WHICH PATH TO PERSIA?

If Iran’s nuclear program is a topic of great importance
for Europe, Tehran’s involvement with
terrorists and violent militant groups, let alone
its efforts to overturn conservative Middle Eastern
governments and block an Arab-Israeli peace
process, stir little European passion. Many Europeans
believe that Iran’s activities in these various
areas are unhelpful, even dangerous, but they do
not seem to have the same power to galvanize
European opinion (let alone action) as much as
Tehran’s nuclear program does. This is an important
area where Europe tends both to be internally
united and of a different mind than the Middle
Eastern states. Consequently, confrontational polices
toward Tehran can often elicit at least some
support when they are tied to Iran’s pursuit of a
nuclear weapons capability but find little backing
when meant to respond to Iranian activities
in other areas that the United States considers
alarming.
While Europe is united in its opposition to Iran’s
nuclear program (if not in the method to stop it)
and in its indifference toward Iran’s support of
militant groups, it is divided over the nature of
the Iranian regime itself. The Islamic Republic is
brutal, oppressive, repressive, intolerant, paranoid,
and prone to widespread human rights abuses. Although
it follows some democratic practices (such
as relatively competitive elections), its adherence
to others—such as transparency, accountability,
the rule of law, the protection of minorities, freedom
of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of
speech—ranges from questionable to nonexistent.
This morally odious behavior is irrelevant to some
European regimes and of paramount importance
to others. The Scandinavian states in particular are
staunch advocates of human rights, and for them,
the Iranian regime’s treatment of its own citizenry
is a matter of great concern.
Russia and China. It is widely believed that
Russia and China could play critical roles in a
new American strategy toward Iran. Both are
important sources of weapons for Iran, including
nuclear sales from Russia. Russia and China are
important trading partners with Iran, and Chinese
businesses especially have moved into Iran
to scavenge all of the business deals that Western
firms were forced to abandon because of the sanctions.
Thus, if Russia and China were to follow the
West in sanctioning Iran, Tehran’s already precarious
economic situation might turn downright
perilous.
In particular, the Persuasion approach would
greatly benefit from Russian and Chinese willingness
to impose harsher sanctions on Iran, and
because the Obama Administration has already
announced that it will pursue this option, Moscow
and Beijing hold potential trump cards over
America’s course. If Russia and China cooperate
with the United States, Iran will come under
much heavier pressure; this may or may not be
enough to convince Iran to change course, but
it certainly will give Washington reason to stick
with this policy for some time. However, if Russia
and China oppose the United States (which, in
effect, would be siding with Iran), not only would
it be far more difficult for the strategy to work,
but also the United States will likely drop it much
faster and turn instead to different options that
require less international cooperation.
Both Moscow and Beijing have publicly stated
that Iran should not be allowed to develop the capability
to make highly enriched uranium, which
is the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon. (The
Iranians probably already have that capability, at
least at the theoretical level.) In addition, despite
the insistence of many experts and most Iranian
officials that they would not do so, both Russia
and China agreed to refer Iran’s nuclear program
out of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and over to the UN Security Council.
They then proceeded to vote in favor of four Security
Council resolutions against Iran enacted
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (which
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