PDF, 2.81MB - Combat Law

ComBAT lAW 

january - february 2007 

Volume 6 ISSue 1 

Editor 

Colin Gonsalves 

Managing Editor 

Harsh Dobhal 

Consulting Editor 

Amit Sengupta 

Senior Associate Editor 

Suresh Nautiyal 

Assistant Copy Editor 

Nenem Misao 

Senior Sub-Editor 

Shantanu Duttagupta 

Correspondent/Sub-Editor 

Nida Mariam (Mumbai) 

Special Contribution 

Girish Agrawal 

Correspondents 

Prabhjot Kaur (Mumbai) 

Sheela Ramanathan (Bangalore) 

Geetha D (Chennai) 

Website Co-ordinator 

Shantanu Duttagupta 

Subscription 

Hitendra Chauhan 

Layout Design 

S Rout 

Hardeo Sharma 

Illustrations 

Vikram Nayak 

Editorial Office 

4th Floor, Engineer House, 86, 

Bombay Samachar Marg, Near Stock 

Exchange, Mumbai - 400 023. 

Tel: 2267 6680, 2267 7385; 

Fax: 2263 2718 

E-mail your queries and opinions to 

editor@combatlaw.org 

Any written matter that is published 

in the magazine can be used freely 

with credits to Combat Law and the 

author. In case of publication please 

write to us at the above mentioned 

address. The opinions expressed in 

the articles are those of the authors. 

Disasters Inc. 

Government of the people, by the people, for the people. An 

old slogan that we never tire of repeating. But it is as hollow 

as the new slogan of “India Shining,” or all the talk of India 

becoming the next superpower. Not only does the Indian State seem 

incapable of providing effective relief or rehabilitation when natural 

disasters strike, it seems to actively create disasters by uprooting and 

displacing tens of thousands of its own people in the name of development 

– a term that has become synonymous with massive infrastructure 

projects that require the expenditure of huge amounts of resources 

for benefits that are dubious at best. 

This issue of Combat Law presents two sets of reports and articles 

that highlight the failure of the Indian State in providing for people 

suffering from disasters – natural or man-made. The first set provides 

a look at the situation in the Andaman & Nicobar islands two years 

after the tsunami. The second set looks at the disastrous impact of the 

Tehri dam on the people of the region. 

In the case of the natural disaster of the tsunami, the misery of the 

victims has been compounded by the government following rehabilitation 

policies and practices that ignore the needs and desires of the 

populace, and seem designed to reduce a once proud people to passive 

onlookers dependent on the government for handouts. As you read the 

reports, you will be struck, as we have been, by the resilience of the 

people of the islands, and the utter incompetence of the State in fulfilling 

its duty even two years after the tsunami struck. Or perhaps this is 

not incompetence, but a well-executed plan pushed by the vested 

interests who really control the government to take advantage of the 

golden opportunity presented by the tsunami. The minister for 

tourism is pushing for these pristine islands to be opened up for “high 

value” tourism. Deals are being struck with a string of five star hotels. 

Bureaucrats support this initiative with talk of the tribals being “backward,” 

of bringing “primitive” people into the “mainstream.” 

The Tehri dam is an ill-conceived, ill-planned project that has 

already proven disastrous for the local people, displacing more than 

nine thousand families from 125 villages. And because it is located in 

an earthquake-prone area, the dam is a ticking time-bomb for large 

populations downstream. After destroying so many local communities, 

the project has produced no tangible local benefits. Even taking 

into account the benefits of the electricity produced and the water sent 

to far away places, the best estimates indicate that the project cost is 

about twice the net benefits it will generate in its lifetime – and this is 

assuming everything functions as designed. Yet the government pushes 

ahead. Who benefits besides the same vested interests who come 

out of the woodwork after a natural disaster? 

It’s clear that the government response to the tsunami and its execution 

of the Tehri dam project are part of the neo-liberal globalisation 

project, pushed by a small elite that desires even more power and riches 

than it already has. We are on our way to becoming a nation where 

the government is of the few, by the few, for the few. 


Editor

C O N T E N T S 

4 

8 

Iron Curtain’s 

Mendacity 

Our colonial hangover 

shows in the post-tsunami 

response to the 

islands’ people 


More horrifying than 

Tsunami 

Betrayal of the people by 

the corrupt officials and 

NGO nexus 

Human Rights Law 

Network (HRLN) Report 

21 

The Daily Apocalypse 

The writing is on the wall. 

A million micro-apocalypses 

are happening right 

here, right now. 

Satya Sagar 

25 

Farce follows Disaster 

Disaster Management 

Policy is the last chance 

for concerted action for 

present and future disaster 

victims 

Max Martin 

2 

C O M B A T L A W J A N U A R Y - F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 7

28 

Exiled in your own 

Imaginary Homeland 

Two years after the tsunami 

the victims have 

become strangers to their 

own lives and land 

Shivani Chaudhry 

30 

There was once an 

Old Tehri town… 

Drowning of the town is a 

stark symbol of the real 

cost of “development” 

Harsh Dobhal 

35 

The future of tragedy 

is now 

Harbingers of doom are 

not too far off the mark 

when it is about Tehri Dam 

Sanjay Parikh 

40 

Drowned out of 

the Map 

Water everywhere and not 

a drop to drink - a hundred 

suicides for lack of 

water in the Tehri region 

HRLN Report 

w w w . c o m b a t l a w . o r g 3

TSUNAMI: TWO YEARS AF TER 

Iron Curtain’s 

Mendacity 

A memorial erected for the victims of the tsunami off the coast of Tamil Nadu 

This cover is a report to the nation of the relentless suffering of the people of the 

Andaman and Nicobar islands. Their decline from a proud race of independent tribals 

who cared two hoots for the government, to a people crippled by a corrupt, inefficient 

administration in sub-human conditions of survival is not accidental but a symptom of 

our colonial hangover, writes Colin Gonsalves 

What sense of importance 

did it give the 

government of India to 

reject offhand the offer 

by the European states 

to provide grants, materials and 

equipments for the victims of tsunami 

in India, only to thereafter 

approach the World Bank for a loan 

albeit with low interest? What drove 

the government to provide relief by 

sea and air to the tsunami victims in 

Sri Lanka, when the victims in the 

Andaman and Nicobar Islands are 

without housing and clean drinking 

water till today? For how long will 

the central government hide the suffering 

of the tsunami survivors in 

India from the rest of the world? 

There is something fundamentally 

wrong with the way we deal with 

relief to the victims of disasters and 

their subsequent rehabilitation. In the 

aftermath of the Latur earthquake in 

Maharashtra, money poured in from 

all over the world. The state government 

forced its employees to make a 

contribution. Notwithstanding all 

this, the situation on the ground 

remained pathetic. 

4 


BAT TERED AND BETRAYED 

A closer enquiry and a public 

interest petition in the Bombay High 

Court (at the Aurangabad bench), 

indicated that part of the funds flowing 

in, including the Rs 801 crore of 

the World Bank meant for rehabilitation 

of the quake survivors, was 

diverted elsewhere, perhaps for election 

expenses. It was only Justice BN 

Deshmukh’s no-nonsense approach 

that forced the government to bring 

money back for the building of houses. 

Ten years after the Latur earthquake, 

and after elaborate monitoring, 

first by the high court and later 

by the Supreme Court, the houses 

were ultimately built for everyone. 

The Gujarat earthquake saw a 

similar situation. Here Muslims and 

dalits were discriminated against in 

the re-building effort. The heroic 

efforts of NGOs and an ombudsman 

appointed by the high court did 

bring some relief. 

A disquieting feature of all disasters 

is the reluctance of the administration 

to publicly acknowledge the 

specific details of the funds coming 

in, and the identity of donors. 

Leading newspapers invariably list 

their donors when they raise money 

for public causes, as after an earthquake. 

But the government is loath to 

do this. The reasons for this are to be 

found in the greed entrenched within 

the system, and the cruel attitude 

towards the poor. 

A careful social audit of how the 

donations of millions of dollars were 

actually used may yield interesting 

results. Indeed, nothing angers the 

administration of the government 

more than a request from the public 

to publish the list of donors. I suspect 

that money meant for the victims of 

disaster are routinely diverted for the 

payment of the salaries of government 

servants and other sundry 

expenses. In the case of the tsunami 

to this day, despite requests, the government 

has refused to put the list of 

donors on its website. 

General figures, of course, are 

routinely reported in the newspapers. 

Besides being unreliable they 

do not permit an individual donor to 

verify whether her contribution has 

been acknowledged. It’s a classic 

government strategy to always hide, 

obfuscate and confuse financial 

details by leaking banal details of the 

total quantum received. 

In the case of 

tsunami to this day, 

despite requests, the 

government has 

refused to put the list 

of donors on its 

website. It’s a classic 

government strategy 

to always hide 

financial figures by 

leaking banal details 

of the total quantum 

received 

When the tsunami broke in the 

Andaman and Nicobar Islands on 

December 26, 2004, very few people 

from the mainland reached these 

remote areas. There was total confusion. 

Some policemen and government 

officials abandoned their posts 

and the people. Others made heroic 

efforts. A member of the Human 

Rights Law Network managed to 

land up on Kamota in the Nancowry 

islands. The people had been deserted 

by the administration. Were it not 

for the air force, many more lives 

would have been lost. 

When Combat Law covered the 

betrayal of the tsunami survivors in 

its September 2005 issue, the joint 

editor, Mihir Desai, characterised the 

government of India’s response as “a 

disastrous response to disasters”. 



Instead of relying upon the skills and 

contributions of the local population, 

the administration in the islands 

went about their business in a typically 

colonial fashion. The people 

asked for tools such as knives, axes 

and saws so that they could use the 

wood of the fallen trees to reconstruct 

their homes; but they were 

denied this. Instead, someone highly 

placed at Delhi took the decision to 

send hundreds of thousands of tin 

sheets long distance across the sea so 

that the people of the Andamans, 

who usually reside in wood houses 

benefit of contractors and bureaucrats. 

The people have no understanding 

of how this structure is to 

be maintained. It is frightening to 

think of what these beautiful islands 

will look like ten years from now 

with 10,000 prefabricated steel structures 

rusting and in disrepair. 

Then the people asked for boats 

and nets so that they could resume 

fishing and get back to living as normal 

a life as possible. Their jetties 

had to be repaired so that the boats 

could dock. Cold storages had to be 

made so that fishing could become a 

commercially viable proposition. 

Two years after, in many of the 

islands, the boats have yet to come, 

nets are yet to be distributed, jetties 

remain destroyed, and cold storages 

do not exist. There is fish in the sea 

but not for the tribals of the islands. 

The other source of traditional 

livelihood is coconut plantations, but 

these have been destroyed. The 

seedlings planted will take seven 

years to yield fruits. There is no work 

or meaningful employment. This is 

why the administration provides free 

rations to the tsunami-affected. 

or machans, were forced to live in cattleshed 

type structures which turned 

into ovens during the day and were 

uninhabitable during the monsoons 

because of the mud flooring. They 

live in these sub-human structures to 

this day. 

The government of India repeatedly 

promised the people that they 

would be given permanent housing, 

but as we publish this report, apart 

from the model houses constructed 

for display, not a single house has 

been built for the 10,000 tsunami survivors! 

Instead of allowing the people 

to construct traditional houses 

made of wood, a prefabricated model 

of tubular steel is being imported 

from the mainland, obviously for the 

6 

There is an iron 

curtain between the 

islands and the 

mainland. Unless this 

autonomy of the 

administration to loot 

at will and to treat 

people as inferior is 

fought tooth and nail, 

a similar report will 

be documented by 

Combat Law again 

When we met with the people we 

found that kerosene had been discontinued. 

The supply of free rations 

was irregular in many areas. And 

then came the announcement that 

free rations were to be discontinued. 

The intervention of the high court 

saw better sense prevail. The stand of 

the administration now is that free 

rations will continue for some time. 

Unless alternative livelihood options 

emerge, free rations cannot and 

should not be discontinued. 

For a country which considers 

itself a super power, safe drinking 

water is not available in most places. 

People are still drinking from stagnant 

water pools and streams. They 

suffer all kinds of diseases. 



This is a report to the nation of 

the suffering of the people of the 

Andaman and Nicobar islands two 

years after the tsunami struck, and of 

their decline from a proud race of 

independent tribals and indigenous 

people who cared two hoots for the 

government, to a people dependent 

on the administration for their survival. 

This has been achieved by following 

policies and practices that 

ignore the desires and suggestions of 

the people, reducing them, in the 

process, to passive onlookers. 

This was not accidental. If corruption 

is to exist and grow, activities of 

the government must operate above 

the people — with very little participation, 

understanding and information. 

Perhaps it is the remoteness of the 

islands that allows for such a colonial 

administration to flourish. The newspapers 

from Port Blair give details 

almost on a daily basis of cases of 

corruption. Nothing happens. 

Justices come on a rotation basis 

from Kolkata to man the high court 

functioning at Port Blair. They get to 

hear the administration’s point of 

view, but there are few NGOs or civil 

society groups who interact with the 

judges to give them the other side of 

the story. As a result, judicial intervention 

through PILs is hardly 

known. The Lok Adalats operating at 

Port Blair are ineffective principally 

because they require individuals to 

travel long distances at considerable 

cost and come to Port Blair — instead 

of holding the Lok Adalat in inaccessible 

and far-flung islands. 

All in all, there is an iron curtain 

between the islands and the mainland. 

Unless this autonomy of a dominant 

section of the administration to loot at 

will and to treat tribal people as basically 

inferior is fought tooth and nail, a 

similar report will be documented by 

Combat Law next year as well! 

In the middle of all this confusion, 

it appears that the minister for 

tourism is pushing for these pristine 

islands to be opened up for “high 

value” tourism. Deals are being 

struck with a string of five star hotels. 

Bureaucrats support this initiative 

with talk of the tribals being backward. 

They, like our colonial masters, 

see their role as bringing primitive 

people into the “mainstream”. 

Globalisation has now reached the 

southern most tip of India. n 


It has been almost two 

years since the Tsunami 

washed over the 

Andaman & Nicobar 

Islands and destroyed 

the homes and livelihoods of 

its residents. Although the 

government made a lot of 

promises, and has spent a lot 

of taxpayer’s money, very little 

actual relief and rehabilitation 

work has been done. 

Most islanders are still waiting 

for compensation. The 

shabby temporary housing 

built in the immediate aftermath 

of the tsunami has not 

been replaced by permanent 

housing. Instead of ensuring 

that people are able to return 

to farming or fishing or trade, 

the islands’ economy is being 

parcelled out to vested interests 

from the mainland. The 

environmental degradation is 

reaching crisis proportions. 

In this on-the-spot and analytical 

report, based on prolonged 

spells of painstaking 

research, we present a summary 

of the relief and rehabilitation 

situation in the 

Andaman & Nicobar (A&N) 

Islands: the hard realism of 

truth behind the rhetoric of 

illusions and lies. 

Thousands have been left 

out of various compensation 

packages. A close scrutiny 

reflects a discriminatory trend. 

Traditional boats, cultivation 

on unlicensed land, and shopkeepers 

are the worst hit. The 

administration has not taken 

adequate steps to communicate 

to the people their entitlements 

and the procedure to be 

followed thereto. This has 

aided rampant corruption. 

