Triangulation Framework for Local Service Delivery - Philippine ...

local and national politicians, creating a low-level equilibrium that benefits them and disadvantages the
people. History of misgovernance, corruption and disempowerment has circumscribed the process of
political, economic, and social underdevelopment. Damaged culture that has been shaped by backward
people’s beliefs, customs and traditions has impacted on the social norms, which in turn, has influenced
their collective consciousness and behaviour. The political and economic elite have not connived to
transform the country from being the Sick Man of Asia to one of Asian Tigers; instead have enriched
themselves with wealth and power at the expense of poor Filipinos wallowing in human poverty and
deprivation. The poor people, having no power to change the elite-driven status quo, content
themselves with the spoils of patronage unable to demand better services, accountable leaders,
democratic governance, and quality of life. All these constitute in capsule the institutional problems
that have plagued the country, with no prospect for institutional change - revolutionary or otherwise –
able to end the logic of self-interest and realpolitik of the powerful few and the tragic optimism of the
suffering multitude. 9
Further, these binding development constraints - ranging from macroeconomic to financial to social –
and compounded by their underlying institutional problems negatively impact on the delivery of quality
of public goods and services. They constrain the ability and willingness of service providers – mainly
the political institutions such as the national government and the LGUs to provide the much-needed
basic social services. For example, some of the usual binding constraints of LGUs are the following:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
limited financial resources due to low IRA, low tax base, and ineffective revenue
mobilization;
lack of competent and innovative human resources, plus a culture of professional
bureaucrats able to take on policy continuity despite change of political leadership;
lack of effective leadership able to harness political will, resourcefulness, and partnerships;
reform fatigue by reformers such as well-meaning local leaders and civil society
organizations (CSOs);
short supply of effective and efficient incentives;
weak linkages and partnerships with stakeholders such as communities, CSOs, private
sector, international donor;
lack of intergovernmental coordination and cooperation and intersectoral harmonization of
development efforts;
weak, if not lack, of effective monitoring and evaluation of PAPs; (viii) political wheelingdealing,
political instability and corruption;
9 Clientelism (otherwise known as patronage system), strong oligarchy and weak state, and bossism are three
theories that explain these institutional problems. See for example Lande (1965), Rivera (1994), Hutchcroft (1998,
2000), Sidel (1999), Hutchcroft and Rocamora (2003), Coronel, S. et.al., (2007), and de Dios (2007). For the
negative impact of these political economy dysfunctions on the party system in the Philippines, particularly
patronage politics and strong oligarchy and weak state, see Kazuya (2009).
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