November 2012 - Indian Airforce

AEROSP CE
Safety
FOCUS: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
November 2012
inside
History Repeats Itself
I am a Good Supervisor
T-20 in a Controller’s Life
Oops! They Forgot the Toggle Pin
An Air Incident
Aur Kitna Time Lagega?
ATS Crossword
Where Eagles Dare

Vol 202
Director General (Inspection & Safety)
Air Mshl AP Garud VM
Principal Director Aerospace Safety
Air Cmde R Marwaha VSM
Chief Editor
Gp Capt S Shrinivas
Editors
Wg Cdr MK Srivastava
Wg Cdr GS Bishen
Wg Cdr Nishant Dhar
Sqn Ldr Shashank Sharma
Editorial Assistants
Mr Niraj Kumar
Mrs S Sangeetha
Mr Rakesh Kumar Singh
Graphic Design
JWO G Ramesh
Sgt DK Chatterjee
Cpl RS Thokchom
Mr Rajib Paul
November 2012
AEROSP CE
Safety
'Aerospace Safety' magazine can be
viewed through http://www.airhq.iaf.in/
(links : DG (I&S) % DAS % FS Magazine)
and on the internet at
http://www.indianairforce.nic.in
Articles/Suggestions may be sent to:
Editor, Aerospace Safety
Institute of Flight Safety
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Tele : 011-25672871, 23247789(AFNET)
Fax: 011-25675059
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Round-the-clock contact of Principal
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Every article must be accompanied by a
brief bio-data and passport size
photograph of the author.
The opinions expressed in the ‘Aerospace
Safety’ magazine are the personal views of
the authors and do not reflect the official
policies of Air HQ. Contributions are
welcome, as are comments and criticism.
The Editorial Board reserves the right to
make any improvements/changes in the
manuscripts.
2
inside
History Repeats Itself
Wg Cdr PC Kalia
4 Avian Activity Risk Assessment and Prioritisation
Wg Cdr Anuj Pathak
8 T-20 in a Controller ’s Life
Wg Cdr Rajesh Sharma
12 An Air Incident that ‘Kick-Star ted’ Us
Gp Capt KVS Nair
14 Oops! They Forgot the Toggle Pin
Wg Cdr R Vijay
18 ATS Crossword Puzzle
WO PM Jangid
20 Aur Kitna Time Lagega?
Wg Cdr B Anandhan
22 Billion Hearts Beating and Flight Safety
Gp Capt Narinder Taneja
24 I am a Good Supervisor
Sqn Ldr Vijaya Kumar
26 Do You Know?
WO PK Swain
28 Where Eagles Dare
Wg Cdr N Dhar
32 Good Show
14 20
36 From The Desk of Ornithologist
24
The Aerospace Safety Magazine is a monthly publication to promote safety
consciousness and prevent aircraft accidents. Indian Air Force units may reprint articles
from the magazine without further authorisation. However, no part of this magazine can be
used or reproduced in any form by any means or translated in any other language without
the explicit permission in writing by the Chief Editor.

Editorial
he onset of winter is a welcome time, as one gladly trades the swelter for the sweater! However,
winter also brings with it its associated weather phenomena that are so very important for
Taircrew to watch out for, be it poor visibility or Western Disturbances. But there is another
group of professionals who need to maintain an equally vigilant eye for safety in the skies. And so we
focus on the vital bonding between aviators and air traffic controllers, highlighting several cases
where prompt action saved the day.
'History Repeats Itself ' is an account of mistaken identity of airfields in close proximity. Such
errors of judgement have been made by both, service as well as civil aircraft, despite a plethora of
sophisticated navigation equipment on board. This is not the first such example and may not be the
last. Aircrew and controllers both need to be extra cautious when operating in such conditions. 'T-20
in a Controller's Life' is another collection of anecdotes which prove that the alertness and quick
response required of an air traffic controller are as demanding and dynamic as a player in a T-20
thriller! 'An Air Incident that Kick-Started Us' is a wonderful account that stresses the intense coordination
required between different agencies involved in the launch and recovery of aircraft,
particularly when today's profiles and area of operations span large durations and distances from
base.
'Avian Activity Risk Assessment and Prioritisation' emphasises the need to be specific to the
peculiarities of each base when planning for effective bird control and avoidance. 'Where Eagles
Dare' is a bird's perspective of its struggle for existence in its natural domain due to the intrusion of
humans; a reminder that it is us who have to learn to co-exist!
'Aur Kitna Time Lagega?' is a situation perhaps encountered many a time when impatience
and interference actually end up delaying task accomplishment. 'Oops They Forgot the Toggle Pin' is
a reminder for being forthright to ensure correct and timely analysis of any unusual occurrence, while
'I am a Good Supervisor' succinctly spells out what a supervisor should do to ensure safe and efficient
operations.
The importance of tool discipline and a comprehensive quiz on ‘matters aviation’ are good
fillers for all of us to test our knowledge at leisure.
Happy Landings.
(S Shrinivas)
Group Captain

Wg Cdr PC Kalia
HISTORY
REPEATS ITSELF
The old adage, ‘Accidents happen when you
expect them the least’ has a special bonding
with IAF, perhaps because of the kind of business
we are in. At times it seems as if Mr Murphy is always
on the lookout for you to commit a mistake so that he
can play his part.
These incidents although more than a decade
old, never fade from my memory. Instead the lessons
learnt from these incidents have helped me in averting
a major mishap in the recent past.
On a beautiful Sunday morning, when the visibility
was in excess of 10 Km (CAVOK in aviation lexicon),
a young Pilot Officer was relaxing in the ATC tower
because no one apart from birds was flying in the
area. He was jolted out of the comfort of a full back
Godrej chair by a call from an Air India Flt from Delhi
to Chandigarh. He rattled out the weather report and
asked the ac to “report for descent”. Over ONOGI (121
deg 21.5 NM from VICG) the pilot requested “a left
hand orbit to lose altitude” and “permission to report
direct finals for runway 29”. The same was granted by
the controller in a near mechanical response. While
in orbit, the pilot reported “runway in-sight”; he was
“cleared descent to circuit altitude” and asked to
“report finals for runway 29”. After a while, the pilot
reported “finals for runway 29” and sought “permission
to land”. As per the drill, the controller looked at the
Airman On Look-Out (AOLO) (fondly called ‘The Third
Eye’ of the controller) who indicated ‘ac not in sight’ by
vigorously waving his hand. The controller couldn’t
believe this and asked him to use the binoculars to
spot the ac (Boeing class in CAVOK conditions). In a
state of disbelief himself, the controller once again
asked the ac to “report position”, to which the pilot
angrily replied, “finals, request permission to land.”
You could call it ‘sixth sense awakening’ or the
result of meticulous training at ATCOTE, where past
experiences shared by the DS had left a lasting
impression in the minds of the budding ATCOs,
much more than the writings in text books. The
controller looked at the DRDF (now replaced by
CADF) and to his utter shock saw that the homing
indicated was Northerly instead of 290 or so. He
literally jumped out of the chair and shouted in a
single breath, words rarely heard in ATC, “(call Sign),
Homing indicated is ______, wherever you are,
climb to 6200 feet (initial approach altitude) and
report steady.” Getting no response from the pilot,
he repeated (rather shouted) the call, possibly in
the same breath. Now, he heard the pilot meekly
saying “Roger”. Complete silence in the tower
was disturbed only by the heavy breathing of
the DATCO. After a while, the AOLO indicated the
“aircraft in sight” and pointed towards the South
of runway. Rest everything was what they call
‘history’.
On another occasion at the same base, the
same youngster was on duty (operating from the
alternate semi-underground ATC) and giving him
company was the COO of the base. A transport ac
(AN-32) was carrying out an air test overhead at an
altitude of 27000 feet. As this was the only ac flying
at the time, on “request for rejoin”, he was “cleared
descend to Initial Approach Altitude (6200 feet)
and report runway in sight”. On receiving the call
of “visual with runway”, he was cleared to report
downwind, followed by “call finals for runway 29”.
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Expecting the ac to report finals at any time, the
controller was busy looking for the ac through the
limited space available to look out from the semiunderground
ATC, when he was jolted by a call
from the pilot, “Going around, why did you fire a red
cartridge.” The controller spontaneously replied
in the negative and said, “Will check with Runway
Controller.” On hearing this RT conversation, the
COO said, “He might have got confused by some
cracker on approach (civil population and Diwali
days), ask him to report downwind again.” Still
confused the controller hesitantly asked the pilot
to report downwind again and re-iterated,
“no one from ATC fired
any cartridge; runway i s
clear and available for landing.”
Everyone was speechless
and looking at each other in
shock and awe. The silence
was broken by the ringing
of the direct line from our
Southern diversion. The Cpl
on other side of the line was
shouting, “What is this AN-32
doing over our base without
any clearance or notification?” The
DATCO, wiser by his past experience,
immediately asked the ac to climb to the
Initial Approach Altitude and report steady. The red
cartridge was fired by an alert Runway Controller at
our Southern diversion because when the ac was
spotted on finals, a working party was deployed on
the runway for maintenance work. Rest all is again
‘history’.
The then budding ATCO has now grown into
a full fledged professional and has a reasonable
working experience in the Tower as well as on
Radar. If nothing else, these experiences added
to his wisdom kitty and engrained a unique habit
of establishing contact with ac reporting finals
notwithstanding the pilots’ report. This habit
proved handy recently, thus averting a total disaster.
At a Western base, on a bright sunny day, when
fighter flying was in full swing and the time was
the peak arrival time for civil scheduled flights, the
duty Radar controller vectored a non-scheduled
civil ac for a visual approach on runway 10 (noninstrument
runway). Approximately at 9-8 miles
from touchdown at a height of a little more than
1500 feet, the pilot reported runway in sight and was
asked to contact tower. The fully occupied Tower
Controller, mechanically responded by asking the
ac to “report short finals”. Though not demanded
out of him as a Radar Controller but out of sheer
habit, the duty Radar Controller was following the
ac on visual approach. He observed that the ac
had altered its heading to 080-085, as against
the expected heading of 095-097 and
the height indicated on radar
was just 400-450 ft while still
5-4 NM from touchdown.
On sensing something
amiss, without wasting a
moment he changed over
to the Tower frequency
and nearly screamed, “(call
sign), STOP DESCENT CLIMB
IMMEDIATELY (repeated
twice).” The pilot diligently
complied acknowledging the
same and was re-vectored for another
approach. Post flight discussion with the pilot
revealed that he had mistaken the rowing channel
on approach (almost the same length as the runway
and of similar orientation) for the runway and
had made an approach for the same. Had it gone
unnoticed, the result could have been anything but
pleasant.
Notwithstanding the fact that ATCs in IAF
lack the crew room culture of flying squadrons,
wherein aircrew learn from each other’s mistakes,
experiences need to be shared for a safer tomorrow.
In this era of technology too, despite the most
advanced avionics being available on board, if all
this happened; chances of history repeating itself
can’t be ruled out.
- Wg Cdr PC Kalia
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 3

