The YBM Magnex Files Adrian du Plessis ... - Deep Capture
The YBM Magnex Files Adrian du Plessis ... - Deep Capture
The YBM Magnex Files Adrian du Plessis ... - Deep Capture
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1997, a total of 3,767,703 shares were traded in 2604 transactions.<br />
A lack of retail public distribution likely accounts for the lack of widespread discussion of <strong>YBM</strong><br />
<strong>Magnex</strong> on the internet. Until recently - and the FBI et al raid, auditor's concerns raised, the<br />
trading halt, public awareness of the company's Russian mafia roots -- outside of mutual fund<br />
managers, advisors, and brokerage analysts, there existed a comparatively small number of<br />
people who followed the stock intently. Prospective class action lawyers will find that, although<br />
they are out there, it will take more work to locate small investors in <strong>YBM</strong> than in such past<br />
Canadian stock promotions as Bre-X Minerals or Harvard International Technologies (the<br />
overheated french-fry vendor that flamed out in the mid-1990s with Canada's ex-Prime Minister<br />
John Turner wearing a director's apron).<br />
It's a feature of the Canadian stock markets today, driven by managed money accounts (e.g.<br />
mutual and pension funds), that when a stock promotion falters or crashes, the institutional<br />
managers of accounts routinely fail to pursue possible financial remedies on behalf of their<br />
unitholders, pensioners etc.<br />
In the near-decade since forestry company Doman In<strong>du</strong>stries' shares clearcut a portion of the<br />
CBC news network's pension fund - and led to insider trading charges against British<br />
Columbia's former premier Bill Bennett and others - there has been curiously little legal<br />
response from burned pension and mutual funds in this country. Lawyers for the CBC extracted<br />
a settlement on behalf of that pension fund, but those money managers who play with other<br />
peoples' money by buying shares in small or mid-cap stocks, particularly those spawned on the<br />
speculative, high-risk, Alberta and Vancouver exchanges, are remarkably sanguine when losses<br />
result from their questionable picks.<br />
Why do in<strong>du</strong>stry professionals backing stocks like <strong>YBM</strong> <strong>Magnex</strong> appear so content to write<br />
down such purchases and leave it at that? That's a question the public may well ask some day.<br />
Questions about the levels of <strong>du</strong>e diligence carried out by mutual fund managers, advisors and<br />
securities analysts, naturally, dovetail with this line of inquiry.<br />
My own <strong>YBM</strong> <strong>du</strong>e diligence review had brought me to the SEDAR web-site where I located the<br />
report of auditors Deloitte & Touche LLP along with various related notes, sche<strong>du</strong>les and<br />
management discussion documents that had been filed in late 1997. <strong>The</strong> one thing I didn't find<br />
was the basis on which First Marathon's analyst, Kaan Oran, could claim that <strong>YBM</strong> <strong>Magnex</strong> had<br />
passed this audit "with flying colours."<br />
Certain findings of the audit were disturbing and when viewed in an overall <strong>du</strong>e diligence<br />
context -- informed by knowledge of other questionable elements of the company's history,<br />
principals, and public disclosure practices - they heightened a growing sense of alarm about<br />
<strong>YBM</strong> <strong>Magnex</strong>.<br />
That any professional would put such a positive spin on this situation seemed more than bizarre<br />
- it appeared downright negligent or reckless.