The impact of natural disasters on the social protection system ...

<strong>The</strong> <strong>impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>natural</strong> 

<strong>disasters</strong> on the social 

protection system: 

empirical evidence from 

the Wenchuan earthquake 

Miguel Salazar 

Xinsong Wang 

Xiaojiang Hu 

Qibin Lu 

Qiang Zhang 

Ling Zhou 

Xiulan Zhang 

IDS_Master Logo 

CSP Research Report 11 

January 2011 

ResearchReport11__FINAL.indd 1 23/01/2011 21:16

CSP RESEARCH REPORT 11 | SALAZAR ET AL. 

This Research Report was written by Miguel Salazar, 

Xinsong Wang, Xiaojiang Hu, Qibin Lu, Qiang 

Zhang, Ling Zhou and Xiulan Zhang (School <strong>of</strong> 

Social Development and Public Policy, Normal 

University, Beijing, China). 

Please see the two-page Research Report Summary 

for a quick overview, available on the CSP website 

www.ids.ac.uk/go/centreforsocialprotection 

Acknowledgements 

This CSP Research Report series presents findings from 

11 research projects conducted over the last two 

years, 2008–2010, for the Social Protection in Asia 

(SPA) policy-research and network-building 

programme, funded by the Ford Foundation and the 

International Development Research Centre (IDRC). <strong>The</strong> 

programme was managed by the Centre for Social 

Protection (CSP) at the Institute <strong>of</strong> Development 

Studies (IDS), Sussex, UK, and the Institute for Human 

Development (IHD), New Delhi, India, with projects 

and partners in China, Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Pakistan 

and Bangladesh. 

For further details <strong>of</strong> SPA programme research 

findings and policy lessons, see the programme 

synthesis report 2010, available online here: 

www.ids.ac.uk/go/idspublication/ 

socialprotection-in-asia-research-findings-andpolicy-lessons 

For more information about the SPA programme 

and links to other SPA research outputs please visit 

www.socialprotectionasia.org 

or email info@socialprotectionasia.org 

Programme administrative coordinator: Marion Clarke 

Publications coordinator: Peroline Ainsworth 

Report copy editor: Dee Scholey 



About CSP 

<strong>The</strong> Centre for Social Protection was established in 2006, to provide a 

global focus for research, policy analysis, and capacity building in social 

protection. Based at IDS, the Centre supports interaction between 

networks <strong>of</strong> equal partners, including researchers and policy-makers 

who work to mainstream social protection in development policy, and to 

build effective social protection systems throughout the world that are 

national, comprehensive, sustainable and equitable, and that improve 

the wellbeing <strong>of</strong> poor and vulnerable people. 

CSP – Influencing social protection debates and strengthening 

capacities to deliver sustainable policies and systems, that protect 

lives and livelihoods while promoting wellbeing and social justice. 

Contact 

Centre for Social Protection 

Institute <strong>of</strong> Development Studies 

At the University <strong>of</strong> Sussex 

Brighton BN1 9RE 

UK 

Email: socialprotection@ids.ac.uk 

Website: www.ids.ac.uk/go/centreforsocialprotection 

Research Report submission 

CSP Research Reports are produced by individuals and organisations working with the CSP. 

For enquires concerning the submission <strong>of</strong> Research Reports please contact us by email or by 

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<strong>The</strong> opinions expressed are those <strong>of</strong> the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views <strong>of</strong> any 

<strong>of</strong> the institutions involved 

Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce material from CSP Research Reports in their 

own publications. In return, the Centre for Social Protection requests due acknowledgement 

and a copy <strong>of</strong> the publication. 

© Centre for Social Protection and IDS 2011 

1 



Abstract 

<strong>The</strong> enormous Wenchuan earthquake <strong>of</strong> 2008 caused great damage 

not just to the local population, but to the local <strong>of</strong>ficials and social 

protection organisations that were supposed to administer the relief 

effort and coordinate reconstruction. This paper explores the <strong>impact</strong> 

<strong>of</strong> the earthquake on the functioning <strong>of</strong> the social protection system 

using data from surveys <strong>of</strong> victims and local <strong>of</strong>ficials at Mianyang 

city, the most severely affected area. <strong>The</strong> double shock <strong>of</strong> internal 

damage and the simultaneous large increase in the demands 

presented a difficult challenge, which required the deployment <strong>of</strong> 

several mechanisms <strong>of</strong> resilience. Among the mechanisms identified 

were flexible leadership structures, high corps solidarity, personal 

commitment because many <strong>of</strong>ficials were victims <strong>of</strong> the disaster as 

well, a very concentrated surge in the use <strong>of</strong> existing resources, a 

well organised central government response that provided both 

resources and administrative back-up, and a very streamlined and 

simple structure <strong>of</strong> early assistance that did not tax the already 

exhausted administrative resources. This successful resilient 

response to the disaster was effective in providing fast relief to the 

affected population, and the level <strong>of</strong> satisfaction with the relief effort 

was relatively high. However, the cost <strong>of</strong> the burst <strong>of</strong> effort began to 

tell several months after the disaster, resulting in relatively high levels 

<strong>of</strong> burnout and negative health consequences for overstretched 

<strong>of</strong>ficials, charged with delivering assistance. 

Keywords: social protection, disaster relief, reconstruction, organisational resilience, 

Wenchuan earthquake, China’s social protection system. 

2 



1 Introduction 

<strong>The</strong> earthquake which occurred in Sichuan in the People’s 

Republic <strong>of</strong> China (PRC) on 12 May 2008 claimed 69,227 

lives and resulted in 17,932 people going missing. More 

than 374,000 people were injured. Nearly 90 counties, 

over 900 townships/towns, and more than 9,000 

communities in the country suffered severe damages in 

terms <strong>of</strong> assets, land, jobs, livelihoods, public facilities, 

infrastructure, and human lives. Over 13 million people 

lost their homes and millions are now living in temporary 

shelters. About 1.15 million farmers lost their lands, and 

372,000 urban residents lost their jobs. <strong>The</strong>se 

staggeringly large numbers make the Sichuan earthquake 

the largest <strong>natural</strong> disaster in PRC’s 59-year-old history, 

necessitating implementation <strong>of</strong> the largest post-disaster 

social protection schemes in China. 

Numerous studies have been conducted on the issue <strong>of</strong> 

social protection for <strong>disasters</strong>. Many argue about the 

importance <strong>of</strong> social protection after <strong>natural</strong> <strong>disasters</strong> 

(Subbarao 2005; del Ninno 2008). Even more people 

provide designs, suggestions and lessons for particular 

social protection policies that may be suitable for the 

affected population (Lustig 2000). Vakis (2006) discusses 

the complementing role <strong>of</strong> social protection in <strong>natural</strong> 

<strong>disasters</strong>, and raises the importance <strong>of</strong> local fiscal, 

administrative, and economic capacities for policy 

implementation from the social risk management 

perspective. Subbarao (2005) argues that social protection 

before <strong>disasters</strong> plays an important role in the short- and 

medium- term rather than immediately after the <strong>disasters</strong>. 

Several factors make the delivery <strong>of</strong> social protection 

services after <strong>disasters</strong> different from that in normal times. 

Firstly, the social protection system itself is <strong>of</strong>ten affected 

by the disaster, suffering possibly, loss <strong>of</strong> social 

protection personnel themselves, collapse <strong>of</strong> agency 

buildings, damage to equipment, and loss <strong>of</strong> data and 

records. Secondly, damage to the other social 

infrastructure (such as roads, the banking system, etc.) 

also affects social protection delivery. Thirdly, the affected 

population has a sudden surge <strong>of</strong> new demands that 

would be difficult to meet even if the social protection 

system could function normally. In summary, checking on 

how <strong>disasters</strong> affect the social protection system may 

reveal that any social protection measures that look good 

on paper could be seriously compromised in the face <strong>of</strong> 

huge <strong>disasters</strong>. Good social protection policies and 

practices can only be implemented under a robust social 

protection system. 

Several angles may be used to assess the social 

protection system in disaster situations. Three <strong>of</strong> these 

angles are reviewed in this paper. <strong>The</strong>se are: institutional 

capacity, organisational disaster preparedness at the 

practical level, and the sociological understanding <strong>of</strong> 

reconstruction by organisations during a disaster. 

1.1 Institutional capacity 

<strong>The</strong> first angle concerns institutional capacity. Since many 

disaster relief operations may take a long time, the 

pressure on the existing social protection systems can be 

extremely high. Disasters <strong>of</strong>ten reveal the insufficient 

capacity <strong>of</strong> existing social protection systems to respond 

to the demands <strong>of</strong> a large and vulnerable group. 

<strong>The</strong> test <strong>of</strong> institutional capacity is harsher when relief 

operations are discontinued but normal operations have 

yet to come into being while many disaster-hit households 

may still face serious problems such as lack <strong>of</strong> permanent 

housing, poor sanitation, social alienation, indebtedness, 

and so on. It is the responsibility <strong>of</strong> the State to address 

these problems by establishing more inclusive and 

comprehensive social programmes on poverty relief, 

social protection, employment services, and social 

welfare. During the period after a disaster, the State faces 

a particularly daunting task because the number <strong>of</strong> 

people needing social protection programmes increases 

dramatically after the disaster. At the same time, 

government institutions themselves may also be victims 

<strong>of</strong> the disaster, as there may be casualties among civil 

servants and their families, trimmed-down tax revenues, 

and increased responsibilities for both the higher level 

authorities and ordinary citizens, all <strong>of</strong> which may drain 

the government’s capacity to effectively carry out social 

programmes. Lack <strong>of</strong> funding further complicates 

matters. While some programmes such as the reestablishment 

<strong>of</strong> postal services to manage pension and 

social security payment are crucial during the postdisaster 

period, they are not in the interest <strong>of</strong> potential 

donors, who tend to target their donations at more 

immediately responsive programmes. This increases the 

need for paying attention to and closely monitoring 

long-term and crucial social programmes, and for 

bridging the gap between relief and development 

programmes (Aysan 2006; Christoplos 2006). 

1.2 Organisational disaster 

preparedness 

<strong>The</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> institutional capacity for social protection 

systems necessitates the assessment <strong>of</strong> social protection 

systems during a disaster from a second angle, that <strong>of</strong> 

organisational disaster preparedness. In one way, social 

3 



protection agencies at local levels can be seen as 

organisations with certain functions to perform. 

Organisational disaster preparedness comprises the 

processes, policies, and procedures that an organisation 

needs to follow in order to restore operations that are 

critical to the resumption <strong>of</strong> daily functions. It includes 

coping with the sudden loss <strong>of</strong> key personnel; regaining 

access to data, communications and workspace; and 

executing other processes after a disaster. 

Organisational disaster preparedness (which is also 

called disaster continuity planning or DCP, and disaster 

recovery planning or DRP), has become increasingly 

important among business organisations in the 

developed world. <strong>The</strong> rise <strong>of</strong> information technology has 

fostered the strong dependence <strong>of</strong> organisational 

functioning on information and communications (Haag et 

al. 2005). Data show that among the companies that 

suffer a major loss <strong>of</strong> computerised data during a 

disaster, 43 per cent never reopen, 51 per cent close 

within two years, and only 6 per cent survive over the long 

term (H<strong>of</strong>fer 2001). Thus, business organisations in the 

West are rapidly devising strategies to protect 

irreplaceable data. Currently, most large companies 

spend 2–4 per cent <strong>of</strong> their information technology (IT) 

budget on DRP (Buchanan 2000). 

As compared to the business world, government 

agencies, even in the developed countries, are generally 

less prepared to face <strong>disasters</strong> (Newcombe 1996). At the 

time <strong>of</strong> a disaster, government agencies <strong>of</strong>ten become 

the lifeline for communities and virtually the last resort for 

survival for most vulnerable people. But these very 

government agencies usually exhibit little concern for 

ensuring the functioning <strong>of</strong> all means <strong>of</strong> communication in 

response to <strong>disasters</strong>. Many countries have learnt painful 

lessons from government apathy and inefficiency during 

major <strong>disasters</strong>. After Hurricane Katrina and other 

Mexican Gulf region <strong>disasters</strong>, many US government 

agencies have realised that relying on a single form <strong>of</strong> 

communication increases the government’s vulnerability 

to breakdowns (Rutzick 2005). 

Government agencies in China are also increasingly 

relying on streamlining their information and 

communication systems, as seen in the speedy 

digitisation <strong>of</strong> China’s administration (Kluver 2005) . This 

implies that the problems that have adversely <strong>impact</strong>ed 

the functioning <strong>of</strong> governments in other countries are also 

being foreseen in China. It is thus necessary to ensure 

that government agencies here follow all measures for 

preparedness to face <strong>disasters</strong>. 

