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Contents:ContentsFINAL.qxd 8/1/2008 8:04 PM Page 1<br />

COMBAT LAW<br />

jULY-aUGUST, 2008<br />

Editor<br />

Colin Gonsalves<br />

VOLUME 7, ISSUE 4<br />

Managing Editor<br />

Harsh Dobhal<br />

Senior Associate Editors<br />

Suresh Nautiyal<br />

Abid Shah<br />

Associate Editor<br />

Sujata Krishnamurthi<br />

Correspondents<br />

Mallika Iyer (Mumbai)<br />

Sheela Ramanathan (Bangalore)<br />

Geetha D (Chennai)<br />

Special Contribution<br />

Faisal Qadri<br />

Aaliya Anjum<br />

Amrit Dhatt<br />

Photos<br />

Harsh Dobhal<br />

Bilal Bahadur<br />

Layout<br />

Birendra K Gupta<br />

Deputy Manager (Circulation)<br />

Hitendra Chauhan<br />

09899630748<br />

Editorial Office<br />

576, Masjid Road,<br />

Jangpura, New Delhi-110014<br />

Phones : +91-11-65908842<br />

Fax: +91-11-24374502<br />

E-mail your queries and opinions to:<br />

editor@combatlaw.org<br />

lettertoeditor@combatlaw.org<br />

For subscription enquiries email to:<br />

subscriptions@combatlaw.org<br />

Any written matter that is<br />

published in this journal can be<br />

used freely with credits to <strong>Combat</strong><br />

<strong>Law</strong> and the author. In case of<br />

publication, please write to us at<br />

the above-mentioned address. The<br />

opinions expressed in the articles<br />

are those of the authors.<br />

Vale where justice fails<br />

Earlier this year, hundreds of unidentified graves were discovered in<br />

Kashmir, believed to be containing victims of unlawful killings in a<br />

region which has witnessed gross human rights abuses at a colossal scale.<br />

Forget the government, even the Indian media and civil society did not get<br />

anguished, agitated and provoked at this discovery. This single incident is<br />

an important pointer towards the kind of attention our country pays to<br />

Kashmir. And here lies the irony. Kashmir is an overwritten but also a written<br />

off issue.. Little understood, Kashmir is always in news but Kashmiris<br />

get scant regard. Indeed, the world community looks at troubles in<br />

Kashmir primarily linked to either India or Pakistan, or part of an Islamic<br />

Jihad and global war on terror. Thus, the Kashmiri identity, the glorious<br />

history of thousands of years as also the real issue are completely ignored.<br />

Nearly two decades have elapsed since the Valley has been stalked by<br />

fear and violence and the unending imbroglio has not only ruined the<br />

economy but also turned the 'paradise on earth' into a dreaded zone where<br />

widows and orphans abound. Over 60,000 dead, thousands gone missing<br />

and hundreds brutally tortured. A staggering 50,000 or more have been<br />

orphaned. Thousands of women have been thrust with widowhood, many<br />

do not know the fate of their husbands or young sons who were whisked<br />

away by armed military or militiamen. Women whose husbands could not<br />

be traced have come to be described as ‘half-widows’. Neither they can<br />

marry again, nor can they claim any share in their husbands’ property, simply<br />

because those who whisked such hapless Kashmiris away never disclosed<br />

their fate. A whole generation calls itself children of conflict, those<br />

who have grown under the shadow of guns; conflict has shaped their personality<br />

and conflict decides their identity. There has been a huge trust<br />

deficit between rulers and the ruled in Kashmir.<br />

And, thus a heavy blow has been suffered by rule of law. The law has<br />

actually been getting a short shrift. Far from inspiring those for whom it is<br />

meant, it drives dread and chill in their hearts. On the one hand this itself<br />

has been preparing ground for potential rebels ready to take guns and further<br />

fuel strife, turning it into a vicious cycle called insurgency and counter<br />

insurgency.<br />

Kashmir may signify different things to different people but this journal<br />

has taken it up as a human rights issue where, as put by former chairperson<br />

of Bar Council of India, Dhairyasheel Patil, during a recent visit to<br />

Srinagar, an entire world (of Kashmiris) has crumbled. And so he exhorted<br />

a group of university students to build a new world. A brave new world to<br />

be built by a new generation has to begin with digging one’s feet for his or<br />

her rights. All those who wield gun have to be made accountable before<br />

law before any kind of change can be visualised vis-a-vis Kashmir.<br />

Kashmir is not the only dark spot belying high standards set by the<br />

founding fathers of the idea called India. There are Manipur, Nagaland,<br />

Assam, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and now even Uttarakhand. Nandigram<br />

and Singur in West Bengal, Kalinganagar in Orissa, Santoshpur in<br />

Chhattisgarh, and Khammam in Andhra Pradesh: the political colour of<br />

the governments in these states might be different, but across the political<br />

spectrum the State has come down heavily on people who differed with it<br />

on one count or the other. And mass uprisings become inevitable if the<br />

State does not address the real issues. Forty-year-long crackdown against<br />

Naxals, for example, could not stop them from spreading their influence to<br />

rural hiterland of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and<br />

Orissa which are characterised by high poverty and high proportion of<br />

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes population. Following pages carry<br />

