source Tanks APCs Artillery
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identify, and fix enemy forces as w
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82 clearly defined. This quality of
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training of the aircrews, the platf
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support Air Force operations. Thoug
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88 Pape, Robert A., Bombing To Win:
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50 Major Phil M. Haun, A-10 unpubli
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What was the Impact of the Luftwaff
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94 …Germany was keen to prove the
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96 …when the Stuka was at last co
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from their nuisance value, [they] a
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In April 1942, ‘tip and run’ at
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102 days later doing the same again
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destroyers, two large landing craft
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acknowledging that 70% of the total
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All of this still did not alter the
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operations, and only five separate
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112 and run’ attacks expected on
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114 What then of the value of the
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116 NOTES 1 In 1943, this extended
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Air Power Taken to its Limits, and
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AIR ORDERS OF BATTLE The RAF’s 5t
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122 Among other items in very short
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A few words are necessary at this p
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Six squadrons of RAF fighters, with
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At 1.pm the crew of a Bristol Fight
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130 “Below us lay a small aerodro
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Throughout the battle there had bee
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134 NOTES 1. Johnson, J., “1918 T
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New Zealand’s Fast Jet
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138 …the NZ media reported that M
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140 ‘…I would rather have six [
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and you needed air. And probably so
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In the early 1980s the Skyhawk forc
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146 MISSILES When the customary eig
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Seven RNZAF Skyhawks have been lost
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EW READING NEW READING NEW READING
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UNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REU
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Volume 4 No 4 - Air Power Studies

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