Wg Cdr Anuj Pathak
A
large part of any SASIO’s task and time
is taken up in trying to manage the bird
activity at an airfield, so as to permit
operations to continue. Being an integral part of
the flying profession, no SASIO would like to hold/
restrict/stop flying due to birds. But at times, that
is the only solution, albeit a temporary one. Apart
from managing the bird activity on a day-to day
basis or planning for short term measures, the
SASIO needs to put his mind in identifying the
risk species/periods with respect to birds, their
habitat, food cycle, travel routes etc and prioritise
the avian hazards so as to be able to effectively
tackle this impediment. Presently, a generalised
approach for control of all species on an airfield
is resorted to. Despite some periodic species
specific modules devised by the Ornithology
Cell, the system lacks a procedure of any risk
assessment and prioritisation of the avian hazards.
It is a known fact that threats posed by all species
are not the same and therefore concentrating on
a particular population or species of birds may be
ultimately more productive than a generalised
control of all available species.
A need therefore exists to carry out a risk
assessment of avian species affecting operations
and to prioritise the risk to plan for effective
control measures.
Why Assess Risk?
How does a SASIO focus his control measures
against general avian activity? Will the same
methods work against all types of birds? Is
‘spiking’ R/W/ taxy track markers to deny perch
area to birds effective for all types of birds?
Are specific forms of control measures such as
food chain denial, roost harassment or habitat
management going to work across the board
for all species of avian activity? Are the modules
season specific? Do some modules work more
effectively in the mating season or the roosting
season? A risk assessment of avian activity would
bring out such answers. This would go a long
way in determining long term policies of avian
control. Also, expenditure planning in terms of
whether or not to implement a particular control
procedure and whether or not to purchase
equipment for the same, can be prioritised. Avian
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species posing the greatest risk to aviation can be
identified and a control programme by which they
could be addressed, created.
How to Assess Risk and Prioritise it?
To combat avian hazards, assessing, identifying
and prioritising risks posed by different species
present in their environment is an important facet
of the SASIO’s job profile. Expert assistance from
the Ornithology Cell is available and should be
sought. The proposed steps permit risk assessment
of avian hazards on airfields and subsequently,
aid in developing a control protocol for dealing
with these risks. Evaluation of all species affecting
operations will result in relative risk evaluation
for various species. After this is determined, an
effective control measure can be developed to
address those risks. As not all species are equally
hazardous to flight operations, this assessment
allows us to acquire a list of species that pose the
greatest risk to aviation and the order in which they
should be addressed in any control programme.
Significant criteria need to be taken into account
when determining the order that the species fall
into and exactly how they might affect overall
operations. Based on survey reports, a ‘Final Risk
Value’ could be worked out which would tabulate
the bird hazards and permit prioritising the risk.
The following factors need to be considered
when carrying out risk assessment and prioritising
control measures:-
Species Population. Greater the numbers,
greater would be the impact on operations.
Obviously, greater the number of birds present in
the environment, greater the likelihood of striking
an aircraft. For example at an airfield if there are
almost 1000 pigeons crossing over a particular
area in a given time frame, the chances of them
hitting an ac are far greater than a bunch of cattle
egret.
in overlooking a serious risk factor. Accurate
determination of species population becomes
important in assigning relative risk status to that
species and prioritising its control. Therefore,
the species that have the highest number of
birds found within an airfield’s environment are
assigned higher risk factor in the relative risk
hazard compilation.
Bird Size. The impact force generated by
a bird strike depends on the ac velocity and the
mass of the bird. The larger an animal’s body mass,
the more significant the damage it could cause to
an aircraft. A single bird strike involving a large
vulture could wreak havoc on even the largest
of planes while impact of smaller birds may not
cause significant damage. Therefore efforts need
to be concentrated on eliminating the presence
of larger sized birds first.
Large Flock Movement. Birds that travel
in flocks are potentially more of a hazard to
aircraft operations than those that move about in
small groups or individually. Ingesting a bunch
Quantifiable surveys are needed to be
conducted to determine the absolute number
of birds involved. Care should be taken to avoid
assumptions during the survey as this may result
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 5

of sparrows or larks into an engine can be as
damaging as ingesting a much larger vulture.
This is especially true for bird groups like the
short toed lark, wagtails, ashy crow sparrow lark
etc.
Time Spent in Airfield Environment. A bird
that passes through the area and may only be
spotted near the aerodrome once, obviously
poses much less of a risk than one that spends
the whole year in the local environment. A case
in point is the migratory bird ‘in transit stopovers’
like that of the greater/lesser flamingo etc.
Activity Cycle of the Bird. All bird species
have a distinct feeding, sporting and resting
cycle. Identifying this cycle of intense activity
be permitted only above stipulated heights at
certain airfields.
Species Location wrt Operations. Those
species that may be located farther from the
airfield area, but could fly to great heights may
pose more of a threat than species that spend
their time within the airfield but do not fly very
far from the group, for example all raptors like
kites/eagles etc. The score for kites in this factor
can be much higher since they fly at considerable
heights. Also, a bird located 100 m off to the side
of a runway poses a very different threat than
one situated 100 m on the approach of the same
in a 24 hr period will allow time specific control
measures. For eg. if resting time is denied by
creating constant disruption in their resting
place, the birds would tend to find an alternate
resting place outside the airfield. Additionally
certain operations may / may not be permitted
during specific periods of the day. For example
despite green period timings, overshoots may
runway. For example, the green bee eater may be
abundantly available at a base, but rarely found
on the R/W shoulders.
Time Spent in Air. Those species of birds
that spend a great deal of their time foraging
on the ground or rarely change locations do not
pose as great a threat as those species that fly
about the airfield frequently.
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Number of Reported Strikes. Knowing what
bird or wildlife species have caused greater
number of strikes at the airfield is generally quite
predictive of future problems. This however
takes time as the normal gestation period for the
swab analysis results, is a few months. Therefore,
for accurate prediction a larger database of a few
years bird strike cases needs to be catered to.
Ability to Actively Avoid Ac Collisions. Not all
species are equally capable of actively avoiding a
collision with an incoming aircraft. Crows, Kestrels
etc. are quite adept at avoiding ac while a vulture
Conclusion
A risk assessment rating system is applied to
each species at an airfield in order to determine
a risk ‘rating’. This list should be used to prioritise
wildlife control efforts and can be used as an
index to help determine the overall effort and
money that should be spent on preventing a
strike of that particular species. Though only
a guideline, this methodology can serve as an
effective method of setting bird control priorities
and may, in the long run, help SASIOs improve the
effectiveness of bird control measures on their
airfields.
- Wg Cdr Anuj Pathak
is notoriously unskilled at avoiding impacts with
faster aircraft.
Bird Response to Control Measures. Different
birds need different approaches to control their
activity. Certain birds would not respond to a
particular control measure. Different measures
would be required to tackle various bird species.
For example spraying of insecticides, drum
beating module, thumping parade etc, must
be aimed specifically at different bird groups/
species.
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 7