Tsunami-affected families 

in the islands face discrimination 

in the distribution of exgratia 

relief. Such entrenched 

discrimination is transparently 

visible in the enumeration 

process where a large number 

of families have been systematically 

left out of the compensation 

schemes, and in cases 

where families have been provided 

wholly inadequate 

amounts of compensation. 

More horrifying 

than Tsunami 

the ground beneath the waves 

8 


Forget the crocodile tears. Two years after the tsunami, the homeles 

for straws of hope in the once pristine and now devastated islands o 

Nicobar. All they discover is that they have been brutally betrayed 

corrupt officials and A NGOs Report › by the Human Rights Law Network 



While the ‘Rajiv Gandhi 

Rehabilitation Package’ lays out what 

losses will be compensated, the local 

administration has chosen to minimise 

the scope of the package by 

interpreting the scheme in a manner 

that excludes the most vulnerable and 

powerless. For instance, those cultivating 

unlicensed land have not been 

compensated, the fisherfolk with traditional 

or unlicensed boats have been 

excluded from the package, and local 

shopkeepers have been largely left 

out of the compensation process. 

The implementation of the package 

violates the equal treatment 

guarantee of Article 14 of the 

Constitution because of two reasons: 

Lok Adalats 

W 

ith 2000 applications filed regarding compensation issues, 

the Lok Adalat has disposed off less than a 100. The functioning 

of the Lok Adalat is far from satisfactory. The Lok Adalat’s 

interpretation of most relief and rehabilitation packages leaves 

much to be desired. The proceedings are conducted in a traditionally 

adversarial manner depriving the poor of their application 

rights. 

Since December 2005, over two thousand applications have 

been filed with the Lok Adalat of the A&N islands. Less than 100 

cases have been disposed of till date. The claims filed with the 

Lok Adalats pertain to inadequate compensation for loss of crop, 

land, livestock, boats and ancillary equipment, life, disability and 

small-scale businesses. 

The Lok Adalat sits in Port Blair, thus forcing most applicants 

to undertake a two to three day journey by ship to get there, and 

then they have to return home without any relief, due to inadequate 

information on part of the administration. The relief packages 

are being interpreted contrary to the spirit of the law, 

depriving most poor people of basic means of sustenance to 

restore their livelihood. 


first, the process of identification of 

ex-gratia relief to all those affected, 

and second, the amounts sanctioned 

are not distributed proportionately 

among the various constituents. For 

instance, fisherfolk and farmers have 

been compensated in lakhs of rupees, 

but shopkeepers have been provided 

with a relief of only Rs 10,000. 

In the Nicobars, there is an apparent 

discrepancy in the figures of the 

dead and missing. Compensation for 

family members who are missing or 

dead has not been completed to date. 

Instead of solving the problem, the 

administration takes refuge in the 

various guidelines from the Centre, 

compliance with which causes innumerable 

delays. 

Field assessments done by the 

Human Rights Law Network 

(HRLN) and others peg the number 

of families who have been excluded 

from the list of beneficiaries for shelter 

as being between 2000 to 3,000. 

The A&N administration feigns helplessness, 

claiming that the matter has 

been closed by the Centre. 

The right to housing 

Temporary shelters: Although most 

of the approximately 10,000 families 

affected by the tsunami have been 

provided temporary housing, such 

housing is generally no more than a 

tin shed. These sheds are most inappropriate 

for a hot tropical climate 

since their interiors become extremely 

hot and it is impossible for people 

to stay inside, especially during daytime 

when the sun is at its peak. 

Many of these sheds even lack flooring, 

making them unliveable when 

sludge and mud enters the houses 

during monsoon. 

The Housing and Land Rights 

Network and other social organisations 

have repeatedly criticised the 

decision by the administration to 

send tens of thousands of tin sheets 

from the mainland to the islands. 

People in the islands have been told 

that the decision was unilaterally 

taken at Delhi. When tin sheds were 

provided as temporary housing in 

the immediate aftermath of the 

tsunami, it was expected, and was 

also conveyed by the administration, 

that construction of permanent housing 

would commence within six 

10 



Individuals report regularly in 

the local newspapers as well 

as widespread corruption in the 

use of tsunami funds. Audits of 

the expenses related to the 

tsunami are supposed to be done 

by the Auditor General at 

Chennai. Such audit reports 

should be made public. Further 

continuing audits should be conducted 

in a participatory manner. 

Victims often complain that 

they managed to get compensation 

only after the payment of 

bribes. They allege, and provide 

evidence to the effect, that those 

who were ineligible were given 

compensation or disproportionate 

compensation and those who 

were eligible but who could not 

pay bribes, were not paid compensation 

or given a lesser 

amount of compensation. 

There is no way for a NGO to 

verify the truth of the repeated 

allegations regarding corruption. 

But the fact that these are 

made on such a large scale by 

Corruption 

Kranti Chinappa 

the newspapers and individuals 

is reason enough for an independent 

inquiry. 

The Comptroller and Auditor 

General had asked the Auditor 

General at Chennai to enquire 

into the use of tsunami funds. 

This report if ready ought to be 

made public. 

The rehabilitation package 

circular dated 24/02/05 gives 

the affected the right to information, 

and in particular the 

right to the government list of 

beneficiaries with full details 

regarding the relief distributed. 

This was to be made available 

in panchayats and municipalities 

and the consolidated list 

was to be displayed at the 

block and taluka level. But, to 

date, this data is not even available 

on the government's website, 

except in selected bits and 

pieces. Nearly two years after 

the circular, this information is 

treated as top secret. Why? 

Who is being protected? 

months and be completed within a 

year. This promise has turned out to 

be entirely illusory. 

Permanent shelters: The tsunami 

was a disaster for the people of the 

islands, and now a second disaster is 

brewing, this one systematically 

man-made. Undoubtedly, this new 

crisis is being caused by the administration 

and by some individuals and 

lobbies in Delhi who have unilaterally 

decided that prefabricated tubular 

steel frames together with engineered 

bamboo flooring is the best functional 

alternative for the people of the 

islands. The claim is that the use of 

these materials was accepted by some 

of the tribal chiefs and captains on the 

islands. But in reality, the people have 

no idea at all as to how these structures 

are to be constructed and maintained. 

It seems likely that within a 

few years of these structures being 

erected, lack of maintenance will 

cause them to degenerate into 

sprawling slums. The islands will be 

saturated with 10,000 such structures. 

Experts such as Integrated Design 

(INDE), whose findings are given 

below, strongly recommended that 

tribals be given tools and wood to 

build their traditional structures 

which are earthquake resistant and 

easily maintained. Moreover, such 

structures do not require large movements 

of men and material from 

Chennai and Kolkata to Port Blair, 

and from there to the islands. The 

immense expenditure involved in 

such movement is a very strong 

argument against the non-traditional 

structures being promoted by certain 

quarters with vested interests. 

Even with inappropriate housing, 

there is scarcely any move from the 

administration’s side to construct this 

housing on most islands. In some 

areas, some amount of foundation 

work and plinth work were completed, 

but now stands abandoned. No 

wonder, the tsunami-affected feel 

that permanent housing will never 

be a reality. 

Of the 10,000 permanent houses 

to be constructed, the administration 

was supposed to build 8,000, and 

various NGOs were given the 

responsibility to build the other 2,000 

houses. The NGOs have barely completed 

50 units. The administration 

has gone one step further and not 

even completed one housing unit! 

The cost of a permanent house is 

approximately Rs 10 lakh (Rs 2 lakh 

for the foundation and Rs 8 lakh for 

the superstructure). In discussions 

with Sameer Acharya of SANE, 

administrative representatives admit 

that out of the Rs 1,200 crore to be 

spent on permanent shelters, only 10 

percent will be accessible to the people 

of the islands, whereas 80 percent 

will be given directly to the contractors. 

There is widespread belief 

among the islanders that there is 

massive corruption in the awarding 

of tenders and the payment of money 

by the administration to contractors. 

In many areas, people ask that they 

be given the money directly, in instal- 



ments, so that they may construct the 

houses themselves. Besides, many 

people would prefer that instead of 

bringing labourers from the mainland, 

local tsunami-affected persons 

should be employed in the construction 

of permanent housing. 

In a discussion with members of 

the HRLN in the months after the 

tsunami, the then chief secretary, DS 

Negi, said that he felt that instead of 

steel and concrete structures which 

are clearly unsuitable for a saline 

environment, it would be better to 

import wood from Malaysia which is 

available very cheap and give the 

tribals basic tools to build their own 

homes. So why was this plan 

shelved? As noted above, there is 

widespread speculation that the 

more expensive option was chosen 

because it gives greater leeway for 

contracts and kickbacks. 

field and plantations. This is impractical 

and not acceptable to the people, 

but their protests seem to be falling 

on deaf ears. 

The only exception is Car Nicobar 

where the tsunami-affected live close 

to the plantations and have been able 

to protect their plantations in the last 

year-and-a-half. As a result, the Car 

Nicobar plantations are more developed 

than the plantations in any of 

the other islands. 

In its report dated June 2006, the 

Housing and Land Rights Network 

notes: It is sad and tragic that even 

after such a long time people are yet 

to be rehabilitated. There is a pervading 

sense of neglect and betrayal. The 

tin structures are uninhabitable 

because of the unbearable heat. 

Drinking water shortages are acute. 

Sanitation and solid waste management 

facilities are largely absent. 

Garbage disposal and collection facilities 

were missing in all temporary 

shelters. Rehabilitation is slow and 

consultation with people minimal. 

Information regarding permanent 

housing is not available. Livelihoods 

have not been restored. 

People are uncertain about the 

future. Impact on children is severe. 

Children are not receiving the systematic 

attention they deserve. 

Assessment of agricultural losses in 

many areas has been inaccurate and 

misleading. In most toilets electrical 

connections are missing. Toilets that 

have been built are poorly constructed 

and often lying unused. People 

have to largely fend for themselves 

when it comes to health services. 

Schools were not constructed in 

many areas. Them temporary shelters 

were like toasters. The heat 

inside was unbearable. Flooring did 

Permanent housing must be constructed 

near the agricultural lands 

and plantations of the tsunamiaffected 

persons so that they may 

watch over their crops and trees and 

prevent theft as well as destruction 

by wildlife. In this context too the 

administration has turned out to be 

highly insensitive to the needs of the 

people. Since the planners seem to 

only have experience of urban projects, 

land in the islands is being earmarked 

for permanent housing in 

urban colony type clusters – often as 

many as 10 km from the residents’ 

When people peacefully 

protested the atrocious 

housing conditions and 

asked to be allowed to 

decide what kind of houses 

they would live in, they were 

shelled with tear gas and 

lathi charged by the police 

and Indian Reserve 

Battalion. When families 

carried their wounded to the 

hospital, police attacked the 

hospital and beat the injured 

and their relatives. 

not exist in many shelters. People 

complained of corruption with contractors. 

The situation in the monsoon 

was unbearable as rainwater 

entered the shelters and the slush 

made these entirely uninhabitable. 

The frustration with the delay was 

such that the Nicobari communities 

resettled in Rajiv Nagar in Great 

Nicobar left even without the help of 

the administration. Lack of work has 

given rise to grave frustration. 

The Andaman administration 

asked INDE to review the proposals 

for housing made by the National 

12 



Building Construction Corporation, 

and the Central Public Works 

Department (CPWD). INDE severely 

criticised the prefabricated steel and 

concrete structures being suggested. 

INDE’s report is concluded as under: 

n All constraints and cost escalations 

mentioned seemed to arise from 

using materials, and hence also the 

technology and labour brought in 

from the mainland. Therefore, it 

makes sense to consider local material 

and technology. 

n The constraints mentioned in the 

report are decisive to the execution of 

the proposal; but no conclusively 

appropriate solutions have been 

given to contain them. 

n The structure, its services, the community 

facilities and the layout, 

imply a drastic change in the 

lifestyles of the people, which is alien 

to their way of life and customs. 

The tin sheds provided by the 

government as temporary 

shelters are like “toasters” – 

unbelievably hot and unliveable. 

Construction of permanent 

housing was supposed 

to start within six months 

after the Tsunami, but not 

one permanent house has 

been constructed to date. 

The prefabricated tubular 

steel structures being provided 

to local communities 

are foreign to the islands and 

cannot be repaired and 

maintained by the locals. 

Just like the use of tin sheds 

was a terribly bad idea, using 

prefabricated structures for 

permanent housing is also 

completely wrongheaded, 

but both are being promoted 

by vested interests. 

and the demand for extra payments 

and inspection vehicles by the 

CPWD also need to be reviewed. 

n INDE concluded that the affected 

people have to become key players in 

their own housing. Eco-friendly and 

easily replicable and available 

resources and materials should be 

used. Transport of men and materials 

should be minimised. Local techniques, 

materials, tools and local 

labour should be used. 

These observations are still valid 

because in response to INDE’s report, 

the administration made only cosmetic 

changes to the planned permanent 

shelters. These changes do not 

make any concession to the primary 

concerns raised by INDE, namely: 

design and layout, location, materials, 

eco-friendly indigenous alternatives, 

and allowing people the choice 

to construct the shelters on their own. 

Peaceful protests: police atrocities 

Homeless and united: On November 

2, 2006, a memorandum of objections 

on the issue of location, design and 

structure of the permanent shelters 

was submitted by the tsunami-affected 

population to the administration. 

The memorandum requested a hearing 

from the concerned authorities, 

failing which, the affected populace 

said, they would have to resort to a 

peaceful protest. With no assurances 

forthcoming from any quarter, the 

tsunami victims took out a silent 

n The environmental costs and the 

environmental footprints are large. 

The proposal is sure to degrade the 

existing environment, directly and 

indirectly. 

n Maintenance and inspection of the 

structures are expensive and not 

readily available. 

n Acceptance of the structures by the 

locals, and the lifestyle they dictate, 

is questionable. 

n The area requirements used to estimate 

cost indices show anomalies 

that need to be clarified. 

n The fees demanded by the NBCC, 

march on November 9. This was followed 

by a full day sit-in and bundh 

on November 15. This was repeated 

on November 16, except that, lacking 

any response from the administration, 

the people preferred a jail bharo 

(fill the prisons) campaign to register 

their protest. 

This peaceful process turned 

nasty when the police and paramilitary 

forces attacked the protestors. In 

any case, the lathicharge by the 

police on peaceful protestors was jarring 

in the first instance, in the context 

of the devastated islands of 




death, homelessness and suffering; 

but this was made worse when the 

police forcibly entered the hospital 

and beat up the injured and their relatives. 

It makes one wonder whether 

such brute force will be used again 

by the vested interests and profit 

sharks of the construction lobby and 

the corrupt officials to subdue opposition 

to their sinister plans. 

Livelihood and survival 

Fishing: Though the Centre and the 

government of Tamil Nadu provided 

14,000 boats to all those fishermen 

who lost their boats in the tsunami, 

including traditional boats, the policy 

in the A&N islands is not to provide 

boats to those who lost their traditional 

boats. As a result, although 

about 1,500 traditional boats were 

lost, none have been replaced. Unlike 

in Tamil Nadu, most fisherfolk in the 

islands have not even been provided 

with nets and ancillary equipment. 

They were coerced to opt for fibre 

boats to appease the contractors’ 

lobby, effectively disturbing the 

livelihood of fishing communities for 

years to come as well as damaging 

the ecological habitat. 

