The Market for UAV Reconnaissance Systems - Forecast International

Product Code F662
The Market for UAV Reconnaissance Systems
In the Beginning. The first use of remotely operated
vehicles (RPVs) by a military occurred more than 1,500
years ago. These RPVs were kites that dropped bombs,
checked weather and wind changes, and signaled to
other elements indications of a widely dispersed army.
The first unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) in the modern
sense appeared during the First World War. In 1914, a
British engineer tried to build a rad io-controlled
airplane, designed to reduce casualties over France. This
project met with little success.
Near the end of the war, the Kettering Bug de buted.
This was a fl ying bomb made from a r econfigured
biplane. The bug was very rudimentary. The U.S. built
about 50 of these systems, but the war ended before
they could be used in combat.
During World War II, each side e xperimented with
unmanned air vehicles. G ermany developed attack
drones launched from aircraft and flown to the target via
remote control.
The allies experimented with remotely controlled B-17
bombers under the Aphrodite Project. These aircraft, no
longer suitable for combat missions, were packed with
high explosives, flown to a d esignated position over
Europe, and then c rashed into a ta rget by an
accompanying control aircraft. The allies launched 11
of these remotely controlled bombers during the war.
None were very successful and they proved easy to
shoot down.
Some B-17s were c onverted to DB-17Ps and ser ved
with the 3215th Drone Squadron at Patrick Air Force
Base in Florida. During "Operation Greenhouse," a
series of atm ospheric nuclear weapon tests conducted
by the U.S. in the spring of 1951 with radio-controlled
B-17 aircraft measured bl ast and the rmal effects a nd
collected radioactive cloud samples.
Not for another two decades and an other war w ould
unmanned air vehicles once more be called into combat
service.
The U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War provided the
impetus for the large-scale deployment of UA Vs. T o
reduce the risk to air cre ws, the U.S. began to employ
UAVs to reconnoiter potential targets proximate to
heavy air defense sites. During the U.S. involvement in
Southeast Asia, the Teledyne Ryan Model 147
performed a to tal of 3,435 operational sorties over
North Vietnam, with an 84 percent survival rate.
Despite the undisputed success of the UAV over North
Vietnam, at the end of the war, the U.S. concluded such
Introduction
operations and relegated these systems to (then) more
traditional roles as airborne targets and simulators.
Once combat operations ended, the pressure on the U.S.
military to reduce casualties disappeared and so did the
desire for UAVs. Unmanned air vehicles suffered from
low reliability and a lack of visibility among important
leaders within the government and military.
Furthermore, many aviators within the U.S. military saw
UAVs as a threat to t heir existence, fearing that
machines would replace them in the cockpit.
In 1981, a U.S. Gov ernment Accountability Office
(GAO) report noted, "Remotely piloted vehicles seem to
suffer from the attitude of users and n ot from
technological drawbacks or unfeasible systems."
Furthermore, some in the services sa w unmanned air
vehicles competing with aircraft for funding.
Although these are examples from U.S. experie nce,
similar reactions have occurred from services in Europe
and elsewhere. This view ha s turned up time and tim e
again, but its prevalence is slowly diminishing.
The unmanned air vehicle is not a rep lacement for
manned aircraft, but a supplement to these formations.
The proper use of UAVs is to take the human element
one step further back from actual combat. The UAV
adds one more layer of weaponry between human
soldiers and their opponents. Unmanned air vehicles
would accompany human-piloted flights to deal with
targets of opportunity or to lead an attack in order to
absorb some of that which is th rown up by the air
defense systems in the area. They would be used to take
out air defense radars (both fixed and mobile) and to
attack armored columns, marshaling yards, railroad
stations, and bridges. Where possible, these systems are
to perform missions too dangerous for manned
platforms or, m ore accurately, that are a waste of
valuable human resources. Furt hermore, companies
design and market these systems as capable of operation
by individuals with little or no aviation experience and,
thereby, no longer a threat to pilots.
Combat Experiences. Unmanned air vehicles played a
significant role in Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon
(Operation Peace for Galilee). Syria's SAM batteries in
the Bekaa Valley caused c onsiderable problems for
Israeli aircraft.
To counter this threat, the Israelis used unmanned air
vehicles as decoys. The UAVs were sent in ahead of a
flight of Wild Weasel-type aircraft to trick the Syrians
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