Advantage Ratio as a Tool in Post-Communist Electoral Reforms ...
Advantage Ratio as a Tool in Post-Communist Electoral Reforms ...
Advantage Ratio as a Tool in Post-Communist Electoral Reforms ...
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hypothesis because they were aimed directly aga<strong>in</strong>st the smaller parties, aga<strong>in</strong>st their<br />
potential attempts to form coalitions, and they also decre<strong>as</strong>ed the possible success of<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent candidates (Ženíšek 2004: 266). The same rules applied <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
election <strong>in</strong> 2005.<br />
The Polish reform carried out before the election <strong>in</strong> 1993 is a relatively frequent<br />
subject of researchers focus<strong>in</strong>g on electoral eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g. Only a m<strong>in</strong>imum of features<br />
had been preserved from the preced<strong>in</strong>g election law (by which the parliament w<strong>as</strong><br />
elected <strong>in</strong> 1991). The follow<strong>in</strong>g changes were made for the distribution of 391 seats (out<br />
of 460) <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual electoral districts: (1.) <strong>in</strong>troduction of the statewide electoral<br />
threshold at 5% for s<strong>in</strong>gle parties and 8% for coalitions, while before there had been no<br />
threshold, (2.) <strong>in</strong>cre<strong>as</strong><strong>in</strong>g the number of electoral districts from 35 to 52, and (3.)<br />
switch<strong>in</strong>g to the d´Hondt divisor from the orig<strong>in</strong>al Hare-Niemeyer quota. The follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
features were newly <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> distribut<strong>in</strong>g the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g 69 seats <strong>in</strong> the national<br />
district (1.) an election threshold at 7%, <strong>in</strong>stead of the preced<strong>in</strong>g 5%, or ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g seats<br />
<strong>in</strong> at le<strong>as</strong>t 5 districts, and (2.) the d´Hondt divisor <strong>in</strong>stead of the Sa<strong>in</strong>te-Laguë divisor<br />
(Kubát 2000: 32-35; Antoszewski – Herbut – Sroka 2003: 112). All described changes<br />
correspond to the trend of strengthen<strong>in</strong>g larger political parties at the expense of<br />
smaller parties, and mak<strong>in</strong>g it practically impossible for very small parties to succeed.<br />
Romania <strong>in</strong> the electoral reforms chose exclusively the path of rais<strong>in</strong>g the election<br />
thresholds. The second reform w<strong>as</strong> carried out before the 2000 election when the rules<br />
changed both for s<strong>in</strong>gle parties and for coalitions. The parties had to exceed a 5%<br />
threshold <strong>in</strong>stead of 3%, while for coalitions the threshold of 4 – 8% accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
number of parties <strong>in</strong> the coalition rose to 8 – 10%. Both changes confirm the outl<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
hypothesis because they further limited the potential of smaller political parties. The<br />
rules rema<strong>in</strong>ed valid for the follow<strong>in</strong>g elections, before which only the number of elected<br />
deputies slightly decre<strong>as</strong>ed (due to the decre<strong>as</strong>e <strong>in</strong> population) and the conditions for<br />
representation of ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities slightly deteriorated (Birch et al. 2002: 96-98, Lege<br />
Nr. 373 d<strong>in</strong> 24 Septembrie 2004 pentru alegerea Camerei Depuţatilor şi a Senatului).<br />
Slovakia <strong>in</strong>itiated the second modification of election rules <strong>in</strong> the <strong>as</strong>pects under<br />
consideration before the election held <strong>in</strong> 1998. The reform <strong>in</strong>volved among other th<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
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