Facing the Klieg Lights: Understanding the "Good Moral Character"

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260 AKRON LAW REVIEW [40:255
nineteenth century, likely dating to British precedents. 36 Although the
American legal tradition owes much to the British, 37 the character
requirement developed simultaneously in both countries. 38
History is silent about the implementation of the character
requirement until the last century, perhaps due to the previous
informality of early mechanisms to ensure good moral character. 39 One
striking similarity between the early British and American bars was that
both used a facially neutral character requirement to deny admission to
undesirables. 40 The British used it to exclude members of the lower
classes, 41 while the American bar’s character requirement placated those
who wanted to totally ban lawyers. 42 The requirement was used to
exclude recent immigrants, 43 Jews, 44 women, 45 and ethnic minorities
from bar admission. 46
A 1985 study funded by the Stanford Legal Research Fund “found
almost no instances of denial of admission on character-related grounds
in the nineteenth century.” 47 During that time, virtually any white man
could practice law. 48 The character requirement’s practical impact was
slight even at the end of the nineteenth century. The required personal
references were hard to obtain only by “undesirable” classes of people. 49
The first rule governing federal admission “required only that an
applicant’s private and professional character ‘shall appear to be fair.’” 50
This rule provided discretion to deny women and ethnic or religious
36. Roger Roots, When Lawyers Were Serial Killers: Nineteenth Century Visions Of Good
Moral Character, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 19, 19 (2001) (citing HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 15 ).
37. Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct For Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57
SMU L. REV. 1385, 1389 (2004).
38. Rhode, supra note 29, at 496.
39. Id. at 494-95.
40. Roots, supra note 36, at 20; Ratcliff, supra note 5, at 490.
41. Roots, supra note 36, at 20 n.10.
42. See id. at 21 n.12.
43. Rhode, supra note 29, at 499-500.
44. Id. at 500; Martin H. Belsky, Law Schools As Legal Education Centers, 34 UTOLR 1, 4 &
n.28 (2002).
45. Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Sex Discrimination In The Legal Profession: Historical And
Contemporary Perspectives, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 859 (2005).
46. See, e.g., Robert T. Begg, Revoking The Lawyers’ License To Discriminate In New York:
The Demise Of A Traditional Professional Prerogative, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 275, 275 n.2
(1993); Cunningham, supra note 28, at 1041.
47. Roots, supra note 36, at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted); but see In re Attorney’s
License, 1848 WL 3476, *1-2 (N.J. 1848).
48. See Barton, supra note 34, at 429.
49. Roots, supra note 36, at 21-22 (citing Rhode, supra note 29, at 497-98).
50. Id. at 22 (citing Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 336 (1866)).