Overview of New DoD Reliability Revitalization ... - DfR Solutions

Overview of New DoD Reliability Revitalization Initiatives
James G. McLeish, CRE
DfR Solutions,
College Park MD
jmcleish@dfrsolutions
ABSTRACT
Since the mid-1990s, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
has recognized two disturbing trends. First the percentage of
new systems failing to meet reliability requirements was
increasing, resulting in costly delays and redesign activities.
Second the cost of supporting fielded systems due to
decreasing durability and reliability performance was also
increasing. A number of initiatives are now under way to
reverse these trends. This paper will summarize several of
the key initiatives that have been announced in the press and
at the 2010 RAMS conference that include:
The Reliability related portions of the Weapons Systems
Acquisition Reform Act defining acquisition policy
updates designed to strengthen oversight and
accountability [1];
Revitalization of Systems and Reliability Engineering
processes being institutionalized to reduce risk [2+3+4];
A Reliability Program Scorecard tool developed to
standardize and assist new programs in applying the use
of reliability best practices and to track planned and
completed reliability tasks [5];
Reliability initiatives currently under development;
The AVSI Reliability Prediction Technology Roadmap;
Proposals for resolving the limitations of actuarial
reliability prediction methods by updating Mil-HDBK-
217 to include science-based Physics of Failure (PoF)
reliability modeling and simulations methods. [6+7]
Key Words: Reliability Assurance, Reliability Assessment,
Design for Reliability, Physics of Failure, Reliability Physics,
INTRODUCTION
An unintended consequence of DoD acquisition reforms and
cost reduction efforts during the 1990s was a reduction in the
rigor and effectiveness of sustainment planning, system
engineering, and reliability assurance throughout materiel
development programs. In the early 2000s, the DoD
acquisition community started to recognize and document
two disturbing trends in Defense Acquisition Programs.
1) An increasing percentage of systems not meeting their
reliability requirements, and 2) the cost of supporting fielded
systems was increasingly higher than expected. Two major
reports recommended significant changes in acquisition
policies to address these issues.
The first, “Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce
Weapon Systems’ Total Ownership Costs” a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report [2], concluded that the
requirements generation process should:
Include “…total ownership cost, especially operating
and support cost, and weapon system readiness rates as
performance parameters equal in priority to any other
performance parameters for major system before
beginning the acquisition program”;
Require “…the product developer to establish a firm
estimate of a weapon system’s reliability based on
demonstrated reliability rates at the component and
subsystem level”;
Structure “…contracts for major systems acquisitions so
that…the product developer has incentives to ensure that
proper trade offs are made between reliability and
performance prior to the production decision.”
The second, the “Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB)
Task Force on Developmental Test and Evaluation” [8],
examined the cause of the growing trend in unsuitable
systems and degraded reliability performance. The related
recommendation of the DSB report concluded that:
“The single most important step necessary to correct
high suitability failure rates is to ensure programs are
formulated to execute a viable systems engineering
strategy from the beginning, including a robust RAM
program, as an integral part of design and development.
No amount of testing will compensate for deficiencies in
RAM program formulation.”
The DoD chartered the Reliability Improvement Working
Group (RIWG) to implement the recommendations of the
DSB. The RIWG membership was drawn from stakeholders
across the DoD. A number of key policy changes were
derived from the RIWG recommendations [4]. Some of
these reforms have been inscribed into law by congressional
legislation to ensure they become permanent DoD policy.
Others are being develop and implemented under separate
initiatives. The remainder of this paper will review some of
the key reforms that have been announced to date.
WEAPON SYSTEMS ACQUISITION REFORM ACT
(WSARA) [1] was originally called the “Weapon Acquisition
System Reform Through Enhancing Technical Knowledge
and Oversight Act”. It is a bipartisan Act of Congress cosponsored
by Sen. Carl Levin, (D-Mich), Chairman-House
Armed Services Committee and Sen. John McCain, (R-Az)
ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The Act was based on the 2008 Defense Science Board Task
Force Report on Developmental Test and Evaluation and the
report of the RIWG that cited the need to reform the way
DoD contracts for and purchases major weapons systems.