1.3 Organisational sociology <strong>of</strong> crisis 

management and disaster 

reconstruction 

Merely instituting a good preparedness plan is, however, 

not sufficient for an organisation to manage disaster 

situations. Sociologists studying organisations view the 

issue more holistically (Lin et al. 2006; Starbuck and 

Farioun 2003). <strong>The</strong> spectacular organisational failure in 

New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina and other <strong>disasters</strong> 

make people wonder as to what went wrong within 

government agencies. Sociologists have found that the 

organisational cultures <strong>of</strong> the Department <strong>of</strong> Homeland 

Security, wherein information flows strictly top-down amid 

an intelligence and law enforcement scenario, are not 

conducive to facing <strong>disasters</strong> when it becomes imperative 

to spread information as far and as fast as possible 

(Perrow 2007). 

Also, organisations tend to adopt different decisionmaking 

mechanisms during <strong>disasters</strong> than what they do 

at normal times (Glenn 2005). While the complete 

organisational failure <strong>of</strong> government agencies in China 

was hardly seen in the case <strong>of</strong> the Sichuan earthquake, 

these agencies would do well to learn from the 

experiences <strong>of</strong> Hurricane Katrina. 

Presently, what is most relevant to the incidence <strong>of</strong> the 

Sichuan earthquake is an understanding <strong>of</strong> how 

organisations adapt to new challenges while 

simultaneously reconstructing damaged capabilities and 

adapting to the gaps left in the system by <strong>disasters</strong>. When 

organisations experience <strong>disasters</strong>, cracks may appear in 

their service delivery systems (Tausig 1987). Individuals 

are described as ‘falling through the cracks’. Different 

types <strong>of</strong> cracks can be identified in an organisation’s 

service networks depending on the nature <strong>of</strong> the 

organisational structure, the degree <strong>of</strong> <strong>impact</strong>, and the 

level <strong>of</strong> preparedness (Gillespie and Murty 1994). It is thus 

essential to identify and classify ‘cracks’ to ensure 

resumption <strong>of</strong> the designated function (Perrow 1994). This 

is more critical during the post-disaster reconstruction 

stage than during the immediate emergent relief stage. 

Kelly (2008) summarises the research on damage caused 

by <strong>disasters</strong> from the perspective <strong>of</strong> needs and rights. 

This is because the government would be able to 

formulate better response-oriented policies on the basis 

<strong>of</strong> an assessment <strong>of</strong> the damage caused to people, 

assets, and infrastructure. In the case <strong>of</strong> the Wenchuan 

earthquake, the assessment <strong>of</strong> damages has been mainly 

focused on defining the level <strong>of</strong> the damage, and 

4 



identifying the regions being affected by the earthquake. 

Losses in terms <strong>of</strong> lives, assets, infrastructure, livelihoods, 

as well as employment, health and education were 

assessed quickly after the earthquake (Hou 2009; Shi et 

al. 2008; Zhao et al. 2008). 

A significant body <strong>of</strong> literature is devoted to an 

assessment <strong>of</strong> the <strong>impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>disasters</strong> on the survivors, 

especially on their physical and mental health status. For 

example, Norris and his colleagues (2002) have reviewed 

the studies on disaster-affected people over the period 

1981 to 2001. <strong>The</strong>y have examined 102 studies across 29 

countries, and have found that <strong>disasters</strong> could have a 

lasting <strong>impact</strong> on the affected people. In the case <strong>of</strong> the 

Wenchuan earthquake, studies have already found similar 

<strong>impact</strong>s (Chen et al. 2009; Dai et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2009; 

Su et al. 2009; Xiang et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2009). 

What is, however, missing from the body <strong>of</strong> research on 

<strong>disasters</strong> and social protection, as well as on the 

Wenchuan mega earthquake is an examination <strong>of</strong> the 

social protection system itself. For this purpose, some <strong>of</strong> 

the questions that need to be answered are: What are the 

possible ‘cracks’ that could surface in a social protection 

system in the face <strong>of</strong> a mega disaster What needs to be 

done for a social protection system to function properly in 

the irregular situation <strong>of</strong> a disaster What measures 

needs to be implemented to prepare a social protection 

system in advance to face a disaster This paper explores 

the issue <strong>of</strong> the preparedness <strong>of</strong> social protection 

systems to face <strong>disasters</strong> by using the Sichuan 

earthquake as a case study. <strong>The</strong> paper first reviews the 

prevalent disaster assistance system in China, and social 

protection policies and practices followed during the 

Wenchuan earthquake, and then examines the 

functionality <strong>of</strong> the social protection systems. By 

identifying the weak links and the bottlenecks <strong>of</strong> social 

protection systems, and by highlighting valuable 

experiences in this area, this paper would attempt to 

enhance the preparedness <strong>of</strong> the social protection 

system in China. 

5 



2 Disaster assistance in China 

China is one <strong>of</strong> the countries that are the most affected by 

<strong>natural</strong> <strong>disasters</strong> in the world. In recent times, China has 

experienced most types <strong>of</strong> <strong>natural</strong> <strong>disasters</strong> except 

volcano eruptions. <strong>The</strong>se <strong>disasters</strong> have included floods, 

droughts, meteorological, seismic, geological, maritime 

and ecological <strong>disasters</strong> as well as forest and grassland 

fires. Natural <strong>disasters</strong> threaten China’s national security 

and social stability, stand in the way <strong>of</strong> economic 

development in some regions, and have impeded poverty 

alleviation for certain parts <strong>of</strong> the rural population. During 

the period 1990–2005, an average <strong>of</strong> 370 million people 

in China (about 3 per cent <strong>of</strong> the total population <strong>of</strong> the 

country) was affected by <strong>disasters</strong> every year. Disaster 

mitigation and disaster assistance are thus crucial for 

promoting sustainable development and maintaining 

social stability in China. 

2.1 Disaster assistance 

2.1.1 <strong>The</strong> concept and contents <strong>of</strong> disaster 

assistance 

Disaster assistance refers to the social security system 

used by a country to assist its populations threatened or 

affected by <strong>disasters</strong>. It includes providing the victims 

with clothing, food, shelter, transportation, medical 

treatment and other means required to maintain basic 

living conditions, helping to extricate them from the 

<strong>disasters</strong> and their consequent dangers, and assisting 

them to re-establish their own livelihood. <strong>The</strong> basic goal 

<strong>of</strong> all these measures is to enhance the ability <strong>of</strong> the 

people to resist disaster risks, and to reduce their 

vulnerabilities. 

Several approaches may be adopted for integrating 

disaster assistance into a country’s administrative 

structure. A common approach (found in the USA among 

other countries) is to consider disaster assistance as an 

extension <strong>of</strong> civil defence, by connecting disaster 

assistance with national security and public order 

agencies. Another approach is to consider disaster 

assistance and reconstruction as a matter <strong>of</strong> social 

protection, and to assign the main responsibility <strong>of</strong> 

providing such assistance to social welfare and public 

health agencies. China usually follows the second 

approach. Disaster assistance is considered as an 

important component <strong>of</strong> China’s social protection system. 

Disaster assistance includes both the actions associated 

with the emergency relief stage (rescue <strong>of</strong> the victims 

immediately after the <strong>disasters</strong>, and the supply <strong>of</strong> basic 

needs to survivors), and the post-disaster reconstruction 

stage. Disaster assistance acknowledges the fact that 

disaster and poverty are <strong>of</strong>ten connected in two ways: 

poverty increases the vulnerability <strong>of</strong> the population, and 

the destruction <strong>of</strong> livelihoods and accumulated wealth 

can significantly increase the rates <strong>of</strong> poverty and 

economic distress. <strong>The</strong> emphasis on the rapid restoration 

<strong>of</strong> the victims’ livelihoods and capabilities is inextricably 

connected with an emphasis on poverty reduction and a 

concomitant reduction <strong>of</strong> future vulnerability to disaster. 

Within this framework <strong>of</strong> restoring the capacity <strong>of</strong> the 

people to support themselves, the goals <strong>of</strong> disaster 

assistance are divided into two stages. <strong>The</strong> first stage is 

an emergency stage after the disaster occurs. <strong>The</strong> goal <strong>of</strong> 

this stage is to restore the material and spiritual survival 

conditions required by the population, and to maintain the 

minimum living conditions <strong>of</strong> the victims. 

<strong>The</strong> second stage is the reconstruction <strong>of</strong> the disaster 

areas and recovery <strong>of</strong> production and living, such as 

providing assistance for employment in the affected 

areas, and restoring major industries, among other things. 

Consequently, the ultimate goal <strong>of</strong> this stage is to restore 

people’s lives back to pre-disaster levels and beyond, by 

rebuilding their homes, restarting economic development, 

and maintaining social stability. 

Accordingly, the targets <strong>of</strong> disaster assistance are 

two-fold. <strong>The</strong> first target is to provide assistance to the 

affected individuals in order to allow them to survive and 

recover. <strong>The</strong> second target is to provide assistance to 

institutions in order to restore the social programmes that 

can help restore the normal lives <strong>of</strong> individuals. This 

approach refers largely to macro-level assistance such as 

rehabilitation <strong>of</strong> social functions and public facilities, 

restoration <strong>of</strong> the administrative capabilities <strong>of</strong> 

government agencies, administrative capabilities, 

reconstruction <strong>of</strong> social organisations, integration <strong>of</strong> 

social mechanisms into the reconstruction process, 

strengthening <strong>of</strong> social safety measures, and bringing <strong>of</strong> 

social life back to order. 

While most studies have focused on the assistance 

provided to individuals and communities, very few focus 

on the function <strong>of</strong> public institutions that deliver social 

protection to communities and individuals. 

2.1.2 <strong>The</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> disaster assistance 

Disaster assistance can be considered as an element <strong>of</strong> 

social assistance. It is an important part <strong>of</strong> social security 

and social protection, as it allows individuals to live their 

normal lives and to thrive by mitigating disaster risks and 

minimising the social <strong>impact</strong>s <strong>of</strong> <strong>disasters</strong>. This means 

6 



that disaster assistance could be constrained by the 

same issues <strong>of</strong> social justice, fairness, and rights 

protection that confront the regular social assistance 

structures. Thus, disaster assistance must be designed 

with the same goals <strong>of</strong> mediating social contradictions, 

maintaining social stability, and promoting social 

development. 

2.2 Disaster assistance in China 

2.2.1 <strong>The</strong> content <strong>of</strong> disaster assistance in China 

In the 2000-year-old history <strong>of</strong> China, the provision <strong>of</strong> 

disaster relief and assistance has been the main mandate 

<strong>of</strong> all the governments. <strong>The</strong> current disaster prevention 

and assistance mechanism was initiated in the 1950s. 

During the following three decades, the goal <strong>of</strong> disaster 

assistance was, ‘Nobody should die <strong>of</strong> either hunger or 

the cold’. <strong>The</strong> general principles adopted by the current 

Chinese government are: ‘prevention first’, ‘prevention 

combined with relief’, ‘relying on the people and the 

collectivity’, ‘self-protection through self-reliance’, and 

‘mutual aid and relief complemented with the necessary 

relief and support by the state’. 

Since the 1980s, the disaster assistance system has gone 

through a series <strong>of</strong> reforms. <strong>The</strong>se reforms include: (1) 

decentralisation <strong>of</strong> the disaster assistance financing with 

less Central Government responsibilities; (2) combining 

relief with self-reliance; and (3) linking relief with poverty 

alleviation efforts. In the meantime, China made the decision 

to accept international aid for dealing with <strong>disasters</strong>. 

In keeping with these guiding principles, China’s disaster 

assistance system comprises the following three subsystems: 

disaster prevention, disaster relief, and disaster 

reconstruction. In the event <strong>of</strong> <strong>natural</strong> <strong>disasters</strong>, predisaster 

measures and post-disaster measures are 

implemented. <strong>The</strong> pre-disaster measures consist <strong>of</strong> 

planning, prediction, prevention, and early warning. <strong>The</strong> 

post-disaster measures consist <strong>of</strong> rescue, relief, 

resettlement, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. ‘Disaster 

relief’ is a general term used to signify immediate 

responses after <strong>disasters</strong> with the goal <strong>of</strong> salvaging 

people’s lives and properties, rearranging the victims’ 

lives, mobilising the general population to support 

disaster areas, and restoring people’s livelihoods and 

normality in their everyday lives. 