excerpts from a government report brought out recently which strongly<br />

recommends redress of economic and social issues in these regions besides<br />

unconditional talks with Naxals.<br />

Harsh Dobhal


Contents:ContentsFINAL.qxd 8/1/2008 8:04 PM Page 2<br />

C O N T E N T S<br />

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 5<br />

GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT<br />

Development challenges in<br />

Naxal-affected areas 6<br />

Forty years of crackdown<br />

against Naxals could not stop<br />

them from spreading their<br />

influence to rural pockets<br />

afflicted by extreme poverty<br />

and blatant discrimination against poor, says<br />

an expert body appointed by government in<br />

its report to the planning commission, writes<br />

Santosh Mehrotra<br />

GENERAL<br />

Deprivation turns people to Naxalism,<br />

says Government report 12<br />

Factors that lead to Naxal uprisings in certain rural pockets<br />

of the country came under Government study, courtesy<br />

Planning Commission. A committee formed by it had former<br />

police and intelligence chiefs<br />

besides bureaucrats and activists.<br />

Together they aver that abysmal<br />

poverty, near destitution, blatant<br />

caste discrimination, misplaced<br />

policing and absence of a redressal<br />

mechanism propel Naxalism.<br />

Exclusive excerpts:<br />

MURDER OF DEMOCRACY<br />

LAND GRAB<br />

Public outrage at activist’s murder 23<br />

Seeking transparent implementation of<br />

Employment Guarantee Act costs Lalit<br />

Mehta his life. His death creates fierce<br />

outrage in Jharkhand. Parvinder Singh<br />

reports from Ranchi<br />

Operation Grab-Back:<br />

Heeding Medha’s Cry 26<br />

In the wake of UP government’s decision to take over<br />

huge chunk of agricultural land in Kushinagar in the<br />

name of developing a Buddhist pilgrimage centre, the<br />

national alliance of people’s movements held a farmers’ meeting in the little<br />

town where Medha Patkar called for land grab whether for manufacturing<br />

or exports or on any other pretext as recolonisation, writes<br />

Elisabeth Abeson from Kushinagar<br />

DISABILITY RIGHTS<br />

UN opens new chapter in<br />

the lives of disabled 25<br />

UN Convention on the Rights of Persons<br />

with Disabilities has come into force from<br />

May 3 with 20 countries ratifying it. India<br />

is also a signatory. This can signal fresh<br />

hope for the disabled. A report by<br />

<strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong> team<br />

LAW AND JUDGEMENT<br />

A voice of conscience 28<br />

A second postmortem in a custody death<br />

was first declined and then acceded by<br />

Delhi High Court and in between the two<br />

positions came judge’s conscience. a<br />

<strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong> report<br />

VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Incarcerated land and people 30<br />

Over half-a-million troops keep Kashmir captive.<br />

This has not only robbed people of<br />

their normal civilian space but also led to<br />

one of the worst stresses that any land or its<br />

people have come under, says award winning<br />

documentary filmmaker Sanjay Kak<br />

KASHMIR<br />

Orphaned souls cry for help 33<br />

Kashmir conflict has turned out to be an orphan factory,<br />

writes AR Hanjura<br />

Enforced disappearances 35<br />

More and more people go out of sight in the wake of<br />

enforced disappearances in Jammu & Kashmir. Their families<br />

want endlessly hoping against the hope, writes Mir Hafizullah<br />

A tale of anguish and courage 38<br />

Sixteen-year-long struggle by a lone woman with eight children<br />

to locate her husband after he was shoved into a police<br />

vehicle. Tanveen Kawoosa visits the extraordinary woman<br />

Impossibility of justice 39<br />

Legal remedies available to protect right to life are crippled by<br />

judicial indifference among other things, writes advocate<br />

Ashok Agrwaal<br />

2<br />

COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008


Contents:ContentsFINAL.qxd 8/1/2008 8:04 PM Page 3<br />

C O N T E N T S<br />

HEALING TOUCH<br />

VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Try out participatory justice 43<br />

