Aristotle, Metaphysics Book Zeta (VII) Commentary ... - CATpages
Aristotle, Metaphysics Book Zeta (VII) Commentary ... - CATpages
Aristotle, Metaphysics Book Zeta (VII) Commentary ... - CATpages
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<strong>Aristotle</strong>, <strong>Metaphysics</strong>, <strong>Zeta</strong><br />
species is called; if it were, that other would be<br />
an element in 'man', i.e. would be the genus of<br />
man. And further, (ii) all the elements of which<br />
'man' is composed will be Ideas. None of them,<br />
then, will be the Idea of one thing and the<br />
substance of another; this is impossible. The<br />
'animal', then, present in each species of animals<br />
will be animal-itself. Further, from what is this<br />
'animal' in each species derived, and how will it<br />
be derived from animal-itself? Or how can this<br />
'animal', whose essence is simply animality, exist<br />
apart from animal-itself?<br />
Further, (3) in the case of sensible things both<br />
these consequences and others still more absurd<br />
follow. If, then, these consequences are<br />
impossible, clearly there are not Forms of<br />
sensible things in the sense in which some<br />
maintain their existence.<br />
Chapter 15<br />
Since substance is of two kinds, the concrete<br />
thing and the formula (I mean that one kind of<br />
substance is the formula taken with the matter,<br />
while another kind is the formula in its<br />
generality), substances in the former sense are<br />
capable of destruction (for they are capable also<br />
of generation), but there is no destruction of the<br />
formula in the sense that it is ever in course of<br />
being destroyed (for there is no generation of it<br />
either; the being of house is not generated, but<br />
only the being of this house), but without<br />
generation and destruction formulae are and are<br />
not; for it has been shown that no one begets nor<br />
makes these. For this reason, also, there is<br />
neither definition of nor demonstration about<br />
sensible individual substances, because they have<br />
matter whose nature is such that they are capable<br />
both of being and of not being; for which reason<br />
all the individual instances of them are<br />
destructible. If then demonstration is of<br />
necessary truths and definition is a scientific<br />
process, and if, just as knowledge cannot be<br />
sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance,<br />
but the state which varies thus is opinion, so too<br />
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