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Aristotle, Metaphysics Book Zeta (VII) Commentary ... - CATpages

Aristotle, Metaphysics Book Zeta (VII) Commentary ... - CATpages

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<strong>Aristotle</strong>, <strong>Metaphysics</strong>, <strong>Zeta</strong><br />

species is called; if it were, that other would be<br />

an element in 'man', i.e. would be the genus of<br />

man. And further, (ii) all the elements of which<br />

'man' is composed will be Ideas. None of them,<br />

then, will be the Idea of one thing and the<br />

substance of another; this is impossible. The<br />

'animal', then, present in each species of animals<br />

will be animal-itself. Further, from what is this<br />

'animal' in each species derived, and how will it<br />

be derived from animal-itself? Or how can this<br />

'animal', whose essence is simply animality, exist<br />

apart from animal-itself?<br />

Further, (3) in the case of sensible things both<br />

these consequences and others still more absurd<br />

follow. If, then, these consequences are<br />

impossible, clearly there are not Forms of<br />

sensible things in the sense in which some<br />

maintain their existence.<br />

Chapter 15<br />

Since substance is of two kinds, the concrete<br />

thing and the formula (I mean that one kind of<br />

substance is the formula taken with the matter,<br />

while another kind is the formula in its<br />

generality), substances in the former sense are<br />

capable of destruction (for they are capable also<br />

of generation), but there is no destruction of the<br />

formula in the sense that it is ever in course of<br />

being destroyed (for there is no generation of it<br />

either; the being of house is not generated, but<br />

only the being of this house), but without<br />

generation and destruction formulae are and are<br />

not; for it has been shown that no one begets nor<br />

makes these. For this reason, also, there is<br />

neither definition of nor demonstration about<br />

sensible individual substances, because they have<br />

matter whose nature is such that they are capable<br />

both of being and of not being; for which reason<br />

all the individual instances of them are<br />

destructible. If then demonstration is of<br />

necessary truths and definition is a scientific<br />

process, and if, just as knowledge cannot be<br />

sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance,<br />

but the state which varies thus is opinion, so too<br />

23

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