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NFIDENTIAL REstkiCT

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SFINFT
" DOCUMENT. TRANSFER FORM
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,...
, .,
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FILE NO.
SOURCE
DATED
200-6-12-15
NASA 449 Encl. 1
I May 51
SUBJECT
FARAGO Interviewed
,
THE ABOVE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO FILE NO. c __a
Remarks:
.
,
ANALYST
', rrPlitli:-,T
' ' 5 Aug 54-
w ,■;;■;.
i:-.:1)--.., L: L L Li, i
DATE
,
FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO: soll4N'
1
JAN 1953 59-42
200 6 12 15
Encl. 1
.
146)
1

• 1
F,April 19, 1951
-
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conference with Ladislas Farago of Radio Free Europe
1. In reference to the attached cable from 4- 1--,° Chief of Staff, USAF, the
undersigned anq: J traveled to Munich C.
C-.
D to contact Ladislas Farago. We arrived in Munich about 1430
flours on 13 April, took a MOM in the Excelsior Hotel and telephoned the office
of Radio Free Europe to contact Farago. He, at the time, was not available so
a message was left for him to come to our room at the Excelsior.
2. At about 1600 hours Farago came, apolozied for being late and proceeded
to make us his proposal. We identified himself as being in charge of the Hungarian
Desk for the headquarters of Radio Free Europe. He described the job that RFE was
attemptin to do and gave us a brief summary of the programs that are being"
channeled into the peripheral countries at the present time. He stated that the
new transmitter in Munich had been completed and that stqrting very shortly.BE
would be channeling 11 hours a day of programs into the iron curtain countries.
He described the programs that are in progress now and the amazing response that
•has come out of Hungary.
3. In discussing one program called "Post Office Box 6220" he said that
as many as 700 letters per month had been received from individuals inside Hungary.
These letters were comments on the program, questions, descriptions of life in
Hungary and the usual radio—listener type letter. He described another program
called the "Doctor r s Program" which employs prominent Hungarian doctors and gives
medical and technical advice to people in H,ngary. This program was also enjoying
excellent response. A third program called the "Historian Program" was jtst getting
underway and according to Farago was being responded to by amateur Hunga
historians.
4. Other work that RFE is doing consits of screening and interrogating refugees
to obtain "hot items of news" from behind the curtain. He said that RFE was
establisling offices in Triest, Munich, Salzburg, Vienna and in many other cities
"around the edge".
5. After the description of the present activities of RFE, Farago was asked,
to discuss his connections with General Zako and the kBBK. He said that hie
original contact with Zako had been made through Nicholas Laza, member of the
Hungarian National Council in New York. Following that introduction, Farago wrote
to Zako from New York, explaining to him briefly that RFE was interested in 14s
or6nization. Zako answered this letter with a long general description of his
capabilities and a statement as to his intentions. Zako said he was interested
only in the reestablishment of a free and democratic Hungary, that he himself had
no personal axe to grind and realized that he had ao following politically inside
Hungary. He asked Farago to contact him personally in Europe.
In COPY
p 9,- I
rEnd 2-

6. Farago reviewed Zako l s ed that he could use him to
collect information and , run operations into Hungary. He went to Washington,
contacted General Vandenberg of the Air Force and was referred to General
Ackerman to whom he outlined Zako l s proposal. Ackerman's interest apparently
resulted in the cable attached. Farago arrived in Munich and contacted Zako,
invited him to Munich and spent two days conducting a thorough debriefing of
the potentialities of Zako and his MM. He said that his approach to Zako
was made on the basis that Zako was a complete failure, that no one in the World
was interested in him because of his rightist political connections. Zako admitted
that so far none of his overtures had met with any success and that he was willing
to do anything now to gain support. Zako told him that his resistance (0960s)
organization which he and SKORZENY ha d established in 1944 and 1945 was still
in existence inside Hungary. He claimed that the organization iriginally consisted
of 35,000 members and that the complete registry is in his hands in
Innsbruck. He claims that the registry had been kept up to date and that occasional
couriers have contacted the members in Hungary. He admits that this organization
needs revitalizing and that mahy of the members have expressed apathy towards any
overt action at the present time.- He volunterred to travel himself in the guise
of a protestant minister to Hungary to contact former KOPJA3 members and to
reestablish the organization.
7. He said he had taken sufficient recaution in 1945 6o keep the organization
from being blown. However, he admits that following the assassination of Attilla
Kovacs as many as 300 peopke, former members of his organization were executed or
taken to Russia by the IND. He felt that those remaining members of the organiA4
zation were secure and are not penetrated.
8. As proof of his ability Zako offered to turn over to RFE 400 couriers
who would gravel to Hungary at various times getting information. In addition
he offered to kidnap any individial suggested by RFE. He himself suggested
the daughter of one of the MO leaders and he volunteered to deliver this girl
to Salzburg. At the present time Zako -said he is only conduction debriefing of
refugees, monitoring of police reporta, maintining KBPJAS registry, and sendihg
an occasional courier into Hungary.
9. In reference to support given to Zako by other countries, Farago said the
only actual-support had came from the French and had soon been withdrawn. Also
control of the Hungary Guard Company in Innsbruck had been taken away from Zako
and he was completely dissatisfied with the support he had been able to obtain
from other countries.
10. Zako's personal support appears to come from a foundation called ZRINYI
which is apparently based in the U.S. and is supported by wealthy Hungarians there.
Zako apparently draw sufficient living expenses from that organization.
11. Farago went on to describe RFE's interest in the Zako organization. He
said that it was his idea to establish a front organization called the "Fighters
for a Democratic Hungary" behind which a secret intelligence organization Sham**
could operate into Hungary. This intelligence organization should be capable of
'getting upt—to—the—minute news of events within Hungary, of doing small acts
of sabotage and of creating unrest within Hungary including even the kidnapping
of prominent individuals. He felt that he could use some of Zako's resources
to set up his intelligence organiat' he had no intention of employing
or supporting Zako himself. He f hJ3t1 v g small items of support to
Zako he could get him to turn over sonal resources for use.