Even the provision of replacements 

for destroyed conventional 

boats is not complete. Despite 

numerous assurances, cold storage 

units have not been constructed; 

hence the fishermen are unable to 

store fish for sale and export off the 

islands. Fishing as a livelihood 

option has been severely stunted by 

the administration’s insensitivity. 

There are two kinds of boats in the 

Andaman and Nicobar islands. The 

conventional and the traditional. 

Traditional boats are called hoodies 

and are made out of the trunk of the 

Paduak tree. Traditional boats are not 

required to be registered under law. 

In Tamil Nadu, over 14,000 conventional 

and traditional boats were 

lost in the disaster. The state government 

and the Centre provided 14,000 

replacement boats free of cost. In the 

The multinational tourism 

industry and the mining 

lobby appear to have total 

control of the Ministry of 

Environment and Forest, and 

of the Andaman and Nicobar 

administration at the highest 

level. Laws and regulations 

meant to protect the environment 

are sabotaged or 

subverted to permit effectively 

unregulated mining, 

tourism and commercial 

activities. The reasoning, if 

there is any, behind the 

recent decision of the administration 

to open up 40 highly 

vulnerable islands to tourism 

is being kept secret. Only top 

administration officials and 

the hotel industry know what 

is going to be the fate of 

these islands. One has to 

wonder why. 

Andaman and Nicobar islands, by 

contrast, traditional boats lost in the 

tsunami — numbering 700 in the 

Nancowry islands alone — were 

never replaced. Only conventional 

boats lost in the tsunami were 

replaced. This has directly affected 

the livelihood of the traditional fishing 

community. 

In Tamil Nadu, the replacement 

boats were given without any loan 

component, whereas in the islands, 

boats above Rs 1,00,000 are provided 

with a loan component that reaches 

up to Rs 60,000. This is clear discrimination 

between the mainland and 

the islands. Furthermore, the island 

14 



fishing communities are being asked 

to pay interest at seven percent. This 

is truly surprising given that when 

many countries offered grants to 

India for the tsunami affected, the 

government of India rejected such 

offers saying that it had adequate 

funds to carry out relief and rehabilitation 

for all. The actual implementation 

of this loan scheme is even 

worse in practice since the fisherfolk 

who took the government loans are 

actually paying a rate of interest 

between nine and 10.5 percent. 

According to the administration 

report of January 2006, 1,703 conventional 

boats were destroyed or damaged 

in the A&N islands alone, 

affecting the livelihood of over 2,200 

fishing families. Most of these families 

have not even received nets 

despite repeated requests. Many 

have not received boats. All those 

who lost traditional boats have not 

even been considered! 

Even the replacement of conventional 

boats has been tardy. For example, 

in the Nancowry group of 

islands, only 76 of the 150 plus conventional 

boats lost were provided 

for, and those too under a scheme 

which required the central government 

to contribute less than half the 

cost of a boat that usually costs more 

than Rs 2 lakh, with an NGO expected 

to contribute the remaining amount. 

The Nancowry islands protested 

about this figure of 76 boats and provided 

the names of 81 additional families 

that had lost conventional boats. 

When they met the Lieutenant 

Governor, he agreed to provide 47 out 

of the additional 81 boats, covering the 

islands of Pilpilow, Bada Inaka, Kakan, 

Champin, Trinket and Balu Basti. But 

these boats are yet to be given. Indeed, 

the 34 remaining families from the village 

of Tappong, Munak, Hitou, 

Bandar Khadi and Changua are still 

“under consideration”. 

In order to enable the fishing communities 

to resume a sustainable 

livelihood by way of sale of their 

catch, it is imperative that the cold 

storage facilities destroyed by the 

tsunami be rebuilt so that every island 

has at least one cold storage facility to 

keep fish. Although the money for 

some cold storage units was sanctioned 

in the rehabilitation package 

way back in February 2005, the 

administration has repeatedly 

Items 

Rice 

Sugar 

Dal (Pulses) 

Salt 

Vegetables 

(Onion/Potato) 

Oil 

Milk Powder 

Tea 

Masala/Haldi/ 

Chilli/Mix Powder 

Kerosene 

Qty per person/ 

per day 

500 gms 

30 gms 

100 gms 

20 gms 

300 gms 

40 mls 

50 gms 

10 gms 

12 gms 

200 mls 

promised that this will be done but no 

step has been taken in this direction. 

A few months after the tsunami, 

fisherfolk were asked to undertake 

the construction of their own boats, 

with the promise that payments 

would be released accordingly. Today, 

many fishermen’s families find themselves 

in a quandary because the 

department refuses to make good on 

its promise of payments. 

Volume II of the report, The 

Ground Beneath the Waves, 

recommends: 

n Fishing be restricted to only five km 

offshore from the high tide line of all 

islands. 

n Trawler nets should be fitted with 

turtle excluder device (TEDs). 

n The crab, lobster, and reef fish harvest 

must be reviewed. A seasonal 

ban must be imposed for long term 

sustainability and the welfare of the 

islands’ fishing community. These 

three to four months non-harvesting 

season should be during the breeding 

season of crabs, lobsters, and 

grouper species. This is easy to regulate 

and enforce as all these marine 

products are sent out of the islands 

via air cargo. The various airlines can 

be advised and instructed not to 

carry these products during the nonharvesting 

season. 

Agriculture: Coconut and areca nut 

are indigenous to the islands. Certain 

vested interests in the administration 

are promoting the intercropping of 

cashew nut with coconut. This may 

have disastrous consequences. These 

plantations take seven years to 

mature and yield fruit. Till then, people 

would be without livelihood. To 

discontinue free rations at this stage 

is indeed very cruel. Farmers who 

were engaged in agriculture on unlicensed 

land have been denied compensation 

for crop loss. 

The principal form of agriculture 

is coconut plantation. Whatever little 

paddy cultivation was being done 

before has virtually come to a standstill 

due to the destruction of agricultural 

lands and crops by salinity. 

Over 10,000 hectares of agricultural 

land used for paddy cultivation still 

lies submerged under seawater. Out 

of this, 4,500 hectares have been conceded 

by the administration to be 

non-reclaimable. Therefore, coconut 

plantations done afresh appear to be 

the main way forward. 

A coconut plantation takes seven 

years to mature and yield fruit. 

Planting has just commenced. The 

tsunami affected will have no livelihood 

options for the next seven 

years. This must be kept in mind 

while considering the administration’s 

stand that free rations currently 

being provided will be discontinued 

by the end of March 2007. 

The new plantations are not free 

from controversy. Certain persons 

from the administration have insisted 

that cashew nut be intercropped in 

the coconut plantations. Agricultural 



experts from the Central Agricultural 

Research Institute, Port Blair, have, off 

the record, strongly advised against 

cashew nut because such intercropping 

would be disastrous for the 

coconut plantation. An independent 

official assessment of this position 

needs to be done, so that the people 

are not misled into following a wrong 

agricultural strategy. The same persons 

from the administration pushing 

cashew nut plantations for others 

have begun planting cashew nut on 

2,500 hectares of unique and irreplaceable 

Nancowry grasslands – all 

of which will be destroyed when the 

plantation develops. 

Persons whose agricultural land 

has been submerged by the tsunami 

are entitled to Rs 10,000/hectare (ha). 

Approximately 1,500 cases have been 

filed before the Lok Adalat at Port 

Blair. Approximately 100 such cases 

have been decided. The remaining 

cases must be decided forthwith. 

These cases have been pending for 

one year. They pertain to claims from 

far-flung islands. Tsunami victims go 

through tremendous inconvenience 

as the Lok Adalat does not travel to 

the islands. That is why, the Lok 

Adalats must move to the victims 

and give them prompt justice. 

Apart from the payment of Rs 

10,000, the administration has disclosed 

in an affidavit that they have 

identified 1,200 ha of land for the rehabilitation 

of those whose land was submerged. 

This land should be immediately 

handed over to the people. 

Compensation for agricultural 

loss has been contested in forums 

other than the Lok Adalat, including 

in the high court. A survey was conducted 

by the administration in 

Campbell Bay, Great Nicobar, immediately 

after the tsunami, to evaluate 

the extent of destruction and estimate 

the loss. However, the payment 

for losses was not done according to 

the damage assessment. Instead, the 

administration did a second survey 

in December 2005, a year after the 

tsunami, by which time most of the 

seawater had receded. The current 

position of the seawater during the 

second survey was taken to measure 

agricultural crop and land loss. 

In Vikas Nagar 

people were drinking 

from streams and 

ponds, consuming 

water unfit for 

consumption. Till 

date, water has not 

been provided to the 

people of the 

Wandoor 

intermediate shelter 

in the Andaman 

Thereafter, a third survey was done 

after the seawater had receded further. 

As a result, approximately 250 

families, who would receive larger 

amounts according to the first survey, 

have now have been given substantially 

reduced sums, as per the 

second and third survey. 

Indeed, other islands speak of 

similar stories. The stories of how a 

government and the nexus of coldblooded 

lobbies take its own people 

for a brutish ride as parasites on their 

continuing misery. Stories of despair, 

relentless, and little hope. 

Shopkeepers: The shopkeepers have 

been provided with only Rs 10,000, as 

against lakhs for some other sections. 

They have not been included in any of 

the rehabilitation schemes. As compared 

to farmers and fisherfolk, shopkeepers 

have been discriminated 

against even on paper. Farmers are 

entitled to a loan waiver, are supposed 

to get alternative land, and 

compensation to the amount of Rs 

10,000/ha for submerged land, Rs 

94,000/ha for plantation crop, and Rs 

24,000/ha for paddy crop destroyed in 

the tsunami. By contrast, shopkeepers 

get only a loan waiver and Rs. 10,000 

– nothing more. 

Most of the shops on the coast 

were either washed away or submerged. 

The policy of the administration 

is discriminatory and a fresh 

policy ought to be made. Over 1,200 

shopkeepers and their families are 

directly affected by such brazen discrimination. 

On the reconstruction 

aspect, there aren’t any plans afoot to 

accommodate the shopkeepers in the 

new permanent structure plans. 

Employment guarantee: The administration 

has not yet provided one job 

per tsunami-affected family. This 

scheme was based on employing people 

in the reconstruction process, yet, 

when the tribals are willing to work 

and make their own houses, contracts 

are being given to contractors from the 

mainland who bring in wage labourers, 

thus leaving the tsunami-affected 

population without work. 

The administration has affirmed 

that they will provide a job for each 

tsunami affected family, yet this affirmation 

exists only on paper. People 

who have approached it for jobs, 

16 



have been turned away. 

Persons outside the Andaman and 

Nicobar islands are discouraged by 

law from entering the tribal reserves 

and are required to obtain a permit to 

enter. It follows from this that if 

employment opportunities are available 

they must first be offered to tribals 

from the islands. Not only is this 

not being done, rather, contracts are 

being given to persons from the mainland 

who bring in a large number of 

contract labourers, many of whom 

stay on illegally after the work has 

been completed. Thus, not only are 

the tribal people deprived of work but 

number of illegal residents on the 

islands have increased over the years. 

Water: Shortage of potable drinking 

water is felt throughout the 

islands. As a result people are drinking 

saline water and water unfit for 

human consumption. It is truly a 

tragedy that two years after the 

calamity, and with all the money 

available with the government, 

drinking water cannot be provided 

to the people. The UNICEF has 

recently completed a report that has 

not been made public. This report 

should be released in public interest. 

The administration maintains 

that they have moved on from relief 

to rehabilitation. Yet, even the basic 

facilities that are inherent in a relief 

phase have yet to be established. 

Grievances about the adequacy and 

safety of drinking water are 

widespread. This has lead to 

widespread occurrences of waterborne 

diseases, especially typhoid, 

dysentery and jaundice. Some agencies 

have conducted tests that confirm 

the apparent concerns with the 

quality of water being consumed. 

The UNICEF has apparently conducted 

such a study confirming that 

on most islands water is unfit for 

human consumption. 

Besides, in most islands, especially 

those of the southern group, supply 

of potable water through pipes 

has yet to be established. 

n In Champin village, drinking water 

was provided by the administration 

from a well that had been polluted 

with seawater. Tests of this water 

using water testing strips saw the 

strips turn black, indicating that the 

water was unfit for drinking etc. 

n In Vikas Nagar (Kamorta island), 

people were drinking from streams 

and ponds, water unfit for consumption. 

n Till date, water has not been provided 

to the people of the Wandoor 

intermediate shelter in southern 

Andamans. 

Food security: High levels of malnutrition, 

including severe malnutrition, 

exist in the islands. Yet, the 

administration proposes to discontinue 

free rations. This, together with 

the absence of livelihood options, 

indicates that the decision to discontinue 

free rations will have a catastrophic 

effect, especially in a context 

when malnutrition already exists. 

Even the provision of kerosene has 

been discontinued in several areas. 

As for the administration’s decision 

to stop free rations by March 

2007, an assessment of the food security 

in the islands is particularly 

important. The National Institute of 

Nutrition, Hyderabad, did a survey 

in May 2005 and found devastating 

figures, “…about 48 percent (of the 

children) were underweight, 37 percent 

were stunted and 16 percent 

were wasted. About 22 percent of 

adolescents were undernourished. 

The prevalence of malnourished children 

is high. Many of the 

AanganWadi Centres (AWCs) were 

not functional, and those that were 

functioning had nothing much to 

offer to the children. Attendance was 

poor. No activity for the pregnant 

and lactating mothers was conducted. 

The AWC that function, either 

function from the house of the 



Aanganwadi worker or the captain. 

Some were functioning in tents. 

There was no place for the children 

to sit at these centres.” 

Dry rations are being provided to 

the tsunami affected. The quota of 

dry ration per family (see page 15) 

Dry rations are not provided to 

the affected families regularly; this 

inconsistent distribution of dry 

rations allows the officials to pass off 

a lesser quantity of dry rations. The 

ex-servicemen of Campbell Bay were 

interviewed — they all complained of 

a break in rations for several months 

and reduction in the quantities. 

They alleged that the government 

gives the ration to the Central 

Consumer Cooperative Society 

(CCCS), which distributes the rations 

to the people, and in this process corruption, 

sets in. They also said that the 

forms maintained by the CCCS do not 

give details of the date of issue, duration 

of issue and the quantity being 

disbursed. Many also complained 

that the dry rations being provided 

are of disturbingly inferior quality. 

A major grievance of virtually all 

islanders we talked to was that 

kerosene has been discontinued. 

Kerosene is needed not only for 

cooking but also for lighting at night. 

The entitlement of a tsunami-affected 

family is 200ml/person/day, that is, 

30 litres every month for a family of 

five. This must be restarted. 

Families are to be provided with 

two cylinders of gas because when 

one is depleted a replacement takes a 

long time. Families are currently 

issued only one cylinder at a time and 

remain without gas for long periods. 

The mid-day meal in most 

schools is run contrary to the directive 

of the Supreme Court. There is 

minimal variation in the food provided; 

contractors who provide cooked 

food to the schools maintain that it is 

impossible to do more within the 

budget. Certain schools were found 

providing lidos under the mid-day 

meal scheme. 

All affected families have consistently 

maintained that if they are 

given the freedom to construct their 

own homes and their livelihood is 

restored, food security need not be 

continued. But no one cares, not even 

those who were shedding loud tears 

in the media on the plight of the survivors 

in the devastated landscape 

after tsunami. 

