forum materials

СБОРНИК ДОКЛАДОВ
FORUM MATERIALS
Санкт-Петербург, Россия
29 мая – 1 июня 2012 г.
“Талион Империал Отель”
St. Petersburg, Russia
May 29 – June 1, 2012
Taleon Imperial Hotel

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Event History....................................................................................................................2
COMMENTS..........................................................................................................................3
FORUM PROGRAM............................................................................................................. 11
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS........................................................................................................ 14
Transcripts of Proceedings.......................................................................................... 20
Please note, that Power Point presentations, as well as photos
of conference participants are on DVD disk, supplied with this binder.

Event History
2
The International Forum on Industrial Safety
is traditionally held in the period of “white
nights” that are definitely one of Saint Petersburg
symbols. The event is held by GCE Group
under support and with participation of representatives
of the CIS Executive Committee,
the United Nations and IAEA. During the past
years the Forum has been attended by delegations
from 28 countries. The main subject of
the event is protection from man-made disasters
and new scientific and corporate developments
in the sphere of risk reduction.
Every year the discussion focuses on the
world experience of ensuring industrial
safety – experience of state supervisory authorities,
major global industrial corporations,
researchand development and expert
organizations. Traditionally the program
core contains analysis of reasons, details of
emergency response operations, and lessons
learned from the man-made disasters.
X th Jubilee International Forum on Industrial
Safety was held from 29 May till 1 June,
2012 in palace interiors of “Taleon Imperial
Hotel” in Saint Petersburg. Among the Forum
participants there were industrial safety
experts from companies, state supervisory
authorities, research and development and
design institutions from 15 countries: Russia,
Chile, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands,
the USA, Great Britain, Switzerland, Poland,
Austria, Slovenia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
and Azerbaijan.
Over 40 reports were presented during
the Forum. The reports covered the experience,
legislation, problems and prospects of
activities to ensure industrial safety in different
countries, provisions of the UNECE Convention
on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents, projects to assist countries in
strengthening safety at hazardous activities.
The Jubilee Forum program was truly intensive
and impressive; it included gala
events, unforgettable excursions to the State
Hermitage and its Gold Rooms, to Peterhof,
to the “Baltika” Brewery, a wonderful boat
trip, theater performances with entertainment
stars, a press-conference and other events.
XI th International Forum on Industrial Safety
will be held on 27-30 May, 2013, in “Moskovskiye Vorota”
Congress Center in Saint Petersburg
(“Holiday Inn Saint Petersburg–Moskovskiye Vorota” Hotel,
Moskovsky Prospekt 97А).
2013 Forum registration fee will be kept on the same level of 21500 rubles
(excluding VAT of 3870 rubles).
All questions regarding participation, presentations and sponsorship should be
addressed to the Conference Department of GCE Group.
Conference Department
of GCE Group
+7 (812) 331-83-53
+7 (812) 325-06-21
conference@gce.ru
www.conference.gce.ru
Main office in Saint Petersburg
192102 Bukharestskaya Str. 6
+7 (812) 334-55-61
+7 (812) 325-06-21
gce@gce.ru
www.gce.ru

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Welcome letter to participants
of the X th International Forum on Industrial Safety
Dear Forum participants!
Dear organizers, participants and guests of the X th International Forum on Industrial
Safety!
I am sincerely glad to welcome you at such significant major event!
Assurance of national security is the cornerstone of the state government system. At
this level the national security is seen as a combination of different areas of security and
safety, such as military, economic, social and political, ecological and informational. The
industrial safety is the basis of economic power and, consequently, of economic security
of the company. Control over this area of national security is effected in the form of state
supervision in the industrial sphere.
We are contemporary with industrial upsurge in Russia: new technologies are introduced,
industrial processes are enriched with innovation solutions.
Unfortunately, the industrial development does not have only positive aspects. Practically
every day we hear about anthropogenic accidents that often lead to fatalities. It
happens everywhere, it happens nearby.
The traditional annual International Forum on Industrial Safety allows representatives
of industry and of state supervisory authorities from all over the world to join their
efforts in order to solve the most important problem of our modern society: protection of
every person from disastrous accidents.
I am sure that your planned discussions and your ideas generated during this Forum,
as well as new approaches suggested by its participants, will contribute into realization of
the state policy in the sphere of industrial safety.
I send my wishes of fruitful work and new achievements to all participants of the X th
International Forum on Industrial Safety!
3
Plenipotentiary
Envoy of the President of the Russian Federation
N. Vinnichenko
COMMENTS

GOVERNOR OF Saint Petersburg
4
To participants and organizers of the X th
Jubilee International Forum on Industrial Safety
Dear friends!
I am glad to welcome participants and organizers of the X th Jubilee International Forum
on Industrial Safety in Saint Petersburg.
This very important event gets together technical supervision experts, ecologists and
industry representatives from 13 countries.Our century of technical revolutionshas placed a
priority on issues of anthropogenic disaster prevention and environmental protection. Representatives
of public authorities, businessmen and experts of public ecological organizations
are equally worried about these issues.
The theme of the Forum is vital for Saint Petersburg, the biggest multi-brunch industrial
center of Russia. The Government of our city pays a lot of attention to innovation development
of industry, building of new production sites and ensuring process safety in industry and at
power engineering facilities.
The International Forum provides a unique possibility to exchange experience and work
together to solve an important problem of our modern society — protection of every person
from accidents and disasters.
I send my wishes of fruitful work to all Forum participants, and hope they will have the
most pleasant impression of the meeting with our beautiful and welcoming city.
Governor of Saint Petersburg
G.S. Poltavchenko
COMMENTS

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
5
Jasmina Karba
The UNECE Convention on the Transboundary
Effects of Industrial Accidents
Senior Officer, Ministry of Agriculture
and Environment (Slovenia)
As an authority you constantly face the question: “how safe is safe enough”. The beauty of
international cooperation and of international events – like this forum – is that they provide opportunities
to learn from other and exchange experience. A forum also gives better opportunities
to local experts and industries to be present.
In Slovenia we treat the question of industrial safety seriously and constantly take steps to
improve it. We look for better solutions and approaches and try to implement them.
Facing the crisis and the cuts in resources we have to be – on one hand – very careful with
how these cuts effect safety and – on the other hand – have to learn to make our work more
efficient and cost-effective.
COMMENTS

6
Chris Dijkens
Chair of the Conference of the Parties, the UNECE Convention
on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents
Director, Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment
(Netherlands)
Speaking on behalf of the UNECE I should say that this Forum is very important for us. It
gives us the opportunity to present to the participants who represent authorities and the private
sector the content and the importance of the Industrial Accidents Convention. This event is also a
great opportunity for us to create new strategic partnerships and to introduce to them the work
under the convention and to exchange views on industrial safety in that regard. Important elements
of the convention are the Assistance Program that was launched in 2004 where countries
can benefit from through projects and the strategic approach with the indicators and criteria that
can be used by the countries to assess their level of implementation of the requirements under
the convention. More in general the countries can make a proper picture of their level of industrial
safety of their hazardous facilities. Countries use the results of these self assessments to make
action plans and with that they improve their industrial safety step by step. There is quite a variety
in the level of industrial safety between the UNECE countries. Some countries are ahead, some are
implementing the requirements and some countries have actually just started and need to make
a consider that significant progress and improvement in this field. In general we can say that the
industrial safety is at a quite good level, we always have to take into account that accidents can
occur unexpectedly. Unfortunately we see that still too often in our daily practice, so there is still
a lot of work to do. Within the framework of the convention we continuously ask attention to
the countries to do their homework. With that is meant that countries must know their hazardous
activities, what kind of preventive measures are needed and have been taken, that they need to be
prepared for giving an adequate response in cases when an industrial accident with transboundary
effects occurs. We also ask attention for the crossborder cooperation with the neighbouring countries,
the development of emergency and contingency plans etc. This is of course not the complete
list of the requirements under the convention but I mention them as some important examples.
This Forum gives us as I said a great opportunity to share our message with the participants
and we are active in several frameworks to talk and discuss about the Industrial Accidents Convention.
Last week I have joined a conference about industrial safety and industrial accidents that
can be triggered by natural hazards, like flooding and earthquakes. This conference was held in
Dresden in Germany and was organized by the OECD. In general such conferences are very important,
moreover, they provide different countries and stakeholders with an opportunity to discuss
industrial safety problems and challenges.
COMMENTS

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Executive Committee
of the Commonwealth
of Independent States
7
Sergey Lebedev,
Chairman, Executive Committee,
Executive Secretary of the Commonwealth
of Independent States
On behalf of Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States I extend my
heartfelt greetings to participants and organizers of 9 th International Forum on Industrial Safety.
This event presents a unique opportunity – an opportunity to consolidate experience in the area of
man-made and natural disasters consequence prevention and mitigation, ensuring industrial facilities’
safety, ensuring workforce health and safety. Exchange of scientific, technical, methodology,
and practical experience in forecasting and preventing of industrial accidents and catastrophes,
experience in methods and ways to eliminate their consequences has a significant practical value
to ensure industrial safety. In this regard, the initiative to conduct this forum is of very high priority
and relevance. The broad spectrum of its participants signifies high importance of the topics
considered.
COMMENTS

8
Jores Alferov,
Nobel Prize Laureate and Member
of the Russian Legislative
I support the initiative of St.Petersburg science and business representatives to hold a world
scale conference on the issues of industrial and environmental safety provision. Undoubtedly it is
impossible to provide safety of a separate state without interaction with the world community. I
think that each country can find claims to the countries with which it is bordering. However it is
high time to pass from claims and agreements made on paper to practical actions in order to find
solution to these problems. In the course of industrial progress environmental pollution, growth of
threat for life and health of the planet population is inevitable, and it is only joint friendly actions
that will be able to protect us and to preserve the world for future generations.
COMMENTS

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
9
Edmond Thompson,
Director Programme Management,
Group Crisis & Continuity Management
BP (UK)
This is the X th International Forum on Industrial Safety and I think the conference is building
momentum. Despite the fact it is the first time that I take part in it I can see this momentum. The
international conference gives a very good opportunity to share the experience and meet a wide
range of colleagues. In my life I try to focus on the response to emergencies and therefore tend
to go to those kinds of conferences.
I suppose it is important that any company whether it is BP or a small company should always
be uncomfortable at their level of industrial safety. Now within BP our goal is never show
up in someone’s presentation as an accident example. And this sense of urgency is translated into
everything that we do.
COMMENTS

10
Helmut Ehnes,
Secretary-General, International Section
of the ISSA on Prevention
in the Mining Industry (ISSA Mining).
Director Prevention, BG RCI (Germany)
What I can see from the first session is that the programme is on a high level. Some of the
leading enterprises and organization present and contribute to this forum.
Mining industries all over the world have more or less the same problems. While good solutions
exist already, not aware of this fact the industries try to invent a wheel again and again.
That’s why our aim is to help them in sharing experience and tell them about the possible solutions.
ISSA Mining invites all mining companies and organizations as well as government agencies to join
ISSA Mining and become a member in order to contribute and participate. I should say that point
number one in industrial safety is top management of the company. If they want to get safe mining
activity they will get it. It’s essential that at the same time they must understand the fact that
safe mining is not only about regulation and inspection. It all starts from the top, but there should
be peer commitment concerning different levels as well. You need to promote a safety culture in
your mine.
We have a good standard of industrial safety in Germany, I can’t say the best one. However,
if you have a good standard it is not so easy to keep it. That’s why we pay attention to all the fields
of industrial safety. Our organization runs 2000 seminars with around 40000 participants every
year. There are so many laws, regulations, paragraphs, but sometimes everything a miner needs is
to use his brain and practical training he has got in company. I hope that in the future we will be
able to co-organize such event as this Forum with GCE as equals.
COMMENTS

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
FORUM PROGRAM
FIRST DAY
29 May, 2012
Press conference at the RIA Novosti Press Сentre
(Zhukovsky Street, 63)
Visit to the State Hermitage museum
Sightseeing bus tour around St. Petersburg
Welcoming reception for representatives of the state
supervisory bodies and intergovernmental organizations
(private event)
SECOND DAY
30 May, 2012
Registration of conference participants
Conference Hall “Imperial”
Conference Opening Ceremony Alexander V. Moskalenko,
Chairman of the Forum and GCE Group President
Session 1.
Measures to Ensure Industrial Safety.
Solutions and Experience of the State Supervisory
Bodies and Intergovernmental Organizations
Guidelines for Ensuring Industrial Safety in Russia:
Problems and Prospects
Alexey A. Kapaev, Deputy Head
North-West Federal Agency for Ecological, Technological and
Nuclear Supervision (Russia)
Projects to Assist Countries in Strengthening Safety
at Hazardous Activities in accordance with Tools and
Practices of the UNECE Industrial Accidents Convention
Chris Dijkens
Chair of the Conference of the Parties, the UNECE
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents
Director, Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment
(Netherlands)
Assessing Progress in the Industrial Accidents’ Control
with Indicators and Criteria Developed under UNECE
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents
Jasmina Karba
The UNECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of
Industrial Accidents
Senior Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Environment
(Slovenia)
The Finnish Inspection System. Results from Seveso
Inspections in Finland and Other European Countries
Päivi Rantakoski, Director of Industrial Plants Surveillance
Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes) (Finland)
18
18
22
25
32
Vision Zero. Safe Mining: Strategies and Tools
Helmut Ehnes
Secretary-General, International Section of the ISSA
on Prevention in the Mining Industry (ISSA Mining)
Director Prevention, BG RCI (Germany)
Specifics of the State Technical Supervision in Ukraine
after Re-organisation of the State Service for Mining
Supervision and Industrial Safety
Stepan V. Dunas, Deputy Chairman
The State Service for Mining Supervision and Industrial
Safety (Ukraine)
Ensuring Industrial Safety and Safe Transportation
of Hazardous Materials in the Republic of Belarus
Alexander N. Kudryashov, Head
Industrial Work Safety Supervision Department (Belarus)
Reliability Analysis and RBI (Risk-based Inspection)
Planning for Petrochemical Industry
Dr. Andrzej Kozak, Manager, Division of Technological Safety
Office of Technical Inspection (Poland)
Session 2.
Corporate Experience in Providing
Accident-free Technological Processes
Incidents Related to Hazardous Waste Mismanagement
Dr. Neal Langerman, Chairman of the Division of Chemical
Health & Safety
American Chemical Society (USA)
Advancing Global Deepwater Capabilities
Edmond Thompson, Director Programme Management,
Group Crisis & Continuity Management
BP (UK)
Process Safety in BP
Cheryl Grounds, VP Process Safety
BP America Inc (USA)
Internal Investigation into Equipment Failures
as a Tool to Eliminate Accidents and Reduce
the Number of Technical Incidents
Albert N. Lyaskovsky, Head of Industrial Safety, Occupational
Health and Safety
Sibur Holding (Russia)
Emergency and Rescue Teams. Formation Problems
and Proposed Solutions
Igor V. Abramov, Chief of the Fire Service
Gazprom Pererabotka (Russia)
Safety Automation and Regular Process Automation:
Principal Differences
Claus Leonhard, Area Sales Manager International Sales
Pilz Russland (Russia)
63
Questions from the audience
32
35
38
41
46
49
51
56
59
PROGRAM OF CONFERENCE
11

12
Conference Hall “Bakkara”
Session “Occupational Safety and Health”
Moderator – CEO of “CAC – GCE” Alexander V. Stakanov
Objectives of the Employer under Conditions
of the Labour Protection Law Revision
Vladimir V. Savinov, Executive Director
National Society of Labour Sphere Auditors (Russia)
Occupational Risk as a Significant Problem
of Human Security at Industrial Facilities
Gregory A. Tsirkin, Deputy Chief Engineer
Naftan (Belarus)
Ensuring Common Safety is Everybody's Business.
Developing Occupational Health and Safety Culture
and Environmental Protection in “Sakhalin-2” Project
Alexey A.Zasutsky, Chief Engineer for OH&S
Sakhalin Energy Investment Company (Russia)
Emergency Safety Shower Systems and their Evolution with
regard to the Industrial Market in Russia
Neil Wallace, Director of Sales
Haws Corporation (Switzerland)
Innovative Multi-functional Devices Used in OH&S
Sergey N. Potrashkov, Director
Technoavia (Russia)
Dinner and concert featuring stars of the “Litsedei”
theatre
THIRD DAY
31 May, 2012
Conference Hall “Imperial”
Summing up results of the questionnaire distributed
to forum participants with the lottery draw
Session 3. Safety at NPP. Aspects of Nuclear Safety
in Energy Industry
The IAEA Nuclear Safety Actions after Fukushima
accident
Miroslav Lipar, Head, Operational Safety Section
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Austria)
Safety Regulations of Russian VVER Projects
with regard to Post-Fukushima Requirements
Sergei A. Boyarkin, Director of Programs
State Corporation “Rosatom” (Russia)
Problems of Ensuring Radiation Safety
in Oil and Gas Complex
Boris A. Chepenko, Head of Laboratory of Working
Substances in Energy Cycles
Ministry of Energy (Russia)
Vladimir A. Moskalenko, Radiation Safety Expert
GCE Group (Russia)
PROGRAM OF CONFERENCE
69
71
73
75
78
81
81
84
88
On Experience in Ensuring Radiation Safety
at “Saratovneftegaz” (NK RussNeft)
Valery A. Tarasov, Director, Department of Industrial and
Fire Safety and Environmental Protection
Saratovneftegaz (Russia)
Session 4. Lessons from the Accident
(San José Mine, Chile, 2010)
The Rescue at San Jose Mine, Sharing an Amazing
Experience
Fidel Nunez, Senior Manager for Mining Technology
and Innovation
CODELCO (Chile)
Chilean Evolution of the Mining Security
Rodrigo Santana, Regional Director of the National Service
of Geology and Mining (SERNAGEOMIN)
in Magallanes
Ministry of Mining (Chile)
Session 5. Training Sets for Training of Specialists
Virtual Training Environments for Training Specialist
on Industrial and Environmental Safety
Alexander P. Khaustov, Professor of Applied Ecology,
Dr.Sci. (Geology and Mineralogy)
Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (Russia)
Development and Implementation of the Automated
System of Evaluation and Training of Professionally
Important Qualities of Employees in Gas Trunk Pipeline
Transportation in LLC “Gazprom Transgaz Samara”
Bogdan S. Zaetz, Deputy Chief Engineer for Occupational
Health & Safety and Industrial Safety
Gazprom Transgaz Samara (Russia)
Virtual Simulators for Training Personnel
in Management of Hazardous Processes
in Pre-emergency Modes
Edward A. Granovsky, CEO
“RIZIKON” Scientific Center of Risk Investigations
(Ukraine)
Session 6. Risk Management. Ensuring Reliability
of Technical Systems. Problems and Solutions
Risk Forecasting in Innovation Technologies
Nikolai A. Makhutov, Corresponding Member of the Russian
Academy of Sciences
Chairman, Scientific Council for Prevention and Elimination
of Emergency Situations at the IGC for Emergencies
President, International Institute for Safety in Complex
Technological Systems (Russia)
R.S. Akhmetkhanov, Dr. Sci. (Tech.), Chief Researcher;
Vladimir Vasilievich Zaratsinniy, Candidate of Technical
Sciences, Senior Researcher, Academic Secretary of
the Scientific Council for Prevention and Elimination of
Emergency Situations;
Dmitry Olegovich Reznikov, Candidate of Technical Sciences,
Senior Researcher, (Russia);
International Institute for Safety in Complex Technological
Systems (Russia)
92
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98
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106
113
114

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Ensuring Stability of High-Rise Buildings, Technically
Complex and Unique Sites Exposed to Combined Special
Conditions Combined with Fire
Vladimir M. Roitman, Dr. Sci. (Tech.), Professor, Technical
Regulations Department, Institute of Construction and
Architecture
Vladimir I. Telichenko, Dr. Sci. (Tech.), Professor, Honoured
Worker of Science of RF, Rector of Moscow State University
of Civil Engineering
Moscow State University of Civil Engineering (Russia)
Contemporary Approaches to Fire Safety Standards at
Industrial Facilities
Yury N. Shebeko, Deputy Head of Research Centre of Fire
Prevention, Professor, Dr. Sci. (Tech.)
All-Russian Research Institute for Fire Protection of Ministry
of Russian Federation for Civil Defence, Emergencies
and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters
(FGU VNIIPO of EMERCOM) (Russia)
Oxidizer plant explosion – lessons we should have
learned
Dr. Neal Langerman, Chairman
of the Division of Chemical Health & Safety
American Chemical Society (USA)
Questions from the audience
Conference Hall “Bakkara”
119
121
128
Master class “Process Safety Management in Chemical
Plants, Pilot Plants and Laboratories”
Moderator – Dr. Neal Langerman, Chairman
of the Division of Chemical Health & Safety
American Chemical Society (USA)
131
Session “Ensuring Safety in Technologically
Complex and High-Rise Sites. Technical Diagnostics”
Industrial Safety Expertise to Ensure Long-term Use of
Buildings and Constructions of OAO “Tagmet”
Margarita I. Gukova, Senior Researcher, Candidate of
Technical Sciences
V.A. Kucherenko Central Scientific Research Institute for
Building Structures (Russia)
I.I. Vedyakov, Dr. Sci. (Tech.), Professor, Institute Head
M.R. Uritsky, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Deputy Head
of Metalwork Laboratory
M.I. Farfel, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Senior
Researcher
OAO “NITs Stroitelstvo”, V.A. Kucherenko Central Scientific
Research Institute for Building Structures
O.N. Donchenko, engineer, KSTiR Manager, OAO “Tagmet”
Causes of Collapse and Problems of Reconstruction
of Administrative Buildings in Kharkov
Sergey N. Yarovoy, Deputy Director for Research, Candidate
of Technical Sciences
Kharkov PromStroyNIIProekt Design and Scientific-Research
Institute (Ukraine)
Ensuring safety in complex organisational structures
on the example of NOVEC
Jan Willem Tom, managing director
NOVEC (Netherlands)
Boat trip around the city's rivers and canals
FOURTH DAY
1 June, 2012
135
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138
Excursion to Peterhof, one of the most beautiful palace
and park ensembles in the world.
Tour to the “Baltika” Brewery. Beer tasting.
13
PROGRAM OF CONFERENCE

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
14
Abrau-Durso (Russia)
Boyarskyh Alexander, Deputy Chief Engineer
Rusokova Rimma, Head of HSE Dept
Aganneftegazgeologiya (Russia)
Isachenko Yuriy, Director of HSE Dept
Akron (Russia)
Kolosovskiy Andrey, Chief Engineer for production
development and new technology
Chernov Andrey, Chief Engineer for Production Control
American Chemical Society (USA)
Langerman Neal, Chairman of the Division of Chemical
Health and Safety
Angarsk Petrochemical Company (Russia)
Yolshin Anatoliy, First Deputy Director General –
Director of Technology
Angarskiy polymer plant (Russia)
Mustafina Svetlana, Deputy Technical Director
Arkhangelsk Pulp & Paper Mill (Russia)
Ulanov Sergey, Deputy Chief Engineer
Bashneft (Russia)
Shvayko Dmitriy, Leading engineer of HSE Dept
Belinecomp, centre of ecological engineering
(Belarus)
Adamovich Vladimir, Deputy Director
BP (UK)
Thompson Edmond, Director Programme Management,
Group Crisis & Continuity Management
BP (USA)
Grounds Cheryl, VP Process Safety, S & OR
BP Exploration Operating Company Limited (Russia)
Buyanov Vladimir, Manager-Communications
Branch of private company limited by shares BP
Exploration Operating Company Limited (Great
Britain)
Mawer Chris, Vice President – HSE
Bryansknefteprodukt (Russia)
Balakina Irina, Head of HSE Dept
Buryat-Terminal (Russia)
Dudnik Sergey, Director General
Central Scientific and Research Institute of Building
Structures (Russia)
Farfel Mikhail, Leading Researcher
Gukova Margarita, Principal Researcher
CODELCO (Chile)
Jenny Katharina, Occupational Health & Safety Manager
Fidel Nunez, Mining Technology & Innovation Senior
Manager
LIST OF PARTICIPANTSS
Cordiant (Russia)
Todishev Andrey, Head of HSE Dept
CPC-K (Kazakhstan)
Yergali Yerbolat, HSE Senior Engineer
Sutiagin Viktor, Operation and Maintenance Manager
CPC-R (Russia)
Bryzgalov Eugeniy, Senior Engineer for HSE
Ignatkin Anatoliy, HSE Specialist
Mitin Sergey, Deputy General Manager for HSE
Fomenko Alexey, O&M Manager
Tsukanov Vladimir, Lead HSE Engineer
Designing and scientific research university of
Kharkhov, Promstroiniiproject (Ukraine)
Yarovoy Sergey, Director Deputy for Science
Dneprvnipienergoprom (Ukraine)
Koledina Irina, Deputy Chief Engineer
Prudskaya Irina, Head of Architecture and Construction
Dept
DTEK (Ukraine)
Podfigurniy Eugeniy, Chief HSE Specialist
East-Siberian Oil & Gas Company (Russia)
Dyatchin Vyacheslav, Deputy Chief Engineer for HSE
Parshentsev Pavel, Chief Engineer
Ecoinstrument (Russia)
Akhadov Kirill, Commercial Director
Engineering Technological Service (Russia)
Shumskaya Olga, HSE Leading Engineer
Ergonomics – working conditions testing laboratory
(Russia)
Chizhma Viktor, Deputy Director
EuroChem-BMU (Russia)
Popov Vladimir, Senior HSE Specialist
Evraz (Russia)
Artemenkov Yuriy, Head of HSE Dept
Bannikov Alexander, Senior HSE Specialist
Maltsev Aman, Head of HSE Dept
Rudnev Sergey, Senior HSE Specialist
Yagudin Renat, Director of HSE Dept
Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (TUKES)
(Finland)
Päivi Rantakoski, Director of Industrial Plants Surveillance
Kirsi Levä, Chief Engineer
GAZ GROUP (Russia)
Polyashov Maxim, Deputy Director of HSE Dept
Gazprom (Russia)
Kozintsev Anatoly, Head of Division
Stoliarov Vladimir, Deputy Head of Division

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Gazprom dobycha Astrakhan (Russia)
Putilin Denis, Deputy Head of the labor administration
Chernyshev Vladimir, Deputy Head of Industrial Safety
and Technical Supervision
Gazprom Neft (Russia)
Voronov Vadim, Head of Production Control Division
Nikolaenko Oleg, Head of HSE Dept
Gazprom neftekhim Salavat (Russia)
Nagaev Andrey, Head of HSE Dept
Shikunov Sergey, Head of HSE Dept
Gazprom pererabotka (Russia)
Afanas'ev Igor, Chief Engineer – First Deputy of the
Director General
Chudin Vitaliy, Chief of HSE Dept
Abramov Igor, The chief of service of fire protection
Gazprom transgas Samara (Russia)
Zayats Bogdan, Deputy Chief Engineer for HSE
Gazprom transgaz Surgut (Russia)
Korshunov Vladislav, Head of the Department of
Industrial and Fire Safety
Starostenko Zinaida, Chief Engineer of the Division for
Industrial and Fire Safety
Gazprom transgaz Ukhta (Russia)
Fastov Sergey, Deputy Chief Engineer for HSE
Shkrum Fyodor, Head of Departmental Fire Service
Gazpromneft – ONPZ (Russia)
Bakhmat Yuriy, Head of the Dept of Technical Policy
Nagibin Andrey, Deputy Head of Dept
Giprogazcentre (Russia)
Borusуak Sergey, Senior Specialist
Gosgorpromnadzor, Ministry of Emergency
Situations of Belarus
Lazar Ivan, Head of the Dept of Superviosion over
Hazardous Goods Transportation
Kudryashov Alexandr, Head
Haws Corporation (USA)
McLean Scot, Vice President Sales & International
General Manager
Wallace Neil, Director of Sales
Ilyich Iron and Steеl Works (Russia)
Domanov Valeriy, Deputy of Director General – Head of
OSHA and SDS
Institute of training for top-managers and specialists
of fuel-energy complex (Russia)
Nikolaeva Nadezhda, Vice-Chancellor
International Atomic Energy Agency (Austria)
Lipar Miroslav, Head of Operational safety section
International Institute of Engineering Safety (Russia)
ZatsarinniyVladimir, Leading Research Scientist, Ph.D.
Makhutov Nikolay, Professor, Dr.Sc.
International Section of the ISSA on Prevention in
the Mining Industry (Switzerland)
Ehnes Helmut, Secretary General
Intertek Moody International (Russia)
Boyd Gary, Principal Consultant
Karagandatsvetmet (Kazakhstan)
Grishina Tatiana, Principal Chief for HSE
Sembin Saken, Principal Chief for HSE
Karpatskiyy ETC (Ukraine)
Pirko Vasyliy, Chief
KChKhK (Russia)
Melnikov Vladislav, Deputy Technical Director and
Deputy Chief Engineer for HSE
Sazanov Nikolay, Deputy Head of the Production Control
and Industrial Safety Dept
Kemerovo Azot (Russia)
Dmitruk Vitaliy, Deputy Direсtor General for HSE
KETC (Ukraine)
Goncharenko Vladimir, Head of Centre
Kodeks (Russia)
Grigorovich Inga, Principal Legal Adviser
Kulikova Anna, Marketing Manager
Prem Natalya, Deputy Director
Lipetsknefteprodukt (Russia)
Brovkin Alexander, Director General
Luberetskiy Vodokanal (Russia)
Lirnik Petr, Director General
Mariupol Office of Kharkov Juridical University
(Ukraine)
Leshishak Stephan
Ministry for Emergency Situations Republic of
Azerbaidjan
Safarov Rushtu, Director
Ministry for Emergency Situations Republic of
Kazakhstan
Amurgalinov Samat, Director General
Tanabayev Mussa, Vice-Chairman
Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment
(Slovenia)
Karba Jasmina, Senior Officer
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
(Nederlands)
Dijkens Chris, Director
Ministry of Mining (Chile)
Arce Oscar, Security Engineer, of the Department of
Mining Operations of
SERNAGEOMIN
Santana Rodrigo, Regional Director of the National
Service of Geology and Mining (SERNAGEOMIN) in
Magallanes
Minudobreniya (Russia)
Shish Sergey, Head of production supervision
department
Moscow State University of Civil Engineering
(Russia)
Roytman Vladimir, Professor
LIST OF PARTICIPANTSS
15

16
Naftan (Belarus)
Tsirkin Grigoriy, Deputy Chief-Engineer for OHS and
safety
National Society of Labour Sphere Auditors (Russia)
Savinov Vladimir, Executive Director
Nikolaev Centre of Technical Examination (Ukraine)
Yeremenko Sergey, Director
Nizhneserginsk Metallurgical Plant (Russia)
Borozdina Tatyana, Deputy Technical Director for HSE –
Head HSE Dept
North Caspian Operating Company (Kazakhstan)
Ilyasov Rustem, Regional Affairs Director
North-West department of the Rostechnadzor
(Russia)
Kapaev Alexey, Deputy Head
Novokuibyshevsky Oil Refinery
Belyakov Andrey, Deputy Chief Engineer
NTS (Russia)
Semdyankin Nikola, Technical Director
Office of Technical Inspection (Poland)
Kozak Andrzej, Manager of Division of Functional and
Process Safety
OGK-2 (Russia)
Sosov Alexander, Head of HSE Dept
Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
Khaustov Alexander, Professor, Department of Applied
Ecology
Phosphorit (Russia)
Leontiev Sergey, Head of Dept
Pilkington Glass (Russia)
Gruzdova Valentina, Engineer for Industrial Safety
Lirnik Julia, Head of Industrial Safety Division
Pilz Russland (Russia)
Sorokovikov Vladimir, Director General
Claus Leonhard Area Sales Manager International Sales
Pridneprovsky ETC (Ukraine)
Khudoliei Eugeniy, Chief
Rive Gauche (Russia)
Orlov Dmitriy, Head of HSE Dept
Rivneazot (Ukraine)
Kolomoets Valentina, Head of HSE Dept
RIZIKON (Ukraine)
Granovskiy Eduard, Director General
RN-Energoneft (Russia)
Abdubakieva Svetlana, Head of HSE Dept
Feshenko Svetlana, Deputy Head HSE Dept
RN-Energoneft – Komi (Russia)
Ageev Alexey, Director
Rosatom (Russia)
Boyarkin Sergey, Director of program
Rosenergoatom Concern (Russia)
Demchenko Oleg, Chief HSE Specialist
LIST OF PARTICIPANTSS
RUSAL (Russia)
Ivanova Marina, Head HSE Dept
Polikovskiy Valeriy, Head of HSE Dept
RussNeft (Russia)
Bushuev Igor, Head of HSE Dept
Saint Petersburg Technological Institute (Russia)
Mazur Andrey, Head of Chair for Industrial Safety
Jankovskiy Ivan, Associate Professor for Industrial
Safety
Sakhalin Energy (Russia)
Gupta Rajeev, Brownfield Approvals Manager
Truskov Pavel, Technical Approvals Manager
Yamomoto Larisa, Specialist – Media Relations
Zasutskiy Alexey, Lead Safety Engineer
Samara-Nafta (Russia)
Glumov Igor Head of HSE Dept
Zhupikov Viktor, Head of Engineering and Technology
Support
Samaraneftegaz (Russia)
Boyarov Nikolay, Deputy Chief Engineer, Head of HSE
Dept
Saratovneftegaz (Russia)
Tarasov Valeriy, Head of HSE Dept
Siberian oil and gas company (Russia)
Skosyrsky Yuriy, Deputy Chief Engineer for HSE
Sibiryenergoremont (Russia)
Sorokin Denis, Head of HSE Dept
Sibur LLC (Russia)
Lyaskovsky Albert, Head of Department, Industrial
Health and Safety
Sinarskiy Pipe Plant (Russia)
Grekhov Alexander, Chief HSE Specialist and Chief of
HSE Dept
Sintez-Kauchuk (Russia)
Krasnov Eugeniy, Chief of the Production Control
Division
Sizranskiy refinery plant (Russia)
Varekha Vuacheslav, Deputy Chief Engineer for HSE
State Oil Company (Azerbaijan Republic)
Ragimov Tofik, Deputy head of HSE Dept
Stojlenskij GOK (Russia)
Nikishin Petr, Deputy Chief Engineer for HSE
Technoavia (Russia)
Kaminskiy Vladimir, Deputy Director for Sales
Potrashkov Sergey, Head of Sales Departament
The State Service of Mining Supervision and
Industrial Safety of Ukraine
Dunas Stepan, Deputy chairman
TVEL (Russia)
Sadovnikov Boris, Principal Inspector
Ukrainian independent Expert Assosiation
Vladychenko Alexander, Executive Director

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
UKU (Russia)
Marenov Stanislav, Head of HSE Dept
Varlamov Vladimir, Director of HSE
Ural Precision Alloys Plant (Russia)
Varlamov Vladimir, Director of HSE
Elsukova Oksana, Head of HSE Dept
Ural Steel (Russia)
Egorov Dmitriy, Chief Specialist
Uralkaliy (Russia)
Zhulanov Alexey, Head of HSE Dept
Yazev Sergey, Head of HSE Dept
Uralneftegazprom (Russia)
Agamalov Garislav, Director General
Voronezhsynthezkauchuk (Russia)
Avdeyenko Galina, Deputy Director General for HSE
Vostoktsvetmet (Kazakhstan)
Bilzhanov Almasbai, Technical Director of Kazakhmys
Branch of Corporation
West Expert Technical Centre (Ukraine)
Prokop’yak Nikolay, Chief
YaNAO
Nagovitsyn Igor, Head of HSE Dept
ZAPCIBORGRES, power station (Russia)
Zhelonkin Dmitriy, Chief of Research bureau
Zlatoustovskiy metallurgical plant (Russia)
Usachev Stanislav, Deputy Chief Engineer for HSE –
Head of Administration
ТNK-ВР Management (Russia)
Zakharov Pavel, Head of HSE Dept
Mass Media:
100-TV (Russia)
Grivenkova Elisaveta, Correspondent
Kasjanov Alexey
Baranov Vladimir
ABNews (Russia)
Naumova Kristina, Correspondent
Kolobov Alexander, Deputy Chief Editor
Business FM (Russia)
Vergelis Alexander, Correspondent
Live Energo (Russia)
Plotnikova Ekaterina, Correspondent
Megamedia Project (Russia)
Levchenko Edward
BERG-Board (Russia)
Dzirlank Viktoriya, Special Correspondent
Russian Gas (Russia)
Alexeev Alexander
Gas Industry (Russia)
Inozemtseva Julia, Head – Marketing and advertisement
Udinskaya Svetlana, Manager for Key clients and human
resources
Interfax (Russia)
Muraviev Mikhail, Correspondent
Karavan (Russia)
Alalikina Raisa, Journalist
METALLURGIST (Russia)
Ivanova Elena, Deputy Chief-Editor
Novoselova Olga, Editor-in-chief
New opportunities (Russia)
Zvjagin Juriy
OH&S AND SOCIAL PROTECTION (Belarus)
Krylova Elena, Editor-in-chief
Petrosfera
Butsalov Valery
Smirnova Julia, Editor-in-chief
Problems of risk analysis (Russia)
Tihomirov Igor
Industrial and Fire Safety (Belarus)
KrylovVitaliy, Editor-in-chief
Promislova Baspeka (Ukraine)
Galach Andrian, Editor-in-chief
RBC (Russia)
Letiuhina Maria, Correspondent
PEN-TV News 24 (Russia)
Alexeyev Igor, Editor
RIA “Industrial Safety”(Russia)
Gruzd Sergey, Editor-in-chief
RIA-NOVOSTI (Russia)
Yudina Anna, Correspondent
Russian Newspaper
Kholodova Ekaterina, Head of Special Projects
Vedomosti SPb (Russia)
Nazarova Galina, Correspondent
Technadzor (Russia)
Bazhukova Lyubov, Head of the project “Environmental
Protection in Russia”
Morning of Petersburg (Russia)
Nesterov Igor, Correspondent
Makarov Alexander, Correspondent
Legislative Center of the National Library of Russia
Diaz Tatiana, Head of the Legislative Center
Filippova Mariya, Lead expert of the Legislative Center
Power and Industry of Russia
Trunova Olga, Journalist
Etnis Vitaliy, Head of International Relations Dept
17
LIST OF PARTICIPANTSS

Transcripts of Proceedings
18
SECOND DAY
30 May, 2012
Conference Hall “Imperial”
Alexander V. Moskalenko,
Chairman of the Forum and GCE Group President:
Let me welcome everybody! For those who do not know
me – my name is Alexander Moskalenko, and for the next
two days I will be the permanent moderator of all sessions in
this hall. Those who came yesterday or the day before yesterday
saw what wonderful weather we had. Now we have
a typical St.Petersburg weather – it's raining, it's rather cool,
but I think it's only favorable for our work. We'll spend less
time walking out and stay here instead.
A few words about organization of our event. Now we
are in the main hall, it is called “Imperial”, and here we'll
have majority of reports. Besides, we also have “Bakkara” Hall
where there will be separate sessions today after 2 p.m. and
tomorrow in the afternoon, and they will be dedicated to occupational
safety and health and to safe operation of buildings
and constructions. You'll be able to find your way there
with the help of informative signs. Coffee-breaks will be held
in the enfilade, it's behind me now, and you can get there using
the side exits. The lunch will be organized in the restaurant
here on the ground floor, and an intimate detail – toilets are
to the right of the main exit, if you have not found them yet.
You can have your business trip documents signed and solve
accountancy problems in the neighboring hall behind the last
door. And if you have any problems, ask any GCE employee
or hotel personnel.
And now let me declare our Xth Jubilee Forum open, and
let us welcome each other.
Applause.
First of all, a few words about our sponsors. We have
a lot of them this year, and I beg your pardon if I miss
anybody. First of all, I want to express my gratitude to
“Technoavia”, a Russian producer of industrial clothing, they
have already been our loyal partner for many years, and to
international companies “Pilz”, offering automation technologies,
and “Haws”, suppliers of emergency equipment.
I also want to thank mass media representatives for highquality
coverage of industrial safety issues and for support
in our Forum development. This is “Technadzor” magazine,
our general media sponsor, and I would also like to mention
the Russian Information Agency (RIA Novosti) – we all
know them, Business News Agency, and “Okhrana Truda i
Sotsialnaya Zaschita (Occupational Safety and Health and
Social Protection)” magazine of the Republic of Belarus. Unfortunately,
as I've already told, I am not able to name them
all, but they are presented on the main screen, let us thank
them for the support!
Applause.
Well, what do we have today and tomorrow First, we
have representatives of 15 countries in this hall, including
representatives of state and interstate authorities regulating
activity in the spheres of industrial safety and occupational
safety and health. And the first block of reports will be dedicated
to the issues of state regulation and transboundary
cooperation.
Transcripts of Proceedings
Further on we'll consider corporate experience of ensuring
safety of technological processes, and I would like to attract
your attention to reports of our colleagues from “British Petroleum”.
We all know about events in the Gulf of Mexico,
and last year we had a detailed discussion about them at our
Forum. Our colleagues will share their experience of working
in such emergency situation, and I hope we'll get to know
about this experience, but nobody would have to use it in
practice. I also want to attract your attention to the report
by Mr Abramov about emergency and rescue teams, as this
report has been included in our program based on results
ofthe last year's questionnaire, when many of you made a
proposal to include this subject matter into our agenda. By
they way, there are new questionnaires in the distributed
handouts, and I ask you to fill them in and give them to the
Forum organizers, and, naturally, we'll try to take into account
all comments and suggestions next year.
Third – tomorrow we'll come back to discussing safety of
nuclear power plants. You remember what a heated discussion
took place here last year. Today we are going to have
again Miroslav Lipar from the International Atomic Energy
Agency as our guest.
The fourth block of reports will be dedicated to lessons
learned from catastrophes, and we have here colleagues
from Chile as our guests, they will tell us about a mine rescue
operation – you may remember, last year there was such incident,
with very interesting and, thanks God, happy results.
And my special thanks are personally to the President of Chile
who helped in organizing this meeting.
And a big block of reports is related, so to say, to virtual
reality, and our colleagues will tell us about some developments
in this sphere that are interesting, in my opinion, for
us in our activity. And certainly we'll have the main items of
our agenda – today we'll go to Chaplin-Hall to see the starts
of the world-known “Litsedei” theater, and tomorrow we are
going to have a traditional boat trip around rivers and canals
of Saint Petersburg.
It's all I wanted to say in my welcome speech. And now,
with my great pleasure, I give the word to Alexey Anatolyevich
Kapaev, Deputy Head of the North-West Federal Agency
for Ecological, Technological and Nuclear Supervision.
Session 1.
Measures to Ensure Industrial Safety. Solutions
and Experience of the State Supervisory Bodies
and Intergovernmental Organizations
Guidelines for Ensuring Industrial Safety
in Russia: Problems and Prospects
Alexey A. Kapaev, Deputy Head
North-West Federal Agency for Ecological, Technological
and Nuclear Supervision (Russia)
Good morning, dear colleagues!
Before I start my report, I would like to greet all participants
of the X th Jubilee Forum and wish all the success in
their work both during our forum and after it.
My report will be dedicated to the state policy in the
sphere of industrial safety in the Russian Federation. One
year ago here, in the same meeting hall, I informed you that
such project in order to change, rather radically, the state

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
policy in the sphere of industrial safety was in the preparation
stage and was sure to be implemented. Today I am going
to inform you what has already been done and what we
still have to do to execute the order of the Russian Federation
Government that approved the concept of the state policy
in the sphere of industrial safety in the middle of last year.
The concept was approved at the Government session in July
last year, and the action plan was compiled with the list of
actions to be implemented. As for us here, this action plan is
not going to be a pure theory, but is to have utterly practical
character, because the rules to be established will be the rules
according to which we’ll have to work together.
A small comment: As you know, two years ago the Federal
Service for Ecological, Technological and Atomic Supervision
(Rostekhnadzor) was moved out of the Natural Resources
Ministry to be subordinated to the Government directly, and
with that the Service acquired rule-making and law-making
powers. Thus the documents that I am going to mention and
briefly describe were prepared mainly by the Rostekhnadzor
experts in co-operation with experts from other ministries
and agencies concerned.
So, what documents of those published in 2011 are of
special interest for us, people working in the sphere of industrial
safety The first document is Federal Law No. 99-FZ
“On Licensing of Certain Types of Activities”. The law became
effective in the end of 2011. What is new in this Law First:
the notion of the licensed activity location was specified,
and prohibition of such activity outside the given location
in certain cases was defined. The Federal Law introduced
an unlimited term of the issuedlicenses. If earlier they had
a period of validity of five years, now they are issued once
and forever. Many independent types of licensed activity in
the area of explosives use in industry are now included in
the same type of licensed activity. Specific regulations were
introduced for pre-license audit procedures, as well as for
audits performed by licensing bodies within the frames of
the license control. In particular, the auditing principles were
brought in line with provisions of Federal Law No. 294 “On
Protection of the Rights of Legal Entities and Individual Entrepreneurs
in the Implementation of State Control (Supervision)
and Municipal Control”, which ensured uniformity of
the supervisory activity and, consequently, led to reduction
of administrative barriers.
We have already been working for two years in compliance
with Law No. 294, taking into account requirements and
objectives set for us by the Government and President, all of
them aimed first of all to reduce administrative barriers. Do
you remember the popular quotation about “nightmarizing”
business So, I want to report that in 2011 Rostekhnadzor
reduced the total number of audits by approximately 21%.
As compared to 215700 audits in 2010, we had only 169000
audits, including both planned and extraordinary ones. I must
say that the number of the found violations also reduced a
bit, as there were fewer audits. But there were more fines,
both in number and money terms. If the increased value of
penalties can be explained by the fact that there had been a
multiple increase in standard rates of industrial safety related
fines, the increase in physical number of fines, in spite of
the audits’ number reduction, reflects the increased auditing
demands by our inspectors.
Let’s come back to our documents. The next two documents
I would like to mention here are two Federal Laws, No.
248 and No. 255, on amendments to the Law on Technical
Regulation and respective changes in some legislative acts in
connection with such amendments to the Law on Technical
Regulation. What can I say about these documents They
created the legal basis for the revision and actualization of
the normative and technical documentation and regulatory
framework in the sphere of industrial safety. I’ll tell you a bit
later what it actually means. Overlapping and excessive procedures
of permit issuance for the use of equipment at hazardous
industrial sites were excluded. We actually face this
problem often enough in our daily practice. I think many of
you have already had such situation when you apply to Rostekhnadzor
for a permit issuance for the use of equipment
and receive an answer that in accordance with the Technical
Regulations Law new technical regulations of machines and
equipment safety are now applied, and if you have another
document confirming the correspondence of your equipments
to the current standards, i.e. certificate of correspondence,
you do not have to obtain the permit for the use of
this equipment in Rostekhnadzor. You should instruct your
experts to clarify this issue. If you introduce any new equipment
into operation, you should understand whether it is
covered by the technical regulations of machines and equipment
safety (there is a list of equipment attached). If this
equipment is covered by these regulations, you should obtain
a certificate of correspondence and do not have to obtain
the permit for the use of this equipment in Rostekhnadzor,
which earlier took rather a lot of time. The normative term of
an application consideration was 60 days, and, as a rule, for
different reasons it had to be extended even more.
So, as I’ve already told, this law has considerably reduced
the list of equipment requiring an expert appraisal of industrial
safety and a permit from the supervisory body in order
to be able to use it at industrial sites. In a nutshell, I can state
that all spheres of application of industrial safety laws and
laws on technical regulations have been delimited.
The next document is Government Decree No. 971 of 24
November, 2011, on declaring ineffective paragraph 2 of Article
6 of the Rules of Sites Registration in the State Register
of Hazardous Industrial Facilities. This Decree excluded reregistration
of hazardous industrial facilities. You all remember
that every five years we had had to pass again and again
the procedure of re-registration of hazardous industrial sites,
now we do not have to do it. If any facility was ever registered
in the State Register of Hazardous Industrial Facilities,
it is forever, it will be there until you decommission it for
any reasons.
Next document: RF Government Decree No. 996 of 5 December,
2011 “On Amendments to Certain Acts of the Russian
Federation Government on the Issues of Authority of
the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological and Atomic
Supervision”, i.e. Rostekhnadzor. What is new in this decree
Also a very important issue: the decree exactly specifies
names of different types of state control in compliance
with Law No. 242. What is important: Rostekhnadzor now
has legal powers to approve federal norms and regulations
in the sphere of industrial safety developed under provisions
of the two laws I mentioned earlier. What is meant under it
The Law on Technical Regulation introduced the notion of
federal norms and regulations which must be approved. And
the specified Government Decree states that these federal
norms and regulations must be developed and approved by
Rostekhnadzor. These federal norms and regulations should
replace the existing safety regulations for different spheres
of industrial activity – you all know these documents. A bit
later, when I go over to those documents that are to be developed
in future, I will also comment on those norms and
regulations that are to be issued in 2012.
The powers to approve the procedure to agree boundaries
of the protected zones of power supply network facilities
were transferred to Rostekhnadzor. Rostekhnadzor is defined
as a federal state energy supervision body. Rostekhnadzor is
empowered to agree upon internal service regulations developed
by legal units operating hydrotechnical facilities. And
I can’t but mention that the same Decree reduced the head
count of Rostekhnadzor by 200 employees.
The next two documents, which are very similar, are two
Government Decrees – on mine-surveying work licensing
and on licensing of operation of explosion-hazardous production
facilities. The second document is applicable to more
companies that that on mine-surveying work. This decree
No. 454 was issued on 5 May, 2011. Actually the list of the
documents that must be provided and issues analyzed during
pre-licensing audits have radically changed. And those com-
Transcripts of Proceedings
19

20
Transcripts of Proceedings
panies that are now obtaining or are going to obtain licenses
on operation of fire explosive facilities should be ready for
these changes.
And the last document, which was also issued on 5 May
this year, is Government Decree No. 455 “On the Regime of
Permanent Government Supervision at Hazardous Production
Facilities and Hydraulic Engineering Structures”. This document
was published a bit earlier, so that we could prepare
ourselves, as it is directly connected with the amendments
to the Law on Industrial Safety that still have to be developed
and introduced. Already last year I told you that it is
planned to differentiate hazardous production facilities into
four hazard classes, based on the level of the accident hazard
risk and the possible scale of consequences. And respectively,
these four hazard classes will be regulated by four
differentiated modes of the state control and supervision. In
particular, Government Decree No. 455 of 5 May refers to
the first mode, i.e. supervision of the most hazardous production
facilities (what we are going to do with them, how
the permanent state supervision is going to be implemented).
The Decree defines the procedures for the permanent state
supervision at hazardous production facilities and hydraulic
engineering structures, and defines control measures to
be taken by Rostekhnadzor officials within the frames of
the permanent supervision. The Decree specifies responsibilities
of Rostekhnadzor officials taking control measures
within the frames of the permanent supervision, exclusively
in accordance with the schedule approved by a head of Rostekhnadzor
agency. As for the most hazardous production
facilities, the schedules prepared for them will be approved
exclusively by Nikolay Georgievich Kutjin, Head of the Federal
Service for Ecological, Technological and Atomic Supervision.
The Law declares the possibility to exchange data between
Rostekhnadzor agencies and supervised organizations in an
electronic format with the use of Internet.
I’ve mentioned the documents that have already been issued
in realization of the state policy in the sphere of industrial
safety. But we still have a lot to do. I’ll now make a
brief review of documents that must be prepared in accordance
with the plan approved by the Government, and tell
you what documents are to be published this year and what
changes they entail.
The first two documents (they are divided here, in the
schedule, but they principally introduce amendments to the
same Law No.116 on industrial safety of hazardous operational
facilities, which we all know and are fond of. The
first amendment that is to be introduced is the exclusion of
the procedure approvals for the expert appraisal of industrial
safety. So, it is assumed that Rostekhnadzor is not going to
study expert appraisals of industrial safety, and I won’t sign
expert reports on them (now all expert reports in Saint Petersburg
are signed by me). And the procedure will be something
like following: An expert organization (irrespective of
whether it is a member of a self-regulating organization, it’s
not so important for us now) prepares an expert appraisal of
industrial safety for you, goes to the Rostekhnadzor website,
fills in a special form, ticks the item off, and this expert appraisal
is provided with a registration number and is included
in the Rostekhnadzor Register as performed. And when an
inspector makes an audit or prepares for an audit, he goes to
the website, looks how many items are ticked off, whether
all the equipment at the hazardous industrial facilities have
been inspected, and with these information he goes for the
facility audit. So, the procedure, instead of approval of the
expert report, will be, so to say, of purely registration, or
notifying, character.
The next change, which I have mentioned already, is also
an amendment to the Law on Industrial Safety that also refers
to the differentiation of hazardous production facilities.
In principle, this classification is harmonized with the EC legislation:
division into four groups and respectively four modes
of the state supervision in the sphere of industrial safety. In
particular, for the least hazardous facilities of the fourth hazard
class there will be a simple notifying procedure for the
start of their operation. Thus, they will send us a notification:
“We classify our facilities as belonging to the forth hazard
class, we started operating, just keep it in mind”.
Next document: draft amendments to Federal Law No. 117
“On Safety of Hydraulic Engineering Structures”. This legislative
act is being developed not only in accordance with the
plan of changes in the sphere of industrial safety approved
by the Government, but also in compliance with Article 8 of
the “Implementation Plan for Water Management Strategy
of the Russian Federation for the Period Until 2020” that
was approved by the Government order in 2009. At present,
as we see it, it is necessary first of all to do the following:
to specify jurisdiction limits for different supervisory
bodies in more detail, because in a number of cases there
is some overlapping of functions, especially when we deal
with hydraulic engineering structures. We should avoid such
overlapping.
It is also planned to amend the RF Law on Subsoil. Draft
amendments are developed in compliance with the RF Government
directive and have the aim to regulate the procedures
of preparation and agreement of schemes for the development
of mining works, and preparation of documents
defining the revised boundaries of the mining allotments.
Well, there are different opinions on how it should look like.
And it is supposed that this law will get it straightened out.
Several Government decrees that will regulate supervisory
bodies in different areas of activity are the preparation stage.
What do I mean It is supposed that new Government decrees
will approve regulations on the federal state supervision in
the sphere of industrial safety, in the sphere of hydraulic engineering
structures safety, federal state energy supervision,
and federal state supervision of atomic energy uses. These are
four major types of supervision that should be described very
thoroughly. I think you also encountered the problems connected
with that, for example, the Heating Supply Law and
the Energy Law, in combination with all subordinate acts, are
enacted in such a way... Everybody must have had winterization
problems, and you all know that Rostekhnadzor now
does not visit companies to check how they are prepared for
winter. And it’s probably not very logical. It looks like nobody
is supervising this activity on behalf of the state, because the
Heating Supply Law has laid this responsibility with the municipal
formations that have neither resources, nor experts to
perform a qualified audit of how companies are prepared for
winter conditions, both from the point of view of technical
condition of their equipment and with regards to the level of
standard and non-standard inventories. The above-mentioned
four documents are supposed to eliminate those contradictions
and get everything straightened out.
And the last set of documents I would like to mention
here: those industrial safety norms and regulations that are
to replace the current safety regulations. I hope this year the
new regulations will be developed for oil and gas industry
and storages of liquid hydrocarbon gases, as well as construction
and installation norms for vertical tanks for oil and
oil products; explosion safety regulations for chemical, petrochemical
and oil-refining industries; safety rules for flare
units, oil tank farms and oil products storage facilities; and
procedures for developing emergency situations localization
and liquidation plans. In coal-mining industry: training instructions;
regulations on coal mine degassing and investigation,
evaluation and prevention of gas accumulation; firedamp
components; ventilation plans. In short, this are operational
documents that – and I repeat it again – will have a different
status as compared to the existing safety regulations. It
is understandable that safety regulations in many industries
have already become outdated, they need revision, and such
revision will be now done in the form of such federal norms
and regulations.
As a matter of fact, this is what Rostekhnadzor has been
doing first of all and will continue to do to fulfill the action
plan for implementation of the state policy in the sphere