Farago intends to closely contrOk ons reaching into Hungary and to
keep that control from falling into Zako l s hands. Naturally most of his plans
are in a nebulous state at the present time.
12. He said he would return to the U.S. on about 15 April and contact
the Hungarian National Council to smooth over thiir objections to RFE's use
of the MHBK. He said he could convince that National Council that for reasons
of expediency they should not object to contact with Zako. He then intends to
• draw up his plans and return to Europe about 7 May when he will again contact
•Zako and go to work putting his plans into effect.
13. Farago felt that the Air Force should be interested in this plan for
the following reasons:
a. because the new organization could provide escape and evasion
networks for downed fliers and
b, because he thought that accurate and voluminous information could
be provided.
He felt that RFE and the Air Force should cooperate in running this outfit. He
said it was quite possible that technical parts of air planes and engines could
be brought out of Hungary by this network. He asked for our recommendation on
the subject.
14. [ jand I both said that the Air Force would be definitely interested
in such an outfit provided that we could first have satisfactory proof that they
could do something. We told him that in order to satisfy ourselves as to the
value of any such unit we would first have to receive and evaluate intelligence
reports, including the operational details of their procurement. We also told
•
him that it might be possible that sometime in the future we would have an interest
in acts of sabotage and kidnapping but at the present time we had absolutely no
interest in these things. Farago appeared pleased with our interest and said
that on his return he would recontact Zako and let us know the results. It
appeared to us that Farago intends to go ahead "full steam" with his plans.
15.
v.
It appears from this discussion that an intelligence jurisdictional
flap is about to happen. It might be well for USFA to 'determine the conditions
of RFE t s charter in Europe and to find out to what extent they are authorized to
dip into the intelligence gathering business. They seem to have-unlimited funds
but a liOited number of capable personnel and that many of the mistakes made by
USFA and CIC throughout the past years Are about to be repeated. It looks as
if business will soon become good for the intelligence factories of Austria.

COPY
*111411 wict,
TOO : 041956Z RPUTINE MC IN K-2965 le i5
TOF : 060725 Z rdw/B
rti
FROM : CHIEF OF STAFF AF MIN C/CC
TO : CG USFA FOR AIR FORCE SECT
REF NO :.NIL
2F
ci
Ladislas Farago, Hungarian born newspaperman, naturalized United States
Citizen, editor UN world since 47, world traveler, experience and big time
operator type, has contacted General Ickerman(sic) stating he is intimate of tN
Hungarian high-up in military underground organization, of which the compander 0
is General Andras Zako, Casthaus Bogner, Abszam, Inn, via Innsbruck, Tyrol, 0
Austria. Zako knownin hotel as G. Kovacs, can only be contacted if person
carries introduction from contact in United States, Farago states underground
organiz4d on Military basis, largely former Non Coma Hungarian Army and Air Force.
Farago mentioned 40,000 person in movement widely distributed in Hungary, as having
high subversive potential, and trained intelligence collecting organization.
Farago states'Zako has authorized him to offer services this organization in
collection and guerilla fields to United States military intelligence. Interested
hdre in collection just now. Farago to be in Salzburg: about 7 April has been
advised to contaet you as one most familiar with just what assistance this
activity could give and what use, if any, will be decided this headquarters
following his conversation with you. Hope names of contacts, plus other information
• will give you basis to determine credibility, feasibility and practicability of
using this activity and making recommendation to as on same. CIA cannot use him
or activity at present. Suggest you be noncommitall, offer no info, promise
nothing, but.horoughly explore possibilities. If WO decide to take any action
, on your recommendations, will put you in touch with Zako and furnish additional
• inf9rmation. Farago l s security status is controversial, not much from any
definite information as from wideness of contacts. Any possible use we may make of
this activit:y will be originally exploratory. 1951 whos Who gives further iriformatio
on Farago.
7
Cs co,
118 Pt
End' 3