Taking people into confidence and redress<br />

mechanism is the task in Kashmir’s case, writes<br />

Haly Duschinski from Ohio, USA<br />

FOUL ARREST<br />

Poor professor in tears as son rots in Tihar 53<br />

A case of victimisation of youth of minority community<br />

Subhash Gatade<br />

MILITARY VIEW<br />

Military might and human rights 55<br />

Forces have to be accountable for punishing the<br />

innocent along side those who took to guns,<br />

writes SuJata krishnamurthi<br />

Maimed, mauled by military-militia 46<br />

Besides being an issue or problem, Kashmir for<br />

locals is difficult to talk about as fear lurks through<br />

the air, writes Amrit Dhatt<br />

Captive state in a free subcontinent 48<br />

Kashmir’s status of a superior order under British<br />

rule could not last as it was soon caught amidst an<br />

India-Pakistan rivalry, writes Dr Abdul Majid Siraj<br />

Twenty-year-long night of<br />

long knives 57<br />

Former Army Chief<br />

General S Padmanabhan<br />

talks to Sujata<br />

Krishnamurthi in an exclusive<br />

interview about army’s<br />

role in Kashmir<br />

Growing up in a valley of fear 50<br />

The new generation of Kashmiris is growing up as a<br />

string of bad dreams chase them even after they<br />

leave and go far away from the home, writes<br />

Feroz Rather<br />

HURRIYAT VIEW<br />

Taking up arms a compulsion<br />

not choice: Geelani 63<br />

Leader of separatist movement Syed Ali Shah Geelani<br />

in conversation with Aaliya Anjum<br />

‘Dialogue instead of deadlock’: Mirwaiz<br />

Umar Farooq 68<br />

The young moderate among the separatist<br />

leaders talks to Amrit Dhatt<br />

www.combatlaw.org<br />

3


Contents:ContentsFINAL.qxd 8/1/2008 8:04 PM Page 4<br />

C O N T E N T S<br />

VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Amarnath row puts communalists back to business 71<br />

Not just chief minister but sanity has also bolted out from<br />

an already embattled zone that got another dose of hate<br />

with the move to hand over a piece of forest land to<br />

Amarnath Shrine Board, writes Praful Bidwai<br />

Inventing a controversy 74<br />

Sectarian positioning by politicos led to<br />

Amarnath controversy, writes Sant Kumar<br />

Sharma from Jammu<br />

International law and Kashmir 87<br />

Right to self-determination is a human right<br />

if viewed in the light of international law,<br />

writes Sheikh Showkat Hussain<br />

A religious rage or more 90<br />

Religion is important but not the only factor<br />

that motivates Kashmiris to a struggle for<br />

what they call as self-determination, writes<br />

Khalid Wasim Hassan<br />

Centuries subjugation kicks off a bitter struggle 76<br />

Chronology of alien rule since Mughal and Afghan days<br />

over Kashmir and its effects on mass psychology are traced<br />

by Farrukh Fahim<br />

Kashmir’s chance for peace 83<br />

Tired of the long trail of violence and bloodshed, the<br />

yearning for peace is too great among Kashmiris. So India<br />

and Pakistan should seize this opportunity,<br />

writes Sajid Iqbal<br />

Press trussed by draconian laws 94<br />

Fourth State face stringent laws, threats and<br />

censorship, yet the Press has been fighting<br />

this valiantly, writes Professor SM Afzal Qadri<br />

Disabled at the mercy of fate 96<br />

As number of disabled rise in embattled<br />

Kashmir, the state and civil society remain<br />

unmoved, writes Sajid Iqbal<br />

WORDS AND IMAGES<br />

Verses beat venom 98<br />

Literature has also been victim of the turmoil that traps Kashmir, driving a wedge among<br />

writers and their work. Yet there have been some sobering voices with universal appeal,<br />

writes Neerja Mattoo<br />

The forgotten voices 101<br />

Voices from valley’s women spin off a book Speaking peace. A review by Amrit Dhatt<br />

To know is to be 104<br />

A new book on RTI is a welcome addition, says review by Suresh Nautiyal<br />

Printed and published by Colin Gonsalves for Socio Legal Information Centre having its office at 576, Masjid Road, Jangpura,<br />

New Delhi 110014 Printed at Shivam Sundaram, E9, Green Park Extension, New Delhi, 110016<br />

Editor: Colin Gonsalves, E-mail: editor@combatlaw.org, combatlaw.editor@gmail.com<br />