Wg Cdr Rajesh Sharma
It’s been more than 15 years since I resigned from my previous job as an Inspector in the Customs
and Central Excise Department and joined the fourth largest Air Force of the world. Pride in uniform,
discipline, security in all aspects and flying were the things which attracted me then and continue to
attract me till date. All this while, for the last one and a half decades, like in T-20 matches, I too have had
my share of good and bad days on the field. Not many are aware of the these moments or nail biting
finishes, therefore it is my endeavour to share these with all of you so as to help others derive lessons
and to perform better each day. As lessons are more important than the names, I do not mention any
names. Being positive in life is ‘THE MANTRA’ of life so I too shall start with days when I performed well
in the T-20 match.
Scoring a Quick Fifty. One day I was on duty as a GCA Radar Controller and fighter flying was in progress.
Three Bisons were carrying out an exercise SE of base. One member rejoined early and informed us that
he was coming for a landing off a descending circuit. Being new to Radar, I wanted to practise vectoring
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of ac and requested the pilot, who was the Flight
Commander of the fighter Sqn, for vectoring
the ac for JLD. This was negated by the pilot. I
could see two ac still operating in sector and one
leaving the sector. The ac which was leaving the
sector was on a North Easterly course, instead of
a North Westerly course as required for overhead.
On the pretext of passing Runway and QNH, I
cross checked the position of ac with homer.
As no other flying was on, I was certain that the
pilot was going in the wrong direction. I had not
identified the ac on Radar. As the ac was going
away from base and getting closer to the ATS
route, I mustered my guts and asked the Flt Cdr if
he would like to be Radar Vectored for JLD. This
time he reluctantly agreed. As ours was a Primary
Radar, I asked for the heading of the aircraft and
gave a left turn by 70 degrees for identification.
The pilot was surprised and reconfirmed if it was
a left turn and that too by 70 degrees. The same
was confirmed by me. Thereafter he did not
speak much on R/T. After landing I got a call from
the Flight Commander. He first thanked me and
said that he had selected an incorrect waypoint
in his navigation system and hence was actually
setting course for a different base. In addition
he said that he was slightly low on fuel as well.
So, that day with this quick fifty, I contributed
significantly towards our team and it was a winwin
situation for all. This episode taught me to
monitor ac regularly even when they were not
being Radar Vectored.
Yet Another Useful Knock. This time, the
venue was the same but the type of ac was
Jaguar. Two ac had gone to sector and changed
over to SU. Within no time both changed over
back to Radar and I was informed by No 1 that
No 2 had an emergency. They were coming in
for a priority rejoin off a descending circuit. After
informing the tower to initiate primary alarm,
I continued monitoring the R/T calls of No 1
who was asking the No 2 for his ac parameters.
I asked the formation leader if he would like to
be vectored for a JLD. This was overruled by the
leader. Meanwhile the SFS in tower told me to
be more careful with respect to No 2 as he had
just become ‘Operational’ on Jaguars and that he
should be made to land ASAP. During our training
on Radar it was grilled into us that emergency ac
must land ASAP unless the pilot had an intention
of holding due to some reason. But in this case the
leader had resorted to a mode of recovery which
was longer. Though I was a little apprehensive, I
gathered the courage and piped up on R/T “.........
(Name) from present position Radar letdown will
be a shorter vector than descending circuit.” I do
not normally use a pilot’s name on R/T or question
the pilot’s decision in an emergency as he/she
may be preoccupied with taking quick decisions,
but this day I did it anyway. The leader agreed
and after identification I vectored No 2 followed
by No 1. Run to touchdown was reduced by
approx 25 miles in this mode of recovery. After
landing the leader informed me that due to No
2’s problem it did not strike him that JLD would
have been a better option. So yet again I was
satisfied with my contribution to the safety of our
ac.
Hat Trick. Another location, dark night,
single engine ac and night flying was in
progress. Fighters were airborne for 1 vs 1 and
maintaining with SU. SU had changed them
over to the training frequency for the exercise.
As other ac had become U/S before departure
and the workload in Radar was less, I decided to
monitor the frequency of SU, though I had no
obligation to do so. I was trying to make sense
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 9

of the position of aircraft engaged in PI, when
all of a sudden I heard a call, “RPM dropping,
attempting relight.” I immediately informed
the Tower that the SFS should change to the
training frequency on the LUP Set and listen
to the calls of the pilot. Meanwhile the pilot
who had successfully relit the engine of the
Bison ac was heading for base. He informed
the SU controller, “Tell SRE to come up on this
channel. I cannot change frequency.” The ac
was nearly 20-22 miles from touchdown and
I had not identified the ac as yet since both
ac were nearly together, though separated
vertically. Now, had the SU controller told
the ADSO to inform Tower, then Radar and
considering the time required for me to
tune the required channel on the LUP set, it
would have been too late to give any Radar
assistance for the landing/approach. Lady
luck was with us that day and on listening to
the last call about SRE, I instructed the pilot to
turn left onto 170 degree for identification. As
there was no reply I repeated my call. My mind
had started working faster as ac was coming
closer. I called up SU on R/T to transmit to
the ac to turn left for identification. I had
given discretionary descend as well. Range
of my R/T on the Training freq was very less.
So whatever I transmitted on R/T, the same
was repeated by the SU controller and the ac
responded. By the time he turned left, he was
just 11 miles from touchdown. By this time
he started getting my calls. I carried out an
emergency approach and the ac landed with
nearly 3000 L of fuel. It was a heavy landing
and it was indeed commendable on the
pilot’s part to have successfully relit the Bison
engine and landing within no time. The No 2
ac of the formation diverted. That day after I
came home I prayed to God in silence for some
time and thanked him for everything. A COI
was convened and subsequently the pilot was
awarded a well deserved SC. To my surprise, this
was one COI wherein the ATC officer was not
asked any questions. Whatever help I could offer
in the emergency approach was very satisfying
and till date I do not know as to why I had that
urge to change channels and listen to the PI that
day. That helped in saving valuable time, when
time was very critical. May be God had his plans
for me. I may hardly ever get such a close call
again for assisting in an emergency approach in
my life.
There is hardly any cricketer who hasn’t had
his share of a lean patch in his career. I too had my
lean patch a couple of times wherein my timing
wasn’t good and I couldn’t contribute much
with the bat or ball. It was due to Situational
Awareness of the pilot and my luck, that we did
mange a safe recovery.
Missed Being Run Out by a Whisker. The
source of electro-magnetic waves is the radar
and if we vector the ac towards this, then the
ac will head towards the radar and not towards
the touchdown point. There exists a procedure
wherein a Radar Controller offsets the centre to
the touchdown point (thankfully, in present day
radars this off-centering is done at the click of
a button, unlike earlier when it had to be done
manually). Once I was vectoring an ac for JLD
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and I forgot to off centre. Now I was vectoring the
ac to the radar and not towards the touchdown
point. I was blissfully unaware and continued
vectoring. At around 1NM from touchdown the
ac went around and positioned for a descending
circuit. It was my good luck that the weather was
good, the pilot senior and very sure of his position.
When the pilot went around, I was informed by
the Tower Controller that the ac was well right of
track and heading towards the radar. I realised my
mistake straight away and thereafter just could
not wait to say sorry. It was good understanding
and a timely “NO” call by the pilot, which saved
me from being run out that day.
Overconfident and First Ball Duck. As I
was gaining experience, I was becoming more
confident in Radar controlling. Little did I realise
that I was becoming overconfident. Once, during
full fledged flying, a five ac formation asked for
a tactical QGH followed by a precision approach
on inbound. I was too greedy to give this QGH
to the Tower Controller and started the QGH
myself. On outbound the ac were to enter sector
SE and a two ac formation was doing a low level
exercise in that sector with the formations being
separated vertically. I was not looking at the
Radar and continued with QGH looking at the
homer. The low level formation after finishing
the exercise gave a call “climbing to 7000 feet,
request precision approach”. It was time to give
a correction to the QGH ac and I responded to
the call with “Roger” and gave a correction to the
formation doing QGH. Within no time I heard the
call “too close” from one of the members of the
formation doing QGH. I looked at the display and
realised that the two formations had come close
to each other. I should not have been doing QGH
and the pilot should have asked permission to
climb instead of giving me information. It was a
bad day but luck favoured all of us. However this
first ball duck did not result in our team losing
advantage.
Caught but Outside the Boundary Line.
Once I was on night flying duty in the tower for
base night flying. My course mate was waiting
for me and as soon as I reached the tower, she
handed over the traffic to me. The first detail was
airborne and as I sat on my seat, I got a call on
EPABX from one end of the runway where the
CFT was parked. The AFSO informed me that the
arrester barrier was still down. I looked at the
light indication and looked at my course mate.
We did not say anything and I quickly raised the
arrester barrier. We were lucky that no aircraft
had required to engage arrester barrier that day
till it was raised by me.
Ups and downs keep taking place in
life including the work place, but better
understanding, confidence in each other and
professionalism go a long way in success of a
mission. Aviation is a team game and everyone
needs to contribute. But in all this one must
remember to enjoy the T20 game we play daily.
After all, in the end it is the team ‘INDIAN AIR
FORCE’ which should be winning all the time. Our
ranking at the top is assured by our efforts alone.
Happy flying and happy controlling.
- Wg Cdr Rajesh Sharma
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 11