<strong>The</strong> main responsibility for responding to <strong>disasters</strong> in 

China lies firmly with the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Civil Affairs (MoCA). In 

China, the MoCA carries out the following disaster 

assistance tasks: 

1. Ascertaining the disaster situation quickly, accurately 

and comprehensively, and assessing all kinds <strong>of</strong> 

disaster losses; 

2. Organising emergency rescue, and transferring and 

resettling victims; 

3. Accepting, disseminating and making use <strong>of</strong> disaster 

assistance and rescue materials, or making use <strong>of</strong> the 

State budget for disaster assistance arrangements to 

help victims resolve the difficulties in their basic 

livelihoods such as those concerning food, clothing, 

shelter, medicine, etc.; 

4. Inspecting and supervising the implementation <strong>of</strong> 

national disaster recovery and reconstruction policies 

<strong>of</strong> self-support, mutual aid and relief; 

5. Launching, organising and guiding activities <strong>of</strong> mutual 

aid and disaster relief; 

6. Receiving, distributing, using, and managing 

assistance funds and materials donated by foreign 

and domestic donors; 

7. Resolving the placement and pension-related 

problems <strong>of</strong> orphaned survivors and the disabled; 

8. Guiding disaster assistance work related to antipoverty 

and supporting victims to become self-reliant 

again by re-engaging in production. 

9. Summarising the experience <strong>of</strong> assistance work and 

sharing this knowledge with others. 

<strong>The</strong> planning and preparatory responsibilities <strong>of</strong> the 

MoCA include: 

1. Formulating a national emergency response plan for 

large-scale <strong>disasters</strong> and developing a series <strong>of</strong> 

contingency plan templates to improve disaster 

response plans at all levels <strong>of</strong> the government, 

particularly at the county, township and community 

levels; 

2. Enhancing coordination through the establishment <strong>of</strong> 

joint disaster response mechanisms among the 

government departments responsible for disasterrelated 

actions; 

3. Improving financing mechanisms for disaster 

response at all levels <strong>of</strong> government; 

4. Enhancing the inventory management system for 

disaster response materials; 

5. Establishing a disaster information management 

system at the community level to improve capacities 

in disaster information assessment, reporting and 

management; 

7 



6. Establishing and improving disaster donation 

mechanisms, disaster response volunteer systems, 

and emergency expropriation and compensation 

mechanisms to enhance social mobilisation 

capacities during major <strong>disasters</strong>. 

2.2.2 Natural Disaster Assistance System 

(a) Disaster assistance management mechanism: 

<strong>The</strong> responsibilities for disaster assistance management 

are somewhat decentralised. <strong>The</strong> CPC Central Committee 

and State Council provide overall leadership and 

guidance, while local governments are responsible for the 

execution <strong>of</strong> all response actions, and the responsibilities 

<strong>of</strong> the relevant Central Government organs are clearly 

assigned in policy documents. <strong>The</strong> National Committee 

for Disaster Reduction with its <strong>of</strong>fice hosted by the MoCA, 

the State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters, 

and other agencies are the subordinate public institutions. 

<strong>The</strong> leadership system <strong>of</strong> disaster management is 

similarly apportioned into each level <strong>of</strong> the local 

government by law. At all levels <strong>of</strong> government systems, 

the management <strong>of</strong> <strong>natural</strong> <strong>disasters</strong> includes at its core 

the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Civil Affairs (MoCA), provincial civil affairs 

departments, and civil affair bureaus at the regional and 

county levels. <strong>The</strong> MoCA is responsible for formulating 

national disaster reduction policies, strategies and 

programmes, for coordinating with Central Government 

departments, and for providing guidance to local 

governments on disaster mitigation and relief activities. 

(b) Contingency plans system: <strong>The</strong> most important 

recent development in China’s disaster assistance is the 

introduction <strong>of</strong> a comprehensive contingency plans system. 

All levels <strong>of</strong> the government must draft localised 

contingency plans covering all types <strong>of</strong> <strong>disasters</strong>, and 

making provisions for early warning systems (including 

meteorological forecasting systems and seismic 

monitoring systems), preparation for early response, and 

inventory management, among other tasks. <strong>The</strong>se plans 

enable the local and provincial authorities to react fast, 

coordinate activities during the chaotic early stages <strong>of</strong> 

relief, and use government resources more efficiently. 

Since 2008, local civil affairs departments under the 

leadership <strong>of</strong> the local governments have actively started 

drafting local <strong>natural</strong> disaster assistance emergency 

plans. Two large <strong>natural</strong> <strong>disasters</strong> created a sense <strong>of</strong> 

urgency in the development <strong>of</strong> those plans: the blizzards 

and ice storms that affected 20 southern, central and 

eastern provinces at the beginning <strong>of</strong> 2008, and the 

catastrophic Wenchuan earthquake in May 2008. 

However, at present, the formulation <strong>of</strong> these contingency 

plans has not been completed at the provincial or 

prefectural level, and the quality <strong>of</strong> existing contingency 

plans for assistance is considered to be low. In order to 

further improve the building <strong>of</strong> emergency rescue 

systems, the MoCA launched a project in 2008 to ensure 

that all cities and counties complete their contingency 

plans before March 2009. 

At the national level, the ‘national contingency plan <strong>of</strong> 

<strong>natural</strong> <strong>disasters</strong>’ issued by the State Council classifies 

<strong>disasters</strong> into the following four levels according to the 

degree <strong>of</strong> damage: (i) Level I, which is reserved for the 

most severe situations wherein the response is organised 

directly by the Central Government, in coordination with 

the affected provincial and local governments; (ii) Level II, 

which marks very severe events, wherein the relevant 

provincial governments are primarily responsible for 

organising responses, with the assistance <strong>of</strong> the Central 

Government; (iii) Level III, which is intended for severe 

events, wherein the responsibility is shared by local and 

provincial authorities; and (iv) Level IV, which is meant for 

general public emergencies, wherein events can be dealt 

with mainly by local governments, with the assistance <strong>of</strong> 

the relevant Central Government departments. This 

hierarchical system <strong>of</strong> intervention is intended to spread 

the duties among the particular levels <strong>of</strong> government that 

are capable <strong>of</strong> executing them. 

(c) Emergency assistance: <strong>The</strong> controlling instrument 

regulating early response, rescue and emergency 

assistance was issued by the MoCA as the ‘Procedure 

Implementation for Dealing with Sudden Natural Disasters’ 

in 2004. Its most important provisions include dividing 

central response to unexpected <strong>natural</strong> <strong>disasters</strong> into four 

levels. <strong>The</strong> regulation also prescribes the maximum time 

for certain types <strong>of</strong> responses, particularly mandating that 

the arrival <strong>of</strong> the central disaster assistance working group 

to the affected area, the deployment <strong>of</strong> assistance 

supplies at the site <strong>of</strong> the disaster, and the provision <strong>of</strong> 

emergency assistance to the victims <strong>of</strong> the disaster must 

be done within 24 hours <strong>of</strong> the occurrence <strong>of</strong> the disaster. 

It also contains specific measures pertaining to the 

responses to different kinds <strong>of</strong> emergencies and <strong>disasters</strong>, 

and stipulates how responses to specific measures and 

disaster assistance work should be incorporated in the 

standardised management workflow. 

(d) Post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction: 

Post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction work in the 

disaster areas mainly implies carrying out repair and 

restoration <strong>of</strong> all kinds <strong>of</strong> facilities, particularly basic 

8 



infrastructure, private houses, schools, and other public 

facilities. Among these tasks, the restoration <strong>of</strong> basic 

public services and reconstruction <strong>of</strong> houses are the most 

crucial and need to be prioritised over the other tasks. 

<strong>The</strong> administration <strong>of</strong> post-disaster rehabilitation and 

reconstruction in China is under the unified leadership <strong>of</strong> 

the Central Government, with the MoCA having the 

primary responsibility for coordinating the various 

departments. MoCA also has the main responsibility <strong>of</strong> 

overseeing the reconstruction <strong>of</strong> housing. 

(e) Social contributions: <strong>The</strong> core <strong>of</strong> disaster assistance 

work lies with the local communities themselves. China 

has a long tradition <strong>of</strong> neighbourhood assistance and 

mutual help among the communities as a measure <strong>of</strong> 

disaster response. In 1996, the MoCA implemented a 

regular system <strong>of</strong> social contributions. At present, the 

social donation system in China mainly includes the 

collection <strong>of</strong> donations during the disaster period, 

one-to-one support, and regular contributions by 

members <strong>of</strong> the local communities. Social contribution 

has thus become an important component <strong>of</strong> the <strong>natural</strong> 

disaster management system in the country. 

(f) <strong>The</strong> legal framework <strong>of</strong> disaster assistance: 

Around 30 laws and regulations constitute the basic legal 

framework for China’s disaster management system. <strong>The</strong> 

most important legal instruments are the Flood Control 

Law and the Earthquake Prevention and Disaster 

Reduction Law. As regards the legal framework in the 

country, legal obligations and regulatory structures are 

rapidly changing in present-day China, leading to 

improvements in this area. <strong>The</strong> inception <strong>of</strong> this legal 

structure started with the founding <strong>of</strong> the PRC and it has 

steadily advanced over the years. 

<strong>The</strong> basic structure <strong>of</strong> disaster prevention and response 

was set up in 1950, when the Central Government 

formulated its first disaster assistance guidelines. <strong>The</strong>se 

guidelines emphasised ‘self-reliance, conservation, 

mutual assistance among the masses, and 

complementary assistance by the government’. <strong>The</strong> main 

features <strong>of</strong> the disaster management system in China are 

as follows: 

1. <strong>The</strong> administrative structure divides duties between 

the Central Government, which is in charge <strong>of</strong> 

policy-making, and the various line departments that 

are responsible for implementing these policies. 

2. <strong>The</strong> executive organisation is based on local 

governments. 

3. <strong>The</strong> role <strong>of</strong> the People’s Liberation Army in providing 

emergency assistance is made explicit. 

4. Both the <strong>of</strong>ficials and the masses in the disaster regions 

are encouraged to undertake self-help measures in order 

to promote self-reliance among the victims <strong>of</strong> the disaster. 

5. <strong>The</strong>re is extensive mobilisation <strong>of</strong> social forces. 

6. <strong>The</strong> basic goals <strong>of</strong> disaster relief are defined as 

minimising the loss <strong>of</strong> life and ensuring that no one 

would either starve or freeze to death. 

7. <strong>The</strong> wider task is defined as ensuring the safety <strong>of</strong> 

human lives and property, and maintaining social 

stability in the affected area. 

This basic framework remained in place until the 1980s. 

As part <strong>of</strong> the United Nations International Decade for 

Natural Disaster Reduction or IDNDR (1990–2000) the 

Chinese government set up the Chinese Committee for 

the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 

(CIDNDR) on 1 March 1989. This committee was hosted 

by the MoCA and was assigned the task <strong>of</strong> overhauling 

the disaster relief system and enhancing awareness <strong>of</strong> 

disaster prevention among the whole population. 

On 18 December 1997, the Committee issued the 

‘Disaster Reduction Plan <strong>of</strong> the People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> 

China’. This plan represented a change <strong>of</strong> approach 

towards disaster reduction, as it formally incorporated 

disaster management into the plans for economic 

development. <strong>The</strong> plan also made provisions for more 

systematic and scientific disaster management. In April 

1998, the Chinese Government promulgated the National 

Natural Disaster Reduction Plan <strong>of</strong> the People’s Republic 

<strong>of</strong> China (1998–2010), which was the first national disaster 

reduction plan formulated within the framework <strong>of</strong> the 

Ninth Five-Year National Economic and Social 

Development Plan and the 2010 Long-term Objectives. 

<strong>The</strong> Plan was developed with significant assistance from 

the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 

In order to carry forward the work <strong>of</strong> disaster planning 

after the CIDNDR was wound up, the State Council set up 

the Contingency Plans Group in 2003. <strong>The</strong> Group carried 

out the initial preparation <strong>of</strong> national contingency plans in 

2004. <strong>The</strong>se national and local plans were issued in 2005, 

and during the same year, the Emergency Management 

Office <strong>of</strong> the State Council was formally set up. 

