Refugees and Asylum Seekers

Iran
Refugees and Asylum Seekers 1,003,100
Afghanistan 914,700
Iraq 57,400
New Asylum Seekers 4,200
Departures 370,500
1951 Convention: Yes
Reservations: 17, 23, 24, and 26
1967 Protocol: Yes
UNHCR Executive Committee: Yes
Population: 71,200,000
GDP: $294.1 billion
GDP per capita: $4,130
Iran . Statistics .
Introduction Iran hosted 1,003,100 refugees and
asylum seekers, including 914,700 Afghans and nearly
57,400 Iraqis. The Government estimated an additional
1.5 million unregistered Afghans were living illegally in
the country. The Afghan influx began with the 1979 Soviet
invasion and continued through Taliban rule. Most lived
in towns and cities but some 25,000 lived in six camps
or settlements administered by the Bureau for Alien and
Foreign Immigrant Affairs (BAFIA). In February, the Office
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
and the Governments of Iran and Afghanistan signed a
Tripartite Agreement extending the assisted voluntary
return program for refugees until March 2008. Since the
beginning of the 2002 program, over 1.5 million Afghans
repatriated, including 846,000 with the assistance of UN-
HCR. With security deteriorating in Afghanistan, only
about 7,500 returned voluntarily in 2007.
Most of the 57,400 Iraqis were Shi’a Arabs or Feili
Kurds who fled in the 1980s or whom the Iraqi Government
had expelled. Most lived in Qom, Mashad, or in
the southern and western provinces. Camp-based Iraqi
refugees generally lived in the western provinces.
Iran claimed it hosted an additional 30,000
refugees, including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Bosnians, Azeris, Eritreans,
Somalis, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis, whom it
recognized under its own procedure.
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Refoulement/Physical
Protection Despite BAFIA’s
screening procedures, between April
and the end of the year, Iran arrested
and deported some 363,000 Afghans,
at least 50 of whom claimed
to be refugees with identity cards. In one incident, BAFIA
declared that the refugees did not tell them that they held
the cards and agreed to readmit them but did not do so.
UNHCR and BAFIA intervened in 62 cases where authorities
were about to deport individuals who reportedly held
cards.
Authorities expelled refugees caught outside their
areas of registration without a laissez-passer. Many did not
receive any warning about their deportation and had little
time to collect unpaid wages or to gather their belongings.
Some deportees complained authorities beat, detained,
and extracted forced labor for several days before deporting
them.
In October, Turkish soldiers returned to the border
three Afghan youths—one a 16-year-old registered refugee—who
had tried to enter Turkey. Attempting to avoid
the Iranian military, they stepped on a landmine and the
refugee lost his right leg; the other two sustained minor
injuries. All three received medical treatment and returned
to their residence in Iran.
In January 2008, authorities forcibly repatriated
at least 9,000 Afghans and threatened to jail others for five
years if they did not leave the country. The Government’s
agreement that repatriation should be voluntary applied
only to registered refugees.
Iran was party to the 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its 1967 Protocol,
but considered its provisions on employment, public
relief, labor legislation and social security, and freedom of
movement, to be recommendations only. The 1979 Constitution
allowed the Government to grant persons asylum
“unless they are regarded as traitors and saboteurs.” Iran’s
1963 Regulations relating to Refugees (1963 Regulations)
provided that, “Refugees should not be forcibly returned to
the country where their life or freedom is endangered for
political, racial or religious reasons or for their membership
in a particular social group.”
Iran claimed to have a refugee status determination
procedure but the legal framework for its implementation
was unclear. Asylum seekers who interviewed with BAFIA
to regularize their status in Iran stated afterwards that no
interview took place.
Detention/Access to
Courts Authorities arrested
mandate refugees for irregular
entry and lack of documentation,
and refugee cardholders for illicit
employment, and unauthorized
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movement outside their province of
registration and rapidly deported them. Many Afghan deportees
reported inhumane treatment, beatings, and torture
during detention. One refugee hospitalized in Afghanistan’s
Herat Province claimed Iranian police had beaten him with
a baton until his arm broke. Another refugee alleged that
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authorities harassed and starved him in detention. Deported
Afghans living in Afghanistan’s Nimruz Province reported
130 cases of physical violence by Iranian security forces
against them.
Authorities generally did not permit UNHCR or
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to monitor detention
centers. In one case, however, in order to counter
allegations of abuse perpetrated by law enforcement officers
during mass deportations, the Government granted
UNHCR access to Sefid-Sang deportation center in Mashad
to observe how authorities identified refugee cardholders
for eventual release. The move came after Iran received
international criticism for returning Afghans without ensuring
that adequate reception facilities were in place in
Afghanistan.
The Government did not share its database of
registered Afghan refugees with UNHCR until July. Authorities
said they planned to determine the status of
the remaining Afghans with cards. The database held
records for some 920,200 registered refugees who held
three-month renewable cards from September 2006. In
January 2008, the Government initiated a re-registration
exercise of all Afghan refugees and simultaneously
required men between the ages of 16 and 60 to apply for
work permits.
Iran issued Special Identity Cards (SIDs) that provided
greater privileges to Afghan refugees who were religious
students, disabled in war, relatives of martyrs, or married
to Iranians. Upon reaching school age, children received
refugee cards.
Although authorities and police recognized refugee
identification cards, they frequently arrested their holders
because BAFIA extended the cards’ validity by issuing memoranda
to law enforcement officers rather than modifying
the actual cards. In some cases, BAFIA intervened to release
refugees. In others, courts ordered deportations for lack
of proper documentation, as they did not accept BAFIA’s
memoranda.
UNHCR recognized most Arabs and Shi’as from
central and southern Iraq as refugees prima facie and those
from northern Iraq as asylum seekers. The Government,
however, accorded them no legal status and did not allow
UNHCR to issue them any documents. The 54,000 longstanding
Iraqi refugees held refugee identity documents
known as white cards. Authorities re-registered them in late
2007, but did not release new figures.
The 1963 Regulations read, “A refugee has the right
to refer to Iranian Courts to demand justice,” but delays and
costs deterred most refugees. UNHCR offered attorneys at
no cost to registered refugees, but they did not use them in
detention cases.
UNHCR and BAFIA had established Dispute
Settlement Committees (DSCs) in 2004 and 2005 to mediate
outstanding legal issues that might hinder repatriation
such as nonpayment of salary and landlords’ refusal to
return deposits. In June, however, the DSCs ceased to function,
as BAFIA thought they promoted refugees’ stay.
Freedom of Movement
and Residence In the second
half of 2007, the Government
heightened enforcement of its 2006
“no-go area” policy, which partially
or entirely restricted foreigners, particularly
refugees, from entering 23
provinces. Authorities ordered some 120,000 registered
Afghan and Iraqi refugees living in specific regions to either
move to designated areas—mostly camps—or repatriate.
In Sistan-Baluchestan Province bordering Afghanistan, the
policy required over 80,000 refugees to relocate to Torbat-e-
Jam, Semnan, and Saveh camps in Khorasan Razavi, Semnan,
and Markazi Provinces. By May 2008, the Government had
restricted 25 provinces and required 180,000 to move. The
penalty for non-compliance was deportation.
While authorities and UN agencies did not restrict
aid or assistance to camp-based refugees, they assisted only
refugees with valid residency and identity papers. To travel
within the country, registered refugees required a temporary
laissez-passer available through local authorities in the
province where they had registered as refugees. Refugees
had to leave their refugee cards with the local authorities
until they returned. Iran maintained its reservation to the
1951 Convention’s provision for freedom of movement and
the 1963 Regulations allowed the Government to restrict
refugees’ residence.
Refugees could not get international travel documents
unless they had received refugee status before the
1979 Revolution and held a refugee booklet. There were
no reports that the Government issued any.
Right to Earn a Livelihood
Work permits were restricted
to particular sectors and
cost 700,000 Rials (around $75)
but few refugees applied for them
because employers did not wish to
hire employees formally and pay
for required insurance and related taxes. The Government
fined both employers and refugees heavily and refugees
ran the risk of arrest and deportation if found working
without a permit. Authorities restricted Iraqi refugees
less in employment than it did Afghans.
Iran maintained a reser vation to the 1951
Convention’s provisions regarding the right to work.
The 1963 Regulations allowed recognized refugees “employment
in the fields authorized for foreign nationals
and those fields deemed appropriate,” including animal
husbandry and brick making. The 1990 Labor Law mandated
the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to issue,
extend, and renew work permits to refugees, subject to
Jobs
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the written agreements of the Ministries of the Interior
and Foreign Affairs. During the February 2007 Tripartite
Commission meeting, Iranian authorities promised to
issue work permits “if possible” and one-year residency
permits to the heads of families who had repatriated
to Afghanistan, for their eventual return to Iran. The
Ministry of the Interior announced in October and November
that it would issue thousands of work permits
to Afghans, but there was no confirmation that they
did so. Following the January 2008 registration, Iran
required all men between 16 and 60 (and not women)
to apply for work permits and to list an employer as
guarantor.
Foreigners could not engage in business without
the appropriate visa and work permit. Registered refugees
wishing to engage in business had to abandon their refugee
status, return to Afghanistan, obtain a passport and an Iranian
visa, and apply for a specific permit.
The 1963 Regulations provided refugees the right
to acquire movable and immovable property generally
on par with other foreigners, but conditioned real estate
ownership on reciprocity of the foreigner’s government.
It also allowed the Government to bar foreigners from
purchasing land near borders and in other restricted areas.
The 2004 regulations also restricted Afghan refugees’
rights to obtain mortgages, to rent and own property, and
to open bank accounts but internal government circulars
prevented them from owning any property. They could
open bank accounts only if they possessed SIDs, unlike
Iraqi refugees.
2+5=7
Public Relief and Education
The Government reportedly
pressured Afghan refugees to repatriate
by suspending education and
medical services and by rescinding
their residence permits.
While Afghan and Iraqi refugees
normally could attend Iranian primary and secondary
schools, the Government denied foreigners access to
Iranian schools and universities unless they met average
grade requirements in public and private schools. Iraqi
children enrolled without paying fees, but Afghan children
were subject to tuition, unless their parents held SIDs.
The Ministry of Education and Training objected to the
rise of self-administered Afghan primary schools and,
over the last two years, the Government began to restrict
their operation. Previously, some 588 self-administered
schools provided education to 70,000 children. Enrollment
of refugee children in schools was contingent on
their parents paying municipal taxes targeting refugees.
Female heads of households were reportedly exempt.
Afghan SID holders could enroll in the national
health insurance program. The 1963 Regulations allowed
refugees medical and social services on par with nationals but
authorities increased premiums and introduced a tax in 2004
to encourage repatriation as UNHCR reduced assistance.
Iran restricted the operations of international
humanitarian agencies and required their funding to be
independent of UNHCR. Authorities did not give UNHCR
or NGOs access to the aforementioned 30,000 refugees of
various nationalities.
Iran’s Fourth Plan of Economic, Social and Cultural
Development from 2004 did not include refugees in its
development plans.
Iraq
Refugees and Asylum Seekers 44,800
Turkey 15,600
Former Palestine 14,900
Iran 11,100
New Asylum Seekers 2,400
1951 Convention: No
1967 Protocol: No
UNHCR Executive Committee: No
Population: 29 million
GDP: n/a
GDP per capita: n/a
Iraq . Statistics .
Introduction According to the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Iraq hosted some
42,350 registered refugees, primarily in Baghdad and the
Kurdish-administered regions, as well as nearly 2,500
asylum seekers. They included Palestinians and various
ethnic and ideological minorities fleeing persecution in
Iran, Syria, and Turkey.
Just under 15,000 Palestinians remained out of
35,000 that arrived beginning in 1948 through the 1991
Gulf War. Over 100 Sudanese who arrived as workers under
the Hussein regime lived in a desert camp in western
Iraq after militias expelled them from Baghdad in 2005.
Syrians in Iraq included almost 100 Kurds and nearly 500
Baathists fleeing the regime. Three groups of Iranians
lived in Iraq: nearly 9,400 Kurds, almost 1,700 Ahwazi
Arabs, and about 3,000 members of the Mujahideen al-
Khalq. Turkish Kurds numbered around 15,600.
Refoulement/ Physical Protection There
were no reports of refoulement of refugees and asylum seekers.
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Nearly 40 Palestinian refugees died
between January and November.
Two brothers died when militiamen
fired on refugees near Al Karamah
hospital in late January. That same
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week, masked gunmen wearing
Ministry of Interior uniforms attacked
several women and abducted 27 Palestinians in
Baghdad, firing at a UNHCR rented building in the process.
In February, there were 31 attacks against Palestinian
refugees and 8 died after unknown assailants attacked
them. Palestinian sources also reported the abduction
of at least 15 refugees by insurgents and U.S. troops in
different incidents. Two of the abductees returned, two
died of torture, and the rest remained missing. Refugees
reported that gunmen frequently raided their homes to
attack and rob them. In March, Shi’a gunmen abducted
a refugee in front of his children and killed him. As part
of the Baghdad Security Plan or “surge,” Multi-National
Forces in Iraq (MNF-I) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
raided the Palestinian district of al-Baladiyat, shooting
and killing a Palestinian. In June, unknown assailants
abducted, tortured, and killed a Palestinian lawyer defending
four Palestinian detainees. In August, gunmen,
allegedly from the Mahdi Army, abducted, tortured, and
killed a Palestinian taxi-driver.
After Iranian agents assassinated 4 of Ahwazi Iranians,
around 100 of them fled to Trebil on the Iraqi Jordanian
border. Unknown agents kidnapped Syrian refugees because
of their Baathist affiliations.
In January, militiamen abducted four Syrian refugees
from their homes.
Although Iraq was not party to the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol,
the 1971 Refugee Act prohibited refoulement. The northern
governorates had no status determination procedure, so
UNHCR registered asylum seekers.
A still-valid Coaltion Provisional Authority order
assigned the Ministry of Displacement and Migration responsibility
for recognized refugees. The Permanent Committee
for Refugee Affairs, established under the 1971 Refugee Act
and reactivated in 2005 lacked the capacity to determine
refugee status, which left UNHCR in charge of the procedure.
The Committee disputed the status of certain refugee groups,
such as the Syrian Arabs.
U.S. troops protected the Iranian Mujahideen Al
Khalq at Camp Ashraf outside Baghdad, after the U.S. Defense
Secretary declared them protected persons under the
Fourth Geneva Convention.
Detention and Access to Courts MNF-I and
ISF arrested and detained at least 100 refugees for alleged
terrorism and insurgency, often without charges or judicial
review. UNHCR often did not have access to detainees or to
information about their conditions, but received reports of
serious abuses and torture, which authorities
denied. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
had access to MNF-I detainees.
MNF-I and ISF detained at
least eight Syrian refugees but released
four. As of April 2008, eight
Syrian refugees remained in detention, but it was not clear
which force held them.
In mid-January, Iraqi security forces broke into two
UNHCR buildings that housed Palestinians and arrested 30
men, whom they later released. Later that month, gunmen in
police uniforms seized 17 Palestinians from another UNHCR
building in Al Batawyen, central Baghdad. That same day,
Iraqi security forces detained 13 Palestinians in the eastern
Baghdad district of Al Amin.
ISF and MNF-I arrested 60 Palestinians during a
March raid in al-Baladiyat, after which they released all
but 4 men. As of mid-August, all four remained in prison
without trial or charges.
Authorities did not issue any identity cards to refugees
and asylum seekers during the year, but because refugees
had access to the Public Distribution System (PDS) their
PDS cards doubled as identity cards. Palestinian families
had to appear before the Department of Residency every
one to three months to renew their registration and the
staff occasionally confiscated their documents. Refugees
in central and southern Iraq holding identity cards issued
by the former regime could not renew them once
they expired. Of the three Kurdish governorates, Dahuk
and Erbil required refugees to hold renewable residency
permits, but complying with the 1971 Refugee Act, Sulaymaniyah
did not.
Freedom of Movement
and Residence Although
there were no legal restrictions on
refugees’ freedom of movement
or choice of residence, the general
lawlessness, physical attacks, and arbitrary
detention restricted refugees’
movement in southern and central Iraq especially Palestinians
without valid identification. In the wake of the March
raid on Al Baladiyat, 41 Palestinians fled to the border and
reported that ISF had thrown out their furniture and ordered
them to leave their homes within two days.
In the Kurdish governorates, Iranian refugees possessed
identity cards that let them travel in the area, but
needed permission from the regional government to go to
other parts of Iraq. Turkish refugees in Makhmour refugee
camp could move freely within the district, but they risked
detention if they did not carry identification and authorization
from camp authorities to leave the district for more
than a day.
Some 3,000 Palestinians sought shelter in two
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camps, Al Tanf in the no-man’s-land between Syria and Iraq
and Al Waleed on the border with Syria. In May, a government
delegation outlined three options to residents: they
could return to their homes in Baghdad under government
protection; they could return to their homes and wait for
UNHCR to resettle them outside Iraq; or they could go to
a camp for at least 750 families in Al Baladiyat, Baghdad.
The Palestinians refused all three options and remained
in al-Waleed, where Iraqi security forces intimidated and
verbally abused them, and where unidentified outsiders
sexually harassed female residents.
Around 200 Iranian Kurds, mostly below the age
of 18, continued to live in a makeshift camp on the Iraq-
Jordan border. Despite UNHCR advice to move to Kurdishcontrolled
areas, the Iranians, from a minority sect, refused,
citing fear of persecution and their unwillingness to live in
a camp. Meanwhile some 9,300 Iranian Kurds integrated
in the Kurdish governorates in Kawa and Barika, where they
received houses.
The Government issued Palestinians blue travel
documents that distinguished them from Iraqis, who
received green passports. Many refugees forged identification
cards and passports to move around or leave Iraq.
Authorities stamped the passports of Palestinians with the
words “right to exit, no right to return” when they left the
country. Neighboring countries did not accept Palestinian
passports or Palestinians’ Iraqi travel documents. After
UNHCR announced in late June that at least 12 camp
residents needed urgent medical care, however, in early
August, Syria admitted 4 seriously ill Palestinian children
for medical treatment.
Right to Earn a Livelihood
The 1971 Refugee Act
provided for refugees’ right to work,
and in the Kurdish areas, they could
work legally under permission
from the President’s office, but
there was no authorization for asylum
seekers. In the Kurdish governorates, refugees worked
