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of self regulation? - The Law Society of Upper Canada

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urdened with the increasing bureaucratic costs <strong>of</strong> <strong>regulation</strong>; third, it would potentially<br />

enhance the legitimacy <strong>of</strong> the pr<strong>of</strong>ession in the eyes <strong>of</strong> the public; and fourth, it might<br />

lead to more efficient complaints systems in which both lawyers and the public would<br />

benefit. 124<br />

To buttress this criticism, reference is <strong>of</strong>ten made to other pr<strong>of</strong>essions, for<br />

example doctors, who have two very distinct organizations, the Canadian Medical<br />

Association (representative), the College <strong>of</strong> Physicians and Surgeons (regulatory). 125<br />

2. Monopoly/Market Control<br />

Although this argument is informed by the economic analysis <strong>of</strong> law, it is worth<br />

noting that it is embraced by critics on both the left and right <strong>of</strong> the political spectrum. 126<br />

On this view the legal pr<strong>of</strong>ession is a “conspiratorial cartel” 127 and <strong>self</strong> <strong>regulation</strong> is anticompetitive<br />

because it limits the supply <strong>of</strong> legal services thereby artificially inflating<br />

prices. Many legal services could be supplied by others, for example paralegals, and there<br />

is no empirical evidence to suggest that the removal <strong>of</strong> <strong>self</strong> <strong>regulation</strong> would either<br />

diminish the quality or availability <strong>of</strong> legal services. 128<br />

More specifically, comparative<br />

empirical research confirms that in many jurisdictions there is a fundamental “lack <strong>of</strong> a<br />

consumer orientation” on the part <strong>of</strong> the legal pr<strong>of</strong>ession and, more importantly, that law<br />

124 Seneviratne, supra note 127 at 48-49. See also MacKenzie, Models, supra note 102 at 32. For an<br />

enlightening account <strong>of</strong> how and why the legal pr<strong>of</strong>ession in Illinois voluntarily surrendered <strong>self</strong>governance<br />

see Michael Powell, “Pr<strong>of</strong>essional Divestiture: <strong>The</strong> Cession <strong>of</strong> Responsibility for <strong>Law</strong>yer<br />

Discipline” (1986) Am. Bar. Found. Res. J. 31.<br />

125 Arora & Francis, supra note 127 at 3, 14.<br />

126 See generally, Robert Evans & Michael Trebilcock, <strong>Law</strong>yers and the Consumer Interest: Regulating the<br />

Market for Legal Services (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Richard Abel, <strong>The</strong> Legal Pr<strong>of</strong>ession in England<br />

and Wales (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988); Pue, “Death Squads” supra note 110 at 8; Seneviratne, Legal<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>ession, supra note 2 at 14-15, 28-29.<br />

127 Parker JL, supra note 100 at 109-112<br />

128 H. Kritzner, “Rethinking Barriers to Legal Practice” (1997-1998) 81 Judicature 100.<br />

36

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