Gp Capt KVS Nair
One comes across incidents / events in
one’s life and profession, which spur him
/ her in a particular direction, often called
‘turning points’. Cricket commentators scramble
to identify the ‘turning point(s)’ in IPL matches.
We as a unit also came across one such incident
(on the first working day after assuming a new
role) which ‘kick started’ us and got us going in
the right direction.
The Incident
On a busy Monday morning, a Gulfstream
corporate jet ac at approx. 8000 ft goes through a
formation of fighter ac. During descent on its ATS
route towards its destination (an IAF airfield also
used by civil flights), the corporate jet comes on
a collision path with the trail pair of a 4 ac mixed
fighter formation. The Resolution Advisory (RA)
of the civil passenger ac cuts in, prompting the
pilot “climb; climb now” from the first fighter
and approaching the second, prompts “descend;
descend now”, to avoid a collision.
The very experienced SATCO thereafter is
obliged to exercise all his superior PR (Personal
Relations) skills to convince the civil pilot not to
report the incident. Incident report or not, there
are lessons to be learnt by all the operators and
associated elements. The following paragraphs
analyse the incident and attempt to bring out
some of those lessons.
What Happened?
On that day, the 4 ac formation of a
detachment was planned for a live Low Level
strike mission. The navigation route passed
through all sectors of the base, crossed an ATS
route at 20° angle (approx) and culminated at
the pull up point for live weapon delivery. Due to
inclement weather during the earlier part of the
day, the sortie launch was postponed repeatedly.
Sure enough, as the weather cleared, there was a
mad rush by all the locally based squadrons and
the one on detachment, to launch sorties in order
to achieve the day’s planned task.
The lead pair of the formation got airborne
at 1118h and contacted the SU to level out at
6000’ for the navigation (instead of low levels)
as it was now ‘Red Period’. Number 3 and 4 got
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airborne six minutes later as planned, to execute
a planned rendezvous (RV) as a part of the sortie
profile. They too contacted the SU, seeking to
maintain 7000’ and 8000’ respectively to maintain
safe height separation for the RV. Having levelled
out at the allotted heights, the formation
was permitted to change over to the training
frequency by the Recovery Director (RD), who is
the FC controlling local flying in the sectors, with
an instruction to give ‘Ops normal’ call every ten
minutes. It was only after about 7-8 min that the
RD started getting perturbed when the formation
started deviating from the track passed by the
Base Ops Room. The RD could not check with the
formation as they were on a different frequency
and so asked the Recovery Assistant (air warrior
detailed to assist the RD) to call up Base Ops
Room and check the route.
The fighter formation meanwhile had
completed three legs of the route but had not
effected the RV. The trail pair was together,
trailing the lead pair by about 15 Km. As per
the sortie profile, a bogie was simulated by the
supervisor and the trail pair took tactical action.
In the process, the Air Interception Radar of one
of the ac picked up a track approaching from the
right and after resuming course, the left member
reported the civil airliner, after making visual
contact. The right member ‘ducked down’ to
create separation and the left member ‘pulled up’.
The Gulfstream civil aircraft passed between the
two ac with RA cutting in, asking the pilot to first
pull up and then push down. Neither the civil ac
nor the fighter formation was informed of each
other’s presence.
The RA is an audio warning, notifying
imminent danger of collision, given by Traffic
Collision Avoidance System on transponder
equipped ac. When an RA is issued, the pilot is
expected to respond immediately. He is allowed
(at that time) to violate the ATS instructions given
to him till the danger is over.
The Mistakes Made / Questions to be Asked.
In retrospect it is clear that mistakes were
committed by many operators/functionaries in
the chain for the situation to reach such unsafe
levels. There are also some questions that arise.
Some of them are listed below.
Should the formation have stuck to its profile,
now that it had got airborne during red period,
given that at the newly decided heights, they
were going to transgress into the airspace of ac
operating in the sectors? It should also have been
expected that the traffic in sectors would have
been heavier as everyone had launched nearly
together with the weather suddenly clearing up.
While planning, ATS route crossing should
have been as close to perpendicular as possible.
Positive RT contact / clearance should have been
taken from SU before crossing/approaching
ATS route. Should the formation have been
Continued on page 17
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 13

Wg Cdr R Vijay
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The time was 2100h and I had just finished my
dinner when my mobile rang. It was Gp Capt
xx C Eng B from the Command Headquarters.
He said that the VIP Avro ac of Command
Communication Flight had made an emergency
landing at Mumbai International Airport at 2030
h due to nose undercarriage red light remaining
‘ON’. Luckily there was no VIP on board and the ac
was returning to base. The ac had landed safely but
had been switched off on the taxi link due to nose
wheel steering failure and was being towed back to
the parking. The STO of the unit was on leave and
since I was the STO of the neighbouring AVRO unit,
I was asked to speak to the aircrew to ascertain the
complete snag and keep a rectification party ready
to go to Mumbai at first light.
I called the senior most aircrew who was a Sqn Ldr
with sufficient experience on type. He said that for
this sortie he was the co pilot and the captain was a Fg
Offr with about one year’s experience. He explained
that they had taxied out normally and after takeoff
when the undercarriage had been selected up, the
nose undercarriage light had changed from green
to red and remained ‘ON’, indicating that the nose
wheel had not locked up. They tried one cycling of
undercarriage and when the red light persisted, they
declared the emergency and carried out a priority
landing back at Mumbai. During the landing roll,
while turning onto the link, he (the Sqn Ldr) realised
that the nose wheel steering was ineffective and
therefore had switched off the ac after clearing the
runway. I spoke to one of my clueful Airframe Fitter
JWO and we suspected that the snag might have
been due to a bird hit during takeoff, which might
have damaged the nose undercarriage door linkage
and also severed the nose wheel steering cable.
However, it was reported by the crew that they could
not find any avian remains or damage, other than
two large dents on the right undercarriage door of
the nose wheel.
A rectification team with I as the team leader
(also the technical member of the Court of Inquiry)
was airlifted to Mumbai to ascertain the cause of
malfunction of the undercarriage and to undertake
rectification on site. Since Mumbai did not have the
requisite equipment, it was decided to carry even
the 10 ton jack along with other requisite tools.
Draining out of hydraulic fluid due to pipeline
rupture was initially suspected, however, it was seen
that the reservoir was still full and no abnormality
in the nose undercarriage system was found
during visual inspection. However two major dents
wherein one of them had torn the aluminium skin
were seen on the right front undercarriage door.
We decided to jack up the front wheel and do a
retraction test with pins on the two main wheels in
place. The system was energised and pressure built
up using the hand pump and the front wheel was
retracted. No fouling was observed and the nose
wheel undercarriage light changed from green to
red and upon getting locked up, the red light went
off. This confirmed that the system was working
perfectly well. The nose wheel steering was also
checked and tested thoroughly and was found to
be serviceable.
The team thereon proceeded to find the
cause of the dent on the undercarriage door.
The nose wheel toggle pin was removed and on
closer examination it was seen that the dent was
commensurate to the shape of the toggle pin
head and there were even traces of red paint near
the dent. The undercarriage was again retracted
this time with the toggle disconnected and the
pin fixed in the upper toggle. It was seen that the
undercarriage door got obstructed by the upper
toggle link at exactly the same place where it was
dented. It was therefore deduced that the ac had
taken off with the nose wheel toggle disconnected
and this had caused the nose undercarriage not
getting locked up and the red light remaining ‘ON’,
creating an emergency in air.
Exact Cause of Failure
Parking for AF aircraft in Mumbai is such, that it
requires being towed out of the slot during refuelling
or just before starting. In this case the ac was towed
out twice for refuelling and also just before departure
at around 1915h. During towing the nose wheel
toggle link is disconnected from the nose wheel
steering jack. However, in this case the ground crew
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 15