Health: A consistent, widespread 

grievance is the lack of health facilities 

on the islands. Most islands lack anything 

even close to a decent healthcare 

system. Doctors are virtually 

absent and nurses usually administer 

general medical treatment. 

The bad condition of the sub-centres, 

primary health centres, community 

health centres and hospitals are 

largely due to the lack of adequate 

number of doctors, equipment and 

specialised medication. For instance, 

in Campbell Bay, there is only one 

doctor for a population of six thousand 

people. There is no lady doctor. 

When the doctor goes on leave, there 

is no replacement. 

There have been reports in the 

local and vernacular papers of how 

seriously ill patients were not 

referred to the Port Blair Hospital in 

time, leading to the death of numerous 

patients, including many children. 

Yet, no decent referral system 

has been put into place. 

Child rights: The Juvenile Justice Act, 

2000, has not been implemented. The 

juvenile justice boards and the child 

welfare committees have not been set 

up in every district. Almost 110 children 

are in prison. The condition of 

the children’s homes (both government 

and private) is terrible, with 

overcrowding, no sanitation, poor 

food, poor bedding and no electricity. 

The Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, 

mandates that no child (under 18) 

should be brought into the criminal 

justice system, arrested or kept in 

any police lock-up or prison. The Act 

requires juvenile justice boards, child 

welfare committees, observation and 

Pankaj Sekhsaria 

18 



special homes to be set up in every 

district. Yet, there is only one juvenile 

justice board for the entire Union 

Territory of the Andaman and 

Nicobar Islands which covers three 

districts and far flung islands. The 

board does not really function in a 

child-friendly manner. Policemen 

surround the children and the proceedings 

are held in a courtroom. 

Despite the earthquake and the 

ensuing tsunami, which orphaned 

many children, leaving them bereft 

of care and the protection of their 

natural families, there is not a single 

child welfare committee functioning 

on the islands. There is only one 

observation home, at Port Blair, for 

the entire union territory. And the 

fact is this home does not accommodate 

any girl child. Almost 101 children 

are being kept in the Central 

different. There are 156 children at 

the home in Chouldhari, which takes 

in both boys and girls. The children 

live in small rooms in overcrowded 

huts. No bedding is provided. The 

schools are three km away and the 

children have to walk. Skin ailments 

were noticed on all the children. The 

children looked unhappy and insecure. 

This home is functioning close 

to the offices of the department of 

social welfare, but the administration 

does not seem to know what is happening 

under its own nose. 

Education: Education in the islands 

has been severely compromised by 

the inaction of the department of 

education. Most islands complain of 

the lack of teachers, and when teachers 

are present, it is a common complaint 

that they do not conduct classes. 

Disturbing instances exist when 

Environment and wildlife 

The die-hard enemies of ecology: In 

Volume II of a report titled, The 

Ground Beneath the Waves, published 

in late 2005, the Wildlife Trust of 

India (WTI), the International Fund 

for Animal Welfare (IFAW), the Salim 

Ali Centre for Ornithology and 

Natural History (SACON) and the 

Anadaman & Nicobar 

Environmental Team (ANET) concluded 

that the violations of the 

Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) 

norms played a major role in the loss 

of human lives and property during 

the tsunami. Plantations of exotic 

species such as Cassurina, instead of 

the native vegetation, which included 

fast-growing species such as the 

Pandanus Nicobarensis, had caused 

severe damage to the coastal areas. 

Forty islands with a 

fragile ecosystem, 

particularly after the 

tsunami, are to be 

opened up for 

tourism. It is 

craftily packaged as 

eco-tourism. But for 

the vulnerable 

islands — this 

means doom 

Prison annexe at Protrapur, along 

with over 250 male prisoners. 

There is a children’s home at 

Ferrargunj in which only orphan 

boys are allowed to live. The condition 

of this home is terrible. There are 

no light bulbs or fans in the rooms. 

The toilets are broken. The food is 

unfit for human consumption. There 

is no recreational or other activity for 

the boys. The boys are not segregated 

age-wise, as required. They are not 

allowed to go out. The home is like a 

badly run and neglected prison. 

When we visited, the boys looked 

terribly scared and unhappy. 

The conditions in private institutions 

such as the Cavalry Home in 

Chouldhari and Bhatubasti were no 

students were not provided with 

textbooks, even when they had to 

prepare for the tenth standard 

national board examinations. 

Preliminary findings of a study conducted 

by TISS regarding the state of 

education on the islands indicate that 

despite a high rate of nominal literacy, 

the regularity and quality of education 

leaves much to be desired. 

Additionally, most homes on 

unlicensed land are denied electricity 

or water. This has had a poor affect 

on the health and development of 

children. Participatory studies 

undertaken by various agencies conclude 

that the denial of electricity is 

tantamount to denial of the fundamental 

right to education. 

Now the planned reconstruction 

with concrete will cause further damage 

as it will lead to more sand-mining 

and further loss of coastal 

islands. The study strongly recommended 

that there be a five-year 

moratorium on the use of concrete to 

pre-empt any possibility of sandmining; 

but the government is turning 

a deaf ear to such pleas basically 

because of the pressure from large 

construction contractors and their 

lobbies in the power establishment. 

Even before the tsunami, the 

rapid environmental degradation 

taking place in the Andaman & 

Nicobar islands was largely due to 

the alliance between the mining 

lobby, the tourism lobby, the ministry 



of environment and forest (MoEF) 

and the A&N administration. The 

basic method with which the government 

agencies, whose legal duty is to 

protect the environment, actually 

undermine the ecology, is through 

successive amendments to the CRZ 

notification. So powerful has been 

the influence of the mining and 

tourism lobbies that the legal protection 

given in the initial CRZ notification 

has been decisively sidelined at 

the highest level. 

In the first CRZ notification of 

1991, CRZ–I, no new construction 

was permitted within 500m of the 

high tide line (HTL). This was 

reduced to 300m by CRZ–III. And 

CRZ–II and CRZ–IV only place 

restrictions on development up to 

200m from the HTL. 

Equations, an NGO working in 

the islands, has documented the successive 

amendments and their effect 

on the islands in its recent report: 

CRZ Notification 1991-2006: Saga of 

betrayal – Andaman and Nicobar 

Islands. The first amendments to the 

CRZ were made in December 1992, 

under intense pressure from the 

hotel and tourism lobby. The government 

set up the Vohra Committee 

which conveniently recommended 

reduction in the ‘No Development 

Zone’ (NDZ) to promote tourism. 

Consequently, in August 1994, the 

NDZ was reduced from 200m to 50m 

with extensive powers given to the 

central government to permit construction 

on the landward side. 

These relaxed limits were subsequently 

quashed by the Supreme 

Court which also quashed the relaxation 

of CRZ from 100m to 50m for 

rivers and creeks, and disallowed the 

move to grant the central government 

“unguided and uncanalised” 

powers to allow construction in NDZ 

limits. 

However, as later events show, 

the MoEF and the administration 

simply ignored the court’s orders. By 

the January 1997 amendment, sand 

mining was permitted up to March 

31, 1998, and not beyond. Despite 

this, there were 10 extensions. The 

Shekhar Singh Committee report, 

which was accepted by the Supreme 

Court and directed for implementation, 

recommended that “the extraction 

of sand should be phased out 

and no further extension should be 

granted after September 30, 2002”. 

Despite this, amendment after 

amendment was made, thereby 

allowing sand mining. 

From January 2002 onwards, a 

new series of amendments to CRZ 

were introduced allowing for the setting-up 

of an information technology 

industry and service industry in 

Special Economic Zones (SEZs). 

Within the SEZs all activities were 

permitted. All this was done in the 

name of “local inhabitants”, “traditional 

rights” and “customary uses”. 

No objections were invited from the 

public since the amendment was 

stated to be in “public interest”. 

By the amendments, construction 

activities took place in a rapid scale 

which resulted in destruction of 

mangroves, depletion of ground 

water and ecological damage on an 

irreparable scale. Places of worship, 

educational institutions, construction 

for cultural activities, etc., were permitted, 

as was the construction of 

waste and effluent treatment plants 

to deal with the discharge from 

hotels and beach resorts. By the 

amendments of June and July 2003, 

the NDZ area was reduced to 50m in 

the Andaman & Nicobar islands as 

well as in Lakshwadeep. 

In each of these “amended” notifications, 

sand mining was specifically 

permitted. Though the Supreme 

Court decision required the administration 

to prepare a Coastal Zone 

Management Plan (CZMP), the 

administration got around this decision 

by proposing to set up an 

Integrated Coastal Zone 

Management Plan (ICZMP), specifically 

for the purpose of relaxing CRZ 

norms for tourism development. The 

ICZMP was never set up, yet, by successive 

amendments, the NDZ was 

reduced to 50m. It seems a little obvious 

to point out that this could not 

The irony here is that many, if 

not most, of these amendments 

were done to supposedly alleviate 

the “difficulties faced by 

local people,” but somehow the 

government forgot not only to 

involve, but even to ask the local 

people about their opinion. 

Public meetings to get the public’s 

input or even inviting written 

objections from the public 

was apparently much too bizarre 

a notion to consider 

have been possible without the active 

connivance of the MoEF. 

The irony is that many, if not 

most, of these amendments were 

done to supposedly alleviate the “difficulties 

faced by the local people” — 

but somehow, the government forgot 

not only to involve, but also even to 

ask the local people about their opinion. 

Public meetings to get their 

inputs or even inviting written objections 

were apparently much too 

bizarre a notion to consider. 

The consequent result of the 

above is that a terrible scenario with 

awful consequences for tribals of the 

islands has emerged. Forty islands 

that have a fragile ecosystem, particularly 

after the tsunami, are to be 

opened up for tourism. It is craftily 

packaged as eco-tourism. But for the 

vulnerable islands — this means disaster, 

doom and utter depair in the 

larger scheme of things. 

n 

20 


at tered and betrayed 

The Daily 

Apocalypse 

For those who are afraid of impending disasters anywhere, Satya Sagar has a message. 

The apocalypse is already over and it's happening right now. There are a million microapocalypses 

happening all the time. So stop searching for the big one and look more 

carefully at the little one in your immediate line of sight 

A 

t the second anniversary of 

the Asian earthquake and 

tsunami of December 26, 

2004, it is worthwhile pondering 

what it was all really 

about. The event has often been 

referred to as the single largest natural 

disaster in recent history. Going 

by the numbers (over 225,000 dead, a 

million more displaced and impoverished) 

or by the area affected (12 

countries across two continents), the 

event of December 26, 2004 was 

indeed a big one. 

The tsunami challenged many 

assumptions that many people 

everywhere had made about many 

things. It overturned the idea of the 

sea as the very source of all life for 

many traumatised fishermen who 

have for centuries lived off its bounty. 

In many of the communities in 

southern India affected by the tsunami 

there is a tradition of funerals 

being accompanied by song and 

For all its 

heartrending, 

graphic images of 

death, destruction 

and sorrow, I am 

still confused about 

what constitutes a 

disaster. Is it about 

the numbers 

involved? Is it 

about the way 

people died or 

suffered? Is it about 

the identity of the 

people involved? 

dance. It is an ancient mechanism 

that helps people cope with their personal 

grief. On the day of the tsunami 

they died in such large numbers 

that in an instant all mourning 

became meaningless. 

And yet, for all its heartrending, 

graphic images of death, destruction 

and sorrow, I am still confused about 

what really constitutes a disaster. Is it 

about the numbers involved? Is it 

about the way people died or suffered? 

Is it about the identity of the 

people involved? 

To give an example of how the 

mathematics of mass disasters works 

or does not work, some three months 

after the tsunami, the Indonesian 

authorities made a quiet announcement 

that few noticed. Apparently 

over 56,000 people who had gone 

missing since the tsunami and had 

been feared dead were in fact found 

to be alive and living in the temporary 

camps set up for the displaced 

people. It occurred to me then that if 


tsUnaMi: tWO years aF ter 

I had mourned for those 56,000 people 

prematurely, what a waste of 

‘high quality, high profile mourning’ 

it would have been! 

This is how ridiculous the situation 

gets when one starts measuring 

disasters in terms of the numbers 

involved. The simple truth is that 

every individual is an entire, unique 

universe on his or her own and with 

the passing of every individual an 

entire universe collapses. For those 

who are afraid of impending apocalypses 

anywhere I have a message — 

the apocalypse is already over, it is 

happening right now, there are a million 

little apocalypses happening all 

the time. So stop searching for the 

BIG one and look more carefully at 

Not one lesson was 

incorporated leading 

to similar problems 

as in Gujarat: lack of 

public participation 

in the design of 

rehab plans, and 

Gujarat’s trade mark 

discrimination 

against minority, 

dalit and lower caste 

communities 

the little one in your immediate line 

of sight. 

The lack of focus on individuals 

caught up in disasters is just one of 

the problems with the general 

response of the world, governments 

and even NGOs to the Asian tsunami 

over the past two years. There are 

many other problems too. 

Lack of context: One of the obvious 

shortcomings of the international 

response to the tsunami disaster has 

been the complete lack of contextualisation. 

For example, the international 

community seems to have deliberately 

overlooked a range of important 

factors influencing the lives of affected 

communities ranging from the 

civil conflict in Aceh and Sri Lanka, to 

the money and muscle power of 

tourism operators in Phuket in 

Thailand, to the serious pre-tsunami 

socio-economic problems of survivors 

in India and other places. 

While the specific problems generated 

by the tsunami are unique and 

need to be addressed, it is my contention 

that this can be best done 

only by taking into serious account 

the background in which the disaster 

occurred. The lack of understanding 

of history, culture and local level politics 

is evident in the way the international 

response by the moneybags to 

the tsunami in Sri Lanka has played a 

role in reviving a dormant conflict. 

Local culpability: The primary 

responsibility for whatever happens 

to the people lies with the local elites, 

the societies in which the survivors 

live and in many ways with the survivors 

themselves. While the international 

community can play a positive 

role, without making major changes 

in the way many of the affected societies 

are organised, there is little 

hope that future disasters can either 

be prevented or will succeed in generating 

a more meaningful response. 

In that sense, one of the important 

long-term goals of any form of rehabilitation 

should aim to build traditions 

and institutions that can deal 

with disasters of all kinds on a regular 

basis. 

Who are the ‘affected people?: 

Throughout the rehabilitation efforts 

of the past two years, the focus of the 

government and NGOs have been on 

dealing with the problems of ‘tsunami 

survivors’ — those who were 

‘touched’ by the salt water on that 

fateful day. All others living in the 

22 

C O M b a t L a W J a n U a r y - F e b r U a r y 2 0 0 7


same context, however vulnerable, 

have been deemed ‘irrelevant’. For 

example, many poor communities in 

coastal Tamil Nadu, with low development 

indicators prior to the tsunami, 

or the thousands of refugees of 

the civil war in Sri Lanka surviving 

without basic necessities for long, 

have been completely bypassed in 

the distribution of relief and material 

aid. 

Besides, the active discrimination 

faced by low-income dalit communities 

all along the coast, for instance, in 

the east coast of Tamil Nadu, whose 

livelihoods were devastated by the 

tsunami, is a continuous and cruel 

narrative. Most of them never got any 

reasonable compensation. That is, a 

fantastic opportunity was lost in 

using the huge sums of money pouring 

in after the tsunami to launch 

long-term social justice programmes. 