in farming, trade, and construction. Refugees in Dahuk
and Erbil had to get work permits, but in Sulaymaniyah,
Jobs
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An Iranian Kurdish girl in Iraq. After fleeing their homes in Iran, the Iranian Kurds were forced to relocate again
as violence swept Iraq. Credit: UNHCR/K.Brooks
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Iranian asylum seekers did not to work as laborers, shopkeepers,
mechanics, and construction workers. Although
technically under the 1971 Refugee Act, refugees enjoyed
the same labor rights as citizens, in practice they did not.
Refugees in central and southern Iraq had difficulty finding
jobs because of their lack of documentation.
The 1971 Refugee Act did not specifically provide
for refugee property ownership, but earlier legal provisions
benefited Syrian refugees. Refugees were unable to
register businesses, own land, or open bank accounts, as
all of these activities required Iraqi national identification
documents.
2+5=7
Public Relief and Education
In October, an Iranian
Kurd woman died in an Iraqi
hospital near Al Tash camp after a
Jordanian hospital discharged her
and her condition worsened after
returning to the rough conditions
at the camp. In November, three persons died of
illness, including two Palestinian boys suffering from
malnutrition and cancer while awaiting resettlement
from Iraq.
The Government cooperated with UNHCR as it
aided refugees but many aid workers left after receiving
death threats and attacks. UNHCR worked through partner
NGOs, while the Iraqi Red Crescent and Iraq Aid Association
(IAA) also operated. In January, insurgents turned back
IAA volunteers bringing supplies to Palestinian and Syrian
refugees in Baghdad.
Iranian camp residents received food from the
ICRC and an Iranian-American relief organization, which
also donated medical supplies and school supplies. UN-
HCR helped Iranian Kurdish refugees who moved to the
Kawa camp in Erbil with vocational training. Some 223
families received houses, and the agency provided internal
roads, water, and electricity to Kawa residents. Despite
limited access to Al Waleed camp, through the Italian
Consortium for Solidarity (ICS), UNHCR gave residents rations,
non-food items, electricity, and fuel. ICRC provided
water, sanitation services, and medical supplies. Medicines
were in short supply, and only one doctor was available for
all 1,550 residents, many of whom suffered from asthma,
cancer, and heart problems. ICS took seriously ill patients
to a hospital every two weeks. Aid officials said Palestinian
children in the desert camps suffered from lack of food
and medicine.
The Refugee Act entitled refugees to the same
health and education services as nationals and, in the
Kurdish regions, UNHCR and the regional government provided
these services. Refugees without identity documents,
however, had difficulty attending school and getting other
services. Some 430 children attended school in Al Waleed,
where UNHCR paid for 12 teachers.
Israeli-occupied territories
Refugees and Asylum Seekers: 1,792,200
Gaza Strip 1,047,200
West Bank 745,000
1951 Convention: Yes
1967 Protocol: Yes
Reservations: 8, 12, 28, 30
UNHCR Executive Committee: Yes
Population: 4 million
GDP: n/a
GDP per capita: n/a
Israeli-Occupied Territories .
Introduction The West Bank and Gaza Strip housed
nearly 1,792,200 refugees, all of them Palestinian, most
of them descendants of some 700,000 refugees who fled
what is now Israel after its war of independence in 1948.
Jordan and Egypt held these respective territories until
the 1967 war in which Israel seized them. In 2005, Israel
withdrew its forces from the Gaza Strip but retained control
over the entry and exit of people and goods, airspace,
territorial waters, tax revenue, utilities, and population
registry. These refugees constitute nearly half of the
population of the West Bank and the majority of the
population of Gaza.
Refoulement/Physical
Protection As Israel did not
permit the return of Palestinian
refugees, refoulement was not an issue
and neither Israel nor the Palestinian
Authority (PA) forcibly deported
anyone from the territories. Israeli
security forces, however, killed nearly 400 Palestinians in
2007, including 53 minors. Just fewer than 100 of the total
were from the West Bank and nearly 300 from the Gaza
Strip. At least 131, or about 35 percent, were civilians taking
no part in hostilities. The total was down from nearly
700 the year before, when 140 of the victims were minors
and 54 percent civilians. According to the Israeli nongovernmental
organization B’Tselem, the primary reasons for
these deaths were Israeli policies easing the military’s rules
of engagement, faulty transmission of regulations to the
field, disproportionate attacks, and failure to investigate in
killings of civilians.
Israeli authorities conducted nearly 400 search
campaigns in the 19 West Bank refugee camps, killing 12
refugees, injuring nearly 100 and detaining more than 400.
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Israeli authorities killed nearly 100 Palestinians and injured
nearly 1,200 in the West Bank altogether. In addition, factional
strife and clan feuds killed 33 Palestinians and injured
more than 200. In January, when the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) sought to arrest seven Palestinians in Nablus, it placed
all 20,000 residents under curfew for about 4 days, strictly
controlled entrance to the main hospitals, closed all educational
facilities, killed one Palestinian, injured 24, arrested
about 70, and damaged nearly 300 houses and shops. In
February, they used at least one Nablus resident as a human
shield at gunpoint as they searched houses. In March, IDF
opened fired in Al Jalazun camp, killing a girl aged nine
and a boy aged 11 in schools sponsored by the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA). In June, IDF killed two children and
badly wounded a 16-year-old on the beach in Gaza 100
yards from the border. The troops said they saw the boys
crawling toward the fence, warned them over a loudspeaker,
fired warning shots, and then shot them. Others said they
had been flying a kite. In August, IDF entered Al Naqar
neighborhood in Qalqilia, looking for six Hamas militants,
demolishing five homes and destroying other property of
13 families, including 86 refugees. Also in August, an IDF
tank killed three children outside Beit Hanoun in Gaza who
had been playing near rocket launchers.
Conflict with IDF resulted in more than 300 Palestinian
fatalities and nearly 700 injuries in Gaza. Factional
and internal Palestinian violence in Gaza claimed the lives
of nearly 500 and injured more than 2,500. In June alone,
armed Palestinian groups killed nearly 200 Palestinians
in factional violence, 85 percent of them in Gaza. Lack of
government in Gaza led many to seek protection from individual
clans and family groups, causing 72 deaths in family
disputes in 2006 and the first half of 2007.
At least five patients died at checkpoints and at least
four women gave birth at them after authorities delayed or
refused passage to hospitals in Israel.
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Detention/Access to
Courts Israeli authorities held
nearly 8,400 Palestinians in one
form of detention or another at
year’s end but only just over 5,000
of them were serving sentences. By
November, Israel held nearly 900
Palestinians in administrative detention without charges,
including 13 minors and two women. During the year,
the number of such detainees averaged more than 800 per
month, about a hundred more than the previous year. The
Military Order Regarding Administrative Detention allowed
military commanders in the West Bank to detain people for
up to six months if they had “reasonable grounds to presume
that the security of the area or public security” required it
and to extend detentions for additional six-month periods
indefinitely. Within eight days, authorities brought detainees
before military judges at the Ofer army base, near Ramallah,
or next to Ketziot prison, inside Israel, to determine whether
the detention was lawful. Security or common law detainees
could challenge their detention before Israeli civilian courts.
At the end of the year, Israel held nearly 900 Palestinians
from Gaza in prison outside the Gaza Strip in six main locations,
limiting the ability of family members to visit.
Detainees complained of position abuse, slapping
and beating during arrest and transfer, threats of house demolition
or harm to family members, and lack of contact
with lawyers or family. Israel allowed the International
Committee of the Red Cross to monitor the detention of
political prisoners, including refugees.
UNRWA issued registration cards to refugee
families. Israeli authorities granted identity documents to
individual refugees according to their place of residence.
Palestinians residing in East Jerusalem and other Israel-annexed
areas held permanent residence status, as did some
of their descendents.
In March, IDF lawyers opened an investigation
into IDF’s 2006 killing of Nafia Abu Musaid, a Palestinian
shepherdess in Gaza. Authorities also announced an investigation
into the 2006 IDF shelling of Beit Hanoun in Gaza
that killed 19 Palestinians but released no results.
Freedom of Movement
and Residence The entire
Palestinian population, including
refugees, was subject to severe movement
restrictions. They required
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Israeli permits to travel between
the West Bank and Gaza, to enter
East Jerusalem, to enter Israel, or to travel abroad, and authorities
could deny permits for any or no reason without
meaningful appeal.
There was an average of more than 100 checkpoints
permanently staffed by soldiers, Border Police or civilian
security companies in the West Bank at any given time,
two-thirds of them deep in the territory (16 inside Hebron).
The army also set up dozens of temporary checkpoints every
week—for example, about 70 a week in November and
141 in May. In addition, Israeli authorities blocked access
to main roads with nearly 500 dirt piles, concrete blocks,
rocks, trenches, fences, and iron gates to divert Palestinian
traffic to the checkpoints with no one present to remove
them in cases of emergency. At almost all checkpoints, authorities
required people to show identity cards or passage
permits, some of which allowed people to enter, or stay in,
particular areas in the West Bank that Israel generally closed
to Palestinians (such as the “seam zone” or the Jordan Valley),
while other permits pertained to a specific checkpoint.
The Israeli Civil Administration did not answer a request to
clarify the procedure to obtain permits and the criteria for
authorizing them.
Holders of West Bank identity documents needed
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permits to enter Jerusalem and the area between the barrier
and the Green Line (i.e., the 1949 armistice line). One
young man suffering from brain cancer died at Jubara/Kafriat
checkpoint. Even though he had a permit, IDF prevented
him from crossing to go to a hospital. In August, an elderly
woman died at Barta’a/Rihan gate when IDF prevented
an ambulance from crossing the terminal to assist her. In
February, authorities allowed people to cross the container
checkpoint south of the Ma’ale Adumim settlement, which
controls movement between the south and center of the
West Bank, without permits, but still checked vehicles and
travelers. Lengthy delays were frequent. In April, the Defense
Ministry announced it would no longer require Palestinians
to obtain permits to enter the Jordan Valley but this applied
only to pedestrians and travelers on public transport
(which required a permit in itself ) and only at two of the
four checkpoints that control access to the Valley. Between
March and May, without an official army order, Israel imposed
a sweeping prohibition on Palestinians crossing the
Almog checkpoint to the north of the Dead Sea, an important
industrial and tourism area. Israel restricted movement in
and out of Nablus to four staffed checkpoints and, between
January and August, prohibited all men aged 16 to 35 from
leaving for at least 45 days. For at least 46 days in that same
period, Israel barred males of the same age group from Jenin
and Tulkarm from traveling south.
Since June, Israel obstructed the arrival of international
observers at the Rafah crossing, the only Gazan border
crossing it did not operate directly, closing it almost permanently.
About 6,000 Gazans on their way back from abroad
were stuck on the Egyptian side of the border for two months
in harsh conditions, until Israel allowed them to reenter
in late July. In December, approximately 750 pilgrims to
Mecca left Gaza via the Rafah crossing – according to media
reports, as a result of an agreement between Hamas and the
Egyptian Government. In December, Israel allowed about
900 Palestinians with permits for work abroad or students
to exit Gaza after lengthy delays. Israeli authorities did not
generally allow the population of the Gaza Strip to enter
Israel or access the West Bank. Israel allowed no Gazan to
pass through the Erez crossing to work in Israel and, since
June, allowed only five traders to cross compared to about
270 per month in the first half of the year. Also in the first
half of the year, the authorities allowed an average of nearly
300 people per month to depart through the Rafah crossing
and about 250 per month to enter, down from more than
400 in 2006. After June, Israel allowed no one in or out of
Rafah terminal except about 2000 pilgrims to go to Mecca
in December.
In 2002, Israel began erecting a physical barrier in
the West Bank consisting of an electronic fence with dirt
paths, barbed-wire fences, and trenches on both sides with
an average width of 66 yards (60 m). In some areas, the
barrier was up to 28 feet (8.5 m) high. By year’s end, the
Government had completed 57 percent of the 450-mile
(723-km) planned route of the barrier. The route would
leave about 9 percent of West Bank territory, including East
Jerusalem and dozens of disconnected enclaves, in the seam
zone between the barrier and Israeli territory, which Israeli
authorities required Palestinians to obtain special permits
to enter. Some included entire villages. The barrier would
enclose about 30,000 Palestinians in these enclaves.
Israel continued to bar or restrict Palestinian traffic
on 185 miles (300 km) of roads throughout the West
Bank reserved for Israelis, mostly settlers, which completely
separated one part of the West Bank from the other. As the
Israeli High Court discussed a June petition against one of
these roads, the army declared it would allow 80 vehicles
from the petitioning villages to use the road during the
daytime through one checkpoint. The Civil Administration
would allow nighttime travel in humanitarian cases and only
with advance coordination. The petition remained pending.
Also in June, the army took down a 25-mile (41-km)
concrete barricade in the southern Hebron hills in response
to a High Court order from December 2006 after plaintiffs
filed another petition that the High Court enforce its verdict.
Israel expropriated private lands and paved or nearly
completed at least 11 alternative roads for Palestinian use
alongside the roads from which it barred them, allowing
the army to monitor Palestinian traffic without disturbing
Israeli drivers.
To issue international travel documents, the PA
required applicants to have Israeli-issued identity cards but
refugees who had lived outside of the territories for more
than three years were not eligible for them. As there were
no commercial flights from the territories and Israel denied
permits to use Ben Gurion airport, travelers had to leave by
land to Jordan or Egypt. Palestinians residing in Jerusalem
needed special documents to travel abroad. Jordan also
issued passports to eligible Palestinians in the West Bank
and East Jerusalem.
In January 2008, some 1,000 Palestinian refugees
were stuck in Egypt after they fled there when militants blew
a hole in the border wall between Gaza and Egypt.
Right to Earn a Livelihood
Movement restrictions (see
above) split the economy into smaller
local markets and raised travel
expenses. Authorities allowed only
a limited number of commercial vehicles
to move freely throughout the
West Bank, and many workers could not reach workplaces
on a regular basis. In the West Bank, more than a quarter
of the working age population was unemployed—compared
with 17 percent prior to the second intifada—with the highest
rates among refugee camp dwellers. In September, only
66,800 Palestinians worked in Israel or in Israeli settlements,
compared to 116,000 at the beginning of the intifada.
The barrier’s construction had already isolated over
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D
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88 square miles (230 km 2 ) of the West Bank’s most fertile
land—about 15 percent of all West Bank agricultural land.
Palestinian communities east of the barrier had difficulties
reaching farm and grazing land. Based on its current route,
the barrier would isolate the 60,500 Palestinians living near
it or between it and the Green Line from the rest of the West
Bank and their main sources of livelihoods, and would completely
encircle some 31,400. The telephone company and
others refused to carry out maintenance in Shu’fat refugee
camp, located inside the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem
but cut off by the barrier.
In the last half of the year, Israeli Navy patrols
limited fishing to less than 6 nautical miles (11 km) off the
Gazan coast and in only one area, shooting at those who
strayed and arresting them. IDF made some fishermen
strip naked and swim 100 yards to its warships in January
temperatures, physically abused them on board, and then
made them swim back.
Israel closed several Gaza crossing points for
months, cutting the entry of goods by nearly three quarters
since June. About 90 percent of Gaza’s factories had to close
by the end of the year because they were unable to import
raw materials or export finished goods and agricultural
products. The Ministry of Agriculture estimated export losses
at $34 million.
Refugees had the legal right to acquire, hold title to,
and transfer property and assets within the territories. During
military incursions into Gaza, Israeli tanks and bulldozers
partly or completely destroyed the means of livelihood,
including farmland, irrigation systems, and citrus, olive,
and date groves of more than 6,100 land owners in Gaza,
stating that someone was firing rockets from those areas. In
September, IDF levelled land and uprooted 25 acres of olive
trees east of Al Bureij camp.
In March, the Ministry of Finance seized 7.5 acres
of olive orchards in East Jerusalem and the Government
leased it to a settler group. In September, IDF confiscated
over 62 acres from two Palestinian villages near Bethlehem
to construct the separation barrier, restricting farmers from
their land. Also in September, IDF confiscated nearly 300
acres in three villages next to Jerusalem. The Government
demolished 68 houses in East Jerusalem it deemed illegal
and 37 homes in the territories for military purposes, leaving
145 Palestinians homeless. IDF demolished another 36
homes in the West Bank because they lacked permit, leaving
209 homeless. In September, IDF demolished a building
and two houses in Ayn Beit Al Ma camp and a building in
Nablus, displacing 77, including 23 children.
medical equipment were unavailable in October. Movement
restrictions impeded UN agencies from implementing more
than $200 million in humanitarian projects.
UNRWA services and PA schools and health facilities
were free for refugees in the West Bank. UNRWA ran one
hospital, 40 clinics, 94 elementary and preparatory schools,
and 3 vocational training centers in the West Bank. Movement
restrictions (see above) inhibited access to health services
and prevented essential staff from reaching facilities.
On over 200 occasions involving nearly 1,500
UNRWA employees, Israeli authorities denied access and/or
delayed accomplishment of their duties in the West Bank
and, reportedly on 36 occasions, fired upon medical personnel
and ambulances. Authorities refused entry to 70 percent
of ambulances carrying Palestinians to East Jerusalem for
medical treatment.
UNRWA operated 19 primary clinics in the Gaza
Strip and provided food, cash, and housing aid. IDF operations
closed UNRWA health centers for 5 days, preventing up
to 1,472 consultations. UNRWA also operated more than
200 elementary and preparatory schools and two vocational
training centers in the Gaza Strip. During the year, Israeli
military incursions cost more than 243 hours of education
for about 12,400 school children. Violence between Palestinian
factions also interrupted education.
Palestinian poverty reduction strategies and development
plans targeted both refugees and non-refugee
populations in Gaza. The UN’s Humanitarian Appeal 2008
included mention of refugees in the territories but did not
specify any programs for them or their protection.
Jordan
Refugees and Asylum Seekers 617,100
Iraq 450,000
Former Palestine 166,900
Departures 1,800
1951 Convention: No
1967 Protocol: No
UNHCR Executive Committee: Yes
Population: 5.7 million
GDP: $16 billion
GDP per capita: $2,810
Jordan . Statistics .
2+5=7
Public Relief and Education
The Gaza Strip lacked clean
water, steady electricity, medicines,
and primary and secondary medical
equipment. One-fifth of essential
medicines and 31 percent of essential
Introduction Jordan hosted approximately 617,000
refugees, including 450,000 from Iraq. While it also
hosted nearly 2 million Palestinians, all but 166,900 held
104