Sec. 303. Expansion of national security objectives of
the national technology and industrial base.
Sec. 304. Comptroller General reports on costs and
financial info of major defense acquisition programs
The Act was introduced Feb. 23, 2009, and it quickly passed
both the Senate and House unanimously (93-0 & 411-0). It
was signed into law on May 22, 2009 by President Obama
who cited the need to end the "waste and inefficiency" in
defense acquisition. The need for such reforms was clearly
demonstrated by external audits like one by the Government
Accountability Office evaluation of 95 major defense
projects uncovering cost overruns totaling $295 billion. “It
will strengthen oversight and accountability by appointing
officials who will be charged with closely monitoring the
weapons systems we're purchasing” [9]. The Congressional
Budget Office estimates that the new reforms will cost about
$55 million dollars and should be in place by the end of
2010. It is expected that the reforms will save millions if not
billions of dollars over the next decade [10].
Reliability related portions of the Act are intended to reverse
the 20 year trend of system development shortcuts in DoD
acquisition processes, including reductions in the reliability
and acceptance test workforce that have resulted in excessive
cost overruns and delays in weapon systems fielding. The
reliability related items and objectives of the key sections of
the act, summarized below, are designed to revitalize (or
institutionalize) up front system engineering, total life time
planning, competent design analysis, and testing while
improving program and cost oversight:
TITLE I--ACQUISITION ORGANIZATION
Sec. 101. Cost assessment and program evaluation.
Sec. 102. Directors of Developmental Test and
Evaluation and Systems Engineering.
Sec. 103. Performance assessments and root cause
analyses.
Sec. 104. Assessment of technological maturity.
Sec. 105. Role of the combatant command commanders
in identifying joint military requirements.
TITLE II--ACQUISITION POLICY
Sec. 201. Trade-offs among cost, schedule, and
performance objectives.
Sec. 202. Strategies to ensure competition.
Sec. 203. Prototyping requirements.
Sec. 204. Actions to identify and address systemic
problems in major defense acquisition programs.
Sec. 205. Additional requirements for certain major
defense acquisition programs.
Sec. 206. Critical cost growth in major defense
acquisition programs.
Sec. 207. Organizational conflicts of interest in major
defense acquisition programs.
TITLE III--ADDITIONAL ACQUISITION PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Awards for Department of Defense personnel
for excellence in acquisition.
Sec. 302. Earned value management.
REVITALIZING SYSTEMS & SUSTAINMENT
One of the main reliability effects of WSARA is the
codification of key findings and recommendations in the
GAO report [2+11] regarding incorporating sustainment
planning into the systems engineering process—especially in
the area of Total Ownership Cost analysis and control from
the earliest program activities. The DSB 2008
Developmental Test and Evaluation report identified the
importance of establishing a viable systems engineering
process at the beginning of programs [8]. Unfortunately, the
DoD and services systemically dismantled systems
engineering activities beginning in the early 1990’s and
revitalization efforts in the reliability arena are incomplete.
This issue is addressed in WSARA by requiring the DoD to:
(1) evaluate if the necessary systems engineering
development planning, lifecycle management and
sustainability capabilities needed to ensure that key
acquisition decisions are supported by a rigorous systems
analysis and systems engineering process are in place and
(2) establish organizations and develop skilled employees
needed to fill any gaps in such capabilities [12]. Similar
capability evaluations and corrective actions are specified for
test and evaluation activities.
Re-establishing these capabilities along with other tasks are
the responsibility of the new Directors of Developmental
Test and Evaluation (D,DT&E) and Systems Engineering
(D,SE), positions that were created within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) by WSARA.