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
of industrial safety. I want to repeat once more that after
implementation of all these regulations in their full scope the
general picture in the sphere of industrial safety will change
dramatically. Everybody must be ready for it. Your industrial
safety experts must monitor new documents in this sphere,
because you will have to prepare your internal operational
documentation in compliance with these general regulations.
In short, you should not neglect this activity, or it will happen
some day that we come for an audit, and you still have only
old documents and work also as before. Naturally, it is not
the right way to operate, and it will obviously be somehow
penalized.
Thank you for your attention.
I.G. Yankovsky: If earlier the expert appraisal of industrial
safety was first approved by EMERCOM, then by Rostekhnadzor,
now EMERCOM won’t consider it, will they
A.A. Kapaev: No, it is Rosteknadzor that won’t consider
and approve this document. I don’t know about EMERCOM,
it’s not our sphere of responsibility.
I.G. Yankovsky: So, now this problem is actually vital.
Let us assume we have developed the declaration, but the
problem with EMERCOM has not been solved yet, and the
declaration is lying without movement.
A.A. Kapaev: I can’t say anything on behalf of EMER-
COM; you should have invited their experts here.
V. Melnikov, United Chemical Company URALCHEM: I
have a question regarding permits for the use of equipment
– will the earlier issued permits keep their validity after the
technical regulations are adopted
A.A. Kapaev: You have the term of validity for the issued
permits, and nobody is going to cancel it.
I.V. Abramov, Head of Emergency Response Division,
“Gazprom pererabotka”: Will the fire safety requirements
be excluded from the newly developed regulations Now
safety regulations include a number of fire safety requirements.
A.A. Kapaev: I don’t think they will be excluded.
I.V. Abramov: You have just told, when answering the
first question, that it is not in Rostekhnadzor’s jurisdiction, it
is responsibility of EMERCOM.
A.A. Kapaev: The colleague asked somewhat different
question, he told that some documents are now required
to be approved both by EMERCOM and Rostekhnadzor. In
particular, the expert appraisal of industrial safety for the
declaration. I’ve said only that Rostekhnadzor won’t give their
expert opinion of expert appraisals of industrial safety. The
question you asked refers to some other legislative acts. As
an example, I can say which issue we have not yet been
able to settle between our Service and EMERCOM: who supervises
fire safety measures in underground constructions
The question you asked is somewhere from this area. First of
all, spheres of responsibility should be demarcated between
EMERCOM and Rostekhnadzor.
I.V. Abramov: But now they are demarcated by the Presidential
Decree, and fire safety requirements are in the sphere
of responsibility of executive agencies of EMERCOM. Why
are they still present in Rostekhnadzor documents
A.A. Kapaev: You are right, except for one moment.
Thus, the Fire Safety Law stipulates that fire safety measures
in underground facilities are within the scope of responsibility
of the body supervising industrial safety.
I.V. Abramov: If those fire safety requirements are to
apply to fire safety measures in underground workings, no
more questions. But what about ground-level facilities They
are all defined.
A.A. Kapaev: Ground-level facilities as well. I repeat once
more: this issue is not directly related to the development of
federal norms and regulations. Those safety norms and regulations
must be in compliance with federal legislative acts of
higher level. Now, if the Urban Development Code states in
the Government Decree on Construction Supervision that the
fire safety supervision during the construction period is to be
effected by the state construction supervision authority, i.e.
Rostekhnadzor, then EMERCOM is unfortunately not mentioned
there at all. The same refers to underground facilities.
Therefore, I repeat once more: federal norms and regulations
are documents being developed in compliance with federal
legislative acts of higher level. If those higher-level acts come
to stipulate that EMERCOM will be responsible for all these
issues, let it be!
D.G. Zhelonkin, “Zapsiborgres”, Surgut.: The current
version of Law No. 116 stipulates that documentation for
reconstruction, technical re-equipment, conservation and liquidation
are subject to expert appraisal of industrial safety.
So, excluded are expansion and design documentation for
construction. What do you think: is it feasible to exclude
these spheres of activity from those subject to expert appraisal
of industrial safety And if expert reports are not
going to be registered with Rostekhnadzor agencies, will expert
organizations be able to perform expert appraisals of
industrial safety, for example, for design documentation for
expansion
A.A. Kapaev: I will divide my answer into two parts: First:
as you know, if your design documentation is subject to the
State Expertise, then, according to the Urban Development
Code, no other expert appraisals can be performed. If you do
not have any state expert report and your documentation is
not subject to the State Expertise, then it is subject to expert
appraisal of industrial safety in accordance with the current
the Law on Industrial Safety. Expert organizations can issue
expert reports for all spheres of activity, except those mentioned
in Law No. 116. And Rosteknadzor won’t consider and
approve those expert reports!
Question from the audience: You explained very well
about the state supervision differentiation. If I’ve understood
you correctly, all facilities will be divided into 4 hazard classes.
And what criteria will be there in the Law for division into
those classes
A.A. Kapaev: Accident hazard risks.
Question from the audience: Will it be possible to be
reclassified into another hazard category
A.A. Kapaev: Of course, after changes in technology or
number of hazardous facilities you should probably reassess
risks and change to another hazard class.
A.V. Moskalenko: I was impressed with the reduction in
number of audits by 20%. And one logical question: do you
plan any further reduction in number of audits Or do you
have any standard norms in this sphere What is your goal
A.A. Kapaev: There is not any specific plan, any control
figures on how many audits we should be performing annually
by 2020. But Law No. 294 stipulates periodicity of such
audits. Electric power – 3 years, industrial safety – 1 year,
energy performance – 2 times per 3 years. And we plan our
audits so that we could meet those periodicity requirements.
Besides, you know that now plans of all supervisory bodies
are summarized by the General Procurator’s Office and approved
by them. And the General Procurator’s Office looks
to that we do not visit the same company too often, so that
it would not happen that every month over the whole year
there will be some audit on-going. We are recommended to
agree periods of our audits with other supervisory bodies. It
is the first limiting factor.
The second one is our head count. We assume that any
auditing inspector should perform approximately 5 audits
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per month, because any audit, besides on-site visits, includes
also preparation of documents, wording of acts and prescriptions.
And we have to impose administrative penalties
as well, when there are reasons for them. Thus, we come
to 4-5 audits per month. Therefore, we, unfortunately (or,
maybe, fortunately for companies), have some supervision
spheres in which we can audit a company once in 33 years!
It’s based on the current staff numbers. One can understand
that in such conditions we cannot have fixed plans for the
number of audits.
Projects to Assist Countries in Strengthening
Safety at Hazardous Activities in accordance
with Tools and Practices of the UNECE
Industrial Accidents Convention
Chris Dijkens
Chair of the Conference of the Parties, the UNECE
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents
Director, Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment
(Netherlands)
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
Mr Chairman, thank you very much for your introduction.
And, well, the first thing I would like to mention is that I
am very honoured to be here and to be able to represent the
UNECE when it comes to the Industrial Accidents Convention.
And it’s a great opportunity for us to give us the floor and
to explain you more about our convention. And it’s also a
very special occasion, because I understand it’s the tenth anniversary
of the International Forum on Industrial Safety. And
I think that’s a great event, and I would like to congratulate
you, Mr Moskalenko, with this event, and all the organizers.
I would like to discuss with you this morning the projects
that are title of my presentation: “Projects to assist countries
in strengthening the safety at hazardous activities in accordance
with the UNECE Industrial Accident Convention tools
and approaches”. That’s the title. However, for the good understanding
I think it’s important to tell a little bit more,
however quite briefly, about the Convention, what does the
Convention include and where it’s about.
The convention is already being in working from 1992,
and the main goal is to prevent industrial accidents and to
minimize the effects, when they might unfortunately occur.
With effects we mean immediate or delayed adverse consequences
for human beings, flora and fauna, soil and water,
landscape, air, and also the interaction between these elements,
and also the material assets and cultural heritage. So,
it’s quite a broad outreach. And the scope is to prevent, to
prepare, and to give an adequate response in cases where
it’s needed. Till now forty till fifty countries, or Parties, are
members of the UNECE. And the UNECE is the United Nations
Economic Commission of Europe.
Well, what is the Convention It’s a multilateral environmental
agreement for promoting the cooperation between
the UNECE members on ensuring safety at industrial hazardous
facilities. It involves all Parties, and through these parties
– all the stakeholders. And that’s not only the national and
regional and local authorities, but that’s also the industry and
other organisations who are involved in industrial safety. And
it’s also a platform for exchange of information – to exchange
innovations, good practices on prevention, preparedness
and response. And it’s a platform to support Parties to
further enhance the industrial safety. And it’s a framework
to establish strategic partnerships. And I see this opportunity
also as an opportunity to establish further strategic partnerships.
Well, the Convention and its focus. As you can see in
this map here, the UNECE covers Western Europe, Eastern
Europe, South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and also the
Central Asian countries. So, it has a broad, broad outreach.
And although the Convention is about industrial accidents of
a cross-border, of a transborder effect, we call it the spirit
of the Convention that you can only develop policies for
the industries which can have an effect on the neighbouring
countries when you have a good legal system in place for
your own country. And that’s policy in terms of industrial
safety; that’s legislation; that is also a preparedness organisation;
that’s preparedness measures for industries; and that’s
also response mechanisms in the countries. Because it’s not
only limited to a certain distance from the border with your
neighbouring countries, it’s something which you have organised
in the whole country. So, that’s why we call the spirit
of the Convention. (Pic. 1)
The main areas of work that we are talking about in the
Convention is the identification and notification of hazardous
activities, and the prevention of industrial accidents,
emergency preparedness, emergency response and also the
industrial accidents notification. And, not unimportant, the
information to and also the participation of the public, to
give them the opportunity to be involved, to raise their voice,
and to give also their opinion.
What you see here is the cycle of prevention – preparedness
– response. And on the left for me, and it’s for you
also, it’s the “Hazard identification and notification”, and on
the other side of the box – the “Information to and public
participation”. These are the main focus elements of the
work under the Convention.
Not all the countries are at the same level of industrial
safety. And not all the countries are at the same level of
implementation of the Convention. Because when you have
Pic. 1
Pic. 2
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
signed the Convention, you have obligations under the Convention
as a country, and actually by that also as the industry.
Not all are at the same level. Some countries are ahead,
some started to implement the Convention, and some are
behind, and some are even far behind. And that was recognised.
It was recognised that countries need assistance, and
that we can help them by training, by all kinds of projects.
And that gap was the reason of establishmentin 2004 of
the so-called Assistance Program. And Assistance Program
is mainly focused on the countries of so-called ECE – that
is South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and
the Central Asian countries – actually mainly the economies
in transition.
The Assistance Program was established to help the countries
with all kinds of projects. These projects are financed by
the so-called trust fund under the Convention. The trust fund,
of course, will only work when you have money in the trust
fund. And we have some donor countries who are pledging
money, funds, to this trust fund. And based on what we have
available as money, we can start with all kinds of projects,
based on identified needs. It’s important to know that only
projects can start – or by a country by themselves, or by a
group of countries – when needs for that are identified.
An important (and that’s why I am showing you this slide),
important element of to identify the needs is the so-called
cyclic approach. And the cyclic approach is – well, you might
recognise it as a Plan-Do-and-Actcycle, but we transferred
it a real bit into this. And what we are doing here is in Step
one is to analyse where are we as a country with our implementation
of the Convention and what is the level of industrial
safety according to the standards which are included in
the national legislation, and, perhaps, also when it comes to
standards used by industry. When you analyse where you
are, what the level is, than you also can refer it to standards
we have been developing in terms of indicators and criteria.
And my colleague Jasmina Karba will go much more in detail
in that specific element, I will do it very briefly. But then you
have a picture of where you are. When you have the picture,
then you also can identify what the gaps are, and how you…
what the plan could be to fill the gaps, and how to proceed
withdeveloping, so that you can come on a higher level. So,
it’s making action plans to evaluate the actions and to come,
hopefully, on a higher level in the next stage. (Pic. 2)
This is one of the most important bases for to identify
the needs where you want to improve as a country or where
you want to improve as an organisation to come on a higher
level. And based on this, countries can submit project proposals
to the Secretariat of the UNECE Convention and to
ask assistance, or to ask for money for starting with such a
project. Actually, with making a plan based on this cyclic approach,
you have identified the needs and you have a robust
proposal for steps you want to take.
Well, we have already quite a long range, long list of
all kinds of projects under the so-called Assistance Program.
And I will go fairly briefly through two projects with you –
projects which have been already finished, of identification
of hazardous facilities, hazardous substances, training of inspectors,
training of authorities, to do table-top exercises,
but also in-field exercises, – that’s a grab from the long list
of projects.
And this morning I would like to go very briefly with you
through two projects:
The safety reporting and inspection in Croatia, Serbia and
theformerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia – and that mostly
in the area of reporting and prevention;
And another project is the hazard and crisis management
in the Danube Delta countries. And with these countries I
mean Romania, Moldova and Ukraine.
Well, you see here, I will go through it by the steps I have
just shown there in one of the previous slides. (Pic. 3). This
project was initiated by Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia. And
the initiative came from these countries because they are in
the process for access to the European Union. And they have
started with the implementation of the requirements under
the Seveso (the European Soveso Directive) – probably, you
are familiar with this directive, as it gives also requirements
and obligations to countries. And these three countrieshave
been forecasting on that. When they started with the process,
they identified – based on Step I, after using the indicators
and criteria, – that there were gaps in some areas. They did
not really understand how you should draft safety report,
what kinds of elements should be included, what kinds of
procedures you should use, what kinds of methods are in
place and which you can use, and, based on that, it was difficult
to demonstrate the safety by the authorities, but also
by the industry. And also there was a lackof knowledge in
expertise of experts in the public authorities, but also in the
industry. Inspection was insufficient, and the link between
safety reporting and inspection was lacking. So, there was
really a need to improve in these areas.
So, after going through the first element of the cycle, they
could identify some actions which should be implemented.
(Pic. 4). The countries by themselves – well, I try to repeat itis
that they identify their own need. So, they said: “OK! The
actions we should implement – that we have to develop clear
rules for the operators on the content of safety reports –
what have to be included And training of our experts – of
public authorities, but also the operators, and training to the
experts of the public authorities to prepare for inspections,
so that they can conduct adequate inspections”. So, the main
challenge is to improve expertise and the practice how to
implement the identified actions. And they identified that it
is important to have some external assistance, expertise to
help them with this.
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Pic. 3
Pic. 4
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So, the further approach by these three countries was actually
on two components of the project. And it was decided
to have a project on hands-on training on assessment of
safety report, and simulation of inspection.
Safety reporting: the instruments we have been using were
workshops: to gather the people, to talk with the people, and
to use all kind of instruments, to raise awareness – that’s
important, and to increase and to improve the expertise, and
also the experience. So, the checklists were developed, and
also guidelines were developed. And these were not only
checklists which are made in one hour, but it was really based
on existing material, like the Seveso Directive, the requirements,
all kinds of scientific material, and also experience
from and knowledge from the private industry, because many
branches have their own safety guidelines, and the elements
of it which are related to industrial safety are also included in
the checklists. It was important to explain the checklists and
the guidelines, so that the representatives of the authorities,
but also the industry, get used to it, how to work with it. And
a very hands-on application of the checklist in evaluating a
safety report with support of the internationalexperts. So, it
was a very well-organised workshop that they went through
the checklist and the guidelines provided.
This is just an example, and, again, mostly the goal was to
raise awareness, but also to raise the competence and to develop
the experience. And the guidelines, but also the checklist,
were used for planned – for activities which you want to
start and which are planned, but also for existing activities.
And actually it’s a qualitative checklist. So, it is not ranking in
terms of 1 to 10, but it is more a qualitative description: Is it
in place Is it there Is it checked And is it also the information
that is reliable Does it give you a good picture of the
planned situation and does it give you a good picture of the
existing situation So, various elements of industrial safety
are assessed by checklists like this. And, for you information,
this is just an element of it.
We also started with the workshop to bring it in practice.
So, with the guidelines and with the checklist under the arm –
to a facility, and really together with the industry to evaluate
the safety elements, and also to evaluate the safety reports.
We have done that in simulation of an inspection. We have
been on site, we have been using the documents and the approaches,
and we have evaluated the on-site inspection with
international experts who have a broad expertise in this area.
So, Step 3. (Pic. 5). When you think about that cycle,
Step 3 of the cycle is the evaluation of the results which are
achieved. Results are that we have countries now which have
an improved understanding of the content of safety reports,
and they understand better the procedures and the methodologies.
They understand how to use evaluate safety reports,
and also they have now an experience with an on-site inspection
based on these guidelines and based on this checklist.
There is material available, and not only in the countries, but
it’s also in the web-site, and I will show you with my last
slide the web-site where you also can read it. It’s not focused
only to these three countries, but it has a general use. And
the follow-up is now to the countries themselves, of course.
They have to work with it. So, they need to use the acquired
knowledge to improve enforcement mechanisms and also to
continue with training their own experts and to spread the
knowledge among the national experts.
This is project number two I would like to go briefly
through together with you. This is a project about the hazard
and crisis management inthe Danube Delta countries
–Moldova, Ukraine and Romania. They took an initiative
to go through the cycle where we agreedupon to use it in
the framework of the Convention.And after the analysis it
showed that the cross border cooperation is insufficient, that
the information and notification on hazard sources needs to
be improved. Countries do not know from each other exactly
what kind of impact they can expect when there might happen,
unfortunately, an industrial accident with transboundary
effects. The joint preparedness and response mechanism to
emergency situations is insufficient. And they identified that
both the hazard and the crisis management needs to be improved.
And it’s an important area, this Danube Delta. It’s a
UNESCO heritage, it is an outflow, as you know, in the Black
Sea, and that basin has a very important flora and fauna. So,
all reasons to pay attention to this delta.
An important mechanism we use here is the safety chain
as a concept for assessment. It’s an instrument to help you to
go through all the elements of safety, starting with pro-action
(what kind of legal framework is in place), land use planning
– important element, hazard identification, the technical
and organisational measures, early warning systems, etc.
The details behind this schedule help you go through it.
Step 2 – what they have identified, what kind of actions
– is to improve the cross-border cooperation, to exchange
the inventories, to exchange information and the approaches,
and to harmonize the off-site contingency plans and the
response procedures. So, they really saw a challengein these
elements. And the way forward was also here to involve external
assistance and expertise.
Two projects are identified on hazard management, crisis
management, with the focus, as you can read it here in the
slide. (Pic. 6). I will go a little bit faster now, as otherwise I
am going out of time.
The approach was to have two technical workshops.
One on hazard management. What kind of hazardous activities
do you have in your country in thatarea And based
on use of indicators and criteria, you gained a real picture
of what you have. And also here checklists are used as also
have been used by the three countries in the project which I
have explained before.
Pic. 5
Pic. 6
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Sorry, I have to go back.
This is an example – you see the similarity with the checklist
I showed before.
Crisis management. Well, this one I just explained. I can
go to the next one.
Here you can see some examples how, also when it comes
to assessment of unfortunately released hazardous substances
when that occurs, the cooperation between al kind of
organisations in the country, but also cross-border… (Pic. 7).
This indicates how they need to cooperate.
In Step 3 actually you have lists of the results of the
project so far. And we have now material available for the
countries that can be used by the authorities. There is an
improved understanding of hazard management. There is an
improved understanding of safety standards and measures,
and also how to improve the management and the content
of contingency plans. And a very important element is the
harmonization of contingency plans. And also to see how
they can include it more in the legal frameworks and to
come more to legal agreements between the countries how
to cooperate.
The project is on-going. It is three-year-doing project.
There is quite a substantial amount of money involved. And
it’s on-going. The continuation is now focused on national
level:to establish and to improve enforcement; cross-border:
to improve the exchange of information. And we now are
also discussing between the three countries the harmonization
of plans.
This slide I will skip. That will Jasmina be going to that
process.
I would like to conclude. We can conclude that the UNECE
Industrial Accidents Conventionis a very useful framework to
improve and to ensure industrial safety, and it covers the
whole ECE region. It is not only Western Europe, but it covers
the whole ECE region. And it is also complementary to other
regulations. It helps countries to identify and to assess aspects
for taking preventive measures and also to adjust preparedness
and response actions. It is a good basis for cooperation
within and between countries. It gives you a very smooth force
in the back, push in the back to coordinate and to discuss
with your neighbouring countries, but also within your own
country, to organise your preparedness and your response.
And it gives opportunities for a close cooperation with relevant
organizations. And Assistance Programme proved that
it is a very valuable instrument. However, commitment at the
expert level is absolutely needed – that’s a condition. I mean
the Strategic Approach must be used. The cooperation and involvement
in this work of experts is also extremely important.
And next and the most important is that on the highest level,
on the political level there is a commitment to create basis for
experts, for their work and their cooperation.
This was my last slide, Mr Chairman, and I would like to
thank you for your attention.
Pic. 7
A.V. Moskalenko: Please, questions, if any. No questions,
thank you, Chris. There is a question. Mr Yankovsky is a
participant of all our conferences, and he has been award
winner for a number of years.
I.G. Yankovsky: Please, tell, in all the countries in the
world the most dangerous thing is not civil objects, but military
industrial sites. Does the UNECE Convention have anything
to do with these particular sites in European countries
and other countries What I mean is – talking about
obtaining and processing hazardous materials, and disposal
of military materials and explosives, and all that. Does the
Convention have anything to do with that
Chris Dijkens: There are certain exclusions in the Convention,
and the military facilities and activities are excluded
from the Convention. So, they are not involved in this convention.
However, when it comes to response, we see more
and more that the facilities and capabilities of the military can
be used in response mechanisms. So, they have equipment,
and for helping the neighbouring countries – because that’s
an obligation under the Convention when unfortunately it
might happen an accident – we see more often that with the
equipment and with the facilities the military can assist, but
the activities on themselves, on military sites, are not involved
in the UNECE Convention.
Assessing Progress in the Industrial Accidents’
Control with Indicators and Criteria Developed
under UNECE Convention on the Transboundary
Effects of Industrial Accidents
Jasmina Karba
The UNECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects
of Industrial Accidents
Senior Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Environment
(Slovenia)
Ladies and gentlemen, good morning, good day actually.
It is an honour and great pleasure to be able to be here
among you, participants of this forum. And let me first to
thank very much to Mr Moskalenko and his team for having
given me the opportunity to present results of one actually
specific activity that has been undertaken under the Convention
on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents. It
is a tool that I would that like to present, tool that has been
developed to assist countries to progress in the implementation
of the Convention in the systematic and transparent
manner.
I consider myself being the supporter of this Convention,
because I think that it brings a lot of progress and lot of good
things to its Parties. I am actively involved in the work that is
being done under the Convention, currently as a Vice-Chair to
the Conference of the Parties, and when I don’t work for the
Convention, I work for the Slovenian Ministry of Agriculture
and the Environment. I am based in Ljubljana. And among my
responsibilities is the development of policy in the area of the
control of hazards of major industrial accidents.
So, for today I will be concentrating the presentation on
indicators and criteria which Chris briefly has mentioned in
his previous presentation. He has provided you with the basic
information about the Convention and its activities. And
you could see that among those a great deal of importance
and important part of resources is devoted to Assistance
Program designed to address challenges that countries face
when they are implementing the Convention. This program
was launched in 2004, and since then it did not only develop
and expand in terms of the amount of activities that
have been undertaken, but also in terms of instruments and
tools that have been developed to steer and to monitor the
achievements of the program and to support cost effective
and efficient use of its resources. These instruments and
tools also serve as internal rules to ensure that really this
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Assistance Program runs in transparent manner to all parties
being involved in this program. And the tool I am presenting
today is part of these instruments to steer and monitor the
Assistance Program, and it’s actually a set of tools which are
called indicators and criteria.
Indicators and criteria were primarily developed to support
the assessment of the stage of implementation of the
Convention, first thing. Then, the second one, based on the
assessment of the stage of progress which has been achieved
with regard to the implementation of the Convention, -the
identification of shortcomings (so, where a certain country is
not that advanced, where there is still some place to progress.
And then, third thing, based on the analysis of the identified
shortcomings – planning of actions to progress further in
systematic and transparent manner. So, these indicators and
criteria are, on the one hand, are considered to be benchmarks
which could be used by different countries to assess
their level of progress, and on the other hand, they can also
be used as tools to support the assessment of the results of
the assistance program as a whole, and also to see whether
the resources under this assistance program are being spent
in proportion to the results and in a cost effective way.
The participation in the assistance program is being managed
similarly to the management practice of different issues
and activities in everyday life. It is namely based, as Chris
already mentioned, on the management loop. And this management
loop, as you are well aware of, involve agreeing on
objective, defining a plan to achieve the objective, formulating
the detailed work, carrying out the work, checking the
outcome, and then taking the corrective actions.
But three cycles of the Strategic Approach is actually the
management loop that is adjusted to the aim, and the character,
and the scope of the Assistance Program. And this
management loop also supports basic principle of functioning
of our Assistance Program, which is that any activity,
action that is going to be taken should really be based on the
needs and priorities of a specific country, and should not be
left to be determined from outside or from what is available
instead of what is needed. For this reason Strategic Approach
simply says: progress systematically, in cycles step by step.
And in each cycle firstanalyse the state of progress, identify
the shortcomings, plan activities to eliminate the shortcomings,
implement activities, assess the results, and if there is
still need for improvement, start the next cycle.
As I was saying, the activities to be realized under the
Assistance Program should be based on a thorough analysis
of the situation against the objectives and provisions of the
Convention. Now, to assist countries to perform such analysis,
these indicators and criteria were developed, matching
goals and the provisions of the Convention, and they have
been clustered into 6 working areas of the Convention. These
6 working areas are, of course, typical characteristics for the
control of hazards of the industrial accidents. They relate to
the identification of hazardous activities, to the prevention
of industrial accidents, to preparedness and response to such
accidents, and to information to the public and public participation
in matters when the decisions are taken.
Let me now provide you with a bit of background how
these indicators were developed. Important starting point in
the development of them was the idea that the indicators
should be, on one hand, general enough to the point that
they should be fit for use by countries facing different challenges
with regard to the management of hazards, and also
choosing different steps to progress in this area. But on the
other hand, they should be detailed enough to capture the
principles, goals and provisions of the Convention.
Pic. 1
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Indicators were developed also following another important
starting point, namely, that they be easy to understand
and use, and of learning character, so that anybody that performs
self-assessment with them does not perceive them as
an unnecessary burden, but rewarding, efficient and learning
exercise. Finally, the most suitable seem to be that solution
that the indicator is a mechanism. And a mechanism in
the context of these indicators should be understood a set
of procedures, implementation rules and actions which are
needed to implement certain provision of the Convention. I
would also like to share with you the idea why, what was the
reason behind choosing a mechanism for an indicator. The
reason was very simple – it was to stress the importance of
sustainable and robust implantation of Convention, based on
mechanism in place and ensuring that there are provisions in
place which are anchored into the everyday practice of the
country, meaning that the implementation of the Convention
is not threatened by staff changes or organizational changes
that happen in certain authority or certain country. So, the
idea is really to ensure sustainable, robust system, to implement
element by element of the industrial accidents’ hazards
regime. (Pic. 1)
So, altogether 16 indicators really have been suggested
to cover provisions of the Convention, and these are clustered
into 6 working areas, as I mentioned before. I don’t,
of course, want to go and explain each and every indicator
in detail. This list is just to show you, to give you a picture of
how finally adapted indicators look like. Let me only stress
that with these 16 indicators no dramatic inventions have
been made or discovered. These indicators simply reflect the
requirements of the Convention. So, for daily use no special
knowledge or pre-expertise is necessary. An average expert
working in the control of hazards should have no difficulty
to understand and to work with them.
Now, having defined the indicators, the question then
arose which criteria should be attached to them to evaluate
the stage of progress. And here also one important starting
point was that the criteria should have learning, and positive,
and encouraging character, and again not to be too complicated,
but simple and straightforward, so that experts could
easily use them.
The solution that was adopted suggests, or this is how
it was adopted, that the criteria aredivided into 6 levels of
progress. They are actually very logical. The first level of
progress is called little awareness, and it reflects the situation
in the country when there is little awareness about certain requirements
of the industrial accidents’ hazards management,
and also of the need to implement them in the practice of
certain country. Then the progress stage 2 – it is called initial
discussion, and it reflects the situation when there is awareness,
but at the level of experts, of the need to introduce
some additional mechanism to control the hazards of industrial
accidents. Level of progress 3 – quality decision taken
reflects a situation when the decision has been taken on the
level of policy makers that something needs to be done in the
country, that some additional effort should be devoted to
the area of industrial accidents. Then the level 4 relates to the
situation when there is an intensive and detailed discussion
related to certain element of the control regime. And then
level of progress 5 is called mechanism adopted, it reflects
the situation when the mechanism in question has been adopted
through a governmental act or other form of national
practice, but is not yet operational in practice. So, in theory
the legislation has been adopted, but is not operational in
practice, be it due to the lack of human or financial resources
or the organization has not been set, or whatever reason
there might be. And the sixth level of progress – and this is
then actually sort of that the maximum has been achieved –
reflects the situation when the certain mechanism in question
is operational and has been implemented in practice, when
there is human and financial resources secured to implement
it, and when competent national experts are available and
they are continuously trained to implement the provisions
that have been defined.
Here I would also like to mention that the higher levels of
progress are accompanied, are attached more detailed list of
minimum tasks that need to be accomplished for a country
or industry to evaluate or to assess that this is the state of
progress that is characterized for this country. (Pic. 2)
Now, the combination of indicators and criteria for each
working area could be indicated, could be seen from this
table. So for each of 6 working areas indicators have been
defined, matching requirements of Convention, and for each
indicator criteria have been attached to identify the level of
progress already achieved.
Now, this has been a bit of theory against indicators and
criteria. Now, if you allow me, I would like to present very
briefly how these indicators and one level of progress – what
27
For each area – set of indicators and criteria
Pic. 2
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28
is the criteria for certain level of progress for the working
area Prevention.
Convention stresses the importance of prevention. It requires
the Parties to take appropriate measures to prevent
accidents, which is a logical requirement, but which in practice
is not that easy to be implemented. Although the Requirements
of the Convention are addressed to competent
authorities, in practice, of course, through competent authorities
these requirements address also operators of hazardous
activities.
Mirroring provisions of the Convention in the area of
prevention and following the requirements of the Convention
which places responsibilities to competent authorities
and to operators, two indicators have been adopted for the
working area Prevention. First indicator is a combination of
procedures, implementation rules and actions that ensure
thatcompetent authorities create an environment in which
operators of hazardous activities are aware that it is them
who are primarily responsible for safe operation, and that
they are not only aware of this responsibility, but they need
to demonstrate to competent authorities somehow that how
they run their activity, i.e. that they run it in a safe manner,
that they have measures in place to prevent accidents, and
if the accident should occur, they have measures in place to
limit the consequences of accidents.
The second indicator – again a combination of procedures,
implementation rules and actions, but this one is to
ensure that the competent authorities operate sort of control
regime in practice, which actually means constant monitoring
of the operation of hazardous activities from the prevention
of accidents point of view. (Pic. 3)
Now, just to give you a feeling of how criteria have been
attached to the first indicator for the working area of Prevention.
For a country to identify itself as having reached
progress stage 5 – and this is, if you remember, the progress
stage when mechanism has been adopted – the criteria says
that there need to be the national legislation available, and
this national legislation should cover as a minimum:First, parameters
for linking the degree of hazards with the responsibility
for safe operation – this means that in the legislation
criteria should be defined for the identification of hazardous
activities with a potential for industrial accident, so that both
the industry and the competent authority know that this and
this activityis under the control regime established for the
management of industrial accidents’ hazards. Second thing
that need to be defined in the legislation is the parameters for
defining the scope of demonstration linked with the degree
of hazard – this means that there should be clear criteria defined
that the operators, and again – competent authorities,
that both sides know how extensive demonstration is expected
from certain activity. Then the third thing that needs to be
put into the legislation is the content of the demonstration,
because once a legislator says: “Hey, operator of hazardous
activity, you are being monitored under this control regime,
so you have to demonstrate to the competent authority that
your operation is done in a safe way”, then the legislation also
needs to say what should be the content of this demonstration,
so that this demonstration is not left to be done in ad
hoc manner, but clear definition of what should constitute
the demonstration should be part of the legislation. And then
following to this content of the demonstration, how certain
elements of the demonstration, what kind of methodologies,
methods and models to be used for the demonstration – these
all need to be defined in the legislation. And last but not least,
the frequency of demonstration – that is to say, when exactly
do the operators of hazardous activities need to demonstrate
their safe performance to competent authorities when is it
they need to review and revise this demonstration
Now, if you look at this slide, these criteria are described
very briefly, but if you look in the guidance document that
I will mention at the end of the presentation, these criteria
are there accompanied with lots of explanations and with
examples of good practice how this could be done. (Pic. 4)
Now this is again a broader picture of indicators and criteria
for the working area Prevention we don’t want to go into
detail with this picture.
Pic. 3
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Now, how should one start performing the self-evaluation
with the use of indicators and criteria When I am asked
this question, I always say: “There is no recipe, because the
approach would really depend on the situation in certain
country or certain industry”. It depends on the number of
available experts, and it depends on the dimension or the
relevance of the industrial accidents in certain country and
certain industry. But what I always advise – what is always
my first advice – is that before you start using, before you
start self-evaluating the progress with indicator and criteria,
sit down and think – as simple as that. Self-evaluation is
an analysis, and before starting this, one should really first
transfer these indicators and criteria into the national context
and have clear answers to the questions: what am I actually
doing Why am I performing this self-evaluation And
what do I expect to get as a result And once this basic
dilemma has been solved, than it is advisable that doing selfevaluation
should be done in a way that each working area
is analyzed separately, that the discussion is really held in the
country or in the industry on what is the situation, so that the
stage of progress could be identified, and this stage of progress
really best describes the progress that has been reached
in certain country or certain industry. And then finally when
all this thinking process is over, it is very important that the
findings, and the conclusions, and the discussions are very
well documented, because these documents could be used
very well if there is next cycle of self-evaluation.
Now, one might ask what is actually the benefit of using
the indicators and criteria, because these have been developed
to assist and support anybody wishing to progress, and
they should not be perceived as additional burden without
value added. It might that they are perceived as a challenge,
but rewarding challenge, since self-evaluation using indicators
and criteria would really support an image of a country
or an image of an operator who has a vision, strategy and
potential for the progress, who is proactive, who does not
wait for external suggestions and kicks from outside. It supports
an image of a country or of an operator who knows
the stage of progress, who knows the needs, who meets the
priorities. And use of indicators and criteria supports progress
in the management of industrial accidents in transparent and
systematic way, and potential assistance, if needed, will not
randomly fall from the sky, it will be planned and realised
based on needs and priorities identified, and accordingly this
approach also supports rational and cost effective use of
resources.
It is true that indicators and criteria have initially been
developed at the request of the Conference of the Parties,
and they have also been adopted by the Conference of the
Parties, and their use is obligatory for all countries wishing
to take part in the Assistance Program. So, before a country
submits a project proposal to be realized under Assistance
Program, a thorough analysis of state of progressshould be
performed, proposed activity should fit, be harmonized with
the identified state of progress and shortcomings, and all
these is to ensure that the assistance is really based on the
needs and priorities of the one that thinks that the Assistance
Program is needed.
But having said that, regardless the fact that this tool has
originally been developed for the use by countries that are
parties to the Convention, it can, of course, be used by any
country or any industry that wishes to explore how advanced it
is, how advanced is its system it uses to control hazards of industrial
accidents, and that wishes to undertake further activities
to make this control even more efficient and effective.
I know that this has been a long presentation, and I thank
you really for listening and for paying attention to it. I am
frequently told that when I start talking about indicators and
criteria, that I really don’t know when to stop. But, nevertheless,
I hope I managed to show you really the beauty of these
indicators and criteria, and the benefits that either a country
or industry gain when it uses them. And also hope that I managed
to raise your interest in looking in more detail in these
indicators and criteria. And if I have, I am very pleased. You
might want to look at the document which is published at the
web site of the Convention. This is the guidance document;
it guides you very thoroughly through the whole theory of
indicators and criteria that I have been explaining.
And with this I conclude my presentation, and again thank
you very much for your attention.
A.V. Moskalenko: Colleagues, if there are anyquestions,
please, go ahead with them.
Question from the audience: Jasmina, can you tell us,
please, is there a clear-cut technique published anywhere
So that I could take them and start using them – are they
formulated in a clear-cut way
29
Set of indicators and criteria for prevention
Pic. 4
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30
Jasmina Karba: I think so, yes, I think that they are formally
did in a very clear way, so they are really meant to be
taken, not first to have to study millions of tons of documents
and of theory and of good practice, and of best available
techniques, and I don’t know what, but indicators and
criteria are really meant to sit down, think, take them and to
do the self-evaluation, and to identify really the shortcomings,
and the state of progress.
The Finnish Inspection System.
Results from Seveso Inspections in Finland
and Other European Countries
Päivi Rantakoski, Director of Industrial Plants Surveillance
Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes) (Finland)
Mr Chairman, dear colleagues, good morning, everybody.
My name is Päivi Rantakoski, and I come from Finland,
the neighboring country of Russia. I represent the Finnish
Safety and Chemicals Agency. This presentation I am going
to present has been prepared by myself and my colleague
Kirsi Levä.
The Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency, Tukes as we call
it, is a national safety and chemicals surveillance authority in
Finland. Tukes promotes safety, of course by surveillance,
but also by means of communication, and research and development.
Tukes is located in Helsinki, the capital of Finland, but also
in Tampere and in quite north – Rovaniemi. And the number
of personnel is about 200.
Tukes operates in many different areas: in product safety,
in the safety of installation and service, and in the safety
of industrial plants. Today I’ll focus on chemical plants and
explosives factories and storage facilities.
Here you can see the map of Finland and the location of
the largest chemical plants in Finland. Many of them are on
the coast line – for instance, big storage facilities. But they
are all over Finland, most of them in Southern and Western
Finland.
A few words of the surveillance of chemical plants. Big
chemical plants – they need, they require a permit for use
or store of chemicals or explosives. That license is granted by
Tukes, our organization. And after granting the license, Tukes
will undertake a commissioning inspection before the startup
of operations. And after that we conduct the periodical
inspections, the frequency of these inspections depends on
the scale of industrial activities are, the amount of chemicals.
We might have a periodical inspection annually; we might
have it every third year, or every fifth year.
The terms I am here using of establishments: we call them
establishments which require a special safety report, or they
might have to demonstrate their major accident prevention
policy – they come out of the EU’s so-called Seveso Directive
which target is to prevent major accident. Finland follows the
EU legislation, and it is a basis to our national legislation as
well. There are about one thousand chemical plants in total
which are under Tukes surveillance. Also Finland has over
2000 km of natural gas pipelines; this natural gas comes
from Russia to Finland. And also we have some 50 mines
– they are both underground and open mines. And as you
know, the price of metals has been very high, so there has
been a lot of activity in this sector.
Here you will see the inspection agenda which our inspectors
are using when they conduct these periodical inspections
to sites. (Pic. 1) It is very important how the companies meet
Pic. 1
Pic. 2
Pic. 3
Pic. 4
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Pic. 5
Pic. 6
Pic. 7
the technical requirements, but also it is important to know
how their safety management system is working, and we
want to know their risk assessment procedures as well. At
first we sit in the office of a company, and have a look to
their records and papers, and documents, instructions, etc.
But it is also very important to have a look to the site, that’s
why we always have in the end of the inspection an on-site
tour, toreally see how everything is working in practice. Alao,
we very often interview workers on site, that we really know
what we have been told to us before the site tour, that is it
really working in practice We have found out these interviews
very useful.
During these inspections or afterwards,Tukes evaluates
the activities, the procedures of a site, and we give certain
grades from 0 to 5 to every company. Number 5 means that
that company has very good practices, we have nothing to
say, we just encourage them to continue. Then, on the other
hand, 0 means that that company has serious deficiencies,
and immediate actions are required.
These grades, they tell about the safety level in generally,
in Finland, but also the safety level in every single company.
They are sort of safety indicators for us, because it is very
important for us, as safety authorities, to know the safety
level in our country. These grades, these evaluates, affect
to the frequency of inspections. If a company gets good
results, we can decrease the frequency of inspections. This is
very important also because of the limited resources of the
authority. We have so-called risk-based approach.
Then some results from our inspections. Tukes has set
safety targets together with our Ministry, the Government,
for these safety indicators. Significant deficiencies should not
be, the number of establishments which have thesesignificant
deficiencies should be under 10% of all these establishments.
And this figure shows the number of this kind ofsignificant
deficiencies; our inspectors have found them in less than 5%
of establishments, so we can say that we have achieved this
target, at least in 2010.
And we have found out that good risk management is
essential, that’s why we pay a special attention to it. In this
figure you can see how many of establishments are over the
target. (Pic. 2). At least 40% of sites should have good risk
management. And it is our target, of course, that they all
should have good risk management.
Ok, and here you can see the average grade versus scale
of operation (Pic. 3). And, as you can see, the grades are
best in the largest companies, which is a good thing, because,
of course, safety results should be best in those companies
which have also biggest risks. So, I am very pleased
with these numbers.
And here you can see some numbers of accidents in process
industry. (Pic. 4). The good news is that number of
accidents is decreasing.
We very often ask and get feedback from operators, because
we also want to improve our own practices. And the
operators have told us that the Tukes’s inspections are effective,
and we have good co-operation between companies
and our organization, but, of course, there are suggestions
to improveour inspections as well. One thing is that operators
are very often waiting that we would have more detailed
inspection agenda, that they could prepare in a better way to
our inspections, and also have right experts present at inspections.
And also we have feedback that the responsibilities of
different authorities – because there are many authorities, I
suppose in other countries too – that the responsibilities are
not always clear, and also operators are looking forward for
joint inspections, that they should take place more often –
it happens, but perhaps we should have them more often.
Companies prefer having the same inspector; they don’t like
that there’s every time a different inspector, because they
sort of feel they have to teach a new inspector what is happening
on site.
Ok, this was what we do on our national level, but because
we want to learn more, Tukes has carried out a comparative
study within EU, because we wanted to know if the
safety level of Finnish industry, or how is the safety level of
Finnish industry, compared to other European countries.
The assumption was that process safety level of Finnish
establishments is quite good, but we are not among the best
in Europe, and we would like to be, of course. We thought
that it would be useful to collect data to know what are the
reasons to the difference. We wanted to learn from other
countries and other industries. That’s why we carried out an
international survey; we asked some companies, some Finnish
companies or international companies, which have sites
in Finland and in other European countries. And there were
volunteers, many companies were very interested to take part
in our survey, because we said that we are not criticizing, but
we are to learn and to know the reasons for different kind
of safety results.
The first company – I just call it here the Company A
(afterwards, when this study is complete, all the companies
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32
have said that we can mention their names), but it was the
chemical company which had sites in Finland, in the Netherlands
and in Germany as well. And in this case it happened
that the best results came from the company in the Netherlands,
especially they had good practices in risk assessment.
But none of these companies had bad results; they were all
very well working companies. But we realized that we have a
lot to learn about the risk management system in the Netherlands.
(Pic. 5).
Then we have another company which is working in gas
industry, and it had establishments in Finland, Sweden and
Norway. And in this time we found out very good practices
in Norway, especially in competence and training, and emergency
preparedness. (Pic. 6).
The operated in the field of explosives. And in this time
we found out very good result in Finnish side. (Pic. 7).
So, the study is not yet completed, but some observations
have already been made with things that are behind these
results: first of all, the personnel commitment, especially
management commitment to safety is very important. And
also we found out that previous owners affect the procedure
on site: both good and poor practices remain after the
change of owner. And, of course, the age of a plant has its
effects.
What is difficult to analyze is national working cultures
– of course, they are behind these results, but I don’t have
one single answer why there’s differences in these national
working cultures. I think it is a big question.
But because we were seeking for good practices, we
wanted to learn something and to give recommendations in
our own country. And we wanted to have an answer to the
question if the safety is on good level in Finland. And the
answer was that the process safety level is on the average
level compared to other European countries, so we have a lot
to do to be on the top of the safety level in Europe.
And there are differences, even if the sites have the same
company requirements and safety management system –
the history of the sites has a long-lasting effect. But I think
this is an important thing to be aware of: nothing changes
just by giving instructions – you need a time to implement
your instructions.
And also the procedures of authorities have an effect: we
found out that there’s a need to emphasize process risk management
– that means hazard identification and risk assessment.
We, as an authority, have to produce good guidelines
and define the requirements more precisely.
And, as already mentioned in previous presentations, indicators
are very important – indicators on national level, but
alsocompanies’ own safety indicators are very important.
This is what I planned to share today. Perhaps, when this
study has been completed, I can tell more results of this
study. But now – thank you for your attention.
A.V. Moskalenko: Before we answer your questions, dear
colleagues, I would like to emphasize the words said by the
presenter – her recommendations every company to work
out their own criteria regarding safety. It is what we are
telling everyone at every forum, at every venue: you should
not wait for the state authorities to dictate some kind of
acceptable safety levels, establish them at your own companies.
Your questions, please. Ivan Grigorievich, please, take a
microphone! The microphone, please.
Question from the audience: I got a question. You’ve
been talking a lot about high level of industrial safety. In Russia
we have established by Law 223 so-called acceptable risk
threshold.Do you have any acceptable threshold or tolerable
risk in Finland – for example, in developing your declaration.
Päivi Rantakoski: Sorry, are you talking about quantitive
risk analysis and the criteria within
Question from the audience: Yes, because the basis for
industrial safety is the analysis of risk, and the risk should be
measured by some figures in quantity. We use individual, collective,
social, regional and other risks. Do you have anything
of the kind established in Finland
Päivi Rantakoski: No, we don’t have that system. I know
that the Netherlands have the system like that. And we have
been learning. But do not have numeric criteria, not yet.
Question from the audience: Tell me then what is the
main indicator of the industrial safety level – only the criteria
Päivi Rantakoski: If we are talking on national level, it is
the number of accidents, and the evaluations made by us,
the procedures by companies.
Vision Zero.
Safe Mining: Strategies and Tools
Helmut Ehnes
Secretary-General, International Section of the ISSA
on Prevention in the Mining Industry (ISSA Mining)
Director Prevention, BG RCI (Germany)
Yes, good morning, Mr Chairman. Good morning, ladies
and gentlemen.
Thank you very much for inviting me for the first time
to this symposium. And, maybe, I would like to introduce
myself briefly – I am an engineer, I come from the south
of Germany, Bavaria, and I work in Germany for the social
accident insurance for mining and chemical industry. We
insure 1,4 million workers against accidents and diseases in
35,000 enterprises. And my second task is Secretary-General
of ISSA Mining. ISSA is the International Social Security
association in Geneva, and ISSA has 11 sections for prevention,
one for mining and one for chemical industry as well.
So, I would like to talk about safety in mining and about
some strategies and tools to you. And first of all, I would
like to show you some pictures of mining activities.
I think all of us know that mining is substantial. (Pic. 1).
And nowadays mining is high technology. (Pic. 2).
Inspiring. (Pic. 3).
I think mining is a great business. (Pic. 4).
Sometimes mining can be positive ecological factor – if
you see, after you use a quarry, what species you will find
in these sites.
Mining is innovative, as has always been.
Great, impressive.
Teamwork, very important.
Ambitious.
And I think mining is sometimes beautiful.
But mining does not have only those positive faces, there
are others.
Changes landscapes.
Still very hard work.
Pic. 1
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Pic. 2 Pic. 3
33
Sometime mining destroys if you think to child labor and
this kind of questions.
Therefore mining means sometimes not a very good image.
We know from our statistics – mining hurts people,
causes pain, makes sick, and kills.
So, lets’s talk about safety, and health of course.
Every year we have all over the world 1.95 Million of
work-related fatal diseases – this is a calculation done by
the ILO in Geneva.
We have more than 330 Million accidents at work worldwide
– small accidents and serious accidents worldwide.
About 360 thousandpeople die of fatal accidents at
work.
And it’s not only what work does to people, it’s also an
economical factor. We lose every year about 4% of the
worldwide economic product.
And the bad news for mining activity – we estimate that
the fatality rate of miners is
8 times higher than on average in the whole industry.
So, what to do Shall we accept these figures as statistical
data I am sure you won’t agree to that.
And therefore I think we need a strategy.
And I would like to talk a little bit about Vision Zero
strategy.
What is the story of Vision Zero Maybe, you heard
about this.
It started in the year 1811 whenin the powder mills of Mr
du Pont several severe explosions happened in the United
States. And he did 3 things: he made his managers responsible
– they had to live near to the production site; he defined
safety rules; and he improved, of course, technology.
Then we had about 200 years, and in 1990s the Vision
Zero philosophy had been used in Scandinavia with respect
to road safety, and then it came to The Netherlands, Switzerland,
United Kingdom and Germany as well, and other
countries. And we focus with this strategy not only on road
safety, but work safety as well.
So, the Vision Zero is a prevention strategy for a safe
future without fatal andwithout serious occupational diseases,
and accidents and traffic accidents. It does not mean
no accident at all, but no fatal and no serious accidents.
And I think we have to concentrate on thefatal and serious
accidents.
If we try to adopt the Vision Zero strategies, we take 4
fields of action.
First of all, we look at the technology, we look at the
surrounding – at the workplace, at the people, or at the
rules or legislation. Let me give you 3 short examples what
I mean by that.
If we look to accidents by explosives, or blasting safety,
we had serious improvement by better technology – we have
safe detonators, we have a substitute of gunpowder we used
in previous times and so on. These are only examples, several
measures we took. If we look to the workplace we improved
the quarry design, we used information technology to measure
the boreholes before we do the blasting work and, and,
and… We educate blasting experts – very important, we use
modern technology for that – for example, computer-aided
training, and we have strict rules how to carry out the blasting
work. And these led in Germany to the situation that we
have more or less no blasting accidents in the industry.
Another example is prevention of silicosis. I think you
know that we have technology of wet processing, wet
drilling, we had a look at ventilation, at road spraying, at
cleanliness on the work sites, we use personal protective
equipment, we carry out medical examinations, and we
have clear threshold values what is allowed, what level of
quartz dust in the air.
And the last example is if we have a look at heavy duty
trucks. Meanwhile they all have, or should have, rear-view
cameras to have a look at blind spots of these large machines,
we have safetybelts inside, we have ROPS and FOPS
technology, we have good road maintenance, we train the
drivers, carry out campaigns, and we have, of course, standards
– CEN Standards or the European Machinery Directive
as an example.
So, it is possible to calculate and to keep the risks.
What I would like to ask you… Sometimes, if I talk to
experts, they say to me: “Mining without serious accidents
– this is an illusion”. Or is it a vision for all of us
In my eyes it’s simple to carry out work safely, even in
mining activities. And you only have to do one thing – you
have to follow these rules, 7 golden rules. If you really follow
them, you will be successful.
Rule number one is Management. All the CEOs, all the
managers have to take their responsibility, they have to take
the leadership, and not only right, nice statements in the
newspapers – they have to do it.
Number 2 – I think we heard already several time this
morning – you have to identify the hazardsand the risks. If
you don’t knowwhere the main risks are in your installation,
how can you act
Three: only if you know what is the situation, you can set
your own safetyand health targets.
Number four is good organization of the company, of
safety and health inside the company – so, ensure a safe system
(and of course, I mean safety management system, which
should be an integrated system and not an extra system).
Number five is safe and healthy technology, but, of
course, we all know we cannot change the whole technology
every year or every two years, and sometimes we have to
work with the existing technology. So, that’s a question –
what can we accept and what not
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Pic. 4 Pic. 5
And therefore number six is people. I would recommend
invest in the qualification of your miners, of your workers
in the company on every level.
And number seven – people again – you should motivate
them, integrate them. When you take decisions, you
should talk to them, because normally the people at the
workplace know best what is the risk and they have the
ideas what should be changed.
If you follow these recommendations, I think you will be
successful. And now I give you some examples what could
be the result.
This is a graph of the German Hard Coal Mining Company
which employs nowadays about 30,000 employees. And
you see in the 60s they had more than 400 fatal accidents
in all the mines in Germany. And then they improved step
by step, and in the year 2010 they had zero fatal accident.
And the yellow line is the accidents per one million working
hours, and you see this figure is decreasing remarkably as
well. (Pic. 4).
Second example is the company of Rigips. And what I
want to tell you by this chart is – you see where the yellow
line starts, they started to install a safety management
system. And just talking about in a consequent matter with
all levels of management about safety brings you a benefit
– the accidents rate goes down, and after some years they
reached nearly zero line. (Pic. 5).
We made an examination, a study in Germany about
companies who have a certified safety management system,
and we found out that the companies who have our
Safety Seal – we have offer such an audit to our member
companies – they are about 56% better than others who
don’t have it.
This is a result of a new study carried out by universities
and the company called Value Group, and they analyzed the
value of companies who clearly proved that they invest in
their people – education, training – that they spend money
for that. And they found out that the value of the shares is
about 40% better if you invest in safety and if you invest in
people. So, safety pays, and does not cost money as people
think very often.
In an international study carried out by the ISSA they
defined the return on prevention, so-called ROP index. And
this study has been carried out in many countries, and the
average is if you invest one dollar, or one ruble, you will get
back about 2.2 ruble.
At the end of this presentation let me just briefly tell
you a little bit what is ISSA Mining, I would like to use this
possibility.
I think you’ve heard we care of safety and health in mining,
we are an independent and international organization,
a non- profit organization, worldwide active for all kind of
mining industries.
Our aims – I think I can go briefly through – we want
to protect miners, we want to support employers and managers,
improve social security, care for good working standards
in mining activities, influence the politics.
And so we deal with all of these sectors- with management
systems, with dust reduction, health systems, risk assessment,
and so on.
We publish some recommendations.
We try to build a global network to bring all the people
interested in health and safety together.
Of course, we have a website / the address here.
We publish regular newsletters.
We carry out safety audits. We send then, if a company
or industry wishes, we send an international team and make
an audit of the mine
And this shows that we have such a project currently
with a Turkish hard coal mine enterprise.
Of course, we organize conferences in different places
of the world.
And one of our recent activities was that we brought together
within industry producer experts who can talk about
mine rescue.
And we analyzed from 11 different mines what strategy
they use in their mine.
We had a look at the mine rescue system, at the fire protection
system, at self-rescue of the miners, and we made
comparisons, and we will publish them briefly.
So, why don´t you cooperate with us I would like to
invite you
Thank you very much for listening.
A.V. Moskalenko: Your questions, if any, please. I can
see Mr Potrashkov.
Question from the audience: Sergey Potrashkov, Moscow.
First of all, I liked your presentation very much. And
the second, you have a site, but do you have a site in Russian,
and do you have a representative office in Russia
Helmut Ehnes: No, we don’t have yet a site in Russian
language, not yet. And we have some contacts, but we don’t
have an office here or representative, but, maybe, and I hope
in future, maybe, we get such contacts for that.
A.V. Moskalenko: This question will be the final questions,
please.
Question from the audience: Thank you for your presentation,
Mahmudov, Moscow. Please, tell me this strategy
– Zero Vision – it goes counter the acceptable risk strategy.
Which strategy will win – Zero strategy or acceptable risk
strategy
Helmut Ehnes: The Zero strategy will win. I think to talk
about acceptable risk strategy – can you really tell every
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
tenth miner: “You will be hurt seriously when you work, or
you will get a disease” I think you have to look, if you talk
about acceptable risk, to special items – for example, we
need threshold values about CO2 and quartz content in the
dust or something like that, – this I can agree. And acceptable
risk must be on the level that nobody gets silicosis –
this is what I understand under acceptable risk
A.V. Moskalenko: Ok, thank you very much for your
presentation, Helmut. What I liked in Helmut’s presentation
is ROPS/FOPS method. Sounded great, but I did not quite
understand, but I will ask him.
Specifics of the State Technical Supervision
in Ukraine after Re-organisation
of the State Service for Mining Supervision
and Industrial Safety
Stepan V. Dunas, Deputy Chairman
The State Service for Mining Supervision and Industrial
Safety (Ukraine)
Good afternoon to everybody! Dear Alexander Vasilievich,
dear ladies and gentlemen, colleagues,
First of all I want to convey the best wishes from Oleksandr
Khokhotva, the Chairman of the State Service for Mining
Supervision and Industrial Safety of Ukraine, to all participants
of the X th Jubilee Forum.
I represent here the state authority supervising safe industrial
operations and occupational safety and health, and
I want to emphasize that in Ukraine the right of any person
for safe and healthy working conditions is guaranteed by the
Constitution. In the end of 2010, after initiative of the President
of Ukraine, structural reforms were initiated, covering
all spheres of our social life, including executive authorities.
Measures have been taken for structural re-organization and
optimization of the central executive bodies in accordance
with the functional-sectoral approach. The main goal is to
eliminate overlapping of functions of the central power authorities
and to reduce their number. The exclusive powers to
initiate legislation are given to ministries.
The reform has been initiated in the State Service for Mining
Supervision and Industrial Safety of Ukraine (Gosgorpromnadzor)
as well. In accordance with the Service Regulations,
our activity is directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine via the Minister for Emergency Situations.
The state supervision is organized in accordance with the
territorial-sectoral approach. The main functions of Gosgorpromnadzor
of Ukraine are performed by territorial authorities.
Our State Service includes 26 regional agencies: 25 regional
agencies located in each regional center and the Mining
Administration of Krivoy Rog. (Pic. 2).
The structure of the Central Office staff functions is presented
in pic. 3).
The main tasks of Gosgorpromnadzor:
– implementation of the state policy in the spheres of
industrial safety, occupational safety and health, mining supervision,
subsoil protection, production safety in the sphere
of industrial explosives handling, as well as offering suggestions
on their formation;
- comprehensive management in the spheres of industrial
safety and occupational safety and health, and control
over state functions performance by ministries, other central
executive bodies, Council of Ministers of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea (ARC), local state administrations and
bodies of local self-government in the sphere of occupational
safety and health;
- organization and implementation of the state supervision
over compliance with laws and other statues and regulations
in the relevant spheres.
The main function is organization of the state supervision
over employers with regards to their compliance with the
legislation on occupational safety and health, and prevention
of accidents and workplace injuries. The supervision is
also implemented over the following hazardous facilities: oil
and gas and chemical industries, metallurgy and mining. In
order to prevent industrial accidents, the Service has the right
to audit companies, suspend production, impose penalties
and fines, make representations to the General Procurator’s
Office to institute criminal proceedings, and to initiate job
competence consideration with regard to officials.
We have got an additional function, quite new for us, –
market surveillance. It is a commitment of Ukraine towards
the UC for the creation of the free trade area. The main
target is to adapt the national market surveillance system to
the requirements of the WTO and EC (in particular, to the
European Directive 2001/95/EC (The General Product Safety
Directive (GPSD): Directive 2001/95/EC), eliminate technical
barriers on trade, and prevent unsafe and low-quality
products from market circulation. In this sphere we supervise
seven sectors: lifts, lifting devices, cable ways, explosives,
safety signs, etc. There has been a considerable progress in
this area. The following Laws of Ukraine were issued in December
2010: “On State Market Surveillance and Control over
Non-food Products” and “On Liability for Damages Caused
by Defective Goods”.
The main distinguishing feature of the new surveillance
system is in that goods are controlled not in the process of
their production, but directly on the market. As a result of
the audits, in case unsafe products are identified, the whole
chain from distributors back to producers will be controlled.
In case of a violation, the producer will have to withdraw all
unsafe goods from the market. It is assumed that the national
market surveillance system will be integrated into the
European one.
The research foundation for our activity is provided by the
National Research and Development Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health, which is in the structure of the Academy
of Sciences of Ukraine, and expert technical centers. The
primary objective of the expert technical centers’ activity is
to support the state technical supervision system; to perform
expert appraisals and hazardous facilities and design documentation;
to organize training in the sphere of occupational
safety and health; to participate in accidents investigations;
etc. Legislative changes, on-going reforms in Ukraine, require
an adequate quick reaction. Latest developments in legislation
– in particular, introduction of the above-mentioned
market surveillance, – make the expert technical centers revise
their strategic plans and obtain the status of the correspondence
appraisal authority, going beyond the limits of
Gosgorpromnadzor’s sphere of responsibility. Elaboration of
a new concept of expert centers development and control
mechanisms over their activity has been already initiated. I
want to add that non-governmental expert organizations will
also be included in the comprehensive system of the scientific
and technological support of the state supervision.
Pic. 1
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Pic. 2
One of Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities is integration
into European community, based on the Law of Ukraine on
the state program of adaptation of Ukrainian laws to the EC
legislation. Every year the Government of Ukraine approves
the list of priority measures to adapt Ukrainian laws to the EC
legislation. As the occupational health and safety issues are
considered to be among top priority spheres of the legislation
adaptation, we are gradually, in order of priority, developing
statues and regulations in the sphere of occupational health
and safe working conditions. Within the frames of the program
of economic reforms for 2010-2014 we’ve chosen a
new approach in order to simplify the licensing system and
technical regulations. What we mean is to replace punitive
measures with preventive one in order to improve business
climate in the country. Already now we are developing mechanisms
of notifying procedures in supervision over facilities
with low risks of accidents and injuries. A decision on whether
to free such legal entities from planned audits will be
taken based on their submitted declaration. Such approach
will reduce an administrative burden on business units, and
at the same rime it will increase responsibility of employers
for the situation with the occupational health and industrial
safety. The related laws have been already prepared and sent
to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. By now fines imposed
under administrative law have been increased by 8 times, and
criminal responsibility has been toughened. And provision is
made for responsibility of legal entities for violations in the
sphere of occupational health and industrial safety.
Besides, Gosgorpromnadzor takes significant measures in
the sphere of the legislation harmonization with the world
standards of human rights and freedoms, introduction of best
practices of the international community in occupational safety
and health and creation of safe and decent working conditions.
First of all, I mean ratification of conventions of the
International Labor Organization. In 2011 only Ukraine ratified
three conventions of the International Labor Organization: №
155 on occupational safety and health in industry; № 174 on
prevention of major industrial accidents; № 176 on safety and
health in mines. In total, Ukraine has ratified 61 conventions
of the International Labor Organization. After Ukraine ratified
ILO Convention of 1995 on safety and health in mines, it has
become one of 25 countries that have undertaken obligations
to pursue coordinated policy in the sphere of safe and healthy
working conditions in the mining industry.
Dear colleagues, the main indicator of our efficiency is still
the occurrence rate of industrial injuries. During the years of
Ukraine’s independence there has been a stable trend of reduction
in the number of industrial injuries. So, the total injury
rate reduced in 2011 by 12 times as compared with 1992. Last
year the fatal injury rate increased, but it happened against
the background of the GDP growth. The GDP grew by 20%,
while fatal injury rate increased by 6%. Nevertheless, according
to the ILO data, the fatal injury rate in Ukraine is still too
high. Calculated for 100 thousand of employees, this rate in
Ukraine is 2.5 times higher than in Germany, 2 times higher
than in the USA, and 1.3 times higher than in Italy. Therefore,
we pay a considerable attention to injury prevention. As decided
by the Government, for the last two years within the
frames of prevention activity we have been organizing the
All-Ukrainian children drawing contest “Occupational Safety
through the Eyes of Children” on the national level – you can
see one of the drawings in this slide.
The main goal of such event is to promote elements of
a new culture in common attitude to personal safety and
safety of people around us. Today they are our children,
tomorrow they will be students, day after tomorrow they
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Pic. 3
will be production managers, and we think that when they
come to work, they will organize technological processes in
totally different way, first of all from the point of view of
industrial safety.
As requested by our friends from Chile, I would like to
say some words about the situation in coal-mining industry
in more detail. This industry is one of the most injury-risk
sectors in Ukraine, with all the complexity of our mining
and geological conditions. Today the coal-mining industry of
Ukraine has the most worn-out mining constructions among
all the CIS countries. Every third mine is over 50 years old, and
coal beds are mined at the depth of over 1000 m. The physical
processes going on there have not yet been researched
by our scientists. And with all that, less than one third of the
mines were reconstructed. The industry employs 330 thousand
persons. Coal is mined in more than 370 mines of all
types of property ownership. According to our legislation,
such mines can be audited once a year. This is a comprehensive
audit. Besides, every three months we check especially
hazardous facilities, and all high-risk mines are distributed
among inspectors in the following proportion: one inspector
is responsible for 3 operated major mines, 5-6 non-operated
ones. The total injury rate in this industry reduced in 2011 by
10 times as compared with 1992, and fatal injury rate – by 3
times. If in 1992 46.6 thousand miners were injured and 445
miners died, in 2011 the respective figures were 4255 and
161. But we can’t but mention that during those years the
coal output had reduced dramatically from 134 million tons
to 82 million tons. In 1990 3 miners died for each one million
tons of coal output, and in 2011 – 2. Only Ukraine, among
all coal-mining countries, takes into account deaths of miners
employed underground that resulted from cardiovascular
diseases. And this indicator is year over year on the level of
15-25% of all fatal cases.
Our society is near the point of understanding that it is
necessary to reform our coal-mining industry and transfer
mines into private ownership. The concept of the coal-mining
industry reform till the end of 2012 provides for the privatization
of mines or granting mining concessions for their
operation. The president signed the corresponding Law in
May this year. I want to mention that injury rates at private
mines are almost two times lower than at state-owned ones.
The analysis of industrial injury rates has shown than year
over year the reasons for their high level at the majority of
coal-mining companies are still the following:
- absence of advanced technologies in mines where coal
beds are mined at the depth of over 1000 m, especially complicated
by exceeding the design stope loads, while our scientists
have not yet investigated the geophysical processes
going on there;
- low efficiency of production and occupational safety
management systems at mines;
- low level of training of experts and managers;
- unsatisfactory level of production and workplace discipline
among employees;
- low production culture, absence of due control by engineers
and technicians over the activity compliance with charts
of supports and technological mining orders in accordance
with the regulatory documents in the sphere of industrial
safety.
The Government approved the program to improve the
situation with occupational safety and health at coal-mining
companies in May last year. One of items of this program
provides for the implementation of universal telecommunication
automated systems of dispatching and optimization of
operation of mining machinery and technological processes.
It is so-call “UTAS system”. By now this system has been installed
and is in operation at 29 mines of Donetsk, Lugansk
and Lvov Regions, and at 7 of them the UTAS system was
installed with full operational functions, including possibility
to switch off energy equipment without involvement of an
operator or dispatcher when firedamp threshold concentrations
are exceeded. The respective information is transferred
to the Safety Center of Gosgorpromnadzor of Ukraine. This
year 220 million hryvnias (about 1 billion rubles) has been allocated
for installation of such systems, 30 million hryvnias
has been allocated for the Safety Center arrangements and 3
million hryvnias – for inspectors’ training.
In September last year, with support from the Government
of the USA, a training center was opened in Lugansk to train
mining technology inspectors, and a center for UTAS system
theoretical and practical training was opened in Donetsk.
Dear colleagues, all those present in this hall! Dear ladies
and gentlemen! I want to use this opportunity to invite you
to take part in the 5th International Conference on Industrial
Safety and Occupational Safety and Health that is held on
08-12 October in Yalta. Welcome and thank you for your
attention.
I.G. Yankovsky: As I’ve understood from your report, in
Ukraine there is one law on industrial safety and occupational
safety and health, not two different laws like in Russia, is
it so
S.V. Dunas: Now our main law is that on occupational
safety and health (Protection of Labor Law). We’ve presented
the draft law on industrial safety to the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine, for the third time already, but is has not yet
been approved. But we hope the law will be approved and
enacted soon.
I.G. Yankovsky: Then the second question: In Russia, after
we signed the UN Convention in the sphere of industrial
safety, we were obliged to enact a Law on Industrial Safety
in 1997. How did it happen that you also signed the Convention,
but you still do not have such law
S.V. Dunas: According to the ILO rules, the Convention
will be ratified in one year, after it has been signed by the
General Secretary, so we still have time to pass this law. The
problem is not with us. The law has been developed. Now it
is the problem of law-makers.
V.A. Tarasov, “Saratovneftegaz”: If it is not a state
secret, could you tell how many people work in your supervisory
agency in total in Ukraine And what is the salary of an
inspector, taking into account additional functions of market
surveillance
S.V. Dunas: Our headcount was 2900 persons, however,
one of the latest reforms provided for its reduction by 30%.
We had to dismiss about 700 inspectors. It resulted in increase
in the number of injuries, especially in coal-mining industry.
The Government heard our complaints and increased
our head count. So, the final reduction in headcount was only
by 10%. Now we have 2500 employees. Salary levels are different
for so-called “mining inspectors” who supervise mines
and for other “ordinary” inspectors. A novice inspector has a
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salary of 2000 hryvnias, and an inspector supervising mines –
twice as much. The compensation package also includes salary
increments, long service pay and bonuses. Salaries can
differ depending on the personal contribution.
Ensuring Industrial Safety
and Safe Transportation of Hazardous
Materials in the Republic of Belarus
Alexander N. Kudryashov
The State Service for Mining Supervision and Industrial
Safety (Ukraine)
Dear ladies and gentlemen, Forum participants,
First of all, I want to express my gratitude to our dear
Alexander Vasilievich for his invitation to participate in such
an important international event. It is vital for us, as we are
also being integrated in the common safety system.
Let me make you acquainted with the organization of
industrial safety and safe transportation of dangerous goods
in the Republic of Belarus.
In the beginning of my report I consider it necessary to
inform you about the current legislative basis for the state
regulation in the sphere of industrial safety in the Republic
of Belarus.
The Law of Belarus “On Industrial Safety of Hazardous
Production Facilities” stipulates that state supervision in the
sphere of industrial safety is implemented by the Republic’s
state authority in compliance with procedures defined by the
body authorized by the President of the Republic of Belarus.
The Decree of the President of the Belarus Republic “On
State Regulation in the Sphere of Industrial Safety” stipulates
that the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus defines
the state policy and regulation procedures for the state
regulation in the sphere of industrial safety.
The Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Belarus
Republic “On Some Issues Relating to Execution of the State
Supervision in the Sphere of Industrial Safety and Safe Transportation
of Dangerous Goods” stipulates that the industrial
supervision is to be executed by the Industrial Work Safety
Supervision Department of EMERCOM of Belarus (Gospromnadzor).
At present, state policy in the sphere of industrial safety is
implemented in the following areas of activity:
- safety at companies of chemical industry and of grain
processing;
- safety of mining and blasting operations, metallurgy and
utilization of ammunition;
- safe operation of pressure equipment and of thermal
electric power stations;
- safe transportation of dangerous goods;
- safe operation of gas supply systems and gas transmittal
pipelines;
- safe operation of lifting devices and amusement rides.
I will tell a bit more about amusement rides, as this sphere
of activity is new for us as well. I accordance with the Decree
of the President of the Republic of Belarus No. 253V of 21
May 2009, Gospromnadzor was empowered with supervision
over safe operation of amusement rides. The main underlying
reasons for such a decision were the following:
- location of amusement rides in crowded places;
- there were cases of amusement rides falling and destruction,
visitors’ injuries, including fatal accidents.
For the last two years Gospromnadzor has taken the following
steps to implement such supervision: technical norms
Pic. 1
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
and regulations have been developed for safe operation of
the amusement ride equipment, and the necessary amendments
have been introduced to the respective legislative acts.
The Resolution of the Ministry of Emergency Situations
No.39 approved “Regulations on the Use of Technical Installations
at Hazardous Industrial Facilities and Amusement Rides”
and introduced amendments to the “Instruction on Procedure
of Legal Knowledge Assessment in the Sphere of Industrial
Safety and Safe Transportation of Dangerous Goods”.
The Resolution of the Ministry of Emergency Situations
No.39 enacted “Regulations on the Safe Operation of Amusement
Rides”. A new standard was introduced, harmonized
with the European norms, – STB EN 13814-2008 “Amusement
Equipment Installed in Parks: Safety Requirements”.
A new department supervising safety operation of amusement
rides have been organized and staffed. State inspectors
and experts of Gospromnadzor structural divisions have been
trained or re-trained at skill development courses. Information
about amusement rides and operating legal units has
been collected, analyzed and summarized. Attraction rides
have been registered and provided with permits for operation.
Provisions have been made for annual technical inspections
before the start of seasonal activities. Technical diagnostics
has been organized and is held for amusements rides after
expiry of their service life defined by the manufacturers. Permits
and licenses for this type of activity have been issued to
operators. Planned and extraordinary audits are held.
Last year a new structure and staff schedule of Gospromnadzor
were finally developed and approved. In accordance
with this structure, Gospromnadzor includes seven territorial
agencies; six subdivisions by supervision types; licensing,
certification and permit administration; and technical service
structures. The total head count of Gospromnadzor is 568
persons, including 250 supervising inspectors, 84 experts,
and 16 persons in licensing departments. (Pic. 1).
Gospromnadzor, like all other controlling and supervisory
bodies of Belarus, operates in compliance with the Decree of
the President of the Belarus Republic No. 510 of 16 October
2009 “On Further Development of Control (Supervision) Activities
in the Republic of Belarus” that introduced a number
of principally new requirements to supervision organization
and implementation. (Pic. 2).
A list of governmental bodies and other organizations
empowered to perform control and supervision functions
was defined. The Decree established common planning and
implementation procedures for planned audits by all control
and supervision authorities. Based on the Decree requirements,
co-ordinated plans are now developed for control and
supervision activities in each of six regions of the Republic,
and a separate one for Minsk. The plans are published on
the official website of the State Control Committee. A principal
novelty of those plans is in that any planned audit of
any operator is allowed only once per year, simultaneously
by all control and supervision authorities that had applied
for it, and the total duration of such audit cannot exceed
30 days. At the same time inclusion of a planned audit into
the co-ordinated plan do not guarantee that it will be held.
A supervisory authority must in due time, at least 10 days
before the audit, inform about the audit start in writing. A
planned audit is only considered legitimate if performed in
accordance with a written audit order issued by me.
These novelties, of course, have made it more complicated
for Gospromnadzor to organize and perform audits. Now a
new statutory wording is being developed. We have made
our proposal that supervision should be excluded from the
scope of control activities. But it is still in the draft stage.
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Pic. 2
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40
number of incidents
The Decree had the aim to reduce the total number of
audits. And it actually happened. If before the Decree enactment
we had about 1000 audits annually, last year we had
only 4300 audits. All over the Republic of Belarus, over 12
thousand operators are subject to the state industrial supervision,
including over 150 thousand supervised facilities. Last
year the supervised operators had 21 accidents (32 in 2010),
9 persons died (15 in 2010) and 5 industrial incidents took
place. Four of the incidents were related to operation of lifting
devices, one – in mining. (Pic. 3).
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Pic. 3
Chart of the total number of incidents (2004-2011)
with railroad cisterns in correlation with their service life
Railroad cisterns service life
Pic. 4
Pic. 5
Analysis of accidents investigation results shows that their
main reasons are still the following:
- inefficient organization of safe operation at potentially
hazardous facilities;
- low level of production and workplace discipline;
- in some cases – non-fulfillment of production guidelines
and occupational safety instructions by the injured employees.
I would like to draw your attention to incidents registered
on the territory of the Republic of Belarus in the sphere of
dangerous goods transportation by railway. They are mainly
connected with leakage of light oils from railroad cisterns in
the outlet valve area. The incidents were timely detected by
railroad employees, and fuel was reloaded into other cisterns
in good operational condition.
Analysis of reasons for these incidents in correlation with
the service life of the cisterns showed that the majority of
incidents were with those that had been in operation for 25-
35 years, irrespective of their state ownership. (Pic. 4).
Last year, working under the Laws of the Republic of
Belarus “On Industrial Safety of Hazardous Production Facilities”,
“On Safe Transportation of Dangerous Goods”, “On
Transportation by Main Pipelines”, “On Gas Supply”, and to
the purpose of meeting the set objectives and concentrating
on the priority areas of activity, Gospromnadzor audited over
41 thousand supervised facilities, found out about 91 thousand
violations, suspended production in over 1000 cases,
and held over 1200 persons administratively liable.
Operating under the tough Decree provisions, Gospromnadzor
considerably increased activity in other areas, including
establishment of specially allocated industrial safety supervision
departments with the production control functions
in the structure of the operating legal units, reporting to their
chief engineers. Such departments regularly provide information
about their activity to Gospromnadzor, where is it summarized
for further development of new solutions to improve
situation in the sphere of industrial safety.
While executing supervision functions, much more attention
is paid to cooperation with other control and supervision
authorities concerned. Let us consider such cooperation, using
safe transportation of dangerous goods as an example.
It is obvious that a lot of participants are involved in controlling
road transportation of dangerous goods, all of them
having the aim to ensure transportation safety and accidents
prevention. Thus, safe road transportation is controlled by
inspectors of the State Automobile Inspectorate of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs (MIA) of the Republic of Belarus. Safe
routes for transportation of the most dangerous goods are
also agreed with this Inspectorate. “Beltekhosmotr” Company
reporting to the Ministry of Transport and Communications
performs state technical inspection of transportation units
and effects additional inspection of units used for transportation
of dangerous goods. Transport Inspection under the
Ministry of Transport and Communications performs weight
and dimensions control on roads and at customs stations.
Diagnostics organizations perform diagnostics of road tanks
after the end of their normative service life and test pressure
tanks integrity. Training centers perform training of personnel
for transportation of dangerous goods. Responsibilities
of consignors, carriers and consignees are regulated by the
Law of the Republic of Belarus “On Safe Transportation of
Dangerous Goods” and regulations related to production
control organization. The functions of Gospromnadzor, as it
has been already noted earlier, include organization of state
supervision in the form of audits, registration of transportation
units and issuing of registration cards.
As proved by our experience, licensing and permits in the
sphere of industrial safety are efficient instruments allowing
to keep industrial safety on the stable level. Documents
regulating this type of activities are approved on the level
of the head of the state and the Government. We have the
Presidential Decree “On Licensing of Certain Types of Activities”
that defined requirements to licensing of certain types

