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<strong>Add<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>On</strong>/<strong>Off</strong> <strong>Device</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Activate</strong><br />

<strong>RFID</strong> <strong>Tags</strong> <strong>in</strong> Enh<strong>an</strong>ced Driver’s Licences:<br />

Pioneer<strong>in</strong>g a Made-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>On</strong>tario<br />

Tr<strong>an</strong>sformative Technology That<br />

Delivers Both Privacy <strong>an</strong>d Security<br />

March 2009


<strong>Add<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>On</strong>/<strong>Off</strong> <strong>Device</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Activate</strong> <strong>RFID</strong> <strong>Tags</strong> <strong>in</strong> Enh<strong>an</strong>ced Driver’s Licences<br />

<strong>Add<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>On</strong>/<strong>Off</strong> <strong>Device</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Activate</strong><br />

<strong>RFID</strong> <strong>Tags</strong> <strong>in</strong> Enh<strong>an</strong>ced Driver’s Licences:<br />

Pioneer<strong>in</strong>g a Made-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>On</strong>tario<br />

Tr<strong>an</strong>sformative Technology That<br />

Delivers Both Privacy <strong>an</strong>d Security<br />

There are well-known privacy <strong>an</strong>d security vulnerabilities associated with Radio<br />

Frequency Identification (<strong>RFID</strong>) technology. So when I learned that the <strong>in</strong>clusion of<br />

<strong>an</strong> <strong>RFID</strong> would be a non-negotiable feature of <strong>On</strong>tario’s Enh<strong>an</strong>ced Driver’s Licence<br />

(EDL), my first thought was, “How c<strong>an</strong> we tr<strong>an</strong>sform the <strong>RFID</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> a technology<br />

that performs its functionality <strong>an</strong>d is protective of privacy” The <strong>RFID</strong> technology<br />

chosen by the U.S. Government for the EDL will respond not only <strong>to</strong> the authorized<br />

readers at the C<strong>an</strong>ada-U.S. border, but also <strong>to</strong> <strong>an</strong>y number of commercially<br />

available <strong>RFID</strong> readers which may be used surreptitiously. Therefore, it is imperative<br />

that holders of <strong>an</strong> EDL be able <strong>to</strong> prevent the <strong>RFID</strong> from be<strong>in</strong>g read by unauthorized<br />

third parties <strong>an</strong>d disengage the <strong>RFID</strong> when not required for<br />

border-cross<strong>in</strong>g purposes.<br />

S<strong>in</strong>ce the ’90s, I have been promot<strong>in</strong>g the concept of “Privacy by Design,” a term<br />

I developed <strong>to</strong> capture the idea of embedd<strong>in</strong>g privacy <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the design specifications<br />

of technology – mak<strong>in</strong>g privacy the default. 1 I have never believed that the relationship<br />

between privacy <strong>an</strong>d security had <strong>to</strong> be characterized as a zero-sum<br />

game, me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g that the more you have of one <strong>in</strong>terest (security), the less you c<strong>an</strong><br />

have of <strong>an</strong>other (privacy). I favour a positive-sum paradigm where<strong>in</strong> add<strong>in</strong>g privacy<br />

measures <strong>to</strong> otherwise privacy-<strong>in</strong>vasive systems need not weaken security or<br />

functionality, but rather may, <strong>in</strong> fact, enh<strong>an</strong>ce the overall level of protection. I<br />

strongly believe that, by extension, my concept of Privacy by Design c<strong>an</strong> be applied<br />

<strong>to</strong> the use of <strong>RFID</strong> technology <strong>in</strong> the EDL.<br />

In my Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 2008 submission <strong>an</strong>d testimony <strong>to</strong> the <strong>On</strong>tario Legislature’s<br />

St<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g Committee on General Government on Bill 85, I recommended that, “The<br />

M<strong>in</strong>istry must work with a selected vendor <strong>to</strong> pursue add<strong>in</strong>g a privacy-enh<strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g<br />

on/off device for the <strong>RFID</strong> tag embedded <strong>in</strong> the card” (Recommendation 4). This<br />

is the privacy-enh<strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g solution I am promot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> safeguard the use of <strong>RFID</strong><br />

technology <strong>in</strong> <strong>On</strong>tario’s EDL.<br />

1 For more <strong>in</strong>formation about the orig<strong>in</strong>s of Privacy by Design, please see my paper “Privacy by<br />

Design,” available onl<strong>in</strong>e at http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/privacybydesign.pdf<br />

197


Privacy by Design<br />

I realize that <strong>in</strong>corporat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> on/off switch <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the EDL prior <strong>to</strong> the government’s<br />

June 2009 deadl<strong>in</strong>e is not possible. In the me<strong>an</strong>time, for those who choose <strong>to</strong> obta<strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>an</strong> EDL, I would caution you <strong>to</strong> be aware of the privacy risks. Although the<br />

protective sleeve provided with the EDL is not a complete privacy solution, until<br />

there is <strong>an</strong> on/off switch <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the EDL, everyone should use it.<br />

