What's a Good Object to Do? - PsyBC

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6 Neil J. Skolnick ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ but, rather, with the good, fallible, integrated object with whom he could identify, thereby expanding the range of possibilities for his own overly perfectionistic ego or self. Risking a new, decidedly nonanalytic intervention that actually furthered the treatment likewise expanded me both clinically and theoretically. I am not attempting here to provide a comprehensive definition of the essence of a good object. As suggested by the title of this paper, I am primarily focusing on what a good object does and not the essence of its nature. The legacy of psychoanalytic theory and technique may rest more with careful descriptions of what analysts do than with the explanatory validity of the theory. Also, psychoanalysis as a theory no longer aspires solely to the constraints of a hypothetical-deductive model of scientific inquiry. While empirical research has been considered an important contributor to the accretion of psychoanalytic knowledge, with the shift in emphasis of relational theory to studying subjective experience and cocreating relativistic and hermeneutic truths, the cornerstones of empiricism—observation, reliability, and validity—do not always apply to the understanding of psychoanalytic phenomena. This paper presents a categorical description, gleaned from years of clinical practice, of what an analyst, as good object, does, not what a good object is. Furthermore, as the technique of relational psychoanalysis has increasingly disentangled itself from many of the technical dictates of drive theory, the importance of the role of the analyst has shifted from passive, neutral observer and interpreter to active participant. And relational analysis can (though not for all who consider themselves relational) insist that the analyst participate as a good object. To the skeptic, visions of analysts portioning out a never-ending supply of need satisfactions clouds their ability to attend to the more textured and complex nature of a good object. To the converted, objections and cautions to this relatively new technical turn may go unheeded with a cavalier acceptance of its validity. I explore here some broad technical strokes describing how an analyst might function as a good object. Before turning to a consideration of what actions determine a good object in treatment, however, I wish to describe briefly what I consider a good object to be. I see the good object as an amalgam of the object imagoes in the theories of Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Kohut. Whether rooted in nature or in nurture or an admixture of both, the good object is mostly on the side of life. The good object is a mature
What’s a Good Object to Do 7 ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ (Fairbairn, 1952; Kohut, 1984), loving (Fairbairn, 1952; Winnicott, 1965; Klein, 1975a, b), whole, integrated self or other (Klein, 1975a; Kohut, 1984) who has acknowledged and accepted the goodness and badness in oneself and others. It occupies either internal or external space (Klein, 1975a, b; Kohut, 1984). This is an object who does not deny the existence of our more grandiose, idealistic strivings, which pull us with endless hope through life (Winnicott, 1965; Kohut, 1984). Nor does it deny our ever-present sinister affects or destructive motivations (Klein, 1975a). It has managed to accept their inevitability, to struggle with the tensions they evoke; to adapt to them, integrate them, and continue to be able to love and accept love (Fairbairn, 1952; Winnicott, 1965; Klein, 1975a, b; Kohut, 1984). Again, a good object is not a perfect object, one that Klein (1975a, b) referred to as idealized and Fairbairn (1952) referred to as exciting. An idealized or exciting object, when too pervasive or rigid, is ultimately a bad object. It represents neither a loving, a whole, nor an integrated object. Instead, it is a one-dimensional fiction, sometimes engaged with for survival, that denies the existence of complexity, ambivalence, or doubt. 3 The achievement and acceptance of doubt, which is a lifetime struggle of good objects, is an anathema to bad objects. Bad objects require immutable truths, truths that demand absolute adherence in order to survive. All doubt must be destroyed. If any uncertainty is entertained, the absolute truth and meaning of a bad object is in mortal jeopardy. For meaning to be maintained by bad objects, anything smacking of ambivalence, uncertainty, or doubt must be defended against, if not wiped out. In psychoanalysis we refer to this process as the deployment of primitive defense mechanisms, such as splitting, projection, introjection or denial. For Klein (1975b), the obliteration of doubt was the hallmark of a paranoid-schizoid organization. For Fairbairn (1952), overwhelming doubt lay at the very heart of our universally split egos. For Osama bin Laden, death to the infidels obliterates those who might suggest the existence of doubt. In his seminal paper on technique and published nearly a halfcentury after Freud and a half-century before now, Fairbairn (1958) demonstrated far-reaching clinical insight: ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 3 This use of “doubt” receives a more thorough explanation in an article by Sullivan (2001). The article was written in defense of the argument that we are currently engaged in a modern holy war.
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