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
of activities by all ministries and governmental authorities. It
amended the list of activities in the sphere of industrial safety.
Licensing of transportation of dangerous goods, operation
of mobile jib cranes and some other activities were excluded,
but added was licensing of works involving the use of explosives,
designing of gas distribution and consumption systems
and boiler houses subject to supervision by Gospromnadzor.
One of our top priorities is further developments of the
legislative basis. We have good contacts with the Russian
Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan in this area. Now
we are closely working together on the development of technical
regulations. One of them – “On Safety of Pyrotechnical
Products” – has already been enacted; others are going to be
adopted within the next 7-8 months. In accordance with the
schedule of developing technical regulations of the Customs
Union, our Department is responsible for coordination of all
efforts in the development of regulations in the sphere of
industrial safety. I can’t but mention that the Regulation “On
Safety of Pyrotechnical Products” has already been approved
by the decision of the Customs Union Commission, and all
national norms have already been brought to conformity
with this regulation. Our Department has been authorized as
a certification body for such products. (Pic. 5).
We pay a considerable attention to training, re-training
and skill development of state inspectors and experts working
in the Department. Our Ministry has taken a decision
to start re-training of specialists in the specialized field of
“Industrial Safety” at the higher technological educational
institutions, qualifying them after re-training as “Engineer-
Inspector of Industrial Safety”.
The main limiting factor on the way to improvement of
industrial safety is insufficient methodological basis for the
procedures of qualitative analysis of threats. When declarations
of industrial safety are developed, they sometimes do
not meet the main objectives and do not solve the problems
to be addressed by such declarations: identification and qualitative
analysis of threats. We anticipate a lot of considerable
efforts in this area, which, maybe, should be taken in cooperation
with other countries.
We consider that strengthening of our international contacts
is one of the ways to improve the level of industrial
safety. Therefore, I want to stress how important it is to
continue organization of such meetings, contacts and joint
activities.
At the end of my report I would like to wish fruitful work
to the participants.
Thank you for your attention.
Question from the audience: According to regulatory
documentation in Russia and, as I know, in Belarus as well,
the normative service life of vessels for transportation of
liquid gases is 20 years. Do you have any methodology that
could allow extending this period and how do you determine
the residual life for such vessels
A.N. Kudryashov: We do have such methodology. As a
matter of fact, we can extend the service life not only for
tanks, but also for other equipment after diagnostics and
technical inspection. Well, it is more related to economic issues,
so if results of scientific research allow us to extend the
service life, we use this opportunity.
A.N. Isakov, GCE: Could you explain in more details one
issue for me Everything is clear with regard to technical
regulations, but what about technical codes of established
practices I can see in your slide that you have already adopted
15 of them. Very interesting: what kind of documents
are they And what are the criteria of established practices
A.N. Kudryashov: I want to say that the Law on Technical
Regulations has been enacted in our Republic, and it is
this law that defines the documents’ hierarchy. The top level
is Technical Regulation (TR). The next – Technical Code of
Established Practices (TKP), and finally – Standards of Belarus
(STB). And on the lower level there are safety rules and
regulations. As for technical codes of established practices,
two state executive bodies are authorized to submit them
for consideration and approval: Ministry of Architecture and
Construction (with regard to construction norms) and State
Committee for Standardization. But any entity can develop
them. Actually these TKP codes are similar to formerly used
SNiP regulations, but with elements of best practices.
Question from the audience: It is not a secret that for
many supervising bodies on the territory of Russia the main
indicator of their activity is the number of administrative
fines imposed, and they all report on this. I would like to
know if you have any regulations on imposing administrative
fines. I’ll clarify the question a bit. Does each single violation,
irrespective of whether it is considerable or not, serious or
not, entails the administrative fine imposed
A.N. Kudryashov: We can split your question into several
parts. Last year we had an explosion at a wood-processing
complex in Pinsk, and 14 persons died there. A respective
Government Decree was adopted after this incident, and
control over violations was strengthened. It has been officially
considered lately that we issue too many administrative
orders, as it has been the position of the Security Council.
Now this position is being re-considered. As a result of an
audit, we make up an act, and then this act is duplicated in
a notice or administrative order. And the main idea is the
following: if there is a violation, it means that there is an
official who must bear responsibility for it. But there are no
control figures for the number of administrative fines. Last
year we imposed 120 administrative fines. If we relate it to
250 inspectors, you can calculate yourself how many fined
were imposed on average by each of them. It’s not a high
figure.
Valentina Gruzdova, “Pinkelton-Glass”, Moscow: I
would like to know whether international risk assessment
standards, like OHSAS180001 and ecology ISO 14000-1, are
being introduced in Belarus and to which extent companies
are interested in such developments.
A.N. Kudryashov: We have to admit we lag behind in this
issue. Legislators have supported this position officially, but
we do not have necessary methodology and organizations to
perform such assessments. It is also one of top priorities for
our department.
A.V. Moskalenko: You described supervision over attraction
rides as novelty. If I’m not mistaken, Azerbaijan was a
pioneer in this sphere, about five years ago. And a question:
how do you define an attraction ride Swings in the yard –
are they actually attraction rides
A.N. Kudryashov: Only those installations that use mechanical
power can be classified as attraction rides.
Reliability Analysis and RBI
(Risk-based Inspection) Planning
for Petrochemical Industry
Dr. Andrzej Kozak, Manager, Division of Technological
Safety
Office of Technical Inspection (Poland)
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, dear ladies and gentlemen!
My presentation is dedicated to the reliability analysis and
planning of inspections in petrochemical industry.
And one question for the beginning: in which area of this
facility will an accident take place (Pic. 1).
No, it is not a concise prophecy course. This is just a result
of a reliability analysis. All that matters is the place and time
of a possible accident.
My dear friends, safety experts! I would like to share with
you our experience of inspections based on risk analysis.
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There are two possible approaches: quantitative and
semi-quantitative analysis, and an inspection based on risk
analysis.
What is the cost of the traditional approach Let us assume
we had an inspection of an isomerization reactor at
a petrochemical plant. It took them one week to free the
reactor from the catalytic agent. At the same time one day
was spent for inspection of hydrostatic pressure testing. One
more week was spent for drying and deoxidization of the
reactor inner zone. One more week – for the reactor loading
and start-up. As a result, they had three weeks of idle time.
So, an inspector’s visit is worse than a strike! Very expensive
equipment is idle. What for
I’ll tell you a bit about our approach. First: it is necessary to
determine which protective barriers exist. (Pic. 2).
We, as a technical supervision authority, are dealing only
with accidents prevention. If we want to develop application
of inspections based on risk analysis, it is necessary first
to systematize those protective barriers and understand how
Pic. 1
Pic. 2
Sphere
of process
management
Sphere
of process
shutoff
Safety
sphere
Sphere
of active
protection
Sphere
of active
protection
Area
of response
to threats
Pic. 3 Pic. 4
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
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Pic. 5
Pic. 6
Pic. 7
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Pic. 8
Pic. 9
44
Pic. 10
Pic. 11
much costs can be reduced, if the inspection is moved to the
lower barrier. And we will find out that every next barrier is
more expensive by a factor of ten. (Pic. 3).
And what is the price of the “catastrophe detonator” I am
considering only three major accidents from those that have
occurred lately all over the world. (Pic. 4).
Explosion at the Buncefield fuel tanks farm in 2005 because
of petrol leakage from tanks. I think the price of “detonator”
was about 500 pounds and losses amounted to 6
billion pounds. Texas Refinery – maybe, up to 10 thousand
dollars, but losses amounted to 20 billion. So, we should look
at detonators first of all. Any risk is a probability multiplied
by consequences.
You can see a functional flowgraph of a reliability analysis.
(Pic. 5).
Here we consider internal factors, such as corrosion, erosion
and other destructive factors, and external factors as
well: vibration, thermal expansion, influence of other equipment.
We also can work out a risk rating.
But if we look at the flowgraph of an inspection based
on risk analysis, the unknown factor for us will be incident
probability. (Pic. 6).
And here is risk matrix. (Pic. 7).
You should be careful here. The automation reduces risk
probability, but does not reduce the scope of consequences.
When automated is too sophisticated, consequences can be
as serious as without it, or even more disastrous.
Now, an example. Here you can see boiler A. (Pic. 8).
It is a small boiler that can be used for heating of a small
settlement (about 1000 –1500 dwellers) or a small hospital.
And another boiler, a bit bigger, type B, with the power of
28 MWt that be used for heating in a town of 7–10 thousand
citizens. (Pic. 9).
Here is a reliability block scheme for those boilers. Here
we can see a fire chamber, power block, and a pressure
vessel. But this is a complex scheme, and technical data for
some of its components can be missing. We can simplify
it. Let us assume that we have three main groups: a grate,
waterwall tubes and water chambers. We obtain failure statistics
for these groups. And we can see that for the grate
the probability of failure follows a Weibull-2P distribution.
For tubes it follows a standard Gaussian distribution. For
water chambers – also a Weibull distribution. And we won’t
further look at lower levels – pumps, engines, safety systems.
We consider only a grate, waterwall tubes and water
chambers.
Now the reliability diagrams for grates of boilers A and B
look similar. (Pic. 10).
For tubes they also look similar. (Pic. 11).
But it is not so for water chambers. (Pic. 12).
Something happened here.
Now, if we add up those 3 diagrams, we get the reliability
diagram for boilers A and B. (Pic. 13).
We can see that reliability of the boiler B starts to drop
dramatically after 12 years of operation.
How can you do it with a semi-quantitative analysis I
want to show you a working sheet from the risk analysis.
(Pic. 14).
It’s a water chamber. We consider erosion, corrosion, material
fatigue and accident probability.
Working with such sheets, we can understand how often
the boilers should be checked. And here is a risk rating:
(Pic. 15).
Erosion – water chamber – annual degradation factor
0.2 mm – low risk category. What shall we do To measure
metal thickness every half a year. But in the third line there
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Pic. 12
Pic. 13
Pic. 14
Pic. 15
is cavitation, very high risk, and we should replace an inlet
control valve.
Thank you for your attention. You know, bridges connect
two riversides with each other. But people also connect them.
Especially as in Warsaw and Saint Petersburg we have bridges
built after designs of the same person, engineer Kierbedz.
Thank you.
Question from the audience: As I understand, what you
have described is an original development. To which extent
has it been approved by the state authorities
Andrzej Kozak: Our laws stipulate the traditional approach
– it means water pressure testing for all pressure
vessels. But there are “small gates” that can be used to bring
in this system. We should understand that this approach is
cheaper, but it is not very simple. You should have a lot of
statistical data.
A.V. Moskalenko: In other words, Mr. Kozak is in a very
good position. He can not only develop the methodology, but
also make it implemented.
Samat Murgalinov, National Research-Technical Center
of EMERCOM of the Republic of Kazakhstan: As I’ve
understood, your methodology implies an expert appraisal of
deterministic probability. This methodology is implemented
by experts, people whom you trust to make such an expert
appraisal. Do you have any qualifying requirement to such
experts
Andrzej Kozak: According to law, of course, no, but there
are some according to our internal documentation. So far
we have had 20 experts. It is not so easy to train such an
expert.
A.V. Moskalenko: On my part, I want to comment that
we got acquainted with our Polish colleagues in the period
when they were restructuring their activity from the old system
to European standards. Certainly, it was very difficult,
and I remember Mr. Yanek reporting on those problems. And
now they have different control principles as a basis of their
work. It is a combination of the best practices of the past
with the new approaches of the present. When we ask Polish
colleagues: “Do you have a respective law”, usually the answer
is no. There is understanding and strong belief that this
particular method is good. If they can prove it to themselves
first of all, they use this method.
Valery Polyanovsky, Nikolaev, Ukraine: You’ve just told
that you need to have a lot of statistics for probability determination.
Please, tell us, do you have in Poland any unified
statistical data, open to everybody
Andrzej Kozak: For some cases, simple ones, – yes, there
is. But what I’ve shown you for two boilers are our own
data. Some plants have such data sometimes. They have a
failure register and some other data. Certainly, you may lack
the complete data, but some combination of quantitative and
semi-quantitative data can be useful.
A.V. Moskalenko: The issue of statistics is vital. Those
who regularly participate in our events know that I raise this
issue every year. There are a lot of data bases, even in the
EC. Practically any organization, be it public or expert, has
their own database. And, as a rule, it is not complete enough.
We’ve been appealing to everybody for a long time: it would
be good if somebody undertook an assignment to create a
unified database. We, for example, have no data on boilers
in Poland, and I would be glad if Mr. Kozak shared them
with us.
Andrzej Kozak: Of course, safety and reliability have no
boundaries. We can do something together. Especially, as
many realities are similar in our countries.
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46
Question from the audience: As I’ve understood, on the
basis of statistical data, by determining distribution laws, you
introduce them for some equipment elements. Haven’t you
tried to look closer at this problem Our research shows (and
we have software complexes for it) that the same elements
demonstrate different distribution laws, depending on specifics
of their life cycle. And it has a considerable effect with
more precise calculations.
Andrzej Kozak: We choose the distribution law that fits
the best to the existing statistical data. Certainly, we can use
others. But Weibull distribution, as we can see, fits the best.
And it is used in different countries. And it is recommended
by the FMA (Failure Mode Analysis) standard. It is successfully
used in electronics. And I think it can be useful for the
majority of mechanical parts as well.
Session 2. Corporate Experience in Providing
Accident-free Technological Processes
Incidents Related to Hazardous
Waste Mismanagement
Dr. Neal Langerman, Chairman of the Division of
Chemical Health & Safety
American Chemical Society (USA)
Ladies and gentlemen, good morning!
But I will continue in English, and I will try to stay on
time.
I want to spend some time today, talking about the issue
we all must deal with – that is the management of hazardous
by-products of industrial activities – typically we call it
industrial waste. It’s a global concern, and when I look globally
how it’s managed, I see practices going from complete
ignoring – flush it down the drain, pour it in the nearest river
or hole in the ground – to a highly structured, highly regulated
under the laws and regulations, management systems.
Regardless of how the industrial by-products are managed,
what we really all need to worry about and be concerned
about is the impact on air, water, and on soil, which means
the impact on people.
The proper management of hazardous waste provides
protection, and we know that this protection can be achieved
without an unacceptable cost to the economic entity – the
company or the state, if you will, generating the waste. The
management techniques range from large-scale treatment
facilities to identification of what the waste is, or to devices,
engineering devices on emissions to remove the hazardous
components.
What I’d like to do in the next few minutes with everybody
here at the 10th International Forum on Industrial Safety is
help you recognize some, not all, of the underlying causes
of incidents which involve hazardous industrial wastes. And
I want to do this by looking at 4 specific incidents. We will
look very briefly at them. One will be a hazardous waste
management facility, a commercial facility that is; the next
is a chemical manufacturer that generates a by-product and
treats it onsite; the third is a non-chemical manufacturer who
does onsite waste handling, not treatment; and the fourth
is an academic institution, a research laboratory. These 4
examples really cover the entire breadth of where we see
problems with hazardous waste.
Briefly, in the United States hazardous waste is managed
under a set of laws (it seems you use the word “norms”
where I would use the word “laws”) and regulations that are
written in order to facilitate the operation of laws. In each of
the four examples that I am going to discuss, the actual accident
would not have occurred if the company, the facility,
the owner or operator, depending on what term which you
want to use, would have complied with the applicable regulations
and laws. We look briefly at the causes, and then some
ideas about prevention of recurrence. Clearly, in the limited
time I won’t go into great deal of detail.
The United States hazardous waste laws are what we call
“mature”, that is they have been around long enough, they
are old enough, to have all or many of the problems worked
out of them. They were passed in 1976 – that is the law, and
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Pic. 1.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
the regulations were started in 1980. These regulations apply
to current and future activities. I need to give you four pieces
of the English language that translators will help you with
and that I will be using. Generators are any companies that
are producers of hazardous waste by-product in the course
of its business. A transporter is a company that moves the
hazardous waste from the generator to where the waste is
going to be treated or disposed, which we call a treatment,
storage and disposal facilities –it goes by the letters TSDF,
with that I’ll be talking about these.
The first example will be a TSDF that… Well, excuse me.
Just show you we understand what the rules say – I will
paraphrase it for you. The rule states that the company that
produces hazardous waste may not allow the hazardous
waste to ignite or explode. They must do everything that is
technically feasible to prevent an unanticipated reaction. And
Pic. 2.
this is the regulatory language; I put it for completeness, not
to be laboring.
The operator of the facility – that’s the generator, or the
transporter, or the TSDF – must take precautions to prevent
an unexpected reactive incident – be that fire or an explosion.
Regulations require that wastes be separated by compatibility,
and the whole is idea is to prevent what has come
up on the screen. People at this conference I have talked to
before know I’ve been fortunate to be able to capture images
like this where events have occurred. On this particular
one there were no losses of life of injuries, but there was a
significant loss in property.
So, the first example happened in our state of Ohio. It
happened in a facility of a TSDF operated by a French global
called Veolia. The incident resulted in 4 injuries, serious injuries,
8 buildings damaged onsite, and 20 residences, homes,
and 4 offices offsite were damaged as a result of the energy
release from the explosion. The facility Veolia provided fuel
blending, wherein two hazardous wastes are blended with
gasoline or other flammable fluids for use as fuel; solvent
recovery – that’s where the accident happened; waste consolidation;
and waste transfer.
The actual incident that happened occurred in this area
that I am indicating on the facility diagram, in the middle of
this tank form. The injuries occurred in the laboratory and
operations building at this point. (Pic. 1).
The tank with the arrow on it is the tank where the an incompatible
waste mixture occurred, causing the release of its
contents, a flammable liquid whose vapors ignited. (Pic. 2).
The chemical in question was the cyclic oxygen ether, Tetrahydrofuran.
It was being processed for solvent recovery.
A vapor release occurred just after the operator began to
backfill the tank with Nitrogen. They had not followed all
of their own procedures and put a Nitrogen blanket in first.
The excess Nitrogen plus THF vapor exceeded the Pressure
Relief Device and released liquid and vapor to atmosphere.
An ignition source ignited the vapor explosively. The total
property damage, in addition to injuries, was in excess of
$27 Million USD.
47
Pic. 3. План подвального этажа
Pic. 4.
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48
This is a photograph of the site after the incident. This is a
D14 tank, and you can see the destruction of the laboratory
and operation building where most of injuries, onsite injuries
occurred.
Underlying causes were improperly designed pressure relief
devices; improperly located boilers – the flames of the
boilers were shown to be the ignition source; improper compliance
with the US National Electrical Code, Electrical Classification
(this was what we call a Class 1, Division 1 location,
which meant that there was a potential for vapor, flammable
vapor to be present at any time and the potential ignition
sources had to be protected from that); and failure to perform
a Process Hazard Analysis – the company never did
any hazard analysis on the operations. I’ll be talking more on
that tomorrow morning in the master class on process safety
management.
In simple sense, the lesson learned from that is to comply
with applicable codes and regulations.
The second incident was at the Bayer, a German company,
Crop Sciences facility in our State of West Virginia. A Totally
Enclosed Waste Treatment Unit is a unit that is hard-piped
between the process unit and where the waste is treated was
where the incident occurred. The Unit treated a highly reactive
process by-product to render it less hazardous for subsequent
handling. The chemicals involve were two pesticides, they go
by the name “Methomyl” and “Larvin”. I will point out that the
chemical made famous by Union Carbide in Bhophal, India,
was also in the site -Methyl isocyanate, and the MIC tank
was involved in the ignition occurred, but was not damaged
because of a reinforcement structure on the tank.
If I ask the AV folks to change over to my video, I’ll show
you what happened This is the Bayer facility.
Can you just hold a microphone up to the computer
speaker And let it play that way.
(Video clip)
Switch back to the Power Point. That animation was provided
by the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board.
If you get my presentation back…
The underlying causes were the lack of pre-startup safety
review; inadequate process control equipment; insufficient
training of the operators on brand-new process control
equipment; failure to follow standard procedures – all of
that falls into the category we talk about as “management
of change” or, if you will, failure of management of change;
Pic. 5.
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out-of-specification feed-stock; and totally inadequate, in
fact not done, process hazard analysis.
Again the lesson that we can learn from this is compliance
with existing norms and regulations – both hazard waste
and process safety management would have prevented the
accident.
A generator facility in New York City had an incident in a
10 story building. This was a basement work area, resulting
from improper mixing of hazardous waste in 2002. There
were 36 people injured, including 6 fire department of New
York personnel.
The workers were mixing solvents, and they knowingly
mixed a flammable solvent – that was lacquer thinner, paint
thinner – with nitric acid. This mixture is well known to react
violently, and that happened in this case.
This is just a drawing of where it happened – this is the
basement work area. They were working in this area during
the waste consolidation. (Pic. 3).
An interesting contributing cause to this incident was that
English was not the common language in the workplace. The
common languages in the workplace were Polish, Spanish,
and Swahili. So, the supervisors actually could not communicate
with the workers well at all.
This is what the building looked like after the fire. The fire
went right up this part of the building, and the chimney effect
damaged this side completely, and the adjacent building
partially. (Pic. 4).
The Underlying Causes: lack of adequate explanation of
hazards to the employees – we call it hazard communication;
failure to follow regulatory requirements; and insufficient supervision
of the employees.
Lessons learned: train your workers properly, supervise
out-of-normal activity –nitric acid was not normally used;
and implement regulatory compliance activity
The Final incident – a run-away reaction in academic
teaching lab involved a 20 L solvent bottle, a waste collection
bottle, that burst “sometime during the night”. There were no
injuries. It made a mess, widely scattering the solvent, nictric
acid, and glass. (Pic. 5).
I track this type of incident, particularly in academic laboratories.
Within the US there are on an average 3 of these a
week. Fortunately, the reaction has an induction period, so
the reaction usually occurs in the middle of the night, and
does not injure people.
During the 4 to 8 hour induction period, pressure buildsup
in the bottle and the bottle bursts from a run-away reaction.
The frequency of this incident makes it highly predictable,
and therefore very, very preventable. It is easily preventable.
If you want to know more about this database that
we have on tracking, see me separately, and I’ll talk about
it with you.
Lessons learned from this hazard waste incidents are that
management procedures that are regulation-based and well
established will actively prevent incidents like this from recurring;
good in-house procedures have to be developed, employee
trained on them, and procedures followed$ and then
regulatory oversight by inspections on a regular basis will
help reduce the risk of incidents.
With that let me then open the floor to questions. And
then I will end simply with “Spasibo” (Thank you).
A.V. Moslalenko: Friends, your questions, please. Personally
I ”liked” the basement floor explosion, because 15 years
ago I had a friend who was proud that he was producing
detergents in the basement of a residential building with the
chemicals. They mixed chemicals in the concrete mixer, and
they thought it was very business-like!
Question from the audience: I come from Finland, from
authority called Tukes. And I picked one issue from your presentation
–failure to follow up regulatory requirement was
one lesson learned in all those cases. Could you explain a
little bit more about that – I mean how this is possible, why
companies did not follow the requirements I mean do they
ignore or do they know them at all

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Neal Langerman: The question is an excellent question
that we have struggled with for years. If I can restate it to
make sure I understand it – why do companies not follow
the regulations The politically incorrect answer is that they
are stupid. The answer that we tend to think is more reflective
of what happens is that smaller companies don’t have
the resources to really understand the regulations – that is,
it’s money; and the bigger companies try too hard, as the
Bayer example, to get their processes back into production –
that’s money too. In the long run the incidents cost them
more than they save, but they cut corners. And the value of
inspections is to help prevent those corners from being cut.
A.V. Moslalenko: Let me join the answer by Mr Langerman.
Our colleagues from the CIS states know very well the
book called “Dog’s Heart”. One smart person, a professor,
said that destroying & desolation starts in a head. Which inspector
can be warned if people by-pass automation control
signals It’s destruction in the head! I think the human nature
is the same in America, in Russia and other countries. And
actually it’s the troubles we have to fight with. Another question
No more questions. Neal, thanks a lot.
Advancing Global Deepwater Capabilities
Edmond Thompson, Director Programme Management,
Group Crisis & Continuity Management
BP (UK)
Good afternoon, everyone.
Thank you, sir, for introducing me, and thank you, delegates,
for being here.
My name is Ed Thompson. As introduced, I was the Deputy
Incident Commander for the response on the Deepwater
Horizon for the States of Mississippi, Alabama and Florida.
I am here to speak to you today about the Deepwater
Horizon. And I’d like to… I am passing BP’s message during
this. My specialty is response to hazardous emergencies and
hazardous chemical releases. But when we are talking about
broader range of topics and speaking to those issues – to
give you BP message here.
It occurred on April 20 two years ago, as you saw, and
I must say BP deeply regrets what occurred and the impact
on the communities and families involved. We are committed
to developing capabilities and practices to further enhance
safety and help to prevent this accident from ever happening
again. We want to do this not only in BP, but throughout the
entire industry as well.
The presentation is aimed at sharing with you, what we
have learned so far, and what we’ve done and continue to
do in the areas of spill prevention and response. This is all
towards our commitment to advance and deploy these learnings
within BP and around the world.
In the immediate aftermath of the explosion BP launched
an internal investigation drawing on the expertise of more
than 50 specialists within BP and within the industry. Our internal
investigation report concluded that no single cause was
responsible for the accident. Instead we found the accident
was a result of multiple complex causes and the activity of
multiple parties. The investigation team made 26 recommendations
specific to drilling which BP is implementing across
all our activities worldwide. The recommendations include
measures to further strengthen contractor management, as
well ensure some blowout preventers, well control and cement
testing. Specialists from across BP have developed an
integrated action plan for the recommendations. To confirm
the delivery of each action within BP, we are setting a program
of continuous self-verification and independent audit
by safety and operational risk council.
The Deepwater response was unprecedented in its scale
and in its complexity. It tested the limits of industry’s knowledge
and capability. For the first time in history we had to
perform unique operations at approximately 5,000 ft water
depth, 50 miles from shore, at the pressure of approximately
2240 psi and the temperature of about 4 degrees C. Beyond
the technical complexity, we mounted and sustained
a massive response effort. To give you an idea of scale: at
its peak across there were 48,000 responders spread across
5 states, we had deployed approximately 13.5 Millionft of
oil containment boom (it’s about 2500 miles), and we deployed
approximately 6500 vessels. There were some 50 vessels
and 16 remotely operated vehicles, all in a tight radius of
about a mile over the well site, all managed by a large-scale
simultaneous operation, or SIMOP operation. The logistical
challenges of the responsewere made more complex by the
necessity for coordinating between various agencies, and
various entities, numerous states within the United States, in
counties – from mayors of cities to the Federal Government.
Our success – our successes that we had in the response
were where we were effective in collaboration with agencies
and people. We are grateful for the help of thousands of
people who came with intent of making things better, and
working hard to resolve the situation. Our current efforts in
the Gulf of Mexico continue, and we shifted from response
to recovery. We still have over a thousand of people engaged
in the recovery efforts in the Gulf of Mexico.
To take all this knowledge and to best convert this huge
collection of learnings and experience into focused initiatives
going forward, we decided to organize in practice like 5 different
areas. First is prevention and drilling safety. This is our
ability to maintain control of a well from the start to abandonment
– this is our first and foremost priority. However,
we need to be ready if for any reason well control is lost;
as a result we need to continue build capabilities in 4 other
areas. First of these being containment, this is our ability to
minimize and stop the flow of hydrocarbons by capturing or
stopping the flow at the source. Number 3 is relief wells –
this is an ability to rapidly intersect and kill the well from the
bottom if we are unable to that from the top. And of course,
the parts that I participate in for most of my carrier, these
two – spill response and crisis management. Spill response
is the ability to manage the release of hydrocarbons to minimize
effects on the environment. And crisis management is
our ability to coordinate the overall response and facilitate
effective decision making through the systematic organization
of people, information and technology.
So, I’ll focus the rest of my remarks on how we are looking
forward to implement those lessons learned and imbed
new developments in each of these areas.
The first, of course being prevention and drilling safety.
Enhanced drilling safety standards are being implemented
today in BP in 3 critical areas: first of all, refreshing our engineering
technical practices and conforming robust practices
are in place, for conformance to these practices. For example,
dynamically positioned rigs contracted by BP must now have
not fewer than two blind shear rams and casing shear rams.
Additionally, blow-up preventer management and cementing
services are being further enhanced. Withinblow-up preventer
management we now have a very strong emphasis on
having independent third partiesverifying that the blow-up
preventers work the way they are meant to. Related to this is
subsea testing of remotely operated vehicles to confirm that
they can activate those blow-up preventers in the event of
emergency. One of our key conclusions of investigation into
the blow-up was that there was a weakness in the cement
design and testing. For this reason we are enhancing cementing
services over site through new standards and technical
approval processes developed for critical cementing operations,
and the strengthened contractor quality checks.
On to the second of containment. There are 3 technical
capabilities we’ve developed within this area I’d like to talk
to you about today. In all three of these we are trying to
advance the current state of knowledge and thinking and
embed it within our organization. One of the biggest learnings
from Deepwater Horizon was the benefit of access to
capping equipment. That’s the equipment you put on top of
well to cap it and keep it from discharging oil into the sea.
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The challenge that now faces industry is to create these solutions
and manage them, so they could be quickly accessed
by deepwater basins around the globe. AndBP will build a
global deepwater well cup and tooling package that can be
air-lifted and deployed in the matter of days in any of the
global operations.And we have Antonovson contract to support
this effort. BP is also committed to working in collaboration
with others in the industry, governments and others to
advance the important containment. In the US wejoined the
Rainwell containment company, and we havemade available
the BP expertise that we have developed during this response
and the equipment developed, so that others can use it. In
the UK we provided project management for the cap design
and fabrication of a capping stack on behalf of the Oil Spills
Prevention and Response Advisory Group. We are also one
of the 9 international companies contributing to the Subsea
Well ResponseProject – a non-profit organization established
to enhance industry’s capabilities to respond to subsea well
control incidents in different global regions.
If capping is notappropriate or immediately available under
the conditions of a given spill, you need to collect the
oil at the well head. And critical to that is the use of free
standing riser systems that is specially meant for deepwater
applications and can operate in challenging conditionsthat
the subsea well presents. It will be important to develop and
to deploy this relatively new technology not only in the Gulf
of Mexico, but in deepwater basins around the world.
Next we are trying to systemize what we learned in largescale
simultaneous operations. We had a build-in to execute
and monitor complex surface and subsea activity in a 4-dimensional
system around the source control area which is
the well head. Being able to do that was very beneficial to
the response of Deepwater Horizon, and weare perfecting
those techniques to be ready in case it occurs again. We
are extending this capability for our day-to day operations
as well.
Finally the best systems in the world are the most effective
with the right people and the experts to use them. BP personnel
and subject-matter experts have developed tremendous
knowledge of how these systems operate in real world conditions
and are capable of applying this knowledge to potential
future events, whether they be BP or someone else’s.
For relief wells there are 2 key areas that we are focusing
on. First, we need to ensure that the rigs and equipment
required for relief well are available and around hand for
anyone who are joining projects around the world. Based
on our experience, we know that advance planning is critical.
Second, we need to help enhance and codify real-time
imaging technology. This technology is wonderful, and helps
you cut down the time you need for logging from about
two days for conventional ranging to about six hours. And
logging is what for real is called measuring as they go down
the hole. And during the response technology was developed
to do it in real time instead of having to pull everything out
of the hole, measure it, and then put everything back in the
hole – cut it from days to hours. We jointly developed this
technology and field-tested it on a land region Wyoming
during the incident and then put it to work on a response in
the Deepwater Horizon. We are doing further work to further
improve this technology and share it.
So, spill response. First, as I’ve described, we beleive that
subsea dispersant are crucial to all in fighting deepsea blowouts,
because they enable greater ability to respond and
extend the window of response operation. We are trying
to advance that technology in the space by developing new
systems that improve effectiveness, including creating dispersing
injection equipment that can operate autonomously
during severe weather.
Further we realized that public information on the use of
dispersants is important – I think we learned that from a
video which was shown here. In order to use it at the time it’s
needed the most, BP supports continuous scientific research
to increase knowledge about the effectiveness of different
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dispersants on various soils types in different environmental
conditions. This work is in progress.
We are investing and improving the art and science of
large-scale in situ burning by codifying its enhanced techniques
developed during the response to select, contain, control
and direct burns, and by continuingto invest in fire-burn
technologies.
And third, we are encouraging all responsible organizations
to adapt enhanced booming and skimming because of
how effective we found it to be. Within BP we are developing
an internal guidance to ensure access to enhanced systems
for all global basins which we operate. We are also codifying
procedures that help us to adapt the skimming efforts to the
use of the modern surveillance techniques, such as satellites,
helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles and balloons.
And crisis management – here’s what we’ll focus on in the
future. First, we are extending the Incident Command System
principles beyond the United States and we are expanding
the pool of Incident Command trained personnel, with a purpose
of creating a broader pool of functional subject-matter
experts. Second, we are formalizing our strategy for balance
centralization and local autonomy and testing this with key
stakeholders around the world that we’ll need to work with in
case of a spill. And third, we are going to push the availability
of the Common Operating Picture and Plan to be at each BP
deepwaterbasin globally, use technology to give a clear view
of what is going on during a response.
BP’s operating management system is the cornerstone of
our process safety, risk management and operational integrity
process. It sets forth key guiding principles and standards
for safe operations, and is designed to drive rigorous and
systematic safety management across the company. We began
designing our OMS in 2006 and rolled in out in 2008.
Our OMS integrates requirements regarding health, safety,
security, and environment and operations reliability. It also
sets our clear expectations in such areas as management of
change, maintenance, contractor relations, auditing, and organizational
learning into a common system. We developed
ourOMS with an understanding that establishing a fully effective
comprehensive management system across a global
company would be a multi-year effort. But it’s critical to our
safety in general, and it’s critical for our company. Our MS is
now running in all of our production sites, and it’s the management
system now at the coreof how we operate at BP.
All of the changes we are undertaking to improve our safety
and risk management are linked to one of the 4 elements of
our operating highlighted her – that’s people, plant, process
and performance.
I hope my discussion today was helpful. As I said at the
beginning, my colleagues and I are determined to further
enhance deepwater safety. We need to work together with
all the people who helped us during the response and all the
people we work with all around the world. We view this as
a critical part of doing our job and as an important skill to
learn, get better at, and to have as an industry that is serious
about extracting the energy the world-over, from deepwater
reserves or any place else. In the short term, we need to
make sure that right equipment and consumable inventory
is in place and ready to act. In a long term, we need to
continue what we shall improve and continuously push our
technology further.
As I mentioned a few times, this is not just for BP. In the
days and weeks that followed the blow-up my colleagues and
I did our best to protect the waters and shores that we lived
and worked on. The lessoned that were forged from that
experience, trust me, are impossible to forget. We are committed
to developing our capabilities and processes to further
enhance safety and to help prevent this type of accident
from ever happening again. To this goal we are engaging
governments, regulators and the industry in key off-shore
and deepwater basins to share our knowledge and foster the
dialogue on how we can improve deepwater drilling safety,
containment and response capability.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
I’d like to offer you BP thanks, and my personal thanks for
your attention. And good evening!
A.V. Moskalenko: Thank you, your questions, please.
Rustam Ilyasov, Regional Director of “North-Kaspian
Operating Company”, Kazakhstan: Thank you for your
presentation. I have a question of a bit different nature,
not technical. I want to ask you: it’s clear that events in the
Gulf of Mexico made a bad impact on the reputation of BP
Company. Do you consider that today BP has been able to reinstate
its good name as a company having high technology,
high ratings of industrial safety. If not, what is necessary to
do for your company to re-instate the normal attitude of
local population and communities in the area where the accident
happened – that the most important for me. We are
beginning to work in the same sphere, doing the same kind
of work on the Caspian Sea shelf, and I should admit that
not everything is good regarding our relations with the state
bodies. I don’t want to reproach the state bodies or controlling
agencies – they do their job. I want to understand for
myself how BP in such challenging conditions has managed
to preserve relations with Government, governmental bodies
and the controlling bodies. And if that has happened,
how has the company managed to re-establish normal good
relations with the community, with the Government of the
regions where that event happened. Thank you.
Edmond Thompson: I’ll answer in two parts. The agencies
and the people – those regulators – were with us during the
response, and they saw what we did. We laid everything on
the table. We did everything, we extended every possibility,
explored every technical avenue, and left no stone unturned
to solve the problem. Agencies that saw that and worked
with us during the response built respect, we gained some
respect for that. The second part of my answer is that trust
once lost takes time to rebuild. So, while our partners during
the response have of the teaming attitude, we understand
that we have a road forward to rebuild the trust that we lost
during the incident, and we are committed to do that.
A.V. Moskalenko: Next questions here.
Question from the audience: Dear Mr Thompson, you
have drawn a very good picture. Let’s get back to the figures.
Have you calculated ecological impact and damage
How many billions of dollars it went down And secondly,
70 thousand of dispersants you were talking about – is that
true that all that amount was used to convert them into the
solvent situation You enhanced the environmental damage
by using those dispersants. Professor Haustov, University of
people’s Friendship.
Edmond Thompson: The question focuses around the use
of dispersants. The dispersants were used only – I think the
figures that were in that video are fairly close. And my belief
is that in the net environmental benefit analysis, the use of
dispersants lessened the impact of the spill. There is a huge
biological community in the Gulf of Mexico of bacteria that
consume the oil. They are natural sieves that occur naturally
within the Gulf of Mexico that have built this biological community.
There are on-going assessments within the Gulf of
Mexico to look for and quantify any residual oil. And I don’t
have the data as to what they are doing, but no one has
found anything of significance that I’m aware of yet. As far
as the ecological impacts, I can’t go into too much detail, as I
don’t have a follow-up update on that. But I can say that use
of dispersants was looked upon by the agencies as reducing
the impact of the oil spill.
A.V. Moskalenko: Next questions, please.
Question from the audience: Thank you for the interesting
report. My question is:
BP is a wide-known company. What is the volume of the
preliminary insurance of risks connected with safety regarding
that platform What were the premiums for the insurance
in the company And the third, what was the proportion
between the amount of premiums and the damage that
was really assessed assessed by you
Edmond Thompson: I do not know what are insurance
premiums within BP, sorry.
A.V. Moskalenko: Any more questions I’ve got a question.
My question:
According to you, BP is investing a lot of money into developing
new improved safety-focusing technologies.And this
is a dilemma: on the one hand, those technologies provided
will enable you with cutting edge, competitive advantage; on
the other hand, a similar incident, should it take place in the
Gulf, impacts the whole community, how BP is going to deal
with the technologies – are they going to be accessible for
other companies that are your competitors
Edmond Thompson: We in BP believe that we gained
some very painful knowledge as a result of this incident, and
that knowledge actually is what makes BP a better company.
But we also realize that what occurs to one part of the industry
affects all of the industry, so it makes sense, based
on our experience, that we share as much of that as we can,
to make sure that all basins of the world where deepwater
exploration occurs have the same level of response, capability
and protection, as any other.
A.V. Moskalenko: No more questions. Thank you, Ed.
Process Safety in BP
Cheryl Grounds, VP Process Safety
BP America Inc (USA)
First of all I’d like to say thank you very much for the
opportunity to speak here today. I’ve really enjoyed the presentations
so far, and I look forward to some more this afternoon
and tomorrow morning on nuclear disaster – should
be quite interesting.
A couple of words about myself. My name is Cheryl
Grounds, I work in the United states. I am currently the Vice
President of Process Safety for BP. Before this, I was the
Chief Engineer for Process Engineering and Process Safety
Engineering in Exploration and Production side of the business.
And before that, all inclusive, I’ve got 28 years of experience
in the oil and gas industry, most of that was with
Mobil Oil and then ExxonMobil in the area of Refining &
Marketing, Exploration & Production – I’ve been involved
in major capital projects, as well as existing operations –
around the world.
I am very involved in a group called the Center for Chemical
Process Safety which operates under the American Institute
of Chemical Engineers, and is by the title, focused on
Process Safety. I am a fellow of that organization.
What I’d like to talk to you today about is 3 things: number
one is Process Safety in BP from a business perspective
(why do we focus on it and how do we drive the business
to focus on process safety); second, I’d like to talk about
Process Safety and Risk Management from a technical perspective
and focus on some of the key tools that we use in
BP; and thirdly, I’d like to speak to a new tool we are using
that we call Bow Tie, and it’s proved very effective in thinking
about communicating risks.
So, process safety from a business perspective – as we’ve
heard already today, it starts with the top of the house, with
leadership. These are BP values – quite easy words there:
Safety, Respect, Excellence, Courage, and One Team. And if
you look at that slide, there are some quotes in there, there
are kind of small words – I’ll quote a couple of words from
each of those. (Pic. 1)
Under Safety it says the safety is good business, so it’s not
an “or” conversation, it’s not whether or not we want to be
safe or we want to make a profit, – it’s an “and” conversation:
safety is good business, we’ll do both.
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Respect – it’s about compliance with regulations. It’s obviously
about respecting our fellow-workers and the neighbors
in the areas where we work, but also compliance with our BP
rules and regulations.
Excellence – if something is not right, we work to correct
it. We focus very heavily on continuous improvement in BP.
Courage – achieving the best outcome often requires the
courage to speak up. And I think this is very true in process
safety, where, if you see something wrong, and you
raise your hand to attract attention to that issue, it may not
provide more barrels of oil and it may not reduce cost, but
safety is very important. So, having the courage to speak up
when you see something is very important.
And working together as One Team – we use this phrase
in BP, but I think this forum is a great example of the industries
– it’s even across industries and around the world
– working together as one team on process safety. It’s very
refreshing to see.
So, the previous presenter spoke a little bit about our Operating
Management System called OMS, and this is one way
that we drive Process Safety in the business. There are 4
key elements to OMS (they are in the middle of that circle):
People, Process, Performance, and Plant. And then as we
think about going out to the outer ring of this circle, there’s
a number of different areas: Privilege to Operate; and the
next one is Risk – this is where I spend a lot of my time
in process safety and risk; Procedures, Assets, Optimization,
Organization, Leadership, and Results. We apply these to all
of our operating sites in BP.
If we take OMS to the next level, there’s 48 essentials.
And if you think about some of the regulations that have
been mentioned here today: Safety Case in the North Sea,
COMAH, Seveso, in the United States we have OSHA PSM,
and as a result of the Deepwater Horizon, now we have the
SEMS (Safety Environmental Management System) – and all
of those management systems have elements that I think
you would find around this OMS wheel. So, just to point
out a few – I think every management system in safety and
environmental has something about regulatory compliance,
all these management systems have something about risk
assessment and management, and personnel safety, process
safety. We’ve heard today the importance of procedures and
management of change, as well as managing the incident
and learning from the incident, so that we can do better
next time. Assets – there is something about design and
construction of our assets, as well as maintenance of that
asset over its life cycle. Optimization actually I think comes
second. First we need to get the basics right, first we need
to earn this privilege to operate before we worry about optimization.
So, right now we are focused on other elements of
OMS, and we’ll be working on that in the future. Organization
– we’ve heard this morning as well the importance of
having right people that are trained and experienced in their
area, they are competent to do their jobs. And leadership
– if you don’t have leadership believing and speaking that
that process safety is important, than you won’t have good
follow-through. And, of course, in any system like this we
need to have metrics and audits to track how we are doing
against our planned objectives.
One of the questions I get frequently is what is the difference
between Personal Safety and Process Safety Or I think
in the vocabulary that you use here – what is the difference
between occupational safety and industrial or technical
safety And one of the things from the Texas City report, the
Baker Panel Report, pointed out was that if you focus only
on just personal safety, or occupational safety, that won’t
necessarily get you all the way to managing process safety.
I think the pyramids from the 2011 report from the Energy
Institute illustrates the point quite well. So, on occupational
side we can have hazards, near misses or near hits, first aid,
medical treatment, loss time incident, and potentially even
the fatality. If we start thinking about process safety, it’s
Pic. 1.
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
the same at the bottom of the pyramid, but as we progress
up, we start to worry about loss of containment, so the oil,
or the gas, or the toxic is getting outside of the pipe, from
where we can escalate up the triangle, and end up with fires,
or explosions, multiple fatalities, and destruction of facilities.
So, there is an overlapping in the middle, but the magnitude
of the process safety events is much greater than the magnitude
of the occupational safety events.
In BP we thought it was important to come up with the
definition of what we meant by Process Safety. Language
is interesting enough between Russian and English, but we
have our own challenges between American English and English
English, so we thought it was important to come up
with the definition of the BP version of process safety. So,
this definition is actually taken fromthe Center for Chemical
Process Safety – they have a number of publications. And
we added a couple of words that are shown in blue; otherwise
we are completely consistent with the definition the
industry is using. So, let’s think through this slowly. Process
safety a disciplined framework for managing the integrity –
I think you might have heard of different systems focusing
on integrity management or mechanical integrity which is
definitely closely linked to process safety. If you go further,
it’s about applying good design principles, engineering and
operating practices. So, again it’s about design, about the
engineering, as well as about operations and I would say
maintenance. What we are worried about is hazardous materials
and energy. And what we are focused on in terms
of consequences or impacts are impact on people, on the
environment, on our facilities, and on our business impact.
So, in process safety, again to contrast with personal safety,
it’s more about acute incidents, so a fire or explosion, as
opposed to a health or safety impact of being exposed to a
chemical over a number of years.
So, the question is how we operationalize process safety
in BP. And actually we saw some graphs like this earlier this
morning, so this may look familiar. And we’ve heard the
point made this morning that hazard identification is key. So,
the first question is what can go wrong – hazard identification.
It’s very important to spend some time, involve quality
resources on hazard identification, because if you don’t
identify that hazard, you won’t be managing it through the
rest of this flowchart. So hazard identification is very key.
We have a number of practices, these are just a few, and
I’ll talk about those in the next slide. Those practices are
linked directly to some of the elements in our OMS, Operating
Management System. So, by everybody adopting OMS,
everybody will understand that they need to implement these
practices. When we have identified the hazard, we have the
two most obvious next questions: How bad could it be How
often could it happen And again, we have tools. So, how
bad could it be – there’s a number of tools available from
companies, such as DNV, such as PHAST, to model how bad
that explosion or that dispersion might be. And there are
mathematical tools, such as fault tree and event tree, to
understand probabilities and frequencies (how often could
it happen).If we put those two together, we end up with
Risk. And we have another tool that we’ve been using quite
frequently, called LOPA – I’ll talk about that on the next
slide. Then the next question is “Well now what What do
we do, now that we understand that we have that risk and
how big that risk might be”And we use a risk matrix that is
depending on the level of risk (the higher the risk, you go to
a higher level of authority in the company to get permission
to either continue to operate in that state or to get the funds
to mitigate that risk).
I think the points down here in the corner are very important.
Once you understand the risk and you put in place
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Pic. 2.
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54
measures to address that risk, it’s very important to maintain
those measures. If you put in a safety instrumental system,
or safety critical equipment, it is very important to maintain
those systems over the life cycle of that equipment. And I
think frequently people put their attention on finding a new
risk mitigation measure as opposed to maintaining the health
of the mitigation measures they already have.
The next point I’d like to have is about Inherently Safer
Design. So, this is the principle that was identified by Trevor
Kletz from Loughborough University in the UK. The key words
around this point are Minimization, Substitution, Moderation,
and Simplification. The point I’d like to make though – if you
think about a big project, right, it might take, maybe, 3 or 4
years to design, engineer and build this project, and then you
might operate that project for 25, 30 or 40 years. So, where
do you get process safety involved I think typically we’ve
got that process safety involved in the middle, where we
are getting into detailed engineering. But actually it’s all the
way back at the beginning where you have the opportunity
to impact very fundamental decisions about the number of
people it might take to operate, how big the facility might
be, what the layout might be, and some of those will impact
the inherent safety of the facility. Once you are onto the
point of having engineer solutions, you’ll never achieve the
effectiveness in risk reduction that you would have if you
thought about inherent safety at the very beginning.
So, inherent safety is a very key concept in process safety.
The picture in the corner is a book that’s available again
from the Center for Chemical Process Safety about Inherently
Safer Design of chemical processes.
So, I’ve said I would talk about a couple of tools that we
use frequently in BP. HAZID is one of these tools. HAZID is
very flexible; it’s a high level review. (Pic. 2) You can use it
any time in a project. And my motto is “to do it early”! I like
to talk about a project I got involved in in Venezuela where
we were building a chemical plant (this was with Mobil). And
engineering manager has just been assigned to the project,
we had one person from operations in that region and myself
from process safety. We got together for two days, with no
drawings, no description of the project, just some loose ideas,
and talked about, you know, where we should build this. It
was on a hill – what should we put up the hill, what should
we put down the hill Which way does the wind blow Should
we use a pipeline How should we arrange a pier Those decisions
very early in that project helped that project to be much
more inherently safe. So, HAZID I think is a very flexible easy
tool that I would indicate people consider using.
HAZOP (Hazard and operability studies) – very thorough,
systematic, rigorous, and a great way to check whether or
not your design will meet the intent and that there are no
hidden problems. It’s very important to have some expert
process knowledge in your HAZOP, but it’s also a great way
for younger, newer engineers to learn a lot about how the
project was designed, as well as how it will be operated.
LOPA (I’ve said I would mention it) –Layer of Protection
Analysis. And LOPA takes and builds on HAZOP, and it
thinks about those layers of protection that were identified in
HAZOP and the risk that they are trying to address, and then
it compares how the layers of protection work in achieving
management of that risk – do we need more layers or do we
actually have too many
And then Risk Assessment that we’ve already heard about
this morning. In number of countries where we operate risk
assessment is required in some of the regulations, and, of
course, we conform to that.
We also use very focused risk assessment to understand
some of these risks, bigger risks, in greater detail, so we know
where to focus our design energies to reduce those risks.
All right, I said I would talk about a new tool that we are
using in BP. I believe it’s new to oil and gas industry, although
other industries have used it for a while. It’s called BowTie.
So, you can see by looking at the picture 3, it looks like a
Pic. 3.
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
bow tie – there’s a knot in the middle, and a bow tie. So,
Bow Tie is aqualitative risk management tool that allows for
graphical communication of an event, causes, consequences,
and barriers. So, if you look at this BowTie, we start with the
hazard. We identify the hazard, we think about what event
could happen as a result of that hazard, and then we think
about what are the causes that could lead to that event. Now
along each of these causes, each of these pathways typically
we have a number of barriers in place to break that chain, to
break that cycle, to prevent getting to that event. And then
equally there could be any number of consequences that
result from that single event. And again, we’ll put mitigation
barriers in place to prevent getting to that consequence.
So, I think the easiest way to understand the BowTie is to
work through an example. So, we’ll go through a story step
Pic. 4.
by step, and I’d like you to think about where the opportunity
are to break that chain, as we go down those pathways to
the even and to the consequences. (Pic 4,5)
Let’s consider a storage tank.
All right. What might the event be with the storage tank
The event could be the loss of primary containment. We
could have the oil come out of the tank – either the tank
or the piping. How might we have that failure There might
be a number of causes. The causes could be operating outside
the design envelope – so, there could be too high of
a pressure. Another cause could be external impact – we
could drop something on a pipe or run a truck into the pipe.
Or a natural hazard, such as an earthquake or a landslip.
So, there could be a number of causes. As we think about
each of these causes, what might be the barriers we put in
place to prevent getting to that event So, for the first one
we could put in place process control systems. So, process
control systems could serve to stop the release or control
the release. We could put in the Safety Instrumented System,
we could put in a release system that could guide the
release to a safe location as opposed to just allowing it to
be dispersed by the wind. For external impact we could
worry about how the facility is laid out, to prevent the opportunity
for a vehicle to impact the tank or the truck. Or
we could put in a physical barrier. Or we could control the
work, so that we might be doing things, lifting equipment
over life lines, etc. in a controlled situation. For natural hazards
we worry again about the location, about monitoring
systems to see if anything is happening with the geology,
and protection systems.
So, now we’ve reached that red circle in the middle, we’ve
got our loss of containment, and the next piece is to think
about what are the consequences and impacts. The consequences
could be a number of things: it could be a fire,
explosion, could be environmental effect, or it could be a
business impact. And what might we put in that space. So,
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Pic. 5.
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56
in the first line we can try to control the release; we could
try and control the ignition – we have a fuel, we can try and
control the ignition; and equally we can put in blast-resisting
modules to protect the people. The next two lines focus quite
a bit on controlling the volume released, to containing the
volume released.
Across the bottom we like to focus on – in sequential
order –elimination, prevention, controlling the event, mitigation,
and then response.
I’d like to show a couple of examples of where we’ve used
Bow Tie in BP. One example, quite recently, is we were lifting
a drilling rig onto an offshore installation. As they were getting
to do this very heavy lift, they put together a BowTie to
think about what could be the event. Of course, the obvious
event could be dropping the lift and what effect it might
have on the platform underneath. And in putting the Bow Tie
together, they identified a number of other opportunities to
put in some barriers to prevent that potential dropped load
and also mitigate the consequences.
Another example is the review system for our producing
assets in the Gulf of Mexico. Often we understand from
operating technicians and maintenance technicians, it’s difficult
for them to see how they fit into process safety and
risk management. Why do they have to test that piece of
equipment every 6 months or every year, if every time they
test it, it’s in good shape. But when they see that they might
be the person involved in ensuring the integrity of that safety
instrumented system, now they understand how important
their job is to preventing that event and those eventual consequences.
So, we’ve heard some discussion this morning about Process
Safety related metrics. And I would say in the world of
personal safety we’ve all got to seeing some of the metrics
over the last, you know, 20-30 years even – about injuries
to people, fatalities, days away from work cases, things like
that. In process safety within industry we have not had many
metrics, we are just now coming together to agree process
safety metrics. The publication I’ve shown to the side here is
from the Center of Chemical Process Safety. The API (American
Petroleum Institute) and CCPS are working together on
it. And from what I understand we are now working closely
with the European Process Safety Center to have some joined
up views on common metrics to inform how we as an industry
are doing in process safety.
The one I’ve illustrated here is loss of primary containment.
So, well, this is actually measuring the number of releases
that we’ve had, so in this point of view it’s measuring
the lagging indicator. It’s also very indicative of what might
happen in the future – the more losses of primary containment
we have, the more likely we are to have that big fire
and explosion. So, “losses of primary containment” is one of
the key measures that we use in BP.
So, in conclusion, I’d like to re-emphasize that safety
is good business, both personal safety and process safety.
These should be an inherent part of any business management
systems.
Hazard identification is key. You can’t manage what you
have not identified.
BowTies are an effective communication tool to focus the
conversation on the health of the barriers in place to manage
the risks. It’s not so much about the level of risk, it’s focusing
on what we have in place, what barriers we have in place to
manage that risk, and how healthy are those barriers.
And Process Safety metrics are relatively new. And I’d
suggest that you make sure that you are using some of those
process safety metrics to help drive and improve performance
in your business in these areas.
Thank you!
A.V. Moskalenko: Colleagues, your questions, please, if
you have got any. Cheryl, I’ve got a question. You showed
the method that you’ve used relatively recently. Was it before
or after the Gulf event – that BowTie.
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Cheryl Grounds: Asking about BowTie. In some places
we were starting to use BowTie before the Gulf incident. I
think we are using it more now. It does not replace HAZAP
or LOPA, but we’ve found it a very effective communication
tool, from conversations with executive leadership right
down to operating technicians. So, because it’s been so effective,
we are using it more and more.
A.V. Moskalenko: Your question, Miroslav.
Miroslav Lipar: In your presentation in one of your slides
we heard that statement like Safety, Respect, Excellence,
One Team, and then something as a leading sentence for
the definition. I would like to ask if do you think this leading
sentence is correct for the discussion with public or discussion
with your workers. So, give the message to the public or
your workers like ”respect compliance with the regulations”,
because for me the compliance with the regulation, this is
much more – this is must, and if you have no compliance
with the regulation, then you have no privilege to operate.
And excellence – “if something is not good, we will correct
it” – from my point of view this is not excellence, this is like
reactive approach. But excellence should be proactive approach
to avoid that something would go wrong and make
continuous improvement before it goes wrong. Thank you.
Cheryl Grounds: I agree with both of the points what
were made. But I think when you describe your values as we
have – and we have shared this with the public as well as
sharing them quite extensively with the BP employees– it’s
important to state what is a must, it’s important to state
what are the expectations, as well as what is the vision. So,
some of them are fundamental, but I think – you know we
have new employees starting every day, and you don’t know
what their background is, where they come from, so it’s important
sometimes to state the obvious.
Question from the audience: Сheryl, isthat piece of
software that you have available to drive BowTie
Cheryl Grounds: Yes, it’s not BP proprietary software;
this is a publicly available piece of software called BowTie
XP. If you google that, you should find it. There’s some good
training pack on BowTie on the website.
A.V. Moskalenko: It was the final question. Cheryl,
thanks a lot.
Internal Investigation
into Equipment Failures as a Tool
to Eliminate Accidents and Reduce
the Number of Technical Incidents
Albert N. Lyaskovsky, Head of Industrial Safety, Occupational
Health and Safety
Sibur Holding (Russia)
Good afternoon, dear colleagues.
Some brief information about our company. I think many
of you know about it. It is the largest petrochemical complex
of the Russian Federation. Our company pays serious attention
to issues of occupational health and industrial safety.
We have taken a lot of efforts to improve the situation in
this sphere. During the last four years we have been working
in cooperation with DuPont Company to develop 12 elements
of safety culture.
Today I want to share with you our developments in one
of these elements. It is an internal investigation of accidents
and technical incidents from the point of view of industrial
safety.
First of all, in order to better understand each other, let
us define terminology, i.e. what I mean when I use different
terms in this presentation.
Accident is a destruction of constructions and (or) equipment
used at a hazardous production facility, uncontrolled
explosion and (or) hazardous release.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Pic. 1.
Pic. 2.
Pic. 3.
Technical incident is a failure or damage of
equipment used at a hazardous production facility,
deviation from standard operating conditions.
Now let us look what events line production
managers can often encounter during their technological
process. Let us consider several situations.
The first situation: some technological process
is going on, and at some moment the technological
pump stopped. Possible situation: liquid
level starts growing in some vessel or device.
Correspondingly, the equipment operators react
in time, start up a reserve pump, and the technological
process continues.
How can we assess this event at this hazardous
production facility Different companies
treat it differently, but if we summarize it, it is
some dangerous situation that took place at the
hazardous production facility.
Now, a similar situation. A pump also stopped,
liquid levels also grew, but in this case the automated
emergency shut down (ESD) system came
into action. In such case the situation is treated
as a technical incident.
And one more similar situation. Everything
was the same, but the ESD system was not actuated,
workers did not notice what happened,
and this case we can have an uncontrolled process
that can lead to an accident.
If we look at all those three situations, we can
notice that they are somewhat similar. The same
events lie in the basis of their development. A
pump stopped, emergency ESD system did not
work, personnel did not react properly – and
in the worst scenario we can have an accident.
(Pic. 1).
If we look at it from the point of view of
a safety pyramid, then we can see that at any
production facility some equipment-related dangerous
situations occur with certain regularity,
and in some companies they are registered, in
others – not. According to our legislation we
are not obliged to consider and register all such
cases. But incidents must be registered according
to law, the notice should be provided to supervising
bodies and investigation is held. As for
accidents, they are already investigated with the
involvement of competent authorities.
All the experience of investigation of similar
events shows that, if we investigate an accident,
the reasons of such accidents will be some dangerous
situations that occur at the hazardous
production facility. Moreover, during investigation
of accidents and incidents one can identify
dangerous behavior of the employees that have
not noticed the dangerous situation in due time
and have not reacted in due way.
So, what is the essence of Sibur’s methodology
It is in registration of all dangerous situations
that occur at a hazardous production facility. A
special methodology was developed to investigate
each dangerous situation. If we investigate such
events, develop corrective measures and exclude
possibility of such dangerous situations, we can
thus prevent much more serious situations.
The purpose of the internal investigation in
Sibur Holding is not to define who is guilty is
some particular situations, but to identifying the
underlying reasons of the event. Objectives of
such investigation are the following:
- prevention of repetition of such events;
- identification of weaknesses in the production
safety and occupational health and safety
management.
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58
Pic. 4.
Pic. 5.
Pic. 6.
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Besides, participation in the investigation allows
managers to demonstrate their commitment
to the safety concept.
When investigating such events, at first
glance, especially if it is some technical incident,
one can say that it is connected with equipment
defects. But if the investigation is held according
to our methodology, we can find the core reasons
of the event: drawbacks in different company
procedures and standards.
What is the methodology of accident investigation
based on First of all, we build an event
timeline, indicating all the chain of events that
occurred at the production facility. (Pic. 2).
Then individual negative events identified that
had had an unfavorable affect on the resulting
incident. How do we do it First an individual
event is identified. Then it is excluded from this
chain of events. If, after excluding this event,
we can see that there is high probability there
would not have been any incident, it means that
this event is a critical factor for such incident or
dangerous situation. Further in our investigation
we concentrate on determining reasons for the
identified critical factors. After we have identified
critical factors, we use “FIVE WHYs” methodology.
We ask a question: why did the critical
factor occur at the facility After we have got an
answer, we ask another question: why did this
event occur Then we continue asking “why”
until we identify core reasons. As a rule, they
are in elements of the production safety and occupational
health and safety management.
After we identified reasons, we develop corrective
actions. And we do it, again applying the
methodology. You all know that it is better to
eliminate a source of a threat rather than develop
additional rules on how to act in presence
of such source. (Pic. 3).
But it is not the end of the process. After
we have identified the reasons and developed
corrective measures at this particular production
facility where the investigated unfavorable
event occurred, we have a requirement that the
company develop an information sheet briefly
describing all reasons of the event and corrective
measures. And this information sheet is sent to
all SIBUR entities, so that all of them developed
similar corrective measures. You all understand
that one should learn not by own mistakes, but
by mistakes of other people.
By implementing this process, we reduce
the pyramid foundation not only at that facility
where there was a dangerous situation, but at all
companies of the Holding. In due course it will
lead to elimination of accidents and incidents at
our production facilities.
Now, a specific example: one of information
sheets. (Pic. 4).
Here you can see a situation with a failure of
a technological pump, after which the workers
quickly tried to switch over to the second pump,
which lead to depressurization of a pipeline, and
the technological process was stopped. The identified
critical factors were the following:
- a gear coupling failed on the pump;
- a motorized valve was switched over to
manual operation;
- a leakage was found in the non-return
valve.
When looking for reasons of these critical
factors occurrence, the following direct reason
was identified: faulty equipment (Pic. 5).

