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NOTES
1 The US government has recently for example committed to make government-held data more
accessible in order to fuel innovation and adaptation under the White House Climate Data Initiative
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/03/19/climate-data-initiative-launches-strong-public-and-privatesector-commitments
2 UN OCHA notes that agreeing triggers for humanitarian action in the Horn of Africa, while accepted
in principle, has proved politically difficult to achieve in practice (OCHA, 2014).
3 UN OCHA has proposed alternate approaches to quantifying UN coordinated appeal requirements,
which rely not on the sum of the cost of projects, but on methods of calculating theoretical response
costs. OCHA is currently investigating potential methods.
4 Lloyds (2010) contend that at the time of writing, the consensus was that the poorest 10-15% may
not be able to access commercial insurance, but that this may change as governments target this
group, citing the example of Georgia where the government paid the health insurance premiums of
the poorest 25% of the population.
5 For example, the donor-funded review of the CCRIF queried the seemingly low return (USD 32
million) on the donor and investor outlay of USD 190 million (Dlugolecki, Kalra and Mechler, 2013)
6 See http://go.worldbank.org/0IYHJGV280
7 For example, Grenada suffered direct losses from hurricane Ivan in 2004 equivalent to 203% of its
annual GDP (Ghesquiere and Mahul, 2010)
8 Donors were Bermuda, Canada, the Caribbean Development Bank, the European Commission,
France, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Ireland and the United Kingdom.
9 Dlugolecki, Kalra and Mechler (2013) note that: “Information on the use of CCRIF payouts is sketchy
and there is a lack of a reporting process, making it difficult to confirm to what extent liquidity
problems were overcome. Payouts are reported to have been used for infrastructure repair, clean-up
and recovery, but also for less urgent purposes such as upgrading weather monitoring facilities.”
10 It is worth noting that during the lifetime of the project, many donors developed much stronger
requirements for demonstrating results such that their expectations at the end of the implementation
period were likely much higher than at the outset. The success of the CCRIF and the desire to
replicate the model elsewhere also contributed to a higher demand for evidence and lessons than
perhaps could have been envisaged at project design phase.
11 Hobson (2012) for example describes how the risk financing mechanism enabled a rapid scale up
of assistance during the 2011 food security crisis
https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/protecting-the-vulnerable-during-crisis-and-disaster-partii-ethiopia-s-productive-safety-net-progra
A CALCULATED RISK: HOW DONORS SHOULD ENGAGE WITH RISK FINANCING AND TRANSFER MECHANISMS
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