Leon Trotsky: 1905
Leon Trotsky: 1905
Leon Trotsky: 1905
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<strong>Leon</strong> <strong>Trotsky</strong>: <strong>1905</strong>: CHAPTER 1-- Russia's Social Development and Tsarism<br />
<strong>Leon</strong> <strong>Trotsky</strong>'s<br />
<strong>1905</strong><br />
CHAPTER 1<br />
Russia's Social Development and Tsarism<br />
* * *<br />
Our revolution [I am speaking of the revolution of <strong>1905</strong> and of the changes it introduced into Russia's<br />
social and political life: the forming of parties, representation in the Duma, open political struggle, etc.]<br />
destroyed the myth of the "uniqueness" of Russia. It demonstrated that history does not have special laws<br />
for Russia. Yet at the same time the Russian revolution bore a character wholly peculiar to itself, a<br />
character which was the out come of the special features of our entire social and historical development<br />
and which, in turn, opened entirely new historical perspectives before us.<br />
There is no need to dwell on the metaphysical question of whether the difference between Russia and<br />
Western Europe is a "qualitative" or a "quantitative" one. But neither can there be any doubt that the<br />
principal distinguishing characteristics of Russia's historical development are its slowness and its<br />
primitive nature. In point of fact, the Russian state is not all that much younger than the European states;<br />
the chronicle of Russia's life as a state begins in the year 862. Yet the extremely slow rate of our<br />
economic development, determined by unfavorable natural conditions and a sparse population, has<br />
delayed the process of social crystallization and has stamped the whole of our history with the features of<br />
extreme backwardness.<br />
It is hard to tell how the life of the Russian state would have developed if it had taken place in isolation,<br />
influenced by internal tendencies alone. Suffice it to say that this was not the case. Russia's social<br />
existence was always under constant pressure from the more developed social and state relations of<br />
Western Europe, and as time went on this pressure became more and more powerful. Given the relatively<br />
weak development of international trade, a decisive role was played by military relations between states.<br />
First and foremost, the social influence of Europe found expression in the form of military technology.<br />
The Russian state, having been formed on a primitive economic basis, was brought face to face with stare<br />
organizations -which had developed on a higher economic basis. Two possible presented themselves the<br />
Russian state had either to fall in struggle with those state organizations, as the Golden Horde fallen in<br />
the struggle with Muscovite Tsardom, or it had to the development of its own economic relations,<br />
swallow- up, under pressure from outside, a disproportionately large of the nation's vital juices. The<br />
Russian national economy was no longer primitive enough to allow of the former solution. The state did<br />
not collapse; it began to grow, at the price of monstrous pressure upon the nation's economic forces.<br />
Up to a certain point all the above also applies, of course, to any other European state. The difference is<br />
that in their mutual struggle .for existence those states could draw on economic bases of an<br />
approximately equal kind, so that their development as states was not subject to such powerful and<br />
economically intolerable outside pressures.<br />
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/<strong>1905</strong>/ch01.htm (1 of 5) [06/06/2002 13:41:29]