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
59
Pic. 7.
Then core reasons were identified: insufficient prophylactic
measures (no preventive repair of the gear coupling held;
insufficient attention was paid to the non-return valve during
technical inspections). (Pic. 6).
The developed corrective measures refer not only to this
particular incident (repair the valve or the gear coupling), but
to revision of the rules and regulations of the equipment inspections
and repair as a whole. These measures are being introduced
in other companies of the Holding as well. (Pic. 7).
Thank you for your attention!
V.A. Tarasov: Just to clarify. You showed to us a sample
form for the incident investigation. I think a key element is
missing there. And, in my opinion, it is a fault of some managers.
And there is nothing about it. How did you “reward”
them for it
A.N. Lyaskovsky: If we speak about the fault of some
managers, let us consider what is more efficient for the company.
We can say that it is Ivanov’s fault that this event occurred,
let us dismiss him, and in that case it was Petrov, let
us punish him as well. As a result, you dismissed Ivanov, and
another person, Sidorov, is employed instead of him. What
does it change in the Holding as a whole If we start concentrating
on finding guilty persons, we lose the essence of
what happened. With such tough corporate attitude to guilty
persons, you would never know what really happened. For us
it is more important to identify the underlying reasons, not
to define who is guilty, and we do not want Ivanov, Petrov,
Sidorov to hide information, they should tell what happened,
why they acted like that, so that we could further develop
efficient corrective measures for all companies of the Holding.
Otherwise Ivanov would not tell us what actually happened,
and we will base corrective measures on the wrong
information and then introduce them all over the Holding.
And then people would say: it happened in entirely different
way. Therefore, we have other priorities. They are to identify
reasons of the event.
Emergency and Rescue Teams.
Formation Problems and Proposed Solutions
Igor V. Abramov, Chief of the Fire Service
Gazprom Pererabotka (Russia)
First of all, on behalf of “Gazprom Pererabotka”, I want
to express my gratitude to GCE Group and personally to Alexander
Vladimirovich for the invitation to participate in this
Forum. However, we have been regularly visiting this event
for several years. And now, I would also like to get you acquainted
with the company we are representing here.
“Gazprom Pererabotka” is rather a new company, incorporated
on May 1, 2007 as a result of restructuring and
consolidating production branches of Gazprom Group under
the common management. The company comprises gas
production departments, two liquid hydrocarbons transportation
units, three plants dealing with processing liquid hydrocarbons
and natural gas. The company produces all types
of engine fuels, technical carbon and liquefied hydrocarbon
gases.
Why do I want to bring up an issue of emergency and
rescue teams that operate, perhaps, relatively successfully
at our company Why “successfully” – because they have
managed to prevent major accidents and fires. Why “relatively”
– we still have had some incidents.
Let us go over to the report and related discussions. Generally,
the Federal legislation stipulates that an emergency
and rescue team is an independent organizational structure
or a part of emergency and rescue service with the main task
of emergency response. The core of the team is comprised
of rescue units equipped with special machines, equipment,
survival gear, instruments and materials. Emergency response
includes activities targeted to rescue people, save material and
cultural values, protect environment in the emergency zone,
bring the emergency situation under control, and to struggle
for containment or mitigation of hazardous factors to the
minimum possible level. Emergency response involves a number
of factors threatening life and health of rescue workers
and requiring a special training, rescue equipment and gear.
Federal Law No. 151 also stipulates that emergency response
works include search and rescue, mine rescue, gas
rescue, emergency well control, as well as rescue operations
related to fire-fighting, containment of negative impacts on
health and sanitation in emergency situations and other activities,
the list of which can be extended under a decision by
the Russian Federation Government.
By the way, the list of emergency response works approved
by the Russian Federation Government so far includes
42 types of activities.
Formation of emergency and rescue teams is governed by
the legislation of of the Russian Federation and specifically
by laws and regulations listed in the slide. (Pic. 1).
But what is the current problem with formation of emergency
and rescue teams At the current moment we have
only an indication that such teams must be present at certain
types of production units. There are no criteria for formation
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60
of such teams. The only document that somehow specifies
this issue is, by the way, Law No. 116 on industrial safety that
stipulates that an entity operating a hazardous production
facility must have a service contract with professional emergency
rescue services or professional emergency and rescue
teams, and in cases provided for by the Russian Federation
legislation, it must establish the own professional emergency
rescue services or professional emergency and rescue teams.
And the criteria for classifying a site as a hazardous production
facility are listed in Appendix 1 to the same Federal Law
No. 116.
Here, on the slide, the list is not complete, it is just an
extract, and on the basis of this extract I suggest that we
consider two variants. (Pic. 2).
First, for example, is a motor transportation company
where the only hazardous units in operation are stationary
hoisting mechanisms. And the second company is an oil or gas
processing plant occupying the total area of over 400 ha.
Considering these two companies, we should ask a question:
should they have similar emergency and rescue teams
Obviously, no! Moreover, what kind of teams must be present
at a motor transportation company where there is only
one stationary hoisting mechanism Practically none, or
should there be nevertheless some kind of emergency response
team We do not have such criterion.
Our company, which I have already described at the beginning
of my report, as a minimum, in accordance to the
legally approved list of activities, must have an accreditation
for at least eight types of emergency response activities, plus
a license, as it is defined in the current legislation, for firefighting
at industrial enterprises and infrastructure sites.
As I have already mentioned, at present there are no criteria
for formation, let alone optimal staff number definition,
of emergency and rescue teams. At the same time any business
unit that is planning to undertake any type of activity is
sure to consider what its emergency and rescue teams should
look like, or whether it should conclude contracts for external
services. To conclude contracts seems to be the optimal
solution, but there are some territories where there are no
emergency and rescue teams, or their staff is so small that
they cannot ensure fulfillment of all emergency response
operations, if needed by certain companies. And then the
companies have to establish their own emergency and rescue
teams. And here we have the first question: what kind of
formation should it be Yow many of them should be established
If today we consider, as I’ve already mentioned, ten
types of emergency response activities, we should establish
ten emergency and rescue teams, very small ones, or one big
emergency and rescue team that would be fully operational
and in this case would be able to perform at least majority of
response activities on its own.
These issues are not stipulated anywhere, they are left
to companies to decide upon. But at the same time, at the
moment of establishing the response teams, they must be
approved by the executive power bodies supervising such activities.
But as for approvals, in practice, nothing has been
approved by the executive power bodies since 2008. So, we
hit a wall, we can’t establish any teams that could be considered
legal.
The second question refers to accreditation and licensing
we should have. Our three medium-size plants have the
staff of emergency and rescue teams of about 460 persons.
It takes one year and a half to train each rescue worker
of emergency and rescue teams to perform each activity
type (and the initial training, by the way, takes about two
months). And the person would not work during the period
of one year and a half, and, moreover, we must pay him
salary. Besides, we must pay for his training and it is rather
a considerable cost for our plants.
Now we have a question: should we establish those emergency
and rescue teams or just avoid all those difficulties by
concluding contracts with ineffective emergency and rescue
teams located either at the production units, or near them,
or anywhere else on the territory of the Russian Federation
And insure our property and insure our risks.
Earlier there had been regulations for at least two types of
emergency and rescue teams. These were fire safety regulations
NPB 201-96 “Industrial Fire Brigades. General Require-
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Pic. 1.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
ments” and “Regulations on Mine Rescue Teams” developed
by the JSC “Center of Emergency Response Teams” and approved
by Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Industry, Science
and Technology of Russian Federation. By now the first
of these documents has been canceled, and the second has
not been registered with the Ministry of Justice and cannot,
therefore, be considered legally binding document.
What do we suggest Nothing new. To initiate in the executive
power bodies, namely in EMERCOM of Russia and
the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological and Atomic
Supervision, a proposal on developing common “Regulations
on Emergency and Rescue Teams” that would establish clear
criteria for emergency and rescue teams formation; define
head counts for emergency and rescue teams and their control
bodies; include standard structures of such teams and
their control bodies for different types of companies; define
standard norms for the amount of special machines
and equipment; and other issues. Until it is done, we cannot
speak about containment and damage minimization. We are
to get such consequences:
We are to continue destroying the special machinery and
equipment in such a way: (Pic. 3).
And we are to bury our rescue workers: (Pic. 4).
That’s all, thank you for your attention. (Pic. 5).
A.V. Moskalenko: Creepy pictures. Your questions,
please.
S.I. Gruzd, “Bezopasnost TEK (Safety in Fuel and Energy
Complex)” Magazine, “Industriya Bezopasnosty”
Russian Information Agency: Thank you for your report,
Igor Vyacheslavovich. You have actually tackled a very complicated
problem, it’s true. And it refers not only to potentially
hazardous facilities, but to a number of others as
well.
As I understand, you would like to bring back that old system
where everything was rigidly regulated – where, what
and how many should be established. Isn’t there another
way There should be some criteria, requirement and parameters
developed in order to establish such emergency and
rescue teams in accordance with them, shouldn’t they
I.V. Abramov: That’s what I have been speaking about.
S.I. Gruzd: But it should not be rigidly regulated, not just
stated in some norms that there should be 50 persons.
I.V. Abramov: I have not been speaking about that.
S.I. Gruzd: I understand. Then, thank you.
I.V. Abramov: If you look more closely at the last report,
you would see that it is about clear criteria for formation of
emergency and rescue teams.
S.I. Gruzd: Well, but I read here: “standard structures”. I
was, maybe, misled by words: “include standard structures
and define standard norms”.
I.V. Abramov: I am going to clarify what is the “standard
structure”. I’ve started my report with comparison of two entities:
emergency and rescue teams for a company with only
one hazardous unit and a big processing holding...
S.I. Gruzd: Yes, I’ve got it, thank you. And the last small
question. You might know that the State Duma passed
amendments to the above-mentioned Law No. 151 in the
first reading, and according to them all rescue workers, irrespective
of their employer’s business legal structure, would
have the the same legal status and social guarantees that are
available now to EMERCOM rescue personnel. To which extent
is it justified and how is it going to affect your company
budget And what about Law No. 100 “On Volunteer Fire
Brigades”, does it help you or not
I.V. Abramov: Federal Law No. 100, perhaps, should be
a subject of a separate report. Why Because at the moment
it actually liquidated volunteer fire brigades that operated in
companies, as within every company now there should be
one more company responsible for the volunteer fire brigade.
It’s my answer to the second part of your question.
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Pic. 2.
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As for the first part... How will amendments
to Law No. 151 affect us In no way! Now we
have those emergency and rescue teams and
bear all expenses. And I consider feasible that
rescue workers will retire earlier, for a simple
reason that today we cannot state that a rescue
worker is still capable of performing his functions
when he is 60 years old. Therefore, I consider
there will be no impact.
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Pic. 3.
A.N. Isakov, GCE: We can see that you take
it to heart and understand this subject matter in
depth. And, certainly, what you’ve told us is a
real headache both for personnel and management
of different companies. But since 22 May
this year this headache has increased considerably.
It’s because now data on the existence of
emergency and rescue teams must be included
in the documentation for license application.
Please, tell us whether you’ve already considered
implications of this change. Maybe, you, as
an expert, could advise us of something. What
should we do now to fulfill requirements of Order
No.454 What documents should we hand in
if you say that we actually have nothing
I.V. Abramov: What documents should we
hand in Only those that can be developed by
the company itself. The first is the standard
structure. The second is the training plan for
rescue workers. Third – what else could there
be Probably, list of special machines and equipment.
There are no other documents to be appended
to a license application.
Pic. 4.
A.V. Moskalenko: Let me take the liberty
to remind: you’ve already mentioned the situation
when there are no emergency rescue teams
nearby. We had an anecdotal situation. We were
developing an emergency response plan for a
company located on Spitzbergen. Well, you know
that Spitzbergen has a special legal status. There
is Norway not far from it, and it has necessary
rescue resources. But, unfortunately, the company
had to sign the contract with “Interspas”
located, as you know, near Moscow, with the
response time of 20 hours.
Well, the last question.
Question from the audience: I would like to
know your expert opinion on whether it is necessary
to establish own non-professional emergency
and rescue teams, in addition to concluding
contracts with professional rescue services. Is it
feasible and can it prove to be efficient
Pic. 5.
I.V. Abramov: If we follow the spirit and the
letter of the law, we must establish both professional
and non-professional emergency and rescue
teams in our companies operating industrial
hazardous facilities. Or we can sign contracts instead
of establishing our own professional rescue
teams. But nobody has relieved us of responsibility
to establish non-professional emergency and
rescue teams in accordance with Article 10 of Law
No. 116. However, rapidly developing automation
of all types of industrial activity is now reducing
the number of people located at the production
site, and hence I have a question: after introduction
of minimally-manned operations, when automated
equipment would work instead of us in the
technological process, who will be part of those
non-professional emergency and rescue teams
A.V. Moskalenko: It’s a rhetorical question,
as I understand.
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Safety Automation and Regular Process
Automation: Principal Differences
Claus Leonhard, Area Sales Manager International
Sales
Pilz Russland (Russia)
Good afternoon, Mr Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen.
Thank you very much for providing the opportunity to me
to talk to you today about safety automation versus conventional
or standard automation. Before starting with that
presentation, I would like to give you a short introduction to
our company. Pilz is a family-owned company located near
Stuttgart, in the south of Germany; Pilz operates internationally
and is recognized as worldwide leader in safe automation
technology. We have 29 daughter companies in the world
and covering further 15 countries with partners.
I would like to talk about safety automation this afternoon
versus conventional automation, and I would structure my
presentation – first, to talk about standards, to talk about
the process for risk reduction, risk elimination; and followed
by technical principles and how to reduce or to eliminate
risks; and later on to see how these technical principles are
applied in basic machinery safety examples.
We saw from this afternoon from presentations overall
that safety is a journey. There is a lot of stakeholders in that.
We see, of course, that we have legislation in place; we have
best practices which are shared among people – and are
shared during this conference among us, all coming from
different industries; we all have so to say “drivers”, which are
not so nice, like accidents, like incidents, injuries, damages
of machinery and so on; and of course, last but not least,
employee behavior. (Pic. 1).
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Pic. 1.
Pic. 2.
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64
Pic. 3.
Pic. 4.
Pic. 5.
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However, the machinery becomes more and
more complex, and also more and more costly,
so it is wise to pay attention on risks, on damages
which may happen. And it was also shown
in the past that safety automation has really
significantly reduced damages to machinery and
also injuries to the operators of the machinery.
The question is, how safety is integrated in
this machinery. Does it look like this here This
could be, let me say, “an industry blossom”. Of
course, also this ski-diver now is protected with
various means, but this is not what we mean by
technical risk reduction measures. (Pic. 2).
Also when we would refer to the standards,
we do not know whether all of these roll bars,
drag chutes, helmets will really reduce risks to
the required level we target for.
What is good is that we have standards and
legislation in place which helps us to really find
out the right means for reducing risks to the
desired level. Let’s talk about the new standards
we see. As a matter of fact, the European Committee
for Standardisation defined on the basis
of his contract with the European Commission
three categories of harmonized standards that
have been identified as A, B C standards for this
purpose. (Pic. 3).
The A standards describe the basic design
principles and terminology. They build somehow
a superstructure for machinery safety
standards, and they are concerned with basic
safety aspects of all machinery – for example
EN 292, EN 1200-1, which is also mentioned
here in this chart, or EN 14121-1 for risk assessment
itself.
If we look now for the B standards, they
cover more general safety aspects, as well as
special protective devices. And they are concerned
with regulations that apply to certain
machine groups, just as two-hand controls as
per European Norm EN 574, or EN 418 covering
e-stop equipment. B1 standards handle
all safety aspects, such as safety clearances or
calculation methods of listings – and examples
are, as mentioned, the EN 294 for safety distances
or the EN 563 about allowed temperatures
of hot surfaces. The B2-Standards handle
safety equipment, thus cover components or
devices, for instance safety components and
devices which are used on a larger number of
machines. An example is the norm EN 281 on
the development of pedals. You will also see
in this chart the EN 13849 – that’s one I will
come back later on to this – which is a key
standard for Pilz as a company to define and
develop safety control products.
Finally, C standards are the so called vertical
standards and are concerned with specific machines-
for example EN 692 for presses and EN
12415 for turning machines.
Let’s have a closer look to the safety control
system itself. When we at Pilz define and
develop a new safety control system, we also
have to consider the general principles and risk
analysis as given per EN ISO 12100 General Principles.
Safety of Machinery – General Principles
for Design – Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction.
What does it mean for us in Pilz, or in case
you design a safety control system First of all
the EN ISO 12100 determines how to protect
people against hazards which are not limited
sufficiently by inherent safe construction, or
how to use the protection equipment in case it’s

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Pic. 6.
Pic. 7.
Pic. 8.
needed. Protection equipment could be fixed
gear, it could be fences, it could be moving or
sliding doors with certain protection equipment
that monitors whether the doors are opened or
closed, or doors with interlocks, if deemed necessary.
(Pic. 4).
Another important guideline here in the
bottom is the EN IEC 60204 covering electrical
safety aspects. It deals with general requirements
concerning the electrical equipment of
machines.
Beyond the general principles and risk analysis
as per EN IS 12100 and the aspects of electrical
safety as per EN IEC 60204 there are
functional safety requirements for the safety
related part of a control system. First of all
there is EN ISO 13849. The norm deals with
safety of machinery – safety related part of
a control system. Second the EN IEC 62061 –
Safety of Machinery – Functional safety of
safety related electrical electronic and programmable
electronic control systems.
The difference between those two is that
the EN IEC 62061 deals mostly with electronic
and electric control products, while the EN ISO
13849 also includes control media, such as mechanic,
hydraulic, pneumatic and others. Finally
the ISO 13849 is also the successor of the Machinery
Directive 954-1.
Leaving the norms and legislation, how does
it look in real life, at least for us as an automation
safety company What are the general
elements or products in safety-related control
systems On the left side you can see various
input systems, which just can be emergencystops,
electro sensitive protective equipment,
monitored guarding and safety gates, and so
on. And we are controlling that by safety logic
controllers with an inherent safe design. On the
right side there are the output devices, such as a
switch-gear which controls or powers a motor;
or just a lamp for signaling. (Pic. 5).
I wonder if you have seen this risk graph
before in your life – I think, it’s well known.
It’s the risk graph as it is stated in the Annex A
of the Standard EN ISO 13849-1. For each safety
function of a machine the required performance
level has to be determined. The performance
level can be derived from the risk graph,
as we see it here based on a combination of
3 parameters: we have the severity of injury,
we have frequency and/or exposure time to
the hazard, and last we have the possibility of
avoiding the hazard, which then determine the
level of the required performance we should
achieve when looking at the risk. We assume
that at the beginning of the risk assessment
there is no required safety function available.
The risk graph gives the opportunity to determine
the level to which an individual risk will be
reduced by a control function, where a control
function is deemed necessary. (Pic. 6).
-However, this process is just a part of overall
risk assessment, of overall risk evaluation. Let
us have a closer look at the risk assessment as
per 14121. I’ve just drawn here a flowchart, of
how it looks in the machinery safety process.
It’s an iterative process, as also we saw it in
today’s other presentations.
At the beginning we have to look for the
limits of the machinery as per EN ISO 12100,
including technical specifications such as range
of energy supply, speed of movement, opera-
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66
Pic. 9.
Pic. 10.
Pic. 11.
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tional frequency, and other limits related to
environmental conditions etc. With the latest
standards for safety related controls it is increasingly
important to know these limits as
later on when a safety control system is designed
its performance may be degraded due
to wear out which is directly related to operational
frequency.
We then have to do the hazard identification
– who could be hurt, when and how
– Throughout all relevant machinery lifecycle
phases. And then there is the requirement to
estimate the risk in terms of quantity of appearance,
and to evaluate, whether it will be severe
or more or less without harm. As an outcome
we will see at that time whether a risk reduction
measure is required or not.
At this part of the process according to
EN ISO 12100 we have to answer the question
whether the risk has been adequately reduced.
If the result is no, we will do the iterative risk
reduction process.
Of course we always prefer an inherent safe
design with all hazards eliminated, so that there
would be no risk. But it’s our experience that
people normally do the safety evaluation at the
end of the machine design, not at the beginning.
So, they will say: “Hay, everything is in
place, and the process will run wonderfully, but
we have some risks – how to reduce, how to
eliminate those now”
The next step is to introduce safeguarding
measures. It is at this stage that the required
level of performance of a safety function must
be determined through the use of either EN
ISO 13849-1 or EN 62061 as we saw before.
After safeguarding measures, the standard EN
ISO 12100 refers to complementary measures to
further reduce remaining residual risks to an acceptable
level. This could be done for instance
by applying training, signage and implementation
of warning equipment.
Getting to some fundamental basics of
safety devices, it’s key for machinery safety
to talk about redundancy and diversity. I’ve
brought two pictures here to show the redundancy:
two suspenders – yes, it’s nice, looks a
little strange, but it works probably. We have
multiple systems performing the same safety
function in parallel. I have a example for diversity
on the right side– probably, it’s a more
advanced system: we use multiple, varying
systems designed to perform the same safety
functions in parallel.
To provide you with another example of
how to make products inherent safe I would
like to show what is key for safety relay technology.
We see here a relay with mechanically
linked contacts – you can see it here, here…
The contacts of so called positive-guided relays
are not only actuated by pushing action but are
force-guided via a mechanical link. It means
that over the entire life-cycle the normally open
contact here and the normally closed contact
of the relay are never closed at the same time.
This is done and ensured by the design itself.
(Pic. 7).
What happens if the contact in the middle,
for instance, now is welded The normally
closed contacts then cannot close when I try to
close this switch here, because it cannot move
further on to the right side. Welding here hinders
this left one from moving, from closing.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Pic. 12.
Pic. 13.
Pic. 14.
Making break contacts never close simultaneously,
as said. However, self-testing is also an
important feature of these positive guided relays,
safety circuits can be realized with these
ones. (Pic. 8).
Another principle I would like to talk about
is implemented in interlocking devices – and
again they also have some inherent safe design
inside. We talk about Positive Mode Actuation.
On the left-side we see here schematics for the
hinge with a contact here. The gate is closed,
and the spring keeps the contact closed. We
see the hinge here, with a certain shape of the
hinge, and the contact here is closed. The spring
is unloaded, but it is closed. We now open the
gate against the force of the spring, the contact
is opened. This principle is called Positive Mode
Actuation. (Pic. 9).
As an opposite example, I’ve also made a
sketch here for non- Positive Mode Actuation.
On the left side again the gate is closed, and
the contacts are closed with the spring compressed.
What happens now here, if the door is
opened – The contacts are now relying on the
spring force to be opened. (Pic. 10).
How does it look in the application here
Again an example for non- Positive Mode Actuation:
in the event of spring breaking, the
contacts will remain intact leading to an unsafe
state. When the door is moved, the spring does
not react and does not open the contacts here,
if needed. (Pic. 11).
Ok, there’s an animation missing – it was
intended to be an exercise for you in the evening.
The question is whether this is Positive
Mode Actuation or whether this is non-Positive
Mode Actuation We see the mechanical
switch, the way it is mounted on this sliding
door; it is already compressed, and in case
the spring is broken, it cannot lift the hinge
to open the contact. So, this is non- Positive
Mode Actuation. (Pic. 12).
If you just mount it in the opposite way as
shown, the spring is relieved at the beginning,
and by moving, by opening the door the hinge
is pushed down and the contact will open,
whether the spring is broken or not broken.
(Pic. 13).
These were just some examples of how safety
products are inherently safe just based on
their technical design.
Before getting closer to examples of machinery
safety implementations I would like to
talk about some safety architectures, here with
examples of safety relays and basic electrical
design principles. On the left side there is an
application up to Category 2. A safety relay is
connected via a single channel wiring, there is
no redundancy at the input, as we can see it
on the slide. The standard requires periodical
testing and detection of faults, respectively. In
the middle we can see Category 3 example –
OK, it’s obvious difference is here that we have
a two-channel input wiring, however, crossshorts
could not be detected here, between
the wires and also within the buttons as the
wiring is done to the same voltage potential.
For achieving Category 3 finally I have either to
put these cables into the cabinet or I need to
mount them in a wiring cable channel to protect
them against damage. Finally, on the right side
Category 4 – it is obvious that we now have 2
separate input circuitries with different voltage
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Pic. 15.
Pic. 16.
Pic. 17.
levels. This allows now to detect cross-shorts
between the wires and between the operating
buttons. Also the unit itself does self-diagnostics,
so we have also all the requirements met
for Category 4. (Pic. 14).
I am bad in timing, so I’ll accelerate a little
bit.
Safety controllers basically consist of at
least two different standard PLCs from different
manufacturers. We have two different
controllers inside with different compilers. This
is to ensure diversity and redundancy. Each inbuilt
PLC gets all the signals from the inputs,
calculates them. The output result has to be
same at the same time for both channels at
all time, otherwise the PLC will go into a safe
state.
Let’s now have look for machinery safety
applications as per ISO 13849-1 Category 3.
The shown application is classified as Category
3. It contains two position switches with
at least one positive opening normally closed
function. This provides, which is also a basic
requirement for category 3, a single-fault
tolerance. The safety circuitry, you can see it
here, is redundant, detects errors in each of
the positions of the switches, and last but not
least, two contactors are incorporated on the
right side by the normally closed contacts. If
one of those contactors fails, either this or
this one, it is detected, and shutdown function
is still available because still one is live and
operating. (Pic. 15).
The example for Category 4 looks pretty
similar. We have again two position switches
on the left side, each one with a positive opening
normally closed function plus a normally
closed contact, that allows the prevention of
the safety gate manipulation. Whenever there
is a manipulation, we detect it with the safety
controller device in the middle. The safety circle
is redundant and detects errors in each of the
positions of the switches, as well as for safety
gates through position monitoring. And again
on the right side, with the same situation as
before, we have two contactors which are incorporated
into the safety circuitry via their normally
closed contacts, with the feedback loop
and so on, – this works then for Category 4.
(Pic. 16).
Again Category 4, now with a more sophisticated
technology, using a safety PLC. The use
of appropriate software can prevent manipulation
of the safety gates. The safety circuit is
multi-channel with cross-testing and it detects
errors in each of the position switches including
their wiring; here using test pulses.
Basically whenever talking about all these
applications, we have to look for the right sensors
or input devices, the right controllers and
proper output devices, to protect men and machine
and to be compliant with the standards.
All these products which we see here provide
high level of safety of applications up to Performance
Level e as per ISO 13849, or SIL 3 as
per IEC 62061. (Pic. 17).
I think that was my last slide. If there are
questions from your side, I am more than happy
to answer those now. Thank you.
A.V. Moskalenko: Colleagues, have any
questions, please No questions. Everybody was
scared with such great detail. Thank you for
your presentation.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
CONFERENCE HALL “BAKKARA”
Session “Occupational Safety and Health”
Objectives of the Employer under Conditions
of the Labour Protection Law Revision
Vladimir V. Savinov, Executive Director
National Society of Labour Sphere Auditors (Russia)
Good afternoon, dear colleagues!
It’s not a matter of mutual gratitude, but, Alexander Valeryevich,
I am really grateful to you personally for inviting
me. I’ve already had an opportunity to tell the same to Alexander
Vladimirovich.
Dear colleagues, pay attention: our professional life has
separated us, pure “labor protectors”, i.e. those who deals
with occupational safety and health, from those who deal
with industrial safety. We have separate meetings, we solve
different problems. And, in my opinion, it is very good and
right that you have gathered here experts from different
functional areas in order to discuss one common problem
of safety.
Alexander Valeryevich has set the common tone: changes
in legislation and challenges for employers in this connection.
I consider that my main task today is to inform you what
is going on with our legislative basis. The current situation is
further complicated with the last reorganization of the Ministry
– as they say, it threw the fat in the fire. It also raises a
number of questions. What direction is the regulatory system
moving What should employers wait for How fast are certain
regulations going to be introduced I’ll try to talk about
all these issues in brief. There is a saying: “If you want to
make God laugh, just tell him your plans”, but we still hope
that these plans are going to be realized.
I’ve been working in the sphere of occupational safety
and health for 16 years, but I can’t remember any other period
when legislation was changing so dramatically. Everything
that could be changed in legislation on occupational safety
and health has been changed. Within the nearest half a year
a key stage of major changes in legislation on occupational
safety and health will be completed.
Let us consider the Labor Code. You know that it was
fundamentally revised in 2006. 300 of 424 articles were
amended. And with all that, 37 new amendments have been
introduced into the Code lately. The last one was introduced
one month ago. And a number of further amendments to
the Labor Code are being prepared.
The major novelty, which is very important both for the
employer and for employees, lies in new compensation principles.
You know, it was stipulated in the Labor Code as long
ago as 2006. And a well-known Decree No. 870 regulating
this process has been adopted since then. Now, a number of
orders are going to be issued by the new Ministry in order
to complete reformation of the system and transfer to new
compensations, they are on the way, coming soon.
Another very important innovation and serious change in
the Russian Federation legislation is introduction of a new
notion – an occupational safety and health standard. I’d like
to attract your attention to this novelty. Unlike standards
of the Occupational Safety Standards System under GOST,
which we all know and have got used to and which are legally
classified as technical regulations, the new occupational
safety and health standards are obligatory for all employers.
And the standards of the Occupational Safety Standards System,
as you know, are of advisory nature, and an employer,
generally speaking, has the right to ignore them. And the
State had to amend respectively the Labor Code and introduce
a new notion – an occupational safety and health standard.
That will be a labor regulatory document, and it will be
approved within the frames of labor legislation, i.e. subject to
agreement with trade unions. And all requirements of those
documents will be obligatory.
So far only one occupational safety and health standard
has been adopted, and it is “Supply of Cleaning and/or Decontaminating
Agents to Personnel”. New hygienic regulations
are on the way and are coming soon. Working groups
have been created, and now they start working actively. New
occupational safety and health standards will be introduced
for all areas of occupational safety and health. I’ll repeat
it once more: occupational safety and health standards are
obligatory for employers.
There have been considerable changes in legislation on organizations
rendering services in the sphere of occupational
safety and health. You know, regulation in this sphere appeared
comparatively recently. The notifying procedures established
by the Ministry of Health Care and Social Development
of the Russian Federation for accreditation of organizations
rendering services in the sphere of occupational safety
and health have been in practice for 1,5-2 years. But now a
new amended version of Order No. 205 has been issued (I
am not giving away any secret, I will even give you links to
this Order). And a bit later I am going to tell more about new
measures prepared for organizations rendering services in the
sphere of occupational safety and health. The main issue: it
is defined what an employer should wait from this “army” of
service organizations that train you, assess your workplaces
and perform outsourcing functions.
A number of other amendments have been introduced
into the Labor Code lately.
A very important issue – all professional experts know
Decree No. 1060 on new rules of developing norms and regulations.
I think you should pay a special attention to this
document. Why There are two important issues there. Only
this document defines what can be considered state requirement
in the sphere of occupational safety and health. And
all requirements outside the scope of this document will be
of advisory nature. And this Decree No. 1060 contains a list
of normative documents with the state requirements in the
sphere of occupational safety and health that employers are
obliged to fulfill. This list has been considerably revised as
compared with what was valid not so long ago. A number of
regulations have been excluded. In particular, safety regulations,
Occupational Safety Standards System under GOST,
etc. Therefore, this document should become an indispensable
guide for those who manage occupational safety and
health activities.
In this regard, I would like to attract your attention to a
new provision in this document: any organization can develop
regulations in the sphere of occupational safety and health.
I appeal to all professional experts representing big corporations:
you now have the whole regulatory system for you to
develop a document, then the Ministry of Labor will legitimize
it and it will be enacted for whole Russia. And people
will remember you with gratitude. Or quite the opposite.
Serious changes are coming in connection with Russia
joining the WTO. A multi-functional group of experts was established
under the Ministry. Among others, representatives
of our Society are also in this group. This group will work
with harmonization of norms and regulations. 273 sanitary
regulations of Russia do not comply with European regulations
in some aspects. An action plan has been developed,
and in the nearest future, after completion of reorganization
procedures that are inevitable after establishment of a new
Ministry, we are waiting for changes in the sanitary regulations
of Russia.
I am going to give only two examples, as the most typical.
European conventions provide for a single common sanitary
noise regulation. As you know, we have different noise
regulations, depending on types of activity. It will be harmonized.
We have wonderful hygienic norms for women’s labor
conditions, which, I am sure, were written by a true gentleman
before the Women’s Day of the 8th of March. How
well it is all defined there! But European regulations contain a
norm missing in our normative documentation. An employer
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is obliged to provide an opportunity for a pregnant woman
to have a bed rest at work. It also must be harmonized.
If you monitor press publications, you know that a big
package of changes has been prepared to drastically increase
administrative responsibility of employers for failure to fulfill
requirements in the sphere of occupational safety and
health in two main areas. The first area is purely technical,
organizational. You know that now we have only one
article in the sphere of occupational safety and health for
non-fulfillment of which the administrative responsibility is
imposed on employers – article 5.27. The maximum fine is
defined there: up to 5000 rubles for a physical person; up to
50 thousand rubles for a legal entity. There is no definition
of violations. Everything is at the discretion of an inspector;
he defines who must be penalized and what should be the
value of the fine. At the same time, for example, in the regulations
on road safety there is a big section dedicated only
to violations. The safety belt is not fastened – this value of
fines, the double solid line was crossed – that value, speed
limit exceeded – another value. New occupational safety and
health regulations will be structured in the same way. Six new
articles of the Administrative Offense Code have been prepared,
specifying the violations: assessment not held, training
not done, medical examination not performed, etc. There is a
serious, well-structured change in this area. And the second
novelty is increase in value of fines: up to 50 thousand rubles
for a responsible physical person; up to 600 thousand rubles
for a legal entity.
I would also like to draw your attention to the Law “On
Accreditation in the Russian Federation”. It is also one of
steps on the way to our entry to the WTO. There are drastic
changes in accreditation of organizations rendering services
in the sphere of occupational safety and health. Our laboratories
– and there are over 660 certification centers now
on this market – will have to pass accreditation procedures
according to tough and stringent rules. But it is good for
employers.
New procedures have been issued for assessment, training
and for state expertise of working conditions. Minister
Tatyana Nikolaevna Golikova signed three orders on the lastbut-one
day of her work: on approval of new training procedures,
on new list of services and rules of accreditation
of organizations rendering services in the sphere of occupational
safety and health, and on new procedures for the state
expertise of working conditions. These are the documents
we’ve been waiting for a long time.
Let me refer to my experience: the most popular question
people always ask me is about the state expertise. Every
subject of the RF performs it in a different way. There are
different requirements in different territories. One expert
treats it this way, another expert – quite differently. The
new state expertise procedures allow unifying it all. They are
more explicit, detailed, and I hope that most of the problems
will be resolved.
Then the second question, also often asked: how is the accreditation
of organizations rendering services in the sphere
of occupational safety and health going to be organized
The new Order drastically changes the situation in this area.
Accreditation procedure is not any more notifying, inspection
control measures are introduced, and it is now possible to
suspend or withdraw an accreditation.
One more change that refers to organizations rendering
services in the sphere of occupational safety and health. New
article 19.19 on violations of uniformity of measurements has
been introduced into the Administrative Offense Code. Why
am I speaking about that with you, representatives of employers
Amount of the fines imposed on a laboratory for
a false measurement result will grow up to 500 thousand
rubles. I think you’ve all have heard that on our market there
are companies that falsify results of workplace assessments
without any measurements. And such laboratories are now
subject to regulation with such high penalty. This norm was
enacted in February, and so far it has not been widely used
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in practice, but I think we’ll see it used. At least laboratories
should seriously think about it, as well as those employers
who support that rotten working practice.
I want to stress that all these measures are taken, so
that you could be sure: any organization rendering services
to you is now under tough control by the state aimed to
ensure quality services. Therefore, I consider you should only
welcome such position of the state. Service organizations are
now moaning and pining, while taking a lot of efforts and
spending a lot of money to meet those requirements.
I would like to comment: how to choose an organization
rendering services in the sphere of occupational safety and
health Now we have 2286 organizations in the Register.
There are three types of services: training, assessment of
working places and outsourcing functions of an occupational
safety engineer. They have passed notifying accreditation in
accordance with the Labor Code. It’s not a final list; there are
a lot of those who would like to be there.
So, the first obligatory condition, if you want to conclude
a contract with an organization rendering services in
the sphere of occupational safety and health, – it must be
in the Register. Working with a company that is not in the
Register is just waste of money. It can even be considered
illegal business practices for the organization you work with.
And for you it can result in training or assessment being
declared invalid.
What would I like to attract your attention to The proof
of the accreditation is a letter signed by Deputy Minister or
a line in the Register. I would recommend that you’d better
look into the Register. About 20 organizations so far have
suffered suspensions of their accreditation, but they still
have an accreditation letter.
The second important issue is the sphere of accreditation
of the assessing company. Here, in this audience, we have
representatives of very serious sectors of industry, and during
assessment of working places you need measurements
of, so to say, exotic indicators, not just noise, light conditions
and 2-3 other standard parameters. Though assessment
centers usually have accreditation in rather wide scope of
activities, many of them have their own specialization. So,
don’t forget to ask representatives of an assessment center
what is the specialized area of their accreditation. Can they
measure those chemical substances or physical parameters
you are working with The same refers to training programs.
We have a lot of training centers, but, unfortunately, they
are mostly generalists. And we, certainly, need specialization
by industrial sectors.
And, besides, there is a requirement of the assessment
organization’s independence of the employer. It’s a new
requirement, but I think you’ve encountered it already in
your practice. A laboratory that is part of some organizational
structure cannot assess working places within the same
structure.
I have now been speaking about obligatory conditions.
But I would like to attract your attention to three more requirements
that are also very important. The first demand
is that the organization should not be listed in the Register
of Unfair Suppliers. There is such Register on the Public Procurement
site, and it includes not only assessment centers.
Unfortunately, some of our colleagues have been already
listed there. Do not neglect it, go and check it at the Public
Procurement site.
I highly recommend to work with companies that are part
of a self-regulatory organization, and not only because I represent
the first and the biggest self-regulatory association
of over 213 organizations rendering services in the sphere of
occupational safety and health all over Russia (in 57 subjects
of the Russian Federation, in 70 – including affiliates). It
is much more profitable for employers. Reliability is much
higher in such case because every member of our association
works according to the highest standards. We regularly audit
them, and you always can ask for additional information
about any our organization. And their responsibility towards

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
you is insured for one million rubles for each organization.
It increases their reliability for you, and you can be sure in
quality of their work.
The third issue is an economically justified price for the
service. Look at this slide.
This is a distribution of prices over regions. The price depends
on local conditions in different regions. It is clear that
Russian Far East is more expensive than the Southern Federal
District. But I would like to attract your attention to the next
slide.
This is a co-efficient showing how prices for working place
assessment decrease during tenders. I’ve used this example
many times, but I think it is very illustrative. Only a very naive
person can hope to find meat in pelmeni (meat dumplings)
sold at the price of 50 rubles. We all understand in this case
that the dumping price cannot ensure quality. But when it
comes to assessment prices, our common sense betrays us!
The price is decreased by 6 times during the tender! And it
means that for the money the winner gets (500–700 rubles
for a working place) it is impossible (!) to perform all the
necessary measurements, make assessments, gage instruments,
train experts, etc. It’s not a saving – it’s just waste of
money. I would like to attract your attention to the fact that
there cannot be a cheap assessment. It is a serious, costly
and important activity. We, as an association, take a number
of measures to exclude possibility for such false assessments
made for small money. Serious changes are coming
in connection with changes in the legislation. A new law is
being prepared on the federal purchasing system that would
include a number of anti-dumping measures, which will distinguish
this law from the well-known Law No. 94-FZ.
Taking into account our time limits, I would like to mention
only one more problem: compensations. It’s a vital problem.
Today, when all compensations are going to be provided
after results of the assessment of working places, based on
working conditions, both employers and employees will be
unhappy with the assessment results. An employee can be
unhappy if he used to get compensation and won’t get it
anymore after the assessment. An employer can be even
more unhappy if before 20 persons used to get compensations,
and after – over 1000 persons will. Assessment reports
will be scrutinized; they will go under the microscope. In this
connection I ask both employers and assessment organizations
to treat this process rather seriously. Now assessment
of working places is the key notion, and all legislation is
built around it. It must be held very professionally, in wellorganized
manner and in full compliance with all paperwork
requirements, all bureaucratic documentation. As, I assure
you, there will be a lot of court cases and expertises of assessment
quality.
It is all, unfortunately, complicated by the fact that our
legislation in this sphere has not yet proved its efficiency in
practice. I want to inform you about two more changes that
are going to take place in the nearest future. It is an amendment
to Decree No. 870 that I have already mentioned. The
current use of this Decree that regulates additional vacations,
shorter working weeks and extra payments after assessment
results has led to disagreement between different arbitration
courts. I know dozens of cases when absolutely different
decisions were taken for similar situations. A recent decision
of the Supreme Court of 4 April this year canceled all previous
compensation lists. In this connection the Ministry made
a proposal on amendments to Decree No. 870 and sent it
out to trade unions and employers for agreement, and now
it is actively discussed. If amended, the Decree won’t have
the direct force, but there should be ministerial orders, now
issued by the Ministry of Labor, and they are promised by
autumn. And from those orders it will be clear who has the
right for vacations, or shortened working week, or extra pay.
And it won’t be treated the same way as now, under Decree
No. 870: if you fixed the 3d class, you must provide all the
range of compensations to your employee. This is the main
direction our legislation development is taking now.
There is a huge amount of norms and regulations in the
sphere of occupational safety and health. I understand how
difficult it is to be familiar with all of them. On our website
we have published an updated list of all norms and regulations
that are currently valid: analysis procedures, sanitary
regulations and norms, etc.
We are glad to see new organizations rendering services in
the sphere of occupational safety and health in our society.
And we are glad when anybody asks for our help, and we
are ready to consult you in your choice of an organization
rendering services in the sphere of occupational safety and
health.
Thank you for your attention.
Question from the audience (Moscow State University
of Civil Engineering): In 2002 the Law on Technical Regulations
was enacted, it contains the list of all obligatory safety
regulations, and occupational safety and health regulations
were not included there. It resulted in that some people in
power consider that occupational safety and health is not
subject to technical regulations and should be excluded from
this sphere.
V.V. Savinov: Unfortunately, I can agree that it is so.
Today I’ve listened with great pleasure to the presentation
of a representative from Ukraine who has told that they
unified everything in one state authority. It is impossible to
divide the industrial safety and the occupational safety and
health. Equipment and people – they are always together,
and it is not important what the reason why the person lost
his hand was: because of the blood vessel rapture or because
of his bad training. I began my presentation with the words
of gratitude to organizers of this event for their efforts to
create such meeting places where we, experts from different
sectors, can think over our common problems. Unfortunately,
in all documents of the former Ministry of Health
Care and Social Development the same idea could be traced:
this is technical regulation (not our sphere of responsibility),
and that is our sphere of occupational safety and health.
Technological norms are of advisory nature (only Technical
Regulation is obligatory), and occupational safety and health
standards are obligatory. And another very important element
– all occupational health and safety documents are
agreed in the Russian Trilateral Commission. And tough discussions
are going on there.
Occupational Risk as a Significant Problem
of Human Security at Industrial Facilities
Gregory A. Tsirkin, Deputy Chief Engineer
Naftan (Belarus)
First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to organizers
for a wonderful organization of this Forum and for the
opportunity to make a presentation for you.
Dear ladies and gentlemen! First I want to present short
information about our company. OAO “Naftan” is one of the
leading producers of petroleum derivative and petrochemical
products on the European market. “Naftan” is located in the
north of Belarus. The current company capacity is 10.7 million
tons of oil processed per year. The refinery yield in 2011
was 75.5 %. The oil refinery profile includes fuels, oils and
fragrances. The oil processing is done at 40 process facilities.
We produce gasoline and diesel fuels, heating oil, jet fuel,
marine fuel, masuts, aromatic hydrocarbons, benzol, toluol,
lubricating oils, asphalt bitumen and other petroleum derivatives.
In 2008 “Polymer” plant was merged with our company
as a result of Belorussian petrochemical industry reorganization.
Now we have even wider specter of oil processing. It
now includes high pressure polyethylene, acrylic fibers, other
performance chemicals, etc.
It is impossible to keep a position on the petrochemical
market without development. We started a large-scale
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reconstruction in “Naftan” in 1990. In order to reach our
targets, we built: facilities of mild hydrocracking, highpressure
hydrocracking, viscosity breaking, thermal cracking,
isomerization, as well as Tatoray unit, paraxylene plant, vacuum
distillation unit, etc. We spent 317 million UDS for this
modernization during the period of 1999-2004. The process
modernization allowed reducing masut output from 38% to
27%, while increasing light-oil products output till 45%. The
International Oil Refiners Association declared “Naftan” to be
the best plant on the CIS territory in 2005. We spent 641 million
UDS for modernization during the period of 2005-2010.
Now we are in the third modernization period of 2010-2015,
it will include 5 stages, 28 investment projects in total. The
cost of the investment program without VAT and customs
duties will be 1.396 billion USD. Realization of this program
will allow “Naftan” to get up to the level of the most advances
oil refineries in the world, both in processing intensity
and complexity.
And now – back to the subject matter of my presentation.
Ensuring efficiency and reliability of professional activity
becomes the main direction in the sphere of occupational
safety and health under the current conditions of growth in
the leading industries of Belarus. It is also necessary to protect
health and working capacity of people affected by unfavorable
factors of industrial environment. When we speak
about occupational safety and health on the company level,
personnel safety is first of all related to impact of harmful
and hazardous production factors, and work intensity and
hardness. Unfavorable working conditions lead to high levels
of professional and production-related illnesses. Petrochemical
and oil-refining industries are among the sectors with the
highest number of employees working in unfavorable conditions.
Thus, creation of favorable working conditions, orientation
to protection of personnel life and health in the process
of working activity, optimization of occupational safety
and health management, decrease of impact of harmful and
hazardous production factors on workers’ health, protection
of employees from harmful impacts of production factors at
working places, solving problems of working area air saturation
with hydrocarbons, and reduction of negative impact of
hydrocarbons on employees’ health condition are nowadays
quite actual and have a great practical importance.
A lot of different notions are now used to define safety
level of production activities, and they are often considered
to be synonyms, but at a closer look you can see that their
meanings are different. Experts from different industries in
their messages and reports constantly speak not only about
hazard identification, but also use such term as risk as well.
Different definitions of the term “risk” can be seen in scientific
literature. And it has different meanings in different contexts.
If dictionaries of the modern Russian language define
meaning of the word “risk”, borrowed from French, as “danger”,
you can also see another meaning: “take a chance in the
hope of a favorable outcome or relying on one’s luck”.
There are two peculiarities in the meaning of the term
“risk” that are sometimes overlooked. First of all, it is about
possible, potential danger of incurring loss or injury, not
about its realization. The general scientific definition of risk is
“possibility of suffering harm or loss”. Second, peculiarity of
the professional term “risk” is in that it involves a quantitative
assessment of the potential hazard, and not only the statement
it exists. What is common in all the quoted definitions
is that risk implicates uncertainty: will the unwanted event
happen or not We can legitimately affirm that the term
“risk” has taken its place in everyday vocabulary of a modern
person. Moreover, now they state in scientific theories that
risk is an indispensable element of human life. First of all, it
refers to notions of production and professional risks.
Just compare two definitions:
Production risk is possible threat to health and life of a
worker during his labor activities.
Professional risk is possibility of confirmation of loss of
health or death of an insured person connected with his
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performance of responsibilities under a labor agreement or
contract.
It is easy to see that in both cases we speak about production
activity of an employee. And what is meant is infliction
of harm at a production site. In other words, production and
professional risks are equated, and, moreover, the definition
of a term “professional risk” even does not contain any reference
to professional activity. Besides, it is not clear what
to consider professional risk if an insured person combines
several professions under his contract.
At the same time we think that there is a considerable
difference between these two notions. It is enough to take
into consideration that assessment of professional risks allows
comparing professions but does not allow comparing
companies with regard to the extent of harm inflicted to the
employees’ health. At the same time, assessment of production
risks can give an idea about the occupational safety of
all employees or some groups of employees of a company,
but does not focus attention on their professions.
The notion of professional risk in scientific literature is
most clearly distinguished from the notion of production risk
when labor hygiene is discussed. Analysis of scientific literature
has proved that, in spite of interest to professional risk,
scientists have not yet come to common understanding of the
content of this notion. We can say that professional risk, if
we speak about an individual worker, is a part of his production
risk. Another element of the production risk is the level
of organizational development of the company that can help
either increase or decrease occupational safety for a worker
of a certain profession at this company as compared with the
safety level that is common for this profession in general. Unfortunately,
in national practice, including legislative practice,
a wider definition of professional risk is mostly used.
The basic values in modern society are the following: ability
to work, earn money to live a full life, realize creative
potential through labor activity and to reach the desired social
status. Therefore, human health, life and professional
aptitude of a person are the key issues of social justice in any
country, and they are in the core of insurance protection of
employees from professional risks.
The modern society has come to understanding that human
health protection depends greatly on the condition of
industrial environment. And in the light of these facts new
problems constantly arise in the sphere of occupational safety
and health. In particular, the problem of human health
protection in production activities. Analysis of professional
literature shows that technological processes used at oil refineries
are sources of contamination of working area air
with harmful substances. The main of them are hydrocarbons
and their derivatives. Such chemical environment has a negative
impact on a human body and leads to development of
occupational illnesses.
It is well known that it is impossible to eliminate all hazardous
and harmful factors at production sites, as some of
them are inherent for obligatory technological processes. But
their harmful effects can and must be controlled. Hence,
it is necessary to use quantitative assessments of risks for
employees’ health, and those assessments can be used when
making necessary calculations related to planning of curative
measures. In 2009 “Naftan” introduced and certified new systems
of occupational safety and health management, OHSAS
180001 and STB 180001. Identification of risks is held periodically,
once in three years. During a follow-up identification
of risks in 2011, 34 new unacceptable risks were identified,
which had been missed earlier because of incorrect estimates
based on the old methodology before it was corrected.
The prevailing hazards with unacceptable risks were:
- increased noise;
- presence of slippery surfaces;
- moving parts of equipment and appliances;
- high-rise location of working surfaces.
Therefore, the company developed a program of occupational
safety and health management, including measures

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
initiated by the company to reduce the identified unacceptable
risks.
One more factor that contributes to creation of safe
working conditions is personnel training, including skill development.
Taking into account measures to improve occupational
safety and health at the company and results of
analysis of materials on professional illnesses during the last
years (both number of cases and days lost), recommendations
and measures were developed to decrease harmful impact
of production factors.
The following recommendations can be suggested:
- thorough development of organizational and technical
measures to improve labor conditions at working places;
- modernization of obsolete technological equipment;
- identification and diagnostics of illnesses of employees;
- periodic hazard identification and risk assessment;
- obligatory use of personal protective equipment required
by norms and regulations;
The following measures to create safe working conditions
can be suggested:
- improvement in sanitation and housekeeping support of
working places;
- use of modern personal protective equipment;
- use of analytical control instruments;
- development of hygienic norms for hydrocarbons, when
they are absent.
The use of modern analytical control instruments to measure
content of harmful substances in the air of working
zones will allow decreasing considerably the sampling and
analyzing time, and get more precise data on concentration
of harmful substances. The use of modern personal protective
equipment will ensure more efficient protection of workers
from the impact of harmful and hazardous production
factors.
In the conclusion of my report I would like to thank everybody
for your attention and wish you safe work.
Ensuring Common Safety is Everybody's Business.
Developing Occupational Health
and Safety Culture and Environmental
Protection in “Sakhalin-2” Project
Alexey A.Zasutsky, Chief Engineer for OH&S
Sakhalin Energy Investment Company (Russia)
Dear ladies and gentlemen! Dear colleagues!
First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to organizers
of this conference for the opportunity to present
experience of our company to colleagues from other industrial
sectors. We have what to share with others. But today
I would like to focus your attention on an issue of human
factor. How can we achieve improvement in the industrial
safety culture and responsibility of employees
It is a vital issue, especially taking into account a number
of catastrophic accidents that have occurred not only in the
Russian Federation, but also abroad. As you know, in each
case the so-called human factor was a direct or indirect reason
of the accident. We often talk about the human factor,
and it has become to be perceived as a constant problem.
And the problem that it is difficult to control.
So, I am going to use our company’s experience as an
example and tell you what instruments we used to transfer
this negative factor into a very useful key element of the
safety system.
Before I start describing the most successful instruments,
I would like to tell some words about our project. Project
“Sakhalin-2” is one of the largest oil and gas projects in the
world. It was realized in two stages. During the first stage,
the stationary offshore platform able to operate in severe ice
conditions was installed for the first time in whole Russia.
But oil production and offloading from the platform could
only be seasonal due to the limited navigation period. The
Okhotsk Sea is covered with ice for about half a year, so the
project had a limited efficiency.
After this stage was successfully completed, the company
shareholders took a decision on a full-scale development of
the second stage during which we constructed infrastructure
facilities on the Island of Sakhalin, installed three ice-resistant
offshore platforms, an integrate onshore technological complex,
a system of offshore and onshore pipelines with the
total length of about 1600 km and a production complex in
the southern part of the island that ensures round-the-year
offloading of oil and gas in the water area that is not frozen
in winter. For the first time in Russia we built a liquefied
natural gas plant that is one of the most efficient plants in
the world. Two factors contributed to this success. The first
factor is the low temperature that allows liquefying gas more
efficiently. Plus the state-of-the-art technologies used by the
company in this plant. Beginning from March 2009, we dispatch
liquefied gas to our key customers located in Japan,
other Asian countries and to the USA.
“Sakhalin Energy” Company was founded in 1994 and has
four main shareholders. Gazprom owns the controlling block
of shares, Shell 27.5%, and there are two Japanese shareholders
– Mitsui and Mitsubishi.
On this slide you can see views of our platforms, onshore
technological complex and LNG plant.
This project was built in a very complicated environment.
First of all, Sakhalin is a seismically active zone. Earthquakes
of magnitude 8 Richter scale have already happened there.
You must have heard about a tragedy in Neftegorsk that
was practically totally destroyed. Besides, there are rather
severe climate conditions, including often storms, strong
snow storms, complicated with underdeveloped road infrastructure.
Specifics of operation on offshore platforms access to
which is rather limited, especially under conditions of a short
navigation period, made us to solve the task of establishing
such system of occupational safety and health that would
allow us to identify hazardous situations and potential incidents
before they have already occurred. It is vital because
operation of offshore hazardous facilities has such great inherent
risk that in case of an accident you can never save
all you personnel even if you have world-class response and
rescue systems. As practice shows, tragic events occur in oil
and gas industry when you suffer damages and are subject
to high risks even if there are state-of-the-art rescue means
in place. Therefore, we took a decision: we should build such
safety system that would use human factor as its key element.
Any organization can be compared with a living body. Relations
between management and personnel are like the nervous
system. Management is the brain; employees are nerve
endings, neurons. If the organization has a low corporate
culture, employees try not to inform the management about
all kind of bad news, any potentially hazardous incidents.
People are afraid of telling truth. In such organizations they
often say that “no initiative goes unpunished”, “the horse
that draws best is most whipped”, and many other stereotypes
are prevailing. So, you can compare such organization
with a person who hurts his foot when stepping on a nail,
but his nervous system does not bring information about the
pain up to his brain. Such person can repeatedly step on this
nail until he can see a pool of blood at his feet.
Using this comparison, we can look at the company operation
in the same way. If we motivate personnel so that
they report all near-misses and dangerous working conditions
and if we take preventive measures in due time, we
can reach the target that can seem unattainable at the first
glance: to exclude serious incidents at our production facilities
totally.
From experience of our company, we can say that we
have almost reached this target by taking a complex of
measures to motivate our personnel and change their cultural
attitudes. If we look at our project statistics, we can
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see that the total number of lost time incidents has considerable
decreased – almost by 90% since 2004 till the
present moment. The total amount of registered incidents
has decreased by 83%. We have had zero level of incidents
in the sphere of road safety for the last 2,5 years. It means
that none of our employees and those of our contractors
has suffered injuries.
How have we reached such results I keep my fingers
crossed, but still I hope we can stay on that level of safety.
While developing our safety systems, we’ve used accumulated
European experience. People there have come to the
conclusion that, if a company wants to reduce the number
of incidents, it should first of all introduce technological solutions
that would protect employees from hazardous factors.
Thus you would considerably decrease the number of incidents,
though would not reach the zero level.
After you have introduced technological protective barriers,
you should develop the system of managing occupational
safety and health. You should include efficiency indicators
of occupational safety and health into the total assessment
of the company efficiency. It means that premiums, bonuses
of managers and employees should reflect some indicators in
the safety sphere. There must be a planning system, budget
allocations, internal audits, etc.
Introduction of such measures allows reducing considerably
the number of incidents already at the next stage. But
even after that you would not be able to reach the zero level.
As you still have the problem of employees’ behavior and
culture. Therefore, we decided to pay a special attention to
these factors. We developed several tools and used them to
address different levels of culture.
I want to explain why we used such occupational safety
culture ladder. We’ve taken it from our colleagues in Shell.
This culture ladder was developed in Europe in the last decade,
and it is first of all used to develop right approaches
for different levels of occupational safety development. It is
very important because some managers do not understand
the process of the occupational safety management in the
right way. People on the Pathological Level demand policelike
measures: tough control, harsh discipline, inevitable punishment.
Using such methods, you can have some improvement
of indicators in the sphere of occupational safety and
health. But if you use the same methods in a group that has
already reached the Proactive Level, where the level of trust
between managers and employees is rather high, you would,
on the contrary, demotivate your personnel, the level of trust
will decrease and the culture level will go down.
It is this approach that can help adjust correctly any program
in the sphere of occupational safety and health. What
actually have we done We analyzed the actual level of culture
in different company divisions. We found out that some
of our contractors were even on the Pathological Level, some
were on the Reactive Level (when conclusions are made only
after an incident investigation), others were on the Calculative
Level (where everything is clearly defined – how the
personnel is motivated, what bonuses are paid, which budget
allocations exist). And we found out that many of our working
groups were as high as on the Proactive Level. It was
especially evident at the offshore facilities. I mean the work
climate at offshore platforms is similar to that at warships.
People understand that they are part of one big family. A
mistake made by one of them can be fatal for everybody.
And it was the factor that placed offshore platforms in the
forefront of development.
In fact, we had a lot of elements in our program, but
due to time limits I would like to tell you at least about
three of them. For those divisions and contractors that were
on the Pathological Level, i.e. that culture level where they
paid practically no attention to occupational safety issues and
lived in accordance with a saying “A peasant needs thunder
to cross himself and wonder”, we developed ten vital safety
rules. These rules are based on accidents with fatal consequences
that occurred during the last years. So, we analyzed
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the available statistics of accidents and identified violations
that had led to those tragic events. As a result, 10 rules were
defined.
These are 6 main rules:
1. I won’t come to my working place being drunk.
2. I won’t come to my working place being drugged.
3. I won’t smoke in the area of hydrocarbons processing.
4. I won’t bring substances that can lead to spark occurrence
and ignition of hydrocarbons to my working place.
5. I won’t exceed speed limits while driving company motor
transport.
6. I won’t use mobile phones and other means of communication
while driving.
The violation of first three rules results in immediate dismissal
in our company.
An important achievement of this program is a complete
absence of double standards. It is not important whether
the violation occurred on the level of a company director
or a rank-and-file employee. At every monthly meeting our
Executive Director states that we have the same approach to
everybody. We had some “show trials”, and the inevitable
character of discipline penalties, irrespective of rank, has led
to rather considerable improvement of discipline.
There are four other additional rules. Three of them are
again in the sphere of road safety. None of our drivers can
work unless he has taken a special course of defensive driving.
We train drivers to behave in such a way while driving
that they are constantly aware that other road users can
make mistakes. It means we have a preventive approach to
driving. And every passenger, while traveling in our transportation
vehicles, must have his safety belt fastened. And all
long-distance trips must be prepared with compiling a specific
plan including risk analysis and trip feasibility.
Those simple rules and inevitable character of penalties
for the failure to follow them have considerably helped to
improve discipline. But, again, such measures work only on
the Pathological or Reactive Levels.
In order to go to the next level, we must involve managers.
As it was demonstrated by the well-known psychological
research in the sphere of industrial safety held in the last
decade in Europe, managers shape the behavioral structure in
any organization. They are like searchlights, as they illuminate
the company and create movement inside it. A heavy burden
of responsibility is upon them. They have no choice whether
they should be an example for others or not. They are always
examples for their subordinates. But they can be both positive
and negative examples. They have a choice: what kind of
cultural model will they transmit to employees
In order to train managers in shaping the correct behavioral
models, we analyzed data about famous historical figures,
such as Marshall Zhukov, Peter the Great, Mahatma
Gandhi, Mother Teresa and many others. We searched for
qualities that made thousands of people follow them. And
we found out that the main element of their influence on
many people was a sincere faith in what they were doing.
Their faith in that it is actually done for a good cause.
We developed a special course for managers, including
psychological training that provided them with a general review
of main techniques: how to motivate personnel to follow
their example In addition to theoretical training, General
Director developed and approved the schedule of on-site visits
by all top managers. It means every manager must visit
the industrial facility reporting to him every quarter. And it
is not an audit, not an inspection. During those visits the
manager must come to the site and demonstrate his sincere
care of employees. He communicates with them, talks
to them, and he tries to be on equal terms with them. It’s
an absolutely new behavioral model, and at first we even
had some problems, as there is certain behavioral stereotype
among officials and top managers. But later, when managers
came to understanding that their sincere behavior resulted in
equally sincere respect towards them, the new model began
working. Practically all managers have believed that a good

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
indicator in the sphere of occupational safety and health is
a good work indicator and reflects the fact that they are
good managers. We’ve managed to connect two notions: a
good and efficient manager is the person who has order and
safety in all working places.
So, we introduced a clear and transparent system of reaction
to violations. We motivated managers by creating a
positive behavioral model. But we still needed the last element.
To involve personnel was the most difficult. And we
were afraid that we could encounter the same established
stereotypes. People are afraid of being involved in solving
some problems.
So, again, we had to develop a special program during
which we involved personnel into taking different measures.
We tried to explain: it is not important what they are doing,
what specialization they have. Their main task is to come,
earn money and ensure well-being for their families. And
they can ensure the well-being only when they are alive,
healthy and come home from work without injuries.
We have done a lot of work educating drivers and other
workers involved in hazardous activities. It is not enough just
to declare such approach. It is very important to provide employees
with a tool they could use to inform management
about hazards at their working places. And we developed an
efficient intervening program during which we trained personnel
to intervene in unsafe situations at work places and
stop working. The company CEO stated that every employee
had the right to stop technological process if he saw that
working conditions were unsafe. Nobody would penalize him
for it. Moreover, he will be encouraged and rewarded. All the
costs connected with production process stoppages, leading
in some cases to down time, are not comparable with the
advantage the company gains through involvement of thousands
of people who work in the project and daily report of
some potentially hazardous situations. By involving personnel,
we managed to change polarity of the human factor.
If you have any questions, I would be glad to answer
them.
Question from the audience: Well, you’ve shown here
the evolution process in the sphere of occupational safety
and health and there you’ve divided it in time into three
phases: technological solutions, management system and occupational
safety and health culture. Isn’t it possible to combine
them and elaborate all three in parallel
A.A. Zasutsky: Actually we work with them in parallel.
I’ve only told that you can’t reduce the number of incidents
to zero only with technological solutions and administrative
measures, without uplifting the culture of personnel. Formation
of a new culture is the last element that allows you to
reach the target.
Emergency Safety Shower Systems
and their Evolution with regard
to the Industrial Market in Russia
Neil Wallace, Director of Sales
Haws Corporation (Switzerland)
First of all, thank you very much. It is a privilege indeedto
be here today. “Menyazovut” (My name is Neil Wallace. “Ya
iz Sholtlandia” (I’m from Scotland). I’m sorry, that’s all the
Russian I can speak right.
It is a indeed privilege to be here today on behalf of Haws
Corporation to talk to you about the evolution of emergency
equipment with regard to emergency safety showers, especially
for the Russian market.
Next slide, please. This one, yes.
As you have seen, by magic I somehow instantly translated
this slide.
What I’d like to talk about today is split into 5 main areas.
The first area will be the Wisconsin study, which is an
independent study with regard to emergency equipment and
safety showers. It seems, within evolution of safety equipment
in Russia, it’s important to make reference to some international
standards. So, I’d like to rake you through, briefly,
some of the main points of American ANSI standard – so,
in terms of ANSI Z358-2009. Also, as the third point, I’d
like also to take you through some of European standard,
to make reference with regard to evolution and the reference
we’d made there. As the fourth point, I would like also
to take you through some information with regards to the
way the best practices are happening throughout the world,
with regards to technicalwater solutions. So, what I am talking
about there is systems whereby we are able to design
and implement, and council people in whatever industry they
would be towards the issues of technical water systems. And
fifth, and finally, I am going to summarize.
So, to start, – why do we actually need emergency safety
equipmentWhy do we need emergency safety showers The
goal of the game for all of us should really be to minimize
time spent in hospital. So, while you are working at the plant,
such as petrochemical plant, such as an oil and gas plant, at
some stage you may or may not require a safety shower. The
goal of the game, as I told,is really try to minimize and the
time spent in hospital. For reference purposes, I would also
like to take it through just a little bit about the study, independent
study, which was commissioned and which copies
will be available, both electronically and on the USB stick. But
it’s an independent study which dates back to 1982 regarding
the use of emergency safety showers within the industrial
environment. Firstly, this study is split into two. This study, as
I said, was from 1982 and from a sample size of 20 people.
And what we established – on the left-hand side of the
slide there – shows the number of people that were actually
receiving first aid, in other words – emergency shower access.
From our sample size of 20 people 2.5% received fullthickness
burns, and, as a consequence, had an equivalent
of 7-7,7 days of hospitalization. On the right-handside of the
slide you will notice that 16 people were in the sample size,
and 45 times that amount of people actually receivedfullthickness
burns, and almost to a factor of 3 did people actuallyrequired
the hospitalization. So, the study speaks for
itself. This was an independent study taken, as you can see
from the slide, from the Wisconsin School of Engineering.
So, the independent study that ratifies the promotion of such
material in industrial capacity.
The converse situation was also experienced from alkali
burns. A similar experience. We can have another study example
where there were 16 people.
Next slide, please.
So, if we are looking at alkali burns this time, in term of
the sample size, the mortality rate, which is inside something
we’ve potentially mentioned here, was 9.5%. And representation
of people requiring skin grafting was 19%. This
was for the people who received access to emergency safety
shower equipment. On the side of those who did not receive
proper first aid, from the sample size of 19 people more than
double, 21% actually unfortunately died in the situation, and
36% – so, quite a substantial amount more, requiredfull skin
grafting.
These studies, like I say, that’s something that was made
back in 96, it’s sure that to some extent the evolution and
life of time of these systems have been in place and have
been accessed.
So, to drive the best practice through the world, it is important
that we take recognition of international best practices.
What standard should we be using At present there
does not seem to be a specified standard in place in the local
market here, but what I’d like to take it through now, like
I mentioned before, is just a brief overview of applying the
standards and looking at some best practice, extrapolating
and taking main points from these reference documents.
Basically, what is the best choice What guarantees the
best performance The shower by-force system that meets
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75