forgot
to reconnect
the nose wheel toggle link
after positioning the ac for startup. This
check is also part of the aircrew preflight checks
and was missed by all the three aircrew. The crew,
oblivious of the fact that the toggle link was not
attached, started taxiing out. Transport crew familiar
with Mumbai will appreciate that the ac has to take
a series of almost 90 deg turns during taxiing so as
to reach the runway. During taxiing, the Captain felt
that the nose wheel steering was sluggish during the
turns and resorted to the non standard procedure
of differential braking to negotiate turns. This fact
was also corroborated by the CVR recordings. The
tradesman responsible for reconnecting the toggle
link was a Propulsion Fitter tradesman with barely
one year of service and this was his first outstation
duty. He realized his mistake immediately after
landing back at Mumbai, however, due to fear, he
reconnected the toggle link before others alighted
from the ac and did not inform anyone.
Why it Happened?
Major international airports like Mumbai
and Delhi have strict time slots, considering their
perpetually busy traffic. In Delhi, the visiting ac is
handled and received in AF dispersal, which is not
the case in Mumbai. In this case, the navigator was
already in the ac during towing, busy coordinating on
RT with Mumbai ground for startup and hence could
not check the toggle link position. The Captain and
the co-pilot also could not ascertain the fitment of
toggle link during their externals as the ground/duty
crew were in the process of disconnecting the tractor.
Hence, the complete onus of ensuring the toggle
link fitment was on the ground crew, who was a Prop
Fit on his first outstation trip. In the urge to avoid
missing the critical time slot, all the crew missed out
o n
the small
toggle link which later
became the weakest link in Flight
Safety. Even during the taxy out when the Captain
experienced sluggishness of the nose wheel
steering, the more experienced co-pilot interpreted
it wrongly and suggested using differential braking
to negotiate turns. Though an incorrect procedure,
aircrew of Avro fleet had expressed that they had
had to resort to this procedure to negotiate turns
at Mumbai and a few other such typical airbases,
while parking. Hence, pointing a finger at the
more experienced co-pilot too was not correct.
Moreover, the decision of the crew to re-cycle the
undercarriage once could also not be questioned
as they thought that it was only an indication
problem.
The Court of Inquiry, after carefully deliberating
over the entire chain of events, was of the opinion
not to blame the tradesman or the aircrew for
this emergency as it was due to the peculiar
circumstances of Mumbai airport. The COI also
recommended the following.
Carry out pre flight externals
meticulously.
Detail suitable senior ground crew
whenever flying into international airports
where there is heavy traffic.
Conduct regular OJT classes for ac
towing for the benefit of FLM tradesmen.
Educate duty crew personnel at
Mumbai regarding towing procedures of all
transport ac in the IAF.
In the end one thought remains in my
mind: what if the nose undercarriage had not
come down after recycling?????
- Wg Cdr R Vijay
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Continued from page 13
maintaining training frequency at that time?
The Recovery Director who cleared the
different heights, started losing SA when the
formation changed over to training frequency
and it emerged that the route being followed by
the formation varied from the flight plan available
with the SU.
The RD did not inform GCA that the formation
was maintaining higher height and was on the
training frequency (not in contact with SU).
The RD did not react despite convergence
of the 5 tracks (four military & one civil) which
could be seen on the scope. At least at this stage
the GCA controller should have been cautioned
about the heights being maintained by the
formation. She had got engrossed in handling
other local flying.
The GCA controller also had the five tracks
converging on his scope. The civil ac was in RT
contact with him. He too did not react.
The formation did not give ‘Ops Normal’ call
at the stipulated intervals (which could have
brought them in contact with the RD) and instead
continued maintaining training frequency.
Lessons Learnt
There are valuable lessons to be learnt by all
involved to prevent a similar incident in future.
Some of these are:
Training. All mistakes committed in the
incident are old and relate to training of all
functionaries in the chain. Everybody’s training
failed and the day was saved by technology -
the Al Radar and TCAS worked. Things might
have been different if the fighters were without
transponder equipment or Al radar.
Aircrew. Sortie planning, profile changes
related to environment changes, SOP (ATS
crossing), avionics exploitation (one RT set on
listening watch, the other for training) etc - in the
hurry to get airborne; much was left unattended.
Launch Base. Training of ADSOs at Base
Ops Room, briefing of outstation crew, GCA
involvement, detailed scrutiny of detachment
flying programme etc; launch bases need to be
serious about these, for these are known areas
where communication ‘gaps’ take place - and
here too they did.
SU. Training of RD and ADSOs, how to
maintain SA being the agency equipped with the
largest picture, how/when to raise alarm and ask
for more help etc.
Policy. Is there a requirement for a separate
control (of civil traffic) with the SU, like the ‘alpha’
control in some sectors, now that the civil traffic
has increased, sortie profiles of fighter ac have
become complicated and cover larger areas?
Unified control will also help M&l functions at the
SU.
Conclusion
The incident, without causing anybody any
harm, brought out many lessons for all agencies
conducting/supporting flying operations.
Providence brought these lessons to this unit
on its first working day (probably the first detail)
and set us off in the right direction. Care needs
to be taken to ensure that the lessons are revised
periodically and our guard remains up, to prevent
any such incident in future.
- Gp Capt KVS Nair
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 17

WO PM Jangid
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CROSSWORD CLUES (ACROSS)
1. Pilots aim to touch down at this marking on
the runway while landing.(6)
3. As a runway is for aeroplanes, a................is for
helicopters. (7)
9. Message type designator for alerting ATS
messages. (3)
10. Rectangular paved surface used for an aeroplane’s
take off and landing. (6)
12. An act of aircraft proceeding to alternate
aerodrome. (6)
13. Services on an aerodrome available at night
only. (2)
14. Essential notices distributed by means of
telecommunication to flight associated personnel.
(5)
15. An ATC vehicle meant to lead RT failure or
unfamiliar aircraft. (6,2)
18. Beginning of a runway. (9)
20. ‘A’ in ATD and ATA (6)
21. Cross bar. (4)
22. A unit of speed generally used in aviation. (4)
24. A meridian adopted for calculation of International
Time. (5)
26. Speak out this to indicate that the exchange
of transmissions has ended and no response is
expected. (3)
28. Special series of NOTAM for snow affected
aerodromes. (7)
30. ‘V’ in VFR or VUABC is pronounced this way
when spelt out. (6)
32. Insert this word in flight plan for persons on
board if their numbers are not known. (3)
33. Colour of FOD lanes. (6)
34. Abbreviation for Passengers. (3)
35. Transmitter which helps in locating aircraft in
emergency. (3)
37. Generally known as arrival routes. (4)
39. Meaning of affirm or affirmative. (3)
40. A flight plan which is filed in flight. (4)
41. A type of controlled descent. (3)
45. First known Air Traffic Controller. (1,1,6)
47. A service which provides aerodrome information
automatically to arriving and departing
flights. (4)
48. A critical segment of instrument approach
procedures. (5)
49. ‘S’ in FDPS, RDPS, ILS etc. (6)
50. ICAO type designator for Jaguar aircraft. (4)
CROSSWORD CLUES (DOWN)
1. An area of aerodrome used for accommodating
aircraft for loading/unloading of passengers/
cargo, refueling, parking or maintenance. (5)
2. Listen out on frequency/channel. (7)
3. Be cautious. This may happen to your aircraft
on landing if a thin layer of water is present on
the runway. (12)
4. One of the sub-items of item-15 of flight plan
form. (5)
5. ATC radar meant to provide precision approaches
to flights. (3)
6. An instrument in aircraft that indicates its
vertical position. (9)
7. One of the methods of air navigation. (2)
8. As a guide is to a tourist, a ........... is to a pilot.
(10)
11. Abeam in abbreviated form. (3)
16. Shape of tactical circuit pattern. (4)
17. All radio frequencies from 30 MHz to 300
MHz. (3)
18. Surface movement of an aircraft. (4)
19. On the route. (2,5)
23. An ATS unit designated to provide Aerodrome
Control Service. (5)
24. The title of FLIP Part-I. (8)
25. Rating of a pilot for operating under adverse
weather conditions. (2)
27. Second general rule of the air for avoidance
of collision. (5,2,3)
29. A dangerous cloud for aviators. (2)
31. The direction of fore and aft axis of a moving
aircraft. (7)
32. A letter displayed in the signal square. (3)
33. Frequencies/channels not confidential. (4)
36. Head lights in vehicles but.....lights in the
aircraft. (7)
38. Meteorological personnel use this code for
‘Rain’. (3)
42. A unit for atmospheric pressure. (3)
43. Red navigational light is displayed on this
side of an aircraft. (4)
44. One of the essential factors that governs
runway-in-use. (4)
46. Time estimated by an aircraft to cover the
distance between two points. (3)
- WO PM Jangid
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 19