Website: www.combatlaw.org<br />

4<br />

COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008


Contents:ContentsFINAL.qxd 8/1/2008 8:04 PM Page 5<br />

L E T T E R S<br />

Foul, frivolous,<br />

vicious arrests<br />

Dear All,<br />

I have been to Raipur twice recently.<br />

From June 24-26, I was there to<br />

express solidarity with the 10-day<br />

fast that Sandeep Pandey and three<br />

others had undertaken, demanding<br />

the release of Binayak Sen and Ajay<br />

TG and against the Chhattisgarh<br />

Public Security Act, 2005. On the last<br />

two days of the fast, a national seminar<br />

against State repression and<br />

repressive laws was organised by the<br />

Chhattisgarh PUCL, timing it with<br />

emergency day.<br />

In this period I also met Ajay TG<br />

in Durg Jail and also spent some time<br />

with his wife Shobha (also a film<br />

maker), their 20-month-old son<br />

called Aman and several cousins and<br />

friends of Ajay, including a couple of<br />

lawyers in Durg.<br />

The second time I went was during<br />

the second phase of Binayak's<br />

trial on July 2-3. On this occasion I<br />

also met Shobha and his lawyers.<br />

Both the visits, as usual were undertaken<br />

in solidarity with Chhattisgarh<br />

PUCL whose members are facing the<br />

ire of the State.<br />

June 25 was a Wednesday, the<br />

weekly day for visitors to Ajay so I<br />

accompanied Shobha to Durg jail.<br />

Shobha who had expected a face-toface<br />

meeting with Ajay and had<br />

hoped that their son would get an<br />

opportunity to hug the father was<br />

disappointed when we were all told<br />

that we could only talk to him<br />

through the window. Left with no<br />

choice all of us (including Ajay's<br />

cousins living in Bhilai) talked to him<br />

though the grilled and wire meshed<br />

window. Ajay had lost his younger<br />

brother Anura on June 19 in a tragic<br />

road accident in Kerala and was visibly<br />

upset. He was very keen to talk to<br />

me separately so we took a chance<br />

and I got the permission from the Jail<br />

authorities to meet him inside the<br />

jail. They would not allow Shobha<br />

but agreed to let Aman come into the<br />

Jailer's room, which was our meeting<br />

room. Those 30 minutes spent<br />

together by father and son were<br />

memorable. Ajay said that he was<br />

innocent and his arrest was part of<br />

the agenda to finish the PUCL.<br />

LETTER FROM PUCL<br />

It was shocking to learn from<br />

Ajay that although four remand<br />

hearings had happened, he had been<br />

produced before court only once. He<br />

was not taken on the date of the hearing<br />

under the pretext that there was<br />

not enough security to take a<br />

Naxalite prisoner out to a court and<br />

the times he was produced he was<br />

taken to the Babu (clerk) of the<br />

Magisterial Court and made to sign<br />

and brought back.<br />

Incidentally, on June 27 (after<br />

Shobha and I had brought this to the<br />

notice of all in the national convention)<br />

he was still taken to the Babu of<br />

the remand court where he was<br />

made to sign and brought back. After<br />

all, these hearings are supposed to be<br />

not merely an extension of judicial<br />

remand but also an opportunity to<br />

share any grievance that the detainee<br />

may have. This was also tried in the<br />

case of Binayak Sen, when he was<br />

prevented from reaching the Court<br />

on the same pretext until our protests<br />

and complaints with the Court, DG<br />

and the IG gave a message to the<br />

authorities.<br />

Whenever Ajay was taken to<br />

Court he was handcuffed. Since he<br />

was never produced in front of the<br />

Magistrate he was never able to point<br />

this out to court. Ordinarily the<br />

accused must not be handcuffed.<br />

This is a settled law through various<br />

judgements of the Supreme Court.<br />

Only when the Court is completely<br />

satisfied by the argument of the prosecution<br />

of the likelihood of the<br />

accused escaping from custody will<br />

the court will permit handcuffing.<br />

We raised this issue with the jail<br />

authorities and gave it in writing to<br />

the DGP on the July 2 and 3 when<br />

Shobha and I met the DGP. He has<br />

assured that he would look into it.<br />

Ajay also has no access to books. He<br />

did apply for it in court but he was<br />

refused. Shobha has not been<br />

allowed to give books. This was<br />

another request that we made to the<br />

jail authorities. He is only allowed to<br />

read one of the local newspapers.<br />

Apart from Binayak Sen, Piyush<br />

Guha, and Ajay TG, there are several<br />

others who are languishing in the<br />

various jails of the state. There are<br />

journalists like Sai Reddy and several<br />

of the 53 who were booked under<br />

the CPSA, 2005, a few lucky ones<br />

having got bail. We know how officials<br />

of the state threaten to book all<br />

those who expose the truth about<br />

Salwa Judum or if they support those<br />

who are exposing it. There is this<br />

constant fear that your phone might<br />

be tapped, your emails hacked.<br />

People are trying to keep the right<br />

distance so as not to appear as easy<br />

suspects.<br />

Kavita Srivastava<br />

General Secretary,<br />

People's Union for Civil Liberties<br />

(PUCL), Rajasthan<br />

— This letter was sent in public<br />

interest to many groups and individuals,<br />

including editor, <strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong><br />

www.combatlaw.org 5


1 general:general.qxd 8/1/2008 8:03 PM Page 6<br />

GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT<br />

Development challenges<br />

in Naxal-affected areas<br />

Forty years of crackdown against Naxals could not stop them from spreading their<br />

influence to rural pockets afflicted by extreme poverty and blatant discrimination against<br />

poor, says an expert body appointed by government in its report to the planning<br />

commission while suggesting a strong dose of development and other measures to<br />

overcome the crisis. The member-secretary of the expert group and commission’s senior<br />

