equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints - Convex ...

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c○ Copyright by Che-Lin Su 2005 All Rights Reserved ii
I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Richard W. Cottle (Principal Advisor) I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Hung-Po Chao I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Kenneth L. Judd I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Michael A. Saunders Approved for the University Committee on Graduate Studies. iii
Page 1: EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS WITH EQUILIBRI
Page 6 and 7: as well as contracts with action an
Page 8 and 9: financial support from Electric Pow
Page 10 and 11: 5 Computation of Moral-Hazard Probl
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Page 16 and 17: 2 Chapter 1 Introduction economics
Page 19 and 20: Chapter 2 Mathematical Program with
Page 21 and 22: 2.1 Preliminary on MPECs 7 LICQ (MF
Page 23 and 24: 2.1 Preliminary on MPECs 9 Theorem
Page 25 and 26: 2.2 A Generalization of Scholtes’
Page 33 and 34: Chapter 3 Equilibrium Problem with
Page 35 and 36: 3.1 Formulation and stationarity co
Page 37 and 38: 3.2 Algorithms for Solving EPECs 23
Page 39 and 40: 3.2 Algorithms for Solving EPECs 25
Page 41 and 42: 3.3 Implementation and Numerical Co
Page 47: 3.3 Implementation and Numerical Co
Page 50 and 51: 36 Chapter 4 Forward-Spot Market Mo
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38 Chapter 4 Forward-Spot Market Mo
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Chapter 5 Computation of Moral-Haza
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5.1 Introduction 53 games, optimal
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5.2 The Basic Moral-Hazard Model 55
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5.3 Moral-Hazard Problems with Lott
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5.4 A Hybrid Approach toward Global
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5.5 An Example and Numerical Result
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5.5 An Example and Numerical Result
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Bibliography [1] Allaz, B., Vila, J
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Bibliography 79 [20] Harker, P.T. (
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Bibliography 81 [42] The NEOS serve
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Bibliography 83 [63] Scholtes, S.,
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