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Proceedings [PDF] - Measurement and Analysis of P2P Activity ...

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International Conference Advances in the <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>of</strong> Online Paedophile <strong>Activity</strong> Paris, France; 2-3 June, 2009<br />

the other. Taking this perspective focuses attention not on just illegality as a significant quality <strong>of</strong><br />

pictures, but on the preferred type <strong>of</strong> pictures selected by the collector, <strong>and</strong> the value <strong>and</strong> meaning<br />

pictures have to collectors (Taylor <strong>and</strong> Quayle, 2003). In trying to underst<strong>and</strong> the ways in which<br />

children are victimised within the images, Taylor et al., (2001) generated a typology based on an<br />

analysis <strong>of</strong> publicly available images obtained from Newsgroups <strong>and</strong> Websites (made possible under<br />

Irish Law). This ‘COPINE Scale’ had ten levels ranging from indicative images to ones depicting<br />

sadism or bestiality. In 2002, in Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Wales, the Sentencing Advisory Panel (SAP) published<br />

their advice to the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal on <strong>of</strong>fences involving child pornography. The SAP believed that<br />

the nature <strong>of</strong> the material should be the key factor in deciding the level <strong>of</strong> sentence, <strong>and</strong> adapted the<br />

COPINE scale to five levels. They dropped levels 1 to 3 completely, arguing that nakedness alone was<br />

not indicative <strong>of</strong> indecency. The proposed structure was therefore that COPINE levels 5 to 6<br />

constitute sentencing level 1 <strong>and</strong> COPINE levels 7 onwards each constitute an individual sentencing<br />

stage (Gillespie, 2003). One consequence <strong>of</strong> using such this measure has been that it provides a means<br />

<strong>of</strong> communication about the images without, for most people, the images ever having been seen. It is<br />

interesting that this way <strong>of</strong> talking about child sexual abuse has also entered into ordinary discourse.<br />

Much earlier work by Lanning (1992) introduced an important distinction between child<br />

pornography (the sexually explicit reproduction <strong>of</strong> a child’s image) <strong>and</strong> child erotica (any material,<br />

relating to children, that serves a sexual purpose for a given individual). In a similar fashion, Tate<br />

(1990 pp 203-217), commented on how the material ranged from, "posed pictures <strong>of</strong> naked <strong>and</strong> semi<br />

naked children, through more explicit shots <strong>of</strong> their genitalia thumbed apart to still, film <strong>and</strong> video<br />

recordings <strong>of</strong> oral, vaginal <strong>and</strong> anal sex". While legal definitions <strong>of</strong> child pornography have to be<br />

objective <strong>and</strong> expressed in terms that allow for the proper application <strong>of</strong> due process, it becomes<br />

apparent that not all <strong>of</strong> the material that is currently circulating on the Internet would meet any legal<br />

definition <strong>of</strong> child pornography, <strong>and</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> such images as ‘abusive’ is a largely subjective<br />

one. Svedin <strong>and</strong> Back (1996, p9) defined child pornography as, “a text or an image – i.e. photo, slide,<br />

film, video or computer program – that is intended to evoke a sexual feeling, fantasy or response in<br />

adults”. However, expressing criteria in terms <strong>of</strong> a capacity to generate fantasy may be problematic<br />

when objective definitions are required, as the range <strong>of</strong> materials that might evoke fantasy includes<br />

photographs that can be found in any family album or clothes catalogue.<br />

The challenge posed by such a debate is, in the context <strong>of</strong> the huge volume <strong>of</strong> legal, but<br />

sexualised material relating to children on the Internet, as to how we might define these images, <strong>and</strong><br />

whether we should be attempting to control their distribution. Clearly we cannot legislate against<br />

fantasy, but King (2008, p 332) has argued that, ‘It is not clear… that the consumer (or the rest <strong>of</strong><br />

society) can always (or ever) be sure what category a particular image falls into, how much harm to<br />

the subject it represents, for however happy <strong>and</strong> carefree the child seems to be, we cannot know what<br />

later effects she suffered (or, indeed, what she was subjected to after or as a result <strong>of</strong> that photograph).<br />

In fact it’s clear that some degree <strong>of</strong> harm is almost always done to the subject in the production <strong>and</strong><br />

distribution <strong>of</strong> child pornography <strong>of</strong> all kinds…’. King (2008) goes on to suggest that child<br />

pornography not only harms its immediate victims, the children whose abuse is at its centre, but also<br />

harms other children through the actions <strong>and</strong> attitudes <strong>of</strong> its consumers.<br />

One further challenge relates to pseudo (digitally altered) images <strong>and</strong> virtual child<br />

pornography. Gillespie (2003) has raised important issues about how different an image has to be for<br />

it to constitute a pseudo–image, possession <strong>of</strong> which in Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Wales is likely to attract a lower<br />

sentence. In the US, the constitutionality <strong>of</strong> virtual child pornography remains a critical issue. In<br />

Ashcr<strong>of</strong>t v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) a majority <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Court struck down portions <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Child Pornography Prevention Act <strong>of</strong> 1996, stating that virtual child pornography created without real<br />

or identifiable minors was unconstitutionally overbroad (Quayle, 2008). It might be thought that these<br />

‘pseudo-photographs’ complicate our underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>of</strong> the problem <strong>and</strong> challenge our underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />

<strong>of</strong> harm. Harm, however, need not always be harm towards a specific child. Most legislation against<br />

the distribution <strong>and</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> child abuse images builds on the fact that even unaware victims<br />

somehow come to harm, much in the way described by King (2008), <strong>and</strong> the increased number <strong>of</strong><br />

abusive images in circulation may add to the likelihood that children are seen as possible objects <strong>of</strong><br />

real abuse.<br />

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