June 2012 - Indian Airforce

Gp Capt (Retd) Rajesh Kumar 

2 Aerospace Safety J u n e 2 0 1 2 

INDIAN AIR FORCE

Imagine an unsuspecting bunch of Armoured 

Corps personnel, engrossed in live firing at a 

range in the North West sector. Tanks and APCs 

milling around, kicking up a lot of dust and the RSO 

trying his best to peer through the obscurities, to 

keep track of results of firing. It was quite akin to 

a real battle scenario and the prevailing visibility 

over the range did not make matters any easier 

for any one. They had a task at hand and were 

doing their best to get the maximum out of the 

exercise underway. Little did they know that an 

unpleasant surprise was already beginning to 

unfold and that their exercise was about to turn a 

lot more realistic. 

orbiting endlessly in an attempt to pick up the 

targets. The local SU had tried its best to guide 

the hapless pilot but to no avail. Finally, good 

sense prevailed and he decided to call off the 

mission. The RSO too heaved a sigh of relief and 

was happy to hear the pilot change over to the 

SU channel for the trip back to base. 

Since the range had not been sighted, the 

return navigation too started off on an uncertain 

footing. Probably the pilot put all his trust in his 

on-board systems and hoped that eventually the 

SU would pick him up and help him get back 

home. Nothing wrong with that, but it certainly 

Some distance to the West, a lone MiG-27 

was involved in heavy armament work over the 

Air Force portion of the firing range, with 2 x 500 

Kg bombs. Though a simple enough exercise, 

things did not seem to be going well that day. 

The problem was understandable and had been 

experienced by many pilots in the past. The 

problem was that the pilot was not able to make 

contact with the range or any familiar feature in 

its close vicinity. In such sorties, fuel is always at 

a premium so one does not enjoy the luxury of 

would have been wiser to confess that one was 

heading back and was somewhat unsure of his 

ground position. Time ticked away. The RSO in 

the meantime prepared to close the range and 

call it a day which had been quite uneventful till 

the small aberration, a little while ago. All of a 

sudden the aircraft that had just left range, piped 

up on R/T announcing that he now had the 

target in contact and was seeking permission 

to go in for ‘direct live’. Fuel considerations 

seemed to have weighed on the RSO’s mind as 

INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 J u n e Aerospace Safety 3

well and he decided to clear the pilot for direct 

live, without the mandatory Safety Height Run 

first. Also, he did not establish visual contact with 

the aircraft anywhere on the circuit. This should 

have woken him up but events that had been set 

in motion probably were too fast for him to evoke 

a rational action. Even when the pilot called out 

that he was now rolling in live, the RSO did not 

react. A confident call, “You are clear live”, was 

ground. I, as the Flight Commander of the unit 

got an unwelcome call from the COO and he 

wanted to know whether any of our aircraft 

was still operating over the range. His very tone 

suggested that something was drastically wrong 

and soon the AOC and the COO descended 

on the dett. To everyone’s horror, it was quite 

obvious that a fighter had just dropped two 

live bombs bang in the middle of the army 

all that he transmitted. The next call from the 

pilot announced, “Bombs Gone, Switches Safe, 

returning to base”. But even after a minute, the 

RSO had not spotted any bomb impact on the Live 

Bombing Target (LBT) or anywhere in the range 

area. The natural thing then was to put down the 

binoculars and call up the pilot to cross check 

if bombs had indeed been released. On being 

confirmed in the positive, the RSO responded 

by transmitting, “Bombs not sighted, probably 

gross undershoot. You are clear to change 

over to the SU”. The range was closed thereafter 

and the pilot navigated safely back to his base, 

basking in the belief that the mission had finally 

been accomplished. The mission in fact had gone 

wrong completely. 

Things seemed to have settled down to 

routine for the pilot but all was not well on the 

ranges and naturally, the guys in the OG were 

furious. Fortunately, no one was hurt and there 

was no damage to any vehicle or structure. The 

next dignitary to arrive in the unit was the Air I 

from the Command Headquarters and I was 

told to get busy writing an Executive Report on 

the pilot. His fighter flying days were over, 

all because of one avoidable mistake that he 

failed to correct on time. 

It would be worth pondering over the 

following : 

The location of this particular range 

is such that many times picking up targets is 

difficult. The navigation to the range therefore 

has to be taken very seriously. In fact, the 

navigation to any destination has to be taken 

very seriously. Odd instances of inaccuracies 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

creeping in are understandable... but think...was 

there an excuse for the pilot not being able to 

find the range in broad daylight 

Fuel considerations notwithstanding, 

permission to go in for direct live for aircraft 

operating alone, must be granted only under 

exceptional and pre-briefed circumstances. What 

such exceptional circumstance are, need to be 

spelt out unambiguously and briefed properly. 

Since the LBT at this range or for that 

matter at any other heavy armament range would 

generally be obscured because of weapons used 

earlier, be aware of the other features on and 

around the range to help you identify the targets 

correctly. 

Once the decision to abort the mission 

had been taken, suddenly reverting and seeking 

permission for direct live was certainly not in 

order. The pilot was probably not comfortable 

with the idea of landing with two bombs under 

slung. Operating manuals do permit landing 

under such configuration, but don’t you think all 

operators should be aware of this 

Should the RSO have cleared the pilot 

for a direct live attack without the Safety Height 

Run Again a matter of practice but the pitfalls of 

doing so must be understood. 

Now for a dive bomb attack, there is no 

way that an aircraft in dive will not be visible to 

the RSO. Surely, if the visibility is that bad, won’t 

the better option be to close the range 

Having cornered the RSO into clearing 

him for a direct live attack, how about the pilot 

confirming with other features around, what he 

believed to be the LBT and that he indeed was 

going in for the correct target. 

During the entire episode, the RSO did not 

spot the aircraft. Worse still, he did not even hear 

it. Should this have forced him to do something 

other than what he eventually did 

The RSO did not intervene even when the 

aircraft confirmed rolling in live and he was yet 

to establish visual contact. He simply assumed 

that the pilot eventually had things under control 

and was going in for the correct target. The pilot 

too assumed the same and pressed on with 

the attack. Remember the old adage, ‘DO NOT 

ASSUME. It makes an ASS out of U and ME’. In 

this case, it certainly did and consequences could 

have been worse. 

Getting ‘Bombs Away’ is the sole desired 

culmination in such a live firing mission but 

please be sure, the bombs are aimed at the 

desired target and nowhere else. Live bombs 

are dangerous instruments with considerable 

destructive power. Therefore there can be no 

complacency in the manner they are released. 

When in doubt ... DO NOT PRESS THE TRIGGER. 

A large number of seemingly weird 

incidents happen at firing ranges everywhere. 

Some result in very unpleasant consequences for 

players involved and many times even for those 

who are caught unaware on the ground, for no 

fault of theirs. Sharing your experiences with the 

environment can certainly increase awareness 

and minimise chances of recurrence of such 

avoidable incidents. If you are in agreement with 

this, then please do get in touch with the ‘editor’ 

with your story without any delay as it is quite 

likely that someone else could enact something 

close to what you did and you could help him 

avert the same ! 

- Gp Capt (Retd) Rajesh Kumar 

Editor’s Comments : 

Inability to spot the range is a situation that 

many aircrew would have experienced. 