Wg Cdr B Anandhan
It was a cold winter morning. The Detachment
should have gone by now but it hadn’t because of
a snag.
The snag was another ‘puzzling snag’. After some
brain storming, it was zeroed down to a component
malfunction.
The Supervisor (Warrant Rank) and the
Engineering Officer were on either side of the ladder,
nearly at its top, reaching the roof of the aircraft inside
the fuselage. Their hands were inside the panel to
remove the faulty component. It was an intricate job!
Nobody had removed this particular component in
the Fleet ever before. Concentration was intense, not
a word was spoken.
The team did not notice the Flt Cdr who had come
near the ladder and was watching them for a while.
The silence was broken by the shrill voice of the Flt
Cdr shattering the concentration of the team.
“Aur kitna time lagega”?
And something fell from inside the panel. The Flt
Cdr searched for that ‘something’ for some time. He
could not find it. He left the place. He realised what
he had done.
After securing the component the WO and the
EO climbed down the ladder and searched for that
‘something’. They could not find it. It had rolled away
after bouncing on the floor.
A Corporal was told to hold the commando torch
to light up the space inside the panel.
One side of the component was released from the
linkage and was held by hand; another 10 minutes
and the faulty component would be in their hands.
WO:
EO:
WO:
EO:
Sir, who asked him to come here?
Nobody. Vo apne aap aa gaye!
First let us remove the component.
Okay, but let us put some boys to
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search for the missing thing. We don’t even know
what it looks like.
A team of five was deployed to search for that
‘something’ which had rolled away. The morning
fog meanwhile reduced the visibility. The EO & WO
removed the component, checked it, rectified it
and serviced it. Now it was ready to be fitted back.
EO: Let us reflect it as a snag in the Form 700
and in the snag register.
WO: Nahi sir, then people will come to know
that we removed the component.
EO: Let’s tell him to buy more time for us to offer the
aircraft.
WO: Sahab, galti unki hai, kyon beech me aaya, let him
only buy more time.
EO calls up Flt Cdr.
EO to Flt Cdr: Sir, the snag is rectified, but we need more
time.
(On Phone)
Flt Cdr: I will get back to you.
EO:
So what?
After sometime:
WO: Part to mila nahi na. (The part was never
found, isn’t it?)
EO:
We will get it.
WO: Time nahi hai sir. Tab se log uchchal rahe
hain. Bina ye chhota part bhi kam chal jayega.
EO: WO Sahab! Agar us part ka koi purpose nahi
to wo part hota kyon?
WO: Theek hai sahab, aap jaise kahenge hum
vaise karenge.
EO: Theek hai, abhi pehle fit karke dekhte hain ki
theek ho gaya ya nahin.
Component was fitted, checked and found ‘S’
on ground.
WO:
Sir, Kaam to ho gaya na?
EO: Yeah! Snag is solved, but let’s find the
missing part. Get the exploded view of the
assembly, then we can find out what the missing
part looks like.
WO: Sir, let’s tell the Flt Cdr that the snag is
rectified. Mere hisab se kaam khatam ho gaya hai.
Flt Cdr to EO:
(On Phone)
CO pooch rahe hain: Aur kitna time lagega?
EO: Sir, Jab missing item mil jayega tab bata sakte hain ki
kitna time lagega. I will keep you informed (On Phone).
EO to WO: Phir poochch rahe hain, ‘aur kitna time
lagega’! **+&$*#@%&>

Gp Capt Narinder Taneja
Billion Hearts Beating is an example of
a successful professionally designed
preventive health campaign against heart
disease in our country. I use it as a template
to demonstrate that if we have to succeed in
preventive efforts- health or flight safety, we
need to engage in professionally designed,
sustained and focused campaigns to achieve
the desired objectives.
Have you heard about ‘Billion Hearts
Beating’ and taken the pledge? Some of you
would have done that. For those who have not
heard about it let me describe what the ‘Billion
Hearts Beating’ is. The vision of ‘Billion Hearts
Beating’ is a long-term sustained movement
towards a heart-healthy India and the mission
is to actively promote heart health across the
country by creating awareness about heart
disease and providing workable solutions to
help overcome it. At the time of writing this
article 353815 people had taken the pledge.
The slogan is extremely catchy; the website is
equally attractive and well designed.
What about focus on prevention of any
similar disease in the IAF. Sadly, none. We have
generic advisories on obesity and lifestyle
diseases. But neither do we have a sustained,
focused, or professionally designed and driven
campaign, nor do we have measures to assess
the outcomes. It is important that we identify
the disease that is most prevalent among our
serving personnel and their families (let us say it
is hypertension). It is a concern because it affects
our personnel, their families, affects longevity,
quality of life and places a yet uncalculated
financial burden on healthcare services. We
need to focus our effort towards combating this
disease problem.
Let us now consider Flight Safety. We have
interesting slogans on each page of the Flight
Safety calendar. There are even more interesting
slogans and themes in the Flight Safety magazine.
Yet if we were to ask anyone how they identify with
Flight Safety issues, we may not get a concrete
reply. This probably is due to lack of a focussed,
sustained and professionally run campaign.
What could be the issues in Flight Safety that
could benefit from campaigns such as ‘Billion
Hearts Beating?’ FOD, human error servicing,
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human error aircrew and bird hits prevention are
some issues that would benefit from campaigns
like that being talked about. We need a focus that
is apparent, all pervasive across the organisation
and sustained for a tangible period of time.
You may at this stage be wondering what
a ‘Billion Hearts Beating’ campaign has got to
do with flight safety and how there are beating
hearts in the IAF. You are right to some extent but
there are deeper and complex implications of the
‘Billion Hearts Beating’ campaign that I want to
put into the perspective of good health and flight
safety.
The whole aim of a preventive program in the
form of a campaign is to overwhelm the target
clientele in a way that he/she literally cannot
avoid the print or electronic message looking at
him/her wherever he/she is. This should be done
to the extent that if he/she opens his/her AFNET
computer, that should be the first message for
him/her e.g. a Flight Safety or health message.
In my view, for a campaign to be effective and
successful, it should be:-
Relevant to the clientele and be
genuine.
Topical.
Practical and easily understood.
Such that people can identify with it.
It must have a face to it.
How Could We Run a Successful Campaign for
Flight Safety?
Media. The Air Force has a wide array of media
which it can utilise effectively for mass reach in
any program. Print, web, cable TV, offices and
housing areas, shopping complexes, display
electronic boards, you name a medium and we
possibly have it. When the campaign focusses
on the role each support personnel can play in
enhancing Flight Safety e.g. timely PORs, on time
sick report and availability of medicines, quick
and user friendly issue of clothing, it will appeal
to each individual and give him ownership in the
cause of flight safety.
Brand Ambassadors. Products in the market
employ brand ambassadors-luminaries/ famous
personalities from different walks of life to
endorse their product. Our own experiences tell
us how effective it is to utilise brand ambassadors
especially for public outreach programs
e.g. Amitabh Bacchan for polio eradication
campaign. It may not be out of place to have a
brand ambassador for our campaign e.g. how do
villagers / small shop keepers in and around an
Air Force base understand the importance of bird
hits and the significance of cleanliness around
the airport? By either using a personality to
endorse such a message or using an ‘aam aadmi’
with whom they can identify themselves.
Do we need a professional agency to run a
campaign for us? Be it Flight Safety or preventive
health, I for one feel, Yes! There are professionals
in this field who have core expertise in
developing such programs and we need to utilise
their expertise in designing and executing such
projects.
This article is an attempt to make us think
again as to how we can run programs to achieve
certain objectives, in particular, related to Flight
Safety and/ preventive health. The need of the
hour is to put in place professionally designed,
driven and executed campaigns that are focussed
and relevant to the target population. Only then
will we be able to achieve tangible results in
these key areas.
- Gp Capt Narinder Taneja
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 23

Sqn Ldr Vijaya Kumar
24
Aerospace Safety N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 2
INDIAN AIR FORCE

I
am not an external member of an activity; I am
the very part of the ongoing activity.
I clearly know answers for the following
questions:
What are the SOPs, facilities and
publications required for the task?
What am I supposed to do?
What can go wrong?
What does it take to ensure safe
completion of the given task?
I always believe that only a good worker can
become a good supervisor; I am a good worker
and I can ensure safe completion of the given
task.
I always clarify my doubts about the given
task and I never keep any doubts with me.
I always bring out to my superiors the
difficulty faced by the personnel in carrying out
a given task.
I always maintain in my personal diary the
critical snag and accident/ incident data about the
system I work on and take adequate precautions
to avoid recurrence of the same.
I never supervise two different activities
simultaneously.
I take excuse myself if I am not in a position
to supervise an activity due to any reason and I
ensure that some other supervisor supervises the
activity.
If I feel some pressure I go back to my superior
and share my views. I never pass on the pressure
down the line.
I am very particular about following SOPs. If I
see some deviation from SOPs, I stop the activity
and ensure all SOPs are adhered to.
I strongly believe that by following SOPs
and by disciplined supervision, we can ensure a
pleasant ‘Aerospace Safety’ environment.
I clearly understand that I am vested with the
great responsibility of ensuring Aerospace Safety
through my supervisory skills.
I always ensure that my supervisory activity
is performed to the best of my ability and in
accordance with the procedures laid down in the
manuals.
I always ensure proper documentation and
these documents always comply with Aerospace
Safety norms.
I always feel proud of being a good supervisor.
- Sqn Ldr Vijaya Kumar
My IAF; My Station; My Aircraft; My Pride!
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 25

