XXXI Abstracts Part 1 page 1-189

that go to constitute it; that is, to put it in a technical language, qualities within a boundary constitute an identity. It is the
ordering and shape of qualities (or attributes) due to which we could make identification of X caste as distinct from another
Y caste. If this is tenable, as it seems to me to be, then the position looks like this: that what have always been identified as
castes from pre-Moghul times on, can no longer be re-identified as the castes in 2000 on when we are looking at this
phenomenon. I think that the question of re-identification is of central importance in the specification of an entity-- object,
person, or collectivity—- as the same identity. Because identity depicts persistence in time, and through a historical process,
therefore for X to be the same identity at two points of time (T1 and T2) it should be capable of being re-identified at T2 as X
as it was at T1.
This no longer seems to be the case. Because all the particulars, qualities or attributes, which went into the
constitution of castes-jatis have become discontinuous; that is, non-persistent, a bit of it may be here and a bit there but as
continuous wholes they are missing. It is difficult to refer to these as the same entity. If this is so, then these cannot be the
same identities. I would like to argue that these entities have much rather become like “communities”. This is somewhat
analogous to the way that the Italians or Polish or Irish were vis-à-vis the WASP—- the disadvantaged and the privileged
who faced each other in the democratic process -- in USA during the period of what is now called the “melting pot”. What
does then remain of the caste? What do we make out of the role of oppressed castes in politics?
Let me begin with a cautionary note. Many features of social forms existing for long historical duration do not get
obliterated even when they change their social character drastically. Perhaps these might be destroyed through
revolutionary or severe reactive violence. We will have to look into a two-way trend to understand what really is happening
to the castes.
The more simply, visible trend first. As social forms these survive while losing much of the inner content. Many of
the oppressed castes either re-christened themselves to make self-references suggesting self-respect, pride and so on. But
none of the oppressed castes refer to themselves in terms of the order of the varna system, as inferior, unclean, in ritual
dependence, etc. Some features of social exchanges continue in the form of marriage but even this is no longer fixed but is
both expanding as circles of endogamy or inviting ideological revulsion even if the same people cannot do much in actual
practice. Much of jajmani system no longer survives and so too the entitlements based on it. Wage labour has replaced
much of the ritual dependence with economic dependence where with the dalits the element of coercion and, many a times,
brutality also works in keeping entitlements low. The rural economy is itself drawn into the market networks and works as a
part of the interacting economic system. Is caste now merely superstructure? may not be the best way of approaching this.
The highly contrary forms of capitalist economic power also determine outcomes. But what is clear is that the inner
mechanisms of the varna order, as an ideological system, do not function. So at this level it is best to leave it with a
description without imposing a categorial classification.
The other trend, which is thoroughly changing the character of the oppressed caste, is far more complicated. It is
based on the internal differentiation and class formation. Two things were happening within these vulnerable communities.
First there was a long period of capitalist development, especially in agriculture, which was followed by land reforms, after
Independence. Many of the OBC’s became propriety peasants. The long chain of dependence and bondage was snapped.
Education, employment, etc. among OBC's slowly expanded. New modern classes were slowly emerging. Among the Dalits
reservations as quotas in education and employment and other meekly implemented affirmative action also led to similar
results though on a much smaller scale. What thwarted the collective development of Dalits was the nature of land reforms
where land often did not go to the direct tiller. Most of the Dalits remained dispossessed of land.
As a consequence of all this, class and income differentiation have been taking place, however uneven, among these
castes-communities and therefore a dispersal of earlier forms of power with their traditional leadership. Earlier such castes
organised as Jatis were internally egalitarian because of the same occupation and skill endowment and therefore similar
income levels. The break down of the inviolable links between the ritual status and occupation had far reaching consequences.
It encouraged the movement of people, imperceptible though among the oppressed unlike with the Sawaranas earlier, into
different occupations and the acquisition of varied and dissimilar skills. With all these developments, jatis started becoming
internally inegalitarian; the process though has had a different tempo across the distinct castes leading to the formation of
modern classes within the caste communities. Differentiation and dispersion of inherited bases of power, if we go by the global
pattern of consequences of capitalist development, also sets in process the dissolution of the "primordial" communities.
Nothing of the sort has happened in India so far nor seems likely to in the near future even with the rapid individuation of
interests and persons.