Jordanian citizenship and USCRI did not count them as
refugees.
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) registered 52,000 Iraqis by the end
of the year, including those registered as asylum seekers.
Of these, UNHCR granted refugee status to nearly
8,100 Iraqis and referred them for resettlement, of whom
1,600 departed for resettlement countries. Additionally,
110 Palestinians who had fled Iraq and whom Jordan
had confined to Al Ruweished Camp departed for Brazil,
emptying the camp.
C
Refoulement/Physical
Protection Jordan generally
did not forcibly return Iraqi refugees,
but did deport some Iraqis it
detained for alleged criminal offenses,
without allowing UNHCR
to determine if they were refugees.
It deported at least 100 Iraqis, most of whom the General
Intelligence Department had detained for criminal activity
or endangering national security. Jordan generally allowed
Iraqi deportees the option of going to Syria rather
than Iraq, although this became more problematic after
Syria imposed a visa regime in October. Jordan generally
did not deport those it detained for offenses under the
Foreigners Act, including working illegally and overstaying
visas.
Policies toward deportees were inconsistent. Officials
stamped the passports of some with marks banning
them from reentering the country for variable periods of
time, ranging from less than five years to life. Officials
allowed some potential deportees who had overstayed
their visas to pay a fine of 1.50 dinars ($2) per day that
they had overstayed in order to avoid deportation. Others
had to pay the same fine to avoid having their passports
stamped, which allowed them to reenter the country
more easily.
If UNHCR was aware of a recognized refugee among
the deportees, Jordan would delay the deportation until
UNHCR found a resettlement country willing to accept the
deportee.
Some Iraqi women domestic workers reported
physical and sexual abuse by their employers.
Jordan was not party to the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees and had no refugee law, but
its 1952 Constitution prohibited extradition of “political
refugees … on account of their political beliefs or for their
defense of liberty.” According to a 1998 Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), asylum seekers could remain in Jordan
pending status determination, and UNHCR-recognized
refugees could remain six months after recognition, during
which time UNHCR had to find resettlement countries for
them. This was not always possible, but the Government
generally did not deport them.
Jordan’s 1973 Law of Residency and Foreigners’
Affairs required that those entering the country as political
asylum seekers must present themselves to a police station
within 48 hours of arrival. There were no further provisions
on who was eligible for asylum or how they could go about
obtaining it. The law granted the Minister of the Interior
the authority to determine on a case-by-case basis whether
persons would be deported. Jordan’s labor law also authorized
the Minister of Labor to deport foreigners working
without permission.
While most Palestinians in Jordan were citizens,
some 162,000 Palestinians who fled from the Gaza Strip
in 1967 did not qualify for citizenship and received only
two-year passports. More than 800 refugees from Iraq,
Russia, and Syria awaited resettlement and the Government
allowed about 100 Chechens to remain indefinitely pending
repatriation.
Detention/Access to
Courts Jordan detained at least
525 Iraqis through November, 479
of whom had registered with UN-
HCR. Of these, UNHCR bailed out
F
330. The International Committee
of the Red Cross had access to all
detention facilities and made regular visits. Jordan’s Law
of Residency and Foreigners’ Affairs mandated penalties of
one to six months’ detention and fines of 10 to 50 dinars
($14 to $71) for illegal entry, but theoretically exempted
asylum seekers from such penalties. Officials also had the
option to deport detainees or grant them residency.
To release a refugee on bail, a Jordanian citizen had
to leave his or her identity card, along with the detainee’s
passport, with the police. Some Jordanians reportedly
extorted money from Iraqis in exchange for bailing them
out.
The 1952 Constitution promised all persons
protection from arbitrary detention or imprisonment,
but refugees and asylum seekers could not challenge
administrative detention in court and bail was available
only in court-ordered detentions with judges’ discretion.
The Constitution reserved to nationals the right to equal
treatment before the law but the MOU and Jordanian law
provided for refugees’ and asylum seekers’ access to courts
and legal assistance on par with nationals. Few asylum
seekers availed themselves of this because of their lack
of legal residence.
UNHCR issued a series of identification cards of
different colors and types to refugees and asylum seekers,
all stamped by the Jordanian interior ministry and good
for six months. Applicants awaiting their first interviews
received orange cards, while recognized refugees received
blue. Once applicants had their interviews, UNHCR issued
asylum seeker certificates, but these explicitly stated
they were not permits for work or residency. UNHCR also
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Jobs
issued special letters to those set for resettlement. Authorities
were inconsistent in recognizing these documents, but
UNHCR made efforts to educate officials about them.
To obtain legal residency from the Government,
Iraqis had to deposit and maintain approximately $150,000
in a bank account.
Palestinians displaced from Gaza in 1967 held
temporary Jordanian passports without national identity
numbers, which were valid for two years.
A
Freedom of Movement
and Residence Following the
November closure of Al Ruweished
camp, there were no restrictions on
the residence or movement of refugees
in Jordan, but under the Law
of Residency and Foreigners’ Affairs,
all foreigners had to notify the authorities of their residence
and any movement.
About 332,000 Palestinians (including Jordanian
citizens of Palestinian descent) also lived in camps throughout
the country. More than 50 squatter settlements in mostly
urban areas housed some 60,000 to 70,000 Palestinians
ineligible for status with the UN Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), including
some of the former Gazan population.
Gazans held temporary Jordanian passports
renewable every two years, as well as cards for crossing
between Jordan and the West Bank, subject to Israeli closures
and other restrictions. The Government refused to
renew the passports of some 10,000 to 12,000 Palestinian
former residents at its embassies outside the country for
failure to prove former residence. Refugees registered
with UNHCR did not have access to international travel
documents.
D
Right to Earn a Livelihood
It was difficult for refugees
with residence permits to work
legally and virtually impossible for
those without them, including many
asylum seekers. Iraqis working informally,
especially female domestic
workers and male day laborers, reported nonpayment and
other forms of exploitation. Some small medical clinics
employed Iraqi doctors but refused to pay them.
The 1952 Constitution reserved the right to work
to citizens. The 1996 Labor Law required non-Jordanians
with legal residency and valid passports to obtain work
permits from the Ministry of Labor showing that the job
required experience or skills unavailable among Jordanians,
with preference to Arabs but with no exceptions for
refugees and asylum seekers. The law required employers
to pay a fee, and the permits were valid for one year or less,
but were renewable. Violators were subject to cumulative
fines and expulsion of the foreign worker at the employer’s
expense.
In addition to work permits, foreigners wishing to
practice professions had to obtain the certification of Jordanian
professional societies, which granted it based on reciprocal
privileges in the foreigners’ home countries. Many Iraqi doctors
worked without the approval of the Jordanian Medical Association
at lower wages than Jordanian doctors received.
According to Jordanian courts, a legal employment
contract between a Jordanian and a foreigner protected the
basic rights of the foreigner in cases of exploitation, but few
signed such contracts with Iraqi workers.
All bearers of temporary passports, including Palestinians
displaced from Gaza since 1967, had to obtain
permits to work legally. Palestinian refugees holding temporary
Jordanian passports could work for the Government
only on a contractual basis.
Jordanian law did not permit foreigners to join
unions but its labor laws did generally apply to noncitizens.
Access to social security benefits depended on reciprocal
privileges in the worker’s country of origin, rendering stateless
Palestinians ineligible.
The MOU provided that a legally resident refugee
could work “for his own account whenever the Laws and
regulations permit” and conditioned the right to practice
professions on the same requirements.
According to Jordan’s Investment Promotion Law,
foreigners could not own more than a half-interest in enterprises
in mining, trade and retail, and construction contracting.
Temporary passport holders had to obtain ministerial
permission and find a Jordanian partner to own property.
Although the 1952 Constitution protected the property of
all persons from arbitrary expropriation or confiscation, few
refugees took advantage of these restricted rights largely due
to their lack of residence status.
Public Relief and Education
The Government insisted
on pre-approving some assistance
projects for Iraqi refugees, and some
nongovernmental organizations
reported that the Ministry of Social
Development made the approval
and registration processes difficult.
2+5=7
All foreigners in Jordan, including refugees and
asylum seekers regardless of their legal status, had access
to Jordan’s public health system at rates subsidized by the
Government. The Government covered 80 percent of the cost
for insured Jordanians, 70 percent for uninsured Jordanians,
and 60 percent for foreigners. In November, UNHCR and
Jordan signed an agreement granting Iraqis access at the rate
for uninsured Jordanians.
The 1952 Constitution reserved the right to free primary
education to nationals, but beginning in August, Jordan
opened its schools to Iraqi children at the request of King
106