However, the lesson for all is to avoid the 

compulsion to believe that everything is 

fine, when it actually isn’t. Every 

tale may not have a happy 

ending! 


Wg Cdr Juhi Borgohain 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

Mental health is an important aspect of 

total positive health. Every physical 

ailment has a mental component and 

every mental illness has a physical component. 

The WHO Expert Committee defines mental 

health as ‘the capacity of an individual to 

establish harmonious relations with others and 

to participate in or contribute constructively to 

change in the social environment’. 

Stress 

There is a lot of talk going around these days 

about stress. Almost every week, some medical 

journal or lay magazine brings out an article 

on this issue. Most of the 

time, doctors also tell their 

patients to cut down on 

their stress. However, to 

the general public and 

patients, it is quite vague and 

confusing. What is stress Why does it occur Can 

we do away with it Such questions can be quite 

intriguing. 

Stress Response 

It is actually not the stress that concerns us; 

what really concerns us is the “Stress Response”. 

This is the sum total of body reaction, both 

physiological and psychological, in response to a 

“stressor”. So, it is not really the “Stressor” (i.e. the 

situation) that leads to stress but our perception 

of that event, the meaning we attach to it and 

the way we react or respond to it, that leads to 

symptoms or diseases of stress. 

Stimuli from the environment or thoughts 

generated within the mind become amicable or 

inimical depending on whether they generate 

positive or negative effect. An inimical reaction 

brings on the fight response if one is angry and 

the flight response if one is insecure. We can alter 

our stress response from inimical to amicable 

and thereby cope with the stress stimulus. 

For example, let us say, to jump down to the 

ground from the roof, just 12 feet high, may be 

tremendously stressful for most of us. Majority 

of us, on looking down at the ground, would 

feel “butterflies in the stomach”. However, for a 

seasoned paratrooper, it would be fun. So, it is 

not the stressor (events, persons or environment) 

but our own interpretation and how we react 

decides whether we will get “stressed” or not. 

The Life Saving Stress Response 

The stress response in our 

body is meant for a protective 

and desirable reason. It is rather 

life saving. Evolution wise, our 

primitive ancestors, the Early Men, 

were exposed to various dangers at 

most unsuspected times - eg -when 

a hungry tiger suddenly pounced on 

them. To survive such flash emergencies, 

nature developed the “stress response” or “fight or 

flight” response in our body. Within milliseconds 

this would cause the heart to beat faster and 

more strongly and the blood pressure to rise (so 

that more and more blood laden with oxygen and 

glucose could go to the muscles, to either fight it 

out or run away). The breathing would become 

deep and extra glucose would be pumped into 

the blood by the liver, so that more of sugar and 

oxygen could be taken by the blood to the active 

muscles. Kidneys start saving water so that blood 

volume can increase, digestion reduces and 

blood from digestive organs is diverted to the 

active muscles. In addition, the blood clotting 

mechanism would increase so as to quickly seal 

off the wounds and minimize blood loss due to 

bleeding from injuries. 

So, where does all this fit into the problems 

of stress that we are talking about Well, the 

same stress response which was so protective 

during the evolutionary stages of human race 

has become a major hazard to our health. In 

our modern age life, we seldom face the kind of 

physical danger for which nature had designed 

the stress response. Even today, we need it on 


World Health 

Organisation 

The WHO expert committee defines 

Mental Health as ‘the capacity of an individual 

to form harmonious relations with others and 

to participate in or contribute constructively 

to change in the social environment’. 

some relatively uncommon occasions, as when 

suddenly threatened by a robber on a lonely 

track. 

The Harmful Stress Response 

We cannot have our body and mind in a state 

of alarm for prolonged periods of hours (may 

be, weeks or months continuously), to negotiate 

modern day “stressors” or challenges like having 

a difficult boss, staying separate from the 

family, preparing for an important competition, 

difficulties in career, or lesser difficulties like 

having a flat tyre while driving on the highway. 

Even for these small hassles, the body’s stress 

response remains massive or perpetual. The 

increase in blood pressure and heart rate, 

increase in blood sugar, increase in blood clotting 

mechanisms, muscles becoming taut, lowering of 

the immune defence of the body and reduction 

in the digestive process continue for long periods 

and lead to major diseases like hypertension, 

diabetes, peptic ulcer, infections, muscular and 

joint pains. It is therefore essential for us to learn 

ways and means to calm down our reactions to 

the stressor, and to develop adequate “coping 

mechanisms” to tackle the stressors of day-to-day 

living. 

The Adverse Effects of Stress 

Stress affects our health in a wide variety 

of ways. Psycho-somatic effects include IHD, 

hypertension, diabetes mellitus, peptic ulcers, 

predisposition to certain cancers, lowered 

immune functioning, arthralgias and myalgias, 

tension - headaches, etc. Emotional effects 

include suppressed hostility, anger, panic, 

irritability, “burnout”, fatigue, sleep disorders, 

anxiety and depression. 

Roadmap for Preventing and Managing 

Stress 

Learning and practising the power 

of “Now”. To have an intense awareness of 

the present moment, rather than brooding 

over the past which we cannot change, or 

contemplating about the future that we have 

no control over. 

Develop Personal Financial 

Management Skills 

Develop Time-Management Skills. Time 

is a premium entity. Managing available time 

in the most gainful and productive manner is 

a skill. Improper time management leads to 

procrastination and stress. 

Maintain Good Health. Even minor 

ailments such as common cold makes one 

feel demoralized; major diseases like diabetes 

would then certainly produce tremendous 

stress. One should therefore make conscious 

efforts to maintain good health and prevent 

such diseases. 

Undertake Regular and Brisk Physical 

Exercise and Yoga. Exercise leads to release 

of beta-endorphins which act on the brain and 

bring about a feeling of euphoria, well-being, 

confidence, alertness and decrease in pain 

sensations. This “high” state acts as an antidote 

to stress. 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

Train the Family Members for Difficult 

Situations and Spend “Quality Time” with Your 

Family. One of the major precursors of stress is 

the feeling of being “isolated” or “disconnected”. 

When you spend quality time with your family 

members, you feel connected, without any feeling 

of isolation, which helps preventing stress. 

a particular task or favour being asked of you is 

unjustified or beyond your capabilities. 

Avoid Ego Struggles. We sometimes act as 

if it is more important to be seen as “right” rather 

than be happy. It is best to avoid the tendency to 

forcefully convince others when it is not so critical 

Practise Assertiveness skills. Assertiveness 

is the honest expression of what you feel and 

want from others, without trying to force them 

to give it. It is particularly useful when dealing 

with “difficult” people and the consequent stress. 

Some of the characteristics of assertive behavior 

which need to be developed are : 

‣ Speak up for yourself, for your needs and 

rights, while letting others speak for themselves. 

‣ Develop a sense of respect for yourself as well 

as for others. 

‣ Protest, maybe politely but definitely, against 

unfair treatment or unjustified criticism. 

‣ Take honest responsibility for your own 

wrongs / mistakes, but at the same time, do not 

take responsibility for someone else’s lapses. 

‣ Say “NO”, maybe politely, when you feel that 

to your own health and well-being. Doing so 

will help you escape a great deal of unnecessary 

stress. 

Develop Social Support Systems. It is 

a very wise investment to put in some effort to 

develop some close friends towards whom we 

can look up for support during stressful situations. 

