Peacebuilding: Lessons for Afghanistan? - CMI

Until Afghan priorities for reconstructing the state and economy are authoritatively
clarified, whatever aid is given must be distributed equitably among the parties. As
four men representing the country's main ethnic groups (Pashtun, Hazara, Tajik,
Uzbek) told a reporter recently: "If you give us four loaves of bread, we will all eat in
peace. But if you give a loaf to just one of us, then the other three will fight to get
it." 26
Realistic expectations about conflict and the future Afghan state
While the US-led offensive is drawing to an end without, so far, provoking a military
response from Pashtun groups, small-scale violence among Afghans is likely to be a
continuous facet of the political process. Low-intensity conflict of this kind is not
necessarily a threat to the state. Violence between local groups may build on the
traditions of the tribal feud, and is governed by codes regarding legitimate reasons for
taking up arms as well as the methods of warfare.
The state in Afghanistan has, historically speaking, survived only in a delicate modus
vivendi with strong social forces, such as those represented by tribal or religious
networks, or by local communities. Successful peace-building hinges on realistic
assumptions concerning the future role of the state as an integrating force. This
probably lies somewhere in the middle of the minimalist-modernist spectrum noted at
the outset: that is, an agent capable of offering a framework for security, facilitating
access to basic welfare services, and providing rules for aggregating interests and
setting policy priorities on a national basis.
26 "Afghan Leaders' Limited Goal: Proving They Can Cooperate", Washington Post, 30 December
2001.
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