Special issue to commemorate the 70th Anniversary of the Battle of ...

“Pillbox 3 did not open fire!” Mapping the Arcs of Fire of Pillboxes at Jardine’s Lookout and Wong Nai Chung Gap
By 07:40, the Japanese were “in possession of the
whole JLO area except PBs”. (War Diary) This meant
that the heavy AA Gun position and the bunkers in the
vicinity (Photo 2), including those guarding Stanley
Gap Road, were lost. Stanley Gap was lost at 08:30.
“Enemy left us alone.” (War Diary) The defenders
blocked the PB ventilating outlets with blankets and
greatcoats.
After the Japanese captured Stanley Gap, they
concentrated their efforts to take PB1 and PB2 “by
heavy mortar-fire alternating with infantry attacks.”
(Stewart 2005) Most of the defenders were wounded
more than once.
Two Japanese attempts to advance along the catchwater
were frustrated by the defenders, who came out and
threw hand grenades into it.
At noon, a Japanese party attempted to throw hand
grenades through the loopholes of PB1, but was wiped
out by the defenders of PB2, who came out to help. As
all MG guns of PB1 had been knocked out, Lt. Field
led his surviving men into the open and fought on with
rifles and light MG.
Five Canadian survivors from the summit of JLO
joined the defenders of PB1 at about 13:30. At about
15:00, Lt. Field ordered L/Cpl Broadbridge and 12 men
(including five walking wounded) to evacuate and held
on with a few defenders.
At 18:00, all the remaining defenders except Sgt.
White had been wounded, some mortally. A Japanese
officer came in with a flag of truce. The PB defenders
surrendered and were taken prisoners. Those who
could not walk were left to die. This was undoubtedly
an indication of the Japanese respect for the heroism of
the defenders as elsewhere captives and wounded were
simply bayoneted on the spot 3 .
The above was all documented in Stewart’s war diary
and his Hong Kong Volunteers in Battle, which was
first published in 1953 and the last reprint of which was
made five years ago (Stewart 2005).
Three questions remain concerning this heroic epic of
the Battle of Hong Kong:
(1) Did PB1 really kill that many enemy soldiers?
(2) Why didn’t PB2 report having fired at enemy
along the Ride or at Wong Nai Chung Gap?
(3) Why didn’t PB3 fire at all?
SURVEY FINDINGS
Figure 1 shows the larger scaled original sketch of the
defences of Jardines Look Out and Wong Nai Chung
Gap by Major Stewart 4 . Our survey findings are
presented in Figures 2 to 7.
Figure 2 shows the accurate locations of the defensive
positions indicated on Major Stewart’s sketch.
Figure 3 shows the measured horizontal layouts and
profiles of PBs 1, 2, and 3.
Figure 4 shows the measured layout of the OP on the
summit of Jardines’ Look Out.
Figure 5 shows the measured layouts of the Stanley
Gap bunkers we discovered above Stanley Gap Road.
Figure 6 shows the layouts of the bunkers of the West
Brigade HQ near the present petrol station.
Figure 7 shows the layouts of the bunkers (occupied
by the staff of the artillery) to the north of the West
Brigade HQ.
Figure 8 shows the beaten zones and firing arcs of PBs
1, 2, and 3.
Our survey results should help answer the three
questions.
3
Banham’s research (2005: p.126) found that in fact four seriously wounded men Jittz, Izatt, Fisher and a Canadian were killed by the Japanese
after surrender.
4
Note that the marking “Present Quarry” refers to an area on the other side of the Mount Butler ridge line, as indicated by the hill cutting symbol.
SBE
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