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A high-ranking group at the Governor’s House was monitoring the situation on a daily
basis. 29 This group included the Governor, the Chief Minister, the provincial advisor on Home
Affairs, and senior officials of law enforcement agencies.
Details of the security plan were not made public; however, press reports indicated
some specific actions. These included the division of policing activities in the entire city into
three zones, each headed by a DIG, the deployment of and patrolling by Rangers and police,
and installations of CCTV cameras and aerial surveillance at various locations, including
Sharah-e-Faisal. It was specified that Section 144 was not imposed 30 .
Interestingly, one report as early as May 7 th had recounted that the government had
decided to fix cameras around the city courts for complete monitoring of the CJ during his
arrival in the city on May 12 and, further, that a monitoring device with a range of 5-kilometre
distance, which could also tape a voice, would also be fixed at the main gates of the city
courts.
At a meeting on May 11, apparently at the Governor’s House, several “security” and
“political” options were discussed for preventing confrontation between rival rallies of
supporters of the CJ and the MQM respectively. The “security” options included offering a
bulletproof vehicle, identifying potential points of conflict between the rival rallies, stationing
Rangers and paramilitary forces at those points, and placing security forces in a state of high
alert 31 . The “political” options included delaying the Chief Justice’s flight, requesting the CJ to
return due to the tense situation, offering to fly him to the city centre in a helicopter, and
allowing his supporters to take him in a rally after the end of the MQM rally 32 . Interestingly,
all of the various options reported in the press take it for granted that the MQM would not be
asked to make any changes to its plans.
HRCP
1.2.1 Commandeering of Vehicles and setting Roadblocks
The most conspicuous “security” preparation for May 12 was the commandeering of
vehicles and the setting up of roadblocks in various parts of the city from the evening of May
11 onwards. Commandeered vehicles included container trucks and trailers, trucks, watertankers,
Suzuki pick-ups, coaches, buses, mini-buses, and rickshaws. The commandeered
vehicles were placed strategically to block roads, streets and lanes and their tyres were
deflated to prevent them form being moved.
As referred to earlier, between 7:00-7:30 am of May 11th, 19 buses belonging to the
University of Karachi, NED University and Government College of Technology were hijacked
by armed MQM cadres from Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Jamshed Quarters, Karimabad, Korangi Road,
Malir Jinnah Square, National Highway, Nazimabad Board Office, Nazimabad Petrol Pump,
New Karachi, North Nazimabad, Numaish Chowrangi, Shahrah-e-Faisal, and University Road.
The drivers were also taken away along with the buses 33 .
Armed MQM workers also commandeered a large number of private vehicles from
transporters and other tradesmen. In most cases, owners or drivers of the vehicles were
instructed to remain with their vehicles. This was done in an organized way with “military”
precision. MQM unit offices collected the vehicles, along with their documents, and parked
29
Jang 12 May (l)
30
Dawn 11 May (b)
31
Jang 12 May (m).
32
Jang, 12 May (m)
33
Jang 12 May (d)
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