Facing the Klieg Lights: Understanding the "Good Moral Character"

CLEMENSFINAL.DOC
3/30/2007 12:51:01 PM
2007] THE “GOOD MORAL CHARACTER” EXAMINATION 283
insufficient. 280 Rehabilitation means an applicant “has undertaken a
useful and constructive place in society.” 281 It cannot occur
simultaneously with getting caught. 282 An applicant bears the burden to
demonstrate appreciation of the “moral and legal implications” of past
misconduct; 283 the bar will not take her word. 284 Although one
jurisdiction denies rehabilitation, another jurisdiction could find
rehabilitation and grant admission. 285
Some missteps demonstrate a lack of rehabilitation, such as arguing
that a guilty plea was entered “to avoid being labeled a ‘snitch’” 286 or
“for the sake of avoiding the expense and uncertainty of a trial.” 287
Similarly, it is unwise to deny wrongdoing and argue that one “pled for
convenience” despite a criminal conviction, particularly when a video
shows that the theft was committed immediately before law school
matriculation. 288 Any potential applicant should follow the law, 289
280. See Blum, supra note 169, at § 9 (citing Bernstein v. Comm. of Bar Exam’rs, State Bar,
443 P.2d 570 (Cal. 1968); In re Ascher, 411 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1980)).
281. Blum, supra note 241, at § 14 (citing In re Prager, 661 N.E.2d 84 (Mass. 1996)).
282. Id. (citing In re K.B., 434 A.2d 541 (Md. Ct. App. 1981)). In K.B., the applicant claimed
that when “‘they put those handcuffs on me, I was rehabilitated then and there.’” K.B., 434 A.2d at
545. The court responded “[i]t would be a most unusual case indeed where rehabilitation, sufficient
to permit admission to the Bar of a convicted adult thief, can be shown to have taken place
simultaneously with getting caught, and this is not such a case.” Id.
283. Id. (citing In re Easton, 610 P.2d 270 (Or. 1980)). The Easton court found no reformation
where felonies were committed by a 43-year-old 3L, “rather than that of a youngster in his
formative years” because applicant “had presumably been exposed to professional concepts of . . .
legal ethics.” Easton, 610 P.2d at 271. The court considered his conduct “the reaction of a
generally unstable person faced with a stressful situation,” rather than “as the isolated acts of a naive
young person.” Id.
284. Blum, supra note 241, at § 14 (citing In re Wright, 690 P.2d 1134 (Wash. 1984)
(“[A]pplicant’s words, without remorse, ‘I am a bit more stable now,’ were not sufficient to meet
the court’s high standards”)).
285. Id. at § 13 (citing In re Kleppin, 768 A.2d 1010 (D.C. 2001)).
286. Wright, 690 P.2d at 1136.
287. In re R.B.R., 609 So.2d 1302, 1302 (Fla. 1992) (denying admission for application “false,
misleading, or lacking in candor” because an “entire explanation implied that he was completely
innocent of any criminal charges, but pled guilty for the sake of avoiding the expense and
uncertainty of a trial”). The applicant “failed to disclose significant facts” and “falsely implied”
innocence. Id.
288. In re. M.L.B., 766 So.2d 994, 995-96 (Fla. 2000). Denial was based on a finding that
applicant: (1) just before law school, helped steal a large number of CDs from employer, pleading
no contest to third-degree grand theft; (2) wrote bar application that was “false, misleading, and
lacking in candor because he denied doing anything illegal and stated that his plea was a plea of
convenience;” and (3) testified falsely before the Board by denying anything illegal. Id.
289. See Keeley, supra note 24, at 844-45 (noting that because she will appear before the bar
after having “invested three years of hard work and accumulated a debt of over $100,000 to become
an attorney,” she is “uncomfortable with the notion that [she] must choose between [her] future law
career and exercising [her] First Amendment right of free expression.” Also worrisome is that she
“may have already jeopardized [her] chances of admission” via her pre-law school activities.