<strong>The</strong> current assistance system and operational mechanism 

for tackling unexpected and serious <strong>natural</strong> disaster 

emergencies were basically set up after the State Council 

approved and promulgated the National Natural Disaster 

Relief Emergency Plan and the National Earthquake 

Emergency Preparedness Plan in January 2006. Before 

that, disaster assistance work in China was carried out in 

9 



1 

Based on the report 

drafted by the School 

<strong>of</strong> Social Development 

and Public 

Policy <strong>of</strong> Beijing 

Normal University and 

submitted to the 

Ministry <strong>of</strong> Civil 

Affairs. 

accordance with a number <strong>of</strong> different laws, in particular 

the Law on Flood Control, the Law on Earthquake 

Prevention and Disaster Reduction issued by the State 

Council in 1997, the Meteorological Law, and the Natural 

Disaster Reduction Plan <strong>of</strong> the People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China 

(1998–2010) promulgated by the State Council in 1998. 

On 5 August 2007, the State Council issued the National 

General Plan for Disaster Reduction Eleventh Five-Year 

Plan [part <strong>of</strong> the Natural Disaster Reduction Plan <strong>of</strong> the 

People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China (1998–2010) issued in 1998 

was removed]. This plan paid more attention to the 

strengthening <strong>of</strong> rescue capabilities and the rescue 

command and control system in the case <strong>of</strong> a national 

<strong>natural</strong> disaster emergency. <strong>The</strong> main goal <strong>of</strong> the plan 

was to establish a unified management structure that 

would bring all levels <strong>of</strong> government together and enable 

them to work in coordination with each other during the 

chaotic rescue stage. It also paid attention to building the 

network <strong>of</strong> central and local material reserves for disaster 

assistance and the production <strong>of</strong> equipment for disaster 

mitigation and assistance, as well as to bringing about an 

improvement in the social mobilisation mechanisms. For 

the first time, it also mentioned that the Red Cross, 

non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and grassroots 

organisations should also be responsible for disaster 

prevention, emergency rescue, disaster relief donations, 

medical aid, epidemic prevention, rehabilitation and 

reconstruction, and post-disaster psychosocial support. 

On 2 March 2009, the National Disaster Reduction 

Committee and the MoCA together issued a communiqué 

that May 12 <strong>of</strong> every year would be regarded as the 

‘Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Day’ starting with 

2009. This move is part <strong>of</strong> an increased emphasis on the 

part <strong>of</strong> the government to facilitate disaster prevention, 

preparation and mitigation, and part <strong>of</strong> the effort to 

increase public awareness about disaster risks and 

disaster assistance structures. 

2.2.3 Improving the disaster assistance 

mechanisms 

<strong>The</strong> government has identified several main tasks for 

effecting an improvement in the Chinese disaster 

assistance system. <strong>The</strong> following critical areas need to be 

addressed urgently: (1) <strong>The</strong> development <strong>of</strong> disasterassistance 

projects cannot keep pace with the rapid 

development <strong>of</strong> the national economy; (2) <strong>The</strong> disaster 

assistance plans <strong>of</strong> governments at various levels have 

yet to be systemised and standardised, and relevant 

regulations need further improvement; (3) Disaster 

assessment technologies and methods are relatively 

backward, and more efforts need to be made on research 

on disaster reduction measures; (4) <strong>The</strong> reserve system <strong>of</strong> 

disaster assistance materials and emergency response 

capabilities needs urgent improvement; (5) Disaster 

assistance publicity and education should be further 

strengthened; and (6) Since the disaster insurance 

programme is limited and the level <strong>of</strong> assistance is very 

low, the disaster insurance system at both the local and 

community levels needs to be improved. <strong>The</strong>se tasks 

mostly fall under the supervisory responsibility <strong>of</strong> the MoCA. 

However, the disaster reduction work involves many line 

ministries and departments, the mechanism <strong>of</strong> coordination 

and information-sharing among government agencies has 

not been fully established yet, and social participation 

channels are limited. It will, therefore, be a challenge for the 

MoCA to shoulder these tasks if a suitable national disaster 

management mechanism is not established. 

2.2.4 Financing disaster assistance 1 

(a) Central financing: This includes the following four 

areas: (1) A new disaster assistance fund, which is used 

to finance emergency assistance, resettlement, and 

recovery and reconstruction <strong>of</strong> the disaster-affected areas 

and households – it is aimed to provide temporary 

assistance in food, clothing, medical care, and house 

rebuilding; (2) Food, clothing and medical relief for the 

disaster-affected people during the non-harvest seasons 

– normally these assistances cover basic sustenance for 

the targeted beneficiaries during spring (March to May) 

and winter (December to February); (3) Funding for 

central disaster reserves and stockpile <strong>of</strong> materials; and 

(4) A Research and Development (R&D) fund to be used 

for disaster prevention, emergency management, and risk 

reduction. 

<strong>The</strong> emergency assistance is per-person based, while the 

housing assistance is per-room based. For the temporary 

assistance in basic sustenance during the non-harvest 

seasons, central funding is used to pay one-third <strong>of</strong> the 

monthly basic expenses. 

(b) Local financing: <strong>The</strong> disaster assistance is jointly 

financed by the Central and local governments, with the 

Central Government paying one-third <strong>of</strong> the total 

expenses, and the local government paying two-thirds <strong>of</strong> 

the costs. <strong>The</strong> management and logistics cost is 

estimated to be 5 per cent <strong>of</strong> the total direct disaster 

assistance fund. Currently, there is no law or national level 

regulation to mandate the responsibilities <strong>of</strong> financing the 

disaster assistance. 

10 



Table 1 Disaster Assistance in China, 1991-2006 

Year 

Total affected 

people (Millions) 

Total deaths 

(persons) 

People 

emergently 

settled (Millions) 

Rescued people 

(millions) 

People who 

received 

assistance 


Collapsed houses 


1991 419.41 7,315 13.09 5.49 67.25 5.815 

1992 371.74 5,741 3.04 2.05 52.59 1.966 

1993 375.41 6,125 3.08 1.59 52.58 2.716 

1994 437.99 8,549 10.54 2.44 59.90 5.121 

1995 242.15 5,561 10.64 2.97 67.10 4.393 

1996 323.05 7,273 12.16 4.78 64.47 8.090 

1997 478.86 3,212 5.11 3.05 54.87 2.880 

1998 352.16 5,511 20.83 9.03 57.81 8.214 

1999 353.19 2,966 6.65 3.67 50.58 1.745 

2000 456.52 3,014 4.67 3.24 51.27 1.473 

2001 372.56 2,583 2.11 4.76 57.27 0.922 

2002 378.42 2,840 4.72 4.60 60.13 1.757 

2003 497.46 2,259 7.07 10.02 62.42 3.430 

2004 339.21 2,250 5.63 4.92 48.55 1.550 

2005 406.54 2,475 15.70 6.24 50.97 2.264 

2006 2,374 13.24 . . 2.020 

Source: Xiulan Zhang and Xiaohua Wang: Long Term Financing Mechanisms <strong>of</strong> Social Welfare Programs: An Internal Report to the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Civil Affairs, October 2007 

2 

Interview with Wang 

Zhenyao, former 

Director <strong>of</strong> the 

National Disaster 

Reduction Office <strong>of</strong> 

China, August 2008. 

(c) Disaster assistance financing in recent years: Table 

1 shows that every year from 1991 to 2006, over 50 million 

people received disaster assistances and millions were 

rescued or resettled. <strong>The</strong> annual rate <strong>of</strong> increase in the 

disaster assistance fund from 2003–07 was 16 per cent. 

<strong>The</strong> budget in 2008 was 24.2 billion, accounting for 0.45 

per cent <strong>of</strong> the total government revenue. However, the 

Wenchuan earthquake has totally changed the situation, 

and consequently, new financing mechanisms have to be 

created to cope with the damages inflicted by the mega 

earthquake. 

2.2.5 Issues in financing disaster assistances 

(a) Financing mechanism not fully established: Due 

to the uncertainties <strong>of</strong> <strong>disasters</strong>, which can be seen from 

Table 1, the Central Government and local governments 

have not established regulations <strong>of</strong> the disaster 

assistance financing mandate. <strong>The</strong> Central Government 

has been asking the local governments to shoulder the 

main responsibility <strong>of</strong> dealing with <strong>disasters</strong>. But already 

burdened with financing economic development, 

education, and social security, as they are, local 

governments <strong>of</strong>ten do not have enough funding to 

provide the necessary assistance when <strong>disasters</strong> hit, and 

the Central Government has to step in to provide funding 

for the affected people. <strong>The</strong> bargaining process between 

the Central and local governments may thus cause delays 

and shortage in assistance. 

(b) Inadequate prevention funding: So far, there is no 

earmarked spending on disaster prevention and assistance. 

<strong>The</strong> maximum spending is on post-disaster assistance, and 

very little effort is made in the area <strong>of</strong> disaster prevention. When 

major <strong>disasters</strong> occur, the Central and local governments 

have to squeeze their budgets to pay for the emergency 

assistance, and rehabilitation and reconstruction costs. 

In addition, while urban areas with better facilities and 

infrastructure have more funding for disaster prevention, 

rural areas have almost no funding for disaster prevention. 

Local governments in the countryside mainly pay for the 

post-disaster assistance costs. 

(c) Limited funding sources for disaster assistance: 

Currently, the disaster assistance is mainly a government 

responsibility, and the level <strong>of</strong> relief is very low, and 

primarily concentrated on basic living and housing. <strong>The</strong> 

disaster insurance mechanism has yet to materialise. 

During the 2008 snow storm and the Wenchuan mega 

earthquake, many banks started providing loans and 

credits to the affected people, which helped speed up the 

rehabilitation and reconstruction processes. Recently, the 

National Disaster Reduction Expert Committee has made 

proposals to expand disaster insurances in China. 2 

11 



3 <strong>The</strong> Impact <strong>of</strong> the Wenchuan earthquake 

on the social protection system in China: 

empirical evidence 

3.1 Methodology 

Using the case <strong>of</strong> the Wenchuan earthquake, this paper 

records and analyses the changing needs <strong>of</strong> social 

protection within a 16-month period after the earthquake. 

On the basis <strong>of</strong> surveys <strong>of</strong> the affected households and <strong>of</strong> 

local cadres at various points during the 16-month period, 

this section examines the process <strong>of</strong> how the social 

protection system reacted to disaster; the problems, gaps 

and cracks that appeared in their capacity to provide the 

necessary recovering support, and the manner in which 

the system adapted to the new challenges and demands 

during the reconstruction period. 

<strong>The</strong>se processes cannot be properly detected from the 

exclusive perspectives <strong>of</strong> the service providers. It is also 

important to include the perspectives <strong>of</strong> the affected 

population. Only the combined study <strong>of</strong> both service 

providers and recipients provides a comprehensive 

image <strong>of</strong> the processes <strong>of</strong> recovery and reconstruction <strong>of</strong> 

the social protection system. <strong>The</strong> process <strong>of</strong> 

reconstruction is studied from two perspectives: (1) how 

it was carried out by the bureaucrats, on the basis <strong>of</strong> the 

perspective <strong>of</strong> service providers (in particular, the line 

<strong>of</strong>ficials); and (2) how it was viewed by service recipients. 

3.1.1 Survey location 

Basic information on Mianyang 

We chose Mianyang Municipal City as the site for data 

collection as we have established a solid research base 

there. Mianyang is located in the northwest <strong>of</strong> Sichuan with 

a total area <strong>of</strong> 20,249 km 2 , which comprises 4.2 per cent <strong>of</strong> 

the total area <strong>of</strong> Sichuan province. Out <strong>of</strong> the total area <strong>of</strong> 

20,249 km 2 , 61 per cent consists <strong>of</strong> mountainous areas, 

20.4 per cent comprises hilly areas, and 18.6 per cent 

constitutes plain areas. <strong>The</strong> central city <strong>of</strong> Mianyang has a 

total area <strong>of</strong> 90 km 2 . <strong>The</strong> Mianyang Municipal City includes 

two districts, that is, Fucheng and Youxian; six counties, 

including Santai, Yanting, Zitong, An, Beichuan and 

Pingwu; and one county-level city, viz. Jiangyou. <strong>The</strong> total 

population in Mianyang Municipal City is 5.41 million, 

including 2.8 million males and 2.61 million females. It has 

388 urban communities and 3,370 villages, and its rural 

population is 4.05 million, constituting 83.2 per cent <strong>of</strong> its 

total population. 

Mianyang is a city with 40 minority and ethnic groups. <strong>The</strong> 

total minority population is around 200,000, with most <strong>of</strong> 

these people being located in the west <strong>of</strong> the city. It has 

one minority autonomous county (Beichuan Qiang 

minority autonomous county) and seven ethnic 

townships. Beichuan Qiang County is the only Qiang 

minority autonomous county in China. 

Mianyang has maintained a GDP growth rate <strong>of</strong> 14.3 per 

cent since 1985, and the growth rate <strong>of</strong> the total industrial 

output has been maintained at 20.1 per cent annually. 