The <strong>On</strong>tario government will issue a protective sleeve with the EDL, say<strong>in</strong>g it “will<br />

prevent <strong>an</strong>yone from read<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>RFID</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation unless you remove the card<br />

from the sleeve.” 2 However, experiments conducted on Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n State’s EDL<br />

show that even while encased <strong>in</strong> a sleeve, the <strong>in</strong>formation on the EDL’s <strong>RFID</strong> tag<br />

may be read. Specifically, it was shown that a sleeved EDL held <strong>in</strong> one’s h<strong>an</strong>d<br />

could be read at 27 cm. Researchers also found that <strong>in</strong> a crumpled sleeve <strong>an</strong> EDL<br />

<strong>in</strong> a back pocket wallet could be read at 57 cm.<br />

Even if sleeves could successfully block reader access completely, there are two<br />

rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g problems. First, there is no guar<strong>an</strong>tee that <strong>in</strong>dividuals will actually use<br />

the sleeves. The results of <strong>an</strong> EDL pilot <strong>in</strong> British Columbia, C<strong>an</strong>ada, show that<br />

some <strong>in</strong>dividuals rarely used the sleeve, because the sleeved EDL did not fit <strong>in</strong> the<br />

slits found <strong>in</strong> virtually all wallets, or the sleeve was not convenient <strong>to</strong> use. 3<br />

Second, most of the time, <strong>On</strong>tari<strong>an</strong>s will be us<strong>in</strong>g the EDL as a driver’s licence or<br />

government-issued pho<strong>to</strong> identification document, while driv<strong>in</strong>g around <strong>On</strong>tario –<br />

hav<strong>in</strong>g noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> do with cross<strong>in</strong>g the U.S. border. Whenever someone takes their<br />

licence out of the sleeve for non-border-cross<strong>in</strong>g purposes, the EDL then would be<br />

vulnerable <strong>to</strong> surreptitious, unauthorized read<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

The support for <strong>an</strong> on/off switch for the EDL has been ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g momentum <strong>an</strong>d<br />

public <strong>in</strong>terest s<strong>in</strong>ce I first raised it last year. A University of Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n study 4<br />

presents various technical <strong>an</strong>d procedural improvements <strong>to</strong> the EDL, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />

add<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> on/off switch <strong>to</strong> the card. Also, a 2009 MIT publication references the<br />

work of Professor Avi Rub<strong>in</strong> from Johns Hopk<strong>in</strong>s University, who agrees that <strong>an</strong><br />

on/off switch could be added <strong>to</strong> EDLs. 5<br />

2 Enh<strong>an</strong>ced Driver’s Licence (Background <strong>an</strong>d FAQ), onl<strong>in</strong>e: <strong>On</strong>tario M<strong>in</strong>istry of Tr<strong>an</strong>sportation<br />

http://www.m<strong>to</strong>.gov.on.ca/english/d<strong>an</strong>dv/driver/enh<strong>an</strong>cedcards.shtml<br />

3 British Columbia Enh<strong>an</strong>ced Driver’s Licence Program Phase 1 Post Implementation Review, onl<strong>in</strong>e:<br />

Insur<strong>an</strong>ce Corporation of British Columbia http://www.icbc.com/licens<strong>in</strong>g/pdf/pir-post.pdf<br />

4 V. Brajkovic, A. Juels, T. Kohno & K. Koscher, “EPC <strong>RFID</strong> <strong>Tags</strong> <strong>in</strong> Security Applications: Passport<br />

Cards, Enh<strong>an</strong>ced Drivers Licenses, <strong>an</strong>d Beyond” (2008) [unpublished], onl<strong>in</strong>e at:<br />

http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/staff/bios/ajuels/publications/EPC_<strong>RFID</strong>/Gen2authentication--<br />

22Oct08a.pdf<br />

5 E. Naone, “<strong>RFID</strong>’s Security Problem Are U.S. passport cards <strong>an</strong>d new state driver’s licenses with<br />

<strong>RFID</strong> truly secure” MIT’s Technology Review (J<strong>an</strong>uary/February 2009), onl<strong>in</strong>e:<br />

http://www.technologyreview.com/comput<strong>in</strong>g/21842/a=f<br />

198


<strong>Add<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>On</strong>/<strong>Off</strong> <strong>Device</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Activate</strong> <strong>RFID</strong> <strong>Tags</strong> <strong>in</strong> Enh<strong>an</strong>ced Driver’s Licences<br />

I cont<strong>in</strong>ue <strong>to</strong> adv<strong>an</strong>ce the privacy-enh<strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g solution of add<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> on/off switch<br />

<strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the EDL. My <strong>Off</strong>ice’s research <strong>in</strong>dicates that there is no legal impediment that<br />

precludes <strong>an</strong> on/off device meet<strong>in</strong>g the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI)<br />

criteria, as prescribed by the U.S. Department of Homel<strong>an</strong>d Security.<br />

These efforts are <strong>in</strong>tended <strong>to</strong> provide <strong>On</strong>tari<strong>an</strong>s with a technology <strong>to</strong> protect their privacy<br />

if they choose <strong>to</strong> use <strong>an</strong> EDL. I s<strong>in</strong>cerely hope that <strong>an</strong> on/off switch is made<br />

available for use <strong>in</strong> the near future with <strong>On</strong>tario’s EDL. Such <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>novative privacyenh<strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g<br />

addition could give <strong>On</strong>tario first mover adv<strong>an</strong>tage by turn<strong>in</strong>g the EDL <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong><br />

a made-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>On</strong>tario tr<strong>an</strong>sformative technology that delivers both security <strong>an</strong>d privacy.<br />

Stay tuned!<br />

199

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