Abdullah II. By September, some 22,000 students had registered.
Iraqis still had to pay school fees—20 dinars ($28) for
primary school, 30 ($43) for secondary school, and 40 ($57)
for vocational education—and buy books, uniforms, and other
supplies. In November, the Government allowed Iraqis access
to homeschooling and other nonformal education.
In May, UNHCR and the Jordanian Women’s Union
provided legal counseling, shelter for women and children,
and job training for women.
UNHCR and its partners provided services to
about 70,000 refugees during the year, including food,
cash assistance, education, counseling, health services,
and safehouses.
Palestinians from Gaza holding temporary Jordanian
passports had to pay school fees in foreign currency
where applicable and a fee for medical services. Public
hospitals and health centers treated patients regardless
of status, but non-Jordanians paid higher fees than citizens
did. Palestinians displaced from Gaza since 1967
did not enjoy social security benefits, medical services,
public education, or other social services that Palestinian
citizens of Jordan enjoyed. UNRWA operated 24 medical
clinics inside and outside the refugee camps.
Children of Palestinians from Gaza holding
temporary Jordanian passports could enroll in Jordanian
schools. Additionally, UNRWA operated 180 schools
and two vocational training centers for Palestinian refugees.
Universities, however, restricted foreign students
with quotas and required them to pay twice as much as
Jordanians.
Kenya
Refugees and Asylum Seekers 319,400
Somalia 196,200
Sudan 46,700
Ethiopia 31,900
Rwanda 4,600
Congo-Kinshasa 4,100
Uganda 4,000
Eritrea 3,300
Burundi 2,900
New Asylum Seekers 34,200
1951 Convention: Yes
1967 Protocol: Yes
Reservations: 8, 9, 17, 24, 25
UNHCR ExCom member: Yes
African Refugee Convention: Yes
Population: 36.9 Million
GDP: $29.3 billion
GDP per capita: $794
Kenya . Statistics .
Introduction Kenya hosted nearly 319,400 refugees
and asylum seekers. About 196,200 were Somalis who
began fleeing the civil war and state failure that followed
the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. Another upsurge
followed Ethiopia’s overthrow of the Islamic Courts
Union in December 2006. Even after Kenya’s closure of
the border in January, some 2,000 managed to enter
clandestinely. There were more than 25,600 Somali applicants
out of the total of nearly 34,200 new applications
for asylum, which also included 5,400 Ethiopians and
2,200 Sudanese.
Kenya also hosted about 100,000 stateless Nubians,
descendants of Sudanese whom the British conscripted
in the early 1900s, and a number of stateless
children of mixed Eritrean-Ethiopian marriages.
Refoulement/Physical
Protection In January, Kenyan
police forced more than 700 refugees
back to Somalia from the border
towns of Liboi and Kiunga and
more at Garissa, arresting most
of them in UNHCR-run transit
centers after the agency had registered them a few days
earlier. The police chased UNHCR’s contractors away
and beat refugees who resisted. Kenya closed the border,
leaving 5,000 to 7,000 stranded on the other side.
Authorities reportedly deported suspected Somali terrorists
to Ethiopia without hearings. In May, Ethiopian
authorities admitted holding 41 of them but said they
released most by year’s end.
In February, officials in Moyale District forcibly returned
some 1,000 to 2,000 Ethiopians who fled communal
fighting in the Yabalo region with their cattle after Ethiopian
officials promised their safety.
In November, authorities detained 49 Somalis at the
Nairobi airport, denied them access to UNHCR, reportedly
beat some, and forcibly returned 23 of them. After the rest
went on a hunger strike in protest and Kenyan nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) won a court order prohibiting
their refoulement, authorities placed them in Dadaab
refugee camp.
Kenya also forcibly repatriated one refugee from the
Democratic Republic of Congo and two Ethiopian asylum
seekers.
Security forces reportedly raped women in refugee
camps. There were also reports of rape, domestic violence,
and crimes between refugees, as well as some attacks against
refugees during the presidential elections. Refugees significantly
under-reported sexual and gender based violence. In
January, four local residents reportedly shot and severely
wounded a refugee in Kakuma camp. According to the
U.S. State Department, some persecuted refugee converts
to Christianity, and there was community pressure against
opponents of female genital cutting and forced and early
F
107

marriage. Reportedly, a Somali group linked to Al Qaeda
worked in Dadaab and authorities caught Islamic fighters
at the border trying to enter.
Kenya was party to the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol but maintained
reservations on the Convention’s clauses exempting
refugees from exceptional and provisional measures and
providing the right to work, labor protection, social security,
and administrative assistance. It was also party to the 1969
Convention governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa. In May, the 2006 Refugees Act went
into force but, after the elections, there was no Minister
for Immigration and Registration of Persons to promulgate
implementing regulations. Nevertheless, authorities
cited a requirement for asylum seekers to register within
30 days of entry to deport the refugees in Garissa and
elsewhere. The Government referred asylum seekers who
applied under the Act to UNHCR, which continued to
conduct refugee status determinations and run the camps
at Kakuma and Dadaab.
In December, the Government appointed a Commissioner
for Refugee Affairs. Under the Act, he was to
receive, process, and decide applications for refugee status.
The Act recognized as refugees those with wellfounded
fears of persecution on 1951 Convention grounds
and, prima facie, those compelled to leave their countries
because of serious disturbances in part or the whole of such
countries. The Act specifically authorized the immigration
minister to declare entire classes of persons to be refugees
prima facie. It prohibited refusal of entry or return in any
manner of persons to countries where they might be subject
to persecution or where serious disturbances of public order
would threaten their lives or liberty.
F
Detention/Access to
Courts Kenyan authorities
detained at least 800 refugees and
asylum seekers for illegal entry and
stay. UNHCR was able to monitor
some detention facilities when officials,
the refugees’ family members
or friends, or NGOs informed the agency that authorities
were holding refugees or asylum seekers and on other
occasions but did not monitor police stations in Nairobi
systematically. Monitoring in locations where the agency
did not have a permanent presence was less frequent.
In December, authorities denied UNHCR access to
49 Somali asylum seekers they were holding at the Nairobi
airport. After Kituo Cha Sheria, a legal service NGO, filed a
judicial review, the court allowed 26 of the asylum seekers
to go to Dadaab refugee camp.
The Refugees Act authorized the Commissioner
for Refugee Affairs to arrest people suspected of offenses
under it but prohibited the detention or punishment of
any “person claiming to be a refugee” for illegal entry or
proceedings for unlawful presence against those who had
filed bona fide applications for refugee status or their family
members. It also required the issuance of identity cards or
passes to “every refugee and asylum seeker” and called for
the Commissioner for Refugee Affairs to register and issue
identity cards to refugees. In 2005, the Government had
issued such documents to the refugees in Kakuma and, in
2006, issued some 30,000 refugees in Nairobi slips similar
to those it issued Kenyans prior to granting identity cards.
Although, the Government had registered the refugees in
Dadaab in 2006, it did not issue them identity documents.
In January 2008, the Government started issuing identity
cards to Somali refugees in Nairobi. UNHCR registered
newly arriving refugees in Dadaab.
In Nairobi, UNHCR provided nearly 2,200 Mandate
Refugee Certificates which served as identity cards for registered
asylum seekers. However, refugees recognized under
UNHCR’s mandate did not have full protection under the
1951 Convention.
Freedom of Movement
and Residence Kenya confined
the vast majority of refugees
to desolate refugee camps around
Dadaab and Kakuma but also began
F
to allow those in Nairobi to register
without being in camps. Camp
refugees could receive permission to leave for higher education,
specialized medical care, or security. Police checked
papers outside camps to enforce movement restrictions
and, throughout the country, police stopped vehicles and
engaged in extortion, requiring additional identification
from Somalis. Many refugees lived in Nairobi but reported
police harassment and often had to bribe their way out of
arrest or deportation.
UNHCR and local officials issued Movement
Passes for refugees to leave the camps temporarily, typically
for medical or other purposes, or for newly arrived
refugees traveling to the camp. The processing took about
two weeks, passes expired before they reached the refugees,
and authorities ignored applications. There were more restrictions
on refugees in Dadaab, which hosted a majority
of Somalis, than in Kakuma camp, which hosted mostly
Sudanese.
About 3,800 who received refugee status from the
Government before 1990, however, did enjoy freedom of
movement and choice of residence.
The Refugees Act provided that the immigration
minister could establish camps and transit centers but
required notice in the Gazette, consultation with the host
community, and that they be maintained “in an environmentally
sound manner.” It called upon the Commissioner
to manage them and to ensure sustainable use of resources
in their areas. Refugees residing outside such areas without
authorization were subject to fines up to 20,000 shillings
108

($310) or six months in prison or both. The Government
deployed managers to the two major camps but did not give
notice in the Gazette.
Pre-1990 refugees were eligible for international
travel documents from the Government and UNHCR processed
nearly 60 requests for refugees it recognized under
its mandate but authorities generally did not consider applications
from Somalis.
Jobs
Right to Earn a Livelihood
Refugees recognized
by UNHCR were not eligible for
work permits and it was unlawful
for them to engage in economic
activity. Police and local council
law enforcement occasionally
harassed and extorted bribes from those who attempted
petty trade.
Kenya maintained reservations on the 1951
Convention’s right to work but only to allow protectionist
restrictions on refugee employment for four years
instead of the three the Convention allowed and to reject
its requirement to give sympathetic consideration to assimilating
refugee rights to those of nationals. It was still
obliged to accord refugees “the most favorable” treatment
accorded to nationals of foreign countries. Under the
Immigration Act, the Government allowed class M work
permits to refugees it recognized prior to 1990 but it did
not issue new work permits nor did it renew expired ones
in 2007. The Refugees Act subjected refugees to the same
wage-earning employment restrictions as other foreigners
and called upon the Commissioner to ensure that refugee
economic activities did not have a negative impact upon
host communities.
Kenya’s reservation to the 1951 Convention’s extension
of social security and compensation for death from
job-related injuries and diseases was only that it apply them
“as far as the law allows.” The reservation, however, did not
cover the Convention’s requirement that Kenya extend equal
treatment to refugees under its labor legislation. Nevertheless,
most refugees did not enjoy such protection. They
also lacked documentation to acquire land, bank accounts,
vehicles, and other assets.
2+5=7
D
Public Relief and Education
While the first of thousands
of Somali asylum seekers who entered
after the border closure could
register with UNHCR for food and
medical services in the camps, authorities
halted this by June.
Malnutrition rates in children under 5 were more
than 22 percent in Dadaab and nearly 16 percent in Kakuma.
The anemia rate for children under 5 was 78 percent and
nearly 73 percent among women.
Officials from UNHCR, Kenya, and Sudan restricted
education for Sudanese refugees to encourage them to repatriate.
Camp residents received free health services, but
if refugees used public services outside the camps without
a referral, the facilities would charge them as foreigners.
The Government provided the same free primary education
to both refugees and nationals but some schools charged
refugees fees.
Kenya did not include refugees in the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper it prepared for international donors,
but its UN Development Assistance Framework for
2009-2013 included implementation of the Refugees Act
and refugee governance in its first priority area, Improving
Governance and the Realization of Human Rights. The
Refugees Act also called upon the Commissioner for Refugee
Affairs to initiate projects promoting harmony between
host communities and refugees and to advise the immigration
minister on soliciting funds for refugee programs that
helped host communities.
Kuwait
Refugees and Asylum Seekers: 51,000
Iraq 45,000
Former Palestine 6,000
1951 Convention: No
1967 Protocol: No
UNHCR Executive Committee: No
Population: 2,800,000
GDP: $111.3 billion
GDP per capita: $39,800
Kuwait . Statistics .
Introduction Although Kuwait continued to reject
categorically Iraqi asylum seekers, it hosted around 45,000
Iraqis most of whom entered on 3-month visit visas and
then overstayed. An estimated 6,000 Palestinians lived
in Kuwait, many of them having arrived between 1948
and 1967, although the Government considered them
expatriates. Kuwait hosted an undetermined number of
Ahwazi Arabs from Iran.
Refoulement/ Physical Protection There
were no reports of refoulement in 2007. Kuwait did not
deport persons who claimed to fear persecution in their
home countries. There were no reports of wrongful death
109

