Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity - OneSAF Public Site

Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
40 Years of
Excellence in Analysis
OneSAF Survivability Suite (OS2) Overview
Scott Johnson
410-278-2036
scott.c.johnson98.civ@mail.mil
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited.
1

• Introduction
• Definitions
• OS2 Capabilities
• OS2 Design
• OS2 Verification
• Future Development
• Future Utility
• Summary
Agenda
2

Introduction
• Background
– US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA)
Other Than Armor (OTA) Survivability Team is
dedicated to providing the United States Army with
analysis, data and tools to support decisions regarding
OTA survivability technologies
– Modeling & Simulation (M&S) tools exist to evaluate
individual survivability technologies but limited
capability exists to address survivability technologies
at the item level
– AMSAA conducted a study to determine the best
approach to developing a survivability suite analysis
tool and decided to develop this tool with OneSAF, a
composable force level simulation
• Objective
– Build a simulation for evaluation of OTA survivability
technologies to support item level analysis
• Purpose
– Inform the OneSAF community of OS2‟s capabilities,
design and future utility
M&S Hierarchy
Theater
Force-on-
Force
Few-on-Few
One-on-One/Few
Engineering
AMSAA intends to bridge the gap between engineering
level and force-on-force level models
3

Definitions
• An Other-Than-Armor (OTA) technology is any technology that increases platform and
crew survivability and is not baseline or add-on ballistic armor
• A Defensive Aid Suite (DAS) is a subset of OTA technologies designed to prevent a
munition, once launched, from impacting the platform or to reduce the resulting
penetration when a munition impact does occur
• An Active Protection System (APS) is a DAS technology that relies on the detection of
an incoming munition to trigger a sequence of events designed to eliminate munition
impact or reduce munition lethality on the protected platform
• A Passive Protection System (PPS) is a DAS technology that does not rely on the
detection of an incoming munition and accept munition impact while reducing munition
lethality on the protected platform
Survivability “Onion”
See-Understand-Act
Avoid Detection
Avoid Acquisition
Survivability Taxonomy
Avoid Hit,
Penetration,
Kill
OTA
Avoid Hit
Avoid Penetration
DAS
Non-Lethal
Avoid
Kill
APS
PPS
4

OS2 Capabilities
• Components of OS2
– Enhanced and added
representation of threat
munitions
• Mobility
• Guidance
• Designation
– Enhanced and added
representation of DAS
components
• Sensors
• Controller
• Countermeasures (CM)
• OS2 Development Status
– Iteration One
Munition Sensor Countermeasure
SACLOS Tracking,
Guidance and Flyout
• Completed Spring 2008
• Integrated into OneSAF v2.5
– Iteration Two
Missile Warning
Receiver (MWR)
Infrared
Countermeasure
(IRCM)
• Completed Spring 2010
• Expected integration into OneSAF v6.0
Munition Sensor Countermeasure
Munition
Fired
Sensor 1
Sensor 2
Controller
CM 1
CM 2
Unguided Direct Fire
Flyout (RPG, KE)
Detection and
Tracking Radar
Hard-Kill APS
DAS
Munition Sensor CM
Repository
5

OS2 Iteration One Design
New model using
direct fire delivery
accuracy data on tick
Designation
Emission
IRCM
CM
Capability
Designation
Capability
Target
Designation
Designation
Manager
Emission
Manager
Intel
Perception
Target List
B.B.
HASC
Weapon
Controller
B.B.
MWR
Target Entity
Vulnerability
Threat Entity
Creates
Physical Component
Behavioral Component
OS2 Development
Mobility
This physical model contains the
Guidance PKAD, IRCM PKAD and
CLOS Mobility PKAD
Detonate
B.B.
Threat Munition
Fuze
Event
Router
Detonation
B.B. – Blackboard
CM – Countermeasure
HASC – Hit Avoidance Suite Controller
IRCM – Infrared Countermeasure
MWR – Missile Warning Receiver
PKAD – Physical Knowledge Acquisition Document
6

OS2 Iteration Two Design
Threat Entity
B.B.
MFRFS/
MWR
Target Entity
Perception
GV
Vulnerability
Dismounted
Infantry
B.B.
Weapon
Controller
Intel
B.B.
Target List
SR/LR
CM
*
IC
Vulnerability
Sensor
Capability
Controller
CM
Capability
*
Creates
Physical Component
Behavioral Component
OS2 Development
Threat Munition
Mobility
Detonate
Detonate
B.B.
EFM
Vulnerability
Fuze
Detonation
Event
Router
Detonation
* Represents
the ability to
model fratricide
B.B. – Blackboard
CM – Countermeasure
GV – Ground Vehicle
EFM – Enhanced Fragment Model
IC – Individual Combatant
SR/LR – Short Range/Long Range
MFRFS – Multi Function Radio
Frequency System
MWR – Missile Warning Receiver
7

OS2 Verification
• Unit Testing
– Focused on single instant in time
– Examined functional areas developed independent of each
other to expose data lookup and algorithm/logic
implementation errors
– Performed side by side comparison of AMSAA‟s expected
versus simulation actual results
• System Integration Testing
– Focused over life of a single engagement
– Examined functional areas developed independent of each
other to expose a broader range of errors
– Analyzed and visualized results to ensure trends met
expectations
• Mock Classified Analysis (Iteration 1)
• Timeline Analysis (Iteration 2)
Successful verification provided confidence that components
correctly functioned independently and together
8

