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2010 Vol 101.pdf (1.63mb) - Primate Society of Great Britain

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Social monitoring by reputation: How to compare human and animals<br />

in an evolutionary framework?<br />

Y.I. Russell<br />

Institute <strong>of</strong> Social and Cultural Anthropology, University <strong>of</strong> Oxford<br />

Reputation is usually defined as an entirely human construct. This is<br />

because the majority <strong>of</strong> studies in human disciplines (economics,<br />

commerce, psychology, etc.) define reputation as a sort <strong>of</strong> one-dimensional<br />

yardstick whereupon the same information is accessible to everyone. This<br />

definition is <strong>of</strong> limited usefulness to animal studies because it requires<br />

language ability and ubiquitous sources <strong>of</strong> public information. The exact<br />

psychological processes that underlay social reputation monitoring are<br />

poorly understood even in humans. In order to begin a comparative study <strong>of</strong><br />

human and animal reputation monitoring, “reputation” should be redefined<br />

in a way that accommodates all animals. Here, I present a framework for<br />

investigating the evolution <strong>of</strong> social monitoring abilities across all animal<br />

taxa. I define reputation as “knowledge about an individual’s typical<br />

behaviour, based on a knowledge <strong>of</strong> that individual’s past behaviour”<br />

(Russell, 2007). The psychological process <strong>of</strong> reputation monitoring should<br />

be dissected into its constituent parts in order to compare the abilities<br />

between animals in a componential way (this approach is similar to<br />

Hockett’s design features approach to language). Most organisms are<br />

capable <strong>of</strong> some form <strong>of</strong> social eavesdropping and intention reading, but the<br />

smallest brained animals are unlikely to cogitate much on the personalities<br />

<strong>of</strong> their conspecifics. At the human end <strong>of</strong> the continuum, social reputation<br />

monitoring probably involves a type <strong>of</strong> social expertise. It is important to be<br />

aware, however, that human social expertise will necessarily involve a<br />

series <strong>of</strong> memory distortions, affected by highly emotional events, schema<br />

effects, primacy, and recency.<br />

Emotional laterality - the influence <strong>of</strong> emotion upon visual field<br />

preferences<br />

A. Milligan<br />

Department <strong>of</strong> Psychology, University <strong>of</strong> Stirling<br />

Emotional lateralisation may influence motor lateralisation, and may<br />

therefore have played a significant role in the evolution <strong>of</strong> social signals in<br />

both humans and non-human animals. The ‘affective state’ <strong>of</strong> animals has<br />

been shown to exert influence upon functional lateralisation in species from<br />

five classes <strong>of</strong> vertebrates with studies observing strong lateral biases during<br />

particular social interactions. However, the association between specific<br />

emotions and social interactions may be more complex than previously<br />

thought. Almost all <strong>of</strong> these studies focused upon scenarios <strong>of</strong> negative<br />

emotion such as fear or aggression, and in each case visual field preferences<br />

were identified as suitable indicators <strong>of</strong> lateral preference whereby subjects<br />

22

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