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flcflET I
DETACKNIVI' 35
MTh/Ms eller* tort DAM
MR. 2
ts
Protseti
Mites -27 /Ora 1951,
. .
440 beet 24 APTil 1951 ft• eike he
the tots', 4*.
Lisa es 040 gas 'me'written to the
er the pun atop by atop t210410 '
eelly, the Plek 101,411,1404
*Om
Ondost414
tills* of Peet US istettlieries o timid
vot type isitAltione*
eaukrotteas and tosionts• -
0 bess *0 *0 t tere020* 0*
U'S fulty *Were taet
0 een.iderble
The prias
/
d over
*OA ehet000 tdsnte 001' be
via operetione divested
00 00041
*PO**• *MO p
out out ,ot
*tot he did not vieb to si
reassurance that he had iebi
ifftitattr*S on the highest
s t.rainaqd shout MOO mil
41 44r 04. it 49 itatemitit 0
41 nature displayed es o rooilt or *ha%
While eels end in comp•ts control of hit% eV', cure*
s suave, istles1 and di eelsIre an excellent efentend of Gsrhost.
L
S C Et E T.71 tt :Opt
11, 4k WIPY

SECRET I
204 did 27 1. gab's Opere len D
However, when ottortiod, (*triaged or indi gnant souroo ts atrolt7
slips considerably, he lapies We a 000r Gorton and, on the
whalei ootpietoly displays the 0tte ort n* lido of his As
40 1$124 40$711 end oonforred with various
isegbeaa of Dot. ), staff Croup, 02 Opts sod UR the *stir'
meaning of 2$ April 1$524 It was decided that 2157 should be
United with extreme firmness it the noot/m6 •elsoduled for the
arts-moos of 25 Apra, The U.E. smith* s iotereztee his elm
pima, his plan tad the 12111.04 Acton. IS Moroi 'atm
to to oolobto4 to him covottn lys He was to he incfteeid with
the Rees for complete S eeettwol of his sad soy or ell operotions0
If esrseins to mob oostroll negotiation. **old ao continued. If
not asreostle, sestitistiess eerie to be Wrote* off at that point'
50 Sure* was reoottaltod at 1310 hour* at the **me coorto.
Mattel quarters in the gOtoi tit ifiraohotolOillte security
uniform is
the"." Mt Of Lti "4.. dois end gket
terms
ir•=2:nrizag"
of eestiased , segetistiosts es aosxmani zio preceding
parisespho
2107 otoftitod sU 14TMS 09100417 and further stated that he -
wished to work *ado, esoset SS *antra and tooli net visualise
say Poo of os000ss **MU*. nhoe_Coortod en the point, he •
reesphasised that his ateslritilit Cos* - TOO Wile real end net *
Re stated ho had sot 047 broken with his vilw.e.wia the
t # else pereonallY• Ho stressed that he and MO were
.Lbe next sooting
44440.*4 - -*flit*
inder 34. plea. **-
CO* r'•
*404 .
for
o,$'
it thoU ,OOStSetS
s .,esell Welt.
se...1„dat. set for 140i .s
that his immediate mission Drier to
is or identities sad all beetgrOune
oho* he propose/ 40 start
ins "seise to Bed wiloieteos
• be eon* for a nes**
,ditts for the sect
15510 2* win send apesteeld
sose sane *Met hes been used
roily giving his •iliveits in 'Sod
-0,0 will then be contacted and $
Up.
toosr00 was heS\ 2900 *Aries Sehilting
e. salary for the tolloving month. The meeting sal on
*any *sic,
at 1445 1*******,..*

I SECRET
ros,41211 iltd Apr 51 * 8ub$: *Operation MOW)
Reereneed XGR.41111 shotld be eorrooted to indicate 7157
is not claan shaven, but has a brown * sandy mustache end eyes are
predemiwantlY blue rather thaw blue-treys
$5124
1511,
SECRET

E
MITONX W
PO
MON
.iltifictia)10L
jp-1,% 7.741:1
id/
11,x,r-eY

MOM
1. Owed
sstosisses sat Matteis
$0 lisaseriss setsvesess sad vslistisis
The osespiet emits, esti ths Wastes stossith
les asti4lasurrtk istsitioass Wads* sad tWalltins
MUM AID Ma
Istottligsaso *seem is tits swami siseles
the esattstisetios øt wales. NA positive istalliwass
ASSMArtial
iir• MUM PROPOWIS
V• MUM PIM 11111104W Ale Vilittiali
*rt. NNW

