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attachment_id=996 - UDC Law Review

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Goldstein’s ordeal is, sadly, far from unique. The Innocence Project maintains a searchable<br />

database of wrongfully convicted defendants who have subsequently been exonerated—many<br />

because of false testimony from criminal informants that was elicited by police and used by<br />

prosecutors at trial. 67<br />

V. REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MARYLAND AND BEYOND<br />

A number of reforms that are available to policymakers could curb this alarming proliferation<br />

of snitch testimony-based wrongful convictions. Maryland depends on jury instructions to<br />

provide procedural protection against wrongful convictions based on unreliable testimony, even<br />

though scholars have long observed that jury instructions alone are not a sufficient tool to<br />

prevent juror reliance on—sometimes false—testimony by biased criminal informants. The<br />

Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions (MCPJI) outlines the jury instructions regarding the<br />

witness credibility, accomplice testimony, testimony by witnesses who have plead guilty, and<br />

compensated witnesses testimony. The statute is included as Appendix A. This is not to say that<br />

jury instructions are entirely without benefit—they put the court “on notice” that a criminal<br />

informant has received some type of consideration for their testimony. However, additional<br />

procedural safeguards are necessary to prevent criminal informants from falsely testifying in<br />

court to begin with. Maryland should require prosecutors to preserve and present to the court<br />

information about compensation that informants have received, such as information about any<br />

promises made to an in-custody informant, the criminal history of an in-custody informant, and<br />

prior cases in which an in-custody informant testified, modeled after the disclosure obligations<br />

outlined in the Justice Project’s model statute on informant testimony. The model statute is<br />

attached at Appendix B. Disclosure of this information would aid the court in determining<br />

whether the criminal informant’s testimony is essential to the case and legitimate, thus providing<br />

a safeguard against false testimony and a greater assurance of a fair trial to the Defendant.<br />

Maryland should also require pre-trial reliability hearings to weed out unreliable or false<br />

informant testimony before it reaches the jury, modeled after the pre-trial reliability hearings<br />

described in section four of the Justice Project’s model statute. At the pre-trial reliability<br />

hearings, the prosecution should be required to present any testimony obtained from criminal<br />

informants, and the judge should make pre-trial admissibility rulings based on a number of<br />

factors that bear on reliability and potential prejudice against the defendant, including any<br />

promises the informant received for their testimony, other cases in which the informant has<br />

testified, and the existence of independent corroborating evidence. Application of these factors in<br />

a pre-trial admissibility hearing would help prevent the admission of false informant testimony at<br />

trial, and would constitute a procedural safeguard that is vastly superior to mere jury<br />

instructions. 68<br />

67 Know the Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/Browse-Profiles.php (last<br />

visited Feb. 2, 2013).<br />

68 The recommendations offered by the Justice Project and outlined in this section are consistent with those<br />

that have been offered by many scholars and experts in the field. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR<br />

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING INFORMANT TESTIMONY 1, 7-9 (2007)<br />

(calling for the adoption of internal policies in prosecutors’ offices to preserve information about agreements<br />

reached with criminal informants and prohibitions against convictions based on criminal informant testimony where<br />

corroborating evidence does not exist); see also <strong>Law</strong> Enforcement Confidential Informant Practices: Hearing Before<br />

the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, and the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights,<br />

and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Congress (Statement of Alexandra Natapoff, Professor<br />

10

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