HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

tions, as well as during full-blown conventional
warfare. SOF’s versatility was particularly useful
in areas where political constraints prevented
using conventional forces. In combat situations
SOF were “force multipliers,” conducting
special reconnaissance (SR), direct action (DA),
and coalition support, while in peacetime, they
deployed to every continent and conducted training,
supported the theater CINCs’ strategy, and
did things that conventional forces were not
capable of doing.
Additionally, the theater CINCs and their
staffs better understood SOF’s capabilities. This
increased awareness was due to USSOCOM’s
efforts to involve the other CINCs in planning
and joint mission area analysis, and to support
their Special Operations Commands (SOCs)
with MFP-11 funding and personnel. Moreover,
SOF were the theater commanders’ force of
choice for such diverse operations as CD and
demining training, FID, medical exercises, noncombatant
evacuations, or handling emergency
situations like Operation PACIFIC HAVEN in
1996, when CA and PSYOP forces helped
Kurdish refugees prepare to immigrate to the
United States. As the number of peacekeeping
missions and small-scale contingencies grew, so
did the need for SOF support.
Each CINCSOC identified as a basic requirement
the recruitment and retention of people
who could meet the rigorous warfighting standards
of special operations and also adapt to the
role of warrior-diplomat. Special operators were
most likely to deploy to remote locations where,
by virtue of being among the first, and often the
only, U.S. troops a host nation’s military and
political leaders might see, their military mission
took on diplomatic responsibilities. When
in combat, SOF went deep behind enemy lines—
for example, providing SR, or conducting “tip of
the spear” H-hour strike missions. Regardless of
the challenge, SOF soldiers, sailors, and airmen
have represented America’s finest.
General Downing publicized the SOF Truths
(first approved for use by then COL Sid
Shacknow in the mid-1980s) as a way to codify
the need for quality people:
Humans are more important than
hardware.
Quality is better than quantity.
Special Operations Forces cannot be
mass produced.
Special Operations Forces cannot be
created after emergencies.
All subsequent CINCSOCs have embraced
the SOF Truths. To ensure that the force
remained professional, General Schoomaker
made training and education—“trained for certainty,
while being educated for uncertainty”—
one of his hallmarks. SOF often encountered
ambiguous circumstances while conducting
peacetime operations, circumstances that could
have a potential impact on strategic issues. The
unique conditions SOF operated under required
not only flexibility and mature judgment, but
also uncompromising integrity.
General Schoomaker cited the maturity and
personal qualities of SOF, coupled with their
widespread presence around the world, as reasons
why SOF served as “Global Scouts.” During
crises, by virtue of their cultural awareness,
regional familiarity, ability to respond quickly,
or simply due to their presence nearby, SOF
were called upon to support American interests.
Examples of SOF Global Scout missions included
the recovery of casualties after Secretary of
Commerce Ron Brown’s CT-43A crashed into a
Croatian mountainside in 1996, the evacuation
of U.S. citizens from Sierra Leone in 1997, and
transporting aid to Vietnamese flood victims in
1999.
The 11 September terrorist attacks, OEF,
OIF, and the GWOT presented enormous challenges
and placed heavy demands on SOF. With
each combatant commander requesting more
SOF, USSOCOM had to manage the competing
demands on the force. To do this successfully,
General Brown requested and received authority
to manage SOF globally for the GWOT. The
new approach was embodied in USSOCOM’s
Global SOF Posture Plan.
Before 9/11, the GCCs submitted requests for
forces (RFFs) to have SOF deploy to their areas;
USSOCOM passed the RFFs to the components
to provide the forces or request relief from the
tasking on a case-by-case basis. By 2004, SOF
were in such high demand that USSOCOM
began conducting conferences to manage SOF
deployments from a global, rather than the
regional, counterterrorist perspective. General
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