Others 

Adopt traditional cultures 

Practise “Relaxation” techniques 

Progressive, deep muscular relaxation 

Practise methods to get a good sleep 

Spiritual Practices, Praying and Meditation 

and 

Promote humor and laughter 

-Wg Cdr Juhi Borgohain 


Sqn Ldr R Kadyan 

Since the dawn of aviation industry we have 

had many accidents owing to marginal 

weather conditions. ‘Respect weather and 

decide in time’ is the golden rule and if adhered 

to will definitely help in preventing accidents/ 

incidents. 

It was one of the monsoon months of 2009. 

I was posted to a premier fighter base in the 

Northern region. On this fateful day, I was part 

of a 4 ac formation tasked to carry out a dummy 

strike over another airfield in the J&K sector. The 

latter part of our route involved considerable 

amount of valley flying. I had recently attained 

my supervisory status and was quite eager to fly 

this mission. Due to bad weather at the target 

base our early morning scheduled take off got 

considerably delayed. Eventually by afternoon, 

on getting latest weather, we got airborne. 

The enroute weather was as predicted and 

did not hamper the safe transit till we hit the 

foothills. As we crossed over the first ridge line, 

the difficulty quotient of the exercise increased as 

it entailed RV with two ‘Tied Escorts’ in marginal 

weather conditions. A successful RV with escorts 

was achieved and the mission continued as 

briefed. Looking towards the hills along the 

planned route, I spotted a thick black layer of 

towering clouds. Out of sheer restlessness, I piped 

up on R/T for a weather update from an enroute 

fighter base. The feedback which we received was 

base specific and no update on weather over the 

hills was given. The Escort Leader also updated 

reasonable vertical development of this clouding. 

With every passing second the formation got 

closer and my restlessness kept increasing. Our 

six ac formation was a minute away from the 

planned intercept leg when broken clouding 

started interfering with our formation keeping. 

The formation leader ordered a few side steps to 

avoid patches of clouds. I was sure the formation 

members must have felt uncomfortable flying in 

that scenario. 

Soon, the escorts were out of sight as they 

resorted to height separation due to clouding. The 

formation keeping was getting challenging and 

the situation was expected to get worse once the 

tactical action would commence which included 

loss of contact, height separation, escape routes 

etc. With the increase of clouding my discomfort 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

level was rapidly increasing. Eventually, I piped up 

on R/T and asked the leader to abort the mission. 

I expected a positive reply and mentally prepared 

myself for subsequent actions. However, when 

the leader called to ‘continue’, I was shocked. 

My professional competence was getting 

sandwiched between taking a safe decision and 

continuing with the mission. Our formation also 

had pilots with lesser experience who were also 

continuing without expressing their discomfort. 

The reason for their silence was not difficult to 

predict at that moment. They behaved as true 

followers with immense faith in their leader. This 

fact hit my professional ego - ’if they could do it 

then why not me’. The ‘Formation’ integrity was 

being challenged at every step due to extended 

trails of clouding and the worst was yet to come. 

Finally, one of the junior pilots expressed his 

discomfort on R/T and requested to abort the 

mission. By this time our ‘Formation’ had already 

entered the black turbulent wall of clouds. A 

turn about was ordered after establishing height 

separation which was a bit relaxing but a big 

challenge of avoiding a mid air collision loomed 

large! Our ‘Formation’ at this time was over the 

hills where the ‘Route Safety Altitude’ was as 

high as 16500’. The ordered maneuver was being 

executed with standard height separation. 

A conventional turn-about in a large formation 

in perfect VMC requires clearances from various 

members to avoid collision whereas in the said 

condition it was getting executed in nil visibility 

conditions, without any clue of relative positions 

of the other members! The turbulence was so 

severe that 1000’ height separation appeared 

very less. All of us were flying on instruments 

and struggling against turbulence to maintain 

flying parameters. The thought of other aircraft in 

close proximity was the scariest of all. The stage 

was all set for disorientation i.e large formation, 

height maintenance, turbulent weather and nil 

visual references. The silence was broken by two 

R/T calls- first one of ‘HUD failure’ from No.2 and 

the second of ‘TGT Amplifier failure’ from the 

formation leader. 

After a long battle (short on time domain) 

with our machines and weather, the formation 

eventually broke clouds. The sky was visible in 

patches. It took another couple of minutes and a 

long series of R/T calls and aircraft manoeuvring 

before we could re-establish our formation and 

recover at our base. During the mission debrief 

few more tales about individual discomfort 

came to light and the scariest amongst all 

was the one associated with ‘HUD failure’. ‘All 

is well that ends well’ applied perfectly to our 

formation 

A few lessons emerged out of this incident 

which should make us wiser :- 

‘Respect Weather’- universally published 

but least followed. 

A perfect balance should be maintained 

between professional ego/competence and 

safety. 

Every member of a formation is equally 

responsible for formation safety. Decide and act 

in time before things go out of hand. 

Formation leaders must take decisions 

based on the least experienced member. 

Respect decisions of juniors as well. 

Do not let your ego overpower a safe 

decision. 

During peace time missions do not push 

your luck too hard for it to favour you on every 

occasion. 

Peculiarity of weather over hills should 

be emphasized in detail for missions involving 

valley/hill transit. 

Let your experience benefit others for a 

better flight safety environment. 

-Sqn Ldr R Kadyan 


Sqn Ldr Binu Venugopal 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

Safe guarding the EEZ and sea lanes is 

required, keeping in view that India is an 

emerging market, with a rapid growth in sea 

trade. Thus, to ensure unhindered growth rate, 

the EEZ and sea lanes need to be kept safe and 

secure all the time. To achieve the said objective, 

the Indian Armed forces have embarked on the 

modernization of Air and Naval forces. The Indian 

Air Force has increased the quantum of maritime 

operations in its island regions, scheduled 

couriers operations and various detachments. 

The surface of the earth is covered by 71% 

water and 29% land. Flights over the oceans 

have few or no diversions. Consequently, 

communications and navigation, which are 

essential for conduct of any flight, are also limited 

due to the vast distances between successive 

stations. The following are some hazards that are 

associated with flying over the sea: - 

Long Eventless Flights. Long flights as said 

earlier, are a feature of sea flying. Though they 

appear innocuous to pose a threat, they may lead 

to one. Lack of any significant activity on a long 

leg leads to boredom and may result in reduced 

level of alertness in the cockpit 

. 

There have been accidents/ incidents due 

to crew not being alert. The only answer to the 

reduced alertness is strict discipline and training, 

which ensures that all the crew members are 

alert, and in case of any deviation, raise the 

alarm so that the situation is contained before it 

deteriorates. 

Disorientation. The horizon over sea is 

different from the usual blue over brown. This is 

taught to a pilot. Due to the large blue sea and 

similar coloured sky the horizon may be nondistinct 

for someone in an unusual attitude. 

In an accident in 1978, Air India Flight - 855, 

Boeing 747 crashed into sea 3 km off the coast 

of Bombay. Investigation revealed that the pilot 

executed a standard right turn after take-off into 

the Arabian Sea. Then the aircraft was returned 

to wings level condition briefly and then started 

rolling to the left from which it never recovered 

and crashed into the sea. 

The flight was being conducted in the 

evening hours. It was attributed to disorientation 

of the pilot due to artificial horizon failure. Lack 

of adequate visual references over sea added to 

the cause. 