RELIABILITY PROGRAM SCORECARD [5]
One problem that often faces government source selection
teams is how to evaluate the ability of an offeror to develop a
“viable RAM strategy.” The RIWG adapted an Army tool,
the “Army Materiel System Analysis Activity (AMSAA)
Scorecard,” to help in the assessment of both the program
office and contractor’s system reliability efforts. The
scorecard has focus areas for reliability requirements
planning; reliability testing; failure tracking and reporting;
and reliability verification and validation. When applied
early in the program, the scorecard can identify areas for
improvement before significant problems emerge. There are
40 elements organized into the following eight evaluation
categories:
Requirements and Planning
Training and Development
Reliability Analysis
Reliability Testing
Supply Chain Management
Failure Tracking and Reporting
Verification and Validation
Reliability Improvements

The scorecard examines a supplier’s use of reliability best
practices, as well as the supplier’s planned and completed
reliability tasks. A risk assessment score is calculated based
on the individual reliability risk ratings assigned to each
element. Each element is given a color coded risk rating of
high (red) which is allotted a score of 3, medium (yellow)
which equals 2, low risk (green) which is rated as a 1, or not
evaluated (gray). The elements are weighted and are
normalized to produce a risk score for each of the eight
evaluation categories, these are combined into the overall
program score. Elements that are not evaluated are removed
from the risk score calculations. The risk scores for each
element are adjusted by weighting factors to produce an
overall reliability risk normalized to a value between 1 &100.
A low score equates to a low reliability risks and a high score
indicates a high risk correlated to a visual green (go), yellow
(caution), and red (stop) scale.
Figure 1: Overall Program Risk Assessment Example
The scorecard provides an early evaluation of RAM
capabilities in an acquisition program while helping to
identify reliability gaps. It provides a guide to help program
offices and contractors think about reliability early in the
acquisition process and throughout the program’s life cycle.
The Reliability Program Scorecard is a valuable tool for
evaluating risks and making an early initial reliability
projection for a program. A copy of the scorecard can be
obtained from the DoD Reliability Information and Analysis
Center’s web site, http://www.theriac.org/ under “AMSAA
Reliability Growth Tools and Scorecard”.
RELIABILITY INITIATIVES CURRENTLY UNDER
DEVELOPMENT
A number of initiatives to permanently institutionalize
reliability activities into major defense acquisition programs
were defined under WSARA.
Reliability related duties of the new Director, Systems
Engineering position include: using systems engineering
approaches to enhance reliability, availability, and
maintainability (RAM) and ensuring that provisions related
to reliability growth are included in the request for proposals
on major defense acquisition programs.
Acquisition executives of military departments and defense
agencies responsible for major defense acquisition programs
are responsible for ensuring that their organizations provide
the System Engineering (SE) and Developmental Test and
Evaluation (DT&E) organizations with appropriate resources
and trained personnel to:
Define a robust RAM and sustainability program as an
integral part of design and development within the
systems engineering master plan;
Identify systems engineering lifecycle management,
RAM, and sustainability requirements and incorporate
them into contract requirements;
Define appropriate developmental testing requirements,
Participate in the planning of DT&E activities;
Participate in and oversee DT&E activities, test data
analysis, and test reports.
To develop plans for implementing these initiatives the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, &
Logistics (AT&L) directed the new DoD Director of Systems
Engineering to convene a Reliability Senior Steering Group
(RSSG) in April 2010. Subordinate Reliability Working
Group (RWG) teams were organized and tasked to address
reliability-related issues regarding policy, people, and
practice for reliability across the DoD. These teams actively
developed recommendations regarding the reconstitution of
DoD reliability, test, and sustainment related policy, skills,
and processes. Related policy and guidance announcements
are expected in the near future.
AVSI RELIABILITY ROADMAP
The Aerospace Vehicle Systems Institute (AVSI) is a Texas
A&M University research cooperative of aerospace
companies, the DoD, and the Federal Aviation
Administration that works to improve aerospace vehicles,
their components, systems, and development processes. The
AVSI has undertaken a project to chart the future of
reliability research by developing a reliability technology
road map for electronics reliability assessment practices.
