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DoD Instruction 8500.2 - Common Access Card (CAC)

DoD Instruction 8500.2 - Common Access Card (CAC)

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DODI <strong>8500.2</strong>, February 6, 2003<br />

as management review items. Specific reporting formats and frequency shall be<br />

established by the <strong>DoD</strong> CIO and coordinated through the DIAP.<br />

E3.2.4. IA Technical Framework. Under NSA leadership in partnership with the<br />

NIST, system security engineers, system owners and users, scientists, researchers,<br />

product and service vendors, and representatives of standards bodies and other consortia,<br />

work together to maintain the Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF)<br />

(reference (k)). The IATF is a common reference guide for selecting and applying<br />

adequate and appropriate IA and IA-enabled technology in accordance with the<br />

architectural principles of defense-in-depth described in the following subparagraphs:<br />

E3.2.4.1. Technical Defense in Multiple Locations. Because adversaries can<br />

attack a target from multiple points via insiders or outsiders, protection mechanisms<br />

must be distributed among multiple locations and address multiple defensive focus<br />

areas, including networks and infrastructures, enclave boundaries, and computing<br />

environments.<br />

E3.2.4.2. Layered Technical Defenses. Even the best available IA products<br />

have inherent weaknesses. Eventually an adversary will likely find an exploitable<br />

vulnerability. An effective countermeasure is the deployment of multiple defense<br />

mechanisms between the adversary and the target. In order to reduce the likelihood or<br />

affordability of successful attacks, each mechanism should present unique obstacles and<br />

include both protection and detection measures.<br />

E3.2.4.3. Specified Robustness. The strength and level of confidence<br />

required of each IA solution is a function of the value of what is being protected (e.g.,<br />

the mission assurance category or confidentiality level of the information being<br />

supported by the <strong>DoD</strong> information system) and the threat. In order to ensure that each<br />

component of an IA solution is correctly implementing its intended security services and<br />

is protecting its information from the identified threat, each component within the<br />

network system needs to provide an appropriate level of robustness.<br />

32 ENCLOSURE 3

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