To prevent the occurrence of disorientation, 

it is essential that the training pattern involves 

sufficient instrument flying and instrument 

approach procedures. This builds the confidence 

of aircrew in flying totally on instruments 

during poor weather and poor lighting 

conditions. Further, the aircrew should recognise 

disorientation and declare it to other members so 

that corrective action can be initiated well in time. 

Present courses conducted at IAM would go a 

long way in exposing the aircrew to disorientation 

and the corrective actions thereafter. 

Communication and Navigation. Due to 

large separation between one station and the 

other on oceanic routes, there are significant 

gaps in communication and navigation 

coverage. There are only a few stations that 

provide communications over oceanic routes. 

Communication is reliant for the most part on 

HF and satellite communications. However, even 

advanced communication systems may not serve 

the purpose at times, as was seen in the Air France 

Flight 447’s case. The flight was flown at 35000’ 

and even at the time the aircraft crashed into the 

sea there was no communication regarding their 

emergency. 

Navigation over oceans suffers from large 

gaps in coverage from ground stations and the 

lack of ground features makes it all the more 

susceptible to failure. The only aids at the 

disposal of the aircrew are satellite navigation 

systems. But over-dependence on one system is 

not always prudent. 


At present on our couriers flying oceanic 

routes, the sole means of communication is the 

HF for obtaining weather and other information. 

The HF system employed suffers many limitations 

due to ageing and interference. This places 

additional work load on aircrew in terms of 

updating of information for diversion. 

Diversion. A major consideration when 

flying overseas is the non-availability of diversions 

en-route. There may only be a few routes that 

have an island en-route with an airfield that 

could serve as a diversion. Otherwise, there are 

none available on most of 

the routes. Therefore any 

critical emergency which 

otherwise requires aircraft 

to divert, would require 

ditching over sea due to lack 

of diversions. Calculations 

of Critical Point and Point of 

No Return assume greater 

significance in oceanic route 

flying. 

alike for decades. Most of 

the convective weather 

phenomena that occur 

over land originate over 

the sea. The large amount 

of moisture available 

over oceans gives rise 

to weather developing 

in a short span of time, 

making it unpredictable 

and intense in nature. 

Weather radar is therefore 

a pre-requisite on oceanic 

routes. Weather check 

through R/T from other 

aircraft ahead / behind 

on the same route also 

helps. Briefings must take into account sea 

surface temperature and lapse rate over the areas 

being flown as they give an idea of the build up 

expected. 

Ditching. The term ditching is synonymous 

with forced landing on land. Ditching is also a 

procedure to recover aircraft on water. 

The statistical chances of surviving a 

ditching are high. It is estimated that 88% of 

controlled ditchings result in few injuries to 

pilots or passengers. You are more likely to die 

Weather. Ocean 

climatology has always been 

a subject of mystery to the 

aviator and meteorologist 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

after ditching by drowning, usually hastened by 

hypothermia and exhaustion. By wearing a life 

jacket in the aeroplane your survival prospects 

are greatly improved. However, in cold water, that 

is 15 degrees Celsius or less, or life expectancy in 

the water is only about one hour. 

There are various other issues that have to be 

borne in mind while ditching. One of the most 

difficult things to get right in a ditching is judging 

the height for the round off. Most aircrew would 

not have experienced landings without an 

undercarriage. Thus you will be used to seeing a 

particular attitude at the round off. In the ditching 

case that attitude will be a little different because 

the aeroplane should be a little closer to the 

surface, to cater for the lack of an undercarriage. 

In general terms it is always preferable to 

impact the water as slowly as possible, under 

full control; but do not stall the aeroplane. Keep 

the wings parallel to the surface of the water on 

impact, i.e. wings level in calm conditions. One 

wing tip striking the water first will cause a violent 

uncontrollable slewing action. 

Ditching into the face of the swell or into 

waves should be avoided because the aeroplane 

will behave in a similar manner to one impacting 

a cliff face. There are many other factors that 

go into a successful ditching like the design, 

condition of sea, winds etc at the time of ditching. 

It will suffice to say that there is a fair amount of 

risk involved. 

After a successful ditching, the next task will 

be of survival. Needless to say, it isn’t easy and is 

inversely proportional to the amount of time spent 

at sea. Type of survival equipment, proximity to 

the coast and rescue team’s equipment would 

all affect your chances of survival. Regularly and 

(more importantly) seriously practising ditching 

drills helps keep presence of mind in actual 

situations. 

-Sqn Ldr Binu Venugopal 


Flt Lt UB Singh 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

What is safety culture Who and what 

we are, what we find important and 

how we go about doing it correctly, is 

called Safety Culture. The possession of a safety 

management system, no matter how thorough 

and systematic it may be, is not sufficient to 

guarantee sustained safety performance. To 

proceed further it is necessary to develop cultures 

that support higher process such as ‘thinking the 

unthinkable’ and being highly motivated to be 

safe, even when there seem to be no obvious 

reasons to do this. But the challenging part here 

is of creating a healthy safety culture and keeping 

it alive. 

We need to adopt a safety culture and 

refine it continuously to achieve hole-proof safe 

environment around. But it is natural human 

behaviour to get used to a particular set of 

conditions or environment and resist change. 

You can easily understand this trait if you happen 

to play golf. When you start the game, you learn 

a particular swing and continue to practise. 

After years of game, you may be advised by a 

professional to adopt a change in your technique 

to get a few extra yards. That is the most difficult 

time, wherein you are in a period of transition. 

You feel like giving up the game because you 

are not able to train yourself with respect to that 

technique. But it is only through your patience 

and belief that you can overcome this situation. 

On the same lines, we continuously need to 

upgrade our safety culture in order to achieve 

few extra yards of safe environment, inspite of 

difficulties we are likely to face. 

Recently, I read about five types of safety 

culture, that are enumerated as follows:- 

We care less about safety than about not 

being caught. 

We look for fixes to accidents and incidents 

after they happen. 

We have systems in place to manage hazards 

(however the system is applied mechanically). 

We follow the procedure but do not necessarily 

believe these procedures are critically important. 

We have systems in place and we genuinely 

belief that safety is genuinely worthwhile. 

Safety behaviour is fully integrated into 

everything we do. 

We may decide on our own in which category 

our safety culture falls. But whatever level it may 

be, the aim is to achieve the fifth level where safety 

behaviour is fully integrated into everything we 

do. 

The underlying reason why cultural change 

often fails to succeed is that the new situation is 

unknown to the participants. We often believe 

that the current situation is as good as it gets and 

there is little scope to change. 

Change agents are like golf professionals. 

They can help develop a person’s game, but they 

can’t play it for them. The greatest single barrier 

to achieve success however, is the belief that it is 

too difficult. On the contrary, in the long term it is 

more difficult and dangerous not to! 

- Flt Lt UB Singh 


Flt Lt K Sharma 

Lessons Learnt in First Solo Landing 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

After my Stage 3 training on Kiran MK-II 

aircraft, I was posted to my first Fighter 

Squadron at a premier Fighter base in the 

West, for MOFT syllabus on MiG-21 T-96 aircraft. 

The morale was high and so were the spirits. The 

station housed two fighter squadrons operating 

the same type of aircraft. So, the atmosphere 

with 22 flying officers from Sem I & II wasn’t 

very different from that in Training Command. 