The AVSI team is applying a Quality Function Deployment
(QFD) process to analyze and prioritize the experiences and
recommendations of a large number of industry experts to
define future reliability methods and research. A QFD is a
widely used tool to help sort out, identify, and prioritize the
requirements for complex issues in order to transform user
needs and demands into criterion and plans that incorporate
key characteristics from the viewpoint of potential end users.
This project has so far generated a prioritized “wish list” of
64 reliability assessment features that are evaluated by 25
needs criteria. The next step is to evaluate how well existing
or near term reliability assessment/prediction methodologies
or tools fulfill the objectives of the wish list items. Current
or near term reliability prediction methods/tools that are
determined to adequately fulfill wish list needs and features
will be identified as easily achievable “Low Hanging Fruit”
items that will be recommended as suitable for immediate
usage in current and new program.

The wish list items that can not be easily implemented in the
short term will be evaluated to estimate the effort needed to
make them happen. These items will be identified as near
term and long term recommended efforts to help influence
the future direction of reliability research. The Reliability
Roadmap results will be provided to the DoD for reliability
research planning, future revisions to military and aerospace
handbooks and processes, and to help direct future industry
reliability research and development.
UPDATING MIL-HDBK-217 RELIABILITY
PREDICTION METHODS TO INCLUDE PoF
The DoD’s Defense Standardization Program Office (DSPO)
has initiated a multi-phase effort to update MIL-HDBK-217,
the military’s often imitated and frequently criticized
reliability prediction “bible” for electronics equipment that
has not been updated since 1995 [4+12]. There are numerous
concerns about the actuarial reliability prediction methods
defined in MIL-HDBK-217 which have been covered
thoroughly elsewhere [14+15]. The main concerns are:
1) Currently, 217 predictions are based on constant failure
rates which model only random failure situations that do
not account for infant mortality and wearout issues.
Tabulation errors where infant mortality and wearout
issues are tallied as random failures are another risk of
this scheme which can produce significant inaccuracy in
predicted failure rates.
2) Actuarial reliability predictions typically correlate poorly
to actual field performance since they do not account for
the physics or mechanics of failure. Hence, they cannot
provide insight for controlling actual failure mechanisms
and they are incapable of evaluating new technologies
that lack a field history to base projections on.
3) The models are based upon industry wide average failure
rates that are not vendor, device, nor event specific and
MTBF results provide no insight on the starting point
growth rate and distribution range of true failure trends.
Also, the MTBF concept is often misinterpreted by
people without formal reliability training.
4) Over emphasis on the Arrhenius model and steady state
temperature as the primary factor in electronic
component failure while the roles of key stress factors
such as: temperature cycling, humidity, vibration and
shock are not modeled [15+16+17+18].
5) Over emphasis on component failures when 78% of
electronic failures are due to other issues that are not
modeled such as: design errors, PCB assembly defects,
solder and wiring interconnect failures, PCB insulation
resistance and via failures, software errors, etc. [19]
6) The last 217 update was in 1995; new components,
technology advancement, and quality improvements
developed since then are not reflected in the current
actuarial data tables [15+20].
In addition to the current effort to create 217-revision G that
entails a simple update of the actuarial failure rate tables, the
team also developed a proposal for a future revision H where
improved and more holistic empirical MTBF models could
be used for comparison evaluations during a program’s
acquisition-supplier selection activities. Later, science-based
Physics of Failure (PoF) reliability modeling combined with
probabilistic mechanics techniques would be used during the
actual system design-development phase to evaluate and
optimize stress and wearout limitations of a design to foster
the creation of highly reliable, robust systems.
The Physics of Failure approach (also known as Reliability
Physics) applies analysis early in the design process to
predict the reliability and durability of specific design
alternatives in specific applications. This provides
knowledge that enables designers to make design and
manufacturing choices that minimize failure opportunities in
order to produce reliability optimized, robust products.