<strong>The</strong> earthquake’s damage to Mianyang 

During the earthquake, Mianyang was the hardest hit 

city with all its nine counties and 276 townships suffering 

very heavy losses. <strong>The</strong> total number <strong>of</strong> people affected 

by the earthquake touched 5.22 million, accounting for 

96.5 per cent <strong>of</strong> the total population. Among the 

affected counties, Beichuan, Pingwu and An were the 

heaviest hit areas, while Beichuan central town was 

completely razed to the ground. A total <strong>of</strong> 21,963 people 

died, 7,795 were missing, and 174,000 were injured. As 

regards damage to property, the homes <strong>of</strong> 814,000 rural 

households were destroyed, while the houses <strong>of</strong> 

576,000 urban households collapsed or were severely 

damaged. 

<strong>The</strong> earthquake also damaged 6,564 km <strong>of</strong> roads, 1,503 

bridges, 131 power stations and plants, 8,944 electric 

transmission lines, 597 reservoirs, 9,416 km <strong>of</strong> canals, 

1,398 schools, 3,113 hospitals, clinics or public health 

stations, 282 broadcasting stations or TV stations, and 26 

km <strong>of</strong> optical cables. 

<strong>The</strong> total economic losses were huge. As many as 2,410 

enterprises suffered losses, and many enterprises had to 

cease operations. A whopping 1.72 million mu <strong>of</strong> 

farmlands (1 mu=666.7 m 2 ) were damaged, while a total 

<strong>of</strong> 1.05 million livestock died, and 44 hotels and 51 tourist 

sites were damaged. <strong>The</strong> direct economic losses were 

estimated to be RMB 297.8 billion. 

<strong>The</strong> secondary disaster following the earthquake was 

also very severe. <strong>The</strong>re were 2,432 landslides, collapses 

and mudslides after the earthquake, and 55 quake lakes. 

Among the latter, the Tangjiashan Quake Lake, the 

largest <strong>of</strong> its kind, posed a threat to 1.3 million people. A 

total <strong>of</strong> 200,000 people had to be evacuated due to the 

Tangjiashan Quake Lake following the first evacuation 

after the earthquake. As many as 3.1 million people had 

to be resettled. <strong>The</strong> biggest temporary settlement site, 

the Jiuzhou Stadium, housed 50,000 survivors, and at its 

peak, housed 40,000 people in a day. <strong>The</strong> total relief 

materials received during the three-month period after 

the earthquake included 225,000 tents, 155,000 

blankets, 1.07 million pieces <strong>of</strong> clothing and 125,000 

tonnes <strong>of</strong> food. Finally, 40,000 temporary houses were 

also constructed. 

12 



3 

Statistics from the 

Ministry <strong>of</strong> Civil Affairs 

<strong>of</strong> China. 

3.1.2 Data for the study 

<strong>The</strong> study is based on longitudinal household surveys 

with the baseline survey having been conducted within 

two months <strong>of</strong> the earthquake and the follow-up survey 

been undertaken 16 months after the disaster. <strong>The</strong> survey 

on local government personnel and local cadres was 

conducted 8–9 months after the earthquake. 

Baseline household survey 

<strong>The</strong> baseline household survey was conducted between 

20 June and 10 July 2008 in Mianyang, the hardest-hit 

city by the Wenchuan earthquake. At the time <strong>of</strong> the 

survey, all the people in Mianyang city had been 

evacuated from their homes and were settled in the 

temporary tent complex. We randomly selected five 

temporary tent complexes, and from every two tents, we 

chose one for an interview. Some tents housed several 

households, so from these, we chose the one with the 

household head in the tent. <strong>The</strong> total number <strong>of</strong> 

households interviewed was 2,003 and we obtained 

information on each member <strong>of</strong> the household. <strong>The</strong> total 

individual sample size was 7,407. 

Follow-up household survey 

In the baseline survey, we obtained their contact 

information. In July 2009, we contacted each household 

on the basis <strong>of</strong> the information they provided in the 

baseline survey, and if the information was incorrect, we 

contacted other people that we had successfully traced, 

and obtained the most recent contact information <strong>of</strong> some 

households. Since the baseline survey was conducted in 

the tents, many <strong>of</strong> the interviewees have since moved to 

other places, and many <strong>of</strong> the households have stopped 

using the cell phone numbers which were supplied largely 

by a cell phone company during the settlement period. In 

the end, we were able to trace 481 households and 

obtained information on 2,275 individuals. <strong>The</strong> follow-up 

survey was conducted from August to September 2009. 

Cadre survey 

<strong>The</strong> Mianyang city government decided to train all its 

cadres in all levels <strong>of</strong> government and all agencies with 

the purpose <strong>of</strong> enhancing the capacity <strong>of</strong> managing the 

recovery and redevelopment policies. A total <strong>of</strong> around 

2,060 cadres were trained in the City Public Administrative 

College from 6 December 2008 to 26 February 2009. <strong>The</strong> 

training covered all cadres with administrative ranking <strong>of</strong> 

township or above in Mianyang city. We distributed the 

questionnaires to every cadre and received 1,241 valid 

questionnaires. 

Document reviews and field visits 

We undertook surveys and interviews five days after the 

quake in the quake-hit areas, and we undertook the 

planning policy research for the National Disaster 

Reduction Commission during and after the earthquake. 

Key policy documents, especially the new policies issued 

for the Wenchuan earthquake with regards to social 

protection, are discussed below. 

3.2 Social protection policies after the 

earthquake 

<strong>The</strong> Chinese Government has been widely praised for 

its fast action following the Wenchuan earthquake. 

Apart from emergency rescue, evacuation, and relief, 

the Government issued a series <strong>of</strong> social protection 

measures, and allocated funding for social protection 

quickly. Table 2 (on page 14) presents the key policies 

formulated after the Wenchuan earthquake. 

<strong>The</strong> major social protection measures are discussed 

below. 

3.2.1 Fast allocation <strong>of</strong> food and cash 

During the three-month period after the Wenchuan 

earthquake, the State Council and Central Party 

Committee issued nine policy documents, while 

different ministries issued seven documents related to 

the disaster and covering a wide range <strong>of</strong> issues. <strong>The</strong> 

four policies issued in May 2008 related to the main 

issues for relief, including provision <strong>of</strong> 300 yuan for 

each person per month and half a kilogramme <strong>of</strong> 

grain per person per day in the quake-hit areas for 

three months (called a ‘three-month temporary living 

stipend’). Also, temporary shelters for the affected 

people had to be built quickly. A specific policy was 

issued 20 days after the disaster to further protect 

those who were most in need, that is, the disabled, 

orphans and the childless, generally known as the 

‘three-orphaned people’ (san ‘gu’ renyuan) newly 

caused by the earthquake. <strong>The</strong>se people were 

provided 600 yuan per month <strong>of</strong> stipend for three 

months. <strong>The</strong> original stipend for the pre-existing ‘threeorphaned 

people’ in the affected areas was also raised 

to 600 yuan per month for three months. 

By July 12 (two months after the earthquake), this 

policy had provided assistance to 8.8 million, including 

‘three-no people’ (that is, people having no housing, 

no grain and no life security, known as san ‘wu’ 

renyuan) and 261,000 ‘three-orphaned people’. 3 

13 



Table 2 Key policies relevant to social protection issued in May–September 2008 

Stages Date Issued Issuance Authority Key Policies Relevant to Social Protection 

Pre-disaster 5 August 2007 State Council National Integrated Disaster Reduction Eleventh Five Year Plan 

Wenchuan Earthquake 

Emergency Rescue 

Period: 12–31 May 

2008 

20 May 2008 Ministry <strong>of</strong> Civil Affairs Temporary Assistant to Wenchuan Earthquake-affected People 

20 May 2008 Central Commission for 

Discipline Inspection <strong>of</strong> the 

Communist Party <strong>of</strong> China 

Strengthening the Monitoring <strong>of</strong> the Wenchuan Earthquake 

Relief Materials and Fund 

30 May 2008 Ministry <strong>of</strong> Civil Affairs and 

Ministry <strong>of</strong> Housing 

Arrangement <strong>of</strong> Temporary Shelter for Wenchuan Earthquakeaffected 

People 

31 May 2008 State Council (2008-39) Strengthening the Management <strong>of</strong> the Wenchuan Earthquake 

Relief Materials and Fund 

Temporary Settlement 

Period: 1 June– 31 

August 2008 

1 June 2008 Ministry <strong>of</strong> Civil Affairs Strengthening the Transparency <strong>of</strong> the Wenchuan Earthquake 

Relief Materials and Fund Allocations 

3 June 2008 Ministry <strong>of</strong> Civil Affairs Assistance and Settlement <strong>of</strong> the Homeless Children, Elderly 

and Disabled due to Wenchuan Earthquake in Sichuan Province 

11 June 2008 State Council Twining Arrangement <strong>of</strong> Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery and 

Redevelopment 

13 June 2008 State Council Guidelines <strong>of</strong> the Usage <strong>of</strong> the Wenchuan Earthquake Donations 

15 June 2008 Ministry <strong>of</strong> Civil Affairs Further Strengthening the Management <strong>of</strong> the Wenchuan 

Earthquake Relief Materials and Fund 

23 June 2008 State Council Further Improvement in Medical Services and Epidemic Control 

in the Earthquake Region 

29 June 2008 State Council Supporting the Policy Measures <strong>of</strong> Wenchuan Earthquake 

Recovery and Redevelopment 

3 July 2008 State Council Guidelines for Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery and 

Redevelopment Work 

18 July 2008 Ministry <strong>of</strong> Civil Affairs and 

Ministry <strong>of</strong> Finance 

Relief Policy after Initial Three Months Emergent Assistance to 

the Affected People in Wenchuan Earthquake 

6 August 2008 State Council Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery and Redevelopment 

Regulations 

Recovery and 

Redevelopment 

Period: 1 September 

2008–to date 

4 September 

2008 

19 September 

2008 

Ministry <strong>of</strong> Civil Affairs 

State Council 

Comprehensive Damage Assessment <strong>of</strong> Wenchuan Earthquake 

Comprehensive Plan <strong>of</strong> Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery and 

Redevelopment 

Source: 2008 China Disaster Reduction Yearbook, Office <strong>of</strong> National Disaster Reduction Commission. December 2009. 147 Baiguang Lu, Dongcheng District, Beijing 

14 



After three months <strong>of</strong> providing temporary living 

subsidies, the Government continued to provide 

follow-up assistance to people who were still struggling 

through unstable living conditions. <strong>The</strong> main target 

group constituted the ‘three-orphaned people’, family 

members <strong>of</strong> the dead or seriously disabled who had 

difficulties, relocated families, and families living in 

damaged houses. From September to November 2008, 

the follow-up stipend was 200 yuan per month per 

person, and even higher for the ‘three-orphaned 

people’. After the follow-up programme ended, people 

still in need <strong>of</strong> Government assistance were covered by 

the minimum living standard system, the ‘Five- 

Guarantee System’, and the programme <strong>of</strong> ‘Temporary 

Assistance for Winter’. 

3.2.2 Establishment <strong>of</strong> the financing social 

protection mechanism 

In order to encourage donation and to avoid the arbitrary 

use <strong>of</strong> donation, the Government issued five policies to 

regulate and monitor transparent management and usage 

<strong>of</strong> the relief materials, fund and donations. <strong>The</strong> State 

Council also issued measures to ensure the financing <strong>of</strong> 

the recovery and redevelopment policies. A ‘twinning’ 

arrangement was set up one month afterwards so that the 

particular provinces or cities could take responsibility for 

a particular affected county by providing support for 

reconstruction and housing. 

3.2.3 Quick recovery and redevelopment 

Planning 

<strong>The</strong> Central Government made a great effort to assess 

the damage and to plan for the recovery and 

redevelopment in a very short period. <strong>The</strong> regulations and 

the comprehensive plan included both financing and 

delivery <strong>of</strong> social protection to the earthquake-affected 

people. 

3.3 Demands for social protection after 

the earthquake 

On the basis <strong>of</strong> the baseline survey in Mianyang, we 

found that 60.9 per cent <strong>of</strong> the households found their 

houses to be destroyed or damaged beyond repair and 

in need <strong>of</strong> being rebuilt, and that only 3.8 per cent <strong>of</strong> the 

households did not see any major damages to their 

houses. <strong>The</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> the houses needed some level <strong>of</strong> 

reinforcement and restoration. 