Every morning ushered in unlimited visibility 

and high serviceability; one could hear reheat 

after reheat, and it filled us with thrill. Soon, my 

ground training was over and I commenced 

flying on what was called the real fighters. She 

was sleek and fast and could take anyone for a 

ride. The time on downwind got over in a flick 

and there was no time to get our parameters and 

carry out vital actions, leave alone the situational 

awareness on the circuit traffic. A few days later, 

the first guy in the course cleared his solo check 

and was launched in a fighter for his first solo. 

With most of us due for our solo checks in a few 

days, we proceeded along with the ACP pilot to 

see the first solo landing of our course. He was 

our very own - Callsign 919. 

After about 20 mins, we heard Callsign 919 

on R/T for the rejoin. He reported dead side and 

turned downwind. In the first overshoot, he was 

correctly on glide path, after which he turned 

for downwind. In this time, Prowler formation 

that had gone for a Basic Flying Manoeuvres 

sortie to the sector, too had rejoined. Prowler 

– 2, a Sem II trainee, joined circuit behind 919, 

and the leader maintained overhead to regulate 

gravy. 919 reported downwind, followed by 

Prowler 2. I picked him up visually on finals - but 

wait a second! These were two aircraft in close 

proximity!! 919 while carrying out his downwind 

vital actions had delayed his baseleg turn and 

Prowler – 2 had turned at the correct baseleg 

turning point. As a result when prowler-2 rolled 

out on finals he was dangerously close to 919. 

The ATC in a panic, gave a call to Prowler-2 to go 

around and 919 to continue. However 919 also 

initiated go around in a panic. The ACP pilot 

intervened and told Prowler-2 to go around on 

dead side. On seeing 919 in such close proximity 

while going around, Prowler-2 put on a vicious bank 

with undercarriage and flaps down and yanked 

back towards dead side. The ACP pilot in a horror 

yelled on R/T to offload, but the aircraft with nose 

up and at very low speeds continued towards dead 

side and started a wild wing to wing rocking which 

is a symptom of approach of stall. But much to 

everybody’s relief, it thereafter gradually lowered 

nose, and spaced out to the correct dead side. Both 

aircraft were recovered safely subsequently. 

Lessons Learnt 

The first solo had no SA of any other aircraft 

on circuit; he was too busy carrying out his own 

checks and maintaining parameters as accurately as 

possible. 

Prowler – 2, a Sem II trainee, happily assumed 

that the traffic ahead would be maintaining correct 

circuit pattern and was taken by surprise when he 

saw the aircraft ahead going around. 

The MiG-21 requires careful handling at 

low speeds and such incidents can be avoided by 

adhering to simple practices like making visual 

contact with traffic ahead, and if no contact, by 

confirming traffic on R/T. 

After both aircraft landed, ACP pilot said “This is 

exactly what you should NOT DO...Remember this 

Black Demo”. 

- Flt Lt K Sharma 

The day before our first para-jump, the 

instructor demonstrated all possible 

malfunctions that one might encounter. 

After watching a total malfunction, 

i.e. failure of the parachute to deploy, one 

of the students asked: “If we have a complete 

malfunction, how much time do we have to deploy 

our reserve parachute” 

The Instructor replied: “You have the REST of 

your life to deploy that reserve!” 


Sqn Ldr NK Rath 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

Safety is not just a set of rules that we follow ow 

to achieve our overall aim. Safety means 

delineating risks and then managing them in 

all aspects of life. A lot matters on the objectives 

and the way of thinking of like-minded people who 

constitute the society. I am reminded of an incident 

that once took place in the Southern region. The 

very thought of it still makes me shiver. I was 

authorized for a local flying sortie in SU-30 MKI 

within LFA. Sortie was uneventful till we landed 

and switched off. During switch off, I realized that 

the controls deflected to the maximum as soon as 

the AC generators cut out! This would happen only 

if I had, by mistake, switched off the batteries (only 

power source available to the aircraft after switch 

off ) before run-down. But this was not the case. 

My inquisitiveness pushed me to explore various 

possibilities that could have led to the unexplained 

deflection. Perturbed by everyone’s finger pointing 

at me, I was frantic to find out what actually had gone 

wrong I went back to the cockpit and selected the 

battery on. I noticed the voltmeter needle stuck at 

zero. I was shocked to see this and for once thought 

this was not happening. I soon realized that the 

aircraft that I just landed did not have a single 

battery in it! The Battery acts as a standby source 

of power to the aircraft, should the generators fail. 

This meant that if I had a twin AC generator failure, I 

had no reaction time available. The aircraft controls 

would have immediately deflected out of control 

and the aircraft would have gone into an unusual 

attitude, one from which a safe ejection may not 

have been possible. 

The incident was to happen and it did. Handling 

the case was in the hands of superiors and the way 

this incident was handled exposed our approach and 

means towards the Flight safety. Our investigations 

and procedures are mostly result based. This incident 

explained it all to me. Result of an uncontrolled 

deflection of controls on ground and that in air 

could have had drastic differences in their outcome. 

ln most cases, our source finding mechanism works 

in proportion to the damage caused/ result of 

the incident/ accident. If the damage was minimal, 

the source/ cause may not be important. But if the 

same 

event 

had 

a severe 

consequence, 

the reason would 

assume 

great 

importance. 

Hence 

the “cause-result” esu bias. In 

the incidentid thatt I 

mentioned, the 

cause was grave but since the result was insignificant, 

not much attention was given to the cause, even 

though it had the potential of fatal consequences. 

Though we assume that being in the armed 

forces, our thoughts and views are similar, it is never 

so. As far as this incident was concerned, within the 

station most of those involved in the reporting chain 

were of the opinion to avoid reporting the incident. 

They seemed oblivious of the fact that ignoring it 

today could cost someone’s life tomorrow. However 

due to the able leadership of the then Commanding 

Officer, the matter was brought to light and others 

got to know about it. Here comes the role of 

collective psyche. There is a disturbing tendency 

to consider a problem ‘hidden’ as the problem 

‘solved’!! (The classical ‘ostrich mentality’). This 

may provide short term relief, but in the long run 

it will catch up, having become bigger than before. 

In this incident, one man stood against a plethora 

of opposition from all around. The courage and 

guidance that the CO instilled by reporting such 

an incident was exemplary. We all must endeavor 

to follow and preach truth and have the courage to 

face difficulties, no matter how strong they are or 

from whom they come. To be able to provide a safe 

flying environment, the first step would be to make 

a radical change in our way of thinking. 

-Sqn Ldr Nikhil Kumar Rath 


Seemingly innocuous events can actually have grave 

consequences in the field of military aviation. It is 

therefore incumbent on our part to report any such 

occurrences so that corrective measures can be 

incorporated well in time. 


Flt Lt Anoop SL 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

I 

was a young Flying Officer posted to a Bison 

Sqn, in one of the premier Air Force Bases 

of the country. I was new to the fleet after 

finishing my training on Hawk MK-132. After 

completing my initial Dual Checks on the MiG-21, 

I was cleared to fly solo. 

It was a bright sunny day and I was authorised 

to fly my sixth solo on type. After carrying out the 

sortie as briefed to me, I initiated rejoin in time and 

with adequate fuel, keeping in mind the traffic of 

the seven flying units of the station. I asked the 

radar controller for a GCA, he made me orbit over 

a point 30 km from base, after confirming fuel 

from me, to accommodate departure of a 4 ac 

formation. 