Lack of linkages with other disasters: 

It is quite amazing that almost 

all the relief and rehabilitation efforts 

undertaken in the tsunami affected 

countries have been done with little 

reference to other natural disasters 

that have taken place in recent years. 

Whether it is the earthquakes in 

Turkey and Iran, or Hurricane Mitch, 

there is a huge bank of experience 

and knowledge of dos and don’ts 

that can benefit those dealing with 

the situation in India, Indonesia, Sri 

Lanka or Thailand. 

The Gujarat earthquake of 2001, 

in which over 30,000 people lost their 

lives, offered ample lessons at least in 

what should not be done while rehabilitating 

survivors. Not one lesson 

was incorporated into the posttsunami 

efforts leading to similar 

problems as in Gujarat: lack of public 

participation in the design of rehabilitation 

plans, poor quality and inappropriate 

shelter, competition among 

the NGOs to ‘capture’ survivor communities 

and of course, Gujarat’s 

trade mark feature of discrimination 

against minority, dalit and lower 

caste communities. 

Another shortcoming, in this day 

of globalisation and instant communication, 

has been the complete disconnection 

between the rehabilitation 

work going on in one affected 

country and the other. No one in 

coastal India knows about what is 

happening in coastal Thailand or 

Indonesia or even Sri Lanka. Apart 

from the valuable lessons to be learnt 

from each other, if there had been 

greater efforts in this direction, this 

could also have been the beginning 

of a new South-South international 

solidarity movement. 

Learn from the survivors: 

Another disturbing aspect is the way 

governments and NGOs have 

approached the ‘affected population’. 

The pattern has been to look at 

them as completely helpless people 

in need of relief, rehabilitation, counseling, 

and so on. There has been little 

attention paid to the trained and 

inherited skills, inherent strengths 

and human resources of the affected 

communities. 

For example, the Tamil Nadu and 

Sri Lankan coasts are home to some 

of the world’s most skilled traditional 

fishermen and to treat them as 

‘illiterate, uneducated, underdeveloped’ 

rural folk is travesty of the 

highest order. Unfortunately, many 

middle-class NGO officials operating 

in the tsunami-hit areas were guilty 

of precisely such an approach. 

As a result of such an attitude, 

there are no programmes to help the 

survivor community consolidate and 

develop their own traditional skills, 

and better still, use these talents creatively 

to make additional income or 

create new livelihood opportunities 

in an atmosphere of self dignity and 

collective pride. It is time for the 

Lack of 

understanding of 

history, culture and 

local level politics is 

evident. For instance, 

the international 

response by 

moneybags to the 

tsunami has played a 

crucial role in 

reviving the dormant 

Sri Lankan conflict 

world to stop being so patronising, 

become a little more humble and 

realise that while those who survived 

the tsunami do need help in many 

ways, they also have many things to 

teach to all of us. 

Disaster as Godzilla: The fundamental 

problem with ‘disaster management’ 

and ‘disaster response’ 

efforts all over is the way they are fixated 

with the definition of the disaster 

as a sudden, one-off calamitous event 

for which we need special institutions, 

policies and even gadgets to cope with. 

So in the wake of every disaster, 

we hear of ‘rapid response’ teams 

and task forces being set up, the need 

to mobilise large amounts of 

resources, demands for using high 

technology to warn people of 

cyclones and tsunamis and increasw 

w w . c o m b a t l a w . o r g 23


The best ‘disaster 

preparedness’ 

policy any 

government can 

come up with is 

the one that deals 

effectively with all 

the mini and major 

disasters that occur 

in our societies on 

a daily basis 

ing calls for the use of armed forces 

to deal with disasters. 

The core perspective which 

guides this approach is one that 

looks at ‘disasters’ as being some 

kind of hidden monster or enemy 

out there to combat whom we need 

large and sophisticated weaponry. So 

not only is there a ‘War on Terror’ 

and a ‘War on Bird Flu’ going on in 

our world, but what they want is 

nothing less than a ‘War on 

Disasters’, with early warning systems, 

spying on the weather and 

commandoes fighting cyclones! 

In all this, the use of the armed 

forces to cope with natural calamities 

is a deeply worrying trend and one 

with long-term negative implications 

for all democratic societies. In the 

short run, it is indeed a tempting 

proposition to pull out the military 

to manage a large national crisis. 

After all, what would any government 

do when a tsunami wipes out a 

major city and kills over a 100,000 

people as it did in Banda Aceh two 

years ago? Which other institution or 

mechanism, other than the armed 

forces, do many societies have today, 

that can cope with the displacement 

of millions, the potential breakdown 

of all law and order and the need to 

rebuild infrastructure on a mammoth 

scale? 

This is particularly true in the 

developing world, where, unfortunately, 

most disasters occur, and 

where the role of the State in public 

welfare has been systematically 

demolished by a combination of neoliberal 

economic policies pushed by 

the World Bank and IMF and the outright 

corruption of the national elites. 

Disaster and democracy: 

Whether it is nationally elected bodies, 

the bureaucracy or other government 

agencies, the sad fact is that 

over the years they have become 

defunct and useless when it comes to 

dealing with crisis of any sort. This 

leaves the military and the police 

among the few State institutions that 

are still relatively intact and functional. 

(When even the US government 

talks of using the military to 

deal with natural disasters, it 

becomes a stark commentary on how 

superpower, super-rich America too 

hides a ‘Third World’ within its 

glamorous and glossy folds.) 

But where does all this leave ordinary 

citizens —- the ones who actually 

die, lose loved ones and grieve after 

every disaster? Are they to remain 

forever dependent on the arrival of 

‘heroic troops’ from remote corners of 

the country (and globe) after every 

disaster? Is there nothing that can be 

done at more local levels where citizens 

themselves are empowered to 

solve their own problems? 

Or for that matter what happens 

to all our democratic institutions if 

we have to use cops and soldiers all 

the time to solve what are essentially 

civilian emergencies? Why bother to 

have an elected government at all if 

their only job is send the ‘men in uniform’ 

to do what they are supposed 

to manage? It is these disturbing 

questions that we need to ask if we 

are keen to find any long-term solutions 

to the recurrent and current 

narrative of disasters, natural and 

manmade. 

Maybe it is time we redefined 

what we mean by ‘disasters’ and 

instead of seeing them as one-off, 

unexpected phenomenon, consider 

them as part of a larger social and economic 

continuum. To understand this, 

we only need to look at the state of the 

roads, access to drinking water and 

sanitation, public health systems or 

means of communication in most 

developing countries, which have 

become a day-to-day disaster anyway. 

In many poor countries one does 

not need a tsunami or a hurricane to 

cause misery for that is the general 

Pankaj Sekhsaria 

state of being for a majority of citizens. 

Instead of rushing in large 

amount of resources after every disaster, 

why not give them these 

resources on a regular basis well 

before they are hit by a natural 

calamity? After all, the best ‘disaster 

preparedness’ policy any government 

can come up with is the one 

that deals effectively with all the 

mini and major disasters that occur 

in our societies on a daily basis. 

Satya Sagar is a journalist and 

video-maker based in New Delhi. He is 

also the regional editor of 

‘www.tsunamiresponsewatch.org’ a 

website that monitors post-tsunami 

developments in South and 

South-East Asia 

24 



Farce follows 

Disaster 

The top down approach of the disaster managment act had 

its advantages but completely ignored local knowledge and 

ways of living. The need is for a judicious mix of the 

traditional and technological, argues Max Martin 

fLashback: A report released in India by Oxfam has attacked 

Indian policymakers and the media for paying scant attention 

to natural disasters. The report says that Indian government’s 

efforts to tackle natural disasters are more reactive 

than preventive. It recommends the construction of earthquakeresistant 

housing in seismic zones, better construction and layout 

of roads.... 

BBC report on the release of India Disasters Report: 

Towards a Policy Initiative, OUP, 2000 

Six years after the release of 

the India Disasters Report 

the Indian government is 

addressing – through a proposed 

Disaster Management 

Policy, a number of points raised by 

the report on the state of disaster preparedness 

in the country. This is no 

mean achievement and means there is 

scope for lobbying and improvement 

in India’s democratic set up. It is time 

for humanitarian workers, legal 

experts, academics and media professionals 

to come together for a debate 

on the emerging policy and find ways 

to make it proactive and humane. We 

all have to ensure that the policy-makers 

walk the talk till the last mile. 

One Act, half a policy 

Disaster Management is fast emerging 

as a key concern in India’s academic, 

bureaucratic, scientific, technical and 

humanitarian circles. India enacted 

the Disaster Management Act in 2005 

and a draft national Disaster 

Management Policy is to be released 

for consultations by the end of 2006. 

Let us first examine the Disaster 

Management Act 2005. It has put in 



place a three-tier administrative framework 

to deal with disasters and integrated 

it with the activities of various 

government departments and other 

organisations. It envisages management 

and mitigation plans, a coordinated 

and quick response and penal 

action against those who do not comply 

with its provisions. The Act has led 

to the setting up of the National 

Disaster Management Authority 

(NDMA), the National Disaster 

Management Institute and the 

National Disaster Response Force of 

about 10,000 trained and equipped 

personnel stationed across the country. 

It is a top-down Act, in the classic 

command-and-control mode. It gives 

sweeping powers to National and 

State governments and district collectors 

and an almost ornamental role for 

elected local representatives and local 

communities. Lower courts, for 

instance, cannot entertain any suit 

against action taken under the provisions 

of this Act. The Act takes precedence 

over other laws. It may be noted 

that it can get further sharpened as it 

allows the government to iron out “difficulties” 

through Gazette notifications 

in a two-year interval period. 

A command-and-control system 

has its own merits especially in times 

of an emergency. In fact, the powers 

vested with the Indian bureaucracy – 

even before the Act – made tsunami 

relief highly efficient here unlike in the 

free-for-all scenarios in Sri Lanka or 

Indonesia, where para-dropped international 

agencies confounded the confusion 

and misery of people. The provisions 

of the Disaster Act can be used 

positively against discrimination in 

relief distribution, misappropriation of 

funds, negligent or dangerous work by 

companies, departments, agencies and 

so on – in the tsunami rehabilitation 

field, scores of erring officials, NGO 

workers and others can be imprisoned 

under the provision of this Act. To 

apply legal provisions, the complaint 

has to come either from concerned officials 

or after the officials have been 

given 30 days’ notice to respond. 

Besides, except in cases of fund 

misappropriation, false claims and 

false alarms, the punitive provisions 

are for not complying with official 

orders or obstruction of officials, not 

necessarily negligent and dangerous 

work. To illustrate this point further, if 

an NGO builds unliveable temporary 

shelters as directed by the district collector 

– as most of them did in the 

tsunami areas – they are not really 

punishable. A large number of the temporary 

shelters were hot, humid, windowless, 

flood-prone, wind-blown, 

rodent-bitten – but they are perfectly 

legal. Worse, the bulk of them still exist 

two years on, as only a quarter of the 

permanent houses are complete. 

On the other hand, if the NGO 

defied the collector’s order and built 

comfortable thatch huts, technically its 

director could be penalised (even 

imprisoned) on counts of non-compliance, 

‘causing danger’, neglect and so 

on. For, several collectors have publicly 

noted that thatches are a fire risk, and 

physically prevented the construction 

of thatches. Eventually, most of the 

tsunami temporary shelters that 

If everybody picks 

up the telephone 

and leaves behind 

contact numbers in 

case of an 

emergency, and 

bothers to call up 

and warn others, it 

could be useful. 

Many officials 

failed to do this 

caught fire over the past two years – 

hundreds of them together in one case 

– were made of bitumen sheets recommended/ 

insisted upon by district collectors. 

As it happened few agencies 

and local officials dared to build comfortable 

shelters – at least till the full 

scale of bitumen-sheet misery became 

apparent in a year’s time. So a law that 

upholds the infallibility of the IAS is 

problematic. At least till a time when 

we have officially-recognised rehabilitation 

codes in the lines of our famous 

relief codes. 

The drafting period of the Disaster 

Bill was a missed opportunity for 

NGOs working in the field of disasters 

– to make it more people-friendly and 

grassroots-oriented like the Right to 

Information Act is to a large extent. 

Some of them did debate it, but the 

hectic schedules of tsunami relief, the 

hurry to burn foreign funds and concerns 

about proposed changes to the 

Foreign Contributions Regulations Act 

somehow overshadowed any talk 

about the relevance of the Act and the 

possibilities it offered. The Act became 

a law almost at the will of the bureaucrats 

who framed it. 

Window of opportunity 

The policy-framing period now offers 

a narrow window of opportunity for 

people’s groups and humanitarian 

agencies to work towards a pro-people 

disaster management regime in India. 

Discussions with NDMA members 

and experts reveal the underlying 

principle of the policy is respect and 

value for human lives – “saving the 

last possible life” in effect. The draft 

policy talks about earthquake-safe 

building bylaws, disaster management 

as part of professional degree courses, 

medical preparedness, amalgamation 

of the traditional with the state-of-theart 

and so on. As for governance components, 

the 11th Plan envisages incorporation 

of a disaster management 

component in all ministries. Local 

communities are supposed to be at the 

centre-stage of disaster management 

activities. (So when the policy comes 

into operation, we will presumably 

have pipelines that do not submerge in 

flood every year, and hopefully 

bridges won’t collapse over running 

trains). The task of those who uphold 

civic rights will be to ensure that the 

policy discourages local officials from 

imposing uncomfortable box shelters 

on people affected by disasters. And to 

see to it that a village chief gets the 

right to demand the disaster vulnerability 

map of his neighbourhood from 

the collectorate or the block office. 

Reaching the last mile 

The test of a policy is in its implementation. 

Even if the notions expressed in 

the policy are noble, implementing 

them on ground will not be easy. 

Disaster managers will have to deal 

with a system that is red-tape-bound, 

lethargic, conservative and corrupt in 

parts; and citizens who tend to be hierarchical 

in social attitudes and generally 

indifferent to the safety of oneself 

and others, when not fatalistic altogether. 

Then there are conceptual limitations. 

The government has yet to 

26 



deal with road accidents, communal 

clashes and the issue of forced migration 

as disaster/ humanitarian issues. 

But for those who want to push for a 

culture that values human lives there is 

a chance to influence the policy’s final 

shape. 

A key part of the policy will deal 

with technology in the context of India 

putting in place its own high-tech 

tsunami warning system and depending 

on its scientific institutions to take 

the lead in disaster early warning measures. 

The dissemination part is perfect 

till the district collectorate or the mandal 

– village cluster – level in cycloneprone 

areas. That is, if everybody picks 

up the telephone and leaves behind 

contact numbers in case of an emergency, 

and bothers to call up and warn 

others – many officials from top to bottom 

failed to do these basic things during 

the tsunami. The real question will 

be how to take the message from the 

district or block office onwards. 

Dysfunctional telephones and 

unwired remote villages often make 

the last mile reach a nightmare. The 

answer will be in strengthening and 

sustaining the local systems that work. 

Community radio initiatives coming 

up along the coasts and their networking 

could be an answer. So also village 

information centres. 

At the recent NDMA sponsored 

Disaster Congress held in New 

Delhi, Science and Technology 

Minster Kapil Sibal talked enthusiastically 

about such an SMS system 

with automatic translation of warning 

messages into scores of languages. 