76
both ANSI and European standards. By doing so, we will
possibly have the best performance,we have user comforts,
and will promote the proper use. For using the safety shower,
these are minimum required performance and minimum
amount of time that one should stand in any safety shower.
This is 15 minutes. So, this adherence to best practice, European
and American standards, gives us, and gives management
in due course, that peace of mind to () from the
employees.
The ANSI standard itself, by the American National Safety
Institute, was first published in 1981 and had revisions accordingly
in 1990, 1998, 2004 and 2009. It’s published by
the International Safety Equipment Association, and process
is accordingly prescribed. So, it’s been in force for many
years now, and has been changed, slightly modified as time
is going by.
Haws as a company actually sits in this standards committee
as well, and helps drive best practice throughout the
world. The ANSI standard is used as a reference point both in
Europe, both in Australia, and India as well. It’s independent,
and it’s also used by manufacturers’ test agencies throughout
the world. Minimum performance is the key here.
Taking a few, a couple of brief areas within, as you can
see a couple of examples of combination of safety shower
on the left, and an eye-wash on the right. So, a safety
shower should always worksimultaneously, at the same time
as eye-wash. It should be at the right time switched on and
working shortly, and safety eye-wash on the right-hand side
should also cover the eyes and the face at the same time, so,
in term of getting a full 15-minute flush and also getting a
full eye-and-face wash at the same time. (Pic. 1)
This next slide gives us a slight overview and intricacies of
the eye-wash itself. The left-hand document explains a little
bit in terms of it simulates where the eyes would be, at 20
cm above the floor. There is also systems in place from our
company where floor control also exists in order to avoid the
situation when you do not pressure absorbs, and too strong jet
of water comes through the mains supply. The left-hand side
also shows in terms of the nozzle and the cage width of the
eye-wash itself – it should be like that according to fitting the
face features of the majority of the population. So, eye coverage
verification is an important part of the standard there.
These are just 2 examples of lack of control in terms of
that, saying, eye-wash facility there on the left shows possibly
a pile of surge or lack of flow control, which is a small
valve that is installed upstream within the safety eye-wash
itself. On the right hand side you can see there’s too tall jet
as well. Most of the eye-wash systems and safety showers
we need are prescribed to be working between 3 and 6 bars
of pressure from the mains water supply. (Pic. 2)
These two examples show more like where the ideal line
of play should be for an eye-wash, with eye and face wash
at the same time, so it’s a combination. Like I said before,
this promotes a full 15-minute use, and also looks to the enduse
to benefit from the full use and comfort there as well.
So, the major consideration there within ANSI: the shower
that you may use in the hotel or at home is probably running
20 or 15 liters of water a minute; the safety shower what we
are talking here, in industrial capacity, upwards of 76 liters
per minute. So, you can imagine the kind of amount of water
that is needed to take acids, alkali, any other contaminants
off the body as quick as possible.
Accessibility is also a major factor here. The location of
such emergency equipment should be within ten seconds of
the risk-assessed danger point. But that’s 10 seconds of normal
working pace, it’s not sprinting pace, it’s not sprinting.
You are possibly in a stressful situation, when you received
an acid burn or alkali burn, on something on your body and
your face. So, that should also be the same level – we don’t
want people going upstairs or going downstairs to access the
emergency equipment.
Temperate water plays a part here, we see that within
a working standard the ideal temperature should lie somewhere
between 16 and 30 degrees C. This promotes the use
of comfort and compliance whereby the end user is willing
to stand in the shower for full 15 minutes.
Valve operation next – we emphasize the point that there
should be one specific movement in operation here. So, one
second or less in terms of making the eye-wash by push-like
or by pull-outoperate in one single movement.The valve will
be open, as I said before, for full 15 minutes.
Like any safety equipment, it should be well sign posted.
It should be accessed and well visible for the end user, to the
people at risk.
Safety green – international safety green is an international
color for safety emergency showers, and it’s an internationally
recognized issue that green is the best color as
opposed to red for fire safety
I would like to emphasize the fact that weekly and annual
testing is also very important. Making analogy to fire
safety equipment, we really have a fire extinguisher sitting
in the corner or not knowing whether it works or not. The
same analogy should be in place foremergency safety showers
and eye-wash – we should know that it works. It should
be tested weekly, it should be maintained, and it should also
be fully tested annually, and spare parts updated, removed,
etc., so we are in full confidence in these facilities.
Installation dimensions I will go on to in just in a second.
Next slide here shows a little bit in terms of parameters in
comparison between the American standard and the European
standard. The European standard talks about the minimum
height from the ground up, and the American standards talks
about 2100 mm in terms of height with the optimal level
where the shower should exist.
That’s, the European standard differs slightly in that –
we’ve got a diagram here that shows a little about the catchment
area of the water within the area of safety shower
itself. The catchment area is in terms of water dispersal from
the shower head itself,coming down on the person and ideally
catching people right about the shoulder level here which
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Pic. 1. Pic. 2.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
is measured at 700 mm shown in shower itself. Concentric
circles also measure the amount water that should also be
hitting the individual, both orbits – core and concentric circle
working over from there, looking at the radius of 200 mm.
The velocity is also important here, that there should be
no injuries and should be consistent with the flow rates that
I’ve already talked about.
The floor bottom, as I mentioned before, has working
maximum diameter, and the center of the location should be
40.6 cm, lined about in that instruction. So, the substantial
floor and dispersal of that water should be according to pattern
diagrams that are shown in this document here. This is
copy pasted from the ANSI standard, so it takes you to the
next level in terms of understanding where the floor dispersal
should be.
Just a little bit on overview for looking at the comparisons
between the two standards: the ANSI standard talks about
76 l/min, the European – 60. In terms of ANSI, looking also
at 1.5 l/min for the eye wash, which also encompasses potable
units, which might be on a building site, on the back of
truck, or somewhere where weneed access to the eye wash
from mobile or portable environment. European talks about 6
l/min. The ANSI talks about 11 l/min. for eye and face wash
combined. The European standard is split into 5 main parts,
and as yet have not tackled the eye wash and face wash issue
together. As it says in the bottom,on the adjunct there,
there is no specific standard or local regulations in place – 60
l/min looks a suitable requirement here.
Next, I’d like to take you a little bit on to the areas of
temperate water in advanced, very in-climatic conditions.
Throughout the world in warmer climates we have to cool
the water down, in cold climate, such as many parts and
localities here, we have to warm the water up in order to
maintain that 15 minutes flushing time. This is an example on
the right-hand side of a cabin thatmight have a boiler system
in it to, one, maintain that 76 l/min., secondly, maintain the
temperature, maybe with mixing valves, thermostatic mixing
valves, which allows to adhere to the right level of temperature
in order to maximize that stay for 15 minutes. (Pic. 3)
The watchword here is really “Optimum temperature”, and
27 degrees, again, to be not too…, not to find a point in it –
it sits between that 16 and 30 just nicely.
Few examples about thetemperate water systems – there
may not be a variable supply of portable with drinking water
quality, because there may be some issues in terms of water
quality in some remote locations. This is an examplewhere
the air-charge system will be able to work off, let’s say,1500
or 2000 l tank and still beable topromote the use of 15 minutes.
So, air charged, forcing through the adequate water for
improved 15-minute flow.
Again, a couple of remotes – independent shower systems
that may be in explosiveenvironments, may be in nonexplosive
environments, depending on what the requirement
is.These systems are just examples, generic systems whereby
there maybe a 1500 or 2000 l tankwhich is maintained on
that connect level by heat tracing around the tank itself to
avoid freezing in the winter, or elsewith chilling systems to
be able also to chill the water down andkeep it to the optimum
level of like, let’s say, 27 degrees. (Pic. 4)
This is an example of gravity-fed systems, again, offering
a better discretion wherebythe victim is actually in a cabin
and is able to promote the use of this product discretely, by
taking all the clothes off in privacy, and not being in full view
of his compatriots or his workers.
Again, another example of a cabin that meanwhile has a
boiler system and heated system in the back of it for temperate
water which allows the end user to… This is, as you see
it from underneath, it’s a forklift installed, so it can actually
be movedinto the remote locations quite easily. It is treated
with a very strong protective coating to protect against the
elements.
A. Stakanov: Neil, please, you have to finish – the time
limits.
Neil Wallace: Sorry. Just going to windup. With the last
point, I am just taking you through a couple of points on
the use on itself, temperate packages and also remote locations.
So, it may be gas heated in Arctic environment as well.
An example of the system where multiple showers and eyewashes
are fed off one system itself. Achecklist is available
also within the brochure pack. Finalizing, just coming up to
the main point again, the whole goal of the game within the
use of this system is minimizing the time in hospital, minimizing
the time in emergency ward. Although there are so many
ideas – there’s the main point again – between the European
and American standards, both standards are promoting
comfort, reducing the stay, and the temperate water is also
a major point in installing the correct systems.
“Spasibo”. Thank you for your interest.
A.V. Stakanov: Thank you very much, Neil. Any questions,
please Maybe, we could discuss… Just a minute. Give
a microphone to the gentleman.
Question from the audience: When you compared the
statistics for the equipment equipped with showers, do you
have any statistics in those rooms equipped with bathtubs
Neil Wallace: I understand. In my travel experience in
Russia I’ve seen a systemwhere bathtubs were used. Bathtubs
to some extent, I think, in terms of cross-contamination it
certainly be anissue, if you flush into above top, it certainly
not that bad an idea. But in terms of multiple injuries, where
simultaneous showers are been required at the same time,
it is probably not the optimal solution from that point of
view. Our experience tends to be – does this answer your
question We’ve seen systems whereby multiple showers are
required in certain areas, in remote relations. That can also
be an issue.
I will be available at the end to talk further.
Any other questions
A.V. Stakanov: Thank you very much for the presentation.
77
Pic. 3. Pic. 4.
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78
Innovative Multi-functional
Devices Used in OH&S
Sergey N. Potrashkov, Director
Technoavia (Russia)
Good afternoon!
Our company has been a permanent participant of such
conferences and forums for the last 4-5 years. And I can
say there is great sense in it for everybody, including our
company. The most important is that it has become a good
tradition: to meet in this beautiful city in wonderful spring
time and discuss important and interesting issues, including
those related to occupational safety and health.
Feedback is an indispensable part of work at any conference
or forum. When we talk to each other out of public view
and get news about the situation on the ground, we learn
a lot of new things. And my report today is not so much
oriented to presenting our company (many of you know it
very well), but rather to raising interest in new directions and
trends on the industrial clothing market nowadays.
Still some words about our company in the beginning. Our
company has been for 20 years on the market. I always say
that one year in Russian can be counted as three years, so we
have already grown into a very serious and big company. We
are represented in 70 subjects ofthe Russian Federation out
of 83. But it is not the end of our development.
Our main advantage is that we have our own manufacturing
facilities. We have eight clothing factories and one
factory manufacturing footwear. Last year we produced
over three million units of clothing and about one million
pairs of footwear. At present, our footwear factory has
the equipment by “Desma” (Germany) that is the most advanced
in Russia. These are three moulding machines that
daily produce about two thousand pairs of footwear. But
we are never satisfied with what has already been achieved
and are always eager to reach something more.
Being manufacturers and sellers of industrial clothing,
footwear and personal protective equipment, we constantly
study the market in order to offer new, most advanced
products to our customers. And a great role in information
exchange is played by exhibitions and conferences where
we participate to have possibility to communicate with colleagues
and customers. Thus, the largest Russian exhibition
in the sphere of occupational safety and health BIOT is held
annually in Moscow at the All-Russia Exhibition Center in the
beginning of December. Our company, along with the Personal
Protective Equipment Association, has been the permanent
participant of this exhibition. I invite everybody to
this exhibition that is one of the most interesting events in
this sphere, as it includes not only exhibition itself, but also
a number of other events (conferences, meetings, round
tables, presentations and demonstrations of models).
We try to transfer all acquired information to our customers,
so that they could also be aware of the latest trends
and could choose the best for their protection and protection
of their employees. And the best means first of all of
the best quality. On our website we constantly inform our
partners and colleagues about the latest developments in
the sphere of occupational safety and health and PPE applications.
We do not consider that site to be just advertising
of our company, but we see it as a place where specialists
can get a lot of useful information.
And it seems to me that lately employers have had fewer
problems with providing their employees with high-quality
industrial clothing. Thus, industrial sector norms for industrial
clothing, footwear and personal protective equipment
(PPE) are periodically renewed, with expansion of the range
of PPE provided to employees, reduction of the use periods
and inclusion of new professions. Many big companies address
to us with a request to develop corporate standards
for provision of employees with industrial clothing and PPE,
and as a result of such development we present electronic
catalogs of industrial clothing and footwear in company
Transcripts of Proceedings
Pic. 1. Exhibition hall in the central office of “Technoavia”.
Pic. 2. Automated cutting and cloth-spreading complex
installed at a clothing factory of “Technoavia”
Pic. 3. Footwear manufacturing moulding machines
Desma installed at a footwear factory of “Technoavia”
Pic. 4. We’ve been working for you for 20 years.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
colors, sorted by professions. When a company has insufficient
funds for occupational safety and health measures,
we recommend them to use money of the Social Insurance
Fund and explain how to use this instrument. So, there are
difference ways.
But so far it has not been possible to get through to
everybody and explain them how important it is to provide
all employees with good-quality, certified, comfortable and
attractive clothing and footwear. Our analysis shows that
there companies that spend less than 1.5 thousand rublesper
person per year. It is impossible to provide a worker with
good-quality protective clothing at 1.5 thousand rubles! The
colleagues who have made their presentations earlier have
made a very good remark on that, when people ask less
than 500 rubles for assessment of a working place, you
can’t get anything good! And here as well, you can’t get
good protection for 1.5 thousand rubles per year! On the
other side, there are companies that spend over 30 thousand
rubles per person per year. Everything depends on the
chosen approach, financial situation, employer’s attitude to
such issues in general and employees in particular.
Now a new trend is visible: PPE producers offer complex
solutions, bringing multi-functional protection equipment
onto the market. It is done not only to make them economically
more feasible for companies, but also to make PPE
use more comfortable for a person, and as a consequence
– permanently used.
I’ve already told you about our own manufacturing facilities
for production of clothing and footwear, but as for
protection equipment, we cooperate with the biggest world
companies, world-known brands. For example, with UVEX,
3М, Ansеll, Dupont, Safe-Tec.
Today I want to demonstrate modern multi-functional
protection equipment to you. For example, here is a helmet
produced by 3M. It complies with GOST 12.4.207-99.
No questions, it’s a god-quality helmet from a well-known
producer. A person puts it on and wears it, and everything
is OK. But there can often be additional risk factors at
their working places. For example, risk of something getting
into an eye. Or excessive noise of over 80 decibels. Or
work in nighttime, when additional lighting is needed. What
has been done for it I’ll show it, using this helmet as an
example. Besides protecting the head from falling heavy
items, it is also provided with earpieces to protect from
high-level noise (noise reduction of 20-30 decibels, depending
on frequency). You can move down goggles with just
a slight movement of your hand, and thus protect your
eyes. When you do not need goggles any more, you move
them up, and they won’t obscure your sight any more. And
one more important element. Modern helmets are made of
high-quality ABS-plastic that is very durable, while being
very light. This helmet is also provided with a special UV
indicator that shows its wear-out level, because helmets
are suffering from constant UV radiation when used in the
open air, which leads to wear of the helmet and loss of
protective properties of the polymer the helmet is made
of. As soon as the indicator loses its color, the helmet is
considered to be worn out, irrespective of how long it has
been used. And it is one more additional factor of your
care of your workers. I consider that the helmet with such
additional functions is more than a helmet. It is a multifunctional
piece of PPE produced by companyPeltorthat ensures
complex protection of a person’s head, eyesight and
hearing.What is the most important is that it is comfortable
to wear, so the person will wear it all the time when it is
necessary. You all know that, if a person puts on a helmet,
and it has not been properly selected, and earpieces have
bad connections, the person just wears it for some time,
then gets tired of discomfort and finally takes it off. And
we know that the person that does not wear earpieces all
the time when he is in the high noise area exposes himself
to a harmful noise impact, and, as a consequence, his hearing
worsens, and this process is not reversible. So, maybe,
it is worth considering what is more important: additionally
spent money or the worker whom you can lose due to his
health conditions.
The trend of providing customers with comprehensive
solutions is also noticeable in on the protective footwear
market. What do we need working footwear for First of
all, to protect feet and legs from cold and harmful production
factors. We offer state-of-the-art footwear with antistatic,
oil-and-gasoline-resistant, acid and alkali resistant
soles, with composite toe cap protecting from injuries, and
with all those protective properties it is very comfortable
to wear. And this trend is developing further. Now special
aerosols are offered together with footwear to prevent
fungous diseases and reduce sweating. And you get a complex
product with nanoscale technologies.
Let’s go on with our examples. The welder’s profession is
one of the most complicated and dangerous, as a welder is
subject to many risks for his health. Earlier people considered
that it was enough to buy a helmet shield and a canvas
protective suit. But now it is relic of the past. Now manufacturers
offer “clever” Speedglas auto-darkening welding
helmets for constant protection from harmful UV and IR
radiation, with ergonomic headband that does not press on
head. Moreover, as it has been proved that a welder inhales
a lot of metal dust when working, which leads to a very
dangerous disease, helmets with special are air feed are
offered for welders.
79
Pic. 5. Peltor protective
helmet combined
with earpieces, goggles
and a face shield.
Pic. 6. Neogard boots.
Pic. 7. Speedglas welding helmet.
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80
As our company first of all specializes in clothing, it is
very important for us what cloth we use for manufacturing
clothes. Today I’ m going to tell you about multi-functional
cloth produced by our partner, company Klopman, called
Megatek. (it is rather difficult to demonstrate its properties
here, so I ask you just to believe me this time, all these properties
are confirmed with corresponding certificates). What
do we have in this cloth Increased cotton content (75%),
which means it will feel soft, and it will be comfortable for
a person to work in clothes of such cloth. At the same time,
it is antistatic, acid and alkali resistant, oil-and-dirt resistant
and waterproof. And in addition to all above-mentioned
properties, the cloth is processed in compliance with Proban
technology, which not only makes it fire-resistant, but also
allows keeping that property after about 100 washings. Can
you imagine so many properties in the same cloth Yes,
certainly, it might cost more than a conventional cloth, but
its functionality is much wider.
Now we are in the process of contract negotiations with
Klopman, and we might be exclusive supplier of cloths with
special EPIC treatment. And this is a real nanoscale technology.
It is a thin layer of a rubber-like substance (EPIC
means “encapsulated protection in clothes”) that ensures
cloth durability, and the use period is increased minimum
twice. The cloth becomes waterproof. At the same time it
stays air permeable, i.e. the person can breathe and feel
comfortable. It is hypoallergic. Bacteria do not reproduce on
its surface. It is economical in the sense it requires minimum
amount of energy and detergents for washing (we do not
pay attention to it here, but abroad they are calculating
every cent). And its main feature: with all those properties
it is only 40 g heavier than any ordinary cloth!
None of those present here, I think, would argue against
the statement that our products are considered good-quality.
But it is not enough for us. We consider that we must
Pic. 8. We’ll be glad to see you!
The central office of “Technoavia”
present to you all the most advanced development available
in the world. Why It is our main competitive advantage –
to be at least one step ahead of others.
I am glad to see a lot my partners and friends in this hall.
I am very grateful to them. And I hope that they consider
our company not only a reliable supplier and manufacturer
of good-quality industrial clothing, but experts in the sphere
of occupational safety and health and PPE applications. If
anybody here has not yet been working with us, you are
welcome to cooperate! I would like to talk to you, so that
you get better acquainted with us and our products. And
my great gratitude is to GCE Group that has provided us
with the possibility to have this discussion today. Thank you
very much. See you next time!
Transcripts of Proceedings

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
THIRD DAY
31 May, 2012
CONFERENCE HALL “IMPERIAL”
Summing up results of the questionnaire distributed
to forum participants with the lottery draw
A.V. Moskalenko, Chairman: Good morning! Let’s start
our second day. I can see that some people still have rest after
our yesterday’s reception; it seems to become a tradition.
I want to start with a pleasant procedure – if you remember,
there was a questionnaire in each handout pack, and we
are going to use it as a basis for developing the next year’s
program. And we have a lottery draw among those who
handed in the filled questionnaires. There are two prizes: a
cup produced by the Imperial Porcelain Factory (actually we
have two of them) and another prize which we consider the
main – it is a bottle of 50-year-old Cognac bottled specially
for the Forum participants on my request.
So, you can see the questionnaires here. Who is going
to draw Who has a magic touch Nobody volunteers. I am
going to ask you – you will draw the questionnaire you like
and give it to me. First one, then another one, and then the
third one.
Vladislav Vladimirovich Korshunov, “Gazprom Transgaz
Surgut”! Well, come here.
Applause. The first prize – a cup of the Imperial Porcelain
Factory – is presented.
The second cup. Denis Vladimirovich Putilin, “Gazprom
Dobycha Astrakhan”! Well, Gazprom is at the best today!
Please, come here.
Applause. The second prize – a cup of the Imperial Porcelain
Factory – is presented.
The third one. Aha! Vladimir Vladimirovich Varlamov, “Yuzhkuzbassugol”!
We will for sure hand it over to Vladimir
Vladimirovich.
Thank you, friends and now back to our program. We
have an interesting block of presentations. If you remember,
last year we had a lot of discussions on nuclear energy safety,
and we even wrote an appeal to the International Atomic
Energy Agency. And now, with my great pleasure, I give the
word to one of the participants of the last year’s discussion,
Miroslav Lipar, Head of the Operational Safety Section of the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
Session 3. Safety at NPP.
Aspects of Nuclear Safety in Energy Industry
The IAEA Nuclear Safety Actions
after Fukushima accident
Miroslav Lipar, Head, Operational Safety Section
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Austria)
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen,
Mr President, thank you very much for invitation and for
the introduction. And I think on behalf of all participants,
because I am the first speaker, thank you very much for
a wonderful evening yesterday and for your extraordinary
hospitality.
And I will start my presentation, maybe, with a sentence
what is the role of the IAEA in nuclear safety. We are not
something as super-regulator or regulatory authority. Our
role is to support our member states. And also what we are
doing is development of safety standards for the nuclear
radiation transport and waste safety, however, those safety
standards are not obligatory, are not legally binding for the
member states. And we are doing also services, peer review,
to assess how the safety standards are applied. Those services
are also not obligatory; we have to wait for the invitation
from the member states. And this is also the reason that
your or our resolution (because I was also here last year)
was not possible fully implemented into the action plat what
I will present now. However, some part of the resolution is
included into the action plan, and will make the comments
when I go to the point.
Just after our last year forum hereI was organizing theMinisterial
conference after the Fukushima. About 1200 people
participated from more than 100 countries, reallymany of
them the Ministers or State Secretaries. There were many
recommendations during this Ministerial conference for the
activities of member states and also for the activities of the
IAEA. This Ministerial conferenceasked our Direct General to
develop the Action Plan of nuclear safety and present this
Action Plan to the Board of Governors and General Conference
last year.We did it, and the Action plan was approved
by the Board of Governors and General Conference in September
last year.
There are 12 elements of this Action Plan, 12 main actions,
but, of course, there are many sub-actions, to get us, maybe,
to about 250. And I will just briefly discuss each of the actions
of this action plan.
The first action is that assessment of safety vulnerabilities
of nuclear power plants – there is a request that every country
should make the additional assessment of the safety –
you know that in Europe they call it Stress Test, however, this
is not good terminology for nuclear people, it was developed
by politicians. But this is deep assessment of the safety of
nuclear power plants, and the task for IAEA was to develop
the methodology for the assessment and support member
states if they will ask so, and the member states to make
their assessment. And, as I know, most of the plants did it
already, or it is under way.
The request from the Japan Government – we made the
assessment of this evaluation in Japan, in Kansay nuclear
power plants, and the mission evaluated the regulatory;
review the assessment process – because you know that
one of the lessons from Fukushima also; we can assist in
the regulatory of Japan; external hazards; an evaluation of
safety margins; plant vulnerabilities against prolonged station
blackout and loss of ultimate heating; and finally, severe
accident management. In addition, we made also evaluation
of Belene project – this is plant that was not even under the
construction, but was prepared in Bulgaria, with very positive
results, because from this point of viewof severe accident
management, and ultimate heating station blackout, because
of many passive systemsthis plant is really very good. However,
Bulgarian Government cancelled that project, and there
will be no construction in Belene, but they will build a new
unit in the Kozlodoy site.
Then a very important element is strengthening of the
IAEA peer reviews. And Member States are strongly encouraged
to voluntarily host IAEA peer reviews, including followup
reviews, on a regular basis. And our role is to respond to
such requests, and improve, maybe, also the effectiveness of
our review processes.
And we have several missions to evaluate the design,
to evaluate the regulatory authority, to evaluate emergency
planning and preparedness, and to evaluate operational
safety.
So, some improvements in our services: there is IRRS, this
is International Regulatory Review Service, this is service to assess
effectiveness of regulatory authorities, and EPREV is the
service to assess emergency planning and preparedness. And
both those services included Dedicated ‘Fukushima‘ Modules
to their review. And OSART – and this is actually my main
job of the IAEA, OSART is Operational Safety Review Team
– we included Severe Accident Managementmodule to our
service. Actually we developed this module, maybe, 2-3 years
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before the Fukushima accident as a voluntary module during
the OSART mission, however nobody asked for this module.
And after the Fukushima we included it as a standard part of
OSART program, so now the Severe Accident Management
module is a standard part of the OSART program. And we
did already 2 missions to evaluate Severe Accident Management
programs, one in South Africa in Gulberg, and one in
France in Cattenom.And since this year this is a standard,
so every OSART mission will have a module Severe Accident
Management.
We also developed the module for theCorporate organization
to review the activity of the Corporate, like here, in
Russia, the corporate organization is Rosenergoatom. We are
developing also new more precise methodology, very closely
linked to the new requirements for the operation. And we
organize the technical meeting to discuss with our Member
States those changes.
And generally there is increase in demand for our services.
Then, next action is strengthening of emergency preparedness
and response. TheIAEA is operating so-calledRANET,
the IAEA Response Assistance Network. And we have some
conventions. There is a Conventionon Early Notification after
Radiation Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case
of Incident. And we realized that those conventions were
still valid. Of course, maybe, some prompt communication
and more precise communication is necessary. And also it is
important that this RANET, this is assistance to the Member
States, and the responsibility lies on the state.
And very important message or area for the improvement
is that Member States should be ready to provide, but also
receive assistance, because in Fukushima case there were a
lot of offers to Japan from many Member States, but they
were not able or did not want to have this assistance.
Then, strengthening the effectiveness of national regulatory
bodies – this is an important part of IAEA activity,
and especially of those IAEA missions. And, as I mentioned
already, there is now a new module. They have several meetings.
You see the list of countries where the IRRS missions
were after the Fukushima, and of course there is also a plan
for this year and next years. Turning to European Union, it is
obligatory for every country to have the IRRS mission every
ten years.
Strengthening the effectiveness of operating organizations
– maybe, I will more focus to this area because it is
more related to this conference. There is a request for the
Member States to improve management systems, safety culture,
human resources, and scientific and technical capacity
in operating organizations, and the IAEA to provide assistance
in this area.Now in many countries it is really the problem
to keep the knowledge, to attract the young generations
for the nuclear power plants.
Then here, there is a relation to the resolution of the last
year. There is a statement that each Member State with NPPs
to voluntarily – still there is this “voluntarily”, so I think the
IAEA missed the opportunity after the Fukushima to make it
obligatory, and many countries actually made this proposal
to make it as obligatory, howeversome, and specifically big
countries, they did not agree with this statement – so, voluntarily
host at least one IAEA OSART during the coming
three years, with the initial focus on older nuclear power
plants, or review all older nuclear power plants. And after to
have OSART missionsvoluntarily – again voluntarily – on the
regular basis.
Next point is that we have to strengthen our cooperation
with WANO – WANO is World Association of Nuclear Operators.
And we made agreement with the WANOthat every
new unit – and this is very much related to the resolution –
should invite or WANO peer review before the commissioning
or IAEA OSART. It is not obligatory as for the resolution,
but it is under the agreement between the WANO and IAEA
that every new plant will have some peer review before the
commissioning.
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This Cooperation with WANO is in the coordination of the
Peer Reviews, because they have similar services like the IAEA
OSART. There are some differences, and the main difference
is the report of the WANO confidential – it is only between
the WANO and the plant, and IAEA reports are available to
the regulators and basically also to the public.
We invited the WANO to help us in developing good
Safety Standards, and we will work together to support new
countries, embarking countries in the nuclear program.
We have a Memorandum of Understanding between the
WANO and IAEA, it was signed in 1999, and we decided to
make some amendments, and the new MoUwill be signed
probably next month.
And here you can see the list of countries where OSART
was carried out after the Fukushima, so it wasSmolensk in
Russia, Hongyanhe in China; Cattenom in France; and the
follow-up missions in South Ukraine and Ringhals in Sweden.
And this year we have much more missions, so this is
inChina, Brazil, Mexico, India, Switzerland, France, Bulgaria,
and Czech Republic. It is more, however, we have now 30
countries operating nuclear power plants, and request from
the Action Plant is that every country should host OSART
every 3 years, and we have so far, maybe, only 50% of
countries requested the OSART. Big countries – like United
States, UK, Germany, Japan – they did not ask yet. From the
Russian Federation point of viewthis is really very good, because
you’ve seen there was a mission in 2011, and we have
already request to conduct OSART mission in Kola nuclear
power plant in 2014 and Novovorenzh in 2015.
Also we are preparing some practical arrangements between
the IAEA and China Nuclear Industry; we have something
like a joint training center for the construction of nuclear
power plants. INPO (this is Institute of Nuclear Power Operators
of the United States), JANTI (this is a similar organization
in Japan), and RINPO (similar organization in China).
This year during the annual Conference we will organize
theNuclear Power Industry Cooperation Forum. Usually during
the General Conference there is only a meeting of senior
regulators, and last year it was the first time and we will
continue also to have forum of the operators.
We are doing the OSART seminars during the preparatory
visits to explain the nuclear power plant how to prepare
for the OSART mission, what is the methodology, and what
standards we will use. We are supporting the Kola and Novovorenzh
NPPs for OSART preparation, also Hungarian Power
Company MVM. And we are preparing two Corporate reviews:
one is in Czech Republic in 2013, and one EDF France,
which is the biggest operator, in 2014.
Then, the safety standards – there is really very comprehensive
set of IAEA Safety Standards on three levels: on the
top we have safety fundamentals, then safety requirements
and safety guides. We consider the safety standards are really
good, and if everything will be followed, most probably
there will be no such consequences in Japan, there won’t be
such consequences of Fukushima accident. However, to be
sure, we are now doing a review of Safety Standards, to see
if in some areas some improvements are necessary. And we
have to submit the report to Director General this month,
next month in June, what safety standards will be, maybe,
revised.
Another area is improvement of the effectiveness of the
international legal framework. And there are two parts: one
is International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability – this was
also issue after the accident, but what is more important is
Convention on Nuclear Safety. So, we have the Convention,
all countries, except of Iran, operating nuclear power plants,
are members or parties in this Convention. There is a regular,
every three years, review process, and the last meeting was
just after the Fukushima in April last year, and this year in
August we’ll have Extraordinary Meeting to find the ways to
strengthen this Convention and the review process.
Under IAEA Member States embarking on nuclear power
program, so as I said in the beginning, the IAEA role is to

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
support Member States and, of course, to support also newcomers,
and support them in the way to develop infrastructure
for nuclear power, because it is not easy to have a new
power plant. It’s important infrastructure, and specifically
safety infrastructure necessary to operate the nuclear power
plant, including regulatory authority. And it is commitment
for 100 or even more years, so this is not that we buy the
plant, then we don’t like it and then we will sell it. So for this
we have so-called INIR Missions, this is infrastructure review
for the newcomers, and also specific SafetyGuide about the
Infrastructure development.
Very important element is strengthening and maintaining
capacity building, and this is for the both – for the newcomers
andalso for the countries operating nuclear power plants,
because in in some countries this is really problem, and specifically
when the country will make the declaration of the
phase-out of the nuclear power, it is very important to keep
necessary knowledge and necessary capacity, so the human
resources, education and training is very important.
Protection of people and the environment from ionizing
radiation – this is another action from the Action Plan. And
you know the biggest consequence from the Fukushima is
that the evacuation of many people from the area. And we
working at establishing an international programme on the
“Models and Data for Radiological Impact Assessment”, and
also remediation of the area, and then the possibility for the
people as soon as possible to come back to their homes or to
that area where there’s sites.
Communication and dissemination of information is an
important element, Fukushima, I think, again proved that
mass media is much quicker than nuclear community. Of
course, what is important for us, and specifically for IAEA,
is that we provide verified information, so not just to catch
something and, maybe, it is not true. But everything what
the IAEA provided as the information, it was verified information,
and we did it every day, after the Fukushima briefings,
for our Member States and the press-conferences.
And the important element of communication: the IAEA is
organizing so-calledInternational Experts’ Meeting. The first
one was in March this year. And there are more meetings:
this was on nuclear safety and spent fuel, and there will
be meeting on Enhancing Transparency and Communication
Effectiveness of Communication in June, Remediation and
Decommissioning in March 2013, Workshop on Seismic and
Tsunami Hazards in 2012, Ministerial Conference on Nuclear
Safety in Japan in December this year, Conference on Effective
Regulatory Systems in Canada, April 2013. And also
we will have a specific experts’ meeting related to the human
factor and relation of the human with technology and
equipment.
Research and Development – so, IAEA is not specialized
forresearch and development;thisis, maybe, more activityof
NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency) of the OECD. But, anyway,
we established the Technical and Scientific Support Organization
Forum – this is a technical and support organization
for the operators or for the regulators, and we would like
to strengthen the collaboration and technical coordination
among the Member States.
This is the“Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of
the Fukushima”, it was this Experts’ Meeting this March.
And just, maybe, some conclusions or lessons learned,
based on the presentations and based on the activities of the
Member States related to the Fukushima. So, what is very important
and, maybe, many operators did not consider it fully
is the combination of the hazards and multiple-units. So,
all the calculation were always for a single unit, and in the
Fukushima case actually 4 units were damaged. Then several
proposals to explore new IAEA some guideline documents
and documents.More attention to the accident mitigation –
after the Chernobyl accident a very strong focus of the IAEA
and also Member States was to prevention. We developed
the defensive methodology to have the all possible means
and barriers to prevent the accidents. However, this natural
disaster demonstrated that also accident mitigation is necessary.
And, of course, in many countries emergency planning
and preparedness is very well established, but there were
some weaknesses in Japan. Severe accident management is
also important area, as I told you, we developed a module
in the OSART evenbefore the Fukushima, but there was no
interest. On-site and off-site mobile equipment and facilities:
so, now many countries – and it will be, maybe, during the
next presentation – they are buying some mobile equipment
to have possibilities to make connections to the steam generators
or to electrical systems to have the possibilities to cool
down reactor and remove the residual heat. However, those
requirements are already described in IAEA Safety Standards,
so it was necessary to do it before.
And so on, you see there are several technical aspects,
like loss of cooling, loss of water, re-criticality, hydrogen
production –it was a big problem in Japan, because those
explosions were because of hydrogen explosion.
And some recommendations to the IAEA: the IAEA should
make available the information from this meeting and other
meetings what we will have to the Safety Standards Committees
and Commission. Lessons that were discussed at the
meetingshould be considered in the responseto the Action Plan.
So, there should be some feedback from the Action Plan.
And this is all, thank you very much for your attention.
A.V. Moskalenko: Dear colleagues, please, your questions,
if any.Take the microphone, please, Ivan Grigorievich.
Question from the audience: Please, tell. (Part of the
question missing on the audio record) You were talking
about the standards, of safety standards and this of kind of
warning of prevention of an accident. Talking about containment,
Chernobyl showed and Fukushima showed, with what
we see, with information we watch on TV and so on, there
is a feeling that there are no plans like this.
Miroslav Lipar: As part of the Standards, there are requirements
for response preparedness, accident preparedness,
they were worked out long time ago, and during the
OSAR mission or IRRS mission this all is checked, how NPP is
really to respond in these situations. I remember making this
mission here in the Volgodonsk NPP, the American expert
was the inspector, and there he liked, he did not find any
problems, did not make any recommendations. It was about
good practices they were implementing. And I know that you
have such a system, but not in all the Member States this
has been practiced and implemented, because some small,
minor countries are unable sometimes to operate such equipment.
We have system RANET, like I said in my presentation.
We work to carry out coordination with what is going on in
Russia, in Germany – for example, in Germany, Duisburg,
there’s a lot of good equipment operated, and in such a
case we are going to check if that equipment is prepared
for operation or being operated. We can help other countries
– in France, for example, like in your country, actually
the Fukushima accident, they have the teams – it’s called the
Rapid Response Team in English. The Rapid Response Team
is in the position to inspect this or that Nuclear Power Plant
and provide support.
A.V. Moskalenko: Any other questions, please
Question from the audience:Thank you. Please, tell if
you have amended the IEAE plans for the period of 2025-
2050, your plans, IEAE plans for that period.
Miroslav Lipar: It’s not about our SafetyTeam; we sure
have a nuclear energy department. Before Fukushima happened
we had such plans, small scenarios, major scenarios
have been developed, and this OCD group had worked out
such program, and they had some special dedicated group
to prepare new countries, to get new countries prepared.
And the assessment is being under way, depending on what
countries are going to continue. Before Fukushima 60 new
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Member countries had said that they were interested, that
that was not their decision, but they just had expressed their
interest. Many are saying now that “we will think it over, we
are not going to do anything special”, but many countries
are continuing to construct, for example,the United Emirates
– they are going to begin the construction this month,
next month, Vietnam, Turkey, other countries.
A.V. Moskalenko: No more questions Thank you, Miroslav,
for your presentation.
Safety Regulations of Russian VVER Projects
with regard to Post-Fukushima Requirements
Sergei A. Boyarkin, Director of Programs
State Corporation “Rosatom” (Russia)
Good morning!
After Fukushima we are answering questions why the
events that triggered the Fukushima accident can’t lead to
unfavorable consequences at Russian nuclear power plants.
And in my presentation I want to tell you about safety principles
inherent to our nuclear power plants. These principles
were formulated in the end of the 1980-s after learning very
tough lessons of Chernobyl. At that time we were rightly
criticized by our Western colleagues, so, learning our lessons
of Chernobyl and with the help of Western colleagues, the
most stringent regulatory basis in the sphere of nuclear power
industry was developed in Russia, i.e. at that time in the Soviet
Union. Analysis of standards of Japan, for example, in
comparison with Russian standards, shows that our standards
developed after the Chernobyl accident are the most stringent
in the world. And in my presentation I want to tell you about
the principles that are the basis for ensuring safety.
The first main principle is the principle of defense in depth.
I am going to clarify later on what it means. The principle of
inherent reactor safety was the problem in the reactor physics,
and as a result, we had the Chernobyl accident with the
reactor runaway with the prompt neutrons. Modern reactors
are self-protected, they have negative feedbacks, and any
power increase leads to the reactor shutdown with negative
feedbacks. Availability of safety barriers, put one into another
like a nest of dolls, ensure deeper safety. There are safety
channels multiple duplication, independent safety channels
with independent control systems, independent power supply
sources, also with multiple duplication. We use passive
restraint systems that work irrespective of whether there is
power available, independent of personnel actions, as they
are based on natural physical principles.
The safety concept includes not only accident prevention
measures, but also measures to control consequences of offdesign
accidents, i.e. those accidents that were not taken
into account in the design. Those were the measures that
were missing in Fukushima entirely, and when the situation
was out of control, they had no instructions on what to do
in that situation, and they had no people prepared to act efficiently
in the emergency situation.
The safety culture should be at all stages, starting from
the site selection and ending with the plant decommissioning,
own civil defense and emergency units at each plant,
and the principle of safe choice of the site that I am going
to talk about later in my presentation.
So, what is defense in depth This is a system of technical
and organizational measures, 5 levels of such measures
oriented to preservation of protective barriers, to ensuring
efficiency of these protective barriers and to population protection
per se. And defense in depth is provided not only
for normal conditions of NPP operation and deviations from
the normal operation, but also for emergency situations –
we have levels of defense in depth ensuring containment of
radioactive substances in case of serious accidents, including
off-design accidents, after standard protective measures
have not worked. So, what we postulate: everything what
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can happen will happen, and even what cannot happen will
happen as well, and we are developing models of situations
when all safety systems fail and make an analysis of what is
going to happen when all safety systems fail. And the fourth
and fifth levels of defense in depth are actually designed
for this hypothetic situation when all safety systems fail and
nothing has worked – this is management of consequences
of serious accidents. And actually it is what distinguishes our
system as compared with systems of many other countries,
and we consider that the tough lesson we learned in Chernobyl
has by now given a serious advantage to our technology
over other technologies, therefore we pre-design measures
to control consequences of off-design accidents.
So all our projects, both VVER and RBMK types, have
inherently self-protected reactors with negative feedbacks.
It means that processes that were running in the Chernobyl
reactor are now impossible in principle due to negative feedbacks
and use of natural laws of physics.
Coming back to the previous slide, I would like to comment
that we have a double-circuit reactor, in distinction
from the reactor in Fukushima that had only one circuit. Two
circuits are always better protection than one.
Safety barriers. Four safety barriers. The first barrier is a
fuel matrix where fission fragments are kept – it’s a ceramic
hard-melting fuel matrix containing fission fragments inside.
The second safety barrier is a fuel-element jacket – if fission
fragments get out of the fuel matrix, they will be contained
inside the protective jacket. The third barrier is the main loop
circulation. Just to make it more understandable – the reactor
wall thickness is 197 mm (20 cm) – two times thicker
than the front armor of the Tiger heavy tank. The fourth
barrier is the containment, a protective coating system that
ensures localization of all radioactive substances inside the
protective coating. There are four barriers between radioactive
substances and the environment, and, as I’ve already
told, the defense in depth must ensure integrity of these
barriers and their efficiency.
Our VVER technology has operational experience of 1400
rector years, and there have not been any serious accidents
for those 1400 years related to such reactors. In distinction
from boiling reactors, pressurized reactors, which is the type
VVER reactors belong to, have all radioactive media inside the
containment. In boiling reactors water and generated steam,
which interact with fuel and can be potentially radioactive,
go from the reactor building to the turbine building and are
not contained inside the protective coating. This is a very
serious distinctive feature of the boiling reactor as compared
with our construction. In pressurized reactors, our reactors,
there is no steam in the primary circuit, and once there is no
steam, there is much lower risk of fuel rods exposure and
zirconium-steam reaction that occurred in Fukushima, which
caused a hydrogen-producing reaction and intensive heat release.
So, the reactor started heating even more, a meltdown
occurred, they had to release hydrogen first into the containment,
then from the containment it was subsequently vented
under the containment building, and finally it exploded. We
do not have two media in the primary circuit, only liquid water,
and there is no boundary between the gaseous and liquid
phases. It increases safety considerably, as in boiling reactors
there is such boundary, it just lowered a little, and the fuel
rods were exposed.
The containment is a double reinforced concrete coating.
The inner layer has a thickness of 1200 mm – it is prestressed
reinforced concrete. The outer layer has a thickness
of 800 mm. The distance between these layers is almost 2
m. And the free volume inside the containment (free, I want
to stress it) is 75000 m 3 . It is 20 times more than the free
volume inside the containment of Fukushima reactors. What
does it mean It means that if they had had the same free
volume in Fukushima, they would not have had to vent the
radioactive media out of the containment. When they had to
release gases from the reactor into the containment, pressure
increased there, and as the containment volume was only

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
4000 m 3 , the process was going on very quickly. And when
the pressure inside the containment exceeded the design limits,
they had to vent excessive gas into the atmosphere. Or,
to be more correct, they vented it under the reactor building
that was not gas-tight, so everything went out into the environment.
As we have 20 times larger volumes, you should
release 20 times more gases from the reactor to exceed design
pressure limits. There is not such power in our primary
circuit. The containment volume is designed to keep the pressure
within the design limits even in a hypothetic case of
off-design accident with the total amount of energy released
from the contained primary circuit under the first containment
coating. And under no conditions we will have to vent
radioactive media out into the environment.
The containment has a double coating for the following
reasons: the inner coating must consume all the accumulated
energy from primary circuit, and the outer coating must protect
from external factors, including extraordinary events,
such as plane falling, tornadoes, hurricanes, external explosions,
for example, in case of terrorist acts.
The distance between containment coatings has passive
filters that create underpressure conditions, which ensures
better containment and inner volume insulation from the environment.
Safety channels multiple duplication. Here 4 safety channels
are indicated in different colors.
Each of them has its own independent diesel generator.
These diesel generators are, first of all, located in contained
buildings isolated from each other, and, second, they are
elevated to very high levels. So, even though we do not have
tsunami hazards here, we take into account the possibility of
complete flooding of a nuclear power plant, and design NPP
in such a way that diesel generators and generator switchgear
will stay above water level and are not damaged even in
case the NPP site is flooded.
Designers of the Fukushima plant for some reason located
the emergency diesel generators at low levels, and generator
switching stations were located even lower, they were lower
than ground elevation. They were at negative altitudes. And
when the water came, it was there only for some minutes,
but during those minutes it hit the negative altitudes and
the switching stations went out of order. And even after an
external power line was laid, they could not connect the cable,
as switching stations were damaged by water. That was
an obvious mistake by designers. Our standards forbid such
things. Here the project with such design solutions would
never obtain a license.
And as I’ve already told, we have four diesel generators for
each reactor. The Fukushima plant had 11 diesel generators for
6 reactors. We have 24 diesel generators for 6 reactors. And
each diesel generator can feed not only systems of its power
unit, but can be connected to other units as well. It means
that each diesel generator at a multi-unit nuclear power plant
can be connected to other units as well. And they had problems
with commutation between the units. So, it means it was
also not taken into account when designing the plant.
This is a principle safety scheme. I won’t describe it in details.
The presentation is open to public. Who is interesting,
can have it. It is available both in Russian and in English.
Now we are going over to what I have already mentioned
– system to control consequences of off-design accidents.
We firmly postulate what we should do if the most serious
accident occurs and all safety systems fail, how we are going
to prevent environment contamination even if there is a meltdown
and uncontrolled process begins, and we won’t have
any possibility to cool down the reactor or release excessive
heat. This is what can happen in this situation. And even for
this absolutely improbable situation we develop measures to
protect environment and population.
Though, as I’ve already told, hydrogen-producing reactions
are in principle less probable in our reactor than in boiling
reactors, we nevertheless have passive hydrogen recombiners
in the building of each nuclear power station.
We actively use passive systems in our designs, they are
indicated here, and they operate without involvement of personnel
on the basis on natural principles of physics, so nobody
has to switch them on. Here up goes the pressure, and
the system starts working. Hydrogen appears, and passive
85
Four channels of safety system
Pic. 1.
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86
hydrogen recombiners start burning it out. I’ll describe each
system in details later on.
This is a principle scheme of systems controlling consequences
of off-design accidents. Now I am going to describe
each system. These red dots are passive hydrogen recombiners.
They are somewhat similar to catalytic afterburner of a
car exhaust system where harmful substances are burned
out on catalysts. And you know a driver does not have to
switch these afterburners on. When a harmful substance appears
near this catalyst grid, the reaction immediately starts
– natural laws of chemistry and physics work. We have those
passive hydrogen recombiners in all facilities. Thus, they are
located not under the dome portion, they are present in each
room in order to prevent local hydrogen accumulation. And
they have positive feedback: as soon as hydrogen appears,
the reaction starts, and the catalyst is heated. With the heating,
its convention capacity grows, and the catalyst efficiency
is increased. So, in presence of hydrogen the recombiner increases
its efficiency automatically on its own. So, the more
hydrogen is in the premises, the more is recombined.
Unfortunately, the Fukushima plant had hydrogen recombiners
only inside the containment. They were absent in the
reactor containment building. If they had been there, there
would not have been any hydrogen explosion, but they were
not installed there.
Passive heat removal systems – these are a passive system
to remove excessive heat from a steam generator and a
passive system to remove excessive heat from the protective
jacket. They are based on the natural convection principle, i.e.
water is heated, goes up, there it is cooled in the heat exchanger
and goes down, so the gravitation law works, and
you can’t switch off earth gravitation. And according to our
standards, only that system can be called passive system that
not only does not require electric power for its operation, but
has no rotating parts as well. The first Fukushima unit had
the passive heat removal systems that did not require electric
power for its operation. And it was operated very efficiently
during the first 24 hours. But that system used a pump for
coolant recirculation, and that pump was driven by an impeller
that was rotated by the same steam. Thus, steam was heated,
water was boiling, rotating the impeller, and the latter drove
the pump that ensured recirculation. So, formally the system
was passive because it did not require electric power supply:
as soon as the temperature went up, it started working, but
actually according to our standards it was not passive, because
the impeller was a rotating part that could fail, and it failed.
So, it was working for 24 hours, removing the heat, and then
a bearing failed, and the system stopped working. So, I repeat
it once more, our standards require that a passive system
should not only work without external electric power supply,
but should have no rotating parts that potentially can fail.
And, finally, our main know-how that is our key advantage
as compared with all other projects.There are two concepts
in the world – that by Areva that makes very good
designs with active safety systems, they have 4 active safety
channels. And a concept of Westinghouse that makes good
designs with passive safety systems. And there is our design
that has 4 active safety channels, like in Areva projects, and
all passive channels, like in Westinghouse projects, so we
combine both safety systems. And we received a lot of criticism
because of the design overloading with safety systems.
And we answered that after Chernobyl we had a regulation
that required it, so we did it like that.
Now many countries who have bought our technology
are very glad, they have reconsidered their attitude and think
now that it is good to have many safety systems. Thus, as I
NPP Safety localization:
land zoning
– integration of regulatory restrictions
Thematic
layer
Pic. 2.
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
have told, we have active safety channels, like in Areva projects,
and passive ones, like in Westinghouse projects, and,
besides, we have a molten-core catcher, and nobody else
has it, at least in this design. A molten-core catcher is a
special device under the reactor provided to catch the molten
core material of a nuclear reactor in case of a very serious,
improbable off-design accident, when nothing else would
work, and the fuel would melt down, burn through the reactor
wall and get into this melting-pot. And this melting-pot
contains some sacrificial material that has 3 functions. First
of all, it absorbs neutrons, as it contains dysprosium that absorbs
neutrons and does not allow secondary chain reactions
to develop; besides, it contains chemical substances that,
coming in contact with the corium, initiate an endothermic
reaction, i.e. heat-consuming reaction, and the molten material
hardens; and, finally, it contains substances that combine
with hydrogen. So, if hydrogen is released from the corium,
it would be immediately bound. This catcher provides for the
molten core material containment inside and prevention of
its contact with the foundation. If the molten core material
touched the foundation, it could theoretically burn it through
and break the containment coating. So, to keep the containment
coating intact, we have this catcher. The cost of this
device is compared with the reactor cost. Its size is bigger
than that of a reactor. For the first time the core catcher was
used at the Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant that Russia built
in China The design of the Tianwan NPP was developed by
“Atomenergoproyekt” in Saint Petersburg. And this design
is in the basis of all our projects that are now being realized
both in Russia – Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant II and
Baltic NPP in Kaliningrad, and abroad – in Vietnam, Belarus
and other countries. All projects we are building now are
actually further development of that Tianwan project. The
Tianwan project was declared by the International Atomic
Energy Agency to be the only third-generation power unit in
the world, as it has the core catcher and double containment.
What distinguishes the third generation from the second
generation – and both Chernobyl and Fukushima belonged
to the second generation – is that at the third-generation
NPP all radioactive substances stay within the containment
area in case of any off-design accident, so it is not necessary
to evacuate population. The evacuation area is within 800 m
from the reactor, so it is limited by the area of the industrial
site, which means that even in case of the worst scenarios
it is not necessary to evacuate population outside the plant
area. This is the difference between the third generation reactors
from the second generation ones. And, as I have told,
we are the only country in the world that has a referential,
i.e. built and operated, third-generation reactor in China.
Organizational measures in emergency situations. In accordance
with our concept, in distinction from concepts of
some other countries, civil defense and emergency response
units and respective equipment should be in the nearest
proximity to the plant, report to the plant management, and,
for example, our fire stations that are located at every NPP
have no right to send out over 50% of their workforce and
equipment in case they are summoned to fight a fire in the
town, not at the plant itself. The residual 50% of their workforce
and equipment should stay at the plant, just in case
something, unfortunately, happens at the plant. They are in
constant preparedness and must help in case of emergency.
Japan has a wonderful civil defense system, but under
conditions of a global catastrophe, when the state civil defense
forces were busy saving people and fighting fires at
petrochemical plants, they had not enough capacity to help
the nuclear power plant as well. Under our concept each NPP
has its own civil defence and emergency response units.
The principle of safe territory selection. There are two
approaches. One approach is, so to say, communistiс ”we
await no gifts from Nature, we conquer it” – but, strangely
enough, this approach is practiced by other countries, not
by us. We have another approach: there are locations where
we do not build nuclear power stations in principle. So, we
select the territories. Here the territories where we can’t build
nuclear power plants are marked with the red color.
We impose these restrictions layer by layer and get the
red territory where we can’t build, and the yellow territory
where it is possible. The green area is where it is positively
possible. This is an example of how we selected sites for
new plants in the Central Federal District. Here is a site in the
Nizhegorosky Region, and the Nizhegorodskaya NPP is being
built here now.
Once more, all the principles are described here. Thank
you for your attention, and I am ready to answer any questions.
A.V. Moskalenko: Any questions, colleagues Please, Ivan
Grigorievich, your question!
I.G. Yankovsky: Still I have a question on hydrogen. We
know that the range of concentrations is rather wide –
4-70%. And I have a question: hydrogen is the lightest gas,
and it can accumulate in the upper part under the dome portion,
and it can happen that it won’t be burned out entirely,
or is it impossible
S.A. Boyarkin: Look, here is the dome portion. The red
devices are recombiners, and they are located in the top section
of the dome. So, it means they are located in the place
where hydrogen is accumulated. Besides, they are located
under the ceilings of all isolated premises, and each room
has its own device.
I.G. Yankovsky: So, hydrogen goes up and is burned out
at the same time, is it so
S.A. Boyarkin: No, it comes up here, here are platinum
and rhodium grids, and it turns into water on those grids.
During this reaction the catalyst grid is heated, and the convection
gets more intensive. The reaction starts at the concentration,
if I remember it right, of 1.4%.
I.G. Yankovsky: It means before it reaches the level of
4%, does not it
S.A. Boyarkin: Yes!
I.G. Yankovsky: Thank you very much!
A.V. Moskalenko: More questions, please!
Question from the audience: Sergei Alexandrovich,
I have a question: some time ago when we described the
range of accidents and emergency situations, we had design,
off-design and hypothetic accidents. Now you’ve mentioned:
a serious off-design hypothetic accident. But I think that hypothetic
accident is something like space object falling or
beginning of the Third World War.
S.A. Boyarkin: As I’ve already told, we have such notion
as “design accident” in the project documentation. What is
“design accident” We, experts and analysts, sit down and
make a thorough analysis to make a list of scenarios when
equipment can fail because of external factors. These equipment
failures are combined with personnel mistakes. What
can happen in this situation: so, the external unfavorable circumstances
occurred – for example, tsunami came, pumps
stopped, and the personnel did not react in the right way.
What actually should the Fukushima personnel have done
When hydrogen was vented, they should have sent one
person to the roof of the containment building (there was
a valve on the roof) to open the valve. They should have
opened the valve, ventilated the facilities, and there would
not have been any explosion. So, there was a combination of
an external event, equipment failure and personnel mistakes.
And we analyze all these scenarios with external events we
can only imagine: failures of all pieces of equipment, one by
one, combinations of two failures, plus personnel mistakes.
And we compile a tree of scenarios. The tree of scenarios is
used to develop measures to control design accidents. These
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88
measures to control design accidents, in case the analyzed
scenarios come true, must bring the reactor to a safe state.
Off-design accidents are those when an event occurs that
we could not think of – for example, we could not imagine
an event that could lead to melting of an active core, but
nevertheless, we postulate that the core can melt. Even if it
can’t melt under any conditions, we nevertheless state – it
will melt. And in case it melts, we have a core catcher, we
have the containment, and they will save us in this case.
But we do not know what events could lead to such an
accident – these will be hypothetic events.
A.V. Moskalenko: If I may, I would make a comment.
Last year Rosatom stated that modern nuclear power units
are designed to sustain falling of a space module or plane.
S.A. Boyarkin: Well, if an asteroid falls... Besides technical
and organizational systems at a nuclear power plant, there
are state defense systems, like air defense and others, and
they must ensure protection of our facilities.
A.V. Moskalenko:Next question.
A.N. Isakov: Well, I’ve been greatly impressed by your
information about protection, but a quotation has come back
to my memory, it was told by Mendeleev, if I am not mistaken.
“Coal is not a fuel, you can burn bank notes as well.”
Tell me, please, maybe, we should better “burn bank notes”
instead of further developing nuclear power industry. We all
understand that this device is necessary.
S.A. Boyarkin: I’ve understood you question. And I am
going to answer it. Taking into account all these safety systems,
the investment cost of the nuclear power unit is approximately
two times higher than that of a modern combined
cycle power plant. But the cost of a kilowatt-hour
includes opex, i.e. operational expenses, in addition to capex,
i.e. capital expenditures. And we have ten times lower opex
than gas-fired power plants have, at least with the current
gas prices. As a result, actual prime cost of a generated
kilowatt-hour at a nuclear plant is about 20% lower than at
a coal-fired power plant and approximately 30% lower than
at a gas-fired one. And these calculations are made for the
current gas prices and with zero payments for emission of
greenhouse gases. As soon as payments are introduced for
emission of greenhouse gases, the difference will be by two
times. Because the nuclear power industry has zero emission
of greenhouse gases.
If we seriously consider the idea of limiting emissions of
greenhouse gases, we must develop nuclear power industry,
as nowadays there is no other source of energy that could
reliably generate energy at acceptable cost with zero emission
of greenhouse gases. There is no other similar source of
energy. The difference between prime cost in our industry
and that in the wind power industry is by 20 times.
A.V. Moskalenko: Next question. This will be the last
question.
R.M. lyasov, North-Caspian Management Company,
Kazakhstan: First of all, Sergei, thank you very much for
your report. It is very impressive. I have two small questions,
with your kind permission: one of them is purely professional,
and the second one is, possibly, from the man in the
street, so to say.
The first question: don’t you think that this really serious
work, this considerate approach and basic underlying principles
of your work – those you’ve shown to us today, could
be used, I think, as key elements at other hazardous production
facilities The human factor often decides everything
in 99.9% of situations, and in your case technical aspects
that have been introduced and realized practically exclude
spurious actions and mistakes of personnel, which can’t but
please us. And in this sense I have a purely professional question
– don’t you think that all these innovations and ideas
that you have already developed and have in operation could
Transcripts of Proceedings
be used by other industries I mean not only oil and gas industry,
bot mining, coal-mining and others.
If the first question is clear, I would also like to ask the
second question. I ask it not as a professional, but as a common
person: You have mentioned countries where you are
now working very seriously or, as I understand, planning
some operations. In that connection, do you have any working
contacts with our country, with the Republic of Kazakhstan
in this area I understand and I know that this question
is seriously considered in our country, and everything you
have told about the prime cost is very important for us as
well. I would be glad if you continued these projects with our
Republic as well. Thank you!
S.A. Boyarkin: I am going to answer your first question.
As we know, the reason of the Chernobyl accident was the
human factor, mistakes made by employees. Three Mile Island
accident was also connected with personnel mistakes.
But I would not call personnel mistakes what happened in
Fukushima. That was an insufficient preparedness of personnel
for emergency situations, and they were not ready,
as nobody taught them to act in such situation. Therefore,
after the Chernobyl accident our regulations provide that any
effort to switch off any safety system would lead to its automatic
activation. So, it is impossible to switch off a safety
channel at an operated unit, you just can’t do it. Thus, fool
tolerance was introduced to our systems, and that fool tolerance
has been further developed during all these years. The
problem is that we must pay for everything in our life, and
we must always make a functional cost analysis. But in our
case we did not have to do it, because we understood that
consequences of only one accident would be so grave that
we must exclude it in any case. Therefore, we created the
system. After we developed it, we understood that the plant
became two times more expensive, but after we calculated
total costs, we found out that, even being two times more
expensive, a generated kilowatt-hour is still cheaper than at a
gas-fired power plant. So, economically it is absolutely competitive.
Therefore, my answer to your question: where the
functional cost analysis will show the payback – yes. But
there are spheres where economy is not the main factor, but
other reasons are more important. We had other reasons.
Now, regarding our cooperation with Kazakhstan. We are
certainly interested in cooperation with all our neighbors,
moreover with Kazakhstan – fraternal country. I know that
some time ago there was an effort to develop a project on
the basis of a 300-megawatt reactor.I did not participate in
this project, therefore I can’t comment on it, but, in my opinion,
it is more feasible to use serial projects, and not some
new developments. It is our serial project, we are building it
in many countries, and the initiative, as a rule, comes from
the country where the plant is built. Thus, Vietnam contacted
us, and we took part in their tender procedures, and now we
are building a nuclear power plant there. We are also building
a nuclear power plant in Turkey, and in many other countries.
Therefore, if Kazakhstan decides to have a tender, we will be
glad to participate in it.
A.V. Moskalenko: Thank you, it was the last question.
My friends, we have come to a very interesting subject
matter. It covers the same problems, but from a different
angle. Why is it so interesting First of all, we have been
considering for over a year if there is a sense to raise this
subject so openly, and finally decided to do it. You see, we’ve
got used to that radiation safety issues belong only to the
sphere of the nuclear power industry, but it is not so. Some
of you know, others do not know, but there are serious
problems in other energy industries as well and first of all in
oil and gas industry. And two further reports are dedicated
to this issue.
The next report has been coauthored by Boris Alexandrovich
Chepenko, Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation,
and Vladimir Alexeevich Moskalenko, GCE Group. And
Vladimir Alexeevich is now going to work for both of them.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Problems of Ensuring Radiation Safety
in Oil and Gas Complex
Boris A. Chepenko, Head of Laboratory of Working
Substances in Energy Cycles
Ministry of Energy (Russia)
Vladimir A. Moskalenko, Radiation Safety Expert
GCE Group (Russia)
V.A. Moskalenko: Dear Forum participants! First of all,
I must say that the second speaker could not come, he is
not feeling well, therefore all the responsibility for this information
is laid on me. Our attention to the problem of
radiation safety of the country population and radiation ecology
as a whole is mainly attracted with consequences of
accidents and disasters at nuclear power industrial facilities.
It is enough to remind you about events that occurred at
the “Mayak” Research and Production Association in 1957,
Chernobyl disaster, events at Fukushima, and, finally, two
reports that we have just heard are also dedicated to these
issues. All these events and related issues were covered in
mass media, discussed in the society, and corresponding governmental
decisions were taken. The nuclear power industry
was developing in parallel with the development of radiation
safety structures. People in the Navy are even joking that
these structures had appeared earlier than submarines. But it
may be only a joke.
It may seem strange, but any person gets the main radiation
dose during the lifetime not from artificial sources,
but from natural radioactive nuclides. I mean from natural
sources. The radiation resulting from nuclear power industry
development constitutes only a small share of the total radiation
exposure of the population. The major radiation exposure
is resulting from other activities of people that rarely
give rise to unfavorable criticism. Among them there is use
of roentgen radiation in medicine, coal mining and burning,
uncontrolled use of artesian water from deep wells, and,
finally, oil and gas production. Therefore, the major potential
reduction of radiation is in such seemingly indisputable areas
of human activity. And here, in my opinion, it is feasible to
attract the public attention to the situation with ensuring
radiation safety in the fuel and energy complex of Russia,
and first of all, at oil and gas production facilities, as they
are the main suppliers of radioactive elements onto the earth
surface. The reason for such attention lies in that radioactive
elements formed in the decay of naturally occurring radioactive
families of uranium-238 and thorium-232 are released
into the environment during extraction, primary treatment
and transportation of oil and gas to the processing facilities.
(Pic. 1).
You can see these families in the first slide. I must comment
that decay chains are longer, but in the slide you can
see only those elements that create the main radioactive dosage.
These are radium-226, radon-222, radium-228 and thorium-228.
You can see also potassium-40 in the table – it is
not formed in the decay of these families, but in number of
cases it can lead to substantial radiation doses for a person.
Please, pay attention to maximum allowable concentrations
of these substances in the fourth column – as you can see,
they are rather small. I want to remind you that the Becquerel
is the unit of radioactivity equal to one element decay per
second, i.e. if 1 decay occurs in one liter of air per second,
it is 1 Becquerel.
You see, all these norms are multiplied by a negative
power of 10. It is a bit simpler with water, as it gets into the
gastrointestinal tract and is further excreted from the body.
How do these substances get onto the earth surface You
see, these radioactive nuclides, except radon, of course, are
usually present in nature as salts that are more or less soluble
in water – and radium and thorium are very well dissolved
in water, and, as oil and gas production constantly leads to
increase in water encroachment of formations, i.e more and
more water is pumped into oil- or gas-bearing formations
(it is such a technology), salts of radioactive elements under
certain thermobaric conditions (and they are always there),
when the mixture of water and oil or water and gas moves
up the boreholes and further into the product accumulation
and treatment systems, deposit as inclusions in barytes (i.e.
barium sulfate, there is a lot of it, and it absorbs these elements).
As a result, the contamination occurs in pumping
and compression pipes of producing wells, equipment of the
systems of accumulation, transportation and processing of
products, as well as filtration fields where formation waters
are disposed – these are open fields. Is it new for our oiland
gas-production industry No, it is not. As long ago as
the beginning of the XXth century it was known that oil and
gas are contaminated with natural radiation substances during
production. And starting from 1950s, there was a growth
in interest in this problem due to dramatic increase in oil
and gas output. In 1990s, in 1992 to be exact, a review of
89
uranium238radium226radon222 lead206(stab.)
thorium232radium228 thorium228 lead209
(stab.)
Isotope ,MeV 1/2 MACair,Bq/l MACwater,
Bq/l
radium226 0.67 1600years 3.0*(5) 0.5
radium228 0.41 5.75years 3.1*(5) 0.2
radon222 3.8days 3.1*(3)
thorium228 0.33 1.9years 2.9*(6) 1.9
potassium40 1.46 1.32*(+9)
years
Pic. 1.
6.5*(3) 0.2
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90
content of natural radioactive nuclides in oil industry was
published in the United States. In the same year a bulletin
was published with regulations on treating natural radioactive
nuclides in products of oil and gas industry. And later in 1993
a report on the oil-field waters research was published, and
it included analysis of risks for the environment and population
resulting from disposal of oil-field waters from three oil
wells in the Gulf of Mexico. Similar publications appeared in
Canada, Great Britain, Norway, Holland, the Federal Republic
of Germany and other countries. This problem was known
in Russia as well. And in the middle of 1990s it was finally a
progress in this area in Russia, thanks to the efforts of employees
of the Industrial Safety Center, at that time reporting
to the Ministry of Energy, and in particular, my co-author
Boris Alexandrovich Chepenko. We started with developing
documents to ensure radiation safety when processing radioactive
wastes in the fuel and energy complex, and later on
they were transformed into federal sanitary regulations on
ensuring safety at facilities of oil and gas production complex
of Russia and sanitary regulations on ensuring safety
when processing industrial wastes with increased content of
natural radioactive nuclides at facilities of oil and gas production
complex of Russia. Now we can state that all necessary
documentation on this issue has been fully developed for this
industry, including even workplace operating instructions. I
can refer to my personal experience to give an example of
what kind of radiation situation can occur.
It was in 1970, I was then a relatively new naval officer,
captain 3rd rank, serving in the city of Baku. And during one
of the local defense training maneuvers I got an order to
make a study of radiation, certainly simulated, of one the
roads from the city to the airport. While executing the order,
I encountered a barrier – the road was blocked due to a road
accident. I asked the highway policeman how to go around
and he indicated to the narrow road towards an oil production
site, so I got there for the first time. So, the driver and
I went there in our UAZ truck. And suddenly I noticed that
my naval radiological monitor started going off scale at first
ranges I ordered to stop the truck, got out and measured
radiation near several pump installations. I was amazed –
gamma-radiation intensity in some areas was up to several
hundreds of milliroentgen per hour, which was approximately
25-30 thousand times higher than the natural background
radiation. The natural background, if I may remind you, is 15-
20 mcR/h. Naturally, I reported the fact through the normal
chain of command, this information reached the Republic
Government and certainly caused some anxiety and concern,
and as for me, after gratitude for the alarm, I was asked
to take care of naval problems, which are always abundant.
So, it was like in a Russian saying about a rooster that has
crowed, and doesn’t care about the dawn. But it is a joke, of
course. It is well known that Azerbaijan is taking this problem
very seriously, as water pumping into wells is escalated, while
oil output is decreasing.
In order to understand the current situation with radioactive
wastes in the fuel and energy complex of Russia, one
should make a comparison. It is easier to do with the use of
radioactive wastes categorization in accordance with sanitary
regulations. I ask to switch on to the second slide.
Here you can see a table with classification of industrial
wastes by their radioactivity Please, pay attention that 1
Class contains 1500 Becquerel in a kilogram of product. What
does it mean Well, 1 Class actually is not considered radioactive
waste, and there are no limitations of handling such
substances, including accumulation, temporary storage and
disposal at general purpose industrial landfills. One could,
certainly, argue it, but such decision was taken. (Pic. 2).
2 Class radioactive wastes can be reused for production
purposes after certification by the State Sanitary and Epidemiological
Surveillance Department. These are pipes after
cleaning, water reused for pumping into oil- or gas-bearing
formations, etc. 3 Class radioactive wastes, as a rule, cannot
be reused, but are accumulated and stored at specially
allocated places in industrial sites. I attract your attention
to this moment, you’ll see later on what it leads to. And,
certainly, there are measures to reduce personnel doses and
limit releases of natural radioactive nuclides out into the environment.
But if they are stored at open sites, meteorological
conditions provide for spreading of radioactive substances.
And, finally, 4 Class radioactive wastes are subject to disposal
at specialized regional organizations. All radiation safety requirements
must be observed when handling such wastes.
Are there any problems related to radioactive wastes on
industrial sites of the fuel and energy complex of Russia
Yes, and sometimes they are very serious. First of all, they
are connected with the total amount of such wastes. So, for
example, 3-5 tons of wastes with natural radioactive nuclides
in the form of drilling sludge and contaminated equipment
are annually accumulated at the oil fields of “Tatneft” Joint-
Stock Company. The amount of such wastes in gas industry
is enumerated in tens of thousand tons. Ant total amount of
radioactive wastes in the fuel and energy complex is several
hundreds of thousand tons. How do these storages of contaminated
equipment look like Let us look at pic. 3.
Here are densely stockpiled pipes that cannot be reused
without a special treatment, i.e. decontamination, etc. This
storage, in particular, is owned by “Stravropolneftegaz”,
“Rosneft” Concern. And such accumulation of pipes is only
growing. So, they are lying in the same places for several
dozens of years, and what should they do with them It’s a
problem.
According to results of the measurements made at that
production site, content of radium-226 and radium-228 in oil
was up to 400 Bq/kg, and the wastes level starts from 1500,
as you remember, so this is not waste, but what is the quality
of the product At the same time there was potassium-40
in the amount of 4200 Bq/kg. And this involves trouble.
The gamma-radiation exposure rate near several hundreds
Classification of industrial wastes
by their radioactivity
1class:

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
of densely stored pipes was exceeding 3000 mcR/h in some
spots. The natural background, I remind it again, is 15-20
mcR/h. The total volume of radioactive wastes in the form
of baryte sediments with radium and thorium isotopes in
pumping and compression pipes can be up to 1000 м3 in
some companies. Large areas of radioactive contaminated
lands stay contaminated without reclamation for dozens of
years in the proximity of oil fields. Thus, we made a detailed
study of the territory of the Stavropol oil field, therefore I
use this example first of all, and the contamination scale is
so large there that the contamination is detected by an aerial
gamma-ray survey, showing such polluted facilities as storages
of obsolete equipment, settling drums, oil accumulation
points and filtration fields. I want to attract your attention
to it, and I am going to explain why. The radioactivity level
of radium-226 for the filtration fields bottom sediment was
in some places up to 84 kBq. It is higher that the level of
4 Class waste. And the level of thorium was up to 52 kBq.
And filtration fields are very hazardous facilities, as under
certain meteorological conditions radioactive substances can
be spread by winds into the environment. I will give you a
demonstrative example.
The disastrous accident of 1967 in the region of the
“Mayak” Research and Production Association. During an accident
of 1957 radioactive wastes were released into water
basins and the Techa River, and the entire length of the river
of 170 km was contaminated. Then the system of damns
was built to contain all that, but in 1967, 10 years later, there
was a natural disaster nobody could wait for – abnormally
hot summer, the water dried out, exposing bottom of water
basins, and, as it always happens, hurricanes occurred, they
lifted the dust with all radioactive elements up into the air.
And a huge territory was contaminated to such extent that
they had to move people out from the local settlements. As
long ago as on 4 May I came back from an expedition to
that region, we made control measurements – the same.
Of course, as compared with 1967, concentrations decreased
based on half-life, but nevertheless the radiometric measurement
proved that everything is still there. After so many
years. We have to wait for 300 years – we’ll wait!
And Stavropol filtration fields have already started affecting
radiation situation in the Stavropolsky Region and further
to the west of Krasnodarsky Region. They are affecting it already
now, what to do with it This is “Stravropolneftegaz”.
But we have a similar situation in a number of other companies.
For example, let’s look at the following data.
Here you can see OAO “Orenburgneftegaz” – and pay
your attention to the radiation dose of the stored pipes
of 990 mcR/h, OAO “Permneft” – 670 mcR/h, OAO “Samaraneftegaz”
– 8670 mcR/h. Just compare it once more
with the natural background of 15-20 mcR/h. What to do
with those pipes Their number is increasing, and it becomes
the state-level problem. Each separate company cannot decontaminate
them or dispose of them in some way. And being
3 Class wastes, they are not accepted by special organizations
that handle radioactive wastes, and even if they started
accepting the pipes, they would be soon stocked up. So, it
has already become a state-level problem, and, maybe, it
should be solved in the same way as in the nuclear power industry,
by establishing some small “Mayak” to do something
with those pipes – decontaminate them, remelt them, reuse
for the same purposes, for oil and gas production, like it is
done in nuclear power industry. But this problem definitely
requires some solution.
All the earlier told refers to oil and gas industry, but the
situation is similar in mining. Thus, results of the survey of
150 coal mines made by the Industrial Safety Center of the
fuel and energy complex show that at 24 mines the radiation
dose of miners reached the level of 1 mSv. Just for
comparison: the annual dose for nuclear industry workers is
5 mSv, for the population in general – 0.5 mSv, and here
they have 1 – it is higher than the norm. And at some of the
mines it was 2 mSv. And at three mines the dose was over
5 mSv. It’s a problem. But problems of radiation safety are
not considered at all and are not solved there. There is an
alarming situation in shale mines. Thus, in Leningradskaya
Region shales with uranium content exceeding the natural
background by 10-100 times lay in immediate proximity to
the earth surface.
The cited examples show that constant control and regulation
on all levels are necessary in the sphere of ensuring
radiation and ecological safety in industries of the fuel and
energy complex, and here we have, maybe, the major problem.
You won’t find in functional responsibilities of the Ministry
of Energy any mentioning of the fact that they should
take care of ensuring radiation safety. And it’s nonsense.
This Ministry that is contaminating territories does not want
to take responsibility for it. Sure, these are costly measures,
but they must manage the general process of ensuring safety
of population and ecology as a whole. But nothing has been
done so far. And when nobody controls and manages the
process from above, we can only hope for local initiatives.
And I would like to refer to radiation safety activity at “Saratovneftegaz”
as a positive example.
A radiation safety service has been established, laboratory
equipped, and responsible personnel with expert knowledge
in this sphere employed. Certainly, they have their problems,
and major ones, but the company is working to solve them
and they have already had progress. The next speaker, a representative
of this company, will tell how they are doing it.
And that’s all, thank you for your attention. If you have any
questions, you’re welcome!
A.V. Moskalenko: Colleagues, your questions, please.
Rustem, your questions.
R.M. Ilyasov: Thank you very much for your report. Vladimir
Alexeevich, I have a question. I understand that this situation
is typical not only for Russia, but generally for all countries
of the former Soviet Union. And I expect that all over
the world they have the same situation, I mean in oil and gas
industry. In that connection I have a question whether there
is some experience, maybe, that of our foreign colleagues
from the developed countries. Most probably, they have
already encountered the same problems. Do you have any
information on this subject How are they fighting with it,
what are they doing in this connection As radiation hazard,
you know, does not make any choice based on nationality,
faith or other principles. I, maybe, put the cart before the
horse, but still our foreign colleagues may have some experience
in these issues and these problems. Thank you!
V.A. Moskalenko: You know it may seem strange, but
we have only very limited information on this subject from
abroad. They are carefully trying to cover it all, as they were
doing it at Fukushima. We have more local information on
this subject, because it can be periodically found in some bulletins
and when working on sites, but we do not have foreign
data. I remember I once asked a question to some guys who
were presenting industrial oil and gas equipment, including
American units. what is the situation with ensuring radiation
safety What about the oil Is it clean or not And I got no
answer to my question.
A.V. Moskalenko: Colleagues, more questions, please!
Question from the audience: Vladimir Alexeevich, thank
you very much for your report. A small question that refers
not only to oil and gas industry. It is not a secret that major
combined heat and power plants are located generally near
industrial centers and big cities. And here is my question: ash
disposal areas that concentrate radioactive substances as a
result of coal burning are, maybe, even more dangerous than
storages of contaminated pipes or filtration fields near oil
production sites, as those are at least at some distance from
big industrial centers. Is anybody taking care of it
V.A. Moskalenko: Yes, I’ve understood you question.
Almost nobody is looking into this problem, though there
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92
are data that major combined heat and power plants with
release of radioactive elements, mainly potassium-40, create
the population radioactive dosage that is 5-40 times higher
that that of a nuclear power plant of similar capacity. But
nobody in the industry is taking care of it.
A.V. Moskalenko: Well, colleagues, Rustem has told that,
maybe, the International Atomic Energy Agency is doing
something. But the IAEA is responsible for control over nuclear
power industry, so oil and gas production is outside their scope
of operation, and this is a problem – there is no controlling,
supervising authority. Our colleague from Saratov will tell you
how well they organized everything there, it’s my assessment,
as I was in April there just to see it. I asked them where you
have taken all that Other companies in your holding have
nothing, and you have the system in place. It weren’t exactly
for bad luck, but still it was almost just incidentally that it was
developed there at such good level. If you remember, Rostekhnadzor
is also not supervising this area. But in our country
there are 2 SanPiNs (sanitary regulations and standards) dedicated
to this sphere, and we have also recommendations of
the Ministry of Energy. So, there are documents, but nobody
controls if companies are in compliance with them.
More questions, and this one will be the last.
Question from the audience: So, there are background
parameters that you have mentioned, there are standards
parameters, but there are also parameters connected with
individual sensitivity of a person as a biological entity to radiation.
And they say, there can be variations up to 200
times. So, radiation sensitivity of different people can differ
by about 200 times. So, how can we connect those parameters,
background, acceptable concentrations and human
sensitivity to radiation
V.A. Moskalenko: Well, connection here can be generally
through penetration of these radioactive elements. First
of all, external radiation, here everything is clear, it is expressed
in annual dose value that is considered standard for
population – 0.5 mSv. As for internal – everything depends
on the type of radioactive nuclide that got inside. Cesium,
for example, is the simplest, and it is more preferable that
strontium-90 that accumulates in bones. There are some recommendations
concerning radium, but they limited by the
fact that it has not been studied so thoroughly as artificial
radioactive nuclides.
A.V. Moskalenko: It was the last question, colleagues.
Thank you, Vladimir Alexeevich. Now we are going to have
a coffee-break. And I am waiting for all of you at 12.00
exactly.
On Experience in Ensuring Radiation Safety
at “Saratovneftegaz” (NK RussNeft)
Transcripts of Proceedings
Valery A. Tarasov, Director, Department of Industrial
and Fire Safety and Environmental Protection
Saratovneftegaz (Russia)
Valery Anatolievich Tarasov: It is pleasant to hear positive
opinions about the company, and I am a representative of
this company. Including positive comments in the report by
Vladimir Alexeevich. In the area of Saratov and Saratov Region
this company is the largest user of subsurface resources.
And though the volumes, maybe, are not the most impressive,
we produce from 1 to 2 million tons in different years,
and production volumes have been declining lately. And I
can declassify some data about the company. The company
headcount is now about 3000 persons, including subsidiaries.
During the Soviet time there were 15 thousand employees.
So, the trend is clear. Other regions and other companies,
probably, are in the same situation. We encountered the radiation
safety problem, and in rather severe variant, in 2004.
It happened so that the company voluntarily decided to survey
its industrial sites and other territories for compliance to
industrial safety norms, and, as a result, it was found out
that at a number of oil and gas fields and adjoining areas
the content of natural radioactive nuclides that are extracted
together with the main product was exceeding the thresholds
requiring very serious measures.
The Saratoskaya Region is rather politically active area.
Maybe, many of you have heard about our famous Governors,
and I want to say that we have a similar situation on
the regional and local level in supervisory authorities. For example,
the thesis or statement that I constantly have to deal
with is the phrase that representatives of supervisory bodies
are always repeating as a final truth – that any economic
feasibility cannot replace the importance of safety problems,
i.e. industrial safety, radiation safety, etc. And it is good
when this thesis is used reasonably, but it is bad when some
people are trying to make the oil and gas production facilities
fully equal to nuclear power facilities.
I am going to explain later on what were the areas of lack
of understanding, or sometimes total misunderstanding, on
the part of both operators and supervisory authorities. As it
was stated in the report by Vladimir Alexeevich, today we
have two pillars that are involved in control and supervision
of the radiation safety, this is former Nuclear Supervision
that is now, after reorganization, included in territorial agencies
of Rostekhnadzor and the Federal Service for Consumer
Rights Protection and Human Welfare (Rospotrebnadzor).
There are virtual supervisory functions with the Ministry of
Energy, but all efforts to cooperate with this respectable authority
have been fruitless so far. I’ll explain a bit later what
kind of problems we have here.
I am not going to list all those factors and processes that
are going on in subsoil. Vladimir Alexeevich explained to
you in details what families of chemical elements exist that
trigger the chain of natural radioactive nuclides, it’s first
of all uranium-238 and its decay products, there are several
groups of them: long-lived, short-lived and thorium-232
family. And Vladimir Alexeevich briefly described to you how
these elements come to the earth surface. I will, maybe,
just specify a bit that sources and reasons for increase in
sediments and growth of concentrations of natural radioactive
nuclides in the production equipment are natural factors.
At a number of fields the product contains increased
concentrations of natural radioactive nuclides as compared
with others. Besides, the product from these fields contains
increased concentrations of hydrogen disulfide and mineral
salts of various compositions. Thus, we are the happy owners
of those fields we are working on, and we have the respective
licenses. I want to say that “Saratovneftegaz” is one
of the biggest oil and gas producing companies in Russia,
as earlier of the Soviet Union; – we just recently celebrated
our 60th jubilee. It is obliging; therefore I mentioned here
this historical fact.
At the moment the level of water encroachment of formations
on average for “Saratovneftegaz” is over 80%, so,
roughly we produce 80% water, 20% oil. Some oil fields can
have even more astounding indicators. Thus, there is 95-98%
water encroachment at some of the oil fields. And economic
feasibility of further development of these oil fields is first
of all explained by the current oil price. Where it still pays
back, it is feasible to produce, so no further comments are
necessary.
Technological factors. Increase of oil recovery factor, different
measures of production stimulation, and today the
main measure at the fields that are, in oil production slang,
dead or dying, is the pump operation. So, roughly speaking,
you put high-capacity pumping equipment into the well. One
of the ways to keep the production volume on the planned
and acceptable levels is optimization of operations at certain
fields and certain wells. What is optimization It’s an increase
in production output in terms of oil-containing component.
Multiple zone production and transfer to other oil reservoir
horizons is also one of the optimization methods. Roughly

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
speaking, we use those horizons that never had much oil
by approved reserves. If in Soviet time nobody cared, these
horizons were passed and forgotten, now we come back
to them, and we, naturally, start including them in well development,
combining production from different horizons
of the same well, i.e. we perforate production zones. The
named reasons for formations of sediments with high content
of natural radioactive nuclides are typical for the majority
of companies of the oil and gas production complex
where fields have been already developed for a long time.
As a result, workers of oil production and processing can be
simultaneously affected by a number of sources of radiation
connected with increased content of natural radioactive
nuclides in the product itself, in oil-field production waters,
solid and liquid production wastes. In each specific case the
list of sources contributing to the personnel dose and share
of these contributions will be, certainly, different.
The main potential radiation sources at production facilities
can be the following: operational process equipment
where salt sediments and oil sludge with increased content
of natural radioactive nuclides are accumulated; production
waters in the form of oil sludge from vessels and soil of
industrial sites contaminated with oil sludge; dismantled process
equipment with salt sediments; technological processes
(cleaning of vessels, repair, dismounting, replacement of
parts and installations) that can lead to inhaling of radon
isotopes (222Rn и 220Rn); industrial dust in the production
zone containing natural radioactive nuclides (cleaning and
dismounting of equipment).
Contribution of each of these sources to the total radiation
dose and its impact on the environment depends on
specific production conditioned and can be assessed with the
help of dosimetric and radiometric surveys.
From our experience of work at “Saratovneftegaz”, we
can state that there has been a big change in this sphere,
starting from 2004 when we understood our situation and it
became clear to us what threat “Saratovneftegaz” operations
could have both for the personnel and local population. From
this moment we have made decisive changes in a number
of areas.
First of all, we realized ourselves where we are. We drafted
an action plan – both short-term and long-term actions –
to bring everything in compliance, to minimize the risks and
hazards that are connected with development of oil fields. It
was important even for feasibility of development of some of
the fields. So there was a question whether we should stop
developing some of the fields, those with rather good yields
for “Saratovneftegaz”, which meant we could lose about 30%
of output. And, besides, I must mention another, maybe,
unpopular factor that affected our decision, I mean shortsighted,
in our opinion, actions of the supervisory authorities,
when we received orders with enormous fines, without
understanding of the problem and outcomes of this situation,
not taking into account that it was not a new problem, as the
situation had been aggravated for many years. Nevertheless,
we started constructive negotiations with Gospromnadzor supervising
authority after we had been threatened with certain
prospects, including suspension of fields’ development, even
before understanding the situation and taking any preventive
measures, and in those negotiations we came to mutually acceptable
ways to solve disagreements and problems.
I must say that this situation in the past was rather serious.
We started moving in slow steps, but in the right direction,
and today our action and plans anticipate, just a bit, with one
step, actions of supervisory authorities in the sphere of radiation
safety and safe working conditions. I, certainly, do not
want to say we are enemies with them, but, nevertheless, as
our experience of interaction with these authorities shows,
their work is mostly assessed and often narrowed down to
a certain planned indicator of administrative penalties and,
especially, fines, and therefore, it, as a rule, has bad consequences.
That’s why I’ve asked some of my questions to
speakers. Today we all understand that there is such indicator
as amount of fines. It is not written down in any document,
but strategy of any audit, any inspection, unfortunately,
ends with the following question. No fines – it means the
audit was dishonest. No fines – in opinion of General Procurator’s
Office, the company and the supervisory body must
have come to some secret agreement. If results of the audit
differ from those of the previous year, i.e. lower indicators
and lower fines, it means the authority works poorly. So, according
to the logic of supervisory bodies, the more violations
are revealed by the body, the better it works. In other words,
it means that the situation is worsening at the company year
after year, and all efforts we undertake in this sphere are
either absurd, or we go in the wrong direction, i.e. we do
something else but not what is demanded from us.
But there are certainly positive moments in our work.
If we divide into two parts that section of the report
where there was a positive opinion about “Saratovneftegaz”,
we can see that two main problems of oil and gas companies
are the contaminated equipment, materials and metal
and the oil sludge after cleaning of the same equipment. In
this sphere we had to take two very important actions. We
had to understand, define and take a number of technical
measures and to spend a certain amount of money in order
to bring the situation in compliance with the current norms
and documents.
As for metal scrap and equipment that was decommissioned
due to high radiation contamination, we designed and
constructed ourselves at our own expense a temporary storage,
and here you can see how it looked like when it was still
new and recently painted, we obtained all necessary expert
reports on our design and performed all construction and
installation works.
We performed a complex of measures to isolate the surface,
we developed accounting and storage procedures and
regulations on personnel access to work with the equipment,
and put the storage in operation. Today this storage is operated
as part of our complex, and it is strictly regulated
in terms of systemization, storage organization and sorting
equipment of different hazard categories. There are different
racks for the first category hazard, and separate ones for
the second category.
Besides, the access is ensured for any controlling, supervising
authority, they can inspect each stored unit of equipment,
93
Pic. 1.
Pic. 2.
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94
every pipe section – everything is accessible and properly
marked. The work was done, it was, maybe, excessively huge,
but now I can say it with a safe conscience that I can sleep
peacefully, knowing that we have everything in order here.
And in my opinion, even more serious technological measure
was taken – in 2010 we built sludge storage. It looks
like two canyons that were submerged into ground after a
serious anti-corrosion protection of these constructions and
these two vessels (storage chambers) that are designed to
minimize risk of handling and contact of personnel with the
sludge and maximize automation of loading operations. And
here, at this forum, I want to disclose some our secrets.
You see, if you start filling those canyons without proper
thinking, the volume will be quickly filled. This problem was
investigated, and the used technology is similar to that of the
washing machine, and it is possible to wash out the sludge
with formation waters in order to decrease concentration of
nuclides and further pump the water into formations.
Thus, we return the extracted water to the same lostcirculation
horizon. The use of this technology will allow to
increase considerably both the service life of the facility and
its effective volume. I can say with dead certainty that there
is no other facility of the kind in the Volga region.
What are we doing it for We do it to in order to avoid accumulation
of 3 Class industrial wastes in process equipment,
to clean equipment from oil sludge of 1 and 2 Classes of
industrial waste. I will just give you some economic indicators.
Today, if you apply to a “RosRAO” regional affiliate with a request
to accept, for example, 3 Class metal scrap or oil sludge
to their storage, the quoted price will very good for “Ros-
RAO”, but not for the company. Today the cheapest price for
1 ton is 250 thousand rubles. You understand yourself, if you
multiply the volumes that have been quoted today by Vladimir
Alexeevich even by this minimum price, the feasibility of
operation for many companies would become questionable.
If we continue accumulating such volumes, without thinking
and understanding what we are doing, what will it lead to
A.V. Moskalenko: As far as I understand, you designed it
on your own, didn’t you
V. A. Tarasov: Yes, exactly. Maybe, a bit of positive information
– my department happened to enroll rather an
initiative group of employees, former military physicists, we
have a radiation control service and radiation control laboratory
that has been officially certified, and we have accreditation
documents for it. Today we have a license to
operate radionuclide sources. The license covers 3 facilities
having several units of process equipment that are classified
as 3 Class industrial wastes and identified as radionuclide
sources. By now we have taken all measures for their physical
protection in accordance with requirements of regulatory
documents, including installation of a perimeter fence with
an alarm system, and we have concluded a contract with a
security company for round the clock physical protection of
these facilities.
As in the Region we have a great number of qualified experts,
expert organizations and other specialized companies
and organizations, including Balakovskaya NPP and a specialized
radioactive waste disposal company (Saratov affiliate
of “RosRAO” Federal State Unitary Enterprise), we regularly
get in contact with them and discuss common development
of technologies of handling wastes with increased content
of natural radioactive nuclides and treatment of operational
process equipment. So, we have had some developments and
some positive experience in this sphere.
Vladimir Alexeevich and some other speakers before him
have informed the audience that radiation safety norms and
regulations in the Russian Federation became very stringent
after Chernobyl. But I think they still have a considerable
drawback, because there is not enough differentiation for
other facilities connected with radiation hazard. So, all these
documents are structured first of all for nuclear power plants.
I am going to explain why. If we have a “Rospotrebnadzor”
Transcripts of Proceedings
inspector, he won’t go into details, just opens the norms and
regulations, and there are stringent rules for personnel working
at such facilities, and there is a division of personnel into
Category A and Category B. And it means a lot of requirements,
there are requirements for medical indicators, constant
medical monitoring, constant training and employment
of many additional employees to the company staff. Believe
me, today these requirements and possibilities of a company
do not always match. And moreover, in my opinion, those requirement
are now excessive, as there is acceptable dose personnel
can have per year, and we have taken account of this
in our work. Today we have a contract with an independent
organization, “RosRAO” Federal State Unitary Enterprise that
performs individual dosimetric survey of all workers employed
at our licensed facilities. And even during that period when
the contract has been in force, we can say for sure that our
personnel cannot be classified by our radiation background in
the same way as NPP workers, i.e. with A and B categories,
and that working conditions of workers at our facilities comply
with the requirements of sanitary norms and regulations.
I would like to thank you for your attention and for the
possibility to make a report today at this reputable Forum.
If you have any questions, I will be glad to share information
with you. All that we passed through and what we have
achieved represent, I think, some positive experience. Thank
you for your attention!
A.V. Moskalenko: Thank you very much for your report.
A small comment. I’ve already told that in April I visited Valery
Anatolievich in order to study their experience. Not without
a bit of malice and mischief, we’d brought our radiological
monitors with us, and, as you can see in this scheme, a dump
truck unloads here radioactive sludge, and we came to that
site. Certainly, we switched on our measuring equipment,
and I thought there had to be something in the corners –
when the truck unloads sludge here, you can imagine how
everything is scattered to the four winds. No, everything was
ideally clear. You see, laboratory workers come and clean everything
additionally with a vacuum cleaner and thus collect
all the wastes. So, the work organization is wonderful!
Questions, colleagues!
B.V. Sadovnikov: Chief Inspector of nuclear fuel company
TVEL, supplier of nuclear fuel to the Russian Federation
and other foreign countries. My question – you are constantly
talking, and with some ambitions, about requirement
of Rospotrebnadzor and Rostekhnadzor supervisory bodies,
but they perform their functions and all they require is to
comply with requirements of state norms and regulations.
As I’ve understood from your report, we can refute those requirements,
using our professional expertise. And this phrase
has caused some indignation. You see, these are not requirements
for nuclear power plants. Division into Group A and
Group B personnel is for all nuclear and radiation hazardous
facilities, including those of your company. Why do you refuse
to comply with this requirement And, please, tell us
what the average annual dose of your workers is.
V.A. Tarasov: You’ve misunderstood me, I meant illegal
demands. And the annul dose for our employees is within 2
mSv, with the maximum acceptable for population of 5 mSv.
B.V. Sadovnikov: Do you know that Rosatom has 0.2
A.V. Moskalenko: I beg your pardon, but we need a
question, not a dispute.
B.V. Sadovnikov: Why do you refuse to follow these
principles
V.A. Tarasov: In response to your comment I can say
that we have never refused and are not refusing of radiation
safety principles. And we are always solving our disagreements
with supervisory authorities on the basis of principles
of compliance with legislation and existing norms and regulations
in the sphere of radiation safety in industry.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
A.V. Moskalenko: I just want to clarify that it is all about
qualified protection from unjustified demands.
V.A. Tarasov: Exactly, that’s what I meant. Maybe, it
sounded a bit too emotional, excuse me.
A.V. Moskalenko: Colleagues, next question, if you have
any! Miroslav, your questions, please.
Miroslav Lipar: It’s not a question, it’s a comment. I can
check what the International Atomic Energy Agency is doing
in this area and what it can do.
A.V. Moskalenko: Thank you! Rustem, you have woken
up the IAEA, wait for them to visit you! Any more questions,
colleagues No. Thank you very much! Thank you!
Session 4. Lessons from the Accident
(San José Mine, Chile, 2010)
The Rescue at San Jose Mine,
Sharing an Amazing Experience
Fidel Nunez, Senior Manager for Mining Technology
and Innovation
CODELCO (Chile)
Ladies and gentlemen, Mr Chairman.
On behalf of CODELCO and myself let me say thanks for
the opportunity to share with you that amazing experience.
But during this day we are talking about the occupational
health and safety. Then I would like to show you the commitment
in CODELCO for this matter.
We have a main project at the company in order to emphasize
our commitment and to improve our result, looking
forward to be world-class company.
And our values – we have 7 values, and the first one is
related to human life and dignity, looking for the life, looking
for to do the best in our operation.
And in that way our mission for 2015 is to improve our
result in term of fatalities (we heard during yesterday and
today some figures on that), and we are looking for to
be under 1 in term of safety index related with number of
accidents in one million hours of work, looking for the automated
dangerous procedures. And for 2020 to be in the
top 5 of the world-class companies related with the base
metals industry, with no fatalities, and working on benchmark
terms of sustain every year.
Why that Because, if you see these figures, we have
very clear trends in terms of result or for injuries index, but
we are really flatin term of fatalities: around 6 fatalities per
year, and we need to do something different in order to be
better and better.
Along the years, I mentioned to you this trend in term of
injuries and in terms of lost time in accidents, but fatality is
the really the biggest concern. We need to make a change
in order to enthusiast the organization and the workers,
in order to work under controlled risk and to avoid all of
the accidents. Like Hulmut mentioned the ISA philosophy in
term of mission zero, and another colleague asked about
“to work in the controlled risk”. I think that both are working
in the same direction as us, in term of to have no injuries
– that’s the idea.
And finally, to mention that we have, defining this main
project for us as working in term of leadership, to define
the standards, and to ensure that we’ll be the best in term
of corporate industry.
In these few minutes the idea is to focus you in term of
concept and the philosophy in COELCO to be the world-class
company. That’s the reason now I am going to share with
you the expediencies of San Jose rescue, because after that
I think it’s necessary to be more specific in term of what we
do in order to avoid something, accident like San Jose.
Can you change to the other computer, please
Now I will refer with some detail of the San Jose accidents
– what we did in term of to rescue the miners.
Because of the size of the accident – 33 miners at the
bottom of the mine –the Government took the management
of that by the Ministry of Mining, and they decided
to ask CODELCO to support this risk. And CODELCO put the
team from the El Teniente mine – on the left side there is
organisational chart, and the head of this rescue manages
the El Teniente mine. They decided to have a chemical team
in Santiago in order to search for the different solutions
all around the world, because it is very complicated to see
what happened inside at 700 m deep, there is no experience
in that.
Then, the agenda of this presentation: we defined the
problem, we followed to find the miners, we sent the rescue,
and the rescue operation itself.
That happened on the 5th of August, 2010, at 2 p.m- it’s
a big block, this is…
You can see this is amine of gold and copper, this mine
is one year old, and there were at 700 m deep – the level
where the miners were working,and level by level design is
to keep a bean like a support in between the levels, and one
these beams was broken and fell.
And it’s a big block – 200 m of lands, 50x50.
This is a typicalPeruviandesert, right.
What’s the step in this type is the typical step when you
have some difficulties in the mine First, find the miners,
and then, if they are alive, decide what we do. First goal is
normally to feed the people, and to have any communication
system, and after that we send the rescue.
In this animation you will see the design that we used
to catch up people inside. In that case we used normal
drill holes for exploration. We put in the next 48 hours 7
machines, looking for the feed points – one of them is
the refuge, because it is the big area, it’s 10x10 in base;
and a workshop on the intersection of three galleries – we
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decided that’s the biggest, sorry, the best position to hit
theworkers.
Ana you can see in this slide I take to show you the
concern that was very wide in term of all the country was
involved in that, even in this area is the camp that was
built where any moment there was more than one thousand
people, staying there by time, living, and it was necessary
to have the lot of infrastructure for that – some facades,
some cafeterias or some installations for feeding these one
thousand people, because they moved there, they installed
thereclose to the area where the mine was.
The miners had been found on the 22 of August, 17 days
after. It was very impressive, because as you can see, we
need to hit a gallery 5 meters wide, drilling 700 meters. Normally,
drill holes have 1.5% of deviation – let’s say, in 700 m
it’s more of less 10 meters, then you will be anywhere! And
we decided to improve that in the last 200 meters, using
the special tools in order to improve accuracy from 1.5% till
0.1%, in ten times, in that case deviation will be not more
than 1.5 m. Then the possibility to hit a gallery is bigger.
When we hit the galleries, we had 3 holes into the mine,
one in the refuge, one in the workshop, and the other one
in the gallery. And the first operation was to feed the workers;
and the second hole – we used it for communication,
and for water, and for ventilation. And I am going – we
communicated we had to use all of the elements inside the
mine to feed, to bring water, and then, when necessary in
terms of protocol, when you have people isolated long time,
we use isotonic drinks and something like that in order to
catch up the energy lost during this isolated times. And in
the film there is tube that we used to move, to introduce,
feed meals to the bottom.
And because, when we studied the situation, the miners
were alive, then we had to rescue. Then, if you look –
700 meters with different means will take not less than two
months. Then the organization – we decided to have one
hole dedicated for communication, and with actual technics
like fiber optics it is possible to have video and voice. Then
we installed videoconference facilities in San Jose in order to
maintain the family communicating with the workers in term
to maintain the spirit of to be alive and wait for the rescue.
Then, when the situation was we knew that they were
alive, they were 700 m in depth, we had three possibilities.
One of them is to go by the decline, but it was not
possible because thedecline was blocked by this big block,
and in the galleries there was movement. We came to measure
the deformation, and the technical decision was we
cannot use the decline. The second one is the horizontal
tunnel,and we designed the horizontal tunnel with the acceptable
inclination – we needed 1.5 km.With 150 m per
month – let’s say, 10 month at least we need in term of
tunneling. And the third one is to make a shaft, and with
this world-wide asking in term of helps that our President
made, some people from the USA and from Germany gave
us some experience:in certain situation – let’s say, 100 m or
150 – they use some cage, some small cage, 70-75 cm in
diameter. Then we conclude that we need a small shaft of
70 cm in diameter, and we looked at different techniques
to obtain this small shaft.
And at the very beginning we used the typical machine,
it’s the raise boring machine, drilling down, this is the Strata
900 that we moved from Andinamine to the San Jose mine
in order to begin as soon as possible.During this installation
we looked for the second machine. And if you look at
oil rigs when they drillfor very deep deposits, they drill 3
thousand meters, and when they do that, in the first 700 m
or 1000 mthey do in term of 1 m or 80 cm diameter. Then
we asked the people at our national company in oil Petroleum,
and they helped us to design the use of rig oil. The
drill forecast time was almost 1 month, but the installation
of this machine, big machine, is almost 45 days. Then the
best time expected with rig oil is almost 80 to 90 days.And,
finally, we looked and made an update of our analysis, and
we looked that we had the third hole in these 3 holes hitting
the bottom of the mine – it’s 6.5 inches in diameter
techniques, and we have it like a back-up if we have any
problem with the other two. Then, when you look at the
techniques in order to use tools to rush this from 6 inches
to 26 inches, it is possible in one pass to 12 inches, and later
on to 26, in only 35 days. Then we decided to accommodate
the T130 to improve the pull-down and to use…
And we used this cluster hammer we use in five or four
bits, looking for these 26 inches we need for to have necessary
diameter to use a vehicle to hoist the miners.
This is just to show the size of the oil rig we moved from
2000 km afar to this area, using 50 trucks to move all of
the parts, and 40 days to move up the towers and to begin
the drill for this machine.
When we built the raise, we studied if it is necessary or
not to put case. We casedin the first 70 m of those 700 m,
because we needed to be sure that it will be sable. Fortunately,
the rocks – it’s very, very hard, then it’s very stable
and we don’t need more casing.
Then, we have found the miners, communication and
have the shaft, now we decided to use a cage – like normal
miner in undergrounds, here we have main experience in
term of sinking shaft for the deeper mines in South Africa,
Canada, maybe here as well. We need rescue team to move
into the mine to rescue the miners and the hoisters system
in order to have a very professional design, because, when
you have any big pressure because of the families, because
ofthe relatives in order to be faster, despite of that, we
decided to respect the protocol in term of the use of the
right techniques.
Then here I take a moment in order to say thanks to
people from the German side Helmut well know, the people
of the rescue area, they had experience, in 1963 they did
that, and they sent us this model. And the second one is a
rescue in the USA, in a coal mine 150 m deep. And we make
a mix between those examples and
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And we define this more safety design, because the actual
time is better than before, then we have better communication
and emphasis in term of medical aspect because
of 700 meters in depth. At the very beginning we calculate
that the trip will be 30 minutes. And to be 30 minutes in 70
inch diameter, you will see, you can see that’s a very, very
hard situation. That’s the reason why we put telephone, we
put some emergency staff in order to be sure that if something
can occur, we can react.
This is a picture for the case that we used. Here’s an anecdote
– you heard about Phoenix light capsules, but from
the miners’ side we use “cage”. But because the President
asked the Navy to construct these cages, these capsules,
because they use them in diving, and for diving the Navy
use the name “capsules”.
This are some pictures showing the rescue team training.
We use a crane in order to simulate the trip in a tube, in
a pipe of 70 inches diameter.
Then – unfortunately, I cannot put you right, so you
move your heads and you can understand better- but this is
a movement that we used to simulate this operation when
the rescue will be in a shaft moving into the mine for the
miners, and what will feel the miners inside this, to prevent
any problems.
And the last step was to prepare thehoister system. And
here we were supported by Otis company, and
I think we were lucky because they just finished the
raise-boring system in sinking shaft for hydroelectric power
station, and the system was close to Santiago, we moved
it to the mine.
As all of the staff of this hoister system was there, then
it was quite easy to move to the site, and the company
moved the best specialists we have to the mine site in order
to be sure that will work very well.
This is a double-drum hoister system.
This is double bracket hoisting room. You can see the
yellow jacket is the supervisor, and red is the operator of
the hoister system. They moved from Otis in Santiago. And
on the screen you can see in the back is a real time where
you saw the rescue arrived to the bottom of the mine. This
is the screen they are looking when the cage arrive to the
bottom in order to have with the accuracy when they arrive
to the bottom of the mine.
The rescue day – I think one of the key issues was that
President of the country was really involved. That is, he arrived
some hours before to be there, and André, the head
of rescue site, explained this.
And myself, I explain in some design what’s the next
step. On the left side there is Mine Minister, and on the
right side is the Chairman of the Board of CODELCO.
Well, you know, you mentioned that this was big news
worldwide, there was a lot of press there, and we decided
to be very orderly in term to not to get a chaos then the
rescue begin. Then, this is staff for the press.
The relatives, 33 by 4 times – wife and the kids, it’s 100
peopleconcerned what we’ll do, and we have this installation
in order that they can see directly the operation.
And because after more than 60 days inside, this is a
special room to welcome with the families, and the doctors
in orders to evaluate any miners when they move out.
This is the general view, I’ll mention you all the staff
after the end of the pictures. It’s the tenth of the camp’s
size, where I think in the peaks were, maybe, more than 3
thousand people there.
And this is the operation itself. You see some in the
video – I did not move my video because it’s not the right
size. It’s the animation when the last rescue arrived, then
the operation finished.
I can read that, but you will understand better than me
that 33 miners now enjoy the life after this operation.
“Spasibo” (Thank you).
A.V. Moskalenko: I would like to emphasize how important
that rescue operation was.QuestionsAny miners
around Do we have such rescue equipment Do you have
questions No. Then, thank you very much. Oh yes, there’s
a question.
Question from the audience: Back to radiation safety.
During this rescue operation was there any radiation control
on the rescue professionals or the miners, and if yes, which
dosage did they sustain
Fidel Nunez: We do not have any radiation, because in
our ore thereis only gold and copper, there is not any metal
that will possibly have any radiations.
A.V. Moskalenko: Your question, please.
Question from the audience: Thank you very much for
your presentation. Myself, I am a miner, and I dedicated my
whole to this profession. And it was interesting for me to
listen to it. My question is purely technical: how could you
avoid occurrence of slime and water into the shaft where
the miners were
Fidel Nunez: Despite the problems, we were quite lucky,
because we are in the desert, it’s very dry there, and the
water that we use is only for drilling, and after that, when
the shaft was done, we get dry again. Then we don’t have
any spillage and broken material go into the shaft. And to
be sure to avoid any spillage or any piece of rock falling to
the shaft, we madesome scan-view techniques, we made
at least 3 times inspection before we begin the moving of
the cage.
A.V. Moskalenko: Any questions
Question from the audience: Two questions. How did
the Government award the rescue personnel Any changes
in the legislation after this accident and the brilliant operation
Fidel Nunez: For the rescue committing the Company
made a special program to say thanks for the dedication
and commitment with works.For ourselves just to be there
is a real award. Then, to be here, to share the views is
another recognition for us, for the technical people. And
from the legislation side from the Government legislation,
we have a lot of changes. The Mining Ministry – the next
presenter will talk something from that, but we review all
of that, because the people concerned on the audits in term
of technical aspects or safety aspects, they did not have
enough people for that. It’s very pity, because Chile ismining
country, and with the actual price, we have more than
3 thousand small mines. The possibility they don’t take care
in terms of safety and health occupational is so big. That’s
the reason the Minister will change this, take into account
all the experience in order to change that.
A.V. Moskalenko: Thank you, Senor Nunez.
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Chilean Evolution of the Mining Security
Rodrigo Santana, Regional Director of the National
Service of Geology and Mining (SERNAGEOMIN) in
Magallanes
Ministry of Mining (Chile)
Ladies and gentlemen, I want today to state recognitions
for inviting me to this Conference to one of the most beautiful
cities in the world. Thanks specially to the Chairman.
My name is Rodrigo Santana, I work for the National
Agency of the Mining and Geology of Chile. My presentation
is about the risk management in Chile. I have to show you
in my presentation this report. First I’ll give you just a brief
introduction about Chile, I will discuss the activities we were
performing the last years, and finally I will focus on what
activities are planned for the next years.
And the picture for the evolution and accident.
Let us always remember: before analysis of numbers and
accident statistics we speak of people who died in miningand
there is a family behind every worker. (Pic. 1)
Chile represents 30% in copper, 10% in gold – you can
see the picture. (Pic. 2)
Now, a little more about Chile. Miningdirectly employs
more than 191 thousand workers. So, it is estimated that
indirect employment is 305 thousand workers. In total 496
thousand workers. In the past ten years mining has double
the number of workers. And Chile last year had production
of 5.3 million tons of copper mine.
This is a picture of Chilean copper mine. (Pic. 3)
Who is SERNAGEOMIN SERNAGEOMIN, it’sGeology and
Mining National Survey, is an agency from the ministry of
mining, The national agency of mining and geology is the
technical and scientific staff for the ministry.
It’ is a picture of inspection to mining companies, to treatment
plant. (Pic. 4).
Other picture – rescue and investigation of accident.
(Pic. 5).
And location of Sernageomin in the country: in mining
area Sernageomin is located in 7 regions in the country (miner
regions); the geology area of Sernageomin is located in 4
technical offices in the country.
Now, the information about safety. Accident rate of accidents
at work by economic activity: the mining is economic
activity with the lowest accident rate.
But mining is the second economic activity with the highest
mortality rate.
We see that mining is the economic activity that has the
largest number of days lost for occupational accidents – line
blue. (Pic. 6)
In conclusion, mining is economic activity of low accident
rate, but it is a production activity of high risk.
Evolution of the fatality rate in mining: I would like to
attract your attention to fatality numbers, the fatality rate
declining by 86% since the 80-s in the last years. You can
see declining, regression annual trend. (Pic. 7)
In the other graph your attention is to the frequency injury
rate numbers. Thefrequency injury rate is declining by 91%
since 80-s. It means at least you can see a regression annual
trend. (Pic. 8)
What was the strategy to get this In identification of variables
that affect theminingfatalities: model of causality,factors
of labor,substandard conditions,substandardactions, and
personal factors.Strategy planning of inspections to mining
companies: there were regularization projects, inspections,
and training. Finally, identification of variables of mining accidents,
long-term
Now well, victims according to type of mining: direct employees
of mining, mining contractors, small miners – in the
last 3 years we have identified that direct mining points and
contractors are 89% of accident. (Pic. 9)
Victims according to type of mining facility: in the last
years, last 30 years, underground mines, treatment plants
and open pit are the facilities with the highest percentage
of facilities.
Pic. 1.
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Victims according to charge: mining equipment operators,
assistant mining and miners are three professions more likely
to suffer fatal accidents.
Victims by age at work: we have identified that under 3
years’ experience at work the workers have the high possibility
to suffer an accident. The Survey under miner companies
has worked to training the people in order to reduce the
number of accidents.
Model of causality, analysis of work factors by facilities:
strategy like this analyzes the model of causality, improves
the adequacy of inspections.
We are equipping and training our inspectors with the last
technology in measuring and monitoring to prevent failures
on the slope. (Pic. 10)
As a strategy to improve working conditions in mining, it
is reviewing and updating the Chilean mining safety law, of
course according to modern seismic values. And these two
pictures – example of tailings dam failures by thee arthquakes.
(Pic. 11)
The feedback on items from the investigation of accidents
is giving to us all the points of view to inspect these
facilities.
And now, strategy planning of inspections to mining companies.
The strategy designed the selastyearshas 3 pillars of
action. First, increase on-site inspection annually – to have
majorpercent in job; approval of mining projects or regularization
of mining; and finally, promote the training in security
applied to mining.
Remembering 2010, in our country we had earthquakes,
tsunami, and the famous accident in the San Jose mine. In
this picture you see the impact of those events in the Survey:
the result is the major budget, and increase of the number
of inspectors, inspections, and more projects.
The regulation of mining operations is developed to the
approval of mining projects.
For these years it’s planning to monitor safety training
2175 workers a mine, which represent 211 thousand hours of
training in total.
Ok, I will like to attract your attention to this picture,
because for me it is the best conclusion of our work. In this
graph we see that as increased presence of inspectors in mining
for two years has reduced the rate of mining accident.
It’s the best important for us.
Ok, this is my presentation. For more information you can
see our website.
Thank you very much.
A.V. Moskalenko: Colleagues, please, your questions, if
any.
Question from the audience: Please, tell, do you… The
translation might be not correct or… Mine you are talking
about, you are talking about mines – pits, but not a mine. You
were talking about pits, but it’s not a mine. I am representing
here the state agency. What I am talking about is the previous
presentation – it was a pit or a mine in the previous presentation.
Underground mining, let’s call it that way. I want to say
there is no gas, nothing was stalled there. What method do
you use in producing It’s exploded by using, applying industrial
explosives or special combing facility And collapsing –
this collapse did not take place, because… this collapse did not
happen, or geological failure collapsed.How did it happen
Rodrigo Santana: This area in the all things in relation to
explosives is control of the authority, especiallythis. This case
is Army control. Ours is control of many things by our lawyer.
But the control of explosives is Army control.
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Pic. 2.
Pic. 3.
Pic. 4. Pic. 5.
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Pic. 6.
Pic. 7.
Pic. 8.
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Pic. 9. Pic. 10.
101
Pic. 11.
A.V. Moskalenko: Ivan Grigorievich, your question might
be asked to Senor Nunez later, because he is connected with
that mine, that pit. Any more questions, dear colleagues
Please, take the microphone.
Question from the audience: Thank you so much for the
presentation. Just small question: You were giving statistics in
mining, and was that statistics in mining about the number
of injuries or fatality per one thousand workers per year, or
over some period, or number of injuries or fatalities per one
thousand or one million tons of ore produced, or rock What
curves How do you build the graphs you were presenting,
you were showing to us during the presentation What is the
main essence that is behind this statistics What is the basis
for that statistics you were showing us
Rodrigo Santana: But the accidents reflected in Chile are
calculated with rates of frequency and fatality. The accident
is calculated as how many fatalities per million of hours.
A.V. Moskalenko: Thank you, next question.
Question from the audience: You were telling about 3
aspects of safety: inspection of operation, inspection of designing,
and personnel training. What from your point makes
the main contribution into safety of all the mining work –
out of those 3 components Thank you.
Rodrigo Santana: Especially is all concept for the security
in the mine, of all things under our control is the training for
us, it is very important for us, the most important control.
A.V. Moskalenko: Next question, please.
Question from the audience: Is it allowed in Chile to
have an underground mine with only one access or exit or if
you require to have at least 2 for case of emergency.
Rodrigo Santana: Now I went to see many things – there
are many changes to drawing, development, and especially as
we have control totally of mining company. It’s very important
change in many companies, and in them all is to change.
A.V. Moskalenko: This has been the last question. Let me
on behalf of…No, second to the last.Now the question.
Comment from the audience: Regarding the last question.
In the case of the San Jose mine, it is a normal situation
that they have two outlets moving to the line and exit. But
the way in the case of the use of the ventilation raisefor the
second entrance, but it was collapsed by the block. But the
legislation is compulsory to use two entrances.
A.V. Moskalenko: Dear friends, let us thank once again
for the presentation.
Dear colleagues, let us continue. Now we are going to
have a very interesting block of presentations that I call for
myself a virtual session, do I understand it correctly And with
my great pleasure, I give the word to Alexander Petrovich
Khaustov, Professor of Applied Ecology, Dr.Sci. (Geology and
Mineralogy), Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
Session 5. Training Sets for Training
of Specialists
Virtual Training Environments for Training
Specialist on Industrial and Environmental Safety
Alexander P. Khaustov, Professor of Applied Ecology,
Dr.Sci. (Geology and Mineralogy)
Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (Russia)
Dear colleagues! First of all, I want to express my gratitude
to organizers of the forum for wonderful organization
and interesting reports. And as a remark, even to reduce the
time allocated for my report, I want to make a comment:
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I’ve managed to listen to reports at different sessions, and
all reports are very interesting. But I would like to start with
a notion of “risk”. Everybody is speaking about the first part
of the definition, i.e. about possibility of some event. But
the second part of the notion is somehow in the shadow, I
mean damage, and now even a three-component model is
used – remote effects. I’ll try to explain what it is, using a
specific example. In order to have some figures, I was asking
uncomfortable questions to Mr Thompson, and it was for a
good reason, because probability, i.e. the first risk component
of events in the Gulf of Mexico, if I remember it right,
was 0.03, and the damage to environment was 20-30 billion
dollars, if we judge by the value of “British Petroleum” borrowed
assets that the company planned to use for compensation
of damages, environmental pollution, etc. And there
will be, certainly, remote effects as well. We have not got
used to speak about them yet and, maybe, do not understand
them in full.
I was an expert at the Usinsk Accident, you know it was
a severe accident. 106 thousand tons of oil during two years,
and over 18 thousand tons of them were released into the
Kolva River. In principle, it was an ecological disaster, and it
was included in the Guinness Book of Records in such a bad
category. And then it was decided that we must educate
experts in this sphere.
And one more comment: I understand specifics of this
forum, but we tend here to consider specifics of a company
isolated from its environment. A company is a component of
the total anthropogenic system. But we are speaking about
damage of equipment, about fatalities, but I have not heard
anywhere about environment. It is very difficult, but we must
do it. It is as important as a human life. We can’t live without
it. If we come back to the basics of insurance, the notion of
risk was introduced there to evaluate the damage and know
the cost of a certain accident.
So, about costs. Liquidation of the Usinsk accident consequences
took 10 years of “Lukoil” work plus 6 billion rubles.
And benzpyrene can be still found in soils and in other environmental
components.
I say it because the ecological dilemma is now undergoing
some change, i.e. there is a trend towards stable pollution
agents that have environmental effect on molecular, transmolecular,
genetic levels, etc.
And if we look at any accident, at any incident from this
point of view, it can seem that nature is fighting and overcoming
the damage, but it is not true.
How did this program originate You know that many
companies now have HSE departments – organizational
structures covering industrial safety, occupational safety and
health and environmental safety.
Looking from this point of view, we studied the leading
higher education institutions that train experts within the
frames of their master programs, because this training is
related to educational standards, and master course ensures
a higher background level.
I am more than sure that 80% of people now present in
the hall are not professional experts in the sphere of industrial
safety. They are either technology engineers or people
with some other background who were retrained or in some
other way developed their skills, but you see, such specialized
programs exist. Here is an example with an evidence of the
actuality of this problem. (Pic. 1).
Demand – you know that we have a problem here. Actually
education is lagging behind the demand from industry.
In order to fill this gap, we studied requirements for HSE
management expert in “Sakhalin Energy”. And we tried to
develop an academic program on the basis of these requirements
in order to train and prepare experts that could meet
modern requirements. It is especially important for developing
countries. Our University is very active in innovation edu-
Pic. 1.
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
103
Pic. 2.
Pic. 3.
Pic. 4.
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104
cational technologies, and such expert training was new for
everybody, but we managed to cope with it.
The second aspect I would like to mention is impossibility
for a student to take part in an actual emergence response
operation. But we create a virtual model of an accident and
train some details there, such as cooperation with EMERCOM
forces and other organizations concerned. You know that
major damage and majority of fatalities are connected with
human factor, with a mess created by people. In distinction
from Chile, we always have a lot of people who do not know
what to do. Any emergency – and 20 generals come, each
with his own operations center. And it results in huge losses.
And fuel and energy complex sites are industrial hazardous
facilities, we must take into account their specifics.
Creation of virtual professional environment. Our task is
to place the student into his future professional environment.
For ecologists it will be our mother Nature, and it is in order
to train them to evaluate the consequences of any accident,
we started developing this virtual training complex. I must
say frankly that it is an expensive game, and it is really a
game.
You are being trained while playing, it is a continuous improvement,
and those who ever worked with virtual training
environments know how quickly the knowledge is mastered.
You can see knowledge pyramid in the scheme.
You see, traditional lectures give only 5% of knowledge
to trainees and students. But training of others, immediate
application of skills, to which these virtual training sets are
oriented, gives 90 %. (Pic. 2).
Actually our experience shows that our masters of science
become really qualified experts after 2 years of education,
and companies, after assessment procedures, employ even
“medium” graduates who have not been studying very well.
Virtual environments are well developed, and they are used
in many industries: in nuclear industry and in drilling. Gubkin
Russian State University of Oil and Gas and higher educational
institutions abroad work in the same direction.
Scheme. Here you can see the modeling section, scenarios,
database, operator actions, evaluation of results, training set,
system of tests, and, finally, an information model. The most
difficult are the scenario and the information model.
The training is organized in the closed loop. You see, the
industrial environment, additional training, identification of
competence level, testing, training, theoretical knowledge,
and everything again and again, until the trained expert
brings himself to the necessary knowledge level.
The teacher plays the role of a consultant. We distribute
the software on USB sticks or computers, they take it home,
and we communicate via e-mail or by phone.
Here is the architecture of the virtual complex we developed.
Of course, you need a training system or an electronic
textbook, and until a student passes the respective tests he
won’t go further. Then he needs Oil spill contingency plan
(OSCP), and if a student can’t compile OSCP, he won’t understand
anything. Then a certain database, inquiry system,
and this scenario type according to our regulatory documents,
with classification into local, territorial, regional accidents or
an emergency situation. Either one of the variants is chosen,
from the lightest to the most severe, or all four scenarios are
realized, but it is difficult.
Then there is categorization of accidents and process visualization,
forecast, monitoring, calculation of economic and
social damages. The latter is the most difficult. We can’t calculate
our money, and this is the reason for all our problems.
We calculate only after something has happened. Or use a
cost method of evaluation, i.e. how much we have spent by
a certain stage of the emergency response. And we should
know technologies of contamination elimination, now there
are so powerful means to liquidate oil spills that one must
know them, these are hundreds and tens of thousands of
sorbents, starting from primitive oil collection and up to such
high-tech and biological substances splitting oil molecules,
they are called dispersants. (Pic. 3).
Transcripts of Proceedings
Then there is efficiency evaluation, and, finally, a report
is compiled, as it is done in practice. There are time limits for
such report, so this part of the student’s work is very close
to industrial practice.
Here is the accident itself. It was very difficult to create
this picture, but it was the beginning of the whole development
process. It is actually a model, and here you can see
a main pipeline, rapture for its entire cross-section, oil is
spilling, and the student must stop it, and the sooner he can
stop it, i.e. the sooner the operator reacts, the lower will be
the damage, and, certainly, less money and efforts spent for
collection of the spilled oil. (Pic. 4).
Unfortunately, the Usinsk accident lasted two years, it
was kind of creeping accident, and everybody tried not to
notice it, just mended oil pipelines here and there. I will give
you a very simple example: The Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous
Region has 5.5 thousand accidents on pipelines, and it
is, probably, the only local administration that provides complete
data, and even they have started limiting it. And they
provide these data in their reports, but they do not provide
economic data, i.e. what they spend for these accidents.
Here you can see that actually the river, and ground waters,
and soils, and air through evaporation – everything is
taken into account in calculations of the impact zones. So,
based on this accident, it was necessary to develop software
blocks that allowed to make those calculations.
Here is the scheme itself. A textbook, library, reference
book, inquiry system. Here goes the beginning of the textbook
that is now studied.
Here is the library. It was a great problem with the library
– we had to create it anew, and it was made thanks
to TNK-BP, they supported us as sponsors, which allowed us
to publish a number of textbooks and reference guides to
train people.
This is a training system, it is a mobile sludge processing
unit. In principle, the student can choose on his own what
he considers needed, depending on how well he has studied
requirements to decontamination of a certain medium and
how good his competence is.
But in principle, you can choose anything, any necessary
equipment.
Here is “Techexpert”, and you all know this complex of
regulatory documents we all study – and this is also an element
of submerging into the professional media. Thus, the
student from the very beginning works not with some academic
textbooks, but directly with norms and regulations
contained in the “Techexpert” system. And it must be certainly
updated, it is a requirement.
It is for that reason that I’ve told you the complex needs
development, we can’t leave it half-done, because documents
change, radiation safety regulations change, and, in
principle, the same complex can be used for fires, for explosions,
and the software of TOXI-1, TOXI-4 that is now being
developed by “Industrial Safety” Research and Engineering
Center can be also incorporated in the training environment.
Here is the “Automated Working Place” section – calculation
of contamination dispersion with “Prism” software complex
that is used for calculations of oil products evaporation
and calculation of the 1, 2 and 3 category impact zones.
Here is “Inquiry” section that is constantly addressed by
the student: how to write a certain document, and there is
a rather voluminous archive with sample texts of reports,
for example, so that nobody racked brains over them and
reinvented the wheel, but used the inquiry material and took
some data about certain measures taken.
And finally, the general scheme of operating the training
complex. It was not an easy task to develop it, but we have
finally come to this version. You see, here is a preliminary assessment
of a student, he can be far from being a specialist
yet, but he has come to be trained and we must know what
he is worth. It is an obligatory stage, and we can’t move
further without it. You can be amazed when seeing that
the background of students is so different. You know that

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
over half of students have bad academic results, and private
higher educational institutions just don’t educate them at all,
they simply buy diplomas and then they come and ask to
teach them. How can we train him with such background
And, on the contrary, there is a trainable part of those coming
to be trained, and they have good background, so the
students must be differentiated before we allow them to
use this training complex. Some of them need 2 years, and
somebody can master it in 1.5-2 months.
Then there is accident visualization – I want to emphasize
it once more, it is the most important, and it is necessary to
show “animations”: it is the most important that a person
could understand how contamination processes go on. So
that, if there were critical situations, if a fire occurred, they
would know how to locate the monitoring scheme, how to
identify the industrial zone, what measuring equipment is
necessary, how to assess the damage or conditions for response
teams operation, etc.
Then there is a management or organizational block, very
difficult, because there are no written instructions on how to
interact with EMERCOM forces, how the contamination level
is defined, etc. Those who dealt with it know that there are
a lot of problems in this area. EMERCOM personnel consider
that if the spill is of 10 tons only, the company should response
with its own forces.
And the most important, of course, is to identify the volume
of the oil spill. What I want to say to you: there were
different data for the Usinsk accident, from 700-800 thousand
tons to 14 thousand tons. Such a wide range. Naturally,
“Komi-neft” owners reported 14 thousand tons, but later,
when three independent expert organizations held instrumental
surveys, two of them proved to make quite accurate
estimates – 106 thousand tons of oil. And then it was possible
to have some idea of what forces should be involved
into the oil spill response operation. So, categorization is not
a simple process, and the ecological (or technological) block
allows collecting all competent authorities, and all new developments
and regulations are included there, i.e. existing
norms and regulations, requirements of the Federal Service
for Supervision of Natural Resource Usage (Rosprirodnadzor),
new technologies and ecological monitoring section.
Monitoring is generally not taken care of properly, and I
want to emphasize that post-monitoring is especially important:
when an accident occurs, we get a “Cheshire Cat” effect
– there is no cat, but its smile is here. And it is a grave
smile for the nature, and it can do us a lot of harm. I asked
about dispersants yesterday, as there was a storm risk during
the accident in the Gulf of Mexico, and you know that all
drilling was stopped there because 1500 m is a considerable
depth. So, all the oil film could be washed ashore, therefore
they took a decision to dissolve it. But they told that it would
go to the bottom, but it can never go down to the depth
on 1500 m, it was proved by other accidents, including the
one in the Gulf of Mexico in 1993. And what was actually
done – they let the dispersed products go along the entire
trophic chain: starting from substances dissolved in water,
to plankton, bioplankton, zooplankton, fishes, and, finally,
human beings. Everywhere concentrations of oil products are
up to 10 thousand times higher, and these are not those oil
products we have got used to.
We calculate “bulk oil products”, but actually it is wide
specter of substances, up to phthalic acid that has a genic
level effect. These are substances in low-quality Chinese
toys, points, pigments and packaging materials. Then there
is benzpyrene-3,4, chrysene and other substances. This is
exactly what is in the focus of attention of modern ecology.
I can say that if we calculate damages for a “oil products as
a whole” and for 16 individual oil components, as it is done
in the United States, the economic losses (I am again about
money) are increased by 16-18 times. Hence is the accident
cost, monitoring costs, as, certainly, you should not run there
with gas analyzers and show the measurements. You should
make a good-quality chromatographic analysis and identify
everything that is present there, as, finally, it affects all of
us, and rescue workers, and response personnel, etc.
Here is the structure of oil spill contingency plan, and it is
a complicated document. Those who have had the practice of
compiling it and working with this document know that it is
a part of obligatory requirements to all hazardous industrial
facilities that work with oil products. Each filling station had
105
Pic. 4.
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106
such plan, though now this requirement has been canceled
for them. It is a complicated document, but all necessary
data and forms (including external conditions and media) are
in the training complex.
A student gets a task. Here is some sample information,
7 items on the slide, and further he works with this training
complex.
In some of the previous reports it has been stated that it
is recommended to burn oil, and it sounds strange. “British
Petroleum” is developing technologies of oil burning. Now in
Russia all regulatory documents forbid oil burning, and it is
allowed only in extraordinary circumstances. I can give you
an example from my practice of one emergency response
operation, when we tried to burn oil and did not manage to
do it. It was April, oil crust appeared and we had to drop the
idea. Here are severe consequences on the slide, and they are
usually shown as horror stories: people often do not understand
until they see it. This is picture of a tank vessel that
spilled its content. (Pic. 5).
You know that half of Spain participated in manual collection
of oil from their shores. These were certainly huge
efforts and very hard manual work, but people finally understood
what an accident could mean. And tank vessels are
constantly damaged, in spite of double and triple protection.
And modern tankers now carry up to 300 tons of oil.
Further on you can see additional details. Many people
do not understand what are the consequences of removing
the soil layer. The soil is actually a huge filter, and we must
demonstrate to students or trainees how important it is to
keep it intact.
The described actions are drilled in this way, and these
virtual environment are developed in order to make a person
perform all emergency response actions quickly and almost
mechanically.
And finally, rehabilitation of oil spill territories. Now, as
you know, emergency training exercises are held in the advanced
joint companies, and all of them have emergency response
teams. You see, all methods are used – from manual
collection to pumping with recultivating equipment, etc.
In spite of its recent development, the training complex
has already been well recognized. We got a national ecological
award, and award from Moscow Government, obtained
respective certificates for the software and developed the
training complex, and author of this product is your speaker.
A.V. Moskalenko: Colleagues, your questions, please.
I.G. Yankovsky: Please, tell whom are these virtual training
sets designed for For training in higher educational institutions
or post graduate training
A.P. Khaustov: I think for both.
I.G. Yankovsky: Then, I beg your pardon. Now in higher
education institution we are training bachelors of industrial
safety in 4 years. So, in four years half-educated people
will be sitting in these halls, and they won’t cope with these
training sets, they are only for master course graduates.
A.P. Khaustov: No, this is a master training, I’ve specially
mentioned that it is only after 4 years’ training as a minimum.
But it can be also for a course of advanced studies.
A. Galach: “Promyshlennaya Bezopasnost (Industrial
Safety)” magazine, Ukraine. I have a question. Is the software
unique or do you use any well-known platform And
the second question – is it designed for interactivity during
the training process and to which extent is this interactivity
present Thank you.
A.P. Khaustov: It’s a very good question. It is a standard
shell program, and you need system software developers
who could fill it in as you like. Now we have developed a
ready-made platform that can be built in and expanded as
you wish. And the second issue – is it designed for interactivity
during the training process, as it is the main component
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in every training complex. So, the problem – response, and
testing again, then again training, and new tests. A student is
developing simultaneously with the training complex.
One more issue. I am attending this brilliant, wonderful
forum for the first time, and it is a good tradition here
to make presents. I would like to give this excellent HSEmanagement
reference book (terms and definitions) as a
present to Forum organizers. The value of this book is that
it contains terms and definitions according to GOST standards.
When you know terms – you know at least something,
that was what Aristotle was saying. And here it is:
“Emergency Situations and Professional Safety in Oil and
Gas Industrial Complex”. And plus this small book about
the virtual complex – it is a set of instructions how to work
with it. I also have some advertising booklets, so if anybody
would like to have them, you’re welcome, I will be glad to
give them to you.
Development and Implementation
of the Automated System of Evaluation
and Training of Professionally Important
Qualities of Employees
in Gas Trunk Pipeline Transportation
in LLC “Gazprom Transgaz Samara”
Bogdan S. Zaetz, Deputy Chief Engineer for Occupational
Health & Safety and Industrial Safety
Gazprom Transgaz Samara (Russia)
Dear colleagues!
I would like to start my report with a reference to risks
involved in operation of gas transportation facilities that can
lead to negative consequences, while we perform our main
task – reliable and non-stop transportation of natural gas.
First of all, there are risks of incidents and accidents related
to technical condition of facilities, resulting in depressurization
of pipelines and forced shutdown of facilities.
Second, there are risks of possible failures of equipment
operational modes and risks of termination or limitation of
gas transportation and supply to customers.
Third, there are main risks – risks of injuries for personnel
operating hazardous production facilities.
The main reasons for risks of non-fulfillment of the set
objectives, risks for human life and health, as well as for
environmental risks, are related to the following:
- first of all, the level of technical condition of gas transportation
system components;
- second, standards and quality of the equipment inspections,
and primarily, expert appraisal of industrial safety of
facilities, equipment and constructions after their defined
service life;
- third, standards and quality of operational planning;
- as well as operational standards, level of technical training
and personnel preparedness to actions in emergency situations.
The main target of ensuring safe operation of gas transportation
facilities for our company is to prevent accidents
and incidents, industrial injuries and cases of unplanned limitation
or termination of gas supply to customers.
Our company performs regular analysis of rates of accidents
and industrial injuries. Results of the performed analysis
for the period since 2000 until now are presented in the
following diagram. (Pic. 1)
The company had had rather high level of incidents until
2004, then there was a period of relative improvement and
stabilization of indicators, but since 2008 there has been a
considerable reduction in number of accidents and injuries.
But after a thorough analysis of reasons of all accidents,
incidents and injuries, we can’t but mention that a number of
incidents could be prevented.
The performed analysis has shown that industrial safety of
the operated gas transportation systems and life and health

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
After
implementation
of the automated
system
107
Number of injuries
Number of accidents
Number
of incidents
Pic. 1. Diagram. Technical incidents and industrial
injuries in OOO “Gazprom Transgaz Samara” in 2000-2011
.. 2000-2007
Group of reasons Number of injuries, %
Carelessness of the injured person 51
Inefficient organization of operational activities 18
Violations of labor and production discipline 13
Failure to ensure safe excavation works in the trunk pipeline
protected zone
6
Design defects, insufficient reliability of machines, mechanisms
and equipment 12
Pic. 2. Injuries distribution by reasons in 2000-2007.
others (including
Machine operator,
gas-distribution station
emergency recovery
operator) 28%
«
»
4
technician
22%
Driver,
crane operator,
15%
Electrician 20%
Electric
and gas welder,
pipeliner
15%
Pic. 3. Diagram. Distribution of injuries by professions
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108
of people depend not only on reliability of the technological
equipment but also on reliability of personnel. (Pic. 2)
At present successful research work is being held in the
sphere of equipment reliability improvement and development
of equipment control and diagnostics methods. But insufficient
attention is paid to personnel reliability and safe work,
while the analysis of statistical data on accidents and industrial
injuries shows that a major amount of accidents and injuries
occur for reasons connected with human factor effect.
Analysis of statistical data on accidents and industrial injuries
at our company shows that 88% of accidents and
injuries occur for reasons connected with the human factor.
This indicator is close to that from the analysis of industrial
injuries and accidents in oil and gas industry (over 70%).
The main reason of accidents and industrial injuries connected
with the human factor is an inadequate assessment
of the production situation by an employee and wrong estimate
of his own possibilities to act in a safe manner in this
situation.
Accidents caused by “low competence” are connected not
only and not so much with low level of professional training,
but mostly with insufficiently developed professionally
important psycho-physiological qualities.
The system of personnel training, re-training and skill improvement
is well developed in our industrial sector. But what
is missing in this system is a block of assessment and development
of personnel psycho-physiological qualities.
It is well known that a considerable amount of accidents
and industrial injuries occurred not because the worker did
1.
General information about the profession (8 questions)
not know safety requirement, but because he neglected
them, and was wrong in his assessment of the situation and
its possible consequences.
In other words, his professionally important psycho-physiological
qualities did not fully correspond to professional
requirements. Therefore, the task of assessment and development
of professionally important qualities of workers
operating hazardous production facilities of gas transmittal
pipelines is very important and rather urgent.
The main target of the work performed in our company,
which I am presenting now to you, was to reduce risk of accidents
and injuries through assessment and development of
professionally important qualities of workers.
The analysis of data on accidents and industrial injuries in
OOO “Gazprom Transgaz Samara” that was performed at the
beginning of the research work allowed identifying the most
injury-risk professions, they are shown in Diagram 2. (Pic. 3).
The following professions were chosen as objects of the
study: process compressor operators, electric and gas welder,
pipeliners, electricians, gas-distribution station operators.
The study of reports made after assessment of working
conditions at the respective working places revealed that
working conditions of workers of the studied professions
involved a number of hazardous and harmful production factors:
higher noise levels, high labor intensity, which increases
probability of emergency situations and injuries. Under such
working conditions, correspondence of professionally important
qualities of personnel to their professional requirements
is especially important.
2.
Main labor operations of the profession (7 questions)
3.
Content and operational characteristics of the profession
(12 questions)
4.
Working conditions (8 questions)
5.
Social and psychological factors of the activity
(7 questions);
6. Qualities defining operational efficiency
(103 names of different qualities).
Pic. 4. Groups of questions of the expert questionnaire.
Professionally important qualities «
»
9 Qualities Methods (tests)
1. Attention
Concentration
Volume and stability
Distribution and switchover
Test "Correction task" (number of mistakes)
Test "Correction task" (number of characters seen)
Test "Search for numbers with attention
switchover" ("Black and red table")
2. Memory (short-term) Volume of short-term memory
Mental patterns research methods (MIOM-9);
Test "Black and red table";
Test "Scales"
3. Mechanical intelligence Level "Bennet" Test
4. Logical thinking
Ability to identify consistent
patterns
MIOM 1-6
5. Size perception (ocular
estimation)
Accuracy
Test "Division of a straight line into halves"
6. Image perception Level MIOM 7, 8
7.Emotional stability Stability Test "Forecast-2"
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Pic. 5. Methods for assessment of the professionally important qualities.
«
»
10