No. 1 of the 4 ac formation was asked to abort 

take off due bird on R/W. He had rolled, hence 

switched off on R/W. At this point of time, I was 

asked to divert to my primary diversion. On 

initiating diversion, I realised the fact that I had 

not carried out a diversion before, and coupled 

with fuel below thirsty fuel figure, a chill ran down 

my spine. I was calming myself down and telling 

myself not to panic. Things were going smoothly 

and I was 50 km out of base, when I was informed 

that I could turn back as the R/W was now clear. 

Happily I turned back, thanking the Almighty as 

there was nothing like landing at your home base. 

A minute later while on inbound course, 

to my horror, I was informed that the R/W was 

blocked again and therefore I was to divert. (This 

happened because the ambulance which was 

following the CFT, while clearing off the R/W, 

rammed into it, leading to fatal injuries to the MTD 

of the ambulance and blocking the R/W). Cursing 

everyone, I turned back. Looking at the fuel 

gauge, I was unsure if I would be able to make it. 

A slight amount of panic had crept into me. I told 

myself not to panic, remembering my instructor’s 

golden words, “if you panic, half the battle is lost”. 

About 60 km short of my diversionary airfield, 

my ‘450 litres remaining’ warning light started 

flashing. Keeping my cool, I went over the ejection 

procedure in my mind. I asked 

for a direct vectoring for finals. 

Considering the way fate had 

been turning out, there still 

were segments of luck that 

had remained functional. nal. 

To my relief and delight, I 

found that the R/W in use 

was along my track. All 

warning lights related 

to fuel had illuminated 

except for ‘service 

tank’ light. I touched 

down with barely 150- 

200 litres on board. 

Following me were six 

more aircraft from the 

same base, all low on 

fuel. “All is well that 

ends well”! But the 

lessons learnt that 

day were: 

Whenever 

in an unfamiliar 

situation, do not 

panic. 

Keep you 

calm and continue 

normally, rather than 

doing something 

stupid in haste. 

Do not be in 

a decision dilemma; 

when you have initiated 

a diversion continue 

with it. In retrospect, I 

should have continued 

with the diversion at the 

first instance, rather than 

turning back for base, only 

to be asked to divert once 

more. 

- Flt Lt Anoop SL 


Sqn Ldr Vikram Chhibber 

It was Oct 07, and we were at one of the most 

picturesque locations that we could have 

been in. 3000 km away from our Nation, our 

12 immaculately maintained, saffron coloured, 

appropriately labelled “Ambassadors of the IAF” 

Suryakiran Aerobatic Team aircraft, were parked 

on an island, wing to wing with a plethora of the 

latest generation fighters. The Royal Air Force RED 

ARROWS team too was alongside. We were at the 

Langkawi International Maritime and Aviation 

Show (LIMA 07), in Malaysia, having flown in via 

Myanmar and Thailand. 

The occasion was momentous, as it was 

the world that waited to watch our skills – the 

stakes were very high. It urged us to perform 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

with the highest levels of professionalism, and most 

importantly - “THE JOSH” – the main ingredient of 

the recipe in mission accomplishment by all fauji 

groups. Thanks to oodles of man-hours spent on 

planning the trip, the ferry to Langkawi island was 

accomplished with picture perfect precision. 

We were on with our routine series of displays, 

usually two in a day. As the routine demands, the 

men with spanners (that’s what the technical team 

are playfully called) were the first to reach early in 

the morning to prepare the 12 aircraft in various 

configurations for the display. Third day into the 

air show came the moment which changed my 

approach towards life as an engineer. With 2 years 

of experience at that time, I undertook a snag 

rectification, which back home in India we could 

only dream of accomplishing (though we don’t 

want such snags to occur at all in the first place). 

As we walked towards the tarmac with our team 

of technicians, a usual panoramic glance of all the 

12 aircraft to ascertain safety (to rubbish the fear 

of someone stealing our machines!!) was the usual 

practice. However, today it left us flabbergasted. 

What we saw (hold your nerves) was a machine 

gun, yes a machine gun, standing on its tripod, on 

the port wing of one of our aircraft, with its bayonet 

pierced right through the wing surface that had 

resulted in a rupture of the aircraft skin. The sight 

of such a damage shook us to the core. At first sight, 

from a distance, it looked unreal and improbable, 

but disbelief turned to reality as we drew up close. 

We found out that there had been a para trooping 

accident the night before. A miscalculated wind 

pattern had resulted in the paratroopers of the 

RMAF descending on the tarmac, which sadly 

resulted in one of them sustaining fatal injuries too. 

But the show had to go on. 

As the SEO of the detachment, I called 

my Detachment Commander and my Flight 

Commander to break the news of the incident, and 

what followed was a flurry of calls to and from our 

parent base and higher ups back home (I remember 

it was a Sunday morning). Our team of technicians 

assessed the damage on the wing, and the silver 

lining to the incident was that the gun’s bayonet 

had missed the fuel tank by about 5 cms. So, now 

all we had to do was structural repair work on the 

wings. This is a task that in India mandates an 

activity from fourth line agencies and specialist 

structure repair teams. In the case of KIRAN aircraft, 

this only is possible at HAL Bangalore Division. As 

per our contingency plans, a team of HAL was ready 

for airlift, in case required. 

This was the point where we had to decide 

expeditiously of what to do. I quickly contacted 

the fourth line agency of Royal Malaysian Air Force, 

and showed them the damage. They assessed the 

damage, but due to international issues refused 

to work on our aircraft. However, they offered to 

provide us all the raw materials required for the 

structure’s repair. This was a welcome moment for 

our Airframe tradesmen, who always excelled in 

their work as usual. Well, a phone call to our mother 

base at AFS Bidar to take an official nod from our 

Senior Engineer (Aircraft) and our Chief Engineering 

Officer, and we were underway with our work in less 

than two hours of the first sighting of the damage. 

A few necessary supervisory checks, and a 

mandatory ground run to ascertain all hydraulics 

and fuel system components were fine, and our 

aircraft was ready for its Air-Test post rectification 

in less than 24 hours. Being an aerobatic aircraft, 

which is constantly subject to high G-loads and 

stresses, any structural work is always very critical 

and needs to be done with utmost care and 

perfection. The Aircraft was check flown by our 

Flight Commander, as the aircraft belonged to his 

position in the formation (for those who may not be 

aware, in any formation flying team, the aircraft are 

generally kept position specific and pilot specific 

(this is always the endeavour of the technical team). 

The aircraft started up and taxied out with shouts of 

hurray on the tarmac, but the test was yet to come. 

We monitored the sortie on RT and did not hear 

anything abnormal, and the aircraft taxied back 

with a happy looking Flight Commander emerging 

from it (I was too apprehensive, in retrospect), 


further enhancing the jovial atmosphere that we 

always create in adverse conditions. However, the 

Flt Cdr to our horror at that time remarked “Guys 

what have you done with the machine” and here 

was a moment I must admit, my heart skipped 

a beat. He quickly sensed the tension and eased 

it out by saying that the machine infact handled 

very well in air and an age old snag of an inherent 

right roll beyond some speeds in that particular 

aircraft was not present now. The divine stab of the 

bayonet had killed it!! 