As regards the issue <strong>of</strong> livelihood, among the rural 

households interviewed, which accounted for 65.2 per 

cent <strong>of</strong> the total, 59.8 per cent had their land and 

fishing pond damaged, and 78.6 per cent <strong>of</strong> them 

predicted losses in agricultural production, while 75.5 

per cent <strong>of</strong> the small business owners were compelled 

to close down their businesses for lack <strong>of</strong> operating 

funding. 

As regards the recovery <strong>of</strong> household livelihood, 37.8 per 

cent <strong>of</strong> the respondents believed that it would take them 

five or more years to return to their pre-quake economic 

condition, and 25.5 per cent <strong>of</strong> the surveyed people 

believed that they would never be able to regain their 

pre-quake economic status. 

From the survey, it was found that since many people had 

lost their sources <strong>of</strong> income, poverty would become a 

major problem. A few <strong>of</strong> the most vulnerable groups were 

identified as follows: 

1. <strong>The</strong> pre-quake poor households such as the 

recipients <strong>of</strong> the rural and urban Minimum Living 

Guarantee Programmes. <strong>The</strong>y would find it extremely 

hard to improve their economic situation given the 

damage <strong>of</strong> the disaster. 

2. <strong>The</strong> marginal poor rural and urban households. <strong>The</strong>y 

were not qualified as recipients <strong>of</strong> the rural and urban 

Minimum Living Guarantee Programmes but their 

income level was low and they would be very likely to 

fall into poverty. 

3. <strong>The</strong> new orphans, the childless elderly, and the 

disabled caused by the earthquake. <strong>The</strong>y needed 

assistance in basic living, medical care, and social 

services. 

4. <strong>The</strong> households in the hardest-hit areas such as 

Beichuan, that had their assets and properties 

completely lost and damaged, and had no source <strong>of</strong> 

income to maintain a basic livelihood. 

5. <strong>The</strong> households whose major labour force had died 

or become disabled. Not only did these households 

have no income, but they also had to spend more on 

medical or rehabilitation care. 

6. <strong>The</strong> families with their houses completely damaged 

and loans yet to be fully paid. Among the surveyed 

households, 23.5 per cent had loans on their 

households. <strong>The</strong>se households would easily fall into 

poverty. 

7. <strong>The</strong> reallocated households without any income 

during the resettlement period. <strong>The</strong>y needed social 

protection to help them settle down and regain a 

source <strong>of</strong> livelihood. 

15 



3.4 Emergency social protection 

provided 

<strong>The</strong> assistances provided during the emergency period 

included: 

1. Rescue and provision <strong>of</strong> basic supplies such as water, 

food, clothing, blankets, medicine, etc. for basic 

survival. <strong>The</strong> main deliverers <strong>of</strong> these assistance 

materials were the militaries and volunteers, as well as 

the surviving local cadres. 

2. Emergent reallocation <strong>of</strong> the disaster-affected people. 

<strong>The</strong> first stage was to move people out <strong>of</strong> the 

dangerous areas to safer places such as parks, 

temporary shelters, and vacant factories. <strong>The</strong>n they 

were moved into the tent areas, and finally to the 

temporary housing complexes. 

3. Provision <strong>of</strong> free food and water. For the first three 

months, all the disaster-affected people were provided 

with free food and water, and some people also 

received other free supplies such as blankets and 

clothing. 

4. Emergency cash for the disaster-affected people. A 

total <strong>of</strong> 300 yuan and 15 kilogrammes <strong>of</strong> food were 

provided to each person for three months. <strong>The</strong> 

orphans, the childless elderly, and the disabled 

received double benefits. 

5. Compensation to the households with casualties. 

Each household received 5,000 yuan for each 

casualty. 

6. Three levels <strong>of</strong> housing assistances were defined on 

the basis <strong>of</strong> the size and economic conditions <strong>of</strong> the 

households. <strong>The</strong> compensation ranged from 16,000 

yuan to 26,000 yuan. 

7. Continued assistance was <strong>of</strong>fered to orphans, the 

childless elderly, the disabled, families with casualties, 

households reallocated without sources <strong>of</strong> income, 

families whose houses were completely or severely 

damaged, and poor households. <strong>The</strong>se people were 

entitled to receive three more months <strong>of</strong> emergency 

disaster assistances. 

In terms <strong>of</strong> social protection coverage after the 

earthquake, it was found from the survey that 99 per cent 

<strong>of</strong> the respondents said that they had enough food, and 

most <strong>of</strong> them had meat in their meals. Nearly 70 per cent 

<strong>of</strong> the shelters had electricity, 92.9 per cent <strong>of</strong> the 

respondents had safe drinking water, and 86.2 per cent <strong>of</strong> 

them reported that they were very satisfied or satisfied 

with their current living conditions. Table 3 presents these 

findings. 

Table 3 Social protection coverage: two months after 

the earthquake 

Current Living Conditions 

Having Enough 

Food to Eat 

Having Meat in 

Meals 

Percentage 

Yes 99.0 

No 1.0 

Daily 23.8 

4-5 Times per Week 5.5 

2-3 Times per Week 22.8 

Once a Week 30.8 

Less than Once a Week or 

17.1 

No Meat 

Having Electricity Yes 68.9 

Having Safe 

Drinking Water 

Satisfaction to 

Current Status 

No 31.1 

Safe 92.9 

Not Safe 4.6 

Unknown 2.5 

Very Satisfied 11.1 

Satisfied 75.1 

Not Very Satisfied 11.6 

Very Unsatisfied 2.1 

Source: Compiled from the Baseline Household Survey in Mianyang 

We further analysed the type <strong>of</strong> assistance that the people 

had received. Table 4 presents the results. Again, we found 

that 34 per cent <strong>of</strong> them were assisted in rescue and 

evacuation; 92.7 per cent received food and water; 80.9 per 

cent received other living necessities; 70.4 per cent received 

cash; 32.1 per cent were placed in shelters; 57.5 per cent 

received help in setting up tents and shelters; 13.9 per cent 

received help in childcare or tutoring; 27.3 per cent received 

consulting services; 16.9 per cent got books; and 6.6 per 

cent received other forms <strong>of</strong> assistance. We found that 

relatives, friends and armies provided the maximum help in 

rescue and evacuation. Government agencies were the 

main providers for food, water, living necessities, medical 

services and medicines, and shelters. Local cadres and 

friends and relatives were also the main providers <strong>of</strong> 

assistance. It was very interesting to note that volunteers 

had played an important role in social protection provision. 

While food, water, living necessities, medical services and 

medicine were mostly provided by traditional actors such as 

the army and the government agencies, other forms <strong>of</strong> 

assistance such as consulting services, childcare and 

tutoring, and books were mainly provided by the volunteers 

as compared to the other actors. In comparison, the NGOs 

played a relatively smaller role in disaster assistance. 

16 



Table 4 Social protection provision 

Social Protection Received Two Months after the Earthquake 

Type <strong>of</strong> Assistances % Received Provider (%) 

Relatives or Local Government Volunteers Army NGOs 

Friends Cadres Agencies 

Rescue and Evacuation 34.0 9.7 4.0 6.6 8.1 19.0 3.3 

Food and Water 92.7 5.0 19.0 61.1 17.9 5.3 6.8 

Other Living Necessities 80.9 4.7 16.0 52.0 16.4 3.8 7.3 

Medical Services/Medicines 81.2 1.3 15.2 53.8 14.4 3.9 8.1 

Cash 70.4 3.4 7.3 45.6 3.8 0.3 2.3 

Shelter 32.1 7.1 5.0 17.6 2.2 1.4 1.1 

Building Tents/Shelters 57.5 5.6 6.7 33.0 6.2 8.8 4.0 

Childcare/Tutoring 13.9 0.4 0.3 2.6 8.6 0.6 2.5 

Consulting 27.3 6.9 3.2 3.9 16.0 0.7 0.9 

Books 16.9 0.0 1.8 4.9 8.8 0.3 1.7 

Other Assistances 6.6 1.0 1.3 1.2 2.9 0.4 0.7 

Source: Compiled from the Baseline Household Survey in Mianyang 

Changing social protection demands between two 

months and sixteen months after the earthquake 

We asked the earthquake-affected people what their 

biggest concerns were at the time <strong>of</strong> the survey. In the 

baseline survey, the top three answers were the following: 

68.4 per cent <strong>of</strong> the surveyed people said that they were 

most concerned about their housing construction, 17.26 

per cent were concerned about their livelihood, and 4.69 

per cent were concerned about the unclear after-quake 

situation and the unclear redevelopment and 

reconstruction plan. 

In the follow-up survey, which was conducted about 16 

months after the earthquake, it was found that 39.25 per 

cent <strong>of</strong> the respondents were concerned about their 

livelihood, 32.57 per cent were concerned about the 

housing construction, and 8.77 per cent were most 

concerned about their health. <strong>The</strong> order <strong>of</strong> concerns had 

reversed between the baseline and the follow-up surveys, 

with livelihood moving up as the top concern and housing 

being the second. Health had also become an important 

concern <strong>of</strong> the people affected by the earthquake. 

As regards the government’s priorities in redevelopment 

and reconstruction, in the baseline survey, 48.95 per cent 

<strong>of</strong> the respondents said that they wanted the government 

to make the building <strong>of</strong> permanent housing as the priority, 

16.91 per cent wanted the roads and infrastructure to be 

restored first, 11.99 per cent wanted school conditions to 

be improved for their children, 11.28 per cent said that 

they needed temporary housing and 4.72 per cent were in 

urgent need <strong>of</strong> jobs. 

In the follow-up survey, it was found that 40.80 per cent <strong>of</strong> 

the respondents were concerned about the housing 

construction, 17.55 per cent wanted the roads and 

infrastructure to be restored, 16.28 per cent wanted the 

government to solve their livelihood problems, 15.64 per 

cent hoped that the government would strengthen the 

local economic development, and 2.33 per cent wanted 

improved education conditions for their children. 

Seen from the order <strong>of</strong> government priorities expected by 

the respondents in the baseline and follow-up surveys, 

housing, roads and infrastructure restoration were the 

issues <strong>of</strong> maximum concern among the respondents. In 

the second survey, a larger proportion <strong>of</strong> the respondents 

expected the government to strengthen local economic 

development and solve their livelihood problems. At the 

same time, a smaller percentage <strong>of</strong> the respondents cited 

the issue <strong>of</strong> education conditions as their top concern, 

probably because the government had already prioritised 

the improvement <strong>of</strong> schools on their agenda. 

While individuals and households suffered heavy losses, 

the social protection system was also severely affected by 

the earthquake. <strong>The</strong> next section concentrates on the 

assessment <strong>of</strong> the damages to the social protection 

system and how, under the severe conditions, the system 

managed to react to the suddenly increased demands for 

social protection. 

17 



4 Social protection system during and after the 

earthquake 

4.1 Damage to the social protection system 

In Beichuan, the hardest-hit county in Mianyang Municipal 

City, among the 3,441 total government personnel, 568 

cadres died and 172 cadres became severely disabled, 

accounting for 21.5 per cent <strong>of</strong> the total cadres. Table 5 

presents the findings <strong>of</strong> the damages from the cadre survey. 

As many as 74.2 per cent <strong>of</strong> the cadres reported that their 

<strong>of</strong>fice buildings were damaged, 53 per cent reported 

damaged <strong>of</strong>fice furniture, and 18.4 per cent reported 

damaged equipment and vehicles. In addition, 15.6 per 

cent <strong>of</strong> the cadres reported that archived files and data were 

missing, and 7.1 per cent reported that they could not find 

the <strong>of</strong>ficial stamps and documents, while 46.4 per cent <strong>of</strong> 

the cadres were left with very poor working conditions. 

Eight per cent <strong>of</strong> the surveyed cadres said that their 

colleagues had died, were injured or had left, and 6.6 per 

cent complained that the new staff members were not up 

to the tasks, 8 per cent suffered injury, 13.2 per cent said 

that their family members were injured, and 6.7 per cent 

said that their family members had died or were missing. 

<strong>The</strong> fact that the personnel <strong>of</strong> the social protection system 

were so severely affected themselves in the disaster created 

a ‘double identity’ phenomenon, with the cadres being both 

victims and relief agents in the disaster. Cadres had to 

operate within a context <strong>of</strong> organisational and personal 

devastation, with limited resources and much pressure to 

help their own communities, all while trying to cope with their 

own losses. While on the one hand this dual reality resulted 

in an extra burden to the already overburdened cadres, the 

fact that they were ‘in it’ together with the ordinary population 

was both a major reported motivation to dedicate 

themselves to relief and reconstruction, and a great source 

<strong>of</strong> solidarity and legitimacy from the perspective <strong>of</strong> the local 

population, their fellow victims <strong>of</strong> the disaster. 