of or injury to any refugees or asylum
seekers in Kuwait.
The number of Iraqis contacting
the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UN-
B
HCR) continued to increase throughout
2007. In January, UNHCR estimated
at 30,000 the number of Iraqis on visit visas, which
offered the only way to enter Kuwait for asylum. Only 300
Iraqis had registered with UNHCR at the beginning of the
year, but as many as 10 new cases opened each month,
with most of the newcomers entering on 3-month visit
visas. Many Iraqis returned to their country after their
visas expired, reentering later to avoid violating Kuwaiti
residency laws. Others contacted UNHCR, which intervened
to prevent Kuwait from deporting asylum seekers.
Since Kuwait immigration regulations prohibited local
settlement, UNHCR submitted the cases for resettlement
to third countries.
Kuwait was party to neither the 1951Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees nor its 1967 Protocol.
There was no national system to determine refugee status,
but the Government worked with UNHCR to allow some
protection to refugees and asylum seekers. Kuwait ratified
the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
and its two Protocols (the Protocol of Suppression and
Punishment of Trafficking of Women and Children as well
as the Protocol against Emigrant Trafficking). Kuwait was
a destination country for trafficked persons, primarily from
Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines but also
from Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Under the provision of the 1959 Alien Residence
Law, Kuwait regarded refugees as foreign residents, reserving
the right to deport them, like all foreigners, without
trial, if they threatened public security, the public interest,
or morals.
In March, UNHCR conducted a training course in
refugee law for Ministry of Interior (MOI) personnel.
B
Detention/Access to
Courts In January, Kuwait’s
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour
detained 259 workers for violating
residency laws, including 6 stateless
persons and 3 on visit visas.
Kuwait detained asylum seekers,
but did not forcibly return them to countries where they
feared persecution.
B
Freedom of Movement
and Residence In March,
Kuwait allowed UNHCR to build
emergency camps to segregate potential
refugee inflows from Iraq from
the local population.
Security forces occasionally set up checkpoints to
check for illegal immigrants and to detain undocumented
aliens. Recognized “expatriates” (refugees) holding legal
residence permits and UNHCR protection certificates
could move freely throughout the country.
Although the Constitution provided for residents’
rights of freedom of movement and residence, in practice
some workers complained they could not leave their residential
camps.
Right to Earn a Livelihood
Recognized “expatriates”
holding legal residence
permits and UNHCR protection
certificates could work under a
Kuwaiti sponsor. Each national
could sponsor up to five foreign
workers.
The Government granted workers the right to
unionize but excluded over half a million domestic servants
and an unknown number of marine employees. It ruled
further that each occupational trade could have only one
union. Foreign private sector workers could join but not
lead unions.
Foreign workers had to live under the sponsorship
of a registered Kuwaiti company, and could not change employers
without the latter’s approval during their first two
years in Kuwait.
Labor laws did not protect domestic workers from
abuse. Police reportedly arrested and indefinitely detained
dozens of domestic servants for alleged immigration violations
after they ran away from abusive employers. They fell
under the jurisdiction of the MOI rather than the Ministry
of Social Affairs and Labor, which regarded such cases as
criminal matters rather than labor disputes. Employers
also routinely withheld passports and threatened deportation
to pressure foreign employees to drop court cases
against them.
In early 2008, a prominent opposition MP
proposed doing away with sponsorship requirements
for expatriates who had lived in Kuwait for 40 years or
more.
Public Relief and Education
Kuwait did not have a
2+5=7
system of public relief for foreigners.
The neediest refugees received
assistance from UNHCR, which assisted
the Kuwaiti Red Crescent and
the government-run Zakat House
in providing basic humanitarian aid. Unlike nationals,
foreigners had to pay yearly fees to the Ministry of Health
for medical coverage to obtain or renew residency or work
permits. They also had to pay additional fees each time they
received medical care.
Jobs
D
110

Lebanon
Refugees and Asylum Seekers 325,800
Former Palestine 270,800
Iraq 50,200
Sudan 4,500
New Asylum Seekers 28,300
Departures 800
1951 Convention: No
1967 Protocol: No
UNHCR Executive Committee: Yes
Population: 3,900,000
GDP: $24.6 billion
GDP per capita: $6,320
Lebanon . Statistics .
Introduction Lebanon hosted about 325,800 refugees
and asylum seekers, including some 270,800 Palestinians
who arrived after the 1948 creation of Israel, and
over 50,000 non-Palestinians from the Middle East and
Africa. The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) had registered roughly
411,000 Palestinian refugees, but this figure included
many who had acquired Lebanese citizenship or resided
outside Lebanon. Most Palestinian refugees lived in 12
refugee camps and in informal settlements throughout
the country.
The number of Iraqis more than doubled to
50,200, in part because of violence in Iraq and insecurity
in Syria. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) registered around 9,800 Iraqis and
referred nearly 1,500 for resettlement but many did not
register.
There were about 4,500 mostly unrecognized
Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers in the country and
about 340 registered with UNHCR.
F
Refoulement/Physical
Protection Lebanon forcibly
returned more than 300 refugees
and asylum seekers detained for
illegal entry or stay, including
more than 200 Iraqis. While the
Government claimed they returned
voluntarily, their choice was between repatriation and indefinite
detention. Authorities did not allow independent
monitoring of returns and did not regularly inform UNHCR
in advance. Authorities expelled one family of four with
refugee status to the Syrian border despite UNHCR’s request
for their release. A father and son who had registered with
UNHCR allegedly chose to repatriate to Iraq, but the son
returned to Lebanon after the father’s killing and his own
detention.
By June, the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), in cooperation with the Iraqi Embassy, had
returned 75 Iraqis, 70 of whom were in detention for illegal
status. In September, IOM suspended its participation in the
operation but also indicated that it might resume later.
The Sudanese Embassy reportedly visited Sudanese
detainees in prison in preparation to return them to
Sudan.
From May to September, fighting between the Lebanese
Armed Forces and the militant group Fatah al-Islam
(FAI) at Nahr al Bared Palestinian refugee camp in the north
left 168 soldiers and 42 civilians dead. The fighting later
spread to Ein al Hilweh camp. The army used heavy weapons
disproportionately during the conflict and shelled the camp
indiscriminately after its evacuation. The conflict displaced
over 32,000 refugees from the camp and surrounding areas.
In June, Lebanese security forces killed three Palestinian
demonstrators and injured about 50 more, as protesters
pushed through a military checkpoint to Nahr al Bared.
Security forces shot into the air, the crowd began throwing
rocks and sticks, and the soldiers opened fire upon them with
automatic weapons. Lebanese soldiers reportedly tortured
some who fled the camp. A nurse at Beddawi camp clinic
reported seeing 30 cases of abuse. One refugee reported
the army detained him at the Kobbeh military base for two
days before transporting him to what he believed was the
Ministry of Defense in Beirut. Prison officials accused him of
belonging to FAI, kept him blindfolded in a crowded prison
cell for eight days, beat him, and “twist[ed] his extremities
almost to the point where he lost consciousness.”
Lebanon was not party to the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, and
did not have a functioning refugee law in accord with international
standards. The 1962 Entry and Exit Law prohibited
refoulement of “political refugees” and provided that any
foreigner whose life or liberty was in danger for political
reasons could seek asylum. In theory, an inter-ministerial
committee headed by the Minister of Interior (MOI) would
handle political asylum cases, but few applied for asylum
and the Government granted political asylum in only one
known case in 2000 to a member of the Japanese Red Army.
Lebanon’s 2003 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with UNHCR declared that “Lebanon does not consider
itself an asylum country” and, under its mandate, UNHCR
carried out all refugee status determinations.
The MOU covered only refugees who entered the
country after it went into effect and precluded persons already
in the country legally from applying. It also did not
cover Iraqis under UNHCR’s temporary protection regime.
Lebanon permitted asylum seekers and refugees to remain
111

on the condition that UNHCR repatriate or resettle them.
Of those who entered illegally, the MOU covered only those
who applied for asylum with UNHCR within two months
of entry. A 2006 Ministry of Justice advisory generally
affirmed that the Government should not return refugees
recognized by UNHCR. UNHCR had three months to
make status determinations and had to hand in the list of
names of rejected applicants to the Directorate General of
the General Security (GSO). If UNHCR granted refugee
status, the MOU gave UNHCR six months to find countries
to accept the refugees for resettlement. During this
time, the Government issued circulation permits, which
it renewed only once “for a final period of three months
after which time the General Security would be entitled to
take the appropriate legal measures.” UNHCR rarely was
able to complete registration, status determination, and
resettlement within a year.
In February, UNHCR began granting all Iraqis from
central and southern Iraq prima facie recognition unless they
fell under one of the 1951 Convention’s exclusion clauses
and did not register them under the MOU as it did other
refugees.
A 1962 decree recognized most Palestinians as
“foreigners without identity documents from their countries
of origin residing in Lebanon on the basis of residence
cards issued by the GSO or by the General Directorate of
the Administration of Palestinian Refugee Affairs [renamed
the Directorate of Political Affairs and Refugees in 2000
(DAPR)].” Those whose families fled after 1948 or whose
first country of exile was not Lebanon generally could not
register.
F
Detention/Access to
Courts Between January and
April, there were 150 to 200 refugees
and asylum seekers in detention. By
November, detentions reached their
peak and there were reportedly more
than 1,200 foreigners in arbitrary
detention, including 760 in Internal Security Forces (ISF)
prisons and nearly 500 in GSO centers, most of whom
were Iraqis. Some 800 detainees were refugees and asylum
seekers, 90 percent of whom authorities detained for illegal
entry or stay.
Lebanon’s regulations stated that prison authorities
should refer foreign detainees who had completed their
sentence to the GSO, which would then decide to deport
or release them. Instead, authorities gave them the option
of remaining in prison or returning to their countries of
origin.
Soldiers arrested and detained Palestinians including
one from Nahr al Bared for four days, during which they
punched and slapped him and gave him food only twice.
Members of some Palestinian groups who controlled camps
also reportedly detained rivals during territorial clashes.
Lebanon’s prison conditions did not meet international
standards and medical services remained insufficient.
There were at least seven reported deaths in detention centers,
due to inadequate medical services and torture. In September,
a Sudanese man detained in Jbeil for illegal entry died of
a heart attack following his transfer to a hospital. In August,
three detainees in Rumieh prison died, including a Palestinian
accused of FAI membership. Family members reported
that he did not receive medical attention despite a gunshot
wound he sustained in the Nahr al Bared fighting.
The Government kept most detainees for illegal
entry at the overcrowded Rumieh prison. Although it
had a capacity of 1,500 to 2,000 people, it held between
2,000 and 3,000, some who had already served their sentences.
Overcrowding led to violence between refugees
and Lebanese prisoners, including serious cases in August
and December.
In February 2008, under an ad hoc arrangement
between the Government and UNHCR, the GSO gave Iraqis
who had entered the country illegally or overstayed their visas
three months to regularize their status, the same period it
granted illegal migrants. After UNHCR paid their fines for
illegal entry, £L951,300 (about $630) each, GSO released
155 Iraqi detainees in the month following the agreement.
To legalize, Iraqis not enrolled in school or those who did
not have a Lebanese spouse or parent would have to find
sponsors, obtain work authorizations, pay $300 residency
fees, present proof that a sponsor had paid a $1,000 bank
deposit on their behalf, and pay for medical tests and
insurance.
The 1926 Constitution, amended in 1990, assured
protection from arbitrary arrest, imprisonment,
and custody to all persons. The 1962 Entry and Exit Law
provided that GSO would issue special identity cards
to political refugees. The 2003 MOU provided that the
GSO would notify UNHCR of asylum seekers detained
“at its premises” and UNHCR could send “an explanatory
letter with the proper documents” if it wished to interview
other detainees. Authorities released refugees from
detention when UNHCR intervened if they had resettlement
prospects. If not, the Government detained them
indefinitely beyond the initial imprisonment sentence,
without judicial review. UNHCR and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) had access to detained refugees
and asylum seekers.
Although refugees and asylum seekers technically
had access to courts, those without status avoided them.
Lebanon granted immigration hearings to dozens at a
time, during which the judge called on them to respond
to questions about the legality of their entry or stay by
raising their hands or nodding. In criminal proceedings,
Lebanon provided legal aid to foreigners whose
home country provided the same to Lebanese nationals,
which excluded all Palestinians. UNHCR provided legal
aid for 136 cases, mostly involving illegal entry and
112

stay, while others involved arbitrary detention, criminal
offences, and civil law cases. In at least two cases, the court
dropped charges of illegal entry against UNHCR-recognized
Iraqi refugees.
C
Freedom of Movement
and Residence During the
conflict in Nahr al Bared camp,
the Lebanese army forced some
30,000 Palestinian refugees to relocate.
The majority moved either
to Beddawi camp in the north, to
schools set up by UNRWA, or to relatives in other camps.
In November, the military allowed about 1,800 families
to return to a section of the camp on the periphery but
sealed off the center.
Most non-Palestinian refugees could not move
freely within the country for fear of arrest. The Government
restricted movement mostly at checkpoints, where many
police and military officials did not respect UNHCR documents,
especially after the conflict in Nahr al Bared.
Under the MOU, GSO issued 52 circulation permits
to non-Palestinian refugees and asylum seekers who entered
illegally pending UNHCR’s determination of their status.
More than 400, however, were eligible for them but did not
receive them. The Government could also issue circulation
permits pending resettlement, which it renewed only once
for a maximum of 12 months. UNHCR no longer requested
circulation permits from GSO for those Iraqis it recognized
prima facie. It gave them refugee certificates but these did not
afford the same benefits and did not exempt bearers from
penalties for illegal presence.
The Government gave all UNRWA-registered Palestinian
refugees and their descendents renewable five-year
travel documents. Palestinian refugees registered with DAPR
received travel documents valid for one year. In 2006, GSO
stated that refugees who obtained foreign passports could
still keep their travel documents.
Two Palestinians survey the damage from fighting in a building next to Ein al Hilweh refugee camp. Fighting
spread to the camp from Nahr al Bared camp in June.
Credit: AP/M.Zaatari
113