PoF focuses on understanding the cause and effect physical
processes and mechanisms that cause degradation and failure
of materials and components [21]. It is based in the analysis
of loads and stresses in an application and evaluating the
ability of materials to endure them from a strength and
mechanics of materials point of view. This approach, known
as load-to-strength interference analysis, has been used for
centuries in mechanical, structural, construction, and civil
engineering, integrates reliability into the design activity via
a science-based process for evaluating materials, structures,
and technologies. In PoF, failures are organized into 3
categories:
1) Overstress Failures such as yield, buckling, and
electrical surges that occur when the stresses of the
application rapidly or greatly exceeds the strength of a
device’s materials. This causes immediate or imminent
failures.
2) Wearout Failures defined as stress driven damage
accumulation of materials which includes failure
mechanisms like fatigue and corrosion.
3) Errors and Excessive Variation issues comprise the PoF
view of infant mortality. Opportunities for error and
variation touch every aspect of design, supply chain, and
manufacturing processes. These issues are the most
diverse and challenging of the PoF categories. The
diverse, random, and stochastic events involved cannot
be modeled using a deterministic PoF cause and effect
approach. However, reliability improvements are still
possible when PoF knowledge and lessons learned are
used to implement error proofing and select capable
manufacturing processes that ensure robustness [22].
The proposed PoF circuit card assembly section defines four
categories of analysis techniques (see Figure 2) that can be
performed with currently available Computer Aided
Engineering (CAE) analysis techniques. This methodology
is aligned with the Analysis, Modeling, and Simulations
methods recommended in Section 8 of SAE J1211 -
Handbook for Robustness Validation of Automotive
Electrical/Electronic Modules [23]. The 4 categories are:
1) E/E Performance and Variation Modeling used to
evaluate if stable E/E circuit performance objectives are
achieved under static and dynamic conditions that include
tolerancing and drift concerns.

2) Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) and Signal
Integrity Analysis to evaluate if an electronic assembly
generates, or is susceptible to, disruptions by
Electromagnetic Interference and if the transfer of high
frequency signals is stable.
3) Stress Analysis is used to assess the ability of electronic
packaging structures to maintain structural and circuit
interconnection integrity, maintain a suitable environment
for E/E circuits to function reliably, and determine if a
device is susceptible to overstress failures [24].
4) Wearout Durability and Reliability Modeling uses the
results of the stress analysis to predict the long-term stress
aging/stress endurance, gradual degradation and wearout
capabilities of a CCA [24]. Results are provided in terms
of time to first failure, the expected failure distribution in
an ordered list of 1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , etc. devices, features,
mechanisms, and sites of most likely expected failures.
These techniques provide a multi-discipline virtual
engineering prototyping process for early identification of
design weaknesses, susceptibilities to failure mechanisms and
for predicting reliability when improvements can be readily
implemented at low costs.
CONCLUSIONS
The 1990 era attempts at up front cost reduction in DoD
acquisition programs through reducing system engineering,
RAM, development testing, and sustainment planning efforts
resulted in large development cost overruns, excessive
maintenance burdens, and increased support costs in a
number of defense systems. The realization of the long term
consequences of these policies has led DoD leadership to
institute a policy and guidance reversal to revitalize these
capabilities and return to a leadership role in system
engineering, system assurance, RAM, and sustainment
technologies and methods. Some of these policy changes
have been incorporated into law by the Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. The initiatives reported in
this paper are only the starting point in the revitalization
effort. The DoD Reliability Senior Steering Group (RSSG)
and their Reliability Working Groups (RWG) are diligently
and rapidly working to refine these efforts, develop
additional initiatives, and to launch activities to implement
them. Announcements of the next steps are expected in late
2010 or early 2011.
REFERENCES
[1] The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.
Public Law 111-23. 2009. Washington, DC: U.S. Congress.
[2] “Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon
Systems’ Total Ownership Costs.” GAO-03-57. Washington,
DC: Government Accountability Office, Feb. 2003
[3] P. M. Dallosta, U.S. Defense Acquisition University,
“The Impact of Changes in DoD Policy on Reliability and
Sustainment”, RAMS 2010
[4] Final Report of the Reliability Improvement Working
Group (RIWG). 2008. Washington DC.