Table 5 Damages caused by the Wenchuan 

earthquake to the social protection system 

Damage caused by the Wenchuan earthquake Percentage 

Hardware Office Building 74.2 

Office Furniture 53.0 

Archived Files and Data 15.6 

Official Stamps and Documents 7.1 

Vehicles and Equipment 18.4 

Very Poor Working Condition 46.4 

Personnel Staff Died, Injured or Moved 8.0 

New Staff Were Not Up to the Tasks 6.6 

Injured 8.0 

Family Members Injured 13.2 

Family Members Died or Missing 6.7 

Source: Compiled from the Cadre Survey in Mianyang 

<strong>The</strong> survey <strong>of</strong> the 1,241 cadres revealed a very 

challenging situation for social protection because the 

system itself had suffered very severe damage in terms <strong>of</strong> 

both hardware and personnel. 

4.2 Coping with the sudden increase <strong>of</strong> 

social protection needs: findings from 

the cadre survey 

Local cadres took every measure to ensure the delivery <strong>of</strong> 

social protection to the needy people. Table 6 presents 

the findings <strong>of</strong> how the local cadres responded to the 

sudden increase in social protection needs. 

<strong>The</strong> cadres at all levels have done a remarkable job since 

the earthquake. During the one-month period following 

the earthquake, they carried out many emergency tasks, 

such as collecting and reporting statistics on the dead 

and the injured, rescuing and transferring the injured, 

evacuating and settling the survivors, building and 

managing temporary shelters, helping in sanitation and 

epidemic control, and dealing with the dead bodies and 

ruins. A majority <strong>of</strong> the cadres reported that their workload 

and responsibilities had increased, and that their daily 

working hours had increased from 8.2 to 13.3 during the 

first month <strong>of</strong> the earthquake, while six months later, they 

were still working 9.3 hours per day. 

Table 6 Coping with the sudden increase <strong>of</strong> 

demands for social protection 

Coping with the Sudden Increase <strong>of</strong> Demands for Percentage 

Social Protection 

Increased Workload 64.1 

Increased Responsibilities 67.8 

Responsibilities during the One-month Period 

after the Disaster 

Statistical Information Collection and Reporting 49.8 

Rescue and Transferring <strong>of</strong> the Injured 23.1 

Evacuation and Temporary Settlement <strong>of</strong> the Survivors 51.6 

Relief Materials and Fund Allocation and Management 46.5 

Building Temporary Shelters 22.4 

Managing Temporary Shelters 13.3 

Dealing with the Dead – Bodies and Ruins 6.4 

Sanitation and Epidemic Control 18.5 

Increased Working Hour(s) 

Before the Earthquake 8.2 

One Month after the Earthquake 13.3 

Current 9.3 

Changed or Promoted to New Positions 16.7 


18 



4.3 Sources <strong>of</strong> resilience in the social 

protection system 

As shown above, the social protection system was able to 

cope reasonably well with the initial <strong>impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> the disaster, 

despite suffering significant damage itself. <strong>The</strong>re were 

several factors that appeared in the interviews as particularly 

salient in the cadres’ own account <strong>of</strong> their resilience: 

1. A very deep sense <strong>of</strong> commitment and duty, 

reinforced in this case by the cadres’ own dual identity 

as victims and restorers. 

2. <strong>The</strong> dual structure <strong>of</strong> Chinese administration (parallel 

state and party organisations) provided an in-built 

degree <strong>of</strong> redundancy and organisational capacity. 

3. <strong>The</strong> very high level <strong>of</strong> identification and solidarity <strong>of</strong> 

most cadres as both civil servants and party 

members. 

4. A very dynamic and flexible leadership system that 

allowed for a very speedy replacement <strong>of</strong> lost 

management, and the quick restoration <strong>of</strong> chains <strong>of</strong> 

command and communication. 

5. <strong>The</strong> fairly speedy reaction by the central government, 

providing both resources and administrative back-up 

in the form <strong>of</strong> pairing arrangements. 

Nevertheless, the process <strong>of</strong> bouncing back from the 

disaster was not instantaneous and unproblematic. <strong>The</strong> 

short-term solutions developed during the relief stage did 

not necessarily facilitate a restoration to ordinary 

functioning. <strong>The</strong> initial stages were almost by definition 

disordered and ad hoc, with the restoration <strong>of</strong> routine 

bureaucratic procedures coming back online slowly. 

Table 7 details the cadres’ own perceived duration <strong>of</strong> the 

period <strong>of</strong> chaos in the functioning <strong>of</strong> local government. A 

surprisingly sizeable minority (almost a third) <strong>of</strong> 

respondents did not feel that the situation ever amounted 

to ‘chaos’, which suggests that at least some structures 

kept operating well enough to justify a feeling <strong>of</strong> 

continuous functioning. <strong>The</strong> answers do fall into a fairly 

monotonic distribution, with most respondents feeling that 

chaos ended within a month <strong>of</strong> the disaster. 

Table 8 details a related but not identical question, the 

restoration <strong>of</strong> ‘order’ to the functioning <strong>of</strong> local 

government, understood to mean a return to the normal 

routine operation <strong>of</strong> their departments (although not a 

return to ‘normality’ given the changes in the demands 

put on the system). <strong>The</strong> distribution is similarly sloped, but 

it is also clear that the respondents saw a more 

protracted, and rather more spread-out, process <strong>of</strong> 

re-normalisation. 

Table 7 Perceived time to end <strong>of</strong> ‘chaos’ in the 

functioning <strong>of</strong> interviewed cadres’ departments 

Perceived time to ‘end <strong>of</strong> chaos’ in their department 

Time <strong>of</strong> Chaos 

Percentage 

Never felt chaos 33.5 

1-3 days 25.1 

4-7 days 13.0 

1-4 weeks 10.9 

1-3 months 6.8 



Over a year 3.1 

System is still chaotic 3.4 

TOTAL 100.0 

Source: Cadre materials from Mianyang 

Table 8 Cadres’ perceived time to ‘restoration <strong>of</strong> 

order’ in their local government work 

Perceived time to ‘restoration <strong>of</strong> order’ in their departments 

Time to Order 

Percentage 

Order all the time 31.8 

1-3 days 19.0 

4-7 days 13.8 

1-4 weeks 12.3 




Over a year 3.9 

Still not back to order 3.1 

TOTAL 100.0 

Source: compiled from cadre materials from Mianyang 

<strong>The</strong> perception <strong>of</strong> the time scale <strong>of</strong> a restoration <strong>of</strong> 

unchaotic normal operation brings into attention the most 

delicate part <strong>of</strong> the process <strong>of</strong> institutional resilience: the 

inflection points between the various stages <strong>of</strong> ‘rescue’, 

‘relief’ and ‘reconstruction’. All stages require different 

capabilities and priorities, but the demands on the system 

remain high throughout. That pressure on the social 

protection institutions and agents remain continuously 

19 



Table 9 Pressure and <strong>impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> the earthquake on the local cadres 

Pressure on the Local Cadres and Impact on Health 

Mental Health 

CESD Average Score 12.9 

Category (%) =20 20.1 

Symptoms Total Score 1.9 

Category (%) Chest Pain 14.3 

Stomach Pain 9.9 

Diarrhoea 11.2 

Headache 36.6 

Serious Injury 0.7 

Non-serious Injury 3.9 

Fever 4.9 

Cough, Sore Throat 45.3 

Palpitation 44.8 

Others 17.2 

Self-reported Health Status Before (%) After (%) 

Excellent 28.4 8.9 

Very Good 36.8 25.7 

Good 29.5 43.9 

Fair 3.9 17.2 

Poor 1.4 4.4 

Self-assessment <strong>of</strong> Current Health Problems (%) Very Serious 1.7 

Relatively Serious 10.1 

Serious 27.7 

Not Serious 42.5 

Hard to Say 17.9 

Treatment when Sick (%) Hospitalised 4.1 

Outpatient Clinic Treated 21.2 

Family/Friend Treated 3.7 

Bought Drugs 56.3 

Not Treated 14.8 

Reason for Not Seeking Treatment Not Serious 31.2 

Financial Difficulties 6.7 

No Time 43.9 

Inconvenient Transportation 0.7 

Long Waiting Line in the Hospitals 3.3 

Do Not Like Hospitals 9.3 

Other 4.9 

Behaviour Health: Smoking Before (%) After (%) 

Occasionally 21.2 13.0 

Daily 78.8 87.0 


20 



high for such a protracted period, at the same time that 

they have to solve the internal organisational 

reconstruction and redeployment <strong>of</strong> resources put a 

significant stress on the human resources <strong>of</strong> the system, 

the cadres themselves. 

4.4 Challenges for sustained capacity 

<strong>of</strong> the social protection system: findings 

from the cadre survey 

Table 6 indicates that due to the damages to the social 

protection system, the local cadre system also experienced 

very rapid change, with 16.7 per cent <strong>of</strong> the cadres having 

changed positions or having been promoted. 

Table 9 highlights the pressure on the local cadres and 

the <strong>impact</strong> on their mental, physical and behavioural 

health. <strong>The</strong> average Center for Epidemiologic Studies 

Depression Scale (CES-D) score <strong>of</strong> the cadres was 12.9 

six months after the quake. As per the survey, 20.1 per 

cent <strong>of</strong> them had a score <strong>of</strong> over 20, indicating severe 

depression and 12.1 per cent <strong>of</strong> them had scores ranging 

between 16 and 19. On average, the cadres reported 1.9 

health symptoms – 14.3 per cent <strong>of</strong> them had chest pain, 

9.9 per cent had stomach pain, 11.2 per cent had 

diarrhoea, 36.6 per cent had headaches, 4.6 per cent had 

injures not related to the earthquake, 4.9 per cent had 

fever, 45.3 per cent <strong>of</strong> them reported having a cough or 

sore throat, 44.8 per cent felt palpitations and 17.2 

exhibited other health symptoms. 

<strong>The</strong>re was a significant change in the self-reported health 

status. <strong>The</strong> proportion <strong>of</strong> respondents reporting excellent 

health dropped from 28.4 per cent to 8.9 per cent, 

signifying a change <strong>of</strong> almost 20 per cent, and the 

proportion <strong>of</strong> people who had earlier reported very good 

health also decreased from 36.8 per cent before the 

quake to 25.7 per cent after the quake. Simultaneously, 

those who reported poor and fair health status registered 

a very significant increase, from 5.3 per cent to 21.6 per 

cent. Over 30 per cent <strong>of</strong> the respondents claimed that 

their health problem was serious, and more than half <strong>of</strong> 

them did not seek healthcare, the main reason for which 

was that they had no time to go to hospital. <strong>The</strong> pressure 

exerted by the post-earthquake situation also resulted in 

increased substance abuse. For example, before the 

earthquake, 78.8 per cent <strong>of</strong> the affected residents were 

daily smokers, but this percentage increased to 87 per 

cent six months after the quake. 

<strong>The</strong> local cadres were also confronted with the pressure 

<strong>of</strong> delivering social protection and other services to the 

affected people, and working on redevelopment <strong>of</strong> the 

economies in the affected region. Moreover, they had to 

face the loss and injury <strong>of</strong> their close family members, 

relatives and colleagues, as also the loss <strong>of</strong> family assets 

and sources <strong>of</strong> livelihood. All these factors took a heavy 

health toll on these personnel. <strong>The</strong> findings from the 

cadre survey indicated that while the local cadres could 

be quickly deployed for carrying out the tasks <strong>of</strong> 

delivering social protection and other forms <strong>of</strong> emergency 

assistance, their sustained capacity <strong>of</strong> social protection 

delivery was severely undermined. 

4.5 <strong>The</strong> weak spots <strong>of</strong> the social 

protection system identified by the local 

cadres 

<strong>The</strong> local cadres were asked to identify the weak spots in 

the social protection system during their work in providing 

earthquake emergency management and relief. Among 

the surveyed respondents, 38.5 per cent said that the 

relief fund and materials should be better prepared, 34 

per cent said that coordination among government 

agencies needed to be improved, 26.4 per cent said that 

the rescue and relief operations should be strengthened, 

and 19.9 per cent said that a disaster insurance system 

needed to be established. 

With regards to the performance evaluation <strong>of</strong> various 

aspects in social protection delivery, Table 10 presents 

the satisfaction scores <strong>of</strong> the cadres. <strong>The</strong> ranking in terms 

<strong>of</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> satisfaction over the performance <strong>of</strong> the cadres 

was quake lake management (8.7 per cent), price control 

and regulation (7.1 per cent), permanent housing 

construction (6.5 per cent), temporary housing 

construction (5.5 per cent), job creation (5.5 per cent) and 

psychosocial support (5.4 per cent). 

