R. v. CONWAY - British Columbia Review Board

Tribunal was explicitly authorized to “determine all questions of fact and law”. Further, the
Tribunal’s decisions could be appealed “on any question of law”. This confirmed that the Tribunal
was entitled to decide legal questions which triggered the presumption that the Tribunal was
authorized to decide Charter questions.
[70] The adjudicative nature of the Tribunal was also relevant. It was independent of
the Workers’ Compensation Board, could establish its own procedural rules, consider all relevant
evidence, record any oral evidence for future reference, exercise powers under the Public Inquiries
Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 372, and extend time limits for decisions when necessary. In addition, its
members had been called to the bar and the Attorney General could intervene in proceedings
involving constitutional questions. In his view, therefore, even if the Tribunal had lacked express
authority to decide questions of law, an implied grant of authority would have been found. The
legislature clearly intended to create a comprehensive scheme for resolving workers’ compensation
disputes. Nothing in the Workers’ Compensation Act rebutted the presumption.
[71] Moreover, allowing the Tribunal to apply the Charter furthered the policy
objectives of allowing courts to “benefit from a full record established by a specialized tribunal fully
apprised of the policy and practical issues relevant to the Charter claim”. It also permitted workers
to “have their Charter rights recognized within the relatively fast and inexpensive adjudicative
scheme created by the Act” rather than having to pursue separate proceedings in the courts in
addition to a compensation claim before the administrative tribunal (para. 56).