Winston Churchill

Exploring Churchill s Canon
Wkat to Do ALout Iraq? A Debate
We often seek in Churchill's experience the answers to modern problems he never had to consider, but on which he
may have left some guidelines. This thoughtful exchange occurred on our Internet forum a year ago, during one of
the periodic Iraq outbursts. We filed it for publication after the next outburst, which involved the recent Anglo-
American action over that country, the results of which are suggested on page 5 in our "quote of the season." -Ed.
THE FUTILITY OF SANCTIONS
Charles Montgomery
Churchill's Arms and the Covenant (London: 1938)
offers many comments relative to the Iraq situation—not
all of them by Churchill. For instance,
on 18 May 1934, in the wake of Mussolini's invasion of
Abyssinia, Stanley Baldwin commented about sanctions
used against aggressor states: "There is no such thing as a
sanction that will work that does not mean war." (146)
Sanctions without war were as unsuccessful against
Mussolini as they were later against Hitler: on 18 June
1936 the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, said in
the House of Commons:
Whatever view we take of the course of action which
the League should follow [upon German aggression]
there is one fact upon which we must, of course, be
agreed. We have to admit that the purpose for which the
sanctions were imposed has not been realized. (345).
Sanctions are an easy alternative to serious action,
which appeal to politicians who base their decisions on
opinion polls, or who refrain from applying more serious
correctives out of fear of public or press reaction. A passage
showing Churchill's commitment to principle, regardless
of political or press attacks, occurs in this book in
his speech of 20 July 1936. He was speaking of course of
how Britain should deal with an aggressive Nazi Germany.
Let us admit at the outset that Saddam Hussein is no
Hitler; but Churchill's political philosophy is no less worthy
of reflection in respect to the Iraq problem today:
I believe that in dangerous times, once public danger
is made known, we should be found not less worthy of
the handling of confidential matters than were the rugged
generations which built up this island's greatness. Nothing
would give me greater pleasure than to be absolutely
stultified...and proved to be an alarmist. I would endure
with patience the roar of exultation that would go up
when I was proved wrong, because it would lift a load off
my heart and the hearts of many Members. What does it
matter who gets exposed or discomfited? If the country
is safe, who cares for individual politicians, in or out of
office? (354)
In contrast to this attitude was Baldwin's response
to Churchill's speech on "The Locust Years" on 12 November
1936, which will be familiar to readers of the
news in 1998:
My position as the leader of a great party was not altogether
a comfortable one. I asked myself what chance
was there...of that feeling being so changed that the country
would give a mandate for rearmament? Supposing I
had gone to the country and said that Germany was
rearming and that we must rearm, does anybody think
that this pacific democracy would have rallied to that cry
at the moment? I cannot think of anything that would
have made the loss of the election from my point of view
more certain. (385-86)
Baldwin was saying that the loss of an election was more
important than the safety of the nation. In all the Parliamentary
exchanges over rearmament, that was certainly
the most damning of any speaker.
How often in reading books like Arms and the
Covenant I am reminded that politicians learn little from
history, continuing to make decisions based on polls and
self-aggrandizement; and even in some cases self-preservation.
One of the things that made Churchill great was that
he was committed to principle. He continued to speak
out when he saw his country heading towards trouble,
even in the face of terrible "ratings" or negative opinion
polls. As Alistair Cooke remarked, recalling those years: "I
imagine that most of us here would like to think that, had
we been in Britain in say 1934-36, we should certainly
have been on Churchill's side. We'd have said, 'Yes, it's
true about the German air force.' In fact I don't think ten
percent of us would have been with him." (Proceedings of
the Churchill Societies, 1988-89).
George F. Will, a longtime Churchill Center member,
wrote in his column on 16 February 1998:
If Saddam's arsenal is as dangerous as the [American]
Administration's hot rhetoric asserts...the Administration
should be making the case for commensurate measures,
meaning measures designed to remove him. Such measures
could include indicting him as a war criminal, recognizing
a provisional government in exile and funding it
with Iraq's frozen assets, stripping his regime of its >>>
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