WHICH PATH TO PERSIA?

to help China with its energy needs. Setting up a
joint energy committee for Chinese and American
officials to begin a dialogue, as Jeffrey Bader
has suggested, would be a good place to start. Another
option could entail determined efforts by
the United States to reduce its own energy dependence
(thereby freeing up oil supplies for Chinese
purchasers) and encouraging oil-producing allies
(such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab
Emirates, Mexico, and Canada) to work more
closely with the Chinese to reassure them that
their energy needs will be met.
Other countries also will want payoffs from the
United States in return for their assistance on
Iran. Such deals may be distasteful, but many will
be unavoidable if the Persuasion approach is to
have a reasonable chance of succeeding. Without
support from a wide range of other countries,
sanctions on Iran will prove toothless. It is not
that these nations do not recognize a danger in
a nuclear-armed Iran; they just do not regard it
as a high priority. As a result, the United States
may have to offer them some benefit on one of
their higher priorities to secure their cooperation
on Iran, assuming that the current administration
considers it one of America’s highest priorities.
Pros and Cons
The following are the advantages and disadvantages
of the Persuasion approach.
Advantages:
• There is evidence that a strategy of employing
both positive and negative incentives
has had an impact on Iranian politics, and
in the manner—though not the extent—
hoped for. Throughout the 2003-2007
time frame, Iranian elites debated about
their nuclear program, with a number
suggesting that Iran ought to be willing to
make compromises to avoid international
sanctions that they feared would cripple
their already fragile economy. Given that
the Bush Administration was never willing
to offer the kind of positive inducements
that might have made Iranians take notice
or might have convinced Europeans, Russians,
Chinese, and others to go along with
the kind of harsh sanctions that might have
made Iranians wince, the level of debate
during this period was surprising. It suggests
that a more enthusiastic embrace of
this option could produce a much more
intense debate in Tehran that could result
in a decision to accept a deal. The success
of similar approaches with Libya and (to a
lesser extent) North Korea also bolsters this
supposition.
• This is precisely the course that most U.S.
allies would like to see Washington pursue
toward Iran. This makes it most likely that
Washington would secure international cooperation
for this option (which, as mentioned
above, is a requirement) and could
translate into leverage with those allies.
In other words, foreign countries may be
willing to accommodate the United States
to convince Washington to follow this
course—especially if they believe that the
new administration is seriously considering
regime change, the military option, or the
Israeli military option (these are discussed
in subsequent chapters) as alternatives.
• Although in an era of domestic economic
distress every penny counts, the costs of the
likely economic incentives to Tehran would
be minor—and could well be offset if U.S.-
Iranian trade blossoms anew in the wake of
such a deal.
• For those looking to avoid a military confrontation
with Tehran, a Persuasion approach
would be unlikely to produce such
3 8 W h i c h Pa t h t o P e r s i a O p t i o n s f o r a N e w A m e r i c a n S t r a t e g y t o wa r d I r a n