Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations - The Global ...

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS
OPSEC MILDEC
PSYOP
PHYSICAL
EW
DESTRUCTION
PHYSICAL
SECURITY
OPERATIONS
SECURITY
(OPSEC) CAN
CONFLICT BY
Limiting information
that can be revealed
to enhance deception
story credibility.
Limiting information
that can be revealed
to develop PSYOP
themes.
Limiting information
that can be revealed
to enemy to develop
targets.
Electronic protection
(EP) and OPSEC may
have different goals.
Should be no conflict.
B-5
MILITARY
DECEPTION
(MILDEC) CAN
CONFLICT BY
PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS
(PSYOP) CAN
CONFLICT BY
PHYSICAL ATTACK
CAN CONFLICT BY
ELECTRONIC
WARFARE (EW)
CAN CONFLICT BY
Revealing information
OPSEC normally
seeks to conceal.
Revealing information
OPSEC normally
seeks to conceal.
Causing firing
systems to reveal
their locations.
Revealing EW assets
prematurely.
Limiting deception
story selection if
deception story
contains untruths.
Limiting selection of
deception means by
denying or degrading
elements of adversary
C2 infrastructure
necessary to process
deception story.
Limiting selection of
deception measures
by denying or
degrading use of
adversary C2 systems.
Limiting PSYOP
theme selection.
Limiting information
that can be revealed
to develop PSYOP
themes.
Limiting means
available to convey
PSYOP themes by
denying or degrading
adversary C2
systems.
Reducing frequencies
available to convey
PSYOP themes.
Limiting targeting to
allow survival and
conduct of critical
adversary command
and control (C2)
functions.
Limiting targeting of
adversary C2
infrastructure to
allow conveying of
PSYOP themes.
Limiting targeting of
adversary C2
systems.
Limiting electronic
attack (EA) targeting
of adversary
information systems
(INFOSYS) to allow
survival and conduct
of critical adversary
C2 functions.
Limiting EA against
adversary
communications
frequencies to allow
PSYOP themes to be
conveyed.
Limiting opportunities
for communications
intrusion by denying
or degrading
elements of adversary
INFOSYS.
Figure B-2. Potential Conflicts Within the Capabilities of Information Operations
Negating the
deception story by
physical security
preventing our
transmitting a
realistic deception
story.
Should be no conflict.
If need-to-know
considerations limit
access to targeting
data.
Revealing what
physical security is
trying to protect (EA).
EP should not
conflict.
Mutual Support Between Information Operations Core Capabilities