The YBM Magnex Files Adrian du Plessis ... - Deep Capture
The YBM Magnex Files Adrian du Plessis ... - Deep Capture
The YBM Magnex Files Adrian du Plessis ... - Deep Capture
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mafia origins and links and its history of incomplete or false disclosure.<br />
In the end, if there is to be some real benefit from this mess -- we may all learn why none of the<br />
in<strong>du</strong>stry players, be they securities regulators or stock hustlers, informed the public of those<br />
damning details about <strong>YBM</strong> which were known to them long before the company's stock<br />
became the latest and greatest embarrassment to the once-prestigious TSE 300.<br />
On August 10 1995, Britain?s Home Secretary signed an order excluding Russian organized<br />
crime leader Semion Mogilevich from the United Kingdom. Despite the findings of U.K. police<br />
about Mogilevich and the Channel Islands-registered entity Arigon, identified as a principal<br />
con<strong>du</strong>it for Russian organized crime, Mogilevich and his associates saw their vehicle Arigon<br />
welcomed into Canada's public stock markets and nurtured.<br />
Arigon, essentially, went public on the Alberta exchange and then gra<strong>du</strong>ated to the TSE, despite<br />
the company's continuing pattern of misleading or false public disclosure. <strong>The</strong> company's<br />
publicly filed documents from 1994/95 report multimillion dollar Canadian sales that never<br />
existed. <strong>The</strong>se same filings, among other omissions, failed to disclose the management role of<br />
<strong>YBM</strong> director Michael Schmidt with the scam company Technigen Corp. (one-time VSE-high<br />
flier). Subsequent filings by <strong>YBM</strong> falsely claimed that the company had generated $20 million in<br />
sales <strong>du</strong>ring 1996 from an oil desulphurisation process. <strong>The</strong> Financial Times of London<br />
journalist Ted Alden has revealed that OSC officials were told, before they approved <strong>YBM</strong>'s<br />
1997 prospectus, that the oil desulphurisation claims could not be substantiated.<br />
And so it goes...<br />
By late 1997, and much earlier in some instances, <strong>YBM</strong> players and securities officials, knew or<br />
ought to have known, that: the company's origins could be traced back to the Russian mafia,<br />
that principal businesses and associates were believed (by the world's top police intelligence<br />
corps) to be engaged in money laundering activities, and that <strong>YBM</strong> was making misleading and<br />
false public claims about its pro<strong>du</strong>cts and sales.<br />
At what point does someone within the securities in<strong>du</strong>stry structure blow the whistle and say,<br />
"This must stop!"?<br />
We all know the answer to that question. <strong>The</strong> game is over when more than five dozen U.S.<br />
government agents raid the company's headquarters, as happened in the case of <strong>YBM</strong> <strong>Magnex</strong><br />
on May 13 1998.<br />
What Canadians knew and did between 1994/95 and 1998 should be told. If it is, <strong>YBM</strong> may<br />
provide a more valuable study of Canada's prevailing securities culture than any scandal since<br />
the mid-1960s Windfall Oil & Gas fallout.<br />
02/11/99