Jobs
The Government did not issue international
travel documents to non-Palestinian refugees except for
resettlement.
D
Right to Earn a Livelihood
In general, Lebanon did not
allow refugees to work legally. Many
joined the informal black market
as unskilled laborers. Women and
adolescent children often provided
for families in illegal status as they
were at less risk for arrest. While domestic labor legislation
existed, most refugees could not use it for fear of arrest. Under
Lebanese law, courts could sentence anyone who entered
the country and worked illegally to at least one month in
jail and a fine.
Non-Palestinian refugees in the country legally
had to apply to the Ministry of Labor (MOL) for work
permits as foreigners. They had to be experts or professionals
in a field where no Lebanese candidates were
available, to be residents of Lebanon since 1954, or to
work in a company for at least nine consecutive months
during the year. Professions practiced through association,
such as medicine, law, and accounting, were open only
to Lebanese with few exceptions. Lebanon also offered
work permits to foreigners married to Lebanese women
for at least a year or to those who had Lebanese mothers
or were of Lebanese descent.
From March to June, refugees and asylum seekers
with employer-sponsors and work permits could
regularize their status, but only to that of migrant
workers and they also had to withdraw their asylum
applications or refugee status. It did not extend legal
status to family members and there was no assurance
of renewal.
In 2005, the MOL partially repealed restrictions
prohibiting Palestinian refugees from working in 70
types of jobs. The edict covered about two-thirds of the
occupations previously restricted, generally the low- to
medium-skilled ones. To obtain a work permit, a Palestinian
had to have been born in Lebanon, have registered
with the MOI, and have a contract with a specific
employer. Annual fees for work permits ranged from
£L240,000 (about $160) for workers earning below the
minimum wage of £L300,000 (about $200) per month
to £L960,000 (about $640) for workers earning twice
the minimum and £L1,800,000 (about $1,205) for consultants,
experts, general directors, or heads of accounts.
Registered Palestinians had to pay only a fourth of those
fees, but were ineligible for social security because of a
requirement that foreigners’ home states give reciprocal
benefits to Lebanese: since the Palestinians had no home
state they were automatically ineligible but still had to
contribute to it. The edict did not change a 1964 law that
also imposed a reciprocity condition on membership in
professional syndicates—a precondition for employment
in professions such as law, medicine, engineering, and
journalism- which also effectively excluded Palestinians.
Few Palestinians received work permits and,
if they did, it was normally for unskilled employment.
Many worked illegally, especially in construction and
agriculture.
The amended Constitution of 1926 promised
protection of property rights to all. Foreigners, including
refugees, could own limited plots of land but they had to
fulfill special legal requirements, including the approval of
five different district offices. An amendment made in 2001
to the Property decree of 1969 allowed foreigners to acquire
property only if they came from countries that granted reciprocal
rights to Lebanese. This excluded Palestinians from
acquiring or bequeathing property to their heirs. Banks
required nonresident foreigners to have a valid entry visa
to open an account but refugees could register vehicles in
their names at the MOI.
Public Relief and Education
Palestinians in Nahr al Bared
did not have running water, sewage,
or electricity for weeks during the
conflict and health clinics were
not operational. Lebanon had the
highest percentage of Palestinian
refugees living in abject poverty and the worst was inside
the 12 camps. Some 5,000 non-ID Palestinians were not
eligible for its assistance and reportedly could not graduate
from secondary school.
There were no reports that the Government
restricted humanitarian agencies’ access to refugees, but
there was no public assistance for refugees. FAI attacked
the staff of international humanitarian agencies that
tried to enter the camp. In May, FAI’s attack against a
UN aid convoy resulted in the death of two Palestinian
refugees. The 2003 MOU required UNHCR to provide
“the necessary assistance” to refugees holding circulation
permits to avoid their being “a burden on the Lebanese
Government.” Palestinian refugees were not eligible for
Government health services or education but UNRWA ran
25 health clinics.
A 1999 Ministry of Education decree granted
all refugee children access to primary and secondary
schools if space was available. The schools required
all refugee children to have identification certificates
issued by UNHCR. UNHCR and its partners provided
educational grants to refugee families with primary
school-aged children. Only around 10,000 Palestinian
refugee children enrolled in either private or public
elementary and secondary schools. UNHCR aided non-
Palestinian refugee children in primary and secondary
schools. UNRWA ran about 86 schools for Palestinian
refugees.
2+5=7
114

Liberia
Refugees and Asylum Seekers 11,000
Côte d’Ivoire 6,900
Sierra Leone 3,600
New Asylum Seekers 50
Departures 5,700
1951 Convention: Yes
1967 Protocol: Yes
Reservations: None
UNHCR Executive Committee: No
African Refugee Convention: Yes
Population: 3.8 million
GDP: $730 million
GDP per capita: $192
Introduction Liberia hosted around 11,000 refugees
and asylum seekers, including about 6,900 from Côte
d’Ivoire and 3,600 from Sierra Leone. The rest came from
Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Nigeria, Iraq, and other countries.
Many refugees from Côte d’Ivoire escaped the conflict
that broke out in 2002 and those from Sierra Leone fled
a decade-long civil war.
Most Ivorians lived in Grand Gedeh, Maryland,
and Nimba Counties, but some lived in the UNHCR-supported
Saclepea camp and the Barraken refugee village.
Most Sierra Leoneans lived in Samukai, VOA (so named
because it was near the Voice of America broadcasting
facilities), and Banjor refugee camps outside Monrovia.
Following a March peace accord in Côte d’Ivoire,
several thousand repatriated. Many Sierra Leoneans also
repatriated but the Government agreed to allow the 2,600
remaining to naturalize, which three-fourths accepted, but
the Government did not naturalize them.
A
Liberia . Statistics .
Refoulement/Physical
Protection There were no
reports of refoulement.
In January and February,
UNHCR and the G overnment
screened close to 1,800 Ivorian
asylum seekers who had arrived in
2002. The Government recognized about 1,200 as refugees
prima facie and moved them to Saclepea camp, but denied
status to 600 who had not arrived in Liberia during the Ivorian
conflict. The Government allowed them to appeal and
remain in the country until it reviewed their cases.
Liberia was party to the 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention), without reservation,
its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 Convention Governing
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Liberia’s
1993 Refugee Act incorporated the definitions of a refugee
from both Conventions and allowed for group classification.
It offered refugees all the rights in the Conventions, but also
allowed the Government to expel them if “necessary or desirable
on the grounds of national security or public order.” It
required applicants to submit claims through UNHCR and
established an Asylum Committee to decide them in 30 days.
According to the law, rejected applicants could appeal within
14 days to the Appeal Committee or within 21 days to the
Supreme Court, and could remain in the country for at least
90 days after rejection to pursue an appeal or admission to
another country. The Government reactivated the Asylum
and Appeal Committees, however, only in December 2007
since the 2003 civil war and it could not review any of the
nearly 100 pending applications.
Under the Refugee Act, UNHCR, could only receive
applications, conduct asylum seeker interviews, and screen
appeals. However, in one emergency case, it granted status
under its mandate to one refugee and immediately referred
the refugee for resettlement.
Detention/Access to
Courts Authorities detained at
least four refugees for illegal entry
and inadequate documentation,
including two Sierra Leoneans police
stopped for loitering and detained
because they did not recognize their
refugee identification. Officers detained five refugees at
border points and allegedly extorted money from them, including
three Ivorians, one Togolese, and one Sierra Leonean.
An immigration official involved in the extortion evaded
investigators and remained at large.
The 1983 Constitution’s equal protection and
due process provisions applied to all persons, including
refugees. Although refugees enjoyed access to courts and
to legal services provided by the Government, the judicial
and correctional systems in the country generally remained
debilitated by decades of war.
Liberia issued identification documents to officially
recognized refugees, and law enforcement officials usually
accepted them. While approximately 7,600 refugees received
identity documents, about 5,600 did not because they were
either absent during the issuing process or had left the country.
Asylum seekers received attestation letters, which they
had to renew every three months.
Freedom of Movement
and Residence Refugees and
asylum seekers moved freely throughout
Liberia and could choose their
place of residence, but UNHCR provided
aid only to camp residents.
B
C
115

Jobs
The 1983 Constitution guaranteed freedom of
movement and choice of residence to “every person … subject
however to the safeguarding of public security, public
order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others.” The Refugee Act allowed the Government to designate
places for refugees, asylum applicants, and their families
to live and allowed regulations to enforce such designations
but also provided “this shall, however, not preclude the right
of any refugee to live in any place of his choice.”
With the permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
UNHCR issued eight international travel documents for
medical reasons in addition to repatriation and resettlement.
Refugees had to prove that they had obtained their visa from the
destination country and had sufficient means to purchase their
tickets and to sustain themselves during their stay to qualify.
C
Right to Earn a Livelihood
The Refugee Act granted
refugees only the same right to work
as other noncitizens but exempted
them from measures to protect the
national labor force and even allowed
regulations requiring employers
to favor refugees over other non-nationals.
The national Labor Law, however, prohibited employers
from hiring non-Liberians unless they obtained work
permits (and professional licenses for medical and business
activities), and the Ministry of Labor issued work permits only
if it determined that no Liberian was qualified for the position.
Both refugees and asylum seekers could apply for work permits,
but had to pass an interview and pay an application fee of $100.
If approved, they had to pay $400 to obtain the permit. The
Ministry of Labor could withhold a permit if a refugee’s country
of origin did not grant reciprocal rights to Liberians.
If they obtained work permits, refugees enjoyed the
same rights and labor protections as nationals, including access
to social security, unemployment benefits, and disability insurance.
Refugees could also obtain licenses and own businesses
like nationals, paying equivalent fees, although the General
Business Law of Liberia reserved 26 business activities for citizens
alone. In practice, however, refugees were able to conduct
petty trade and other activities in the informal sector.
The 1983 Constitution reserved the rights of equal
employment opportunity and treatment at work to citizens.
While refugees could freely acquire and transfer movable and
immovable properties under the Constitution, only Liberian
citizens could legally own real estate in Liberia.
Public Relief and Education Liberia provided
public relief to refugees on par with nationals, including
health services introduced nationally in November.
The Government coordinated the access of humanitarian
aid agencies to refugees and asylum seekers and did not
restrict agencies that abided by its policies.
UNHCR and other organizations provided food,
housing, education, and health
2+5=7
services to refugees in camps. However,
after the end of the voluntary
repatriation program for Sierra
Leonean refugees in 2004, UNHCR
formally closed the Samukai, VOA,
and Banjor camps, and ceased aid
but provided self-sufficiency training, hand pumps, and
toilets and replaced plastic sheeting on shelters. A Christian
group provided medical services to more than 200 Sierra
Leoneans remaining in the VOA camp.
UNHCR also offered assistance to needy refugees
including medical evacuation, counseling, and legal aid.
UNHCR did not aid 500 Somalis because they had not applied
for asylum.
The Government mandated free and compulsory
primary education for all children, including refugees and
asylum seekers but could only provide it to some. UNHCR
and humanitarian groups provided free primary education to
refugees in camps, except those living in the Sierra Leonean
camps outside Monrovia.
The Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs
included the local integration of Sierra Leonean refugees in
the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper it prepared for
international donors. In the section on national security,
it set a goal of integrating more than 3,500 Sierra Leonean
refugees by June 2008 through residence permits, citizenship,
and enhancing “legislative and general support and
acceptance.” In the section on governance and rule of law,
it aimed to reactivate its Asylum and Appeal Committees
by the same date, and to have local organizations absorb
the responsibilities of UNHCR and others for managing
refugees by December 2008.
Libya
Refugees and Asylum Seekers 16,000
Former Palestine 9,000
Sudan 3,200
Somalia 2,500
Iraq 1,100
New Asylum Seekers 2, 700
1951 Convention: No
1967 Protocol: No
Executive Committee: No
African Refugee Convention: Yes
Population: 6.2 million
GDP: $57.1 billion
GDP per capita: $9,200
Libya . Statistics .
116