ORM
holereaeoe sad rolatifte roestasiviag tho Toagartaa
10114414; tb* lakthar if WS Prsp000l sot. aiv44 teas loot saw haso itor
eeasoottoao with 2000 .ilitelitgegine nenkeien. Il bee 1202202
salt OhOne* tho 001* tor alaw yoozo aM eoaplotelf ai4orstsais
lbs ithoir thsetioao if thli arajssiios. Its .,,v1044 itho to Ohes
brimlb *00.4 Olia oeiosel A* its Otitisety the posp000l is is
41Oftthra * fiat page., pirOse014 Wier OS ts.:02er _
140420 Pitnatieite the tattoo Oist fasottoss, *I sairattit
• poOthittat tho origealsoliosk without itgdat is** fen Mails.
MOM
I. bleaL
thus a** as stwi that tho inlet Vales has Orel sa, .bor
41010rnatio Ogimmtbko is 000thamo tat with*
the sostio- tel tho 4100111 St ilogo isst.ra 41/100 ova if 001 v.
aOisiftost• the otos** otnagprepssMe to thiropo., the tatisiethi
tag grosods • of eapitelletitt vo$16) ths iiitoattO of tho
*0 hot *it is to soassell4ato the o veittotos , sot theskosolW *kW, ..:.,..
fiithttai the Iteatapie if skillioao of Mims thOOO.
it wilt ho 10,. VI is vithott (teat that a geasivil ehoothis was
WU! s, inat this . wale *OA start amass is later. Ia.
alit its " tOraatioa liatisidoo the sigitifieome Of Ihtflit.!.
TOW at is to be sosahol vithoot roost Is tho voll-hotat of 0"
ioaatiiso %Mai tho loos Totals.
2. adainatiastgalliumueLblatisai
The most lop t *sal of the vosUolaresitiai ilotatosi 1st
Mt ftlnietes eat the valevelaies of o semaio oat
powers.
1.40441 tOostsettea sal tatiltratioa
iosasloot. 0TIO414, thoso$ilt Polio" oh4 fifth TOPsso
ma othilast soil $0 000144ilatet ant **W.
tn latelligeliee PaSpOlos.
aritisa
The Iietdotio aft tor is the writ 404 taw isis tho pIe !M. St
against ITO vaWfi will. Isesna. of this, tbsve is
Ottifo th %h. lawiet *es. is olittioa . Ohe
, Intor 4eavis siaOs AO has proSiikii tiot oholo
opistith aiiaiast tiotoolfi lbs tatosael iati oat,: 4 ,04efs are an a
11100Sel3yo'.' the lit, of this party Sepi*Os as Slit** It
toOlotak mataliW 144 prei restive siesaree.- lb. Testai fe total ,
toms ea* soils* solkossoo boo,. to the goo of 014 poOtiti. halli
4olotratie say if Wei.- the ,400.40 are Wad together by '1141011k***"
of PrO11040*** amiss* 4411ter *Wow. Th. 4e50er5e7 to $404,4 TOO sal
somity momparos keep tereige iteeoati free entering their deolOit#0. The
ok,.-„i)

a oL4,.,„, !' HET
isteUtiesee problem la the Mal *atom etstr. kr. illaKeillia0
1111 their ditinIROOS in their arigthal • The allots
etrastares ass torso awl tor to gala Waxiest* NA tatellipase i its
the dieseereales en sot eat le met resort to those astheis to gala Waal
goes. praettee, it mesas that is ea* side Nowa tatelligesee WM*
0611 sit is peetieseate i is Amiga WIN* ma POseitiV held WV
within* is ths Uwe libtle the offieille sf fonts' Asloptiosit are set
persittei frosios of wrommit is *Owe * the 00****114 Weistse is
Vesta* eastries travel frodte 401 de Ammar %Wen Ordempi by the
treeilia, *kilo in 1~-otoutrollet mews, ores 04,440, hreelessto see
tow&
intalkilidUSUILOANIMISIV
The eseaplett mutts" 'eel the defensive strengths
In the present soli political siteatital, litegarlr is sae of the as
Saserteat ooaatries % phial the boa Carta* ter latelligease ga
0*.itaiktelair• antearr boll* a key positioat en*peat* to the
in the 14to aaetrias Mast*. Stain in taw haat l'egliettirta.
WW1* Rm. these are the emit 1/104767=ipae ofattWit bythe
toriote. All sloe ladies*. that %nor rill to the
awls biggest (10101111117. la the attippo its onalittes„
thulathise learstais• amusta, lago A** : am* to tie** *WU*
*0 MP 14IMPOBIN OW Wag *heat this mat la the (laspathiaa
Ike erigla. the Uwegs eat atilitisusitheatiesat are the
•t the leleherlit hereasaist. lagorteat seaelaileatioa and
rest* aim the arta et the D.. this area Mir it/04m AlifigrAwli
*UV* **41 141Seatokna #t i•
are lagiorteat _ to the 1feet. leviete resegaisei the
1111011Mba wilitosIG political out latoiligiaoe egesolbe
IOW* 04141 kilt a eoessily oat Itemise eripestatioa
Ihe'llhagariaa tonasalst looter* hare elielastel allopposition fish
position if .traet. Colleetivein lakey ligaitatal the atilio alas
WSW' eat thelparileseats *at got the Wows
/he velitioal pollee aro evealiikete
gealiaiet Party seekers are poteatial tat
visa,* lite to Wet sarreflie * i.e.
%Son this. 61.
$t the oat baltilage vote lid* Wet
la the Wrier aro*
the lakele deaatsy
dori sea eater the ostatty obi if
ess Wad* the *sat
boa the tree vend OWL
to Vetag , 140 plim 4,0440 they to a
of the . . *Aside soak, sal the "Olio is Atha*
the *tho. Voles the pretest that On*gn apt*
they keep, the 'rotative ester a ;mese
the maUtlea is faittAkteberik sat WO*
eel is waillag to sake saavitioes, bat still gathirieg late
ishlostion is littlealt for this tellesiag remilsost
ET