His enthusiasm for technology 

raised many eyebrows. But in fact, 

cell phones were widely used soon 

after the tsunami when all other communications 

were cut – to find missing 

relatives and later to spread 

alarms that turned out to be false. 

The systems should involve not 

only dissemination of the warning, 

but also the next step – safety measures, 

such as evacuation and rescue 

as needed. There are efforts to this 

end. The Government of India – 

UNDP National Disaster Risk 

Management Programme, formulated 

under the National Disaster 

Management Framework of the 

Ministry of Home Affairs, aims at 

reducing vulnerabilities of communities 

at risk to sudden disasters in 169 

most multi-hazard prone districts, 

People do not live 

in imposed, alien 

structures. 

Villagers do not 

enjoy shopping 

from malls. Such 

brilliant urban 

ideas showed a 

singular lack of 

understanding of 

local tastes 

spread over 17 states of India. One of 

the key components of the programme 

is a community-based 

response system. But often the groups 

identified and trained under such 

programmes tend to go back to goodold 

lethargic ways once the disasterrehabilitation-training 

phases are 

over. A few months after such training 

was done in the earthquake-torn villages 

of Kutch, one could find that 

most of the villagers were totally 

unaware of any such a trained group. 

It is important to note there are 

community initiatives that work very 

well even without any formal training, 

programme or funds. Take the 

case of Pulicat in Tamil Nadu, a string 

of backwater islands and a thin strip 

of coast between them and the Bay of 

Bengal. It is a cyclone and floodprone 

area. When the tsunami waves 

rolled in people managed to summon 

boats from the mainland and evacuate 

their villages quickly. The casualties 

were minimal. The lesson for disaster 

policy-makers is to evolve a 

judicious mix of traditional and technology-intensive 

systems. 

Then there are aspects to be 

taken care of in the rehabilitation 

phase. The same absence of sensitivity 

often shows up in this phase as a 

one-size-fits-all Government Order. 

The result will be structures like 

empty concrete malls and two-bedroom 

cattle-sheds in the earthquakehit 

Latur, and cyclone shelters custom-made 

for illegal activities in 

coastal Andhra Pradesh. People do 

not live in imposed, alien structures. 

Villagers do not enjoy shopping 

from malls. All these brilliant urban 

ideas showed a singular lack of 

understanding of local tastes and 

concerns. It is such top-down 

approach that is still causing untold 

miseries to people still living in tight 

rows of temporary shelters in Tamil 

Nadu after the 2004 tsunami, many 

of them braving the second monsoon 

in knee-deep water. In 

Andaman and Nicobar, tsunamiaffected 

people stuck in tin-box 

shelters asked for their rights to 

choose the kind of houses they 

would like to live in. A recent street 

demonstration led to a lathi-charge. 

It is rebuilding of communities, not 

just shelters that the new policy is 

supposed to envisage. The milliondollar 

test will be in the last-mile 

reach of the policy or in bureaucratic 

parlance, its last-desk reach. 

Based in Bangalore, the writer edits 

www.indiadisasters.org and reports on development, 

disasters and migration 




Exiled in Your Own 

Imaginary Homeland 

Almost 60 percent of tsunami survivors still live in rapidly deteriorating temporary 

shelters made of tar sheet or tin, reports Shivani Chaudhry 

I 

t is hard to believe that two 

years have elapsed since the 

December 2004 tsunami. 

Visiting tsunami-struck areas 

across Tamil Nadu further 

heightens one’s disbelief. While in a 

few places minimal progress in rehabilitation 

has been made, most areas 

still wear a ravaged look with rubble 

and debris still lying uncleared. More 

shockingly, tsunami survivors continue 

to face a steady onslaught of 

suffering, resulting from the violation 

of their human rights, including 

their right to livelihood, work, adequate 

housing, health, water, sanitation, 

security, education, and most of 

all, to live with dignity. 

While the conditions in a few 

areas demonstrate improvements on 

the surface, these are still the exceptions 

rather than the norm. Almost 60 

percent of tsunami survivors still live 

in rapidly deteriorating temporary 

shelters made of tar sheet or tin. The 

responsibility of management and 

upkeep of the temporary shelter sites 

seems to have been evaded by the 

government and the NGOs who built 

or provided funding for them. 

Residents have had to largely fend 

for themselves by putting up thatch 

and plastic to mitigate the severity of 

heat and rain. 

The cramped living conditions, 

the line house nature of construction, 

the absence of bathrooms, the lack of 

space within shelters — is taking its 

toll on the survivors. The incomplete 

walls preclude privacy, as does the 

partitionless, one-room structures 

that threaten women’s right to personal 

security. The absence of 

kitchens, forces women to cook in 

overcrowded unventilated corridors. 

The resultant indoor air pollution 

increases their vulnerability to acute 

respiratory disorders. 

The State has failed to meet its 

obligation of providing basic sanitation 

services, which has resulted in 

stagnant water and garbage piles in 

most sites. Given the rampant spread 

of in the state, this 

oversight is even more alarming. It is 

the same story in temporary shelters 

at Seruthur in Nagapattinam, 

Keezhamanakudy, Kottilpadu and 

Rajakamangalam Thurai in 

Kanyakumari, and Srinivasapuram 

in Chennai. 

In the few completed permanent 

housing sites, one doesn’t witness a 

sense of contentment of people having 

been adequately rehabilitated. It 

is only a relative sense of relief due to 

improvement over the dismal living 

conditions in the temporary shelters. 

When people are driven to such a 

level of despair, anything provided 

in the form of ‘rehabilitation’ or 

‘housing’ tends to be accepted. 

Because if they question, they are 

afraid they may not get anything. 

Because if they reject what is given, 

they have nothing else. Even when it 

is their legally enforceable right to 

demand rehabilitation, security, adequate 

housing, healthcare, food, education, 

livelihood, and information. 

The operative practices of relief 

and rehabilitation organisations, 

including government and non-government 

agencies, however well 

intentioned, are not human rightsbased; 

neither are they focused on 

ensuring that the people’s special 

needs and concerns are met. The 

majority of permanent houses that 

have been provided were not developed 

in consultation with the affected. 

So while women might now have 

an actual kitchen to cook in, it is too 

28 



small and does not permit them to 

cook with firewood (as in 

Keezhamanakudy, Kanyakumari), 

which is why the majority of them 

are still forced to cook outdoors. 

Indeed, while each house might 

have an attached toilet, in many 

places it is not operational (as in 

Kottilpadu, Kanyakumari). While toilets 

might have been provided, 

bathing areas are absent (as in 

Kovalam and Veerabagupathy, 

Kanyakumari), which means that 

women have to either manage in the 

inadequate space or bathe outdoors 

which is extremely difficult, especially 

for adolescent girls and young 

women. Where two rooms might 

have been built, there is still not 

enough space to accommodate large 

joint families, nor is there a separate 

space for prayer (as in Pillumedu, 

Chidambaram), which is an integral 

requirement in many homes. Not one 

of the houses has provisions for persons 

with disabilities, for older persons 

or those living with illness. 

The lack of child-friendly spaces 

in some of the sites seriously violates 

children’s rights to security. The 

insensitivity to the specific needs of 

marginalised groups, including 

women and children, is glaring; this 

is a direct outcome of the failure to 

include them in planning and decision-making 

processes. 

The distance of many relocation 

sites from the coast, although providing 

an element of increased security, 

has jeopardised the livelihoods of 

fishing communities. For those families 

who have been able to rebuild 

their houses along the coast, the government 

has refused to support such 

construction or to recognise the communities’ 

customary rights over 

coastal land. In some areas, as along 

the Marina Beach in Chennai, coastal 

communities face a constant threat of 

eviction. Ostensibly justified under 

the guise of ‘safety,’ the aim is to 

acquire coastal land for commercial 

and tourism development. 

While the trend has been one of 

bypassing people and ignoring their 

voices, there are a few organisations 

such as SNEHA in Nagapattinam, 

Praxis and Rural Uplift Centre in 

Nagercoil, CREED in Chidambaram 

and Development Alternatives in 

Karaikal, which have utilised participatory 

mechanisms and developed housing 

plans in consultation with the people. 

These models need to be studied, 

evolved and adopted in the ongoing 

and future rehabilitation processes. 

Apart from creating a deeper 

sense of satisfaction among the people, 

such participatory processes 

ensure the special concerns of 

marginalised groups. Besides, all 

affected people must be provided 

with timely and adequate information, 

including the various aspects of 

resettlement and rehabilitation. 

All actors must exigently act to 

ensure that in-depth consultations 

are held with the affected people, 

including the marginalised and vulnerable 

communities. Permanent 

housing, built according to human 

rights standards of ‘adequacy’1 must 

immediately be provided to all those 

still living in temporary shelters. The 

government should revise its policy 

of providing one standardised house 

for every house lost. A comprehensive 

post-disaster rehabilitation policy 

needs to be developed which 

incorporates international human 

rights standards,2 especially given 

the deficiencies of the National 

Disaster Management Act, 2005. 

Moreover, binding timelines for 

the completion of reconstruction 

need to be developed and enforced, 

else the rehabilitation process could 

possibly continue endlessly with 

people languishing while waiting 

for essential services. The government 

needs to exigently establish 

effective monitoring and grievance 

redressal mechanisms and ensure 

that the special needs of women, 

children, persons with disabilities, 

older persons, historically discriminated 

groups and other vulnerable 

groups, are incorporated in all 

rehabilitation plans. 

The right to humanitarian relief 

and rehabilitation has to be recognised 

and upheld as a basic human right. It 

is absolutely imperative that existing 

lapses and violations are recognised 

and rectified to ensure that people are 

able to realise their right to an adequate 

standard of living, including the 

right to adequate housing, and are 

able to resume a life with security and 

dignity. Two years after the horror of 

the tsunami and the incessant trials of 

rehabilitation, this is the absolute minimum 

that one can ask for. 

The writer was part of a fact-finding 

mission conducted by the Housing and 

Land Rights Network to Tamil Nadu and 

Pondicherry in October 2006 

endnOtes 

1The elements of adequate housing are 

elaborated in General Comment 4, 

‘The right to adequate housing’ of the 

Committee on Economic, Social and 

Cultural Rights. Also see: www.hlrn.org 

and http://www.ohchr.org/english/ issues/ 

housing/index.htm 

2See International Human Rights 

Standards on Post›disaster 

Resettlement and Rehabilitation, 

Housing and Land Rights Network and 

PDHRE People s Movement for 

Human Rights Learning , January 2006. 

Available online at: http://www.hics 

a r p . o r g / P o s t - D i s a s t e r % 2 0 

Compilation.pdf. . Also see the IASC 

Operational Guidelines on Human 

Rights and Natural Disasters and th 

UN Guiding Principles on Internally 

Displaced Persons. 


30 

C O M B A T L A W J A N U A R Y - f e B R U A R Y 2 0 0 7

an Old Tehri town... 

Despite three decades of criticism and concerns, as the 

Tehri dam finally starts producing electricity and 

drinking water reaches distant Delhi, most questions 

have gone unanswered, writes Harsh Dobhal 

W 

ith the Tehri water gushing into the Sonia Vihar water 

treatment plant, a long wait by a parched Delhi has 

ended with the completion of the first phase of the controversial 

Tehri dam project. As of mid-July, the project 

has begun producing 150 to 400 megawatts of electricity, 

depending upon water availability. Meanwhile, with the closure of 

the project's Tunnel 2 in October 2005, Tehri town and nearby villages 

have been completely submerged under the dam's artificial lake. This 

project has been mired in controversy ever since its approval in 1972, 

particularly with regard to rehabilitation and environmental issues, 

but also as pertains to alleged structural flaws in the dam, its size, 

design and location. Lawsuits have repeatedly challenged the project, 

and national and international criticism has forced construction to 

drag on for nearly three decades. Officials with the Tehri Hydro 

Development Corporation (THDC) spout statistics: the project will 

generate 2400 megawatts of electricity, supply about 100 cubic feet of 

water per second (about 25 crore litres per day) to Delhi, and irrigate 

about 2,70,000 hectares (6,90,000 acres) of land in Uttar Pradesh, which 

has a 25 percent share in the project. But such figures do not drown 

out the project's negative impact, nor do they address the potentially 

drastic problems that have come up and would further arise from its 

construction. Apart from the old town of Tehri, the dam directly 

affects about 125 villages, 33 of which will be completely submerged. 

Nearly 5200 hectares of land is being inundated, and almost 5300 

urban, and over 9000 rural families, 5429 of them fully, are being displaced 

from their homes and land. In 1972, the Tehri project's cost was 

assessed at Rs 197 crore, and aimed to produce 600 MW of electricity. 

Over the years, the size and the cost of the project have multiplied. 

With the completion of the first phase of the project, which is estimated 

to produce 1000 megawatts of electricity, Rs 8000 crore has already 

been spent - a 24-fold increase in cost. The second phase will both 

pump up the water to produce another 1000 MW and the third phase, 

adjacent to Koteshwar dam, will produce 400 MW. But completion of 

these two phases will further require massive amounts of funding. 


TehRI DAMNeD 

Constructed over the confluence of 

the Bhagirathi and Bhilangana rivers 

in the Garhwal Himalayas, the reservoir 

that is being formed by the dam 

extends 45 km into the Bhagirathi valley, 

and 25 km into the Bhilangana valley. 

The lake's total surface area is 

nearly 43 square km. Perhaps most 

critically, the dam has been built on an 

active seismic area known as the 'central 

Himalayan gap,' just 45 km from 

the epicentre of the 1991 Uttarkashi 

earthquake. 

Seismologist and dam experts 

point out that in the event of a major 

earthquake, the dam can fail and the 

massive amount of water in the reservoir 

could suddenly come crashing 

out, inundating an unknown amount 

of the surrounding and downstream 

land and communities. 

Promised hospitals, 

roads, irrigation 

canals are nowhere 

to be seen. 

Resettled 

individuals are 

being cut off from 

their traditional 

social fabric, 

thereby risking 

serious social 

disintegration 

government promised a review but 

later reneged, allowing the work to 

continue. 

After Bahuguna undertook a third 

fast in April 1996, New Delhi appointed 

an official committee to look into 

the matter. The Hanumantha Rao 

Committee subsequently pointed out 

that the dam was being built in violation 

of the conditions that accompanied 

its environmental clearance. This 

committee was in fact the last in a 

series to look into the dam's construction. 

Both the SK Roy Committee, set 

up by Indira Gandhi, and the 1990 

Environmental Appraisal (Bhumbla) 

Committee had recommended that 

the construction of the project be halted. 

In addition, engineers from the 

Soviet Union, which had agreed to 

bankroll the project on concessional 

Harsh Dobhal 

Catastrophe in waiting 

Construction began in 1978, six years 

after the Planning Commission formally 

sanctioned the Tehri project in 

1972. The dam was vehemently 

opposed by the Tehri Bandh Virodhi 

Sangharsh Samiti (TBVSS), which 

went to the Supreme Court against the 

construction in 1978. Although the 

apex court rejected the appeal, the 

movement against the dam continued. 

The government's Environmental 

Appraisal Committee twice refused to 

give clearance to the project before 

finally granting it in 1993. 