adviser on rural development Santosh Mehrotra sums up the report and its<br />

recommendations<br />

This short note summarises the<br />

analysis and recommendations<br />

of the Expert Group’s report to<br />

the Planning Commission. In Section<br />

I it asks the questions: What are the<br />

underlying factors and context for<br />

the support for Naxals? Why has a<br />

dead movement risen again, and<br />

why is it spreading rapidly (71 districts<br />

in 2001 to 212 now)? The<br />

Section 2 goes on to examine the<br />

proximate and specific causes of discontent<br />

in Naxal affected districts,<br />

and discusses in each case the relevant<br />

recommendations of the Expert<br />

Group.<br />

Factors behind Naxalism<br />

There are as many as 300 million<br />

poor in India (2004/5) – 80 percent<br />

are Scheduled Castes, Scheduled<br />

Tribes or belonging to Other<br />

Backward Castes (OBCs). Naxal districts<br />

are concentrated in Bihar, MP,<br />

UP, West Bengal and Orissa – which<br />

are characterisd by high rural poverty<br />

and high proportion of SC and ST<br />

population. As much as 70 percent of<br />

India’s SC poor are in these five<br />

states – but they have only 59 percent<br />

of SC population. Also, 63 percent of<br />

India’s ST poor are in these five states<br />

– but they are only 49 percent of<br />

India’s ST population.<br />

6<br />

COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008


1 general:general.qxd 8/1/2008 8:03 PM Page 7<br />

GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT<br />

But other states too have Dalits<br />

and Adivasis; in other words, the<br />

concentration of Dalits and Adivasis<br />

in a state may be an important condition<br />

for Naxal influence, but that is<br />

not a sufficient condition. Thus, there<br />

are many districts with high proportions<br />

of Adivasis or Dalits but little<br />

Naxalite activity, e.g. in Punjab,<br />

Haryana, Gujarat, Rajasthan and<br />

Madhya Pradesh. Poverty among<br />

Dalits and Adivasis are a factor but<br />

other factors like denial of justice and<br />

human dignity also cause alienation<br />

resulting in the conviction that relief<br />

can be had outside the system by<br />

breaking the current order asunder.<br />

The Expert Group’s Report examines<br />

the sources of denial of justice in<br />

Naxal-affected districts.<br />

There was a combination of<br />

other factors alongwith the overwhelming<br />

presence of Dalits and<br />

Adivasis. Thus,<br />

Naxal-affected districts mostly<br />

belong to zamindari system of<br />

land ownership – exploitation of<br />

peasantry was intense (which<br />

especially affected Dalits);<br />

Naxal-affected districts more<br />

mineral-rich – hence there has<br />

<br />

been a struggle over minerals;<br />

Naxal-affected districts are<br />

also highly forested – with<br />

affected districts in relevant<br />

states more so.<br />

In other words, the causes of<br />

extremism are complex and not<br />

reducible to simple solutions. In fact,<br />

dissent movements, including the<br />

extremist Naxalite movement, are<br />

not confined to difficult hilly and<br />

forested areas but cover large contiguous<br />

tracts in the plains. They are<br />

not limited to dryland areas of recurring<br />

crop failures but extend to irrigated<br />

commands of major irrigation<br />

systems, as in the state of Bihar.<br />

Hence, land rights issues are crucial,<br />

for instance in large areas, inhabited<br />

by Bhils and some other tribals<br />

where the situation is seemingly<br />

peaceful may face this problem with<br />

spread of awareness and consciousness.<br />

The conclusion of the report,<br />

therefore, is that the causes are complex,<br />

and not reducible to simple<br />

development interventions (e.g.<br />

www.combatlaw.org<br />

In fact, dissent movements, including the extremist<br />

Naxalite movement, are not confined to difficult<br />

hilly and forested areas but cover large contiguous<br />

tracts in the plains. They are not limited to dryland<br />

areas of recurring crop failures but extend to<br />

irrigated commands of major irrigation systems, as<br />

in the state of Bihar<br />

build infrastructure in affected districts).<br />

The Report warns that the government<br />

needs to guard against<br />

another perception:<br />

“The more recent development is<br />

in the emergence of CPI (Maoist)<br />

after the merger and consolidation of<br />

two powerful Naxalite streams in<br />

September, 2004. This new formation,<br />

since its inception, is defining<br />

the official understanding of the<br />

extremist phenomenon of the level of<br />

the state as well as the Union<br />

Government. This has appeared in<br />

the public perception as a simplistic<br />

law-and-order face-off between the<br />

official coercive machinery and this<br />

more radical extremist political formation.<br />

This results, then, in undermining<br />

instruments of social and<br />

economic amelioration as well as<br />

processes of democratic exchange to<br />

resolve persisting issues. This is the<br />

crux of the problem.” Hence, the<br />

suggestion for talks of Expert Group<br />

should not be interpreted as merely<br />

talking to CPI (Maoist) alone.<br />

The government has already<br />

taken some good actions recently.<br />

Thus,<br />

Not all blocks of ‘affected districts’<br />

are actually Naxal-infested:<br />

so identification of 33 core districts<br />

is move in right direction,<br />

and it would be appropriate to<br />

“walk on two strong legs together”<br />

in core districts.<br />

Secondly, government has also<br />

taken some good recent actions in<br />

respect of forest rights (Forest Act<br />

2008), Displacement (R&R<br />

Policy), Livelihoods (NREGA),<br />

BRGF (all Naxal districts are<br />

included).<br />

Causes of discontent<br />

The dispossessed forest-dwelling<br />

STs are a major source of support for<br />

the Naxal Movement. Forest<br />

dwellers were dispossessed by the<br />

state’s declaration of “reserve<br />

forests”, without recognising rights<br />

of pre-existing communities. The<br />

main culprit in this regard was the<br />

Forest Conservation Act 1980; prior<br />

to1980, the dispossessed were usually<br />

regularised; but this process was<br />

stopped post-1980 – and in the discontent<br />

that set in as a result, the<br />

Naxal movement stepped in. Since<br />

then ‘forest conservation’ became a<br />

strange companion to industrial<br />

forestry: conservation restricts<br />

Adivasis rights, but industrial needs<br />

are accommodated. Joint Forest<br />

Management (JFM) was seen as a<br />

remedy for this situation. But JFM<br />

merely institutionalised this state of<br />

affairs. Hence there arose the need<br />

for the ST and Other Forest Dwellers<br />

(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 1<br />

Jan 2008.<br />

Expert Group’s (EG) recommendation:<br />

Address conflicts due to forest<br />

dwellers’ rights:<br />

Reports so far of Forest Rights<br />

Act implementation don’t inspire<br />

confidence; urgent action is needed<br />

to improve the institutional<br />

machinery to implement the Act.<br />

Requirement of proof of occupation<br />

(of forest land, as required<br />

under the Forest Rights Act 2008)<br />

as on 13 Dec 2005 should be dealt<br />

with imaginatively<br />

7


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GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT<br />

