Peacebuilding: Lessons for Afghanistan? - CMI

SRSG undertook a lone, one-man performance. While Pakistan also actively engaged
in the negotiations, Islamabad had strong partisan interests and gave massive support
to its own client faction. A transition agreement brokered in Pakistan in mid-1992
provided for an elected government in 18 months, but lacked mechanisms for settling
disputes between the parties and provisions for asserting state control of the
commanders and regionally based armies. The domination of the new cabinet by one
party, the Jamiat-e Islami, alienated other groups, which boycotted the next transition
phase. The peace process was effectively dead.
By mid-1995 the situation on the ground changed dramatically as the new Taliban
movement gained control over most of southern and western Afghanistan, and in 1996
captured Kabul. At the UN, Lakhdar Brahimi took over as SRSG in late July 1997 and
tried to confront the destructive logic of competitive foreign interference by calling
the relevant states into a joint forum - the so-called 6+2 group (neighbouring states
plus USA and Russia). 11 An expanded UN peace mission (UNSMA) brought Afghans
other than the armed factions into the peace consultations, particularly Afghans in
exile. However, with the Taliban in control of most of the country, and the Northern
Alliance riven by internal tension, neither the Afghan parties nor their regional
backers were ready to engage in serious peace talks. In February 2000, Brahimi
resigned.
As a recent evaluation of UN engagement in Afghanistan has pointed out, the
diplomatic side in the coordinated Strategic Framework launched in 1998 worked on
the assumption that only isolation would be effective in relation to the Taliban. The
aid community, by contrast, tended to advocate constructive engagement (see chapter
5 below). 12 The difference in perspective was reinforced by mistrust between the
diplomatic and the aid communities, precluding efforts to link assistance to peacebuilding
in a constructive manner. Yet, some positive developments were noted,
including UNSMA's recognition of the need to engage Afghan civil society more
broadly in the consultations.
At the same time, a discussion emerged in the aid community of possibilities for
starting reconstruction as a step towards peace, rather than following the conventional
sequence of peace first, reconstruction second. 13 Innovation was supported at the
highest level in the UN: in August 2001, Kofi Annan called for a new approach to
promote peace in Afghanistan. 14 As it turned out, the initiative was overtaken by the
events of September 11 and their aftermath.
11 Matthew Fielden & Jonathan Goodhand (2001), "Beyond the Taliban: The Afghan Conflict and
United Nations Peacemaking ", Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 1, no. 3.
12 Mark Duffield, Patricia Gossman and Nick Leader (2001), Review of the Strategic Framework for
Afghanistan (final draft), Islamabad: Strategic Monitoring Unit.
13 Promoting peace-building through reconstruction was a major theme at the Afghan Support Group
meeting of donors and aid organizations held in Islamabad in June 2001. The ideas inspiring the current
initiative for a massive reconstruction package to solidify the peace process are in fact closely related to
those underlying the discussions in Islamabad.
14 United Nations General Assembly, Security Council (2001), The Situation in Afghanistan and its
Implications for International Peace and Security, Report of the Secretary-General, A/55/1028-
S/2001/789. www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/789e.pdf.
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