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Download PDF file - Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

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The police were also relatively inactive in the aftermath <strong>of</strong> May 12 as violence<br />

continued unabated. Though some action was taken to curb the violence in the form <strong>of</strong> setting<br />

up buffer points, and even trying to control violent mobs and protestors, however this still led<br />

to several deaths and injuries in various neighborhoods. For example, in the Benares/Qasba<br />

area it was reported that the police maintained a low pro<strong>file</strong> all day until around 6 pm when<br />

they made some arrests with the help <strong>of</strong> an armoured personnel carrier (APC). 120<br />

The police were also not spared during the ensuing mayhem. Many police were injured<br />

when their mobile units came under fire near the courts and other skirmishes between the<br />

police and armed activists. An <strong>of</strong>f-duty police head constable, 48-year-old Mansoor Ahmed<br />

was caught by a mob and beaten and then shot dead in the Manghopir area on 13 May. 121<br />

There was also damage to police posts, such as the 15 Madadgar” post in the Aath Chowk<br />

area. 122<br />

4.2 Rangers and military<br />

In contrast to the police, Rangers and the military were entirely absent on May 12,<br />

despite the Rangers being placed in potential conflict areas as per the <strong>of</strong>ficial security plan.<br />

When either <strong>of</strong> these security forces was present, they maintained distance and diligently<br />

avoided any engagement with violent elements. These forces were not responsive to judicial<br />

orders either, as was the case with the City Courts.<br />

Some <strong>of</strong> the main ambushes took place within close range <strong>of</strong> military and paramilitary<br />

installations. The ambush at COD/Drigh Road Railway station on Shara-e-Faisal was in close<br />

proximity to army installations. In Malir, firing at the CJ supporters was reportedly started<br />

from close to the main gate <strong>of</strong> the Bhitai Rangers’ base at Kala Board. In both these places<br />

firing continued for several hours. It is incomprehensible that the military and paramilitary<br />

forces could remain alo<strong>of</strong> while there were war-like scenes at their very doorsteps. Such<br />

indifference not only betrayed callousness towards the lives <strong>of</strong> citizens it also displayed a<br />

sloppy and lackadaisical attitude to the security <strong>of</strong> important military installations.<br />

HRCP<br />

Major-General Javed Zia, the Director General <strong>of</strong> the Rangers in Karachi, met a<br />

delegation <strong>of</strong> Pashtun community leaders and some journalists on 16 May and told them some<br />

13,000 troops had been deployed on May 12. He also stated that they were assigned security<br />

duties at the airport and were responsible to protect the Chief Justice, multinational<br />

companies, banks and other important installations. “As there were no unfortunate<br />

occurrences at these places, the Rangers cannot be held accountable for incidents in other<br />

parts <strong>of</strong> the city” 123 . He further said that the primary duty <strong>of</strong> the Rangers was to secure the<br />

Sindh segment <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Pakistan</strong>-India international border. 124 A day later he was reported as<br />

saying that if the Rangers had become active in the city on May 12 there would have been<br />

heaps <strong>of</strong> bodies. 125 These comments and remarks, if reported correctly, reveal some level <strong>of</strong><br />

confusion within the command structure <strong>of</strong> the security policy vis-à-vis May 12. The numbers<br />

mentioned by the DG were certainly not in evidence in the streets. If such large numbers were<br />

indeed present and available, it is not clear what their rules <strong>of</strong> engagement were. Even if the<br />

Rangers’ primary duty was with respect to the Indian border, it was inexplicable that they did<br />

120<br />

Ummat 14 May (c)<br />

121<br />

Ummat 14 May (c),<br />

122<br />

Dawn 13 May (i), Express 13 May (h).<br />

123<br />

See The News, “Rangers not guilty for May 12: DG Rangers”, May 17, 2007<br />

124<br />

Express 17 May (a).<br />

125<br />

Express 18 May (a).<br />

32

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