Introduction Libya hosted about 16,000 refugees,
mainly Palestinians, Sudanese, Somalis and Iraqis.
F
Refoulement/Physical
Protection In July, Libya
forcibly repatriated a number of
Eritreans and throughout the year,
returned others to countries where
they risked persecution, and collectively
deported thousands it suspected
of illegal entry without giving them the opportunity
to seek asylum.
In March, the Government threatened to deport
Palestinian refugees to the Gaza Strip in response to a
Saudi peace initiative that it feared would stem Palestinians’
right of return and “liquidate the Palestinian
cause.”
In January 2008, the Government threatened to
deport summarily all foreigners without legal status—possibly
more than a million people—including many from
Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan, claiming that none of them
was a refugee.
There were reports that authorities beat, raped,
and sexually abused refugees in detention and that some
may have died in custody from such treatment. An
estimated 1,900 died attempting to migrate irregularly
from Libya to Europe in 2007, down from nearly 2,100
the year before. On two occasions in May, Libya refused
to rescue at least two boats of migrants in distress in its
territorial waters. In one case, the 57 Eritreans made it
back to shore where authorities arrested them and put
them in jail. In the other, even though Libyan authorities
said they would send a boat for them, some 27 West
Africans clung to the net of a tuna boat for at least 24
hours before an Italian vessel picked them up. In June,
authorities ignored the distress call of another boat carrying
29 Eritreans.
Libya was not party to the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees or its Protocol but was party to
the 1969 Convention governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa. It also endorsed the 1965
Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States
(Casablanca Protocol) but with reservations on its first
article guaranteeing the right to work on par with nationals.
A 1989 law granted Arab citizens the same rights
granted to Libyans. Although the 1969 Constitutional
Proclamation prohibited the extradition of “political
refugees” and the 1991 Endorsement of Freedom Law offered
“shelter for oppressed people and those struggling
for freedom,” Libya had no law on granting refugee status
and the Government claimed there were no political
refugees in the country.
Libya had no Memorandum of Understanding
with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) but did allow UNHCR to conduct
refugee status determinations (RSDs) under its mandate
and issue letters of attestation to those it granted.
An increase in applications, however, contributed to
an eight-month delay for an appointment with the
agency.
Libya had readmission agreements with Italy
and the United Kingdom, cooperated closely with the
EU border agency Frontex and other European countries
to block migrants, and entered into an agreement in December
for six Italian naval ships to patrol its coast with
Libyan sailors on board to interdict irregular migrants.
According to Human Rights Watch, such cooperation
was “often without adequate regard for the rights of migrants
or the need to protect refugees and others at risk
of abuse on return to their home countries.” Libya also
reportedly had a tacit agreement with Eritrea to return
its nationals and allowed the International Organization
for Migration to open an EU-funded center in March
2008 to return migrants as “a complementary concept
to deportations.”
Detention/Access to
Courts Libya maintained detention
camps and reportedly held
and threatened to repatriate about
500 Eritreans, including over 50
F
women and children. In June,
after ignoring their ship's distress
calls, authorities reportedly arrested and jailed more
than 50 Eritreans who made it back to shore. In July,
authorities arrested some 70 asylum seekers and held
them in Al Zawiyah, about 24 miles (40 km) west of
Tripoli. When the Government arrested people for illegal
entry, it did not formally charge them and they usually
remained in detention indefinitely or until deportation.
While most had no access to a lawyer or opportunity to
challenge their detention in court, authorities did bring
those charged with common crimes or captured trying
to enter Malta or Italy before a court.
The Government allowed UNHCR to visit three
detention centers. However, it severely limited access to
all detention centers for independent monitoring. In
August, UNHCR conducted an RSD and resettlement
mission in the Misurata holding center. According to the
U.S. State Department, conditions in migrant detention
centers reportedly improved since 2005, in particular,
medical services.
Refugees received no government documents
affirming their right to stay in the country. UNHCR issued
refugees letters attesting to their protected status
but authorities did not always recognize them. A 2005
law allowed foreigners and refugees UNHCR recognized
to receive a permit (red card) for a stay of up to three
months while they fulfilled the necessary requirements
for a residence permit (green card).
117

Jobs
Freedom of Movement
and Residence Libya had no
refugee camps, having shut down
the last one in 2004, but police harassed
those who lacked residence
permits or identity documents when
traveling. Refugees could not obtain
residence permits, however, without
regular work contracts.
Libya issued no international travel documents to
refugees.
Right to Earn a Livelihood
Libya had no law allowing
refugees to work. It maintained a
reservation to the article of the 1965
Casablanca Protocol that would
grant Palestinian refugees the right
to work on par with nationals and
instead offered parity with other Arab citizens.
Law 6 of 1987, amended by Law 2 of 2004, required
foreigners, without exception for refugees, to have contracts
with employers in order to work, proof that Libyans could
not fill the positions, health certificates verifying that they
had no contagious diseases including HIV/AIDS, and registration
with tax authorities.
In general, refugees did not have the right to run
businesses, obtain necessary licenses, or own property, but
the Government allowed a few Palestinian and Iraqi refugees
to run businesses.
2+5=7
C
D
Public Relief and Education
UNHCR gave time-limited
subsistence allowances only to the
poorest refugees. International
nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) were not present in Libya
and local ones were more interested
in refugees in Chad, Guinea, and Pakistan, but, in February,
UNHCR concluded a partnership agreement with the
Libyan NGO, International Organization for Peace, Care and
Relief. UNHCR sponsored self-reliance activities, including
microcredit agricultural schemes, vocational training, and
apprenticeships to phase out protracted aid. Palestinian
refugees received free health services and education from
the Government, while other refugees received health services
through UNHCR. After allowing all Arabic-speaking
students to attend primary and secondary schools for free,
in July, the Government began charging foreigners high fees.
In November, however, the Government exempted refugee
children. In January 2008, as it threatened mass expulsions
of mostly African migrants, the Government also threatened
to fine and take other legal action against citizens who
sheltered them.
Malaysia
Refugees and Asylum Seekers: 155,700
Philippines 70,500
Myanmar 69,700
Indonesia 21,800
1951 Convention: No
1967 Protocol: No
UNHCR Executive Committee: No
Population: 27.2 million
GDP: $186.5 billion
GDP per capita: $6,860
Malaysia . Statistics .
Introduction Malaysia hosted nearly 70,000 refugees
from Myanmar, including 25,000 ethnic Chin, 20,000
Mon, and 12,000 Rohingya, and other minorities. It also
hosted about 70,000 Filipino Muslim refugees who fled
the Moro insurgency in the 1970s.
In October, 11 Thai Muslim refugees out of a
group of 131 who fled to Malaysia in August 2005 returned
to Thailand.
Refoulement/Physical
Protection Malaysia deported
nearly 2,300 refugees and asylum
seekers to Thailand, at least 14 of
whom Thai authorities deported on
F
to Myanmar. Myanmarese detained
three of the deportees upon their arrival
there. In deportations to Thailand, officials often gave
advance notice to traffickers who kidnapped the deportees or
bought them directly from immigration officials. Deportees
reported that immigration officials received 900 ringgits
(about $272) per person from traffickers. If they could afford
it, deportees could bribe the traffickers to return them
to Malaysia and one reported paying 1,800 ringgits (about
$543). Traffickers often sold those not able to pay to Thai
fishing boats, in the case of men, or brothels, in the case
of women. The Government said these deportations were
voluntary, but the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) could not always verify this and the harsh
conditions in Malaysia’s detention facilities made it likely
that not all were voluntary. In previous years, deportees who
were able to return to Malaysia reported that Myanmarese
officials detained them for up to five months, tortured them,
118

Myanmarese refugee mothers in Malaysia. The women had been detained by Malaysian authorities when they
tried to register the births of the children, but UNHCR intervened to secure their release.
Credit: UNHCR/E.Tan
and fined them from about 6,000 to 50,000 Myanmar kyats
($1,000 to $7,900).
The People’s Volunteer Corps (RELA) often injured
refugees and migrants during raids, including one Myanmarese
a RELA member blinded with a club. Victims and
rights groups accused RELA members of rapes, beatings,
theft, destroying UNHCR identity documents, and other
abuses. Members received a monthly stipend and an 80
ringgit ($24) bounty for every allegedly illegal migrant they
arrested. Also, a bus taking 46 Myanmarese detainees to
the border for deportation crashed in September, killing 5
detainees and the Malaysian bus driver, with 10 detainees
suffering broken bones and others minor injuries.
The Government had no procedure for granting
asylum or registering refugees. UNHCR handled all refugee
status determinations in Malaysia and issued plastic, tamperproof
cards to those it recognized as refugees. UNHCR gave
Myanmarese Rohingyas temporary protection as a group,
interviewing asylum seekers to establish their ethnicity.
UNHCR performed individual status determinations
for non-Rohingya asylum seekers under its mandate.
Rohingya refugees UNHCR recognized prima facie were not
eligible for resettlement. If the authorities arrested and detained
them, UNHCR gave them full interviews and those
that passed were eligible.
As UNHCR had no presence at the border, most
asylum seekers had to travel to Kuala Lumpur for determinations.
UNHCR conducted mobile registration exercises
in areas with high concentrations of refugees, but these did
not meet the need.
In 2005, Malaysia issued between 32,000 and
35,000 IMM13 work permits to Acehnese refugees and
migrants, which legalized their stay in the country. As the
Government allowed the Acehnese community to handle the
process instead of UNHCR, not all of the refugees recognized
by UNHCR received the permits. Following the 2005 sign-
119

ing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Free
Aceh Movement and the Indonesian Government, Acehnese
refugees began returning. There was no formal process for
doing so, and many had to purchase false passports to return.
Around 27,000 of the Acehnese remained and had to renew
their permits by late September 2007.
The Government continued to permit 70,000 refugees
from the Philippines' Moro insurgency of the 1970s to
remain in Sabah State. The Government did not grant them
citizenship, however, rendering their children stateless.
F
Detention/Access to
Courts Throughout the year, Malaysia
conducted raids and detained
refugees and asylum seekers along
with allegedly illegal migrants. At
any given time, an average of 730
refugees and asylum seekers were
in immigration detention. RELA conducted as many as 40
raids a night during the year, and through November it had
detained more than 30,000 purportedly illegal immigrants,
an increase from 25,000 in all of 2006. UNHCR managed to
win the release of nearly 1,200 refugees and asylum seekers
by the end of July.
In late February and early March, Malaysia detained
three refugee infants and five adults when the parents tried
to register the births. In late March, authorities released a
group of 25 refugees and asylum seekers, including 6 infants
less than two months old and their mothers.
In April, RELA raided a market in Kuala Lumpur
and detained 33 refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar
for illegal entry or lack of documentation, although
upon UNHCR’s intervention they released 2 mothers who
were nursing infants the same day. On June 25, RELA
launched a raid at 2 a.m. against the Chin Refugee Centre
and two neighborhoods where Chin refugees lived, arresting
nearly 230. Among the detainees were 30 children, 10
refugees slated for resettlement to the United States the
next day, 5 pregnant women, and a Chin refugee leader.
Malaysia released the Chin leader and the 10 refugees slated
for resettlement, but transferred the rest to the Semenyih
detention center.
In early August, Malaysia detained 300 Rohingya
refugees, including at least 150 recognized by UNHCR.
In October, Malaysian authorities arrested 8 Chin women
and 13 children after the vehicle they were traveling in was
involved in an accident.
Authorities continued to detain more than 120 Thai
Muslims who entered in 2005. Unless UNHCR secured their
release, Malaysia held detainees until they agreed to deportation:
in most cases about six months, although Malaysia
held some detainees for more than a year.
In November, the Government announced it was
transferring control of the immigration detention centers
back to the Immigration Department and that RELA members
would be staffing them until it could train full-time
staff, perhaps for as long as two years.
Detention centers for illegal immigrants remained
overcrowded with poor sanitation, insufficient food and
health services, and abusive guards. Detainees reported cells
designed for 4 people held 15 to 20 and that staff gave them
contaminated drinking water.
UNHCR was usually able to access detention centers,
and made several visits during the year. The Human
Rights Commission of Malaysia, a governmental body,
was able to visit detention centers but needed Government
approval. The Government did not generally
permit the International Committee of the Red Cross,
nongovernmental organizations, or the media to visit
prisons or monitor conditions. Refugees could challenge
their detention if they had legal representation.
UNHCR provided refugees with volunteer lawyers but,
as Malaysia had not ratified most relevant human rights
accords, they rarely won. Authorities did not permit
detainees to make phone calls upon arrest, so they generally
had to bribe a police officer to be able to inform
anyone of their arrest.
Refugees with UNHCR cards were usually safe from
arrest by regular police, although RELA still detained them.
Police still arrested asylum seekers occasionally, as they did
not always recognize the letters UNHCR issued asylum seekers.
Refugees were subject to prosecution under the 1959 Immigration
Act, which made no distinction between refugees
and illegal immigrants. Amendments to the Immigration Act
in 2002 provided for up to five years' imprisonment, along
with whipping up to six strokes, and fines of 10,000 ringgit
($3,020) for violations.
The Federal Constitution extended its protections
for individual liberty to all persons, but created an exception
whereby the 24 hours allowed authorities to bring a detainee
before a magistrate became two weeks in the case of an alien
detained under the immigration laws.
Freedom of Movement
and Residence Refugees
and asylum seekers recognized by
UNHCR enjoyed some freedom of
movement, although police sometimes
held refugees with UNHCR
D
cards until they paid bribes of
200 to 500 ringgits (about $60 to
$145). Authorities arrested those without cards while
they were moving about and during house-to-house or
workplace raids.
The Immigration Act prohibited renting housing to
illegal migrants. Refugees resided illegally where they found
jobs. Many Chin refugees lived in makeshift camps in the
jungle, near construction sites or other places of employment.
The law generally confined Filipino Muslim refugees
to the designated area of Sabah.
120