Future Development
• Smoke/Obscurant technologies
• Surface-mounted technologies
• Documentation
– Verification report to be published Fall 2012
9

Future Utility
• DAS Requirements Analysis
• DAS Tactics, Techniques & Procedures Analysis
• DAS Operational Effectiveness Analysis
• DAS Timeline Analysis
10

Summary
• AMSAA intends to bridge the gap between
engineering and force-on-force level modeling
• There is a capability to model survivability
technologies at the item-level
• OS2 intends to play a significant role in supporting
the development of DAS technologies
11

Backups
12

Unit Test Case Matrix – MFRFS
MFRFS Unit Test Case Matrix
Case # Sensor SR Tracks LR Tracks
1 OS2MFRFS 0 0
2 OS2MFRFS 1 0
3 OS2MFRFS 2 0
4 OS2MFRFS 0 1
5 OS2MFRFS 0 2
6 OS2MFRFS 1 2
7 OS2MFRFS 2 1
8 OS2MFRFS 2 2
Case /
Result
Factors that Affect the
Model
Notional
Data
13

Unit Test Results - MFRFS
PKAD Data
Verification
List
MFRFS Unit Test Results – Case 3
Radar
Target
Counter Measures
Unit Test – MFRFS
Case 3
Weather Condition
Time of Day
Range of Threat Muntion to Target System (m)
Number of SR Tracks 2
Number LR Tracks 0
Probability of SR Detection
Probability of SR Track
Probability of LR Track
Test Input Expected Actual Pass
OS2MFRFS
SR Search Rate (s) 0.14 0.14
SR Track Rate (s) 0.55 0.55
LR Track Rate (s) 0.55 0.55
Uniform Random Number
Sensed
Notional
Data
Input
Data Lookup
14

Probability of Track
Probability of Track
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
System Integration Test – MFRFS
MFRFS Acquisition and Track - Long Range KE Maintain Track
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
Notional
Results
LRCM Employed
Range to Target (m)
MFRFS Acquisition and Track - Long Range KE Lost Track
Acquisition Probability
Acquisition Draw
Track Probability
Track Draw
MFRFS
lost track
Maximum coast
time exceeded and
track dropped
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Range to Target (m)
Scenario:
• KE threat munition launched at
approximately 2000m
• Successful MWR detection
• Visualization of acquisition and
track probabilities
Top Plot:
• MFRFS acquires KE munition on
first acquisition attempt, „time
to acquire‟ never expires
• MFRFS maintains track
throughout engagement, „max
coast time‟ never expires, until
LRCM is employed
Bottom Plot:
• Reduced MFRFS acquisition and
track performance
• MFRFS acquires KE threat on
second acquisition attempt prior
to „time to acquire‟ expiring
• MFRFS track is lost at
approximately 1600m and is
never successfully tracked
thereafter before „max coast
time‟ expires
• KE threat must be detected
again, though in this scenario
another detection will not occur
15

Notional
Results
Timeline Analysis – RPG Case (1 of 3)
RPG Engagement Timeline
MWR
MFRFS
Controller
SRCM
2
3
4
Threat Munition Flyout
Threat Munition Intercept
MFRFS Detection
MFRFS Track
HASC Prioritization
SR/LRCM Fire Tick
LRCM
IRCM
149 m/s
200 m/s
135 m/s
1
Mobility
Designation
Guidance
EFM Vulnerability
Max MFRFS Detection Range
Mean Intercept Range (Launcher 3)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Range (m)
1. Threat RPG 18 launch from Infantry @ 177m and 91 degree
aspect angle – munition moves every 0.01 seconds
2. MFRFS detects SR threat munition near sensor‟s maximum
range
3. HASC prioritization cycle begins after target list update –
decides to use SRCM launcher 3
4. SRCM checks when to fire its interceptor every 0.01
seconds
16

Notional
Results
Timeline Analysis – RPG Case (2 of 3)
RPG Engagement Timeline
MWR
MFRFS
Controller
SRCM
7
6
5
2
3
4
Threat Munition Flyout
Threat Munition Intercept
MFRFS Detection
MFRFS Track
HASC Prioritization
SR/LRCM Fire Tick
LRCM
IRCM
149 m/s
200 m/s
135 m/s
1
Mobility
Designation
Guidance
EFM Vulnerability
Max MFRFS Detection Range
Mean Intercept Range (Launcher 3)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Range (m)
5. MFRFS begins threat munition SR tracking –
tracks every 0.03 seconds
– On all successful tracks the HASC reprioritizes
6. SRCM posts interceptor detonation after munition
crosses the intercept range
7. Controller sends a message to MFRFS – stop
tracking threat munition
17

Notional
Results
Timeline Analysis – RPG Case (3 of 3)
RPG Engagement Timeline
MWR
MFRFS
Controller
SRCM
7
10
6
5
2
3
4
Threat Munition Flyout
Threat Munition Intercept
MFRFS Detection
MFRFS Track
HASC Prioritization
SR/LRCM Fire Tick
LRCM
IRCM
9
149 m/s
200 m/s
135 m/s
1
Mobility
Designation
Guidance
EFM Vulnerability
8
Max MFRFS Detection Range
Mean Intercept Range (Launcher 3)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Range (m)
8. EFM vulnerability assessed – Fragment Induced
Detonation (FID)
- Munition does not detonate
9. Threat munition continues to flyout to the target
10. MFRFS detects threat munition – model rejects
successful detection when threat munition is less
than 10 meters away from target
18