WO PK Swain
All tools are serially numbered.
Why and when did this practice start?
Time: Good old days in 1996.
Location:
MIG 21 fighter squadron of the IAF.
26
Aerospace Safety N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 2
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A
MIG 21 aircraft was cleared for
Ground Run. A few seconds after
engine start up, fuel was found to
be leaking from the starboard side of the
fuselage. The engine was immediately cutoff
and everyone rushed to the aircraft to
find out what had gone wrong.
The STO suggested that the rear fuselage
be removed so that the point of leak could
be located. Soon, a gang started working on
this. Meanwhile, the engine tradesman came
running and told everyone that the ‘L’ shaped
compressor screw driver was missing. This ‘L’
shaped Compressor Screw Driver had screw
driver tips at both the ends of the ‘L’. It was
used by engine tradesman for opening the
engine compressor panels. It was also used
by the radio tradesman to open the radio
panels.
The STO ordered everyone to
immediately deposit their tools so that
the person who had lost the tool could be
identified.
Meanwhile the rear fuselage was
removed but the source of leak could not
be located. Suddenly an engine tradesman
shouted that many compressor blades were
damaged. The airframe i/c found out that
there was a small hole on the starboard side
inner fuselage wall. Flexible fuel tank No 5
was fitted close to that and it was suspected
to be leaking. The STO ordered the removal
of the fuel tank. All of us were surprised
to find a metal part in the fuel tank. It had
pierced into the fuel tank, causing the leak.
The Tool Crib i/c confirmed that one
of the ‘L’ shaped screwdrivers was not
accounted for. One of the tradesmen said
that he had seen the Radio Fitter take the
‘L’ shaped tool from the Engine Fitter’s tool
bag but the Radio Fitter said he had put it
back after sometime. But the doubt was still
lingering.
A Court of Inquiry was ordered.
The findings of the COI were:-
The Radio Fitter had left his tool on the radio
panel and returned the Engine Fitter’s tool to the
tool crib instead of his own.
When a ground run is given on MIG 21 aircraft,
the nose oleo leg gets compressed and the aircraft
stoops (dips) a little in the front due to engine
thrust. Therefore the tool which was left on the
radio panel started moving towards the air intake
(due to vibration) and eventually got sucked into
the engine.
The engine sustained damage due to the FOD
by ingesting a tool. One of the broken pieces of
the tool also pierced the flexible fuel tank causing
the fuel leak.
The Engine Fitter and Radio Fitter were found
to have not checked their tools on completion of
their job. The WO i/c DSS too had added to the
lapse by signing for independent FOD checks
before offering the aircraft for ground run. The
STO did not ensure accounting of tools prior to
start of ground run.
Recommendations by COI:-
Each and every tool is to be serially numbered
by engraving and the serial number of the tool is
to be written in the ‘Tool Crib Daily Issue’ register
against the tradesman drawing that particular
tool.
Since then the practice has continued till date.
Lessons learnt:-
Always count your tools before and
after the ground run.
Own up to the mistakes made by you
rather than hiding them.
Avoid borrowing tools.
- WO PK Swain
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 27

Wg Cdr N Dhar
28
Aerospace Safety N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 2
INDIAN AIR FORCE

There was a hushed silence in the briefing room
when the Mission Leader disclosed the target.
The target had been a closely guarded secret
for some time now with speculations and rumours
doing the rounds. Food and accommodation had
been difficult to come by recently with large scale
deforestation on the rise. Avian HQ had come up
with a plan to recce new feeding grounds down
in the plains. This was one such feeding ground
which had been selected for a probe and went
by the name of ‘Alottafilth Nagar’. The specialist
from the ‘Avian Intelligence Group’ got up and
strutted pompously to the podium ruffling the
feathers of the Mission Leader in the process. The
Intel Bird started briefing using a fresh Powerpoint
presentation. I guess ‘Powerpoint’ was an affliction
that transcended genetic boundaries too. The
Intel Bird chirped, “My dear friends! As you know
‘Alottafilth Nagar’ holds the key to our food and
energy requirements. We must recce this feeding
ground successfully in order to fend off the crisis
we are facing right now. However, as we know, all
good things are fattening, illegal or dangerous.
This feeding ground is dangerous to say the least.
The single most factor that makes this mission
daunting is the geographical location of ‘Alottafilth
Nagar’. ‘Alottafilth Nagar’ is bounded on the North
by huge Sulphur springs and geysers. Believe me
the stink is overpowering. Humans are often found
wallowing like cows in that stuff. On the East and
West are huge skyscrapers. Last but not the least,
on the South, right on the edge of ‘Alottafilth Nagar’,
is the fighter base ‘Can’t Believe My Rotten Luck’.
From our present location our ingress will have to
be from the South. As if ingressing over this well
guarded air base wasn’t enough, we have to egress
through the Sulphur springs too.” “It is a tough life
but somebody has got to do it,” someone quipped
from behind. “Well, we need to run through the
defences threadbare before undertaking this
mission,” said the Intel Bird.
“These guys have bird watchers/shooters
deployed all around the airfield throughout the
day and they are well equipped with twelve
bore guns, German whistle/cracker deploying
pistols, binoculars and walkie talkie sets for
communication. The shooting efficiency of these
shooters is suspect though. Just a handful of them
are sharpshooters. Most of them couldn’t hit a barn
door at five yards. We have mapped their positions
and will avoid flying directly over them. Their guns
too are old and not very efficient, with an effective
range of fifteen metres at most. So unless you
are unlucky or stupid enough to fly directly over
these shooters, you should be ok,” Intel chirped,
thoroughly enjoying himself now. “Yeah and they
are really into those gas cannons which are placed
at the edge of the runway. They call them ‘Zon
Guns’. But they hardly ever change their location
and our guys are kind of getting used to them
now. So they are no big deal unless they change
the location of their ‘Zon Guns’. Another thing we
really need to do is to locate a similar target area
somewhere else close by and practise our runs
out there. These humans are getting pretty good
at mapping and trend generation; this way we
will be able to maintain the element of surprise.
Okay, the next part is really important; formation
to fly! We are going to fly small elements of four,
nothing more than that. We don’t want to show
off our formation skills with those mass 100 bird
formations that the humans are in awe of. Those
huge formations are picked up too easily and it is
easier for them to take pot shots at us. Even with
their shooting skills, they just might hit something
and we don’t want to risk that. And remember the
golden rule: when the flak starts coming up just
soar to greater altitudes like 100 m and above.
They have nothing to get you there excepting 0.22
inch rifles, of which not very many are available to
the humans.” The mission brief was over and the
raptors got busy updating their mission planning
grey cells. This was dangerous business and they
did not want any Faux Pas!
On ‘D’ day at dawn, the ‘Eagles’ sat preening
and sharpening their beaks. The air was ripe with
tension. The bonhomie was forced and soon
everyone just retired in a corner, cocooned in
their own thoughts. The Mission Leader was a
wizened old eagle with hundreds of missions
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 29

under his beak. He knew it was the newcomers
who would get the chop if they were not careful.
The wetbeaks usually lost their nerve and broke
formation leading to aircraft hits. Such attrition
was not really acceptable. ‘Big Chief Long Beak’
back at HQ was known for chewing out Mission
Leaders who lost their under trainees in the first
few missions. Well, he had done all he could as far
as briefing and training was concerned, but it was
always the unexpected that got you in the end.
The wave got airborne on time and set
course for the first waypoint. The Mission Leader
thanked God for the natural ‘state of the art’
onboard navigation system that they were fitted
with. This would never fail unless someone blew
up their CPU and then it wouldn’t really matter,
would it? They flew at a comfortable height of
100 m without bothering about being picked
up. The enemy had no bird detection radars
and there were no firing posts to bother about
till they reached close to the airfield. The tactical
routing kept them clear of most of the known
danger zones like other airfields. The terrain
started dropping away gently and the Mission
Leader admired the countryside. Beautiful green
rolling hills! Suddenly the leader was jolted out
of his reverie with the call “Bogie 12 O’ clock!”
Instinctively the formation retracted their wings
and ducked. Four fighters crossed on top of them.
“Phew! That was close,” thought the leader. But
there were two more fighters trailing and lower,
which hit the starboard element. All four from the
starboard element went into the intake of the left
aircraft. They could see the fighter pitching down
and crashing taking with it four of their comrades.
“Damn! The fighters generally never came down
this low. Had the fighters stuck to their usual
heights we would all be happy” the Mission
Leader ruminated.
As they closed in to the airfield, a few stray
shots were encountered which fell away well
below them. These humans were like hordes
of ‘Don Quixotes’ waving at the windmills with
their antiquated twelve-bore rifles. The raptors
were not going to get down to lower heights
unless dictated by their mode of ‘food recovery’.
Suddenly two members of the lead element
dropped down flapping in agony. The leader
knew that one of the human marksmen was
taking them out using a 0.22 inch rifle. This was
the unexpected that they had been dreading.
They were fast approaching the airfield and
started easing up using the thermals. Some were
slow in easing up and then there were those who
got lured by the open garbage dumps near the
messes meant for feeding the humans. Almost
immediately most of these were shot at with
twelve bore rifles. Attrition was about 4%. Quite
a few got away with wing cells punctured. The
leader was livid. He had briefed these guys not
to deviate from the briefing. This is the price they
had to pay for indiscipline. Thank God this base
30
Aerospace Safety N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 2
INDIAN AIR FORCE