[5] M. H. Shepler, N. Welliver, USAMSAA “New Army and
DoD Reliability Scorecard”, RAMS 2010
[6] L. Gullo, “The Revitalization of MIL-HDBK-217”, IEEE
Reliability Newsletter, Sept. 2008.
http://www.ieee.org/portal/cms_docs_relsoc/relsoc/Newslette
rs/Sep2008/Revitalization_MIL-HDBK-217.htm
[7] J. G. McLeish, Enhancing MIL-HDBK-217 Reliability
Predictions with Physics of Failure Methods, RAMS 2010.
[8] Report of the Defense Science Board on Developmental
Test & Evaluation, U.S. Dept of Defense, May 2008.
[9] Whitehouse Press Release “Remarks-by-the-President-atsigning-of-the-WSARA,
May 22, 2009.
[10] R. Lake, "Weapon bill passes House, goes to Obama".
http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2009/05/21/4426481-
weapons-bill-passes-house, MSNBC (21 May 2009),
[11] G.R. Schmieder, “Reintegration of Sustainment into
Systems Engineering During the DoD Acquisition Process”,
RAMS 2010
[12] Summary of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform
Act of 2009, Senator C. Levin, press release #308525, Feb.
24, 2009
[10] G. F. Decker, “Policy on Incorporating a Performance
Based Approach to Reliability in RFPs”, Dept of the Army
Memo, Feb, 15 1995
[11] F. R. Nash, “Estimating Device Reliability: Assessment
of Credibility”, AT&T Bell Labs/Kluwer Publishing, 1993.
[12] M. Pecht, “Why the Traditional Reliability Prediction
Models Do Not Work - Is There an Alternative?”, Electronics
Cooling, Vol. 2, pp. 10-12, January 1996
[13] M. Osterman, “We Still have a headache with
Arrhenius”, Electronics Cooling, pp 53-54, Feb. 2001
[14] M. Pecht, P. Lall, E. Hakim, “Temperature as a
Reliability Factor”, 1995 Eurotherm Seminar No. 45:
Thermal Management of Electronic Systems, pp. 36.1-22
[15] O. Milton, “Reliability & Failure of Electronic Materials
& Devices”, Ch 4.5.8 – “Is Arrhenius Erroneous” Academic
Press, San Diego CA. 1998
[16] D.D. Dylis, M.G. Priore, “A Comprehensive Reliability
Assessment Tool for Electronic Systems”, IIT Research/
Reliability Analysis Center, Rome NY, RAMS 2001
[17] “PRISM vs. commercially available prediction tools”,
RIAC Admin Posting #558. May 17, 2007 RIAC.ORG,
http://www.theriac.org/forum/showthread.php?t=12904
[18] R. Alderman, “Physics of Failure: Predicting Reliability
in Electronic Components”, Embedded Technology, 7-2009
[19] S. Salemi, L. Yang, J. Dai, J. Qin , J.B. Bernstein
Physics-of-Failure Based Handbook of Microelectronic
Systems, Defense Technical Info Center/Air Force Research
Lab Report., U of MD & RIAC, Utica, NY, Mar. 2008
[20] SAE J1211 – “Handbook for Robustness Validation of
Automotive E/E Modules”, Section 8 - Analysis, Modeling
and Simulations, SAE, April 2009.
[21] S.A. McKeown, Mechanical Analysis of Electronic
Packaging Systems, Marcel Dekker, New York 1999.

BIOGRAPHY
James G. McLeish, CRE
DfR (Design for Reliability) Solutions
5110 Roanoke Place, Suite 101
College Park, Maryland 20740 – USA
e-mail: jmcleish@dfrsolutions.com
Mr. McLeish holds a dual EE/ME Masters degree in Vehicle
E/E Controls System. He is a Certified Reliability Engineer
and a core member of the Society of Automotive Engineering
Reliability Standards Workgroup with over 32 years of
automotive and military Electrical/Electronics experience.