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
The first stage of development of the automated system
of evaluation and training of professionally important qualities
included a survey among managers and experts of the
main departments of line production management of trunk
pipelines. The survey was held with the use of specially developed
questionnaires, and you can see descriptions of the
main groups of questions in the picture 4.
The statistic analysis of expert opinions revealed 7 professionally
important qualities that are necessary for reliable
production activity. They include:
attention;
memory;
mechanical intelligence;
logical thinking;
size perception;
image perception;
emotional stability.
After respective analysis, adequate methods (tests) were
chosen to assess the level of development of the professionally
important qualities. In this table you can see the professionally
important qualities, their properties and assessment
tests. (Pic. 5).
262 employees from 5 line production departments were
tested with the use of the chosen methods.
The assessment results for those workers are presented in
the diagram. Based on the shown data, it was determined
that:
41% of employees got the highest vocational aptitude
grade of 5, and the forecast for their successful operation in
this profession is the most favorable.
29% of tested employees got grade 4, which corresponds
to rather high level of the professionally important qualities
(the forecast for their successful operation in this profession
is favorable).
20% of tested employees got grade 3, which corresponds
to medium level of the professionally important qualities (the
forecast for their successful operation in this profession is uncertain,
and they are recommended subject to a condition).
and finally, 10% of tested employees got grade 2, which
corresponds to low level of the professionally important
109
Number
of people tested
Integral vocational aptitude assessment
Pic. 6. Diagram. Employees’ testing results
Pic. 7. View of a screen with testing results.
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110
Pic. 8. Methodology for development
of
professionally
important qualities.
«
»
Exercise "Scales"
15
Exercise "moving shapes"
Exercise "physical gumption"
Pic. 9. Sample methods for development of professionally important qualities.
Pic. 10. Вид окна выбора занятий обучения.
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
qualities (the forecast for their successful operation in this
profession is unfavorable).
Thus, it was defined that about 30% of all employees
were in the category of “recommended subject to a condition”.
It is so-called “high risk group”. These are employees
with the highest probability of faults. (Pic. 6).
We successfully use this testing methodology when employing
personnel for the above-mentioned professions, determining
in advance whether they have necessary professionally
important qualities.
An automated assessment system was developed based
on this methodology, and it was installed in all occupational
safety and health classes of the company affiliates.
The automated system of evaluation of professionally important
qualities of employees includes a set of 15 diagnostic
tests that allow assessing main professionally important
qualities.
As an example, testing results of one of the workers, an
electric and gas welder, are shown in picture 7.
The screen with testing results is divided into three functional
parts: a table with summary results, a diagram and a
conclusion.
Earlier the only assessment that was done in the sphere
of evaluation of professionally important qualities of workers
operating hazardous production facilities of oil and gas
industry was targeted to define the vocational aptitude of a
candidate.
Within the frames of this study, for the first time in our
industrial sector, a new intellectual training methodology was
developed, based on the analysis of production activity and
evaluation of professionally important qualities of employees
at gas trunk transportation facilities, i.e. we developed a
methodology that allows improvement of a worker’s psychophysiological
qualities up to the level that could meet requirement
for a certain profession.
The developed methodology has the aim of correcting and
improving such qualities as mechanical intelligence, attention,
memory, logical and image thinking. Special exercises were
chosen to train each of these qualities. In this table you can
see the qualities identified by experts, their properties and
training exercises. (Pic. 8).
In the following slides you can see examples of some
training exercises for development of certain qualities.
Exercise “Scales” to develop memory and attention concentration;
Exercise “Physical gumption” to develop mechanical intelligence;
Exercise “Moving shapes” to develop attention concentration,
volume and stability. (Pic. 9).
A training complex was developed for training professionally
important qualities, based on the chosen exercises,
including 20 lessons designed for independent work.
The complex includes exercises that, in case of their systematic
repetition, can help to develop technical, analytical
and spatial thinking, computational capabilities, memory,
increase attention concentration, volume and stability, and
improve attention distribution and switchover. Each lesson is
designed for 30 minutes training. The total training period –
10 weeks, 2 lessons per week.
In the following slide you can see a screen view with training
results.
As a result of testing, we get two histograms representing
the number of grades received for each of the exercises
of the lesson and time it took to perform them. We also get
the total amount of grades received by the employee during
this lesson as compared with the total possible amount of
grades.
The training complex is simple and easy to understand,
can be easily adapted for the use in production environment,
which is especially important for company workers.
The developed methodology of training professionally important
qualities was initially tested in two departments of
line production management of trunk pipelines – Srenevolzhskoye
and Tolyattinskoye.
The choice of the Srenevolzhskoye line production management
of trunk pipelines was based on low vocational aptitude
grades received by their employees during initial testing.
The Tolyattinskoye line production management of trunk
pipelines was chosen as statistically average, as vocational
aptitude grades received by their employees were at least
on the average level. Training of workers with unsatisfactory
111
Pic. 11. View of a screen with training results.
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number
of workers
vocational aptitude assessment
112
before training
after training
Pic. 12. Diagram. Results of testing vocational aptitude of employees
of the Srenevolzhskoye
line production management of trunk pipeline before and after training
number of workers
vocational aptitude assessment
before training
after training
Pic. 13. Diagram. Results of testing vocational aptitude of employees
of the Tolyattinskoye line production management of trunk pipeline before and after training
testing grades was organized in these departments. Results
of the intellectual training held in those experimental groups
are presented in the following diagram.
The number of employees of the Srenevolzhskoye line
production management of trunk pipeline that received unsatisfactory
grades was reduced by 7% as compared with the
initial testing, and the number of those with the average development
level of professionally important qualities (grade
3) was reduced by 12%. Naturally, they were moved to the
group of employees with rather high or high level of the professionally
important qualities (grades 4 and 5 respectively).
The number of employees of the Tolyattinskoye line production
management of trunk pipeline that received unsatisfactory
grades was reduced by 4%, and the number of
those with the average development level of professionally
important qualities (grade 3) was reduced by 20%.
After the described methods of assessment and development
of personnel psycho-physiological qualities were tried
and tested in two line production departments, we installed
the software in all company affiliates.
I want to refer once more to the slide that illustrates results
of our work targeted to ensure accident-free and injuryfree
operation.
Of course, our current result is related not only to the fact
that we implemented this system of personnel assessment
and training.
We consider that introduction of all safety components
to our company operations and a systematic approach to
personnel training can only bring positive results.
Taking into account positive results of introduction of this
methodology, we suggest that you also use our system.
The methods can be easily adapted, they are simple and
easy to understand, do not take much time in production environment,
which is especially important for company workers.
We are currently developing respective methodologies
for engineers, technicians and experts.
A.V. Moskalenko: Colleagues, I do not know about others,
but I was pleasantly surprised by this report. Your questions,
please.
Question from the audience: Bogdan Stepanovich, I
have a question that you can find a bit unexpected: do you
connect the need of developing this product of yours with
the enactment of Law No. 294 exactly in the same period
of time I mean you were audited less frequently and understood
that you should mobilize yourselves on your own, or
am I mistaken Thank you.
B.S. Zayats: No, it is not related to this Law and to the
fact that we had less audits – and, by they way, I can’t
say that now we are audited less frequently. As you know
Gazprom has its own multi-layer control system, and it is
even more complicated than that of supervisory authorities.
Therefore, we based our work mostly on those violations that
we can identify on our level of control.
A.V. Moskalenko: Colleagues, more questions, please!
V.I. Dmitruk: Dmitruk, “Azot”, Kemerovo. Have I understood
correctly that you use your assessment system for
evaluation during training of specialists, but it is not a routine
psycho-physiological test before beginning of the shift
As, in our experience, mistakes of operators working under
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
increased situational tension are mostly demonstrated in the
beginning of the working shift. Somebody is feeling ill at
ease, somebody can be under addictive conditions, and it is
important for us to identify it. So, could you, please, tell us
whether this system is designed for such testing or, maybe,
you plan it for the future, i.e. can it be used for psychophysiological
test before beginning of the shift
B.S. Zayats: I understand. You see, it can be also used in
your situation, i.e. before the shift. As it is not a problem to
spend 30 minutes to understand what is the current condition
of a person and his qualities, but we do not use the
system for this purpose, because one thing is to test, but to
“treat” him to improve his qualities is a totally different thing,
it’s a long process. But we use this complex when employing
personnel, and quite successfully, and many “specialists” are
not selected to work in the company. I can anticipate your
question. You can say: what about human rights How can
you make such assessments
You know, when we first met with this dilemma – that
we can infringe human rights, assessing a person by his
qualities – we discussed this problem with our management,
and the manager told: “I am responsible for safety at my
production site, so I want and I have the right to use some
training methods, to introduce some assessment techniques
to see whether the person fits this profession or not.” So, we
decided to introduce this methodology.
A.V. Moskalenko: Any more questions, colleagues No.
I have a question. Bogdan Stepanovich, you so confidently
invited everybody to contact you, but this software – will
you sell it or give as a present
B.S. Zayats: No, no, the product is certified, it is certainly
for sale. But I can give it as a present.
A.V. Moskalenko: So, you’re welcome, colleagues. Thank
you, Bogdan Stepanovich.
Virtual Simulators for Training Personnel
in Management of Hazardous Processes
in Pre-emergency Modes
Edward A. Granovsky, CEO
“RIZIKON” Scientific Center of Risk Investigations
(Ukraine)
I also want to express my gratitude to our hosts for wonderful
organization of this Forum and for providing me with
an opportunity to tell you about our developments in this
area, in the sphere of safety that is the subject matter of
this Forum.
I am going to tell you about a training software complex
called TRENARIZ. It is a tool that is designed to help a process
engineer or an industrial safety and risk expert who knows
everything about hazards of some production unit in creation
of a database and a knowledge database about this facility,
loading it to the training simulator and adjusting it for each
individual process unit.
It has already been discussed, but I would like to repeat
once more that we often speak about a “man-machine complex”,
but in practice, while increasing reliability of our machines,
using new automation means, increasing reliability
of system elements, we forget that we should also increase
reliability of the machine operator. Therefore, when we start
analyzing, build the failure tree, make risk assessment, we
find out that the limiting factor is the man. So, it is understandable
that if we started increasing reliability of people, it
would be more efficient, as they are often the least reliable
elements of the system.
We started developing this complex in 1996, and in 1998
we started implementing it in specific training simulators.
Obviously, any technological system can have different
phases of operation, so our software complex allows developing
a training simulator for all stages – start-up, process
management, shut-down and actions in pre-emergency and
emergency situations.
We all know that when a person is being trained, he has
two main tasks: first is to understand operational logic, what
he should do in emergency conditions, and the second is to
drill some motor skills, interaction skills, spatial orientation,
etc. Therefore, we call this tool a virtual simulator, because it
has two major components. The first is training according to
schemes of the specific technological process, so the person
can see the whole system and understand the logic of actions
that are prescribed for him in certain situations. And the second
is the space perception, and during this training any person,
besides being trained in the space of the production process
in which he usually works, is also provided with schemes that
help him with spatial orientation and understanding the whole
system even before he starts practical training sessions.
The training simulator has several tabs, or functions: first
there is a preliminary training stage, with a soundtrack, so it
is actually an instruction film; and the second stage is training
in different modes – prompted training, non-prompted
training, and, finally, independent training sessions when a
trained operator must act on his own, demonstrating spatial
orientation skills.
There is a library of technological schemes, so, while training,
an operator can study the whole process and understand
the production unit in its entirety.
And after studying those schemes, he can feel free in his
spatial movements. We do not show it here, but, in principle,
if I was showing it on a computer with such training
simulator, you could see that one can move in space and,
while moving in space, one can manage the process from
the control panel, if there is one, can read instrumental data
and monitor system conditions. So, if you have an automated
control system, you can sit at the computer, see all the system
in the full-screen mode, and operate it as you do when
work at the production unit.
It is a multi-user simulator, and it is its most useful feature,
because the whole group of operators usually work in
the production system, and they should divide functions, so
that each could have his own service area and operate his
own process, so if you have a computer class, each person
takes his place in front of a computer and can perform
his prescribed functions, moving in space to any location he
needs. And the system is organized like this: as there can
be fewer participants of anti-accident measures in the class
than the total number of people being trained, the system
will perform simulation for the absent people itself. So, the
people who are being trained can perform their actions, but
they must perform them in a correct way.
Besides, the system has the following function: in the
training mode one can review, return to the previous stage,
and study the process stage by stage, so you can study on
your own.
As not all the actions can be visualized, there are communicative
actions, order issuance, etc., i.e. there is an information
board with addresses to which data should be sent. With
all that, there is a possibility of free information transfer between
process operators or participants of anti-accident actions
either directly in the class or with computer sound messages.
If somebody should wait until his colleague shuts down
the pump, as only after that he can perform some actions, he
waits for the notice that the pump has been stopped.
What is also important: an accident is a sporadic process,
and if we know exactly what has happened, we remember
what we should do. But when something happens sporadically,
we must identify system conditions through its indicators
and start acting. Therefore, the system provides both for
the choice of the emergency situation by the instructor or by
a trainee himself and the random accident generation: in the
latter case the trained operator does not know what has happened,
and he must identify what has happened, looking at
instrumental indicators and other identifying characteristics
of the system, and take a decision. The second feature: we
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know that there are fixed working places and people usually
are at their working places, but in the process anybody can
be in some other place, therefore the training can be organized
both with all trainees at their working places or with
random locations. In the latter case an operator must orient
himself in space and understand where he should move and
what he should do to continue working.
There are following operation modes: when the instructor
can observe the trainees’ actions as a bystander. Besides, there
is an individual training mode when one operator must perform
actions for all participants of the process management.
What is it for When an incident occurs, it is very important
that everybody knew what his neighbor should do, so, in principle,
every person should study not only his own actions, but
should also know what his neighbor should do (especially if
the person in question is the chief operator or instructor).
One more important issue is time. The process is presented
in the real time mode. At first you can switch off this
feature, so that while personnel are not trained enough, they
can act without time limits. But when you switch on the time
limits in training, and a person does not manage to complete
actions required in a particular situation within the allocated
time, the process will continue developing and a new situation
is simulated. The trainee must understand what has
happened and start acting in the new situation.
Besides, there is a possibility to record the game (your
training session). So, if you have done a record, you can
make a “mission evaluation”. The instructor can see who,
where and which mistakes made, and come to conclusions
accordingly or correct mistakes that were made.
Well, I have been speaking about time, and it is very important.
Here is an example of a СDU facility – if there
is water in it, pressure will go up in the column, and the
operator will have a certain period of time, 9 minutes, in
order to stop pressure growth. If he does manage to do it
in due time, he would break the vapor line, and a jet efflux
would occur. And when he can see that pressure goes down
for some other reasons, he must start acting on the basis
of identifying indicators – stop the leakage, eliminate spills,
liquidate ignition sources if there are any, stop repair works,
etc. If it is not done during a certain period of time, the fire
occurs. It means that the situation develops naturally, and
people must change their action plans, depending on the
current situation.
And finally there is a log, recording everything, there is a
possibility to control the process, and the instructor must have
a training plan. And in accordance with this plan, the personnel
can be trained in all emergency situations, all technical incidents
and standard situations that are loaded into the simulator,
one by one, and get respective grades for their actions.
We have been producing such training simulators for
many years, and here are some places where they have been
installed: “Stavrolen” in Budennovsk – we have a “EP-250”
complex there, it includes simulation of “Pirotol” for ethylene
production through pyrolysis process, and besides, there is
a simulation for a new polypropylene unit. There is a training
simulator in Rossosh for ammonia production. There are
several training simulators in Dzerzhinsk, including “EP-300”.
There are simulators in Sayansk for vinylchloride and polyvinylchloride
production. In Komsomolsk-on-Amur we have so
far produced 28 training simulators for complex technological
systems.
Thank you!
A.V. Moskalenko: If I may, I would start with some recommendations.
I liked your picture with sounds of water,
and I suggest that you add a feature of actually throwing
water at them, if those bastards allowed that happening and
got to the spillsituation.
Any questions, colleagues Yes, please, Ivan Grigorievich!
I.G. Yankovsky: I have the following question: I do not
know about Ukraine, but in Russia we develop the ERP
(Emergency Response Plan), including explanatory and calculation
report and operative instructions. The operative
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instructions include detailed descriptions of what operator
should switch on, switch off, what tap valve, throttle, button,
etc. in emergency situations. As I’ve understood, your
software is a step ahead. So, we can say that with the use
of your software we can train an operator to follow operative
instructions.
E.A. Granovsky: Yes, exactly. When I was speaking about
accident liquidation, I really meant acting under the ERP. The
only think I would like to say is that the standard ERP does
not include such detailed descriptions that are necessary to
develop a training simulator. For example, you speak about
stopping the pump, but in order to stop it, you must perform
a number of actions, so you cannot just stop it, those actions
must be taken in the process.
I.G. Yankovsky: And can I ask one more question When
we develop the ERP, we define the level of emergency – accidents
of type A, B, C, etc. Does your system provide for
training on different levels of emergency situations
E.A. Granovsky: I understand. This training simulator is
for operators and it is, certainly, for level A. But we also have
a “Dispatcher” system, and it is for level B. But I have not
demonstrated it today.
I.G. Yankovsky: Thank you very much! Good job!
A.V. Moskalenko: Yes, it’s very good job. Any more questions
You know, I liked your phrase that the film is accompanied
with sound comments. As a former Fleet officer,
I imagined – you have pressed some wrong button, and
receive such a “vivid” comment!
E.A. Granovsky: Well, there are some identifying features
in the system on what can be done in this position. You can
curse if you like.
A.V. Moskalenko: Dear friends, I am glad to give the word
to Nikolai Andreevich Makhutov, Corresponding Member of
the Russian Academy of Sciences, President of the International
Institute for Safety in Complex Technological Systems, –
I beg your pardon, I have not mentioned all his titles.
Session 6. Risk Management. Ensuring
Reliability of Technical Systems.
Problems and Solutions
Risk Forecasting in Innovation Technologies
Nikolai A. Makhutov, Corresponding Member of the
Russian Academy of Sciences
Chairman, Scientific Council for Prevention and Elimination
of Emergency Situations at the IGC for Emergencies.
President, International Institute for Safety in Complex
Technological Systems (Russia)
R.S. Akhmetkhanov, Dr. Sci. (Tech.), Chief Researcher;
Vladimir Vasilievich Zaratsinniy, Candidate of Technical
Sciences, Senior Researcher, Academic Secretary of
the Scientific Council for Prevention and Elimination of
Emergency Situations;
Dmitry Olegovich Reznikov, Candidate of Technical
Sciences, Senior Researcher, (Russia);
International Institute for Safety in Complex Technological
Systems (Russia)
N.A. Makhutov: Thank you, Alexander Vladimirovich! I
would like to tell some words about the current situation,
when Russia and other countries of the world live in the
sphere of hazardous processes, high risks, and we’ll have to

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
live in such a world in the future as well. Now we’ve come to
rather an interesting moment when certain information has
been accumulated. We should look at those huge projects,
those strategic problems that are now being solved in different
countries, and try to use all that extensive accumulated
material that is currently available. We have some facilities
that constitute a real danger but are still in operation, and
we have facilities that are almost past their service life, and
we should take some decisions concerning their future and
continue operating them. We have facilities affected by accidents,
we need to restore them and continue living with
them nearby. We have facilities in the design and construction
stage, and facilities that are still in the initial design stage.
It is against the background of all that so-called technosphere
that we are to use rationally our knowledge in
the safety area, introduce this knowledge into the projects,
and – as an ultimate target – to reduce risks.
For example, I think you all know something about our
national tragedy – a catastrophe at Sayano–Shushenskaya
hydroelectric power plant, and I was there, participated in
the Accident Commission and a number of other commissions.
There was certainly a combination of economic and
human factors, as well as political and environmental to
some extent, – and as a result, that accident occurred,
consequences of which it will be very difficult to overcome
entirely. The primary damage for our national economy is
estimated to be about 50 billion rubles, and, taking in account
secondary effects, it will be about 250 billion rubles.
It is clear that many future solutions will be different, as
we’ve learned our lesson here. But, what is worth mentioning
– you all well know that the cover of the second
hydroelectric unit came off. It was estimated that the force
affecting that cover was equivalent to 20 thousand tons.
That accident, i.e. its active part, lasted about 4.6 seconds.
It’s clear that such an accident is not simple to deal with. It
is rather difficult to manage anything in such short period
of time. It is clear that in some cases any management is
impossible at all.
We had another accident with a cover some dozens years
ago, and I also participated in the accident investigation,
when a cover came off an autoclave at a chemical plant. It
flew across the shop, damaged columns, the roof collapsed,
and a lot of people died. And the cover again. If in the former
case, as I told, there was a force of 20 thousand tons,
then in the latter case the force was about 1000 tons.
Let us look at reactors, which have already been mentioned
today, – for example, a WWER 1000 reactor also has
a cover, fixed with the same bolts and studs. And the pressure
there is considerably higher, though diameter is smaller.
So, the pressure force can be as high as 40 thousand tons.
One can imagine what the flight of this cover would look
like and what would be the consequences. In all those cases
the source of the catastrophic accident was the same. There
was approximately the same mechanism, though the facilities
were different, as were the consequences. Therefore,
the first conclusion that we can make now is the following:
in order to avoid later investigations of accidents and catastrophes
we must know two first answers to major questions
– source of the respective accidents or catastrophe
and underlying reasons. The source in this case, for example,
it’s the cover that came off, and studs it was fixed with.
But there were a lot of reasons for this catastrophe, not
one reason, but a combination of a set of reasons, and in
this sense the main task of supervisory bodies and designers
is to know such critical elements, critical situations and
scenarios of such accidents and catastrophes, then we can
fight with them.
Each of such serious accidents at unique facilities gives us
a lesson, sometimes it makes us to change state policies, as
well as personnel training policies, supervisory regulations,
and subject matter of our conferences. During a number of
conferences organized by Alexander Vladimirovich, we have
already been talking about protection of critically and strategically
important facilities from major catastrophes. They are
in the focus of our attention; they are extremely tragic and
lead to substantial losses. Both our country and many others
have suffered a lot of such catastrophes during the last
years. It’s a new phenomenon of the last 20-30 years, it’s a
new situation that we had not have before, and I am going
to talk about it.
Today we have already mentioned Three Mile Island
accident and the catastrophe of Chernobyl. Each of such
catastrophe changes our views of atomic energy industry,
politics, people and their well-being and plans for the fu-
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Pic.1.
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116
Pic.2.
Pic.3.
ture. And we learn a lot of lessons from those accidents and
catastrophes, but a lot more should have been learned from
them. You, maybe, remember, Alexander Vladimirovich, I
told you once that we were in Japan after the catastrophe
of Chernobyl and began telling them what could happen
with operation of nuclear power stations in Japan. And, in
few words, the Japanese told us: no, as we survived Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, we can’t make the Japanese people
suffer this once more, and we going to do everything to
prevent it. We told them that it could not be like that. And,
unfortunately, real life proved that there had been such a
problem.
It is clear that the tragedy of Fukushima once more revealed
the following: the Japanese people, when started developing
their atomic energy industry, said something like
this: the disaster was brought to us by the Americans, so
we’ll now take their technologies and use them here. All responsibility
will be laid on the Japanese people and thus we’ll
be protected to a certain extent. But they found out that
the most reasonable attitude cannot protect you from such
accidents.
There were accident, catastrophes that were very serious,
– at submarines ‘”Thresher”, and, as you remember,
“Komsomolets” and “Kursk”. There were a lot of interesting
and instructive for us in those events. Let us consider
“Kursk”, for example. When that explosion occurred, it was
later found out that reactor facilities of “Kursk” were affected
by forces of about 600 g. Such emergency situations
are pre-calculated. Here the calculation is made for 30 g,
and it actually happened so that solutions that had been
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developed and introduced under strict control and tried and
tested, later allowed avoiding the nuclear catastrophe at
“Komsomolets”, in spite of the fact that all possible extreme
factors were present during that explosion.
Here is our infamous catastrophe near Ufa, where 600
persons died. I also was in the group that worked within the
frames of the Procurator’s investigation of that accident, and
everything started there from low-quality repair works and
damage inflected to a pipeline by transportation vehicles, and
those events were followed by gradual destruction, spills and
an explosion. So, it happens so that small, quite common effects,
which are not so important if taken individually, lead
to such catastrophes.
“Nevsky Express” – it was also a great lesson for us, such
a bitter experience, and a model was built that showed how
it all happened, where the explosion occurred, how the train
ran off the rails, how wagons went off the rails, how people
were injured, and seats were torn off. When we analyzed that
accident, it became clear that, in principle, wagons should be
designed differently, and rail joints should be arranged differently,
so this catastrophe also taught us a lot.
Space technologies. Here is the famous “Challenger”, Columbia
in the USA, and our sad story with H-1 rocket system.
If three catastrophes of the same type are repeated one
after another, major projects are closed as a result. And you
can’t realize them later on, they are lost, which actually happened
with our H-1 system. And such accidents, as a rule,
are not reflected in norms, regulations or laws, there are no
specialists in these areas, and every time we learn our lessons
afterwards. But what is interesting in this respect is that,
though approximately 50 space accidents resulted in serious
catastrophes in Russia and in the Soviet Union, none of those
accidents was repeated. So thorough was the investigation
process and decisions taken that accidents later occurred only
for some different reasons.
Here is Bhopal tragedy, it has already been mentioned today,
and I won’t talk about it. But, certainly, this catastrophe
generally gave momentum for adoption of directives that
changed our attitude to safety. The Gulf of Mexico accident
has also been discussed today. And the Gulf of Mexico provides
rather simple environment conditions for such unique
projects, especially for such an experienced company as BP,
but now, when we are to go to Sakhalin with all our offshore
projects in the Arctic Ocean, there will be different conditions,
much tougher and severe, and more complicated for
analysis of accidents and catastrophes. And there, frankly
speaking, the experience we have accumulated so far won’t
be enough. There we may have to change technologies in
principle, abandoning sea platforms, or, maybe, leaving them
for drilling only and moving further processes under water,
below ice. These solutions are being developed now, and,
certainly, they will allow reducing risks to certain extent.
In petrochemical industry – I won’t talk in details about
this great tragedy in Siberia, when a small crack led finally
to total destruction of a whole company by a fire, I am here
speaking about Nizhnevartovsk.
Conclusions: by now we – the Academy of Sciences of
Russia, Rostekhnadzor and other authorities – have tried to
look at these processes from the point of view of risk forecasting,
as it is said in the title of this report, and understand
what will happen further with the technosphere and
infrastructure we now live in. We have the Law on Technical
Regulation, and respective facilities subject to technical
regulation (TRF), which are placed here in this chart. We
have hazardous production facilities (HPF), which you can
also see here, and, as proposed by the Academy of Sciences,
EMERCOM of Russia and Security Council, so-called critically
important facilities (CIF) are now subject of consideration,
and lately, after the catastrophe at Sayano–Shushenskaya
hydroelectric power plant, we have started speaking about
strategically important facilities (SIF).
What is critically important facility We have such definition
in the Security Council documentation – this a facility that, in

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
117
Pic. 4.
Pic. 5.
case of an accident, can disrupt normal living conditions in a
region or a country, lead to worsening of living standards of
the country as a whole or of considerable amount of people,
and can have such accident consequences that are difficult to
overcome. As for strategically important facilities, we speak
here about such facilities that can disrupt normal living conditions
in several countries and continents. Such accidents as
Chernobyl, the Gulf of Mexico oil spill to some extent, and
Fukushima can be considered accidents at strategically important
facilities. Now we have a classification of such accidents
that should have been used for planning of actions. There are
local, facility-wise, municipal-level, regional, national, global
and planetary accidents. For each type there are facilities that
can be locations of such catastrophes and such consequences.
They are all shown here – these are nuclear power plants
(NPP), nuclear power submarines (NPS), missile and space
systems, liquefied natural gas (LNG) installations, hydroelectric
power plants (HPP), trunk pipelines (TP), unique installations.
They are all here. But what is important, here on the
left there are losses caused by such accidents. (Pic. 1).
They vary, and here we have a logarithmic scale from
103 dollars per accident till 109, i.e. hundreds of billions of
dollars.
Frequency of repetition, periodicity is shown on the right
side. Such accidents can occur once in ten years. This picture
was drawn rather long ago, after a national catastrophe of
the “Kursk” accident scale occurred in 2000. We thought
that, maybe, we would break this trend and live without
catastrophic accidents, but when a catastrophe at Sayano–
Shushenskaya hydroelectric power plant occurred, it was approximately
10 years later. It was exactly in this point. So, this
picture tells us what we are going to live with. We cannot
abandon it now, and it will most probably continue to be
valid in future, though we are eager to reduce risks, and risks
are what actually move events from one scale into another,
where accidents are rare, but losses are of multi-billion value.
They are more important, as they do not happen every day,
but losses are risks are considerable. And what we call strategically
important facilities (SIF), they bear strategic risks,
they are subject to further definition, and this year we’ve
been considering them in the Security Council, they were
reflected in the national security strategy, in foundations of
strategic planning in Russia, and we will have to account for
them. (Pic. 2).
I think the picture is more or less clear, in this scale we
have time, from 1980 till 2010, and the number of accidents
and catastrophes will change with every year, some of them
environmental, others – anthropogenic. We wanted to show
that there are new terrorist threats, risks related to them are
now minimal, very small as compared with other risks, but
their growth rate is, unfortunately, 5-6 times higher than
that of other risks, and this is also subject to assessment.
The first thing to do is, certainly, to classify the facilities
we deal with. Here you can see these facilities, and each of
them can be now defined with a certain value. (Pic. 3).
Thus, any facility can be assigned a value shown here
that defines the hazard through risks for people, technosphere
and environment, and in this sense it would be not
just classification of facilities, but their numerical categorization.
It is clear that problems to be solved by designers, engineers,
technologists and supervisory authorities are defined
by these requirements of strength, hardness, resource, reliability,
survivability, safety, risks and protection. (Pic. 4).
Here at the top we’ve shown that there is a new problem
– to protect facilities from major catastrophes. This
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118
problem requires new parameters, criteria, it bears new risks,
and it will demand new norms and regulations and dedicated
experts. Such work is being done now and will continue in
the future. The risks themselves are function of time. They
will grow differently for different types of facilities. When
we leave the area of “ordinary” facilities, and start considering
critically and strategically important facilities, scenarios
and risk trajectories will have a considerable uncertainty and
complexity, and the task will be to use some universal equations
for all available facilities in order to make an appraisal
of the their safety and risks. (Pic. 5).
The equation against the yellow background has been
evidently developed for the first time in our country, it will
be introduced in due time via the Security Council, supervisory
bodies, EMERCOM and Academy of Sciences, and the
idea is that those integral risks Ri should be less acceptable.
And to reach this level of acceptability, we should develop
a whole complex of measures indicated here on the right,
with respective costs that are proportional to and are related
to risks. It’s a new ideology, we’ll have to live and
work with it.
All those norms and regulations we had in the Soviet
Union, all those GOSTS, SNiPs, other norms, are now being
replaced with laws, and was important is that notions of
strategically important and critically important facilities have
not yet been supported by modern structured legal basis.
Protection – it has been well demonstrated today how in it
done in atomic energy industry: natural protection, functional
protection, security protection, rigid containments – all those
measures should be considered for different facilities in their
combination, and only then you can say that you’ve analyzed
your facilities, built barriers and protection systems, taken
complex approaches to establishing protection systems, and
thus reduced hazard and risks.
The life cycle, of course, is still the major element, and
all its stages – design, manufacturing, operation and decommissioning
– should be defined with a set of numerical
indicators, and we have this task now.
The state functions are now structured like this: there is
the Security Council, there are R&D institutions, there are
fundamental science institutions of the Academy of Sciences,
research and technological training of experts by the Ministry
of Education and Science, EMERCOM, other authorities, and
the problems are solved on the level of industries, but the
basis is still the national security strategy and strategic planning
in our country.
All that I’ve described to you in short, we have summarized
under instruction from the Security Council in 35 volumes of
the book “Security of Russia”, but, unfortunately, it was published
in a limited amount of copies under the decision of the
Security Council. We are now writing new volumes for this
edition, and I hope that next time we’ll be able to give part
of the volumes to you, Alexander Vladimirovich.
And some words about the CIS. Vladimir Vasilievich Zaratsinniy
is present here – we’ve published 4 volumes of a
book that summarizes the legislative basis of the CIS states
in the sphere of emergency situations, and the volume of this
information is constantly growing. We are going to continue
this work in the next dozens of years, as we have got such
task from the Security Council.
And I would like to thank you once more for your attention.
Alexander Vladimirovich, the Forum is organized very
well. It is clear that this is not a meeting, neither a congress
nora conference, but a forum, it’s a good word, and I wish
you live to see the 100th anniversary of this Forum. Thank
you!
A.V. Moskalenko: Dear colleagues! Do you have any
questions to our speaker Well, Ivan Grigorievich, don’t you
have any questions Yes, there is one.
I.G. Yankovsky: When we make mistakes in designs,
when we install the facility in such a way, when we operate
it so – well, you remember that tragedy in Ufa Region when
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a tractor driver drove through the pipeline, when the phone
connection was also cut – I can’t understand how to connect
all that with what you have just been describing. How can we
struggle with all that
N.A. Makhutov: Well, first of all, we cannot struggle
with anything. Second, as we’ve just discussed, the critically
important damage for pipeline systems is, saying it in technical
terms, a combined dent and tear, and it is not important
what there was in Ufa – 3 mm, 5 mm. You should first
describe and prove there was no defect like that, and this
written document will have an effect, you’ll see. So, we cannot
prevent anything. Yesterday I asked a question on what
is the target – zero fatality or acceptable risk. There will be
always some risk, it’s clear. We should reduce it, and what
I am speaking about does not exclude driving through the
pipelines, but is oriented to manufactures and process engineers.
If everybody knows that the person was a criminal,
and he actually critically damaged the pipeline, I think he will
it treat it differently next time, though it is impossible to
exclude accidents entirely.
Ivan Grigorievich Yankovsky: And the ignition was not
from the contact systems, but from other sources further on.
It’s also a question.
N.A. Makhutov: It is right, you are absolutely right. We
must – with requirements, supervision, norms and regulations
– exclude sources for such major accidents. Of course,
there will always be some ignition sources – a lightning,
train or a cigarette – they will always be some, as you can’t
exclude it. But the most dangerous defect must be excluded.
We’ll write it down in regulations, and I think the situation
will change.
A.V. Moskalenko: Your questions, please.
Question from the audience: I would like, Nikolai Andreevich,
not so much to ask a question, but to comment.
You say we should “write it down in regulations”, but it is already
written not only in GOSTs, but in the law, as there is a
Federal Law and Technical Regulation on fire safety requirement.
So, what you’ve said is stipulated not only in norms
and regulations, but in the law as well. Thank you.
N.A. Makhutov: I would like to state in simple words for
everybody. I was in the Investigation Committee and signed
the respective non-disclosure documents. But I am saying
that we have no legal basis to bring people to court, because
there is no respective law, there are no definitions, neither
in regulations nor in Rostekhnadzor and “RusHydro” documents,
no norms that could initially orient people to possibility
of such catastrophe. And as we have no basis, it’s nothing
to talk about here. Therefore, we now say that one of the
most important laws that must be enacted is the law on protection
of facilities from major catastrophes. Unfortunately,
it is important, but it is not done in the entire world as well,
and the BP and Fukushima accidents prove that this law is
missing. It is actually our new problem and our reaction to
major catastrophes. If we do not stipulate it in written documents,
it’s really nothing to talk about here.
A.V. Moskalenko: Well, it was the last question, colleagues.
Thank you once more. And before we go out for
a break, I have a short announcement. Today, 31 of May, is
birthday of Scott MacLean, Vice-President of Haws Corporation
that is represented here. Let us congratulate him! And
we’ll eat a tasty cake in his honor, they will show the cake
now, so that you know how it looks like, but we’ll have it
during the coffee-break.
Let’s go on with our presentations. My friends, we are going
to changer the program a bit, as one of our speakers is
ill, and another one is still on the way. So, I give the word to
Vladimir Mironovich Roitman, Professor of the Moscow State
University of Civil Engineering (Russia)

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Ensuring Stability of High-Rise Buildings,
Technically Complex and Unique Sites Exposed
to Combined Special Conditions
Combined with Fire
Vladimir M. Roitman, Dr. Sci. (Tech.), Professor, Technical
Regulations Department, Institute of Construction
and Architecture
Vladimir I. Telichenko, Dr. Sci. (Tech.), Professor, Honoured
Worker of Science of RF, Rector of Moscow State
University of Civil Engineering
Moscow State University of Civil Engineering (Russia)
V.M. Roitman: Thank you! Dear colleagues, the subject
matter of this report was actually suggested to our Moscow
State University of Civil Engineering by the Forum Organizing
Committee.
Academician V.I. Telichenko, the University Rector and
head of research in this area in the University, entrusted
me with delivering this report to you. So, I am going to talk
about ensuring stability of unique and technologically complex
facilities exposed to combined special conditions as a an
important element of ensuring integrated safety and security
of facilities.
I would like to attract your attention to main notions I am
going to use and their definitions. The notion of integrated
safety and security is well-known, but in this case I will use
it in the following meaning: such condition of a facility that
is characterized with possibility to ensure its safety in case of
any hazardous exposure.
Let us look at the slide – this is a classifying scheme
that shows the core and content of the notion of integrated
safety and security. (Pic. 1).
At the bottom of the scheme there is the life sphere in all
its different manifestations, and this life sphere is affected
by a large number of possible hazards. Here are possible
hazards affecting the life sphere. And for each of these hazards
people have developed a system of measures to ensure
safety in the respective area of activity. All these safety types
are regulated by our federal laws.
So, this “sphere”, including all systems of measures to
ensure protection from all possible hazards, is what we propose
to call the “integrated safety” of life sphere facilities.
(Pic 1)/
Now I am going to clarify the notion of combined special
conditions. These are emergence situations related to emergence
and development of several types of special factors
affecting a facility in different combinations and sequences,
including fire as one of the hazardous factors. Main mancaused
special factors that can affect construction facilities:
impact (I), explosion (E), fire (F), stress (S), etc.
The main parameter that defines capacity of a facility to
sustain the combined special conditions aggravated by fire is
the well-known characteristic that is called “fire-resistance”. It
is an internationally accepted parameter that defines capacity
of a facility to withstand fire. Let us consider the most typical
examples of different withstanding capacity of facilities affected
by various emergency situations aggravated by fire.
The first case we are going to consider is the stability of
a unique site – Ostankino TV tower – during a fire that occurred
in August 2000. You can see a picture of the tower
on fire in the slide. And the emergency situation developed
in rather complicated way. The fire broke out at a height of
about 458 m and, contrary to ordinary laws of fire escalation,
it did not go up, but began spreading downwards. It
happened so because the fire resulted from an ignition in
PVC insulation of TV cables. When this plastic is on fire, it
melts, and the burning mass is spreading down, setting on
fire new lower layers of insulation. They could not cope with
the fire escalation for 24 hours. The fire was stopped only at
the height of 80 m. It means the fire was spreading inside
the tower for 350 m. And the situation was so serious that
there was a discussion on whether they would have to start
evacuation from the area of possible tower collapse.
This slide demonstrates that stability of the Ostankino
TV tower during that event was ensured with correct fireresistance
designing of the tower structural core. The fire resistance
of the tower reinforced concrete core was over 180
minutes. As the fire mode was milder than that used in the
standard tests (fire load inside the tower core was small, so
119
Pic. 1.
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120
the fire mode was milder), the designed fire resistance of the
tower structural core ensured its stability during that event.
Now, let us consider the events of 11 September, 2001,
during a terrorist attack against the building of Pentagon. The
building of Pentagon is a unique construction, the world’s
largest office building, shaped like a pentagon, each side of
which is equal to 330 m. The inner side of the building consists
of 5 concentric rings. During the events of 11 September,
2001, of one the planes hijacked by terrorists crashed into the
outer facade of the external Pentagon ring. And the events
developed in rather a strange way. It seems terrorists had to
change the target of their attack. We can suppose they had
planned to attack the White House, but could not see this
small building from such altitude, and therefore changed their
target and attacked Pentagon. As a result, the plane was flying
just above the ground for the last several hundred meters
and hit the building of Pentagon at the ground floor level.
The next slide shows the area where the plane hit the
building of Pentagon at the ground floor level. I want to
attract your attention to the fact that there was no progressive
collapse of the building at the first moment after the
impact, fuel explosion and fire. It means the floors above the
hole made by the plane were still in place. And only after 19
minutes there was progressive collapse of the external ring
of the building of Pentagon.
The fire resistance of the main key constructions of the
building again played the role as the main property ensuring
the building stability under such circumstances. The fire resistance
of the key elements of the Pentagon building – strong
reinforced concrete columns – was over 180 minutes. But
the progressive collapse of the external ring of the building
occurred much earlier, only after 19 minutes.
Let us look at the development of events of 11 September,
2001, in New-York, where two unique high-rise towers of
the World Trade Center (WTC) suffered from the terrorist
attack. Those were really unique buildings, masterpieces
of engineering art, 110 floors each, 417 m high, built, just
note it, of metal constructions. And these are constructions
that have the lowest resistance to fire. Therefore, special
measures were taken to protect metal constructions from
fire when the towers were built and used. On 11 September,
2001, those towers were exposed to combined special conditions
aggravated by fire. First there a was an impact from
the flying object, then an explosion of the plane fuel pouring
from the damaged fuel tanks inside the building, and then
a fire in the impact and explosion area. We should say that
those towers, in spite of all the tragic events, demonstrated
wonderful capacity to withstand those extraordinary special
conditions. I mean they did not collapse immediately. At the
first moment after the impact there was no progressive collapse
of the towers. The Southern Tower had withstood the
impact for 56 minutes until the progressive collapse began,
and the Northern Tower had been stable for 1 hour 42 minutes
until the collapse. These were the minutes that allowed
to save and evacuate hundreds of thousands of people from
the southern Manhattan. All the people who were in the
buildings below the area of the impact, explosion and fire
also successfully left the towers thanks to the fire-fighting
system. Only the people who were higher than the emergency
zone encountered serious problems.
Nevertheless, every construction has resistance limits, and
finally the progressive collapse of the towers occurred.
The next slide shows the moment when the progressive
collapse of the Southern Tower began 59 minutes after the
terrorist attack. The slide shows that the fire resistance of
those towers was in compliance with norms and was 3 hours
(180 minutes) as the ultimate limit. I would like to attract
your attention to the fact that the progressive collapse began
before this normative fire-resistance limit. As I’ve told before,
the Northern Tower began collapsing after 102 minutes, and
the Southern Tower – after 56 minutes. So, the progressive
collapse of buildings exposed to combined special conditions
occurred much earlier than it would have been in case of
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fire only. It is an evidence of the fact that new hazards and
threats appear under combined special conditions, and we
should take them into consideration.
The next slide shows that the main threat and hazard
under combined special conditions aggravated by fire is in
that the critical heating temperature at which constructions
lose their bearing capacity is much lower than under affect
of fire only. It occurs because of the increased load on the
residual constructions after consecutive collapse of constructions
due to different damages. The increased load on the
residual constructions results in reduction of the critical heating
temperature during the fire.
Thus, peculiarity of the stability assessment for buildings
exposed to combined special conditions aggravated by fire is
in necessity to take into account new hazards and threats.
In the next slide you can see how it is possible to take into
account those hazards and to calculate period of the building
resistance under combined special conditions aggravated
by fire. The slide shows a solution for a reversed problem –
knowing the resistance period of the Pentagon building during
the events of 11 September, 2001, it was necessary to assess
condition and behavior of constructions inside the building
that resulted in its progressive collapse after 19 minutes.
This work was performed in cooperation with the State
Fire Academy of the EMERCOM of Russia. The slide demonstrates
some specific details of the progressive collapse of the
external ring of the building of Pentagon. The experimental
calculations showed that there would have not been any progressive
collapse of this part of the building, if the plane trajectory
had not crossed the expansion seam that divided the
Pentagon building in its full height. It resulted in appearance
of a huge, extremely heavy cantilever that rested on several
undamaged or partly undamaged columns. When a fire began
after the impact from the plane and fuel explosion, those remaining
columns started losing the residual bearing capacity.
And finally, when the total bearing capacity of the remaining
columns was lower than the load that affected them, the
progressive collapse of the external ring of the building of
Pentagon began. In this scheme you can see the condition
and number of columns of the external ring of the building
of Pentagon that finally led to the progressive collapse of the
building 19 minutes after the aircraft wreckage.
Conclusion.
Ensuring stability of buildings and constructions exposed
to combined special conditions aggravated by fire is a necessary
element of ensuring integrated safety and security of
these sites. The list of hazards that was shown on the scheme
on the second slide of my presentation should now include a
new hazard – that of combined special conditions.
If we take into account specifics of impact that combined
special conditions can have on buildings and constructions,
it will increase the level of ensuring integrated safety and
security of construction sites, including the factor of terrorist
threats. Thank you for your attention!
A.V. Moskalenko: Colleagues, your questions, please. I am
personally interested where you have got Pentagon drawings.
V.M. Roitman: Thank you for your question! It is a very
interesting story. In fact, there was no information, as Pentagon
is a very special site. But 4 years ago there was an
International Seminar “Protection of Urban Settlement from
Terrorist Threat” on the basis of the Russian Academy of Sciences
in Moscow. I participated in the seminar as an expert
from Russia. And among the reports at the seminar was
that by Paul Mlakar who was Chairman of the Commission
that investigated consequences of 11 September events in the
building of Pentagon. It is that from that report that we got
information on how it was all going on.
A.V. Moskalenko: Now it is clear!
Well, colleagues, any more questions No questions.
Thank you very much! Colleagues, tell me, please, whether
Oleg Borisovich Kutsev is in the hall. Is he here or not No,
he has not come. OK.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Contemporary Approaches to Fire Safety
Standards at Industrial Facilities
Yury N. Shebeko, Deputy Head of Research Centre of
Fire Prevention, Professor, Dr. Sci. (Tech.)
All-Russian Research Institute for Fire Protection of
Ministry of Russian Federation for Civil Defence, Emergencies
and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters
(FGU VNIIPO of EMERCOM) (Russia)
Dear colleagues! My report can seem to be more down
to earth as compared with some of the previous reports. I
am going to talk about development of legislative basis and
norms and regulations in the sphere of fire safety in the Russian
Federation. This development began in Russia after the
Law on Technical Regulation was enacted 10 years ago. At
that moment a lot of new provisions were formulated that
are now realized, in particular, in the Federal Law “Technical
Regulation on Fire Safety Requirements” that has already
been in action for 3 years. It has been used since 01 May 2009
and actually formulates main requirements to fire safety of
various facilities, including industrial facilities. In particular,
one of the main articles of this Law stipulates the content
of technical regulation in the sphere of fire safety. First of
all, it is formulation of fire safety requirements in legislative
acts and in norms and regulations, and I want to emphasize
a considerable difference between these two types of documents.
Legislative acts are legally binding, and norms and
regulations, in accordance with the Law on Technical Regulation,
are optional. Therefore, there is no such legal provision
that we used to have – non-compliance with standards is
subject to legal prosecution – as they are now optional documents.
But to which extent they are actually optional, and
to which extent compulsory, you will understand from my
report. The fundamental article of Law “Technical Regulation
on Fire Safety Requirements” is Article 6 defining conditions
of compliance of a facility with fire safety requirements, and
I ask you to pay a special attention to the first part of this
article. When are fire safety requirements met First of all,
you must meet obligatory fire safety requirements stipulated
by Federal Laws on technical regulations – well, it’s clear.
Laws must be always executed. Second – fire risk should not
exceed the standard values defined by the current Federal
Law. Here in the first part of the article there is nothing
about norms and regulations. You are free not to comply
with them, but you must comply with the fire risk values.
It is an element of so-called flexible regulation. It is actively
discussed all over the world, and some countries has begun
using it, and it is also used in our country, which allows designing
and building many facilities for which we do not have
any design standards. Practically all facilities in the fuel and
energy complex are now designed and constructed this way.
I ask you to pay attention to the third part of this article
stipulating that in case of compliance with obligatory fire
safety requirements established by legislative acts and with
requirements of norms and regulations, it is not required to
calculate the safety risk. So, you have a choice – either you
demonstrate compliance with all laws, norms and regulations,
and then you do not need to calculate the safety risk,
and you decide it voluntarily; or you voluntarily decide to
deviate from fire safety requirements of norms and regulations,
but then you must calculate safety risk and prove that
your facility fully comply with requirements of Law No. 123
that I am speaking about.
The actual scheme of ensuring fire safety or, more precise,
a scheme of identification of compliance of a facility with fire
safety requirements, is presented in this slide. (Pic. 1).
Actually it can be re-formulated as follows: if norms and
regulations stipulate fire safety requirements, then you check
121
IDENtIFICatION ON FaCILItY COMPLIaNCE WItH tHE REQuIRED FIRE
SaFEtY LEVEL
Federal Laws on technical regulations define
fire safety requirements for the facility
Ye
s
Norms and regulations define fire safety
requirements for the facility
Ye
s
Fire safety requirement of legislative acts
are met entirely for the facility
No
No
Project Specific Technical
Specification is developed
Ye
s
Fire safety is considered to be
ensured for the facility
No
Fire risk is calculated
Fire risk indicator does not exceed the standard value
Yes
Fire safety is considered to be
ensured for the facility
No
Additional fire-safety measures are
developed
Pic. 1.
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122
whether they are fully met. If met entirely – OK, fire safety
is considered to be ensured for the facility. If the requirements
are only partly met, you calculate fire risk and check
whether the resulting value exceeds or does not exceed the
standard values of the fire risk. If it does not exceed the
standard, the facility is safe, if exceeds – not safe. But if fire
safety requirements are not defined by norms and regulations,
you must obligatorily calculate fire risk. So, this scheme
demonstrates those items I have been speaking about.
What are these standard values of the fire risk I will
speak only about industrial facilities, as we are the Industrial
Safety Forum, so I not going to discuss community facilities.
A.V. Moskalenko: Blast them all! (laughing)
Y.N. Shebeko: No, it is only not to take time of those
colleagues who have come to listen about industrial safety,
and not about safety of community facilities. So, these standards
are the threshold values of fire risk for personnel that
correspond to the best international practices. So, this is the
maximum acceptable value of fire risk, and it is 10-4 per
year. And if your fire risk for personnel is less than 10-6 per
year, you have a very good situation and do not need to take
any additional measures. If you are between 10-4 and 10-6,
you must organize personnel training in fire safety requirements
and actions in case of fire hazardous situations and
fires, and, naturally, provide social protection of the personnel
to compensate for their work in increased risk conditions.
It is a normal practice, and it is done at all hazardous facilities,
and thus status quo is actually re-confirmed. I want to
emphasize that these values of acceptable risk for personnel
from 10-4 to 10-6, first of all, comply with the standard
values of fire risk adopted in many countries, and, what is
the most important, – in spite of the fact that we are ahead
all the word in fatalities during fires, it does not refer to our
industrial facilities. As for industrial facilities, we are here
among developed countries, it’s all quite good in this sphere,
so we easily fit into this range of risk for industrial facilities
of 10-4–10-6, though it certainly depends on a specific facility,
but nevertheless, here the situation is not as bad as with
community facilities.
However, the Law must be further developed, so now
draft amendments and addenda to the Federal Law “Technical
Regulation on Fire Safety Requirements” are ready for the
second hearing in the State Duma. It is assumed that these
amendments and addenda will be approved in the second
hearing in June, i.e. very soon.
What is important in those amendments and addenda –
there are a lot of them, but they are mostly very small – but
what is there more significant regarding industrial facilities
First of all, in case of major repairs, reconstruction and reequipment
of a facility, provisions of the Law “Technical Regulation”
are applicable only to that part of the facility that
you reconstruct. Thus, if you reconstruct any old refinery,
requirement of the new Law do not apply to old parts of
the plant that were built, for example, 20 years ago, if you
do not touch them during this reconstruction. And that part
that is undergoing this reconstruction must be constructed in
compliance with the new Law.
Moreover, it is very important when you should or should
not calculate the fire risk. It is planned to state in the amendments
that for facilities commissioned or designed before
enactment of the Federal Law, i.e. before 01 May, 2009, for
these old facilities fire risk calculation cannot be required at
all. I am going to explain why. Now a lot of unscrupulous
organizations have started working with such old facilities
where the owner for some reason does not want to ensure
the required level of safety. By making safety risk calculation
for these old facilities, they are trying to prove that
everything is OK there, and nothing should be done. So, it
is done to close this loophole for old facilities, and the norm
about acceptable value of fire risk will be applied only for
new facilities, but not retroactively. So, this Law won’t have
retroactive effect, and this provision should not be used for
old facilities. It is very important, and that amendment will
result in better regulation of the Law application.
What else is important A lot of unnecessary small detailed
regulations are taken away, such as fire safe distance
between buildings, constructions and other units for some
types of facilities. So, these requirements will stay in norms
and regulations, but will be taken away from the Law. Just
Main provisions of Federal Law No. 123-FZ of 22 June 2008 "technical
Regulation on Fire Safety Requirements" related to oil and gas industry
article 93. Standard Indicators of Fire Risk for Industrial Facilities
1. The value of individual risk of fire in buildings, installations, constructions and
territories of industrial facilities cannot exceed 1/1000000 per year.
3. The increase of the value of individual risk of fire up to 1/10 000 per year is
allowed for production facilities where it is impossible to ensure the value of
individual risk of fire of 1/1 000 000 per year in connection with the technological
process specifics. In this case measures must be taken to organize respective
personnel training and provide social protection of the personnel to compensate for
their work in increased risk conditions.
4. The value of individual risk of fire as a result of hazardous factors of fire at an
industrial facility cannot exceed 1/100 000 000 per year for people located in a
residential zone near the facility.
5. The value of social risk of fire as a result of hazardous factors of fire at an
industrial facility cannot exceed 1/10 000 000 per year for people located in a
residential zone near the facility.
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Pic. 2.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
feel the difference: norms and regulations are optional, but
the law is legally binding. So, here this binding power and
excessive regulation will disappear.
What else is important in these draft amendments Please,
pay attention to changes in Article 93 in the bottom of this
slide. (Pic. 2).
I mean the item regarding population living near hazardous
industrial facilities. In the initial version of the Law, at some
stage some clerk or somebody else changed a bit – and really
not a bit, but by 100 times – the acceptable values of risk for
personnel living near the hazardous facility and made it too
low. That led to great difficulties in designing many facilities
of the fuel and energy complex. Now it is brought back to
the world practice, and as multiple calculations made by us
and other organizations showed, the value of risk for population
living near hazardous industrial facilities of 10-6, – and I
mean here the risk that is related to industrial activity, and not
that somebody was drinking and smoking, and caused a fire
at home – so, if we decrease this risk to 10-6, we will correspond,
on the one hand, to the practice of developed countries,
and, on the other hand, to realities of our Russian life.
What else is here the most important Regarding location
of fire-fighting units at industrial facilities. Earlier it was
defined by fire safety regulations, now by the list of critically
important facilities that Nikolay Alexeevich was so well
talking about. Second, there are other facilities with high fire
hazard, though not critically important, where fire-fighting
units must be obligatory established. Now it is not done on
the basis of laws, and not norms and regulations. So, it has
become a bit tougher and more regulated. Now a question
appears: what fire fighting vehicles should be located in certain
fire safety stations It is clearly stated that the number
of these fire fighting vehicles should be defined based on
design fires that can occur here. So, you should not scratch
your head and say that you need so and so many vehicles
here, but you should first select design fires and calculate
which vehicles with which flow rate and reach can fight
these fires. And then you can say: guys, we need a vehicle
that could have a flow rate of 20 liters per second, and for
some facilities, maybe, 150 liters per second, as, for example,
for a liquefied natural gas plant that we were working with
in Sakhalin, and now for projects of Shtockman field development
and Yamal-LNG. Thus, it is an entirely new approach
that is introduced to streamline the existing practice.
Now some words about other legislative acts and norms
and regulations that support and develop provisions of Law
No. 123. (Pic. 3).
Here is rather a detailed scheme of hierarchy of legislative
acts that define the required level of fire safety. First level –
these are, certainly, Federal Laws “On Technical Regulation”,
“Technical Regulation on Fire Safety Requirements” and “On
Fire Safety”. Then there is the RF Government Decree “On
Fire Risk Calculation Regulations” because it is very important
element, one of the pillars of Law No. 123. And again, procedures
for fire risk calculation are approved by the EMERCOM
of Russia and registered in the Ministry of Justice, and these
are new norms developed in compliance with this Law.
In the following slide you can see other legislative acts,
namely: Government Decrees that define requirements that
are also very important for industrial facilities. First of all,
this is a list of products that are subject to obligatory certification
– I name it simply, without complicated legal definitions.
This is a list of standards that define how to identify
indicators during the certification, and a list of standards
and codes of practice that ensure the Federal Law requirements
in case you voluntarily opt to comply with them. As
123
FIRE SaFEtY LaWS, NORMS aND REGuLatIONS
Federal Law No. 184-FZ of
27 December 2002 "On
Technical Regulation".
Federal Law No. 123-FZ of 22
June 2008 "Technical
Regulation on Fire Safety
Requirements".
Federal Law No. 69-FZ of
21 December 1994 "On Fire
Safety".
RF Government Decree
No. 272 of 31 March
2009 "On Fire Risk
Calculation
Regulations".
Other norms
and regulations
Codes of
Practice
Fire Safety Norms and Regulations:
National
standards
Fire safety rules, other
regulations
Procedures for fire risk
calculation
New national standards
developed in accordance
with Federal Law No. 123-
FZ
Standards before FL No.
123-FZ enactment
Procedures for fire risk
calculation for industrial
facilities
Procedures for fire risk calculation for
buildings, installations and constructions of
different functional fire hazard categories
Pic. 3.
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124
Norms and regulations developed in accordance with provisions of Federal
Law No. 123-FZ of 22 June 2008 "technical Regulation on Fire Safety
Requirements"
"Regulations for Fire Risk Calculation" (appr. by RF Government Decree No.
272 of 31 March 2009).
"Regulations for Assessment of Conformity of Facilities of (Product)
Protection to Fire Safety Requirements by means of Independent Fire Risk
Evaluation" (appr. by RF Government Decree No. 304 of 7 April 2009 as rev. by
RF Government Decree No. 777 of 02 October 2009).
"Procedures for Fire Risk Calculation for Buildings, Installations and
Constructions of Different Functional Fire Hazard Categories» (appr. by the Order
of EMERCOM of Russia No. 382 of 30.06.2009, registered in the Ministry of
Justice on 06.08.2009, No.14486).
"Procedures for Fire Risk Calculation at Industrial Facilities» (appr. by the
Order of EMERCOM of Russia No. 404 of 10.07.2009, registered in the Ministry of
Justice on 17.08.2009, No. 14541, as rev. by the Order of EMERCOM of Russia
No. 649 of 14.12.2010, registered in the Ministry of Justice on 20.01.2011, No.
19546).
Order of EMERCOM of Russia No. 91 of 24 February 2009 "On Approval of
Form and Procedures of Registration of Fire Safety Declaration» (as rev. by the
Order of EMERCOM of Russia No. 135 of 26.03.2010).
Pic. 4.
Codes of Practice (CP) developed in accordance with provisions of "Technical
Regulation on Fire Safety Requirements" regulating issues of ensuring fire safety at
facilities of oil and gas industrial complex (developed or in approval stage)
CP "Storages of Liquefied Natural Gas. Fire Safety Requirements".
CP "Stationary Offshore Platforms for Oil and Gas Production on the Continental
Shelf. Fire Safety Requirements".
CP "Pipelines for Transportation of Flammable Gases and Liquids.
Fire Safety Requirements".
CP "Pipelines for Transportation of Flammable Gases and Liquids. Fire Safety
Requirements".
CP "Storages of Oil and Oil Products. Fire Safety Requirements".
CP "Oil Processing and Petrochemical Companies. Fire Safety Requirements".
Pic. 5.
you remember, I’ve told that you do not need to make risk
calculations if you voluntarily comply with all requirements of
norms and regulations. And this Government Decree clearly
defines which norms and regulations you should comply
with, which of them are taken into account.
As I’ve already told, evaluation of fire risk is an important
moment, and a number of documents have been adopted to
regulate the respective procedures. First of all, these are Fire
Risk Calculation Regulations approved by the Government
Decree, then there are procedures to identify fire risk reasons
– they are for community buildings, and Procedures for Fire
Risk Calculation at Industrial Facilities. You can see that these
Procedures were approved by the Order in the beginning of
2009 and registered in the Ministry of Justice. (Pic. 4).
The additions, mainly related to main pipelines and other
gas pipelines, also regulate procedures of fire risk calculation,
and this document is also registered in the Ministry of
Justice.
A very important moment in ensuring fire safety is development
of codes of practice. I would like to show new
codes of practice that have been developed or are in the
approval stage, or partly approved. In particular, what has
been approved: code of practice for fuel filling stations, for
oil fields infrastructure development, and code of practice
for storages of liquefied hydrocarbon gases. These codes of
practice are of those already developed, they have already
been adopted by the EMERCOM Commission, are now in the
approval stage and soon will be effective.
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
And the codes of practice that are in this slide are in the
development stage. (Pic. 5).
Thus, in my report, which is almost finished, I’ve actually
described the scheme of legal regulation of fire safety of
industrial facilities. Though it has been developed as continuity
of the previous system, it is new in many aspects, more
flexible and actually allows ensuring necessary level of fire
safety, without following stringently all the existing norms
and regulations. So, we should follow the principle of performance
based codes, as they are called world-wide, i.e. flexible
regulation principle, in order to build facilities for which,
maybe, norms and regulations have not been developed yet.
Thank you for your attention!
Question from the audience: Good afternoon, Yury
Nikolaevich! I actually have two questions. First – in principle,
you’ve mentioned amendments to Law No. 123-FZ that
exclude possibility to prove fire safety by fire risk calculation
for facilities commissioned before enactment of Law No. 123.
It is done in spite of the fact that practically the same fire
risk, 1/1 000 000 per year (10-6 per year), was defined by
fire safety regulations of 2003 and those adopted earlier, in
1993, and there were procedures and methods, one of which
was described in GOST 123047 “Fire Safety of Technological
Processes” that, by the way…
Y.N. Shebeko: Now GOST 47 is being revised.
Question from the audience: But at present it is still
valid and is included in the list of legally binding documents.
Y.N. Shebeko: Optionally.
Question from the audience: It is based on Law No. 184-
FZ “On Safety of Buildings and Constructions”. I understand
what list you are speaking of, and I am talking about “Technical
Regulation of Safety of Buildings and Constructions”. It
defines the list of legally binding legislative acts and regulations.
Not optional.
Y.N. Shebeko: It is in case designing is not done according
to project specific technical specifications.
Question from the audience: Certainly, certainly! So,
GOST 123047 is still in this list, so why is it not possible to
prove fire safety by fire risk calculation for facilities commissioned
earlier If owners operate them properly, they take
care of fire safety systems, we haven’t...
A.V. Moskalenko: Excuse me, your question, please.
Question from the audience: …changed fire resistance
limits of our buildings, they do not contradict to Law No.
123-FZ.
Y.N. Shebeko: I’ve already told that what you want is still
valid. But after enactment of amendments and addenda, the
principle will prevail that the law does not have retroactive
effect. So, those legislative acts and regulations that provide
for the fire safety calculation can be applied only for those
facilities that were designed and built after enactment of
the Technical Regulation. As for other norms that were used
before the Technical Regulation – you’re welcome, and you
can use GOST 47 and GOST 4 and other documents, which
is actually done. But new procedures and methods and the
maximum acceptable values of fire risk defined in Law No.
123 do no apply to old facilities. It is clearly stated in the Law.
The new Law will be applied only for new facilities, but not
retroactively.
I.G. Yankovsky: Dear Yury Nikolaevich, I have such question:
when are you planning to take away a word “premises”
from the article where there is a classification of explosion
hazardous zones
Y.N. Shebeko: Well, first of all, if you think that I personally
or our institute is dealing with this...
I.G. Yankovsky: No. I mean in general. Will there be an
amendment
Y.N. Shebeko: Yes, there will. The changes are being introduced,
but they are less substantial than those I’ve been
describing. And the draft contains changes regarding explosion
hazardous zones. But I would only like to emphasize one
thing: if you think that the entire wording of the Law No.
123 was written by our institute, I dare to disappoint you,
but it is not true. There is a huge amount of federal executive
power bodies involved in the law-making process. And
other authorities, such as Government, Presidential Administration,
Government Staff, Central Office of the State Duma,
the State Duma itself, and actually it’s a great difference
between the draft law that was developed by the institute
and that finally approved. So, if you think that all that was
developed by the institute was actually included into this law,
you are mistaken.
I.G. Yankovsky: This article contradicts the GOST in classification
of explosion hazardous zones. Do you agree
Y.N. Shebeko: Now these definitions have been changed
in amendments.
I.G. Yankovsky: The second question:
A.V. Moskalenko: It’s not fair! Ivan Grigorievich, I have just
forbidden another our colleague to ask the second question.
Question from the audience: Yury Nikolaevich, I have a
question. A fire occurred, nobody died, but a lot of property
was burned out – is the Law applicable to this case
Y.N. Shebeko: It depends on when the facility was built
and designed. It if had been before the enactment, then,
generally speaking, no, it is not applicable. There is an article
that stipulates that the law is applicable only in case the
facility is in fire hazard condition, and in this case the executive
power bodies must take measures to bring the facility
to proper fire safe condition. And only the court can decide
whether it is in fire hazard condition or not. So, if the facility
had been designed and built before 1 May 2009, the Law is
not applicable, and it is clearly stated there.
Question from the audience: Good afternoon, I have a
question on risk calculation for existing facilities. What about
an independent fire risk evaluation, i.e. fire safety audit
Y.N. Shebeko: Here also we are waiting for some changes,
and I can’t speak about them in detail yet, but after amendments
to Law No. 123 that I’ve been speaking about are
enacted, there, probably, will be an amendment to the respective
Government Decree regulating independent fire risk
evaluation. But the independent fire risk evaluation is not so
much fire risk calculation, but I would first of all use another
term – non-government fire safety supervision. It will be kept
by all means, though fire risk calculation is not needed for
old facilities, but non-government fire safety supervision will
stay, it is an independent fire risk evaluation, for old facilities
as well, but for them it will use norms and regulations that
existed when designing and building such old facility. So, use
the old legislative base for old facilities, new laws and regulations
for new facilities, except when a court decides: “No,
guys, this facility is in fire hazardous condition”, but I emphasize
it once more that only court can decide it. But the general
principle is that old norms are used for old facilities, and new
norms – for new facilities. It’s a very clear ranking.
A.N. Isakov: You see, any law can really work when it has
a system of definitions around which the legal framework is
built. Let us consider, for example, Law 123-FZ that you have
been talking about and its future revision. The basic, fundamental
notion of this Law is that of “object of protection”.
But with the existing definition of this notion, all territory of
the Russian Federation, from Vladivostok to Kaliningrad, can
be considered object of protection, and it will be 0.1 object
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125

