Class Plaintiff's Response to Automatic Stay - equitatus
Class Plaintiff's Response to Automatic Stay - equitatus
Class Plaintiff's Response to Automatic Stay - equitatus
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Case 11-03620-bjh Doc 40 Filed 02/21/12 Entered 02/21/12 23:34:41 Desc Main<br />
Document Page 9 of 34<br />
resolved. Plaintiff Nolan has also agreed <strong>to</strong> abide by the stipulation.<br />
8. On February 1, 2012, the Deb<strong>to</strong>r filed a proposed joint plan of reorganization (the “Plan”),<br />
<strong>to</strong>gether with a proposed disclosure statement (the “Disclosure”), in their chapter 11 cases.<br />
FACTUAL BACKGROUND<br />
9. The California <strong>Class</strong> Plaintiffs represent over 1400 inves<strong>to</strong>rs in RE Loans and over 600<br />
inves<strong>to</strong>rs in Mortgage Fund ‘08 (“MF08”). As alleged in the Consolidated Complaint, Greenberg<br />
and Wells Fargo <strong>to</strong>gether compromised the rights and interests of inves<strong>to</strong>rs in RE Loans and MF08<br />
and caused them devastating financial injury. The California <strong>Class</strong> Litigation claims are the<br />
inves<strong>to</strong>rs’ only chance <strong>to</strong> mitigated the losses inflicted on them by Greenberg and Wells Fargo. The<br />
factual allegations supporting the California <strong>Class</strong> Plaintiffs’ claims in the Consolidated Complaint<br />
are summarized below.<br />
10. RE Loans was a “hard money” lender that used funds from inves<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>to</strong> make secured real<br />
estate development loans, returning profits from these loans <strong>to</strong> the inves<strong>to</strong>rs. RE Loans inves<strong>to</strong>rmembers<br />
were given equity membership interests in return for their contributions. As limited<br />
liability company members, they had important contractual control rights. For instance, members<br />
holding a majority of interests could remove the RE Loans managers ("Managers" or "RE Loans<br />
Managers"), vote <strong>to</strong> dissolve RE Loans, or (with limited exceptions) amend the RE Loans operating<br />
agreement. CC 48. 2<br />
11. RE Loans grew rapidly from its formation in 2002 through 2006. CC 52. By early 2007,<br />
the Managers had raised more than $700 million from approximately 1400 members, and RE Loans<br />
had more than $55 million operating cash on hand. Id. 52, 55. The portfolio loans were<br />
performing well, providing members with an average annualized yield exceeding 8%. Id. RE Loans<br />
members had no reason <strong>to</strong> doubt that their investments were safe and profitable.<br />
12. In 2007, the RE Loans Managers encountered two major problems. First was the realization<br />
that, from 2002 through 2006, they had violated state and federal securities laws in the sales of RE<br />
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Citations <strong>to</strong> the Consolidated Complaint are in the form "CC at __."<br />
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