- 3 -
a. Important piston ant valuable reams of information are pistoled in
the trust of Wel, fanatic Party members who cannot be wreathed
for any 0100.
h. The Whole pepalation is kept undor strict lervelllanee and terror,
mad only a fOw dare volunteer to assist in dotting informatics.
s. This talk of forming a oenorete moll for one or two people is too
dangereas. Area it a man's personal ties ant feelings are anti"
Bolshevik, the material and moor be receives is net 01000% to wks
a toll workable. leen It it were, he would not know where to start
and What to de with the money and in all probability would sell him.
self.
I. Blighty went of the informants are being ought on the voll-pardoint
border, or in the interior of the er rantry is the not of the well
organised soeuritr organisations. When this homes*, information sad
tips are takes in by the dommenist Party and used ea propaganda, cn44
in the best ease, the ma is seat beak as a double agent.
a. The lucky few who manage to get through to their cells tarry sninportant
messages and they visually have double U0811.401.
The Sassari** security measares are patterned after the Bastian SYstsss•
Sven BMWs well organised inkiness** was sestio to sissetlis the
Inselanl e Intelligente. May miscalculated the Session tank divisions by
fifteen (point of interest only). they are orgealood into sell type
organisations with a steamier loader (one head). The smallest matte work
in harmony and probably everybOdy knows What is going en within the tell.
The disposition "Mali be together to Mks possible offensive. They report
accurate and complete information.
The Asti...Bolshevik Agents, OrsemiseAlene and reaction's
After the war the Western countries tailed to pay 'Man giest attention to
intelligence. Trance was buoy °leaning Up after the Gersten occupation and
the war draws. Ike USA and Inglan& had net been attested by grommi.trooy
so thatch** to resedmiee the importance of esatinfAttal Weill/pato and
they loot the than,* to get valuable practical esPesteses is that flail. A
fine years after the war, the Weston missions were forest oil of the alga
satellit0 *Mee * The trusted Allies in tho ottloo were tows0d to Oise or
were Soiled. Unnoticed, the iron Clarkin slowli Oessseds li. 1%0 1Sgtsw%
Berepe *snail and Tederatioa units were Oren a few heave settee to
lieuidate their affairs and lasso. Only then did the Western countries -
roans, the necessity of an intelligence not. With feverish hafts thOF
Wet to correct their mistekes. Web brought about the present sonditten.
They tried is many leers to sot information pest the Bolshevik **seri*
measures, bat •vee securing ninor bits of information proved to be a OnieS
Viable*. In this harried start, the organisations were haphasostar PM'
together and the missions were net thoroughly outlined and coordinated. 1%
different Western 'sentries and different oreanisetions continued to oross
each other ant a rivalry took place. At times they out bid oath other for
the ease piece of information and objective. The occupation forces hada*
orgonisatiee whit& could use the unfortunate Ws in Austria and OSSISAY.
These people would have gladly heaped in *scaring information. The 1400440ss
entreated to got information did not understand the Soviet ',stem Or the

4
TVAtarian situation and circumstances, and most of ail the fOndmmentel
methods of Ontherieg information. In the intelligence gathering seStions
there were few persons who had any experience in that type of work. The •
work was specialised not ler quality but for quantity. The agents end
supervisors were given missions without °areal preparation. Hering the
informatios was done in a haphasart manner uso4417 resulting in coeprOmil
leg the agents and superiors. Prior planning was mission as was seeerity
end *eerier in the missions. Frequent Owes in personnel adtet to the
measles. People without thorwagh eleossustes eat with neither training
nor adaptability entered the intelligence organisations. The itarigariamill
were suspicions ant agents were *sable to convince them of the sineerety,
of the mission, sines they bed no proper identification. This ineressed
the growing compromise of the agents and seared the informants. emu.
this, the enemy received gratis information es foot for their
througn . this disorganised system, the agents would min CP the information'
ant, to add value to it or strengthen it by over emphasising its imPOctscso
This paragraph teals with the fact that there was ne prepared sit. The
Agate, when they 4,4444 they had made enough mew, woald Cheap their
'ones est eesatries, nasally leaving behied the memos of other agents sat
their beekerousd as for as their mission was sweeerued. . After all these
mistakes end sherteemiugs, the situation today is as tellowss
a. These is no power that to satisfied with the imitates iatellitscos
net is Hungary
b. In the lumpiest country, a loyal intelligence orgenisaties, built
from' within is not operated by any power
o. The intelligence set, and interstate are known to the Bolehavike
and ars being washed
d. Tears se° the trained agents fled the **copied senntry or at present
have not volunteered their sesvises. The beekground of the new
summits in the organisation is bard to tetersime.
o. The majority of the informants (seeriers) are eempromised, or return
without any revolts
f. Melatiag to gathering informatios from reftwees, the refugees oe from
power to power sad lobes they see that there is messi in thtoccallaos.
they magnify their stories to fanatical levels to gain a higher price.
Agents end informants usually sake up stories just to keep their
positions sessre in the organisation. Set only are they dishonest,
but they *confuse their few friends and confederates.
To sum It all up, the anti-Solsbovik intelligence net in Rungery to bankrupi
and all previous °ionisation* ant esthete have not prolneed any remelts.'
This iyeten of utieg tomahawks against concrete bunkers and machine guns
sensed the liquidation of 200 - 250 agents and informants sent in from the
West. At home (in Hungary), the annual rate of agents and informants 'being
compromised is 800 - 1000. Since 1201, 1,000 foreign agents and 8000 Mee
agents have been saerificed on the altar of intelligence. This is five
times the amount lost in tore* by the combined Navy ant Air Forces. There
is no comparison to the results of the Intelligence gathered to the 6,000
fanatical Hungarians who were lost to the enemy. UP t o coif , the systems