126
of protection. Is detailed specification of this notion planned,
are any subordinate acts prepared that would define procedures
of identification of objects of protection
Y.N. Shebeko: My answer: First of all, the notion of “object
of protection” did not appear with Law No. 123, but it
was introduced in 1994 by enactment of Federal Law No.
69-FZ “On Fire Safety”. It is clearly defined there what is the
object of protection, and it is not possible to consider that, as
you say, it is the whole territory of the Russian Federation, if
you judge by what is stated in that Law. It is not true – these
are buildings, constructions, transportation vehicles, etc. As
for the notion of fire risk, which is a fundamental notion of
the law, it refers to peoples: either to the company personnel
or people living near the hazardous facility. But I would,
certainly, limit my comments to industrial facilities only. And
the fire risk notion is not anyhow connected with the object
of protection. I emphasize once more, it refers to people. I
want to say once more that what you are asking about is not
a new notion, as it is about 18 years old.
A.V. Moskalenko: Let me say, but it’s not a question,
it’s a comment. I have been listening very attentively, and,
however strange it can sound, GCE has been dealing with this
issue for a long time. First about the Law. When it was enacted
(and my assessment is it’s a very good law), people did
not like it very much for two reasons. First: The EMERCOM, I
mean those who initiated the Law, stated clearly and unambiguously
that it was the owner who was responsible for the
fire safety at a facility, or it could be the facility operator.
Y.N. Shebeko: It had been already stated in Law No. 69,
not in Law No. 123.
A.V. Moskalenko: It was re-emphasized, let us say so. I
am not speaking about the letter of the law, but about its
spirit.
Y.N. Shebeko: And I mean both letter and spirit.
A.V. Moskalenko: And they say: “You should not shout
each time about ‘what the state is looking at’.” The state has
the task to decrease governmental expenses, so respectively
your staff must be also reduced, etc. And the business is
growing, and so on, and “guys, you are responsible for your
actions”, figuratively speaking.
Y.N. Shebeko: In principle, you are right. The law has
been treating it like this since 1994.
A.V. Moskalenko: The second step, one of the foundation
notions, was acceptable risk. I just applauded. You
may remember this discussion– zero risk strategy vs acceptable
risk. Rostekhnadzor is still afraid of it and tries to avoid
like the plague, but still seems to be also introducing it. The
EMERCOM made great progress – now there is a notion
of acceptable risk, which had been absent previously in our
legislation.
Y.N. Shebeko: Not in legislation.
A.V. Moskalenko: It is very good. It was extremely brave.
What is going on now Some time went by, and they say:
“Stop!” The Law, at least in this part, does no apply to facilities
built earlier. Oh, such dishonest experts, such dishonest
owners, they will manipulate the data, etc. It seems we have
forgotten about dishonest inspectors, etc. You see, what we
have now – amendments are introduced that this Law won’t
have retroactive effect, but it’s OK, there had not been any
notion of acceptable risk before. I will give you such an example
from real life. Citizens of Saint Petersburg may remember
this TV program on one of TV channels. There is a
school, it is, maybe, with profound study of art, but walls are
decorated with frescoes there. The majority of outstanding
artists took part in this work, they painted the walls. Naturally,
there was a canvas glued or somehow attached to the
wall, it was covered with some ground layer, but I do not
Transcripts of Proceedings
know the details. Our wonderful artists painted it. The school
has been like that for several dozens of years. An inspector
came, wrote an order – take away the canvas, destroy those
frescoes, because it is a fire hazard, etc.
I make no assessments on whether he was right or wrong.
Y.N. Shebeko: He was not right, and I can say it at once.
Only court had the right to do it, not an inspector. The inspector
has only the right to apply to court.
A.V. Moskalenko: But the inspector writes some paper,
some prescription.
Y.N. Shebeko: But he cannot suspend operation of the
facility.
A.V. Moskalenko: I have not told that he suspended operation
of the facility, but he wrote some order. People in
the school gave a gasp of surprise and ran to court, having
obtained the certificates that this canvas could not burn, i.e.
it could not be set on fire until a certain temperature.
Y.N. Shebeko: The school acted in the right way.
A.V. Moskalenko: The court decided that, as there is an
order, a formal prescription, it’s final, it must be fulfilled.
It’s done for. We got to know about it only after the court
decision and, unfortunately, it cannot be canceled. Lawyers
tell that it is impossible. So, the school administration, I won’t
call them any names, do not know the letter of the law. But
what about the inspector He acted according to that second
branch in your scheme – either we calculate the risk or live
according to old norms. He does not know the law, does he
Could not he give them an option: either meet my requirement
or calculate the risk as soon as possible and check
whether you are safe or not What I am actually speaking
about – an excellent law has been adopted, and now we are
moving backwards.
Y.N. Shebeko: It is not true.
A.V. Moskalenko: Yes Just see what you have shown
us, how many norms and regulations are being prepared for
approval.
Y.N. Shebeko: Codes of practice are optional, and I want
to say that they will be beneficial for business, and I’ll explain
why. In absence of these documents you can only design
facilities with the use of project specific technical specifications,
because Article 78 stipulates that when there are no
norms and regulations, you must have project specific technical
specifications. As soon as there are norms and regulations
– that’s all! You do not need to have project specific technical
specifications, which reduces your costs. You should understand
that, on the contrary, it is only profitable for business,
as one doesn’t have to develop project specific technical
specifications. Except for the business that it is interested in
developing project specific technical specifications, including
us. So, we saw off the bough on which we are sitting.
A.V. Moskalenko: You know, we are business that is not
interested in either options. Why We are middle-size business.
We have our own building, but it does not contain hazardous
industrial facilities, except lifts, if we remember that
they are subject to regulations of Law No. 116. I remember
these technologies, like they say in the EMERCON, – potentially
hazardous facility.
Y.N. Shebeko: You know, this terminology has nothing
to do with fire safety. Let me stay within the sphere where
I am competent.
A.V. Moskalenko: I agree. So, I have a medium-sized
business, and very specific. It is easier for us to calculate on
our own. And my employees here won’t let me tell a lie and
can confirm we are actually doing it. It is easier for me to
calculate once whether my facility if safe or not than have
discussions with inspectors every other time.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Y.N. Shebeko: I will give you a good advice. I have actually
given it indirectly, and now I’ll do it openly. There is
GOST, for example, 004, let you calculate according to this
GOST – it was effective then, so use it for your calculation,
but do not apply new methods and procedures that have
now been developed. Calculate with methods that were valid
before. And now many companies are doing it like this. But
then it is not called fire risk, but probability of fire hazardous
factors impact on people, and you have every right to
make calculations for an old facility with the old norms and
regulations that provided for such calculations, and just do
it – nobody forbids you.
A.V. Moskalenko: And that dear inspector is constantly
telling me about those old documents, not about the GOST,
but another one, etc. The Law has been enacted, and now
we are beginning to divide the legal framework between the
old and new facilities. How come
Y.N. Shebeko: it’s because the law does not have retroactive
effect. Yes, exactly. It is a general principle, and it has
been just emphasized once more. It was also earlier stated in
Article 9 that the Law was not applicable to facilities that had
been designed and built before its enactment, except when a
facility was in fire hazardous condition. It was stated earlier,
in 2009, and quite clearly. Moreover, there were SNiPs, for
example 100194 that formulated a similar regulation. So, we
are not turning anything upside down, nothing of the kind.
A.V. Moskalenko: I have not been speaking about that.
You see, you refer to the SNiP and to the GOST, but give
me only one document to live in accordance with. Why is it
allowed for the new facilities, but not to us
Y.N. Shebeko: First, that was a decision of law-makers;
second, we should not, probably, cancel a general principle
that law does not have retroactive effect.
A.V. Moskalenko: And who has told you that old facilities
do not comply with this new risk regulation
Y.N. Shebeko: I can only say that it happens more often
than not. I will give you an example. Maybe, it is not an
industrial facility, I want to emphasize it, but these are cultural
heritage sites. And they are to be reconstructed. And
as in XV, XVIII and other centuries nobody knew about Law
No. 123, they were designed and built quite differently from
what is now described in Law No. 123. Should we apply Law
No. 123 Definitely not. Moreover, at that time there were
not any written regulations for such sites, and then such
decisions of fire safety compliance were decided by experts
at the level of regulatory and engineering committees of
regions and on the federal level. Sometimes they calculate
safety level for people as safety level according to GOST 4.
It’s a current practice. But they do not use new methods, do
not apply new regulations.
A.V. Moskalenko: And it is very bad, and it’s what I am
trying to say to you.
Y.N. Shebeko: And how can we apply the new law to a
XVII-century facility
A.V. Moskalenko: OK. The last question, as an exception.
Question from the audience: Yury Nikolaevich, my question
is to pursue the subject that Alexander Vladimirovich has
just raised. Why are we allowed or not allowed to calculate
You are speaking about facilities that had been built before
introduction of any norms and regulations, in XVII–XVIII
centuries. But at the same time we say that these facilities
are to be reconstructed now. But today we still do not have
those norms and regulations. We develop project specific
technical specifications, calculate risks with new procedures
and can live with it. Why can’t we do it now Well, we have
an industrial facility, and the workshop area is 10 thousand
sq.m. We are performing reconstruction of fire protection
systems. Should we apply Law No. 123-FZ only to the reconstructed
fire safety systems or to the workshop as a whole
We have a reconstruction in the shop, I emphasize it, but we
do not change technologies, but only replace fire protection
systems.
Y.N. Shebeko: I want to remind what I have been speaking
about. The law, first of all, stipulates minimum requirements.
Thus, if you reconstruct something, you should apply
the Law only to that part that is reconstructed. But if you
opt to apply the Law requirements to old facilities as well,
voluntarily – I emphasize it, nobody can forbid you.
I would only read distinctly the following: “it is not required
to calculate the safety risk in this case”, it does not
mean you can’t, it is not legally required but not forbidden.
But it won’t be confirmation of your compliance.
Question from the audience: There is a gas processing
plant that has been operated since 1941. At present its walls
are over two times thicker than it is required by the current
Federal Law. And naturally, the needed fire resistance is ensured,
even in accordance with requirements of new norms
and regulations.
Y.N. Shebeko: And that’s good, wonderful! I am glad
for you!
Question from the audience: No questions, but why
can’t we at this facility confirm safety of this building with
risk calculations if we perform modernization of technology
– only technology, I emphasize – inside the building
Y.N. Shebeko: I have been speaking about this today, and
want to emphasize once more. Subject of fire risk calculation
is a person, not a building. If you modernize your technology,
but, obviously, leave old buildings intact, you can show the
risk for that personnel that operate your new technologies,
and as you modernize your technology, you must be changing
your fire safety systems as well, hopefully for the better,
and you can use these new methods and regulations in this
case. Why can’t you do it You can. You are modernizing
your technology, and here is the person who operates your
new technologies, you have the right to prove with the use
of fire risk calculation that, modernizing your technology,
you do not exceed the acceptable risk level, and you can do
it in this case. But if you have 2 workshops, and one is reconstructed
and the second is not reconstructed, you do not
need to calculate fire risk for the second. And, generally, you
can only apply old norms and regulations to it.
A.V. Moskalenko: Well, two parallel worlds. We have
given a right orientation to Yury Nikolaevich, and I feel you
are to get straight to the post of Minister.
Y.N. Shebeko: No, friends I understand a good joke, Alexander
Vladimirovich, ha-ha! I am a scientist, and I express
my opinion as a scientist.
A.V. Moskalenko: Good wishes! Colleagues, let us stop
here, we’ve already spent a lot of time. Thank you very much!
It is a wonderful report and wonderful speaker, aren’t they
Y.N. Shebeko: Thank you for your attention and questions.
I have an evening train, but I am going to spend some
more time here today, so if you have any further questions,
you’re welcome!
A.V. Moskalenko: My friends, we have a replacement
in our program, and instead of Mr Kachanov we are going
to listen to Oleg Borisovich Kutsev. Well, he is not in
the hall. We’ve got a new speaker, and he has disappeared
again. And, unfortunately we don’t have here Mrs Kobysheva,
whose report I’ve been waiting for (you could see she
was going to talk about equipment operating in extremely
low temperatures). She is, unfortunately, ill. So, we’ve made
a replacement. Mr Neal Langerman. I ask him to mount this
platform and make a very interesting presentation for us.
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128
Oxidizer plant explosion –
lessons we should have learned
Dr. Neal Langerman, Chairman of the Division of
Chemical Health & Safety
American Chemical Society (USA)
I did not expect to be back speaking to you. And I hope
what I have selected to talk about will hold your attention.
I am going to discuss an event that many of you will be
familiar with the direct cause. The incident happened in a
chemical plant in the State of Nevada that goes by the name
PEPCON – that’s an abbreviation for the Pacific Engineering
and Production Company of Nevada.
(Pic. 1). This is a photograph of the plant after the fires
were allowed to burn out. What I am going to do is to show
how the plant would end up looking like this.
(Pic. 2). This is a photograph of one of the fires that was
burning.
(Pic. 3). Now, the layout of the plant is shown here. The
physical plant is very close to the hydroelectric generating
station in Nevada called Hoover Dam. It is one of the very,
very large hydroelectric stations. The reason the plant is near
Hoover Dam is that the plant uses huge amounts of electricity
to manufacture the chemical ammonium perchlorate. Ammonium
perchlorate is a mixed salt of a fuel, the ammonium
ion, and an oxidizer, the perchlorate ion. Anyone who has
had a little bit of chemistry knows that if you mix a fuel and
an oxidizer, and do it correctly, you make an explosive. Ammonium
nitrate is another example.
The plant manufactured the ammonium perchlorate in this
area. Here is the drier building. They took the wet ammonium
perchlorate salt and put it in industrial ovens and dried it.
The plant had a history of fires, and the plant management
ignored them. The fires occurred in the insulation of the
drying ovens – the fiber glass; the dust of the ammonium
perchlorate that accumulated would be heated by the oven
and occasionally ignite. The plant workers would put out the
fire, and nobody really followed up on this.
Prior to the incident the United States shuttle “Challenger”
failed. I think that’s an incident all of us remember; the absolutely
spectacular, tragic photographs. When “Challenger”
failed, NASA instructed the Thiokol Company in Northern
Utah to stop manufacturing the strap-on motors, the external
motors, until they understood the cause of failure.
Thiokol failed to tell PEPCON to stop manufacturing ammonium
perchlorate. Ammonium perchlorate was mixed with
aluminum and polyethylene pellets to the make the fuel for
the strap-on motors.
PEPCON in their storage area normally had about 300
thousand kg of ammonium perchlorate. When they finally
figured out that their sole customer, Thiokol, was no longer
accepting the shipments, they wound up with something on
an order of about 4 Million kg – so, a huge excess.
(Pic. 4). A fire started in the drier building. It started
mid-morning, late morning, 1988. Within 21 minutes of the
fire the first of seven detonations, explosions occurred. The
fire in the drier oven ignited the ammonium perchlorate dust
on the fiberglass walls of the building; the fire on the walls
ignited drums of ammonium perchlorate just outside the wall
that was burning; the drums ignited the asphalt that was
saturated with ammonium perchlorate; the asphalt spread
the fire under the storage area. That’s where the detonations
began. The largest detonation, which actually put out
the ammonium perchlorate fire, but started the natural gas
fire by rupturing a pipeline that was under the plant, was the
equivalent of 1 kiloton nuclear free-air-burst, one thousand
meters above the ground, or 250 (metric) tonnes of TNT
detonation at ground level.
(Pic. 5). PEPCON produced ammonium perchlorate, and
the excess inventory led to the event.
(Pic. 6). There were theories invoked that the violation of
hot work permitting ignited the fire. We were able to show
that this theory did not hold up. There was a theory that the
natural gas pipeline started the fire. I will show you on the
video that that did not hold up. And ultimately, we all settled
on this as the direct cause of the fire, where the fire started.
Incidentally, I led a major portion of the investigation
which lasted about three years, that was 1989 till 1992.
(Pic. 7). I am going to show you a video, very shortly. It
is called the “Black Mountain” video. And the reason why it
is called Black Mountain, I will show you in the end, is that
a ccable TV installation crew was working up on the mountain.
The mountain is an antenna farm; it has many, many
antenna on it. If you go to Las Vegas and look north, you’ll
see it. One of the maintenance guys had a video camera on a
tripod, that never got explained why he had video set up. But
when the first detonation occurred, he rotated the camera
around and captured what you are going to see. And then
he did something that none of us in this room would do– he
and his two colleagues got in their truck and drove to the
plant that was burning and detonating. So, we have close-up
footage at ground level from the plant.
One thing just from the point of interest, right after he
realized the value of the video, he hopped on an airplane,
flew out to our NBC Broadcasting Network in Los Angeles,
walked in with the videotape, and told them: “You can show
it once when you hand me $30,000 cash”, and they did!
There were then about a hundred law firms involved, and he
sold it to each one of them. He made $330,000 for this tape.
The judge finally called him in the court and said: “The court
is taking possession now. You’ve made enough”.
Now switch the video.
(Video): There were two fatalities, over three hundred
injuries, and in excess of hundred million USD dollars in
damages. This is the plant burning. The voices you hear in
the background are the crew: “Oh, my God! I hope nobody
is hurt”. They are going to talk about the Marshmallow
Plant. Right here, that building adjacent to the chemical
plant manufactured those little sugar fluffs called marshmallows
– they got toasted, they burnt.
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Pic. 1. Pic. 2.

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
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Pic. 3.
Pic. 4.
Pic. 5.
Pic. 6.
Pic. 7.
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Now, the time marker we put into the video to allow detailed
study of the video. Each one of these centers of fire
is a storage area of the ammonium perchlorate. The brown
smoke is ammonium perchlorate burning, not detonating –
burning. This grey smoke is the combination of the building
fiberglass and the insulation on the electrical cables of the
building burning.
Ok, you notice there is a car running all along here. So,
don’t blink! From the time of the visual detonation till the
sound wave, pressure wave hit the video camera we can
estimate they are about 5 miles out.
Now the nature of the smoke has changed, the black
smoke in the background is the sugar in the marshmallow
factory burning. You may not hear – I am not sure about
the sound quality. But about 10 miles away, or 16 km away,
is Nellis Air Force Base. They saw the smoke, they could account
for all of their aircraft, they knew they had not lost
an aircraft, but they could not believe that that smoke was
anything but one of their aircrafts down, so they scrambled
an air rescue flight, all – that’s a separate tape – reported
what they were seeing, which is the plant burning.
Now, in the foreground, where I am pointing, you will
see light puffs – these are 300 kg aluminum bins of ammonium
perchlorate bursting from the heat, and just blowing
the AP, the ammonium perchlorate up into air. We will also
see in that area where I am pointing to in the foreground two
detonations that will be occurring. When we reconstructed the
chemistry and energy, those detonations are those 300 kg bins
detonating. They will come up any minute. That’s a 300 kg bin
detonating, and that’s the second one. We were able to reconstruct
this that the first one shared it energy in what’s called a
“sympathetic detonation” that initiated the second one. Now,
a bit of time is going to go by, approx. 1minute, and there will
now be the final detonation that measures a 4 on the Richter
earthquake magnitude scale. It occurs just about the 7 minute
mark. You saw the tripod-mounted camera bounced, that’s
how much seismic energy this blast imparted.
I want to focus your attention, on the foreground where
the nature of the fire is going to change. Right here – there
is a new fire. We could correlate the seismic event with the
pressure in a high-pressure natural gas pipeline that went
under the plant. And what we saw was the seismic event, the
pipeline pressure started dropping, and the motor-operated
valves, located about 10 km apart, closed.It takes 24 hours
for residual natural gas to burn out.
You can see why we discounted the theory that natural
gas fire preceded the plant fire – it clearly did not. I don’t
know if we heard it – but at some point at just 9 km away,
they are about 9 km away actually, but one of the people
that you can hear says: “Feel the heat”. Radiant heat from
this fire is uncomfortable at the separation that they are.
It will burn like this… I hope I grabbed the correct video. I
cut out the section. I hope I have the correct video, so you
can see the activity at the plant. Let it go another 30 seconds.
If not, I will cut it and go to the end. While that’s running, let
me share some other things that happened on this. The State
of Nevada passed a law that forbids the construction of an
ammonium perchlorate plant in the state. The US Department
of Defense found that to be objectionable significant
problem because ammonium perchlorate is a component of
most all smokeless powder, smokeless ammunition. So, the
Department of Defense funded the reconstruction of this
plant in the State of Utah. Five years after the new plant was
up and running in Utah, it too detonated in almost the same
fashion. And one of the workers who survived the Nevada
incident died in the Utah incident.
Interestingly, the Kerr-McGee Company operates another
ammonium perchlorate plant in Nevada that has never had
Pic. 8. Pic.
9.
Pic. 10.
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
a significant fire, and certainly has never had anything like
that. You can see what is different because they are using
the same technology, the different system of management.
In my career I investigated 5 fatalities that the management
of this firm had been involved in over the period of 20 years.
And don’t ask me why they are allowed to stay in business.
(Pic. 8). The investigation pretty clearly demonstrated that
the cause was the fire ignited in the drying oven. As part of
my study we demonstrated that if we place ammonium perchlorate
in a glass vessel and heat it up to about 170 degrees
C for 7 days, the glass vessel will detonate. And we were able
to do it reproducibly and demonstrate that a run-away chemical
reaction actually occurs in a heated mass of ammonium
perchlorate. The “Challenger” disaster initiated the chain of
events which culminated in the PEPCON fire. Dust accumulation
– and I’ve talked about the dust hazard at this conference
in the past – was clearly a contributing factor. The plant
lacked a good emergency plan. When the fire broke out, they
tried to fight it for about 15 minutes before they initiated the
evacuation. When they started evacuating, the plant manager
realized that an employee who was paralyzed and in a wheelchair,
his legs did not work from an injury, had not evacuated.
The plant manager went back to get that employee, and the
plant manager and that employee were the two fatalities.
Employees could not get out of the chain-linked fenced parking
lot fast enough – so, many of them drove their cars right
through the chain-linked fence to escape. Of the 300 injuries,
most of them were to non-plant employees. For example,
I met an airline cabin attendant who lived in this area, was
walking out of her house, when a major pressure wave hit
her house, blew the door off and broke her nose. I met a
man about my age now who climbed up on his roof to better
watch this fire several km away, when the pressure wave hit
him on his house, it blew him off the roof and he broke his
hip. That’s were what the most of injuries were from.
(Pic. 9). Nevada refused the permit. Utah sponsored the
plant, and then we had this that I related.
(Pic. 10). The real lesson from this is “Those who don’t
know history are destined to repeat it”.
I did not expect to talk about PEPCON here, but I hope
you understand why I enjoy talking about PEPCON – it’s
rather impressive.
A.V. Moskalenko: Thank you very much, Neal. Thank you
very much once more.
CONFERENCE HALL “BAKKARA”
Master class “Process Safety Management
in Chemical Plants, Pilot Plants and Laboratories”
Moderator – Dr. Neal Langerman, Chairman of the
Division of Chemical Health & Safety
American Chemical Society (USA)
Well, good afternoon.
This is the session on Process Safety Management.
I have the first slide.
Oh, very good. Thank you. Thank you.
Let me introduce myself. I spoke yesterday. This session
is a little less formal than the session yesterday. My name
is Neal Langerman, I am from San Diego, California. It has
been a long trip to get here, but I thoroughly enjoy visiting
Saint Petersburg. I am a chemist, for the last roughly
30 years I have devoted my professional life through my
company to preventing problems in industry, in academia
and in government with the handling of chemicals. My main
interests are the prevention of problems, though I do spend
a fair amount of my professional time investigating things
that went wrong, so that we can all learn from the lessons
from those incidents.
Today I am going to be talking about Process Safety Management.
But before I begin in detail, I would like a little
feedback from you, folks, as to the level of your familiarity
with Process Safety Management, which I would generally
call PSM.
So, by a show of hands, how many of you are familiar
with PSM Few of you. So, for many of you this is a relatively
new topic, is that correct Or… OK. As we progress, if you
have questions – and given the response you just gave me,
there may well be questions – please, just interrupt. Put your
hand up, and we’ll take your question just right and now. It
will work in this setting much more effectively than, perhaps,
waiting for the end for questions. I think we’ll be able to get
everything in about an hour and 15 minutes that we’ve been
allocated. With that, we will begin.
PSM is a very formalized approach to all aspects of the
design and operation of a unit with the objective of identifying
and managing the hazards. What I like to work out with
you in an hour and a half is the idea of what PSM looks
like, the formal structure of PSM, and an idea how the PSM
has been implemented at some specific locations, and then
I’ll finish up with pointing you to some resources available
on the web where you could look further at PSM. As we
progress, I’ve got a number of little problem-solving sessions
for you to look at a video clip of a real unit, and at the end
of the video clip I will ask for your ideas of what failures of
Process Safety Management may have occurred that led to
the incident that the video clip will explain. Most of the video
clips will be short, the last one actually will be quite long, and
I’ll make some comments as we progress.
First, Process Safety Management is, at least that what
I will talk about, is the US Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) regulation. And you can actually find
the regulation on this site www.osha.gov. And you can get
more information at the American Institute of Chemical Engineers
website www.aiche.org/ccps/ Center for Chemical
Process Safety. You heard at least that mentioned yesterday,
and I mention it again – CCPS.
As a regulation, there are threshold levels of chemicals
that kick, start the requirements. If you have, for example,
5 kg of hydrogen cyanide at your facility, you must in the
US follow the OSHA regulations. If you have more than 40
thousand liters of flammable liquid, hydrocarbon, you must
follow the regulations. However, one of the things that I
have been working with for the last roughly 10 years is implementing
PSM where it’s not required by regulation, such as
small pilot plants or even laboratories. And it turns out that
the formal structure of PSM is exceedingly helpful in any
environment, from a large production facility all the way to
a laboratory, or even a specific device, like a distillation column,
in the laboratory. We can scale PSM, and I am going to
talk about that scaling, as we progress.
Let me give you an overview. And am not going to beat
on the regulations, I am not going to go into regulations
in depth; I am going to give you a feel for what PSM is
all about. And it starts with identification of the hazards
– that’s not just chemical hazards, but hazards associated
with process and technical implementation of the process.
So, if you are re-arranging carbon chains by catalytic reaction,
that technology has hazards specific to it, in addition
to, for example, the flammable nature of chemicals. And the
actual – the equipment: equipment operating temperatures,
operating pressures, flow rates, etc.
PSM requires the performance of the hazard assessment. I
am going to talk about options for hazard assessment in little
more detail, but, it’s as we talked about yesterday, it’s the real
center, the core of all PSM activities is the hazard assessment.
And when we look at hazard assessment for a chemical unit,
regardless of the size, what we want to be looking at are
sources of possible losses of containment, releases; a history
of what has on in the past at that unit – what releases, what
losses of containment may have occurred, the near-hits that
have occurred (let’s say, choice of English word – I don’t know
how it translates, frequently it is called a “near-miss”, I don’t
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like that, it’s a “near-hit”); and what the environmental health
and safety implications are of a loss of containment. So, these
things all will go into the hazard assessment.
Then, PSM requires controls. Once you have identified the
hazards and begin to understand the risks associated with
those hazards, how do you mitigate the hazard Yesterday,
it was briefly discussed on inherently safety processes. Mitigation
may be substituting a less flammable feedstock for
a more flammable feedstock. How do you prevent loss of
containment What do you actually do to respond to out-ofnormal
situation or actual loss of containment
Written – PSM requires written standard operating procedures
(SOPs) for all unit operations. And the SOP needs to
address pre-start-up – that is what you do when you first
bring your unit on line; actual start-up; re-start after a normal
shutdown and restart after an abnormal shutdown –these
can be very different start-up operations. How do you operate
your unit normally And what are your responses to exceeding
operating limits – high temperature or extremely high
temperature, high pressure, extremely high pressure, high
flow rate – how do you respond Or your operators, how are
they supposed to respond to this kind of conditions.
PSM requires training not only of your employees, but of
contractors working onsite, whose activity could impact the
unit or who could be impacted by the unit. So, for example,
in a laboratory that we recently audited, contractors delivered
gas cylinders to the lab, and in order not to interfere with
laboratory operation, they did it before the lab staff came to
work in the morning. That is the area where the contractor
could be impacted by the lab, knocking something over, not
knowing what the chemicals are, what the processes are, or
the lab could be impacted by the contractor in the same way.
And we remedied it by simply changing their delivery schedule
from before the staff was there till after the staff arrived. It’s
that kind of interaction that PSM designed to identify.
Train your operators in how to handle out-of-normal situations
– the way I say it generally is “What do you do when
a high level alarm occurs and what do you do when a highhigh
level alarm occurs – that is 10 degrees C above normal
and, perhaps, 20 degrees above normal – what should your
operators do”
PSM requires a well-organized risk management system
based on the administrative controls. I think everyone is familiar
with the “Know-Do-Tell-Check-and then Do this” loop
as the loop of continual improvement.
Continuing this overview – PSM requires a formal preventive
maintenance program. So, if you know that a pump will
fail after5000 hours of operation, your PM program, your
preventive maintenance program, may well specify that that
pump is taken out of service at 3000 hours of operation, for
example.
So, the structured PSM program. A pre-start safety review
– and for me that usually means 3 separate reviews:
at the design step – that is “what this unit going to do”,
“how are we going to design it”, “how are we going to lay
it out”, “can we develop right then and there activities or
changes to reduce the overall hazards and risks of the unit”;
the second review at the final design and construction stage
of the unit; and then the final review just prior to start-up.
These are formal structured reviews by a team, well-versed
in the unit, in process safety management and in operation
of industrial activity.
Implement a Management of Change Program – that
starts with a definition of when is a change really a change.
It could be something as dramatic as changing the feedstock
completely, or it could be – lets’s say, on the smaller scale,
laboratory scale – a change in the temperature or ph of the
system, as part of the management of change this needs to
be addressed in a formal sense.
PSM requires the investigation of all actual incidents and
near incidents. That means that the operator of the company,
the laboratory, the pilot plant in charge has to define when
is an incident really an incident and when is a near incident
really a near incident. Many of the companies I work with,
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for example, in first aid will just say: “If you put a Band-Aid
(I hope that word translates correctly) on a cut, that must
be reported, that’s an incident”. It won’t be a Government
report, but internal, so that the company can say: “What
caused the cut and can we prevent it, how do we prevent it”
When you do an investigation, you publish the findings internally
and you follow up on those findings. It’s not good, it’s
embarrassing to a company to have a repeat of an incident,
and you go back in the records and you discover that 5 years
ago when the first time it occurred, your company said: “Fix
this, so we don’t repeat it!”, and that was ignored. That’s not
good, that can be very embarrassing.
Now, this is the formal definition – and I am not going to
read it in detail – of what process is within PSM. But when
you look into this definition, PSM defines highly hazardous
chemical – for me it is simple: any chemical that can injure
people or damage property is highly hazardous.PSM describes
vessels, containers and processes – to me a picker that gets
on nerve is sufficient to use some of the formal structure of
PSM to prevent, as well as formal tank, a 100 thousand l tank
is the vessel we need to worry about.
PSM as a regulation in the United States is restricted to
those facilities that have the trigger amount of chemicals.
But does not need to be the case, it can be – I’ve found
that it’s very helpful to apply the concepts I am talking about
anywhere where chemicals are handled.
Let’s talk a little bit about the process hazard analysis.
(I apologize – my cell phone is my watch, so that I know
where I am for time). The concept of process hazard analysis
requires the process safety information on chemical, its toxicity,
its human exposure guideline – we call it a permissible
exposure level, a threshold limit value – it’s the concentration
in air that a worker can be exposed to full work shift hours
every day of the work without injury over the entire working
career. And many of the countries that are represented here
have their own versions of these exposure guidelines. The
physical characteristics of the chemical – its boiling point, its
flash point, its corrosive nature. If it is, for example, a nonflammable
chlorinated hydrocarbon, that can be extremely
corrosive to mild steel when the hydrocarbon is wet, and that
needs to be recognized as part of process hazard analysis.
The thermal and chemical stability, indeed, – that is how reactive
is the molecule, and what is the hazardous effects of
mixing of the chemical in question with other chemicals that
it could interact with, whether on purpose or accidentally.
The technology in PSM process safety studies starts with
not just a team who understand the technology, but a good
block diagram of the process, or something that generally is
referred to as a process piping and instrumentation diagram
(PID). When I start to try to understand the unit, that’s generally
the first thing I ask for is the piping and instrumentation
diagram, as well as list of all the chemicals that are there
involved.
The maximum anticipated inventory – the unit that operates
on a just-in-time delivery system and never has more than
a thousand liters of flammable liquid in the system at a time, is
very different than one that inventories 100 thousand liters in
a bulk storage tank for delivery, – they are very, very different
risks, just associated with maximum intended inventory.
The safe upper and lower limits for parameters – and upper
limit for temperature, for example, is obvious. You don’t
want, you would not like to exceed the boiling point of your
liquid. However, if you are dealing with a chemical such as
phenol, you need to worry about a lower temperature, because
it crystallizes, it solidifies just under room temperature
– its formal melting point, its crystallization temperature,
if you will, is just about 18 degrees C. So if your unit drops
below the solidification temperature, and you are trying to
pump against a solid blockage, you can rapture the pipe.
Evaluation of the consequences of deviations from your
anticipated operating conditions (what if the temperature
gets very high or very low what if the flow gets very high
or very low) – what are the implications to the integrity of
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St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
Materials of construction – let me just illustrate that.
About, maybe, 20 years ago now, I was asked to look at
an incident that occurred just outside San Francisco, Ca, at
a refinery. If you familiar with San Francisco, if you visited
this one of the most beautiful cities of the United States,
there is a large oil refinery just north-east of the city across
the Bay. The refinery had a unit fail that resulted in some
5 million USD in damage, no injuries or fatalities. I walked
into the office, meeting room, where my first introduction
to the failure was supposed to occur, and on the wall they
had a chart showing the block diagram of the unit. They had
the materials of construction listed on the chart. This is a
hydrocarbon-reforming unit, so you have steam, as well as
hydrocarbon, running through piping. I looked at it, and they
had this transverse pipe made of mild steel, it connected in
a standard piping union to stainless steel. And the person
running the briefing for me said: “We don’t know why this
unit failed 6 months after start-up.” And I said: “Right there
is why – you had these similar metals in a wet environment,
you had galvanic corrosion. And all these – I am a chemist,
what do I know about engineering And all these engineers
sat there and said: “You are right!” This was a design failure.
There were reason they did that, at least they thought they
had reasons. But it’s this type of activity that PSM needs to
address in “materials of construction”.
Electrical classification – you can never eliminate all sources
of ignition. All you can do is reduce and control the obvious
ones. And that’s what the electrical classification is all about.
Ventilation –how do you prevent ignitable atmospheres
from accumulating Very good ventilation. This room probably
has 3 air changes an hour. If we had hydrocarbon in
here, we probably would want to be at about 6 to 12 air
changes an hour.
So, these are the things we want to consider in our process
safety information.
Process hazard analysis – a formal structure of identifying
the hazard. These are some of the ways we can do PHA
(process hazard analysis). If I speak to my colleagues who
are chemists, not engineers – chemists, they prefer checklists.
They prefer saying: “What if my system gets too hot”
When I work with my engineering colleagues, they much prefer
a formal hazard and operability study, and I must admit I
prefer the formal HAZOP study to almost all other PHA. But
whatever PHA you use, it needs to be done in a structured
sense, so it captures the information, and you can use that
information over time. Each one has advantages and disadvantages;
there are major discussions, that takes textbooks
to help you choose your PHA. But PHA has to identify the
hazards; it has to have identification of previous incidents; it
has to have both the engineering and administrative controls
applicable to the hazard, and their inner relation. The second
lecture of this morning about the engineered hydrogen management
system that has been installed in a nuclear power
plant is a beautiful, incredibly elegant example of identifying
through the process hazard analysis a hazard – explosion of
hydrogen, and engineer eliminating the hazard or mitigating
the hazard by engineering the control right into the system,
so that operators don’t have to do anything. It was just elegant,
and as soon as I listened to it, I know I was talking
about it here, because it was just beautiful illustration.
The PHA has to identify and understand the consequences
of failures of engineering, failures of operation – administrative
failures. It has to include facility siting. I have in my
slide collection – I did not include it here – a photograph of
a hydrocarbon tank farm with several 40- to 80-thousand l
tanks that were not in very good shape, located right on the
water front of the main harbor of the Galapagos Islands,
a true ecological beautiful environment that these tanks sit
there and threaten. Now, we can identify that as a facility
siting hazard.
Consider the range of possibilities of safety and health
impacts on your employees in the process hazard analysis.
So, with this idea in mind I will show you a short video
clip. And I am going to start by introducing to you the unit.
That unit failed. I am going to introduce you the unit. And
then we’ll follow that with another video clip – they are coupled
together, so I’ll need to do anything. That was – I will
show you the failure. What I’d like you to do, as you watch
the video, is think about what PSM failures occurred, and
then we’ll hopefully talk about it, what they are briefly. And
I’ll share with you mind, and you’ll be able to compare with
what you identified. Maybe, you’ll be able to tell me what I
missed, which I am sure you will! So, let’s start this. It’s called
“Run Away”. It’s an explosion at the TITU () laboratory.
That’s a photograph of after. This is the unit that actually
failed, so it’s a good size unit.
Video
Ok. So, what failures could have led to that fireball
Small fragment of video
Ups. I may have hit back. Let me, I think I hit the control.
I apologize.
Question was: What are the PSM failures They had an
out-of-normal operation condition, and they were not prepared
for it. The cooling system did not work. As the video
showed you, they had an exothermic reaction occurring, and
when the operators went to try to cool it, it did not work
– the cooling water did not work. The damage to the unit
prevented the determination of whether it was a bad valve
or blockage. But they had never asked the question: “What if
we can’t cool the unit” That’s a clear failure of unit design
and process hazard analysis. When the unit started to overheat,
the burst disk, vent system, was activated, but it could
not relieve the pressure rapidly enough compared to hoe
pressure was increasing. So, they had an undersized venting
unit. Again, a design failure. Their operating procedures had
nothing in them to address what to do if the temperature got
too high. What the operators actually did was they called the
plant owner, who took about half an hour to arrive, and by
that time it was too late to save the plant. For some of you
who maybe knew – I think I talked about this incident two
years ago at this conference in detail. So, this incident would
have been prevented by a proper hazard analysis, proper
safety management system.
Operating procedures– PSM requires them, I’ve talked
about most of these things, but let me just address emergency
shut-down. My engineering approach to emergency
shut-down is that there will be a single big red button that
the operator would hit under specific conditions that will render
the unit safe – that means energy will be removed from
heating systems, vents will open to blow down tanks or to
proper vents. One button to initiate the shut-down under the
control of a procedure. Your operators need to be trained on
the procedure and on the controls, and they need to know
when to activate such a control.
Your operating limits – highs and high-highs for all of
the parameters that could cause loss of integrity of the unity.
What the consequences of the loss of integrity are In
the pharmaceutical industry a high temperature destroys the
product. In the hydrocarbon-handling industry a high-high
temperature can initiate a fire. We need to know what the
consequences are, and that helps us mitigate the event. The
steps required to control a high deviation of a parameter,
and what specific actions everybody need to take when a
high-high occurs – what we’d like to tell our operators is to
hit the red button, and everybody evacuates. We want everything
to protect human health and safety, even if that means
the loss of a plant. That’s how we activate the shutdown.
Safety and health consideration – what the effects are of
exposure and overexposure to a chemical. I hope you understand
the difference between exposure and overexposure. If
you don’t, let me help you – many people last night were
exposed to a toxic liquid. I hope that this morning some of
you did not learn that you were overexposed to that toxic
liquid- I was not. Hopefully, you keep in mind that exposure
and overexposure are important considerations when we look
at the health consideration. Control measures – that must be
taken when a person is overexposed or comes into contact.
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Are there quality control issues on raw materials That is if
the raw material coming to your unit does not meet a certain
specification, could this cause a problem
How do your safety systems interact How do you update
your operating procedures I ask operators all the time:
“When was the last time this SOP was updated” If they tell
me it was 5 years ago, or even a year ago, I’ll question that,
because we know our units evolve.
Does your company have good work practices in place, for
example, for lockout/tagout, for confined space entry, for
opening vessels in lines These are all part of PSM.
What kind of training programs do we have in place The
sessions after lunch are going to be devoted to training. PSM
requires periodic retraining. And what kind of documentation
is in place
How do you deal with your contactors – from selection
to information sharing, to evaluating their performance and
communication between unit operators and tradesmen. PSM,
it turns out, originated in the United States when communication
between a unit operator and a trades crew failed,
and both of them thought the other guy had safety unit,
and neither of them had. Then the trades’ people opened the
unit, releasing the hydrocarbon which detonated. So, how
these things – they occur.
Construction and operation according to design. Mechanical
integrity – how often do you inspect and document
inspections If you just wait for scheduled shut-down, for
some parts of the unit that may be not frequently enough.
What do you do with non-routine repair Again, in this mechanical
integrity interacts with contractors. If you vent a
toxic vapor to the roof of your facility, how do you inform a
heating contractor who might be going up to that roof that
there is a toxic vapor that gets released. Or how does the
contractor notify the unit operator to shut-down, so that we
don’t overexpose the contractor These are the things that
we need to worry about. What does the mechanical integrity
program apply to Pressure vessel, tanks, controls, alarms. If
you have alarms in place, flammable gas detectors, in high
humidity environment they need to be replaced usually more
frequently than the manufacturer tells us. Where I live, which
is a very low humidity environment, manufacturer of our hydrocarbon
detectors tells us – every 2 years. Experience says
we must change our sensors every year. They don’t handle a
very dry environment. San Diego gets less than 20 cm of rain
a year. It’s extremely dry.
So, let’s again take these ideas and look at another video.
Video
I will show you the rest of it in a minute. But what failures
of PSM occurred
Now, before we get there, let me make an administrative
announcement. You will not be denied lunch. We started a
little bit late. So, what I am going to do is finish this section,
and then at that point I am going to ask the folks in the back
room to move my PowerPoint ahead, but not yet! And we’ll
job over some things. But the coordinators of the conference
know that we will be a little bit late for lunch, but you will
have lunch.
Back to what failures of PSM were noted. Well, clearly
the operators violated their own operating procedures. There
was a pre-start-up failure of procedure and following those
procedures. There were clearly mechanical integrity program
problems. The valves failed. I was consulting for Amoco long
before BP bought Amoco, acquired Amoco. And the blowout
tank that failed was on Amoco’s “must repair” list for years,
and it just never got repaired. That contributed. Contractor
communication – contractors had no idea. Emergency procedures
– the emergency procedures in this case probably
were a major consideration, because the operators actually
did not know that the unit was in impending disaster. Training
– that’s always a consideration. If they had an adequate
training program, it would help them all, help to point out
failures in the computer screens.
So, let’s have a look at the consequences.
Video
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Ok. Can I… First, did you identify as the tutorial video
clip played what PSM failures were and realized from that
video how intervention at any one of the steps could have
prevented the incident – loss of 14 people, the huge financial
losses Can I ask the folks in the back on my computer to
exit out of the PowerPoint, go to 3 slides from the end I am
sorry, 4 slides from the end – it’s the slide after the black
one. Perfect. OK.
In order to stay, keep you, everybody, including myself,
on schedule for the day, let me just comment a little bit in
closing about resources. I mentioned the Center for Chemical
Process Safety as a major resource. The Chil worth Company
has a wonderful European and, I believe, Russian presence
in doing process safety. Bureau Veritas is also… has strong
North American and European presence in PSM.
I did not put it on here, and I probably should apologize,
but the videos that I am showing I did not produce. They
have been produced by the US Chemical Safety Board. You
can download the video clips that I showed you and manymany-many
more at no cost by going to www.csb.gov and
going to the video library, and download the videos. You
need a good high-speed connection, but that’s all. You don’t
need to register; you don’t need to do any more than click
a mouse. And the reaction, you folks, I could tell from your
faces when having the videos is how your employees are going
to react. And they really are impressive videos for training
and for sharing information.
So, I hope that you have an idea about PSM, what it’s
all about and how it can help prevent problems. I’m going
to be certainly here for the rest of the afternoon, and this
evening, and through the alcohol refinery tour tomorrow,
the beer brewery. Feel free to ask questions. Six month from
now send me an e-mail and feel free to ask questions, I’ll be
more than happy to help you and reply. If you do send me an
e-mail, at least mention that we met at the 10th Conference
here, in Saint Petersburg.
And realize that PSM applies certainly to chemical plants,
to pilot plants and to laboratories.
So, with that, let me simply say thank you, “spasibo”, and
ask if there are questions. And there is in the back. I am not
quite sure how we handle questions.
Question from the audience: Thank you very much for
the master course and this very interesting presentation. I
was wondering – the last example, as you explained while
showing the video clip, it was kind of a range of technical
failures and things which did not work. How much attention
was there for the organizational part What kind of lessons
were learned A had a slight bad feeling when it showed
how the operators took over the shift from each other during
the running of a… when it was in the turbulent process, and
so on. In the slide – short information was shared with each
other. Can you say something about that
Neal Langerman: Yes. The incident resolved in a very detailed
investigation that has been published, and you can get
it on line. The investigation clearly documented organizational
failures, starting at the very top of the corporate structure.
The organizational failures, including ignoring known – not
ignoring, it’s not an appropriate word – not addressing known
equipment problems, were pointed out in the study. And we
would like to think that the company involved in each one of
these incidents have fixed those organizational failures, but,
as I think we all do, we struggle with them. So, yes – you are
absolutely correct. If you look at the entire CSB video, which
runs about 35 minutes, that will be discussed in detail. So,
very good question and thank you for pointing it out.
Question from the audience: Can I ask one more question
Neal Langerman: Please.
Question from the audience: What about the role of the
authorities who had the responsibility for the inspections
Did they identify any lacks or problems Not only due to this,
but in the whole structure. In terms of, are they also more or

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
less accountable for what happened When you know, when
you are aware of the failure and you do not act – was it
also in the case
Neal Langerman: The authority having jurisdiction in this
particular case was US OSHA. Let me explain something. Every
one of the 50 states in the United States has the choice of
running their own their own occupational safety and health
program or relying on the Feds, on the Federal program.
Texas, where this incident occurred, is a Federal OSHA state.
There were many failure, weaknesses, of the OSHA inspection
program. Inspectors did not have the knowledge to adequately
understand the refinery. Inspectors did not have the
frequency of being onsite. Very often in the United States
a young engineer, right out of the University, goes to work
for an agency, spends 4 years, 5years with the agency and
does inspections, nowhere near the time it takes to gain the
experience to do the job correctly. So, yes, there were real
failures. They don’t often get pointed out that the agency
failed. In the Golf incident, the Deepwater Horizon incident,
that I talked about last year, it was talked about yesterday,
the federal agency responsible for oversight was in fact
identified as responsible. And within less than one year that
agency was dissolved, and an entirely new oversight agency
was put in place with completely new management. That lesson
is being learnt by the other agencies. So, their amuse is
how that sort of played out. Again, very good question.
Anything else Yes, one more, and we will then… Right
here. Yes.
Question from the audience: Could you tell me, this
incident with the car and explosion of the backfire, was it an
independent event that contributed to the large-scale explosion
It’s the first question. It’s very surprising that these are
the design mistakes. Then, for the level in this tower – we
can’t control the liquid level in the tower – it’s a human
mistake and design mistake. And the second question: in
what case your employees can implement their own rules and
regulations rather than to rely on the Federal ones.
Neal Langerman: Again, very good questions. The first
question was about the backfire as the source of ignition. As
I mentioned earlier in my presentation today, you never can
eliminate all sources of ignition. If you are dealing with flammable
vapor, you must always assume that there is a source
of ignition present. And the best you can do is control the
obvious ones, the ones you can identify. We know that a diesel,
in fact even a gasoline engine, will behave as was shown
in that video in the hydrocarbon rich atmosphere. We have
many examples of that. The 2 employees in the pick-up truck
recognized that there had to bea hydrocarbon environment,
because they could not turn the diesel engine off when they
turned the ignition off. And they ran and survived. So, they
understood that. The second question. In our best running
companies any employee (small part of video missing) but is
encouraged to do that. Well, at some companies the management
is not so enlightened. Let me point out, since I have
been illustrating some of this with BP, 6 month ago I spent
a week at a BP operating unit. And the employees -every
employee I spoke to, and I spoke to a lot of them, felt very
comfortable, saying: “Hay, Neal, these are some things we
are concerned about, we’ve talked to our management about
it, but we’d like you to talk to them too.” And when I sat with
management of BP, of this unit, I felt very comfortable, not
saying this particular employee by name, but saying:“I met
with the operators of this unit, and they raised their concern
about”. And management was totally open, saying: “We are
aware of that, for example, it requires a capital expenditure,
we have it in our approval request for next fiscal year”. Or
whatever the answer was. So, this BP, this is the company
that in a sense I’ve been kicking around. But I am much more
impressed today than I was two years ago. Listening to the BP
talks yesterday and knowing what BP is doing. They are moving
ahead. Having just spent time at a BP facility, I am seeing
a real management change. So, again, I wish I could come to
Russia and say: “Hay, friends, United States has no problems
at all!” I can’t do that. We all know we have problems. Your
facilities have problems, my facilities have problems. And we
are all human, the best we can do and what we try to do is
achieve an excellent state of operation where we’ve eliminated
the problems, where employees are comfortable speaking
up, where management is responsive.
I want to thank you all, I appreciate your attendance and I
certainly welcome any questions that you may have as the afternoon
goes on. Enjoy the rest of the conference and I hope
to see you in Saint Petersburg next spring too. Thank you.
Session
“Ensuring Safety in Technologically Complex
and High-Rise Sites. Technical Diagnostics”
Industrial Safety Expertise to Ensure
Long-term Use of Buildings and Constructions
of OAO “Tagmet”
Margarita I. Gukova, Senior Researcher, Candidate
of Technical Sciences. V.A. Kucherenko Central Scientific
Research Institute for Building Structures (Russia)
I.I. Vedyakov, Dr. Sci. (Tech.), Professor, Institute Head
M.R. Uritsky, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Deputy
Head of Metalwork Laboratory
M.I. Farfel, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Senior
Researcher
OAO ”NITs Stroitelstvo”, V.A. Kucherenko Central Scientific
Research Institute for Building Structures
O.N. Donchenko, engineer, KSTiR Manager, OAO
“Tagmet”
M.I. Gukova: First of all, I would like to express my gratitude
to GCE managers and employees – organizers of this
Forum – for the opportunity to make a presentation for such
well-informed audience.
For the last 17 years V.A. Kucherenko Central Scientific Research
Institute has been performing expert appraisal of industrial
safety for building structures at the shops of Taganrog
Iron&Steel and Tube-Rolling Plant (OAO “Tagmet”). Our
cooperation started after an accident that occurred in tubewelding
shop No. 3 in March 1995. Our Research Institute
was invited to participate in the Accident Investigation Commission.
Roofing slabs of four spans (30 m each) collapsed
in 108 m-long thermal block of tube-welding shop No. 3. So
the total collapse area was about 12 thousand sq.m. People
died, and a lot of equipment was damaged.
You can see the shop layout in this picture, and the collapsed
area is in a dark circle.
Actually it was an avalanche-type collapse, or as it is called
now – progressive collapse of the shop roof. One of the
reasons of the collapse was considered to be the insufficient
number of lateral braces between trusses, i.e. absence of purlins
at the bottom and top chords of trusses. Besides, reinforced
concrete beams built monolithically with slabs were not
connected in the right way to the top chords of trusses forming
the roofing rigid system. Removal of one of the trusses
during repair works led to disturbance of the rigid system,
and absence of purlins at the chords of trusses contributed to
the avalanche-type collapse. If you look at the picture, you’ll
see this place on the right, where the crane is located.
Now the current regulations of designing roof metal constructions
contain the requirement on installation of purlins
at the bottom and top chords of trusses, even if reinforced
concrete roof slabs are used. But there were no such requirement
at that time.
Immediately after the accident, employees of our Institute
investigated the undamaged spans of the shop and gave
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recommendations on their strengthening, i.e. installation of
purlins at the bottom and top chords of trusses for the undamaged
spans of the shop and vertical bracing between
columns.
When designing and constructing the destroyed spans of
the shop during its reconstruction, the earlier made mistakes
were corrected. The shop was reconstructed within a year
after the design by “Dneprproektstalkonstruktsiya” Institute.
Since 2000 our Institute has performed inspections of building
structures at hazardous production facilities of OAO “Tagmet”.
V.A. Kucherenko Central Scientific Research Institute for
Building Structures is a specialized organization that has a license
from the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological
and Atomic Supervision for activities in the sphere of industrial
safety expertise of buildings and constructions. The expert
appraisal of industrial safety of building structures of tubewelding
shop No. 3, held by V.A. Kucherenko Institute every
three years, has allowed operating the shop and supporting its
constructions in operating condition for the last 17 years.
During those years the Institute employees have inspected
and issued industrial safety expert certificates for all major
shops of the company. A special attention was paid to the
open-hearth plant, some parts of which were built as long
ago as 1929-1932 after a standard design by “Gipromet”. The
building of the open-hearth plant was partly blown up before
evacuation during the Great Patriotic War. Restoration works
started only after 1944. The remaining trusses and secondary
trusses in the old shop spans were mostly riveted, some of
them were both riveted and welded. And only after 1968 all
structures were only welded. The old riveted columns of the
main teeming bay of the shop were deformed, which resulted
in that the roof lowered to such a level that crane trolleys began
grazing lateral braces at the bottom chords of trusses.
After strengthening the columns, together with Tagmet
engineers we lifted the shop roof and installed it on special
supports. Thus, that entire huge roof was raised in two
neighboring spans.
In one of the spans there was also a necessity to increase
the distance between the crane trolley and the bottom chord
of trusses. Here also a unique solution was developed to raise
the bottom chord of trusses, with fixing it to reinforced gusset
plates. All the chosen solutions had been initially checked
with calculations made by experts of V.A. Kucherenko Institute.
In the open-hearth plant, after a thorough investigation,
we also found damages in some load-bearing structures, in
particular in secondary trusses over 4.5 m high, which could
lead to collapse of a span or the whole building. Corrosion of
bottom chord of secondary trusses on the outer open side of
the shop led to separation of the truss web from the chord.
Urgent measures were taken to reinforce truss nodes, and
the emergency condition was liquidated.
In 2005, after almost 5 years of conservation, a new steel
continuous casting shop adjoining to the open-hearth plant
was put into operation and a scale pit was arranged at the
outer wall of the plant, and there was a resulting settlement
of a number of columns. And the settlement was up to 28
cm. It led to destruction of vertical bracing between columns,
bending of crane runway beams, and, consequently, it made
it impossible to use bridge cranes with the working load of
over 20 t.
According to recommendations of V.A. Kucherenko Institute,
they reinforced columns foundations in line B with pipe
piles, while injecting the formed cavities with cement-silicate
mortar (the same mortar was injected into soil round piles
to consolidate it) and further injection of consolidating slurry
OTDV “Mikrodur” in order to create a non-shrinking cementand
soil ground at the columns foundation. It means there
was practically stone foundation under piles. Besides, top
chords of trusses were reinforced, vertical bracing between
columns was replaced, supports of thick metal slabs were installed
in pickup fittings of crane runway beams, and braking
systems on crane runway beams were strengthened.
It should be noted that longitudinal bracing in industrial
buildings with heavy-duty cranes has a considerable impact
Transcripts of Proceedings
on crane runway beams, which start additionally working out
of their plane in absence of the adequate framework fixing.
At the same time, as it was revealed during numerous inspections
of braking systems on crane runway beams, repair and
maintenance personnel often mistakenly rigidly fix breaking
stops to the building columns, which leads to uncontrolled
restraint of upper flanges of crane runway beams on the
support and, as a consequence, to rapture of weld seams
of end stiffeners and beam sides. The braking systems on
crane runway beams must provide for top flange moving
from lateral forces of crane trolley breaking, and the building
framework should be rigid enough to sustain all lateral forces
inside the shop. In open crane trestles, where there is no cover
bracing at all, the biggest danger is occurrence of cracks
in crane runway beams at the upper flanges level in case of
damage or absence of breaking bracing constructions.
The slides illustrate cases of cracks in crane runway
beams.
OAO “Tagmet” is a modern metallurgical plant. During
the last years the company has constantly renovated production
equipment to increase production volumes and quality of
pipes and tubes they produce. When undertaking such technical
reconstruction, the plant invites experts to make expert
appraisal of industrial safety for design documentation as
well. Thus, V.A. Kucherenko Central Scientific Research Institute
for Building Structures has performed expert appraisal
of industrial safety for design documentation on technical
modernization of the open-hearth plant, where continuouscasting
machine (so-called ladle furnace by well-known Italian
company Danieli) was installed; for design documentation
on reconstruction of the heat treatment bay of tube-rolling
shop No. 1; for design documentation for the steel continuous
casting shop that I have already mentioned; for design
documentation on technical modernization of the tube-rolling
complex with a PQF continuous mill, and may others.
When the company carries out technical modernization, it,
certainly, has a lot of construction works. For example, they
have to extend the shops, to remove columns to organize entries
and passes between spans, or install additional columns,
to install beams, etc. For all those reconstruction activities,
the company must have expert appraisal of industrial safety
for design documentation from a specialized organization,
and later on – also for the installed constructions.
You can see the construction process with removal of columns
in the pipe-welding shop in Fig. 13.1, and in tube-rolling
shops – in Fig. 13.2 and Fig. 13.3.
And V.A. Kucherenko Central Scientific Research Institute
was performing expert appraisal of industrial safety with calculation
of load-carrying ability for all new building structures.
V.A. Kucherenko Central Scientific Research Institute has
performed expert appraisal of industrial safety for practically
all chimneys at OAO “Tagmet”, involving experts in high-rise
constructions in this work: we inspected metal, brick, reinforced
concrete chimneys, 25 chimneys in total. The Institute
performed expert appraisal of specific bottom beams under
open-hearth furnaces, power line pylons, etc.
OAO “Tagmet” management very seriously consider recommendations
and conclusions of the appraisal reports of
industrial safety issued by experts of research institutes after
appraisal procedures, meet the deadlines for the agreed
measures, and, if needed, schedules of follow-up inspections
of the constructions.
Expert appraisals of industrial safety play a considerable
role in preserving buildings and constructions, and in prevention
of their damage by unwarranted factors that are inevitable
during their operation. It is especially important when
we deal with hazardous production facilities or operation of
heavy-duty cranes.
Cooperation of V.A. Kucherenko Central Scientific Research
Institute for Building Structures with OAO “Tagmet”
not only allowed rebuilding the destroyed shop without stoppages
in the total production process, but also helped preserving
other shops with serious construction defects and

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
damages revealed during expert appraisals of industrial safety.
Participation of V.A. Kucherenko Central Scientific Research
Institute for Building Structures contributed into the
modernization of the metal casting and tube-rolling production,
and regular expert appraisals of industrial safety helped
in eliminating and preventing emergency situations occurring
in the operation of buildings and constructions.
On the basis of V.A. Kucherenko Research Institute experience
at “Tagmet” plant, we can give the following basic
recommendations for industrial safety of old, reconstructed
or new buildings of production shops:
- arrangement of lateral braces in strict accordance with
requirements of modern construction norms and regulations;
- use of metal sheets or floor plates instead of reinforced
concrete slabs in covering whenever possible;
- arrangement of breaking stops on crane runway beams
with a clearance from columns, so that lateral forces could be
transferred from a crane trolley to the building framework;
- timely and thorough alignment of bridge cranes;
- regular inspection of condition of weld seams connecting
upper flanges and end stiffeners with sides of crane
runway beams in shops with heavy-duty cranes, especially on
open crane trestles.
That’s all, thank you for your attention.
Question from the audience: How much does investigation
of one shop cost
M.I. Gukova: It depends on the shop volume. For example,
a tube-rolling shop has 133 axes, 4 or 5 spans, each span
is about 30 m, and the price for it is 6-7 mln rubles.
Question from the audience, “K-instrument”, Moscow:
Could you tell what equipment do you use for assessment
of the reinforcement condition in the reinforced
concrete
M.I. Gukova: Mostly nondestructive control methods. We
do not inspect reinforcements ourselves, as there are specialized
organizations under V.A. Kucherenko Institute. They
have necessary licenses and use nondestructive control instruments.
Question from the audience: So, you invite contractors
for technical work, do you
M.I. Gukova: Yes, by all means. As we use Schmidt instruments
to determine grades of concrete used in the reinforced
concrete.
Causes of Collapse and Problems
of Reconstruction of Administrative Buildings
in Kharkov
Sergey N. Yarovoy, Deputy Director for Research,
Candidate of Technical Sciences
Kharkov PromStroyNIIProekt Design and Scientific-
Research Institute (Ukraine)
Two high-profile accidents have occurred in Kharkov for
the last two years. The first was a collapse during reconstruction
of the Giprotsement Institute building practically in the
center of the city. At that time there was no Institute in that
building, it had been bought out, and the new owner of the
building was performing a major reconstruction. The second
was a colonnade collapse at the VIP-terminal of the airport.
A new terminal had been built before Kharkov hosted the
European Football Championship, and the old one was being
reconstructed to serve as a VIP-terminal.
I’ll start with the Giprotsement building. It was built in
1954. It was a five-storied building, but during construction
they designed one more level, and it was built over. The
building was bought by the new owners 5-6 years ago, and
the reconstruction began two years ago. The design was developed
by a company that, certainly, had a license, and they
had prepared about 400 drawings, but, unfortunately, those
drawings had only 3-4 signatures under them in total. And
the reconstruction was very serious. It was planned to build
over two more levels. The plan was to reconstruct the fifth
floor, arrange one more covering and change the designated
function of the building. It was supposed to have a trading
center on the lower five floors and to use two upper floors
for office premises. Consequently, the load was also growing.
At the moment of the collapse many parts of the walls
were covered with plasterboard, and interior finishing works
were going on. The collapse occurred in March 2010. And the
building is located practically in the center of Kharkov. It is
near Svoboda Square and Sumskaya Street, the main street
of Kharkov. A part of the building fell onto Pravda Prospekt.
The building collapsed at 05.30 a.m. By happy fortune nobody
was killed, though a trolley-bus had just passed by.
After the collapse the PromStroyNIIProekt Research Institute
performed an engineering survey of the residual structures,
developed recommendations for further construction
and provided research and engineering support (we have
such notion in Ukraine, and we also have SNiP norms for
research and engineering support for construction of important
facilities).
The building structure is based on an internal framework.
External walls are built of cement-bonded ceramic bricks. Inside
the building there is a row of columns. Floors, main
beams and columns are built of cast-in-place reinforced concrete.
Besides, there are prefabricated T-beams. They were
bearing the direct load.
When we came there, we found out that all partition walls
were covered with stress cracking. Stress cracks in brick masonry
are very rare. Settlement cracks are much more common.
And there partition walls were just divided with stress
cracks. It indicated that there was a significant overload.
Look here: the wall is divided into three parts with the
cracks.
What was the reason First of all, we assessed the actual
brick strength. You see, the designers, when developing the
reconstruction design, had made the survey, and it had been
stated in the survey report that the bricks and cement mortar
had the design strength. But actually, when we measured
the strength with nondestructive methods, and later made
it for sample bricks with destructive methods, we found out
that the bricks strength was two times lower than designed.
The design grade was 100, and actually it was 50. As for the
mortar, the grade was 20 instead of 50. So, it was different
from what the design company had accounted for in their
reconstruction design.
At the collapse moment, the framework had been built
for the seventh and eighth levels, the reinforced concrete
floor had been reconstructed on the fifth level, floor covering
had been deleted and a 100 mm cast slab was laid on the
floor for future commercial premises of the trading center.
Thus, when we recalculated the loads, taking into account
the actual brick strength, we found out that the fourth level
had been already overloaded by 25%m, and the third level –
by 75%. On the second level the load was 2.5 times higher
than the bearing capacity. The same referred to the ground
floor. The overloading was also considerable at some sections
of the reinforced concrete foundations.
The task was to save the maximum of what was left. The
customer wanted to restore the building and was ready to
bear substantial costs in order to build the trading center.
Can you see how the staircase looked like
In this particular case we decided to enclose it into metal
trusses, transfer the load from the upper walls on those
trusses, then disassembled them part by part, and so we
solved this situation.
Some serious changes decreasing spatial rigidity of the
building were provided for in the reconstruction design. The
central staircase that was very massive and played the role of
the stiffening core was disassembled. Powerful lifts were also
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dismantled. The floor above the ground level was also partly
disassembled (they were installing a sky light). It means that
the designer was taking away stiffening cores and horizontal
disks. But those changes were decreasing bearing capacity of
the building and its spatial rigidity. It was also designed to cut
the capping beam in some places, though it was binding the
building contour. They planned to install lifts in those places.
So, operating properties of the building were often worsened
for the sake of some architectural solutions.
We developed drawings to reinforce the bearing capacity.
All partition walls were metal cased, and those metal
cases took over the load from reinforced concrete floors. The
metal cases were supposed to bear the load themselves, even
without the brick masonry. The cracks were filled in, and we
had been providing research and engineering support of the
project until the reconstruction was completed.
I must certainly say that a lot of money was spent, because
the amount of metal structures used was rather considerable.
By now the trading center has already started working.
Let us go over to the airport accident. The building was
constructed in 1956. Reconstruction works were going on.
The task was to transfer the ordinary airport building into a
VIP-terminal.
What caused the collapse All columns of the entrance
porch were cement plastered. And the stucco layer was about
30-40 mm thick. And the stucco was very good, of grade
100. The brick strength was just a bit lower that designed, as
it was found out during the survey, but construction workers
removed the stucco very coarsely and seriously damaged
the bricks.
Moreover, the company that was responsible for architectural
supervision had only architects in their staff. For some
reason they decided to survey the condition of strip foundations
under the columns. Whole trenches were dug instead of
test pits. And the foundation was actually dug down.
It was raining, and the columns collapsed. Unfortunately,
there were fatalities. Two persons died during post-accident
disassembly works.
In this case we also provided research and engineering support.
It was proposed to strengthen the constructions with
metal casing. New foundations were laid under the collapsed
columns. The new columns were made of reinforced concrete
with brick cladding. Now the airport is being operated.
Analyzing the current situation, I would like to say that
companies taking responsibility for serious reconstruction
works now often do not have the sufficient engineering potential.
They have a lot of drawings, and they are made
graphically very well, but 2-3 persons are not able to perform
detailed analysis of all their architectural solutions, especially
during a serious reconstruction, when they remove or add
floors, and increase loads. The formal approach to surveys,
when physical strength of materials is not checked before
load increase, leads to sad consequences.
And it is particularly noticeable that all these accidents
happened in the center of the city. Such constructions works
are supervised by the State Architectural and Construction
Commission (GASK). But this supervision seems to be formal
as well. And in the cases when such supervision is performed,
it has any purposes, except those related to safety. And such
situations, unfortunately, occur not only in Kharkov. I know
that in Kiev a lot of different facilities are being built where
they start reinforcing constructions even before commissioning
the building.
Question from the audience: Tell me, please, what
about such notion as monitoring These buildings are not
some bazaar stalls. And, probably, after you had provided
research and engineering support during restoration design
and construction works, you continue some monitoring of
the buildings, don’t you
S.N. Yarovoy: Unfortunately, we had a contract for the
construction period only. At the end we signed the respective
acts, and all our requirements were taken into account. We
are not performing any monitoring now.
Question from the audience: Do you think that in our
current conditions we should bring up an issue of establishing
a special agency to prevent such accidents Otherwise, we are
going to encounter these problems more and more often.
S.N. Yarovoy: Unfortunately, the situation is actually like
this, and the GASK commission is nor controlling it, but pursuing
their own goals instead. I think we need such agency.
Ensuring safety in complex organisational
structures on the example of NOVEC
Jan Willem Tom, managing director
NOVEC (Netherlands)
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
Good afternoon, congress participants in beautiful Saint
Petersburg,
My name is Jan Willem Tom, I am Managing Director of
NOVEC. I’ve honor to tell you something about the fire that
destroyed our mast last year. (Small part of the audio missing
on the tape)
NOVEC is a small company in the Netherlands; we have
many broadcast and GSMtowers. The Netherlands is a small
country of 16 million people, lying on the sea somewhere
between Germany, France and England. We have broadcast
masts – you see in the right picture a broadcast mast, we
have towers for mobile communication, GSM towers – you
see in the left picture, and we also use high-voltage pylons
for GSM antennas–you can see in the upper left picture.
Introduction NOVEC
• Broadcast towers
• Towers for mobile communication (GSM)
• High voltage pylons for GSM antennas
10th International Forum Industrial Safety
Pic. 1.
Transcripts of Proceedings

St. Petersburg • Russia • 2012
What did we learn for the future
1. masts need better safety
2. antenna-installations need better safety measures
3. no further tubular masts
4. fire prevention and detection ti measures are of limited it use
Legal framework
• divided ownership
• anti monopoly law
Pic. 2.
10th International Forum Industrial Safety
• limited it legall right to enforce security
Future challenges
10th International Forum Industrial Safety
Pic. 3.
Pic. 4.
Antennas of
several
providers
Mast of
NOVEC
Tower of
other
company
Ground
around the
tower
landlord
Certification system for antenna installations
Independent body for enforcement
More natural ownership structure
10th International Forum Industrial Safety
Now you will see a small video of Dutch News
Bulletin on the national public TV one week ago,
which explains what happened that day, 15 July,
2011.
(Voice in Dutch)
But we have good news. The mast is up again,
and the services will soon be restored. What did we
learn for the future First of all, the mast needs better
safety. We never expected that the mast would
completely collapse. Secondly, as you’ve seen in the
movie, the news, antenna insulations need better
safety measures. That’s why we decided not to build
any tubular masts any more, but only open masts
that cannot be destroyed so easily by a fire. As
you’ve seen in the video, the new mast is an open
mast construction, not a tubular any more.And we
also learned that it’s very difficult to make fire prevention
and detection measures, because the mast
is 200 m long, it’s veryexpensive to cover the full
mast with the fire-protection system. Of course, we
have spot detection systems, but it is only limited
to part of the insulations. Anyway, fire protection
or not, we’ll have a large chance that it will be too
late,in case there is a fire, to save the mast.
Then, the legal framework. You’ve seen in the
News Bulletin that there are many parties involved.
In the mast that was destroyed there are 5 parties
involved. Two parties who have the antenna installations
– you see it in the right picture, the mast
is owned by NOVEC, the concrete tower is owned
by another company,and the ground is by a different
landowner. So, there are five parties involved,
which makes it very difficult legal framework to
ensure safety.
The mast is very high; you cannot build easily
another one in a year. So, NOVEC is according to
Dutch law that prevents monopoly – NOVEC is regulated
by the anti-monopoly law.That means that
any party with the frequency issued by the Government
to broadcast, either terrestrial television,
or radio, has the right to use our mast.NOVEC has
limited legal rights to enforce security measures.
Security measures are divided by many bodies,such
as the Government, local government, community,
and other parties. So, it’s not only responsibility for
NOVEC to ensure safety, that’s why it’s very hard
for us to enforce the safety.
That’s why we’ve made ourselves our future
challenges. First, we want a certification system for
antenna installations. I you drive with a car on the
motor way, the car has the certificate system on
the car itself, not only on components, but on the
full car. Everybody who wants to drive with a car
on a motorway needs a certificate. We would like
to have the same with the antenna installation.Everybody
who wants to have an antenna system on
the mast of NOVEC should have certificate system.
We would like to have an independent body to enforce
safety. Not NOVEC, butan independent body
should check the systems if they are safe enough,
and we don’t have accidents as we’ve seen in the
film. Another thing which seemslogical, but not so
easy, is a more natural ownership, not five ownerships
for one mast. So, these are the main challenges
for NOVEC, we are working on it.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention.
I hope you did learn something to avoid
any future accidents in your installations. And
I hope you have a good congress in Saint Petersburg.
If you’ve any questions to ask NOVEC,
please, feel free to send them to the email presented
on the sheet, and we will be happy to
answer you. Thank you.
Transcripts of Proceedings
139

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