had guns which were in poor condition and were
being wielded by humans who were even worse
marksmen.
There was a sudden flutter amongst their
ranks which soon settled down. They could hear
some avian distress calls emanating from devices
installed on runway edges. The leader sniggered.
This was hilarious. It was like tickling them. These
bird calls were not specific and weren’t going
to do them any harm. The ‘Zon Guns’ too which
were banging away at the same old locations in
the background, sounded like monotonous noisy
friends.
Time to get out of the danger zone! The
wave managed to reach ‘Alottafilth Nagar’ and
carried out a successful recce of the prospective
feeding ground. It was great that the admin
safety establishment at ‘Can’t Believe My Rotten
Luck’ had so far been unable to influence the civic
authorities of ‘Alottafilth Nagar’ regarding proper
garbage disposal in the vicinity of the airfield. The
exit via the sulphur springs was horrendous. The
definition of stink was rewritten for generations to
come. But no ground fire or air interceptions were
encountered. Mission accomplished without any
further attrition!
That night, the wizened old leader sat on his
perch and mulled over the missions he had flown
in all these years. One mission blended into the
next as he fast forwarded them in his tiny mind.
And then it came to him. It was the humans who
were not designed to fly and yet were flying
supersonic jets, had more brains and yet were
intruding into their airspace. The onus of safety
was on the humans. The birds had to go about
the business of looking for food everyday and the
humans had to ....., well they had to fly too I guess.
Maybe we just had to look out and stay out of
each other’s way much more than we were doing.
Happy Landings!
-Wg Cdr N Dhar
Solutions to the Air Traffic Control Puzzle
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 31

On 30 Apr 12, Flt Lt AK Upadhyay (30849 G) Adm/ ATC and 700939 R Sgt Anil Kumar
AFSO were on duty in ATC tower. During the period of their duty, a four helicopter
Mi-17 formation was airborne for an SHBO mission. On the return leg the leader of the
formation announced on RT that his No. 2 was experiencing rise in MGB temperature with
oil pressure dropping below laid down limits and that his No. 2 would be carrying out a
precautionary landing. The DATCO immediately asked for their GPS coordinates. Without
losing time, he plotted the GPS coordinates on the map. During this period, the IC Ops
alerted all concerned individuals/agencies. The captain of the helicopter was contacted
on his mobile to check the safety of the crew. They were further guided to the nearest
town/village. A minute to minute update on the crew was provided to all concerned. This
ensured a quick activation of the agencies involved with the post accident plan.
Flt Lt AK Upadhyay and Sgt Anil Kumar displayed a high degree of situational
awareness and professionalism in dealing with this emergency.
Good Show Flt Lt AK Upadhyay and Sgt Anil Kumar.
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
On 29 Aug 11, Sqn Ldr GPS Brar (28714 G) F(P) and Flt Lt M Rana (29251 K) F(P) were
authorised to fly an RTR mission in an AVRO ac. During pre flight inspection for this
mission, Sqn Ldr GPS Brar and Flt Lt M Rana noticed a small paint scratch resembling a
crack on the port wing between engine nacelle and the fuselage. On investigation, a
one inch crack was found on the upper surface of the wing. A detailed investigation,
subsequently revealed a crack on the supporting stringer as well and few loose rivets.
Sqn Ldr GPS Brar and Flt Lt M Rana displayed a keen sense of observation and a high
degree of professionalism in detecting a crack which might have led to a catastrophic
disaster.
Good Show Sqn Ldr GPS Brar and Flt Lt M Rana.
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
32
Aerospace Safety N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 2
INDIAN AIR FORCE

797614-F Cpl Shantanu Chandra Inst/Fit while on posted strength of a Jaguar
Squadron having DARIN–II aircraft, undertook an innovation based repair work of
the FDR milking out equipment. The DATS –300M consisting of PC, tape recorder and
cassettes which are required for analysing data (Parameter & Voice) is not supplied
by the OEM for DARIN – II aircraft. Hence, the DATS of PC was suitably configured for
milking of operational data. However, voice data could not be retrieved for analysis
due to non availability of tape recorder and cassettes in the local market. Thus, the
activity was taken on concession.
Cpl Chandra , with his relentless efforts, managed to retrieve voice data by
connecting the data acquisition and storage unit (DASU) of DARIN – I system to the
aircraft and interfacing it with an audio jack, purchased from local sources, to the
GRE laptop of DARIN – II system. Consequently, the concession on an operationally
important activity was removed.
Cpl Shantanu Chandra displayed a high degree of professionalism and dedication
to duty by innovating a system thereby removing an important concession from the
fleet.
Good Show Cpl Santanu Chandra.
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
On 05 Mar 12, Sqn Ldr Jagat Behari Dash (28230 G) Adm/ATC had stopped at a
Crossing Point to cross the R/W. The barrier at this location was closed to facilitate
take-off of a Mi-8 helicopter. When the helicopter got airborne, he noticed a dead bird
on the R/W. The officer rushed to the ATC and informed the same to the SATCO, who
in turn alerted the aircraft through the DATCO. The captain of the helicopter was asked
to check all vital parameters. The captain transmitted that all the parameters were
normal. However, the captain of the aircraft abandoned his mission and returned for
an external check. A thorough check revealed a bird hit on one of the main rotors.
Sqn Ldr JB Dash displayed a keen sense of observation and a high degree of
professionalism in noticing and reporting a bird-hit incident.
Good Show Sqn Ldr JB Dash.
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 33

On 04 Jan 12, 734936-S Sgt AS Praveen AFSO was detailed to perform the duties of
runway controller. During this period a MiG-27 was cleared for take - off. During the
take-off roll of the ac, the runway controller observed fuel leakage from the port wheel
bay of this aircraft. He transmitted this to the aircraft. Subsequently, the DATCO also gave
a call to abandon take-off. The pilot acknowledged the calls and abandoned take off.
The aircraft was switched off on the runway and towed back to the dispersal. Subsequent
analysis confirmed the fuel leakage. Had this fuel leak gone unnoticed, it could have
resulted in a grave emergency.
Sgt AS Praveen displayed a high degree of professionalism and situational awareness
in detecting a potentially hazardous situation.
Good Show Sgt AS Praveen.
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
On 12 Mar 12, 779783-G Cpl Sikandar Khan AF/Fit was detailed to carry out First Flight
servicing of a Mi-8 Helicopter. During the checks, he noticed a Hydraulic oil leak
from the ‘Non Return Valve’ beneath the hydraulic cradle. This was not a routine check
and was difficult to detect under normal conditions. If this leak had gone unnoticed, it
could have led to an incident/accident.
Cpl Sikandar Khan displayed keen a sense of observation and dedication to duty in
averting a potential accident/incident.
Good Show Cpl Sikandar Khan.
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
34
Aerospace Safety N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 2
INDIAN AIR FORCE

On 02 Mar 12 , 766345 H JWO T Pratap Flt/Gnr was detailed as Flt/Gnr for a
conversion training sortie on a Mi-8 helicopter. During the sortie he observed
fluttering of ‘the tape covering the tail boom joint’ of another helicopter which was
operating from the adjacent helipad. He promptly informed his captain who in
turn informed the crew of the adjacent helicopter. Subsequently, the gunner of the
other helicopter went out and held the tape. A safe switch off was carried out. The
tape, if left unnoticed could have fouled with the tail rotor leading to a disastrous
consequence.
JWO T Pratap displayed a very high degree of situational awareness and
professionalism in detecting a potentially hazardous situation.
Good Show JWO T Pratap
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
Gp Capt Rajesh Purohit VSM (19170-T) F(P) is posted as the Chief Instructor, Fighter
Training Wing, at AF Station Hakimpet. He is a Cat ‘A’ QFI with a vast instructional
experience and flying experience of Jaguar, Hunter, Kiran and HPT-32 aircraft.
During the month of Nov 11 he has achieved the land mark of total service flying
of 5000 hours of accident free flying. The officer has shown extra ordinary enthusiasm
and passion for flying. His enormous experience in fighter flying is praiseworthy.
Good Show Gp Capt Rajesh Purohit.
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 35

Nest: The nest is a rough platform of
twigs and rags placed in a tree. Nest
sites may be reused in subsequent
years.
Breeding: September to May; varying
locally.
Food Habit: Black Kites are most often
seen gliding and soaring on thermals.
One of the most dangerous birds for
Aerospace Safety which has caused
quite a few Cat I accidents.
36
Aerospace Safety N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 2
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