We all celebrated as this aircraft flew snag free 

in all displays and ferried back to Bidar successfully, 

where upon landing it was put down by base CEO 

for intricate checks by the HAL team specialists who 

were amazed to see the workmanship of our very 

own Airframe tradesmen with scarce resources and 

a few facsimile photocopies 

of the Airframe Manual 

to refer to, and 

had 

declared 

the aircraft fit to 

fly. We learnt the 

following 

lessons 

from this episode as 

engineers in the field 

of aviation. 

A dynamic and professional problem solving 

ability exists in all individuals and must be showcased 

when duty calls upon to do so. 

To have an eye for detail and to be aware of 

your resources at all times. 

To think about flight safety implications in all 

actions, as one wrong step can prove catastrophic in 

this field. 

Be confident of your abilities but not 

complacent, due to over confidence. 

Trust and exploit your own capabilities and 

recognize hidden skills within your own group. This 

may not only save the exchequer, but also save 

critical operational time and inculcate a sense of 

belief and confidence in our extremely talented and 

skilled manpower. 

- Sqn Ldr Vikram Chhibber 


Off base operations pose multi dimensional challenges 

to the maintenance personnel due to the absence 

of/limited availability of expertise and resources. A 

thorough & professional approach forms the key for 

solving such challenges. 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

Flt Lt AA Mahale 

I 

was a young flying officer full of spirit and 

aspiration just posted to a Sqn. After lot of 

studies, ground training and spending hours in 

the cockpit (the ac being on ground), we started 

flying the MiG-21. It was my third solo sortie 

wherein I was supposed to fly a handling profile 

in sector. The sortie was uneventful till rejoin on 

downwind, when after lowering u/c, my main 

hydraulic failure warning came on. I declared the 

emergency, then took a moment to ascertain the 

situation and went over the actions. I reported 

dead side again, completed my actions and landed 

off a flapless approach in the next circuit which 

is considered quite tricky on the MiG-21. I was 

debriefed the following day, in fact I was praised 

and my actions at such limited experience were 

appreciated. I was quite happy with myself and 

continued flying with a newly gained confidence. 

I even got a commendation through the flight 

safety channel for my emergency handling. 

But about six months down the line when 

I gained sufficient experience on the MiG-21, 

I realised that my actions had not been very 

correct, in fact they were wrong. When I realised 

that I had an emergency on downwind, all I had 

to do was continue in the circuit and land. But 

I elected to go around and carry out one more 

circuit which could have led to an aircraft fire as I 

already had a hydraulic leak. 

All is well that ends well. But the point to 

ponder is that why was this point not brought 

out to give a lesson to other youngsters in the 

Sqn. In the interest of Flt Safety, I write this and 

implore those young pilots flying this aircraft 

to apply system knowledge to the emergency 

encountered so that they do not land up 

complicating the emergencies encountered. 

-Flt Lt AA Mahale 


Cdr Sunil Chungath 

Somebody asked me recently whether you 

can get lost in an aircraft. The uncertainty 

that existed was complemented by a 

simple question, since you could see everything 

from the air, can’t you find your way out 

For a Dornier pilot, I was blessed with the 

best avionics in the Naval inventory. The ways 

of ‘FIXing’ yourself were many – GPS, VOR track 

and range, VOR track intersection, NDB bearing 

intersection, etc to quote a few. If all else failed 

and still lost ask the nearest control for bearing 

and distance to base. 

Going down memory lane I remember 

an eventful sortie from the time when I was 

instructing at Air Force Academy. 

For those who missed the HPT-32 phase, a 

transition from a Dornier back to HPT-32, is like revisiting 

the Stone age. None of the navigational 

aids listed above exist and we start with the last 

quoted statement “If all else failed......!!” 

It was another one of those sorties in 

marginal weather conditions when training had 

to be progressed and the instructors were being 

pushed to undertake sorties. The trainee was 

in his pre-solo phase. I was ordered to progress 

general handling part of the sortie with a promise 

that a flex sortie would be accommodated later 

for teaching circuits. We were airborne for about 

20 minutes when the weather deteriorated at 

base. All aircraft were recalled using homing 

(Radar was then unavailable at AFA). Three aircraft 

rejoined. Two were still left in air and unluckily, I 

was the farthest out (Junior most instructor gets 

the farthest sector!) 

It is pertinent to remind the readers of some 

salient features of the HPT-32 aircraft at this 

stage. Firstly, the aircraft has a Direction Indicator 

(DI) which is a pure gyro with no magnetic input. 

The DI has to be synchronised with compass 

every now and then (known as the DISCo check – 

stands for DI Synchronised with Compass). A very 

often neglected check, but very critical in finding 

out the direction once the homing is given. 

Secondly, there is no navigational aid other than 

the eyeball. With minimal visibility, that luxury is 

also withdrawn. Thirdly, it does not have a radio 

altimeter which gives the altitude AGL which is 

most essential when you go below the clouds to 

check your position. 

The max speed of 200 kph minus head wind 

speed of 50 kph, gives a very slow ground speed, 

and I re-emphasise “kilometres per hour” and 

not “knots”. The stalling speed is 115 kph (clean 

configuration). While heading towards the base 

on the homing given at full throttle, the next 

call from ATC asked us to maintain in sector at 

endurance settings since the visibility was now 

nearly zero. Since only two aircraft were in air, 

I asked the other instructor who was closer to 

the base (who happened to be an IAF Dornier 

pilot incidentally) to find out how bad it was. He 

informed me that he was already in circuit area 

and was only getting glimpses of the runway at 

circuit height. 

The pupil, till now, a neglected factor, piped up 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

to tell me, “Sir, I think the compass in not moving”. 

After asking him to carry out the “DISCo”, I realised 

that he was talking about the magnetic compass 

(the only reliable instrument on the aircraft). It 

seemed stuck. Now the chances of getting lost 

were increasing. I descended to the minimum 

sector altitude to find a very familiar way point 

quite close to base. Being in and out of clouds 

and through the small window within the cloud, I 

decided not to lose sight of that way point. 

So instead of maintaining at endurance 

setting, here I was, at full throttle carrying out 

continuous steep turns, one to avoid losing sight 

of the way point, and second, to get my compass 

back on line. A Lot of banging on the compass 

followed. But the compass refused to budge. The 

ATC confirmed from me regarding endurance. 

With no sign of recovery of the compass, I heard 

the other pilot informing that he is on downwind 

with the runway in sight. Navigating with the 

road which leads from the way point to the main 

gate of AFA, I informed ATC that I was heading to 

base at minimal height. 

Soon, I saw myself very high on top of the AFA 

main gate which is too close to the runway for a 

comfortable approach and not in sight of the 

preceding aircraft, I managed a fleeting sight of 

the runway and decided to make the approach. 

Throttle closed and gliding to where I thought the 

runway threshold is, I gave a call to the preceding 

aircraft –“Confirm landed”. “Affirm” – came the 

reply. All was well and I found the threshold 

winking at me at 100 m AGL. Speed was about 

230 kph. (Max threshold speed for the aircraft 

is 180 kph to cater for the main wheel touching 

down instead of the nose). With throttle closed 

from top of descent, there is no other way to 

reduce speed. Visibility was about 200 m. Finally 

I rounded off and maintained at round off height 

to wait for the speed to reduce. Speed dropped to 

about 190 kph. 