The issue again hit the headlines 

following the 6.6 strength earthquake 

of October 20, 1991 in the area. Then 

Prime Minister, PV Narsimha Rao, 

remarked that the earthquake had 

raised a question about the project. 

During that year, opposition to the 

project further gained momentum 

when environmentalist Sunderlal 

Bahuguna undertook a long fast and 

succeeded in bringing construction to 

a standstill for 75 days. Bahuguna and 

other activists were subsequently 

arrested, and the work resumed under 

heavy police protection. Two fasts 

undertaken by Bahuguna in 1992 and 

1995 marked the high point of the antidam 

movement to press for an independent 

and transparent review. 

Following both of these fasts, which 

lasted 45 and 49 days respectively, the 

loans, had noted in reviews that the 

dam site’s location in a seismic area 

had not been taken into adequate consideration 

by the Indian planners. The 

project was unsuccessfully challenged 

in the Supreme Court. Another petition, 

raising rehabilitation and environmental 

issues, is still pending with 

the apex court. 

In April 1987, the Indian National 

Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage 

(INTACH) sponsored an independent 

assessment of the dam's economic feasibility. 

After calculating social and 

environmental costs and benefits, the 

multi-disciplinary team concluded 

that the project's benefit-to-cost ratio 

worked out to around 0.56:1 - not sim- 

32 


BIg Is NOT BeAUTIfUL 

ply short of the 1.5:1 ratio adopted by 

the Planning Commission to sanction 

such projects, but also that the project 

will cost more than the benefits it is 

expected to deliver. The INTACH 

team also noted that the projected useful 

lifespan of 100 years was questionable, 

as the high siltation rate in the 

Bhagirathi River would reduce the life 

of the dam to just 62 years at most. 

Even the International 

Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) 

has declared the Tehri dam to be one 

of the most hazardous sites in the 

world, a contention supported by 

independent seismologists from within 

and outside India. An earthquake of 

large magnitude could result in bursting 

of the dam, which would almost 

immediately flood nearby towns such 

as Deoprayag, Rishikesh and 

Harsh Dobhal 

Harsh Dobhal 

Haridwar, as well as those farther 

away. If the dam broke, the city of 

Meerut would be under water within 

12 hours. 

The myth of rehabilitation 

The story of rehabilitation for those 

affected by the dam's construction has 

been one of broken promises. The creation 

of the town of New Tehri has significantly 

altered the social, economic, 

cultural and administrative dynamics 

of the entire area. Oustees have cited 

hundreds of examples of discrepancy, 

as well as a general absence of political 

will to rehabilitate people. While 

affected families were promised 

employment for one adult at the time 

After Bahuguna 

undertook a third fast 

in 1996, Delhi 

appointed the 

Hanumantha Rao 

Committee which 

pointed out that the 

dam was being built 

in violation of 

environmental 

clearance conditions 

of acquiring their land, authorities 

appeared to quickly forget the 

promise, leading to discontent. 

Community members could have 

taken a cue from those families that 

were resettled to areas around 

Haridwar and Rishikesh a quarter 

century ago, back at the beginning of 

the Tehri project. Promised hospitals, 

roads, irrigation canals and the like are 

still nowhere to be seen. Resettled 

individuals have experienced a disorienting 

process of being cut off from 

their traditional social fabric, thereby 

risking social disintegration. 

While compensation has been 

reserved for those who had land in 

their name before 1985, many families 


TehRI DAMNeD 

Harsh Dobhal 

who came after that year have also 

been left out - particularly those who 

do not have 'good contacts.' 

Furthermore, even while 1985 was set 

as the cut-off date for the people living 

in the town, people living in villages 

are eligible for rehabilitation only if 

they were there before 1976. Partially 

affected villages face another problem. 

Only those who have had more than 

half of their lands acquired qualify for 

complete rehabilitation; those with 

less than half of their lands affected 

are compensated, but not moved to 

new lands. Nonetheless, in most cases, 

the land being submerged, even if less 

that 50 per cent of their landholding, is 

the only fertile land around the river 

valley - the rest is barren land on steep 

hills, not suitable for agriculture. 

Harsh Dobhal 

Even the International 

Commission on Large 

Dams has declared the 

Tehri dam to be one of 

the most hazardous 

sites in the world, a 

contention supported 

by independent 

seismologists from 

within and outside 

India 

Harsh Dobhal 

The number of affected families is 

more than just those whose lands have 

been submerged, and includes those 

who have lost link roads, schools and 

hospitals. With crucial infrastructural 

links disrupted, local communities are 

demanding new link roads, bridges 

and ropeways. But the government's 

rehabilitation policy does not clearly 

state anything about partially submerged 

villages, or the fate of the people 

living in such altered situations. 

The Tehri project is nearing completion, 

but there are crucial questions 

and concerns related to the environment, 

development and rehabilitation-some 

of which are still unanticipated, 

and many of which are as 

unanswerable as Old Tehri town is 

forever unreachable. 

n 

34 C O M B A T L A W J A N U A R Y - f e B R U A R Y 2 0 0 7


Harsh Dobhal 

The future of 

tragedy is now 

All it would take is about 90 minutes for Rishikesh and Haridwar to be flooded, if the 

Tehri dam breaks. And this is not a remote possibility. From its seismic prone location 

and failure of environmental clearance by the Bhumbla Committee, to the damaging 

impact on the lives and livelihoods of thousands of people, the Tehri dam poses a clear, 

catastrophic danger, writes Sanjay Parikh 

T 

ehri dam is located in an 

extremely fragile and highly 

seismic prone area. It is 

located in the Seismic Gap 

between the sites of Bihar- 

Nepal and the Kangra earthquakes. 

The entire Himalayan range, in fact, 

was formed as the Indian sub-continent 

drifted northwards and 

rammed into Asia about 40 to 50 million 

years ago. 

Why was the site still chosen for 

the construction of the Tehri Dam? 

Sometime in 1961, the central 

government started looking for construction 

of a dam for hydel power 

generation. A decade later in 1972, 

the Planning Commission gave its 

clearance for the investment. In 

Soviet scientists 

estimated that the 

Tehri area’s 

seismicity might 

touch nine on the 

Richter scale, 

higher than the 

seismicity for 

which the Tehri 

dam was 

designed 

March 1980, out of the submitted 

proposals, an in-depth review by an 

expert group was directed by the 

Union Ministry of Science and 

Technology. The statement made at 

that time by the then Prime Minister, 

Indira Gandhi, is significant: “There 

are several proposals which were 

agreed to earlier but would need to 

be looked into again. Amongst them 

are Silent Valley, the dam in Tehri 

Garhwal and the dam in Lalpur, 

Gujarat. It seems that large areas of 

very fertile land are being submerged 

without any commensurate 

gains. There may be other such cases 

also. It is true that these decisions 

have been taken over a period of time 

but there is great local distress and a 


TehRI DAMNeD 

Place Distance D/s Arrival time Depth (M) 

of dam (KM) for surge(Hrs.) 

Dam 00 Approximate time 260.00 

for emptying of 

reservoir-22 Min 

RISHIKESH 80.00 0.63 260.00 

HARDWAR 104.00 0.80 232.00 

BIJNOR 179.00 4.45 17.72 

MEERUT 214.00 7.25 9.85 

HAPUR 246.05 9.50 8.78 

BULAND SHEHAR 286.05 12.00 8.50 

feeling that contractors and other 

such groups will be the main gainers. 

Hence, it is necessary to have another 

look in-depth.” 

In the final report submitted by 

the working group, it was recommended 

that the entire Tehri Project 

should be abandoned, even though 

an expenditure of Rs 206 crore had 

already been incurred. This report 

was accepted in October 1986 by the 

Union Ministry of Environment and 

Forest (MoEF), and thus, the Tehri 

project stood abandoned. 

However, within a month, the 

then USSR offered administrative, 

financial and technical aid and the 

government decided to revive the 

project. Surprisingly, in January 1987, 

the MoEF issued the following press 

release: “The government has 

cleared the project after a thorough 

asdkj 

Harsh Dobhal 

assessment of the impact of the project 

on environment and after satisfying 

themselves that the adverse 

impacts on environment can be 

remedied.” It is beyond anybody’s 

comprehension, how this categorical 

statement could be issued barely a 

month after abandoning the project. 

Although a general agreement for 

the Tehri project was signed in 

Moscow, the Soviet scientists estimated 

that the Tehri area’s seismicity 

might touch nine on the Richter 

scale, higher than the seismicity for 

which the Tehri dam was designed. 

This arrangement could not continue. 

Later, the execution of the Tehri 

dam was taken over by a joint venture 

company, namely, the Tehri 

Hydel Development Corporation 

(THDC). 

The THDC had formulated certain 

environment action plans which 

were submitted to the Environment 

Appraisal Committee in 1989. This 

Environment Appraisal Committee 

(the Bhumbla Committee) recommended 

unanimously that the Tehri 

dam project does not merit environmental 

clearance. The conclusion of 

the Bhumbla Committee was as follows: 

“Therefore, taking into consideration 

the geological and seismic 

setting, risks and hazards, ecological 

and social impact accompanying the 

project, the costs and benefits expected, 

and after a careful examination of 

the information and data available, 

the committee has come to the unanimous 

conclusion that the Tehri dam 

project, as proposed, should not be 

taken up as it does not merit environmental 

clearance.” 

Notwithstanding the above conclusions, 

the MoEF decided to grant 

“conditional clearance” in July 1990 

to the dam. It was provided in the 

conditional clearance that environment, 

rehabilitation and other 

aspects shall be studied, action plans 

will be formulated and implemented 

within a given time schedule, pari 

passu with the construction, failing 

which engineering work would be 

brought to a halt. 

The enforcement of this condition 

was protected under the provisions 

of the Environment (Protection) Act, 

1986. It is on record that the conditions 

relating to environment, rehabilitation 

etc. lagged far behind, but 

construction of the dam continued 

with great speed. 

The gross violation of the terms of 

conditional clearance under the 

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, 

namely, the catchment area treatment, 

command area development, 

protection of flora and fauna, formulation 

and implementation of the 

resettlement and rehabilitation policy, 

led to the filing of a public interest 

litigation in the Supreme Court. The 

case continued for more then a 

decade. 

In 1996, the then prime minister, 

HD Deva Gowda, appointed two 

expert committees, one on the safety 

aspect and the other on environment 

and rehabilitation. These two reports 

were submitted in 1998. 

On the safety aspect, the experts 

concluded that the present design of 

the dam is expected to be structural- 

36 



ly safe to withstand the Maximum 

Credible Earthquake (MCE) during 

the economic performance life of the 

dam reservoir system, but four 

experts (out of five) recommended, 

as a matter of abundant caution, the 

following two studies: 

n A 3-D non-linear analysis of the 

dam to evaluate its performance 

against the MCE. 

n A simulated dam-break analysis 

to ensure that in the unlikely 

event of an uncontrolled release of 

water, the consequences are minimum. 

The government, however, decided 

that these two studies were not 

required, notwithstanding the potential 

damage to life and property that 

will be caused in the eventuality of 

Harsh Dobhal 

In its final report the 

working group 

recommended that the 

Tehri project be 

abandoned, though Rs 

206 crore had been 

spent. This report was 

accepted in October 

1986 by the Union 

Ministry of 

Environment & Forest 

Scenes from the last wedding in Tehri before submergence 

the dam breaking. As a matter of fact, 

the MoEF had prepared a brief in 

1993 for the then prime minister, 

Narasimha Rao, pointing out the 

havoc which will be caused in the 

event of the dam breaking. 

According to this note, the impact 

would be seen from the table 

above(see opposing page), in less 

than an hour-and-a-half, the water 

would hit Rishikesh and Hardwar 

and wipe out these two cities. This is 

certain because the height of the 

water would be 260 meters and 323 

meters respectively. 

As regards rehabilitation and 

environment, the report of the expert 

committee headed by Professor CH 

Hanumanta Rao, with several other 

experts, commented that among othw 

w w . c o m b a t l a w . o r g 37

TehRI DAMNeD 

ers, the date for submission of the 

command area development plan 

was extended by 33 months, but still, 

the same was not submitted even 

within the extended time frame. The 

conclusion was that the required 

studies and action plans were not 

completed/submitted within the time 

frame laid down in the condition of 

clearance. The expert committee also 

remarked: 

“Prolonging the discussion on 

these reports for years, while the project 

construction continued, is neither 

in the interest of environmental conservation 

nor of the project. By not 

taking timely and decisive action on 

the issue of approval or rejection of 

the environmental reports, the MoEF, 

in the opinion of the committee, has 

The case against the 

multi-crore, gigantic 

Tehri dam was fought 

in the Supreme Court 

for protection of the 

human rights of the 

thousands of oustees 

as well as for the 

preservation of a 

young and fragile 

Himalayan ecology 

Sridev Suman’s last house 

Harsh Dobhal 

been seriously remiss.” 

The Supreme Court gave its final 

judgment on September 1, 2003. It 

accepted sustainable development, 

protection of environment and the 

right to rehabilitation as part of 

Article 21 of the Constitution. It also 

accepted that strict compliance of the 

conditions relating to the protection 

of human rights and ecology are 

important and, if neglected, human 

life and the whole Himalayan environment 

will be the casualty. But 

on the safety aspect, the court did not 

agree with the experts that two studies 

were required, when that should 

have been the approach keeping in 

view the precautionary principle. It 

agreed with the government that it is 

in the realm of policy decision and 

38 



there is no need to re-examine the 

safety aspects of the dam. 

The Court granted relief only to 

the extent that Tunnels T-1 and T-2 

shall not be closed down and no 

impoundment shall take place unless 

all the conditions in the environment 

clearance (July 1990) are complied 

with and stand fulfilled. The 

Supreme Court also decided to transfer 

the case to the Uttaranchal High 

Court for further monitoring. 

It may be relevant to point out 

that at no stage was there any stay on 

the dam construction. The construction, 

therefore, continued, and was 

almost complete by the time the 

Supreme Court passed its judgment. 

But the pari passu requirement of the 

area plan. Unquestionably, flora and 

fauna protection is necessary for 

keeping a balance in the environment. 

Similarly, Resettlement and 

Rehabilitation (R&R) is the basic 

right of the oustees — much before 

the fear of submergence becomes a 

threatening reality. The government 

agencies are required to do this, as it 

is a legal and constitutional obligation 

of the State. If these concerns are 

not fulfilled, it causes grave loss to 

our ecology, besides seriously affecting 

the lives and livelihood of the 

people. 

Therefore, to attach an anti-dam 

or anti development tag to such pro 

bono actions, is basically ignorance 

Harsh Dobhal 

Bimla Bahuguna: Last person to leave old Tehri town 

conditional clearance stood grossly 

violated: while the construction of 

the dam continued, the other conditionalities 

pertaining to environment 

and rehabilitation seriously suffered. 

The Tehri case was fought in the 

Supreme Court essentially for protection 

of the human rights of the 

oustees as well as for protection of 

the Himalayan ecology. Can it be disputed 

that if the catchment area 

treatment is punctual and proper it 

can help in preventing soil erosion, 

silting and thus maintain the life of 

the dam? Is it not true a proper command 

area plan helps in making 

water available for irrigation as well 

as for drinking in the area where it is 

required; problem of water logging is 

also taken care of in the command 

of the ground reality. One may certainly 

raise objections as to whether 

such big dams on sensitive locations 

and without a cost benefit analysis 

(social and environment cost included) 

should be allowed at all. Such 

questions in the welfare state are 

quite justifiable. 