He started his career as a practicing electronics designing
engineer who helped invent the first microprocessor based
engine computer at Chrysler Corp. in the 1970’s. He has
since worked in systems engineering, design, development,
product, validation, reliability and quality assurance of both
E/E components and vehicle systems at General Motors and
GM Military. He is credited with the introduction of
Physics-of-Failure methods to GM while serving as an E/E
Reliability Manager and E/E QRD (Quality/Reliability/
Durability) Technology Expert. Since 2006 Mr. McLeish has
been a partner and manager of the Michigan office of DfR
Solutions, a quality/reliability engineering consulting and
laboratory services firm formed by senior scientists and
staffers from the University of Maryland’s CALCE Center
for Electronic Product and Systems. DfR Solutions is a
leader in providing PoF science and expertise to the global
electronics industry.

SERIES 1 - E/E
CIRCUITS & SYSTEMS
ANALYSIS
SERIES 3 – PHYSICAL
STRESS ANALYSIS
SERIES 2 -
EMC & SIGNAL
INTEGRITY
ANALYSIS
FILTER
PERFORMANCE
CONDUCTIVE
TRANSIENTS
GENERATION &
ENDURANCE
ESD
ENDURANCE
VOLTAGE
SUPPLY
VARIATION AND
TRANSIENT
EMC
RADIATED
EMISSION
SIGNAL
INTEGRITY
ATTENUATION
& TIMING
ANALYSIS
CIRCUIT PERFORMANCE &
VARIATION ANALYSIS
CIRCUIT PERFORMANCE & I/O
SENSITIVITY MODELING
E/E PARAMETER TOLERANCE
VARIATION ANALYSIS
OPERATING VOLTAGE RANGE &
GND OFFSET ANALYSIS
THERMAL DRIFT
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
ABNORMAL & EXTREMES
VOLTAGE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
E/E POWER & LOAD
ANALYSIS
COMPONENT POWER
DISSIPATION
WIRE & CIRCUIT TRACE
CURRENT LOADING
SHORT CIRCUIT LOADING
ANALYSIS
MECHANICAL STRESS
ANALYSIS
STRUCTURAL LOAD ANALYSIS
- HOUSING
- CIRCUIT BOARDS
- OTHER
FASTENER
PERFORMANCE
VIBRATION MODAL
ANALYSIS
CIRCUIT CARD
SHOCK ANALYSIS
COMPONENT INERTIAL
VIBRATION ANALYSIS
THERMAL STRESS )
SELF HEATING SIMULATION
CONDUCTION
CONVECTION
RADIATION.
WIRE/CIRCUIT TRACE
- THERMAL ANALYSIS
SERIES 4 – POF
DURABILITY &
RELIABILITY
ANALYSIS
CIRCUIT CARD
FLEXURE ANALYSIS
DROP ENDURANCE
SIMULATION
VIBRATION FATIGUE
DURABILITY
SHOCK OVERSTRESS
FRACTURE
DURABILITY
ANALYSIS
VIBRATION FATIGUE
DURABILITY
THERMAL-
MECHANICAL
CYCLING FATIGUE
DURABILITY
COMPONENTS
THERMAL-
MECHANICAL
CYCLING FATIGUE
DURABILITY
PLATED THROUGH
HOLES / VIAS
RF
ANTENNA
ANALYSIS
PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
EVALUATIONS
ELECTRICAL INTERFACE
MODELS
ELECTROMECHANICAL,
POWER ELECTROMAGNETIC &
ELECTRIC MACHINE ANALYSIS
PHYSICAL SYSTEM
PERFORMANCE MODELING
FIGURE 2 – Example of an analysis work flow plan based on fundamental engineering and
Physics of Failure principles for producing highly reliable and robust electronics systems.
The dotted arrows identify analytical work flow when one analysis task requires the results from a preceding analysis task.