In March, the home minister called for the establishment
of closed camps for refugees and for UNHCR to
administer them.
Refugees did not receive international travel documents
except for resettlement.
Jobs
F
Right to Earn a Livelihood
Malaysia allowed Filipino
Muslims in Sabah and Acehnese
refugees to work, but not other
groups.
I n 2 0 0 5 , t h e G o vernment
issued between 32,000 and
35,000 IMM13 work permits to Acehnese migrants and
refugees from Indonesia. The permits cost between
162 and 180 ringgit (about $47 and $52), were valid
for two years, and were renewable. They did not permit
the refugees to engage in trade but did allow them to
work, attend school, and live in the country legally. The
permits did not tie their bearers to single employers. In
2006, the Government began to issue IMM13 permits to
Muslim Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, but stopped
amid accusations of bribery and corruption in the issuing
process. That left some 4,000 Rohingya holding
receipts proving they paid for IMM13 permits without
the permits themselves.
The Immigration Act penalized employers of illegal
immigrants with fines of about 10,000 to 50,000 ringgits
($3,020 to $15,100) or, if they employed more than five,
imprisonment from six months to five years and up to six
cane strokes. Through July, Malaysia had caned 30 refugees
and asylum seekers, an increase from 10 in all of 2006. In
May, a restaurateur filed suit against RELA for corruption and
abuse of power, alleging that a RELA member had detained
four of his staff and demanded a bribe of 2,000 ringgit
($604) for their release.
Many refugees worked in the informal sector without
legal protection and in unsafe conditions. In January, a
Chin refugee fell to his death on a construction site. Refugees
had no access to workers’ compensation, and medical
treatment for on the job injuries was at the discretion of
the employer.
Foreign workers with legal permits could join
unions, but the permits of most foreign workers tied them
to single employers, although this was not the case with
the IMM13 permits given to Acehnese or Filipino refugees.
Workers without legal status generally could not use the national
system of labor adjudication. If employers dismissed
foreign workers for any reason, they lost their permits, their
legal right to remain in Malaysia, and their right to pursue
legal action against abusive employers—despite court requests
that the Immigration Department grant them visas
to do so.
Malaysia also did not allow refugees to hold title
to or transfer business premises, farmland, homes, or other
capital assets. The Federal Constitution offered most of
its protections from arbitrary deprivation of property to
all persons, but reserved protection against discrimination
based on religion, race, descent, or place of birth in work,
trade, professional, or property matters and the right to form
associations to citizens.
Public Relief and Education
Malaysia did not provide
primary education or free health
services to most refugee children
or asylum seekers—not even those
born in Malaysia. Although the
IMM13 permits granted parents the
right to send their children to public schools, the Government
allowed them to attend only private schools.
Refugees with UNHCR documents received medical
services at half price. Refugees and asylum seekers with
HIV/AIDS received free treatment from the public health
service. Other than this, authorities provided no medical
care, public relief, rationing, or assistance, but did permit
independent humanitarian agencies to assist refugees.
Malaysia did not include refugees or asylum seekers
in the Ninth Malaysia Plan, the country’s primary economic
planning document, but it did include them in its National
Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS 2007-2010.
Mali
Refugees and Asylum Seekers 12,800
Mauritania 6,500
Côte d’Ivoire 3,300
Departures 100
1951 Convention: Yes
1967 Protocol: Yes
UNHCR Executive Committee: No
Population: 12.3 million
GDP: $6.8 million
GDP per Capita: $548
Mali . Statistics .
2+5=7
Introduction Mali hosted 6,500 Mauritanian refugees,
who mostly lived in the southwestern Kayes region
close to the Mauritanian border. Some 60,000 “black”
Mauritanians first fled ethnic violence to neighboring
Senegal and Mali in 1989. There were also 3,300 refugees
121

from Côte d’Ivoire, who arrived in 2002 after a rebellion in
the north effectively split the country in two. An undetermined
number of refugees from Guinea-Conakry entered
during the year. There were also some 2,100 asylum seekers
from several African countries.
In June, the Mauritanian Government decided
to allow an estimated 20,000 refugees to return home
from Mali and Senegal. Two Ivorian refugees repatriated
voluntarily, while another 12 resettled in Canada.
A
Refoulement/Physical
Protection There were no
reports of refoulement, deaths, or
serious danger to refugees.
Mali was party to the 1951
Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees (1951 Convention), its
1967 Protocol and the 1969 Convention governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, without
reservation. The Constitution granted the right of asylum
to those fleeing persecution.
With assistance from UNHCR, the Government
operated the National Commission in Charge of Refugees
(CNCR), whose meetings UNHCR attended as an observer.
Asylum seekers could apply in writing to CNCR directly
or through UNHCR. CNCR’s Eligibility Committee
interviewed applicants. Successful applicants received
recognition of their refugee status, conditional upon approval
from the Minister of Territorial Administration and
Local Communities. There was no independent body for
appeals, so CNCR heard them as well. Applicants could
use counsel. Refugees and asylum seekers detained for a
lack of documentation generally went free if they could
prove registration with CNCR
During the year, Mali granted refugee status to 60
out of nearly a hundred applicants and gave temporary
protection to more than 200 who were ineligible under the
1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol.
Detention/Access to
Courts There were no reports
of Mali detaining any refugees
during the year, but officials could
detain asylum seekers and refugees
without documents, in which case
they would notify UNHCR and
CNCR. These agencies jointly supervised the detention
of refugees and asylum seekers which typically did not
exceed 24 hours.
CNCR provided all recognized refugees with cards
issued by border police services, which were valid for three
years and which authorities respected. Upon applying to
CNCR or UNHCR, asylum seekers received temporary attestations
that served as identity cards and residence permits
for their stay in Mali.
Freedom of Movement
Refugees could move freely within
Mali and could live where they
chose, as there were no regulations
restricting them to camps.
A
At the onset of the 2002
refugee inflow from Côte d’Ivoire,
refugees set up camps across the country, but mainly near
the Mali-Côte d’Ivoire border in Zegoua, Loulouni, Sikasso,
Faragouaran, Kadiana, and Manankoro. The declining number
of refugees from Côte d’Ivoire led to the closure of one
camp in 2005, with the remaining 70 refugees moving to
the Faragouaran camp.
Police frequently stopped and checked citizens
and foreigners alike to restrict trafficking in contraband and
to check vehicle registrations. Some police and gendarmes
practiced extortion. By law, however, Mali, as a member of
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
was committed to “the free movement of persons, goods,
service and capital, and to the right of residence and establishment”
within ECOWAS member states.
Mali issued refugees with international travel authorization
upon receipt of a written application and proof of
means of travel. During the year, it granted such authorization
to one refugee.
Right to Earn a Livelihood
Article 13 of the 1998
Refugee Law granted refugees the
same rights as nationals regarding
access to the labor market,
with the exception of the civil
service. Mauritanian refugees
in the Kayes region were essentially self-supporting
through agricultural activity, growing corn, peanuts,
and other crops.
Refugees had the right to practice professions, establish
businesses, and acquire property. The Refugee Law gave
refugees access to social security on par with nationals.
Public Relief and Education
Refugees had the same
rights as nationals to obtain health
services. Teams of visiting health
workers educated, treated, and
immunized rural women and children
and distributed malaria nets.
Refugee children had the same access as nationals to public
education. The Association of former United Nations Volunteers
provided refugees with school supplies and paid
their enrolment fees.
Mali did not include refugees in its April 2008
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper prepared for international
donors.
Jobs
A
2+5=7
122

Mauritania
Refugees and Asylum Seekers 30,500
Morocco 26,000
Mali 3,500
1951 Convention: Yes
1967 Protocol: Yes
Reservations: None
UNHCR Executive Committee: No
African Refugee Convention: Yes
Population: 3.1 million
GDP: $2.8 billion
GDP per capita: $889
Introduction Mauritania hosted some 30,500 refugees
and asylum seekers, including about 26,000 ethnic
Sahrawis from the disputed Western Sahara held by
Morocco, many of whom moved back and forth from the
camps in Tindouf, Algeria. There were also about 3,500
Malians, and nearly 1,000 refugees and asylum seekers
recognized by the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) from various countries, including
Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia. There were also
about 130,000 migrants, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa,
following massive expulsions from Morocco and Algeria,
some of whom may have been refugees.
Most refugees and asylum seekers lived on the
outskirts of the two major urban centers: the capital,
Nouakchott; and the economic center, Nouadhibou on
the coast.
C
Mauritania . Statistics .
Refoulement/Physical
Protection Mauritania deported
at least two recognized refugees,
one from Côte d’Ivoire and
another from Liberia, to Senegal,
but both managed to return with
the help of smugglers. Another
refugee chose to repatriate after seven months' unjustified
imprisonment rather than remain in prison for another year
and a half; another, faced with the same choice, went to Mali
to seek asylum. The Government also helped the European
Commission and Spain repatriate thousands of migrants
trying to reach the Canary Islands.
Refugees and asylum seekers were likely among the
many migrants who attempted the dangerous crossing by
sea to the Canary Islands or the desert crossing to Morocco
in which thousands died. Between January and February,
Mauritania refused to allow Marine I, a stranded vessel from
Guinea-Conakry with some 400 mostly South Asians and
Africans, to land until Spain agreed to fly them out within
4 hours. Because they had no papers, however, Spain could
not repatriate them and they remained in detention. A senior
Mauritanian official said that the Government would not
permit vessels to land in the future. The Ministry of Interior
(MOI) claimed to have intercepted at least 4,500 migrants by
August with the assistance of Spanish security forces.
In November, at least 47 died off the northern
port of Nouadhibou after being at sea for 19 days trying
to reach the Spanish island of Fuerteventura. Although
Mauritania withdrew from the Economic Community of
West African States in 1999 and imposed restrictions on
nationals of member states in 2001, it still allowed visa-free
entry and residence to Senegalese, Malians, and Gambians
with papers.
Mauritania was party to the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and the
1969 Convention governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees
in Africa, all without reservation, and its 1991 Constitution
provided that international treaties were a superior authority
to national law. The Constitution also prohibited extradition
except according to international law and extradition
treaties.
In 2004, Mauritania became the first country in
North Africa to adopt a national refugee law. Under a 2005
decree, the MOI created the National Consultative Commission
for Refugees (NCCR) through which asylum seekers
could apply for protection. A committee of six civil servants
from different ministries, under the supervision of UNHCR,
could hear cases to determine refugee status. It did not approve
its first cases, however, until January 2008. There was
no appeals process. UNHCR continued to be the primary
agency to determine refugee status and the Government accepted
UNHCR’s registration of about 800 asylum seekers
from Sierra Leone, Liberia, and elsewhere.
Detention/Access to
Courts Authorities detained
at least three asylum applicants for
a week without offering reasons.
UNHCR prevailed upon the MOI to
D
free two of the aforementioned refugees
who had spent seven months
in prison. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) brought them to UNHCR’s attention during the fifth
month. There were some 30 cases of arbitrary detention of
non-nationals released upon UNHCR’s intervention.
Authorities detained many migrants in transit to
and from Europe, some of whom may have been refugees,
including some with legal immigration status in Mauritania,
whom authorities merely suspected of attempting to
123

migrate to Europe. Overcrowding prevented the separation
of convicted criminals from mere suspects, let alone from
immigration detainees. The UN Working Group on Detention
also noted restricted access to medical care and violence
in a February 2008 visit. The Government did, however, give
UNHCR and ICRC permission to meet detainees.
In March 2007, the Spanish Red Cross reported
that, because authorities did not allow the hundreds of
South Asian and African migrants from the stranded Marine
I ship detained in a warehouse in Nouadhibou out even
to exercise in the courtyard, they suffered from scabies,
respiratory infections, muscle pains, and abscesses. Authorities
denied the BBC and the UN press agency, IRIN,
access to the facility.
The MOI was responsible for issuing identity documents
to refugees and asylum seekers but did not do so.
Instead, UNHCR recorded receipt of asylum applications
under its mandate but, at the Government’s request, did not
give any acknowledgement to the applicant except in cases
that it deemed vulnerable, which it decided in an average
of two months. In Nouadhibou, most asylum seekers did
not receive certificates acknowledging their applications
until their first interviews. UNHCR issued attestation
letters to all refugees it recognized under its mandate
and sent copies to the MOI. Authorities respected them
as identity documents, but refugees and asylum seekers
had to renew them in person every six months, which
was impossible for many who had to leave the two main
cities for seasonal work.
The Constitution extended the presumption of
innocence and protection against arbitrary deprivation of
liberty to all, but reserved the right of privacy to citizens.
B
Freedom of Movement
and Residence The threat of
identity checks hindered the movement
of asylum seekers. Refugees
with UNHCR attestations, however,
could move around freely.
The Government did not issue
international travel documents to
refugees and had an agreement with Spain to accept the
return of any migrant to the nearby Canary Islands who
passed through Mauritania.
Mauritanian authorities and 20 Spanish civil guards
conducted surveillance and interdiction operations at sea to
prevent migrants from reaching Spain’s Canary Islands.
The Government maintained 100 police and gendarmerie
checkpoints along the border with Mali and Senegal
and the International Organization for Migration helped it
to open 5 more.
The Constitution reserved its protection of freedom
of movement and residence and the right to leave the
country to citizens.
Right to Earn a Livelihood
Since they lacked government
documents, refugees could
not receive work permits from the
Government. Nevertheless, most
worked in the informal sector for
lower wages and under worse conditions
than nationals did and almost never with social
security coverage. Movement restrictions also hindered
their ability to work.
Some Sahrawis worked in the iron ore mines in the
desert, some herded camels and fished in the Nouadhibou
harbor, and others worked in internet cafes or small shops.
Most refugees fell below the national poverty level as did
about 40 percent of the population.
The first receipts that the Government issued asylum
applicants in 2006 stated that they had the right to work and
the 2005 decree said refugees had the same right to work as
other foreigners.
While the Government recognized diplomas from
French- and Arabic-speaking countries, the European Union,
and North America, graduates from other African countries
and elsewhere had to take individual exams.
Some refugees started businesses that the authorities
recognized as legitimate. Some refugees, especially
those from Sierra Leone, found work as teachers in official
schools.
Refugees did not have access to agricultural land
even though the Constitution included general protections
for private property and did not reserve them for citizens,
and expressly protected the property of foreigners. It reserved
its protection of intellectual property, equality in taxation,
and the right to join unions and engage in commerce, however,
for citizens.
Public Relief and Education
Although it did not mention
asylum seekers, the 2005 decree
offered refugees the right to health
services and education on par with
nationals and they enjoyed it in
practice as well, sometimes with
UNHCR’s help with expenses, and authorities included
asylum seekers under a broad, prima facie presumption. Free
services at municipal clinics required prefectural registration,
however, which was difficult to obtain. Free clinics for
HIV/AIDS diagnoses, counseling, and treatment accepted
refugees on par with nationals.
The Government cooperated with UNHCR and
there were no reports that Mauritania hindered humanitarian
aid to refugees, but Mauritania did not include refugees in
the October 2006 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper nor in the
Country Assistance Strategy that it prepared for international
donors in January and June, respectively.
Jobs
C
2+5=7
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