After the Supreme Court judgement, 

the tunnels T-1 and T-2 were 

closed down. This resulted in rise of 

water level upto 760M. People questioned 

why this has happened when 

none of the conditions pertaining to 

environment have been fulfilled, 

completely and properly and many 

sections of people are still awaiting 

the benefits of relief and rehabilitation, 

besides several other related 

important issues. Why those who 

suffer, who are uprooted, and at 

whose cost so-called development 

takes place, are compelled to face this 

fait accompli: to accept whatever, or 

nothing at all, the government offers 

as a part of R&R. 

The so-called ‘better-off’ life after 

rehabilitation becomes only an illusion. 

Why are their rights not given 

the same place of importance in the 

so-called development process? Why 

are all promises to protect the environment 

are breached with impunity? 

These questions repeatedly arise 

in every dam project but are never 

answered, none especially in terms of 

compliances. 

Though the dam has been constructed, 

several questions pertaining 

to development still remain 

unanswered. The local people are 

raising questions that will not die 

down: whether a dam of this size, in 

an ecologically and geologically sensitive 

and fragile zone, having enormous 

risks and human costs, was at 

all advisable? Their demand for a 

body of independent experts to conduct 

a thorough analysis of all the 

factors — social, economic, environment, 

safety — is basically to seek 

reassurance on every count, that 

there are no unpardonable errors. 

The lesson of true development, it is 

hoped, will not be learnt at the cost of 

a current and potential catastrophe. 

The writer is senior advocate, 

Supreme Court of India 


TehRI DAMNeD 

Harsh Dobhal 

Devaprayag - one of the Panchprayagas - which will be 

underwater within minutes if the Tehri dam bursts 

Drowned 

outof the map 

In village after village, submerged with the rising waters of the gigantic, multi-crore Tehri 

dam, thousands of displaced people in Tehri Garhwal narrate the same, tragic story: their 

temples, homes, shops, trees, streams, forests, fertile land, memories, hopes, futures, have 

been drowned. But the entire government machinery operates overtime to deny them even 

an iota of justice, land, home, compensation or rehabilitation. 

T 

he Tehri Dam affects one 

Tehri town and 125 surrounding 

villages situated on 

the shores of Bhagirathi and 

Bhilangna rivers in the mid- 

Himalayan terrain of Tehri Garhwal 

in Uttaranchal. Out of this figure, 37 

are declared as fully affected villages 

and 88 as partially affected villages. 

The Goelogical Survey of India 

(GSI) conducted a survey for the government 

only in three villages. This 

survey is conducted to assess the stability 

of land pursuant to the increase 

of water level in the reservoir. The significance 

of the survey lies in the fact 

that as the water level in the Tehri 

reservoir increases daily, large tracts 

of village land will get submerged 

and the land situated above the reservoir 

level will thus become loose and 

prone to massive landslides. In turn, 

this will make the villages situated 

above the water level on a steep slope 

extremely vulnerable to landslides 

and hence completely uninhabitable. 

With the water level rising above 

778 reservoir level (RL) on August 19, 

2006, the danger of land and villages 

situated at steep slopes sliding into 

the reservoir has become a serious 

threat to the life of hundreds of villagers. 

Indeed, photographs of the villages 

situated above the reservoir 

level clearly show small tension 

cracks at about 150 m, which indicates 

40 



the onset of instability. 

Employment: The government of 

Uttar Pradesh had issued various 

government orders (GOs) from 1973 

to 1988 stating that with regard to the 

hardship and difficulties faced by 

people whose land is being acquired 

in public interest, compulsory 

employment would be provided to 

one member of the affected family in 

the same project. However, the UP 

government, despite all the early 

promises and GOs, issued a fresh one 

(October 27, 1998) withdrawing all 

earlier GOs, and thus withdrawing 

the employment guarantee to protect 

affected people. 

Drinking water: The 

Hanumantha Rao Committee had recommended 

the provision of drinking 

Displaced once 20 years ago, they are now being thrown off the land that they made fertile 

Harsh Dobhal 

With the water level 

rising in the Tehri 

reservoir, villages 

would be cut off from 

the district 

headquarters. 

Villagers who trekked 

five kms for water will 

now have to travel the 

distance of 170 kms 

Building homes stone by stone 

water facility to all the rural areas that 

have partially affected villages for 

which Rs 30 crore was to be allocated. 

Out of this, Rs 17 crore was taken 

away for New Tehri town. The committee 

did not contemplate this earlier 

as the Rs 30 crore allocated was to be 

utilised for drinking water facilities to 

the rural areas. 

Despite these provisions for drinking 

water, veteran Gandhian 

Sunderlal Bahuguna pointed out in 

June 2005, that the Pratapnagar and 

Jakhnidar blocks and the 50 villages 

falling in the Raika region, are facing 

severe shortage of drinking water that 

has led to over 100 suicides by women 

and massive migration from these villages. 

Thus, only few old people and 

young women in these villages were 

Forced to break their own homes 


TehRI DAMNeD 

at the rehabilitation sites. But their 

houses, trees and other property have 

not been acquired and paid for, being 

above 835 RL- the maximum reservoir 

level. Hence, these families cannot 

construct their houses at the rehabilitation 

sites. 

Village Utthar had 26 families that 

were not determined as ‘eligible families’ 

and thus deprived of rehabilitation 

benefits as less than 50 percent of 

their land were acquired for the Tehri 

dam project. But the rest of their land 

was acquired for the construction of 

the Tipri-Pipaldali Road which was 

constructed because of the dam itself. 

n Village Bhattkanda at 783 RL faced 

the same problem as above. Nine families 

were allotted agricultural land 

and residential plots at the rehabilitation 

sites, though they were not paid 

compensation for ‘house-construction’ 

and other property as it was situated 

above 835 RL. 

n Village Kailbagi situated at 790 RL, 

has 22 families that have still not been 

compensated for their rightful claims 

and are finding it difficult to properly 

construct their houses at the rehabilitation 

sites. Their claims for unpaid 

compensation range from 1-4 rooms, 

boundary wall, tank, toilets etc. 

n Village Ghunti at 782 RL faces an 

acute situation as there is only one 

Harsh Dobhal 

left behind to fend for themselves as 

distressed male members moved out 

in search for livelihood. 

Bahuguna pointed out that with 

the water level rising in the Tehri 

reservoir, these villages would be further 

cut off from the district headquarters. 

Villagers who had to trek 

five km for water will now have to 

travel the impossible distance of 

about 170 km. In response, the new 

state of Uttaranchal prepared a few 

pumping schemes which still remains 

to be implemented in these areas; as a 

result this has led to the creation of an 

extreme emergency situation. 

Compensation for rural shop owners: 

The state government paid Rs 3 

lakh as compensation for shops and 

Rs 2.5–4 lakh for houses situated in 

urban areas. But only about Rs 60,000 

compensation was given for both 

houses and shops situated in the rural 

areas. There is no rational basis given 

for this discrimination while verifying 

and accepting the discrimination in 

payment of compensation. The 

demand of the rural shopkeepers for 

compensation at par with their urban 

counterparts has still not received any 

response from the government. 

Village-wise rehabilitation 

n Village Utthar, situated at 735 (reservoir 

level) RL and now completely 

submerged, has 44 families that are all 

declared ‘eligible families’ for rehabilitation 

and have been provided land 

With water level 

rising above 778 RL 

on August 19, 2006, 

the danger of land 

and villages 

situated at steep 

slopes sliding into 

the reservoir has 

become a serious 

threat to the life of 

hundreds of 

villagers 

small bridge connecting this village to 

the Dhungmandar Patti. This bridge 

is now getting submerged due to the 

rising water level but the government 

has still not constructed any bridge to 

replace it. As soon as the existing 

bridge gets submerged, the families 

living across the river will be totally 

cut off from the rest of the village on 

the other side of the river. 

Caste discrimination in allocating 

the rehabilitation package is visible 

from the example of village Ghunti. 

Out of the 88 families, only 82 have 

been declared as ‘eligible families’ for 

rehabilitation. As per the ‘rehabilitation 

policy’, the whole village should 

have been considered as ‘eligible’ for 

rehabilitation. The only five families 

that have not been determined as eligible 

belong to the ‘Scheduled 

42 



Godi Sirain at 684 

RL has 47 families 

with several 

grievances that 

have not been 

addressed. They 

have not been paid 

compensation 

either for their 

shops or houses 

other community-owned institutions 

that existed at Old Tehri which have 

not been replaced by the rehabilitation 

department at the rehabilitation 

sites. There were several temples 

devoted to Hindu gods in Old Tehri 

which have not been constructed in 

New Tehri or elsewhere. Some of the 

names of these temples are 

Dakkhankali, Seetlamata, Naramad - 

eshwar and Bhattakandamahadev. 

Similarly, apart from the compensation 

being paid to the people for 

compulsory acquisition of their property 

for the Tehri dam, there were several 

other households whose shops 

and houses were damaged due to the 

Harsh Dobhal 

Castes’. 

n Ghunti Bazaar at 790 RL faces acute 

problems of connectivity. As the only 

bridge situated at 770 RL and catering 

to at least 50,000 people, it was on the 

verge of submergence some time 

back. A new bridge was not constructed 

for replacement, though the construction 

would have taken only a 

minimum period of two years. 

n Sixty shopkeepers of Ghunti Bazaar 

have been left out by the rehabilitation 

department. Not one of them 

were paid compensation nor allotted 

any shop at the relocated sites. 

n Village Khand at 760 RL had a total 

of 352 families out of which 287 families 

were determined as ‘eligible families’ 

for rehabilitation and 65 families 

were left out. As per the rehabilitation 

policy, any village of which more than 

75 percent of the families have been 

determined as ‘eligible’ has to be 

declared as a fully affected village, 

and all the families have to be determined 

as ‘eligible families’ for rehabilitation. 

Despite this, these 65 families 

were not given the benefits of the ‘eligible 

family’ category, in total violation 

of the rehabilitation policy. 

n At the Old Tehri town, situated at 

640 RL, the first to get submerged, the 

rehabilitation department did the valuation 

of ‘remaining properties’ of 185 

families out of which 142 families 

were paid their dues and 43 families 

were left out despite their properties 

being already valued in 2002. As 

many as 65 families were not given 

compensation as they could not produce 

the proof of their demolished 

shops/houses before October 31, 2001. 

Their shops were demolished but 

commercial compensation was not 

paid to them as per the policy. 

In Old Tehri, 12 persons, who 

were the owners of ‘phad/theli’ and 

whose name found mention in the 

survey register of 1985, were neither 

allotted shops nor paid compensation 

for them. Three individuals, whose 

name found mention in the survey 

register of 1985 and whose shops are 

totally submerged now, were neither 

paid compensation for their shops nor 

allotted new shops at the relocated 

sites. 

Apart from the individual, unresolved 

grievances, there were several 

sudden increase in the water level on 

July 29, 2004. There was heavy rainfall 

and water logging in the town as only 

tunnel T4 was open. The other three 

tunnels were closed down. Almost 34 

households faced severe damage of 

their houses and shops due to this 

sudden water-logging and were not 

paid any compensation for the damage 

by the rehabilitation department 

despite this being the direct result of 

the dam project. 

n Village Gadoli at 640 RL and one of 

the first villages to get submerged has 

17 families. None of them have got 

compensation till date, though their 

cases have been identified and accepted 

as ‘oustees’ by the coordination 

committee. Besides, 20 families of the 

same village have not been compensated 

for their various entitlements 


TehRI DAMNeD 

ranging from boundary wall, private 

irrigation gool, panchakki and shops. 

Indeed, three brothers of this village 

have been compensated and allotted 

agricultural land and residential plots 

at the rehabilitation site, but they have 

not been paid any compensation for 

‘house-construction’ as their houses 

are situated above 835 RL mark. 

n Village Godi Sirain at 684 RL has 47 

families who still have several 

grievances that have not been 

addressed by the rehabilitation 

department. They have not been paid 

compensation either for their shops or 

houses; they have not been allotted 

residential lots or agricultural land at 

the rehabilitation sites. 

n The worse condition is of the nine 

families among the above-mentioned 

47 families who have been allotted 

either residential or agricultural plots 

at the rehabilitation sites. The plots or 

land are absolutely unusable due to 

either high tension wires running 

above them or sewer lines going 

under them. The rehabilitation 

departments, despite being aware of 

these circumstances, have not 

attempted to find a solution. The villagers 

have nowhere to go in these 

conditions. 

n Village Godi Sirain has 50 families 

that have not been paid compensation 

Harsh Dobhal 

Sunderlal 

Bahuguna pointed 

out in June 2005, 

that the 

Pratapnagar and 

Jakhnidar blocks 

and the 50 villages 

falling in the Raika 

region, are facing 

severe shortage of 

drinking water that 

has led to over 100 

suicides by women 

for their shops or other commercial 

ventures and neither have they been 

allotted shops at the rehabilitation 

sites. Similarly, 31 persons of village 

Mail Deval at 726 RL have not been 

compensated nor allotted shops at the 

rehabilitation sites for their shops 

acquired for the dam. 

n Village Siyansu at 761 RL has 30 

families determined as ‘fully affected’ 

families that have been given agricultural 

and residential plots at relocated 

sites but compensation has not been 

given as their houses are situated 

above 835 RL. Therefore, they cannot 

construct their houses at the relocated 

sites. 

n Village Baldhiana at 774 RL has 

seven families who are not considered 

‘eligible families’ for rehabilitation, 

despite 98 percent of the families of 

the same village being marked as ‘eligible 

families’. This, despite the rehabilitation 

policy statement, whereby a 

village with 75 percent of families 

considered as ‘eligible families’ has to 

be declared a fully-affected village 

and all its families have to be rehabilitated. 

The rehabilitation department 

acts in complete violation of the rehabilitation 

policy in such cases. 

n Village Jogiara (Uttarkashi) at 762 

RL is in the submergence zone. Its 

eight families have not been paid 

compensation. The rehabilitation policy 

has not been extended to them on 

account of alleged shortage of funds, 

though it is a fully affected village 

within the submergence zone. 

n Village Chaam at 768 RL has 10 

families who are yet to be paid compensation 

for their houses that are 

falling in the submergence area 

below 770 RL. 

n Village Padiargaon at 640 RL is one 

of the first villages to get completely 

submerged. It has 8 families who 

were not paid compensation for their 

house and remaining properties. 

Their cases are still pending with the 

Director (Rehabilitation). 

n Village Chaudhar Patti Raika at 994 

RL has 29 families who have not been 

paid compensation for their land situated 

below 790 RL. 

n Village Khaand Athur at 640 RL has 

35 families who have not been paid 

urban compensation for their land 

despite their land falling within the 

territory of Old Tehri and being eligible 

for urban compensation as per the 

rehabilitation policy. 

n Village Thapla, Padiyargaon, 

Vilyasaund, Kandal etc, has 315 

families which have been rehabilitated 

at Banjarawala, Dehradun. 

They have been given only ½ acre 

agricultural land while the 200 sq 

metre residential plot has not been 

allotted. At Pathri near Haridwar 

both ½ acre agricultural land and 

200 sq metre residential plots have 

still, after so much time not been 

alotted. 

n 

44

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