And then, I saw funny sight, there was an 

aircraft ahead of me moving very slowly on the 

runway. As it became larger, I checked with the 

tower whether any aircraft was on runway. He 

confirmed that the preceding aircraft was still 

on runway. (In later discussions, it emerged that 

he was teaching his pupil how to taxy – to date 

I still don’t forgive him). Touching down on the 

runway at 180 kmph, I slammed on the brakes, 

praying that it should not get any worse and 

hoped that I did not suffer a tyre burst/ brake 

failure (a common occurrence on this aircraft). 

My aircraft had slowed down even though I had 

shifted to the right lane catering to overtake him 

if required. There is no rule as to which side or 

how you should overtake another aircraft on 

runway – since the instructor is on the right hand 

seat, I thought he might notice when I overtook 

him. 

All’s well that ends well but coming to the 

lessons learnt... 

 

Pushing task is positively anti safety. 

Endurance at endurance setting is 

different from max settings. 

 

Adapt to limitations of the aircraft. 

Do not teach taxying with an aircraft on 

your tail on the runway. 

Do not fly an aircraft cleared only for VMC 

in IMC. 

-Cdr Sunil Chungath 


Though the concept of ‘slow lane’ does exist while 

recovering in formations, the procedure is not 

usually practised at the ab-initio level, owning to 

lesser experience. 

The balance between instructional flying and safe 

recovery is a crucial but hazy one and must be 

discussed continuously. The actions of the first ac 

pilot, could have seriously jeopardised the latter’s 

safety. 


On 28 Oct 11, 786517-A Cpl P R Deora AFSO was detailed to perform the duties of 

Runway Controller. During this period a MiG-27 aircraft lined up for take off. The 

air warrior observed fuel leakage from the starboard undercarriage bay and promptly 

transmitted it on R/T. The aircraft vacated on the ORP for inspection. The `Take-off 

Inspectors’ found no signs of fuel leakage and the aircraft was cleared to line up for the 

second time. However, Cpl Deora insisted on his observation and the aircraft was taxied 

back to the dispersal. Subsequent checks revealed that there was a fuel leakage from the 

under carriage bay. 

Cpl PR Deora displayed a high degree of professionalism, perseverance and situational 

awareness in detecting a potentially hazardous situation and prevented a potential 

mishap. 

 

(R Marwaha) 

Air Cmde 

PDAS 

On 20 Nov 11, 786562-L Cpl Pritesh Kumar AFSO was detailed as Safety Crew in the 

afternoon shift. During the start up of an outstation AN-32, unusual smoke was 

observed from the engine. Immediately the CFT proceeded to the site. Realising the 

gravity of the situation he operated the BCF, on instruction from the ground crew. The 

fire was extinguished in time. 

In another incident, on 11 Nov 11, while he was attending the ground run of a SU-30 

MKI aircraft, the port engine caught fire. On clearance from the Engineering Officer at the 

site, he operated the BCF of the CFT and the fire was extinguished in time. 

Cpl Pritesh Kumar displayed high degree of professionalism and situational awareness 

thereby averting possible damages to the aircraft, in both the situations. 

 

(R Marwaha) 

Air Cmde 

PDAS 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

On 27 Dec 2011, 769789-R Sgt B V Nair Flt/Engr was detailed to fly an A&E sortie in 

a Mi-17 1V aircraft after 200 hrs servicing. During ground exercises he observed 

a few black spots of oil on the runway and suspected some leak. On his advice the 

aircraft was taxied back and switched off. On investigation it was found that there 

was a fuel leak in a pipeline coming out of port external tank transfer pump. 

Sgt Binu demonstrated keen sense of observation and high degree of 

professionalism and was instrumental in averting a possible accident/incident. 

 

(R Marwaha) 

Air Cmde 

PDAS 

On 02 Dec 11, 787603-F Cpl S C Rao AFSO, was detailed as the Runway Controller. 

While a MiG-29 aircraft was lined up for take-off, he observed heavy fuel leak 

from the port wing. He promptly reported this on R/T and the aircraft was asked 

to clear off the runway by the ATC. Had the fuel leak gone unnoticed, it could have 

resulted in a possible mishap. 

Cpl SC Rao displayed high degree of professionalism and helped in averting a 

potential incident/ accident. 

 

 

(R Marwaha) 

Air Cmde 

PDAS 


On 16 Nov 11, 913796-F Cpl TB Srivastava Prop/Fit was detailed to carry out PFS on 

a MiG-29 aircraft. While carrying out his checks, he observed an unlocked quarter 

turn fastener on the lower ramp panel, inside the starboard air intake. The check of this 

fastener was not a part of his DI. Also, its location was in an inaccessible region. Subsequent 

investigations revealed malfunctioning of this fastener, which could have led to an IOD. 

Cpl TB Srivastava displayed high degree of involvement and keen observation in 

averting a possible accident/incident. 

 

(R Marwaha) 

Air Cmde 

PDAS 

On 26 Aug 11, Sqn Ldr RS Sodhi (26082-H) F(P) was authorised to lead a formation sortie 

in a MiG-21 aircraft. At the aircraft inspection point, he noticed something falling out 

of the tail section of another fighter aircraft, which was rolling for take-off before him. He 

immediately gave an R/T call to this effect. Subsequent FOD checks of the runway revealed 

that a spanner had fallen off from the aircraft. If unnoticed, it could have led to an FOD. 

Sqn Ldr RS Sodhi displayed a high degree of professionalism and averted a potential 

accident/incident. 

 

(R Marwaha) 

Air Cmde 

PDAS 


INDIAN AIR FORCE

On 04 Sep 11, Sqn Ldr Rohit Singh (28176-B) F(P) was authorised to fly an ESC vs CAP 

sortie in a MiG-29 aircraft. After getting airborne, the pilot experienced excessive 

pitch up and rearward movement of the control stick. He experienced abnormal stick 

forces in lateral as well as in fore and aft axis. Subsequently, he switched off all modes 

of autopilot, announced the emergency on R/T and climbed overhead to 3 km. After 

burning up fuel, he carried out a slow speed check and found controllability to be 

abnormal. Thereafter, he carried out a flawless precautionary landing. 

Sqn Ldr R Singh displayed good situational awareness and presence of mind in 

handling an emergency and recovering the aircraft safely. 

 

(R Marwaha) 

Air Cmde 

PDAS 

On 11 Dec 11, Sqn Ldr MP Dhand (27508-L) Adm/ATC was detailed as DATCO on a 

holiday. During the period of his duty he observed heavy fuel spillage from both 

the wings of an IL-76 aircraft parked in the dispersal for maintenance. He immediately 

activated the crash fire tenders and cordoned off the area, simultaneously informing 

the DSS and other agencies. He sent the SAR Gypsy to the DSS to assist the technical 

tradesmen in positioning the dip trays beneath the wings. The fuel spillage was 

serious and could be controlled only after intervention of DSS personnel. The spillage 

could have caused a mishap, if gone unnoticed. 

Sqn Ldr MP Dhand displayed a keen sense of observation, proactive approach 

and a high degree of professionalism in averting a possible incident/accident. 

 

(R Marwaha) 

Air Cmde 

PDAS 



INDIAN AIR FORCE

June 2012 - Indian Airforce

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?