UKL444 - Chair of Ukrainian Studies

same: “vsyo propalo” and the “fierce firs” incident in the end were all over television
and the internet for the amusement of all.
The television journalists of Channels 1+1 and STB, as well as the Stop Censorship!
movement, are to be commended for their open letters and actions against
censorship, however, many of the examples of censorship and politicized content
management they cited also occurred when Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia
Tymosehnko were in power. In short, these public protests show concern about the
phenomenon of ownership intrusion into news content and commentaries, i.e. a
longstanding practice (occasionally also on view in the United States – think New
York Times and Fox News) and not a consequence of Yanukovych’s accession to
power.
So, too, have rumors of Ukraine’s political death been exaggerated. Whatever one’s
opinions of the “gas for fleet” tradeoff, the commentary on growing Russia-Ukraine
cooperation that preceded the summit hosted by Yanukovych and Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev suggested Russia was taking over Ukraine’s gas, nuclear energy,
and aerospace industries, and surrendering the island of Tuzla to Russia control.
Instead, the main accomplishment of the summit was agreement on the demarcation
of the land borders of Ukraine, an accomplishment that had eluded three earlier
presidents.
Ukraine’s state institutions, the actions of Ukraine’s leaders, and the foreign policy
course of the country is only beginning to take shape. And that final shape is far
from determined. The current ruling elite consists of both reformers and retrogrades;
seasoned defenders of the national interest and those eager to dance to the
Kremlin’s leitmotiv.
This is why there is a far more restrained and nuanced view of developments in
European capitals, in Washington, and on the editorial and news pages of the
international media.
What, then, explains this explosion of fear and loathing on the part of Ukraine’s
media?
First, with a few exceptions, the current ruling elite in the main is the first without
direct experience of participation in the early struggles for Ukraine’s statehood and
sovereignty. Many of them have a tough time articulating a detailed case for why
Ukraine should be a state distinct from Russia.
Second, few in the current ruling elite had a track record of engagement in human
rights and civil liberties struggles.
Third, the selection of the rapier-witted Ukrainophobe Dmytro Tabachnyk as
education minister has turned the vast majority of the intelligentsia against the
government. Efforts to undo the inroads Ukraine’s language and cultural output have
made in education, government, and the marketplace of ideas are also calling forth a
hostile reaction. But such a justifiably hostile reaction should not deter scholars and
analysts from taking a more nuanced view of developments in the economic, foreign
policy, and civil liberties spheres.
Fourth, the rapidity and efficiency with which the president has shaped an effective
team and began implementing his agenda has caught people unawares. But this is
what happens in every democracy where executive and legislative powers are