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R. v. CONWAY - British Columbia Review Board

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information that was irrelevant, unreliable or inaccurate. Accordingly, the <strong>Board</strong> had the jurisdiction<br />

to exclude evidence and it therefore met the third Mills criterion. Major J. expressly disagreed with<br />

Sopinka J.’s conclusion that the doctrine of procedural fairness provided sufficient protection of<br />

constitutional rights in the context of the <strong>Board</strong>’s proceedings.<br />

[34] More recently, the Court has had two further opportunities to consider the Mills<br />

test. In Dunedin, the issue was whether a provincial court judge with jurisdiction under Ontario’s<br />

Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, was a court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose<br />

of ordering costs against the Crown for failure to comply with the Charter. McLachlin C.J., writing<br />

for a unanimous Court, again confirmed that applying the Mills test is, first and foremost, a matter<br />

of discerning legislative intent. The question in each case is whether the legislature intended to give<br />

the court or tribunal the power to apply the Charter:<br />

[W]here a legislature confers on a court or tribunal a function that involves the<br />

determination of matters where Charter rights may be affected, and furnishes it with<br />

processes and powers capable of fairly and justly resolving those incidental Charter<br />

issues, then it must be inferred, in the absence of a contrary intention, that the legislature<br />

intended to empower the tribunal to apply the Charter. [para. 75]<br />

[35] This approach “promotes direct and early access to Charter remedies in forums<br />

competent to issue such relief” (para. 75). Applying it to the issue before her, McLachlin C.J.<br />

concluded that both the structure and function of the provincial offences court supported the view<br />

that it could and should apply the Charter. Looking first to function, McLachlin C.J. concluded that<br />

the provincial offences court’s role as a quasi-criminal court of first instance weighed strongly in<br />

favour of expansive remedial jurisdiction under s. 24 of the Charter. Such jurisdiction would<br />

promote the resolution of Charter issues in the forum best situated to resolve them:

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