The focus of the Naxal movement has been<br />

on “land to the tiller”, which is the same<br />

slogan as freedom fighters: trying to provide<br />

land of landlords or government to landless.<br />

But successive State and Central<br />

governments have failed to distribute even<br />

ceiling surplus or Bhoodan land<br />

Action: Ministry of Environment<br />

and Forests and state governments<br />

Land and Naxal movement<br />

The focus of the Naxal movement<br />

has been on “land to the tiller”,<br />

which is the same slogan as freedom<br />

fighters: trying to provide land of<br />

landlords or government to landless.<br />

But successive State and Central governments<br />

have failed to distribute<br />

even ceiling surplus or Bhoodan<br />

land.<br />

The Naxal movement targets<br />

landholders with “sizeable” holdings<br />

or oppressive in conduct (even<br />

if not big) – while normally the<br />

police intervenes on behalf of landlords.<br />

Three kinds of situations have<br />

arisen in this context:<br />

Private land: In Andhra Pradesh,<br />

landlords are willing that state government<br />

assign land to poor identified<br />

by Naxal movement, but government<br />

has resisted taking such<br />

action as it would ‘sanctify violence’.<br />

The result is that thousands of acres<br />

are lying fallow in Warangal,<br />

Karimnagar, Adilabad, while numbers<br />

of landless poor grow.<br />

In Bihar, a rather different situation<br />

prevails. In Bihar, the Naxal<br />

movement evicted landlords, in contrast<br />

to that in Andhra Pradesh, the<br />

landlords are prepared to reoccupy<br />

land, so efforts of Naxal movement<br />

to redistribute land failed – thus<br />

inviting police violence, giving further<br />

impetus to the Naxal movement.<br />

Government land: Naxal movement<br />

has assisted landless Musahars<br />

to take possession of land in Bihar;<br />

the government, however, feels giving<br />

them conditional access would<br />

sanctify law-breaking – exacerbating<br />

conflict.<br />

Forest land: There has been occupation<br />

by Adivasis on extensive scale<br />

in AP, Chhatisgarh, Vidarbha,<br />

Orissa, and Jharkhand – not fresh<br />

occupation, just reassertion of traditional<br />

usufruct with Naxalites’ support,<br />

but this has brought them into<br />

conflict with Forest Department.<br />

EG Recommendation: Land<br />

related:<br />

Land Tribunals or Fast Track<br />

Courts (Art 323B of Constitution)<br />

should be set up for quick disposal<br />

of land ceiling cases; landowners<br />

have had decades to create<br />

false documents, no cut off date<br />

for reopening old cases should be<br />

set.<br />

Tenancy increasing: 40 percent of<br />

land is cultivated by tenants, who<br />

do not have access to institutional<br />

credit. Tenancy laws have failed<br />

to protect tenant interests (except<br />

in Kerala, West Bengal,<br />

Maharashtra). All tenancies<br />

should be recorded.<br />

Ceiling, Bhoodan, government<br />

land assigned to landless has not<br />

delivered; criminal cases should<br />

be filed against those who dispossess<br />

land that has been handed<br />

over to landless; all eligible occupants<br />

of government land should<br />

be regularised.<br />

<strong>Law</strong>s prohibiting transfer of<br />

Adivasi land to non-Adivasis suffer<br />

from many loopholes, besides<br />

tardy implementation. The loopholes<br />

are documented – but laws<br />

survive unamended.<br />

States with Adivasi population<br />

and not included in fifth<br />

Schedule should enact laws for<br />

protection of Adivasis in same<br />

manner as in fifth Schedule.<br />

ACTION: Department of Land<br />

Resources (Ministry of Rural<br />

Development) and State Governments<br />

EG recommendation: GOI should<br />

address Common Property<br />

Resources (CPRs). Fisherfolk, graziers,<br />

honey gatherers had customary<br />

rights over Common Property<br />

Resources; such rights have been<br />

eroded over a period of time, and<br />

should be statutorily protected and<br />

recorded, and user Pattas issued<br />

jointly for husband-wife. The Naxal<br />

movement has tried to ensure protection<br />

of CPR rights of cattleherders,<br />

fisherfolk, toddy tappers<br />

where these resources were appropriated<br />

by dominant groups.<br />

Currently, there is no legislative protection<br />

of traditional rights. Hence,<br />

Planning Commission should<br />

devise a programme for restoration<br />

of CPRs for sustenance of<br />

<br />

<br />

poorest groups<br />

Gram Panchayats (GPs) should<br />

be empowered for management<br />

of CPRs, with requisite autonomy,<br />

legal backing, and resources.<br />

CPR model legislation on CPR<br />

management should be prepared<br />

by the Central government – to<br />

be suitably adapted by States for<br />

their purpose.<br />

Naxals response to displaced<br />

As many as 60 million people<br />

have been displaced (1947-2004) –<br />

this is an unofficial estimate (based<br />

on solid research state-by-state).<br />

Adivasis and landless most affected<br />

– why? Of 25 million hectare of land<br />

acquired for projects, 7 million (28<br />

percent) forestland, and 6 million<br />

hectare (24 percent) is CPR. Further,<br />

Orissa, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh<br />

are rich in minerals – mining projects<br />

have threatened Adivasi existence,<br />

and with further impetus to mining<br />

due to growing demand from a fastgrowing<br />

economy, there is a risk of<br />

further legal and illegal mining<br />

occurring, without any concern for<br />

the displaced.<br />

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GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT<br />