- 5 -
politest no results and if it eentinnes the same in an ecenpled (MAW.
the Bolshevik Noma, seam** are going to housesc cuttin g information
off completely. ilea; (in the UAW% countries), the agents ant thOWNSM
will disappear and *yea the information secured from Mho** will be nureliable.
if it continues the same imir, *nava will be an ilakiallik area
in the intelligence circles of the 111*. In the meantime, other Powers are
realities the situation awl are patting now *Wens into afoot. The
fault new does net lie in the la* of fends, material or Wafted agents,
but in the talk of a geed grams. We are reedit with e time elmnont,
new is the time to bidet in new ideas awl build up the bankrupt ationleati
The initial start was 'mune before. A, now oremnisation en a interest
basis has to be built mad put in eperatisa; It has to be understood that
at the proses* time there is no possible ergmaisation in existence. What
does exist is insufficient sad hat to bt rebuilt from the beginning.
negaiLARLSOUNELMEASIA
The duties of agents and informants ars to penetrate the mew l s defense and
scours reliable information. the actual stress* or the powers is tried and
proven en the battlefield. the outcome of this &mites the fate of the settee.
Ye, the leaders of the powers it is important that they be supplied 40
complete sal reliable information about the enemy continently when important
decision* are to be *ado. Maximus emcees WM be attained entr through Weeper
intelligence nets with missions given to then. The situation to that ell
solutions without the proper intelligent* leaves you selling yourself short.
Intelligence nets Should be *remised in pease time in order to be successful
in time or war. the war arrests the mental attitude of the people and the gem
is seesawed by its economical ant military strength. One incident renewing
another growing larger sash time eventually leads to a shooting war. The
intelligence net should be in all government *Mee* es that the deers are
always open ant Information ea* be molted whenever needed. The final atm
of war is break the fighting power of the enemy. Daring the time of war,
iatelligeese has to be is the inner striates at the highest level to learn the
strength of the mew. Before the warren must find out the weak spots of the
enemy se the attaOkiag forces will knew the direction and read to renew for
enemies.
In nodes* warfare the ttEhtin*: gees on in front and behind the enemy
In a matt, at war the *pinions er the people in large areas **Met smIAL
should not be disregarded. Maturalty, only when a shooting war Wirt*, an
these people bet**, motive and west behind the lines. these people bare to
be *untested and organised by the net Were the sheeting war *Wits, this
indite, the presides if material and leadership. the intellionse met
*heed be well monism', net Only to secure information, but else to Owes&
ProPagande, to porters eeenemis sabotage and Wereate partisan uprising,.
The leaders in the country gathering information should not he the teeter* in
deciding the tepertaaee er information. It should be **Weed from the inside
ead outside keeping in its& the smell pieta.. Theo- . tho remits will as
complete and they will be working in harmony. The importance of obtaining
information about futurity %retests minuet he overemphasised When dealing with
the Bolsheviks. In utters war well organised seeurity still cannot oeunter all
information, gathering unite. Secret sersioes, Mato Hart's and paid agents are
a thing or the past. Serowe work can be started and valuable agents ***Wiest
the organisation has to he built up ea a bread basis to prods** sueeesstal

