Mind – Body Problem

Mind – Body Problem
A. Recall Classical Greek attempts to understand
“Reality” and knowledge … there is only one type of
stuff in the world (monism) vs are two or more
kinds of stuff in the world (dualism/pluralism).
B. Two kinds of monists: mental monists or
“idealists”” ... and physical/material monists or
“materialist” .
C. Mind/Body problem: For dualists…how can one
kind of “thing” (e.g, mind) influence another totally
different kind of “thing” (brain) . For materialists …
how can “mental events” which are conscious and
have intentions but do not seem to have physical
features exist in a material world. [Plato and
Aristotle struggle with these problems.]
D. Descartes ... body functions were mechanical but there
is a soul or mind that is not material.
1. Solution: Mind-body interaction through the
pineal gland
2. Of course this idea doesn’t work but Descartes is
credited with the idea that the body is like a
machine
3. Descartes also clearly defined the mind-body
problem which allowed others to recognize and
understand the problem

E. Phrenology and Development of Physiological
Knowledge of the Brain/nervous system
1. Bell-Magendie Law (Localization of Function)
2. Johannes Muller (Specific Nerve Energies)
3. Gall-Spurzheim (Phrenology)
4. Faculty Psychology
F. Material Monism ... three basic approaches to mindbody
problem:
1. Behaviorism (positivism)
2. Identity Theories
3. Material Functionalism
G. Behaviorism: Watson/Skinner argued that the only
scientifically valid approach to psych. was to study overt
behavior in the context of the physical environment.
With this approach there is no need to make reference to
mental activity of any kind (Positivist –Comte)
H. Neo-Behaviorists: Tolman/Hull etc. argued that there
are “intervening variables” (Positivist – Mach)
I. Identity Theories
1. Strict biological reductionism (type identity)
2. Weak biological reductionism (token identity)
3. Emergent reductionism (system identity)
I. Material functionalism is not inconsistent with some
type of token reductionism but does not require a
reductionist account of mental activity. According to this

theory mental events are the cause of other mental
events. Causes are defined as intentions (purpose) or
simple associations between ideas. Often explained using
computer analogy.