Governments both Centre and<br />

states have had no serious<br />

Rehabilitation and Resettlement policy<br />

for 60 years. Since the administration<br />

provided little succour, Naxalite<br />

movement stepped into. One problem<br />

is that internally displaced forest-dwellers<br />

tend to settle down<br />

again in some forest region, which is<br />

prohibited by law – the Naxal movements<br />

assist, inviting the wrath of<br />

state.<br />

Another problem is that there is a<br />

Presidential Order (under Art 342),<br />

which declares the list of STs Statewise.<br />

However, the problem is that a<br />

tribe that migrates involuntarily<br />

from one state to another is not<br />

recognised as ST in new state – so<br />

there is no protection from state, but<br />

receives Naxal protection. When<br />

Orissa’s ST shifted to forests near<br />

Vishakhapatnam, the Andhra government<br />

targeted it for eviction.<br />

When Naxalites intervened, they<br />

were harassed. Similarly, landless<br />

Gothi Koya tribes of Chattisgarh<br />

crossed to AP (Khammam), with<br />

Naxal support – so AP forest and<br />

police departments cracked down on<br />

them. Also, Bihar caste Senas (e.g.<br />

Ranbir Sena) drove Dalits away.<br />

They received Naxal support on the<br />

one hand and police lathis on the<br />

other.<br />

EG Recommendation: Rehabilitation<br />

of displaced. A new R&R<br />

Policy has been notified by the<br />

Government of India, which is good,<br />

but there is now need to pass the<br />

R&R Act in Parliament. States can<br />

ignore GOI Policy on R&R, but not<br />

an Act on R&R. Already our R&R<br />

policy is 60 year old -- India’s R & R<br />

record is far worse by BRIC standards.<br />

Extend Panchayati Raj to SAs<br />

Tribals in India have been historically<br />

self-governing – which brings<br />

them in conflict with the formal state<br />

system. The regulatory and developmental<br />

role of the state post-1947 led<br />

to erosion of authority of traditional<br />

system -- traditional system is now<br />

strongest among Ho (Jharkand);<br />

weak among Santhals and Mundas;<br />

and very weak among Oraons. Selfgovernance<br />

meant management of<br />

natural resources, general economic<br />

matters, use of intoxicants – had<br />

been appropriated by formal system<br />

over 1947-1995. PESA enacted in<br />

1996 was meant to change this erosion.<br />

How? Distinctive feature of<br />

governance at village level in PESA is<br />

creation of space in legal frame for<br />

functioning system of self-governance<br />

of tribal people. All laws relating<br />

to panchayats inconsistent with<br />

PESA ‘are deemed to have lapsed on<br />

December 23, 1997’.<br />

But PESA remains unimplemented.<br />

There is hardly any realisation in<br />

the Union Government that implementation<br />

of PESA has to be a collaborative<br />

effort of almost all Central<br />

ministries. Only two ministries<br />

issued guidelines to States in 1997:<br />

Ministry of Rural Development on<br />

role of Gram Sabhas in land acquisition;<br />

and the role of Gram Sabhas<br />

before granting of leases for minor<br />

minerals by Ministry of Mines. But<br />

there is “…total silence ever since<br />

about the holistic frame of PESA in<br />

the entire government establishment”.<br />

PESA casts direct responsibility<br />

on state legislatures, but being a<br />

central legislation and logical extension<br />

of fifth Schedule, it is duty of<br />

Central Government to see that it is<br />

implemented. Many central laws<br />

need harmonisation with aims of<br />

PESA: Land Acquisition Act 1894;<br />

Mines and Minerals (Development &<br />

Regulation) Act, 1957; Forest Act,<br />

1927, Forest Conservation Act 1980.<br />

Also, national policies: R&R Policy<br />

2007, National Water Policy 2002,<br />

National Minerals Policy 2008,<br />

National Forest Policy 2004 – should<br />

be examined for ensuring compliance<br />

with PESA provisions.<br />

Further, the Indian Constitution<br />

fifth Schedule Article 5 states: (1)<br />

“Notwithstanding anything in the<br />

Constitution, the Governor may by<br />

public notification direct that any<br />

particular Act of Parliament or of the<br />

Legislature of the State shall not<br />

apply to a SA or any part thereof in<br />

the State…” In other words, it is<br />

actually possible for the Governor to<br />

eliminate the inconsistency between<br />

existing laws and PESA.<br />

Given that tribal lands are rich in<br />

minerals, the Expert Group recommends<br />

that mineral rules should be<br />

amended transferring all quarries<br />

with annual leases with annual lease<br />

www.combatlaw.org<br />

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GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT<br />