s
'
results. Only maresents on a broad basis with life end a fanatioal Opirit can
hope ti hare sources of information at their disposal. Seem with the above
conditions, all missions will not succeed. Somehow the peliefS4 of the Oommod
Party should be adopted. Is the first plats the Wilsey and spiritual proglem
flea with will to win has to be indoctrinated Wore missions eau be assi
This orsmoisation oust be patterned directly opposed to the Bolshevik de
Its doctrine must be to work and build for freedom mad for the downfall of the
Bolsheviks. If this succeeds, the problem will solve itself and the seed will
be easier to plant. the aim soi solution to this problem would be a mation-wid
military underground seevesent .*Mimi sisaagth shoal& be etaibisait in a
goodarian Inner movement patterned after fite isjeovement so that it streets
everybody. A marmoset ef this type
a. %army the anti-Bolshertk struggle and all the results and ar guments of
the Wad war.
b. Is not *fleetest by foreign polities
e. Can be a IA-partisan movement and can be absorbed by the entire smitten
A. Must be a movement on a unitary basis, eapable of being tied in with
notibberiag soustries haring *toiler movements
o. Will he impendet and made active. (It will support intelligence emits,
giving them necessary support aad be used for sabotage and armed uprising.,
S. Will be easily eensealei.
e. will looses up the Bolshevik seecrity meastres.
h. Will use ideology, fanaticism and eppertuniem to win ever individuals
for intelligence purposes.
At preset, there is no underground movement is Zutagrr. In a Soviet *twistet
country• ithSal srpfraf serenest cosset be born without outside aid. Stassaaergroaad
arrement and its establishment naturally does not fall is the sithostiaat4
circles. Oho present events taking pleas in the world have pea*" itonghrf into
the tasAftwomit. The actual verities is 'Bas the tins arirtvri for 'soh siaairemmit
ea 400.4 the PeoPio to prepared LA alerted for enef il If the **swat is
yes, this peeps:idiot we* shooed start Immediately, for enlomble tine is WAS
lest and II trreplameefle. PreWieno tataUSEtee =Wilmot will be estOlered
to make the mutt.' work easier. In the final *atoms, there must be a nano*
wide movement Whit& will ftsd the while hearted support of the people and *lett
will en*, the necessary Information snits.
Mistiest Aim.
A, mattes wide underground propaganda movement with successful intelligence
Emotions es a Woad basis. An ample& steustry l e spiritual feelings have to
be prepared for life l e work in the underground movement to make a successful
intelligence organisation whit& it centralised and secure.
III. Applumllos
sk. Where is no necessity for an underground movement. Advantages There are
no new problems. Disadvaatigess Giving this key country to the edverearr.

- 7 -
11. they* is no notessity for an underground novo:moat. Atvantagot The
possibility for integration will not arrive. Disadvaatages etv0044
enostioned, how it will *tan* later if those will be a possibility to
built laP a movement.
4. the underground **valiant will to built up by a Auropean power. Advaataem
Sho USA will not be cencorsot with it, jot they will benefit. Disadmaste
The Samoa* rivalry will saw enters.** possibilities taring sad after
the war.
4. the vederground movemest built up by the USA through **lomat unite.
Advantages the influesee of the USA is odeureit. Disadvantages this typ
of moment malt to hard to metal, sat it would be very doubttal if th
oesupiod somata' would trust than (migrants).
O. Movement units. the Atlantis Pact tattoos, tommaaded by Senora SISSIBOWIS
Advantages Vatter this supervision, these will be no rivalry amaset the
matte's. Sisatvastagess tho fortis* political situation is very uastals1
IT. tiattNe
It topmost* that an underground sovement be built up in *maw with diresot
and misstates from the USA. Advantages the inflatese of the USA to seelvold an
in spit. of the Soviet Ocesioation, it can be kept eterst that the USA is *APS
r•rojea patties will not eomplitato the situation. len will have an &Otto*,
trusted orgentsatien which will *toast in establishing intelligence
Disadvantages: eptoist staffs will be attester, and it will take a long time
form them.
V.
0111164414611LEakiaLAELIBISME
1. Authority and direction from competent SSA organs to Wino and tetanal*
the tasks and Motions in outline. Control shoji be is • VS arilalinatl
or a trastad person. the decisions should eons fres top level. At least
from the VI istolligesse sootiest leader in Name or free the hieftsosit VS
military Itader, in Same. Only with this tress tf lseefort will molt*
be assured sat will U. different sootiest falsettos together.
a. A small stall of Masts and informants shout* be matovitembinsid wIth
esesslissui lte and lesme&WAsk personnel. 'attest collecting isilimatten,
supplying, direeting and Leading the underground aerostat. Void Oast men
only from higA and trusted pleats. Suagarisas ant emigrants have to
checked easefully if the plan is to succeed. Double *goats watt be kept
oat of the orgaaisation. Give the informants the fooling at Viala ale
essusity with basking. Dea l t give thee the resoling, "I Ime, I sill* or
Wind them with limite4 petiole of work only as a part time jot. Agents
saturatly will net obits by that solution. Thor* 'Walt be created is th
US Zone of beto &sopa a similar resistant* organisation to support the
military units. sooner or later there will be tasks which can be
aceonplithed by the.. people.
S. Mt staff agents and informants will tot stantardisation of security,
cod's, timing and coordination, assigning of tasks, personnel, time and
plats problems, •te.