<strong>The</strong> ranking in terms <strong>of</strong> a high degree <strong>of</strong> satisfaction over 

the performance <strong>of</strong> the Government was hygiene and 

sanitation (47.5 per cent), treatment and transfer <strong>of</strong> the 

injured (41.4 per cent), emergency mobilisation (40.9 per 

cent), evacuation (37.6 per cent), rescue (35.3 per cent), 

transportation <strong>of</strong> relief materials (34.9 per cent), temporary 

settlement (34.7 per cent), restoration <strong>of</strong> water and 

electricity lines (33.4 per cent), school reopening 

(32 per cent) and reopening <strong>of</strong> markets and stores 

(31.4 per cent). <strong>The</strong> health sector has won the highest 

score in its performance during this earthquake, followed 

by emergency rescue, evacuation and mobilisation. <strong>The</strong> 

provision <strong>of</strong> basic living conditions (settlement, water, 

electricity, market, etc.) ranked the third. Schools 

reopening was also considered by the cadres to be a very 

satisfying achievement. 

21 



Table 10 Evaluation <strong>of</strong> service delivery performance during the earthquake 

Tasks 

Very Satisfied 

(%) 

Relatively 

Satisfied (%) 

Satisfied 

(%) 

Not Satisfied 

(%) 

Emergency Mobilisation 40.9 44.1 11.5 3.5 

Rescue 35.3 47.7 14.1 2.9 

Evacuation 37.6 50.7 9.6 2.1 

Temporary Settlement 34.7 55.2 8.4 1.7 

Transportation <strong>of</strong> Relief Materials 34.9 56.3 7.9 0.9 

Allocation <strong>of</strong> Relief Materials 29.0 62.4 7.7 1.0 

Allocation <strong>of</strong> Relief Fund 27.2 61.6 9.7 1.5 

Temporary Housing Construction 24.7 51.4 18.4 5.5 

Quake Lake Management 28.7 43.0 19.6 8.7 

Temporary Housing Allocation 25.3 59.3 12.6 2.8 

Redevelopment Planning 23.7 59.4 13.7 3.2 

Restoration <strong>of</strong> Transportation 26.2 57.8 12.6 3.4 

Restoration <strong>of</strong> Water and Electricity Lines 33.4 59.1 6.4 1.0 

Reopening <strong>of</strong> Markets and Stores 31.4 62.1 5.9 0.7 

Hygiene and Sanitation 47.5 50.1 2.0 0.4 

Treatment and Transfer <strong>of</strong> Injured 41.4 54.3 3.6 0.8 

Price Regulation and Control 23.1 50.8 18.9 7.1 

Recovery <strong>of</strong> Productions 25.3 63.9 8.9 2.0 

Permanent Housing Construction 19.7 52.8 21.0 6.5 

Reorganization <strong>of</strong> Grassroots Organizations and Communities 22.2 63.0 11.9 2.9 

School Reopening 32.0 58.5 7.7 1.7 

Psychosocial Support 21.3 54.6 18.7 5.4 

Creation <strong>of</strong> Jobs 20.1 56.8 17.6 5.5 


22 



5 Issues in social protection during <strong>disasters</strong> 

5.1 Gaps in social protection 

implementation 

At the macro level, in accordance with public expectation, 

the performance by the Chinese Government appeared 

to be effective in terms <strong>of</strong> provision <strong>of</strong> the disaster relief 

and reconstruction processes, with most people in the 

disaster-affected areas having been relocated to safer 

places and shelters, schools having been quickly rebuilt 

in a much safer condition, infrastructures reconstructed 

and repaired, and people’s livelihoods being restored. 

From June to August 2008, China’s National Audit Office 

published three auditing reports on various aspects <strong>of</strong> 

disaster relief work for Sichuan and found ‘no serious 

incidents <strong>of</strong> breach <strong>of</strong> laws’ in the process <strong>of</strong> disaster 

relief and reconstruction. At the meso and micro levels, 

however, various problems were seen in the social 

protection programme during its implementation. At the 

county level, there were problems <strong>of</strong> uneven progress and 

unequal implementation. <strong>The</strong> Audit Office found that, one 

month after the earthquake, only people in 28 out <strong>of</strong> 65 

towns/townships in the three audited counties were 

receiving the temporary stipend. <strong>The</strong> time lag among 

counties could be as long as one month and the affected 

people had to wait even for the most urgent assistance. 

Interviews with the Wenchuan Earthquake Taskforce 

(WET) team indicated that the criteria to decide who 

‘qualified’ for stipends and subsidies varied greatly from 

place to place. In Chengdu, only ‘people without housing’ 

could receive stipends. In Mianzhu, all people with local 

hukou (household registration) were qualified. In the 

neighbourhood <strong>of</strong> Luojiang County, only one third <strong>of</strong> the 

population could receive the stipend. Naturally, the 

people in Luojiang protested and demanded, ‘Why are 

people at the other side <strong>of</strong> the river eligible for stipend 

even though their houses were intact, while we cannot get 

subsidy when our houses have become uninhabitable’ 

<strong>The</strong> entitlement <strong>of</strong> the emergency disaster assistance 

required the recipients to hold the local hukou. If people 

were reallocated to the settlement sites, they had to go 

back to their hukou locations, which also had to be the 

<strong>of</strong>ficially defined earthquake-affected counties for a 

certificate <strong>of</strong> local hukou registration. Many <strong>of</strong> them may 

not have been able to find the local cadres or <strong>of</strong>ficials in 

time. This policy completely excluded the migrants who 

did not belong to the <strong>of</strong>ficially defined earthquakeaffected 

counties. 

Also, different settlements distributed stipends differently. 

Some provided free meals as well as a standard stipend 

(10 yuan and 0.5 kilogramme <strong>of</strong> grain, per person per 

day), some cut the grain due to provision <strong>of</strong> free meals, 

some provided free meals and no stipend at all, while 

others provided a standard stipend but no free meals. 

This varied implementation <strong>of</strong> social assistance led to a 

lot <strong>of</strong> complaints to the governments. 

At the village level, most regions did not differentiate 

between social protection targets. <strong>The</strong>y either distributed 

resources evenly by household (regardless <strong>of</strong> household 

size), or did a lottery (regardless <strong>of</strong> different family 

situations). Similarly, the programme was biased because 

it only considered the economic condition <strong>of</strong> the 

household, but vulnerable groups such as women, 

children and the elderly were not given special 

consideration. Some local leaders believed that only 

equal distribution among households or per person 

constitutes fairness, and any special treatment to selected 

groups is unfair. Another problem is that the number <strong>of</strong> 

people reported to be qualified for receiving stipends was 

<strong>of</strong>ten inaccurate. More <strong>of</strong>ten than not, the number was 

exaggerated at the county level so that more resources 

could come from the provincial government. 

Finally, there was no formal channel for redressing the 

grievances <strong>of</strong> the people during programme 

implementation. <strong>The</strong> WET team found that some people 

were unsatisfied with the progress or implementation <strong>of</strong> 

the social protection programme but found no regular 

channel to express their opinions. Since local <strong>of</strong>ficials, 

and not personnel from social protection agencies, were 

<strong>of</strong>ten in charge <strong>of</strong> the temporary programmes, local 

people could rely only on the personal reactions <strong>of</strong> 

higher-level <strong>of</strong>ficials to right the wrong, and they were 

afraid <strong>of</strong> facing the vengeance <strong>of</strong> local <strong>of</strong>ficials. 

5.2 Decision-making dilemma 

Differences among the quake-affected counties in terms 

<strong>of</strong> the social, economic, environmental and geographical 

conditions necessitated that the policies on 

redevelopment should suit local conditions while being 

consistent with the national policies. In addition, the local 

situation changed rapidly. <strong>The</strong> complexity required the 

policymakers to be cautious and the policies to be 

tailored to local needs and capacities. But the urgency to 

get people back to normal life demanded quick policy 

responses. 

Information asymmetry was also intensified and created 

more challenges in decision-making and implementation. 

Although information dissymmetry existed in all policy 

design and implementation processes, the situation was 

especially complex during the Wenchuan mega 

23 



earthquake because <strong>of</strong> the large area and number <strong>of</strong> the 

affected regions, disparities in their original social and 

economic development, as well as the different types <strong>of</strong> 

damages caused by the disaster. In addition, as the forms 

<strong>of</strong> emergency assistance were urgent and the situation in 

the region changed quickly, information dissymmetry got 

worse. Finally, many grassroots units were damaged and, 

consequently, the information channel to local 

governments was also lost. 

During the field visits, the WET team found that the 

Government’s responsibility extended well beyond its 

normal range. Due to the heavy social and economic 

damages, the Government had to bear almost all the 

responsibilities for the daily life, and the boundaries 

between the Government, society, and individuals 

became hard to define. All these issues contributed to a 

‘decision-making dilemma’ in the <strong>disasters</strong>, and the role 

<strong>of</strong> the Government went much beyond mere 

implementation <strong>of</strong> the regular social protection system. 

24 



6 Conclusion and discussion 

This paper uses the case <strong>of</strong> the Wenchuan earthquake to 

examine the social protection system, the policies and 

practices <strong>of</strong> social protection during <strong>disasters</strong>, and to 

identify implementation gaps in social protection during 

<strong>disasters</strong>. 

<strong>The</strong> study finds that the existence <strong>of</strong> a pre-disaster social 

protection system, quick policy responses and innovative 

approaches in both the financing and delivery <strong>of</strong> social 

protection are essential for meeting needs when people 

and communities are hit by <strong>disasters</strong>. <strong>The</strong> damaged social 

protection system and the daunting tasks <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fering social 

protection after earthquakes can be managed by 

reallocating the local government personnel and local 

cadres. Several possible sources <strong>of</strong> institutional resilience 

(in particular the dual administrative system in China, and 

the flexibility inherent in the high esprit de corps <strong>of</strong> the 

Chinese civil service) were tentatively identified. <strong>The</strong> 

severely damaged social protection institutions can 

restore functionality in a very short period <strong>of</strong> time by 

intensifying the use <strong>of</strong> surviving resources. However, this 

‘burst’ over stresses the local system in the long run, as 

human resources become over-exhausted and the 

existing organisational structures become over-extended 

and frayed. This can result in an ‘after-shock’ dip in 

functionality or near-systemic failure several months after 

the initial <strong>impact</strong>. 

At a deeper level, if one focuses on these problems <strong>of</strong> 

social protection at the early stages <strong>of</strong> disaster recovery, 

one may fail to take into consideration the social 

protection system itself: how its capacity has been 

affected and how the system could fix itself. In particular, 

one may overlook the double challenges faced by the 

social protection system: to solve the damages caused 

by the disaster, and to rebuild and expand its capacities 

to address the new problems resulting from the disaster. 

This lack <strong>of</strong> consideration for the organisational capacities 

can result in a mismatch between implementation plans 

for new programmes and the disrupted capacities <strong>of</strong> the 

system. This is particularly important when we consider 

the system beyond the formal structures to include the 

intangible assets, networks and communication 

resources, and the interface between suppliers and users 

<strong>of</strong> social protection. 

Finally, volunteers played important roles in delivering 

social protection after the disaster. <strong>The</strong>re is thus a need to 

examine in detail the prospects <strong>of</strong> their increased 

involvement in the social protection system during 

<strong>disasters</strong>. 

In sum, it can be said that the problems in social 

protection policies and implementation, as well as the 

functionality <strong>of</strong> the social protection system reveal some 

typical weaknesses and challenges faced by a social 

protection system during and after major <strong>disasters</strong>. First, 

there can be lack <strong>of</strong> personnel and lack <strong>of</strong> means <strong>of</strong> 

communication and transportation for social protection 

agencies to perform normally. Second, the principle <strong>of</strong> 

social protection (that is, more help to the vulnerable 

groups) is not familiar to most people who are assigned 

to replace the lost formal social protection personnel. 

Third, there are inherent difficulties in accurately 

assessing and verifying information in disaster 

situations. Fourth, in disaster situations, people’s 

expectations for social protection tend to be different 

from those during normal times, and they lay greater 

emphasis on equality than what a social protection 

system is designed to ensure. Lastly, the chaotic 

situation during <strong>disasters</strong> provides windows <strong>of</strong> 

opportunity for some people and organisations (local 

government included) to pursue their own agendas, 

and there is no built-in mechanism to counter the effect 

<strong>of</strong> this. 

25 



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