Aristotle, Metaphysics Book Zeta (VII) Commentary ... - CATpages

Aristotle, Metaphysics, Zeta
way. Therefore these materials are principles and
parts of the concrete things, while of the form
they are neither parts nor principles. And
therefore the clay statue is resolved into clay and
the ball into bronze and Callias into flesh and
bones, and again the circle into its segments; for
there is a sense of 'circle' in which involves
matter. For 'circle' is used ambiguously, meaning
both the circle, unqualified, and the individual
circle, because there is no name peculiar to the
individuals.
The truth has indeed now been stated, but still
let us state it yet more clearly, taking up the
question again. The parts of the formula, into
which the formula is divided, are prior to it,
either all or some of them. The formula of the
right angle, however, does not include the
formula of the acute, but the formula of the acute
includes that of the right angle; for he who
defines the acute uses the right angle; for the
acute is 'less than a right angle'. The circle and
the semicircle also are in a like relation; for the
semicircle is defined by the circle; and so is the
finger by the whole body, for a finger is 'such and
such a part of a man'. Therefore the parts which
are of the nature of matter, and into which as its
matter a thing is divided, are posterior; but those
which are of the nature of parts of the formula,
and of the substance according to its formula, are
prior, either all or some of them. And since the
soul of animals (for this is the substance of a
living being) is their substance according to the
formula, i.e. the form and the essence of a body
of a certain kind (at least we shall define each
part, if we define it well, not without reference to
its function, and this cannot belong to it without
perception), so that the parts of soul are prior,
either all or some of them, to the concrete
'animal', and so too with each individual animal;
and the body and parts are posterior to this, the
essential substance, and it is not the substance
but the concrete thing that is divided into these
parts as its matter:--this being so, to the concrete
thing these are in a sense prior, but in a sense
they are not. For they cannot even exist if
The main point here is, as Aristotle says, that the question
of whether a substance is prior or posterior to its parts is
not a simple one, for it depends on how one conceives the
whole and parts. If we ask whether the hum an being is
prior or posterior to its parts--that is, its human parts--then
the parts are posterior, since reference to the human being
includes reference to the form of the human, and this form
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