4. The Medal radio will do the followings
iieedeeet the mete end efroach of the undergreand movement, with
disealptions of important points. It will have to be well untrolled to
keep it curet end give the best results. Preadstasts Vast We kept to a
miasma of eau or *wise a week on Short it Will use the cell worts
NILN (NM (Nemuti itnenallasi Nosealen) National resistance movement and
will glee life and glory to the portions lad the intelligence tothorini
netts. the news at first will be jammed sad denied br BeisPeet eed the
presses will in turn spread propaganda to the century. the station can
be toasted in Unser or Austria as lug as it is elese to the staff.
•
I. Pereiga sad ausarten emigrants must be organised to insure the OU40000
of the movement. it is aseessary to alert the homeland : en abroad bests,
se that the spats and rummers will be smirking together for the same
interests. (Inside and outside tip sellseting, direst refuges, sodas*
all other inner unneetions, etc.) Whets by ihreiga and tasaisaga
radio salmi surto**.
I. the INIA09Mniarlan relations in sessuritf oseeil et ilosteiroe stender& mentrells.
antics. losintial central defuse should be *peal, imitated. It i$ •
alleessary is order to Glean out the wades and sidd to the effectiveness s
the security. Anetwork tkas suds would remain and there would be elsoier
harmer smug the units.
T. The 49 Isagarian relations in intelligence eentralisailons the leedeelmelmi
yetnett la improving the quality of the work, preens* couriers ant
1niosnan s famish concealment for aetivities, provide seearity and la
general assist in orgesisiag the mat. Other powers have also/Ay est up
their own intelligence movement into &awl- the mistakes eeSe by the
present German ergemisation mast net be repeated.
I. The Ni theorise relations in Gaunter intelltienees the Almeria' met
west takeaway sad unite with all the iatelltio**0 Wastes. Ossonett,
tessetleming of reel's" sad *UP "elloetite should all be den" b overt.
presently established se;strity ult.. itith this relationship the "Osstsmee
of thetileeh4 assenplishments and arreageaute will We dem' in *wet sad
will be continual.
9. Ihreakini teen the Iiekgeriam401shevik amity agencies will be duo WI
prepagenda against the political sense, %order guard*, Party seabsis. and
"tato officials, etc., an& by radio IseePeteede sad 004404 Ile P*110104 41114
eillawt pesters.
listablishing overt NS, ausgerian organisation es ennestions. It is nouns
to unseal the aims of the 'evert staff. It will also sem as eeverft, le
Idle assuagers sad the agents tercet to flee. It will provide informants
mad porters ether tanks that eons to mind.
11. Osellfiet agents end messengers will be sent in to establish the net. Oat;
after coordinating the security and information gathering agencies, and
sifting out and training messengers, can the real information collecting

. 9 .
stmt. Is the • 00400401 sowers the lssertaat task to is 41,60 tOPIWIt szsd
the set. As loss as the refugees are arriving sat $010 WAS isterii
,
1101.1411s1 (of moats) 1.04 important. that to ispertest to OW
i1t 11 be able to , report *as seasseary. *sports fres possess wit in
fres the rateite are Sot worth se each as OW intonation supplied by at
440100 who hot SW erase before. At a later date, the spats eas sake a
for teoo feotrietod'oonerts with litniost esettee . It veal& be a Shale t*
bring about the tall of the newly organised net.
lh. the Vest of tho *gists will bet getheriag the mooesoarY Isfafmattma,
Warta* the seivrity sad bustles* of the set t asposatmg go the ta4.
woos th• orgesisaties together ea triaging tt to perfection,
4104 mietekes loomed through experieness, ant oorrimiting ell
*Mies.
13. the .41efeetiir presses win attempt to discover the pliar4otere in the
Ittleherik .70.14 the system's plane, fusetione esti weak personnel.
will tiy to tient the *awe* front the stastpoist of viallity' -at epeetikitota
aVikottlissidke::esil SOW to lirite, or motet pet.** to *Hirt ., The
tho ehititia meterial, they bring with .thele 4440 liettomiti
p1000040 what the 44114,* *tries far.
14. trgoito the rSpperters of the *mama estsiam the fassatm7. At ii..410.11!
ants dots voter eosiiettatial eenditiess Ida0111** to the it.4014414104,
Within the iteenpiet mutt* that they have supporter* on the entiate.
will etriiiiithes the resistance movement eat they WM prepare *0044
whatever telleve. 'Threw* this the we* will be easier eat %Os 1011*.
of ersimeet. /Or the objective and aims, threugh friendebie sake 0400$14
two additienal movanests mild possibly be started', one is Western *S0000,.
one is iagoslavie. fitse erotism emdAlsoke a compromise with the titeiseeteaq
the Ituagerian Motets in mina.
Ih. *the together the moistens* units is the homelands If prepagaaila gkres
the sin of the movement, Mende and relations will fora snail end
tosisteness stoups. The agents and messengers sent is will also sit
movemeat. Theo. glossa will be informed to pretest, shelter sad he *A ithe
ilisposia of the information set. *es the support free the •enteitii te
assetheet„ the inner porearat will he seeeptet eat neve *lost oacar■
this, isfermaties wilt start nimbi out of the eitespiet eeinitrir hos TIM
reirsines.
11. flnOy cetahlishieg the tsformaties gathering set. The mites% and 1,4010101
with the ethnic Ihnigariesis siscrity is the eureauldbig eisistrles resstita
alive est anchaaged. %di is dose by the assele of lotto's, 140041
eater** eta. They profess that they are of gunge:ion 0,040. .2h: 100'4
VIII enlist this 'three sillies sinerit, towns of thiti locattoh. 1014
this border territer$11 erverego, sooner or later the setverh vIll
*elders of the deriet easspatios troops, thus oeiblIve a possible 002104100
of the soviet set.
1,. AS the vatted sewers headquarters develops, it will eventually boom* 11.0.111
to dead, es who will rouser and sentrel resistance moveseete. If the
already has such as orgeniseeies„ she will be the natural leader. A strong
intelligesso worries will help to assure 1119 *sutra.
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