value upto Rs 10 lakhs to Gram<br />

Sahbas and GPs – to cover all minor<br />

minerals.<br />

In addition, the National<br />

Minerals Policy states that exploration<br />

should be carried out in a way<br />

non-intrusive of rights of tribals<br />

under fifth Schedule, and causes<br />

least disturbance to ecology. In any<br />

case, the Supreme Court Samata<br />

judgment (1996) states that tribal<br />

communities through their GSs,<br />

should be fully involved in any decision<br />

to be taken on mining in their<br />

area.<br />

The Expert group concludes:<br />

“Tribes are not opposed to development.<br />

All that they want is to control<br />

its pace and influence, its pattern and<br />

direction so that they are enabled to<br />

prevent its damaging effects and<br />

enjoy some of its benefits. The autonomy<br />

and control over natural<br />

resources which tribal communities<br />

seek is consistent with national<br />

development”.<br />

Finally, the Expert Group expects<br />

the central Ministry of Panchayati<br />

Raj to take the initiative with regard<br />

to PESA. The Ministry has analysed<br />

state laws, and is persuading state<br />

government to implement PESA.<br />

Given that tribal lands<br />

are rich in minerals,<br />

the Expert Group<br />

recommends that<br />

mineral rules should<br />

be amended<br />

transferring all<br />

quarries with annual<br />

leases with annual<br />

lease value upto Rs 10<br />

lakhs to Gram Sahbas<br />

and GPs – to cover all<br />

minor minerals<br />

MOPR should now finalise and issue<br />

guidelines for PESA, suggest Statespecific<br />

guidelines. If any state is not<br />

implementing PESA, GOI should use<br />

its powers to issue directions (Part A<br />

of fifth Schedule) -- implementation<br />

of PESA gives rightful role of governance<br />

to GS and through it to GP –<br />

“it would douse the embers of discontent<br />

and disaffection among the<br />

tribals in the Schedule Areas”.<br />

Economic measures<br />

Forest produce: Naxal movemnet<br />

derives support from rate increases it<br />

secured for picking of tendu (bidi)<br />

leaves in forest areas of AP,<br />

Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Maharashtra,<br />

Jharkhand, which had been major<br />

source of exploitation of Adivasi<br />

labour. Government ignored it, but<br />

the Naxals put an end to it.<br />

EG recommends: forest produce<br />

should be provided a fixed<br />

Minimum Support Price for various<br />

commodities, and asks for<br />

up-gradation of traditional<br />

Adivasi haats.<br />

Action: Ministry of Tribal Affairs<br />

Basic services in tribal belts<br />

Health, schooling, electricity<br />

infrastructure is abysmal in Naxalaffected<br />

districts – a gap Naxal<br />

movement is unable to fill.<br />

In the forested districts,<br />

Electricity is possible to provide<br />

through distributed (initially offgrid,<br />

but grid-connectable in<br />

future) generation using forest<br />

biomass-based gasifiers to generate<br />

electricity for rural households,<br />

and in fact the tribal areas<br />

ideal for the widespread use of<br />

this technology, since wood, a<br />

renewable resource, is plentifully<br />

available. Rajiv Gandhi Grameen<br />

Vidyutikaran Yojana, a Centrally<br />

sponsored scheme which is part<br />

of Bharat Nirman, however,<br />

builds poles and lays lines to BPL<br />

houses – without actual supply of<br />

electricity; hence, poles and wires<br />

both get stolen.<br />

ACTION: MNRE and NTPC<br />

should take action to provide<br />

biomass based gasifiers so that<br />

electricity can be provided at low<br />

cost to poor tribal households in<br />

rural areas.<br />

There is need to provide social<br />

infrastructure in Naxal-affected districts<br />

as per national norms within<br />

11th Plan. Much of Naxal-affected<br />

area has hilly terrain and tribal population<br />

– failure to provide social<br />

infrastructure as per national norms<br />

is a manifestation of discriminatory<br />

of governance.<br />

The Expert Group recommends:<br />

Schooling: fill sanctioned teacher<br />

posts; in Jharkhand the pupilteacher<br />

ratio was 80, still 49:<br />

<br />

Action: MHRD<br />

Health facilities: provide as per<br />

national NRHM norms; use special<br />

allowances to fill para-medic<br />

posts at least, also ASHAs.<br />

Action: Ministry of Health<br />

Nutrition: Anganwadis on<br />

demand for SC/ST hamlets.<br />

Action: Ministry of Women and<br />

child Development<br />

<br />

The Expert group<br />

concludes: “Tribes are<br />

not opposed to<br />

development. All that<br />

they want is to control<br />

its pace and influence,<br />

its pattern and<br />

direction so that they<br />

are enabled to prevent<br />

its damaging effects<br />

and enjoy some of its<br />

benefits<br />

Discontinue commercial vending<br />

of liquor and institutionalised<br />

control of GS over preparation of<br />

traditional drinks<br />

The Expert Group also recommends<br />

talks with the Naxal movement.<br />

The Expert Group asks: why<br />

there is a ban on talks with Naxal<br />

movement? It points to many inconsistencies:<br />

why are there peace talks<br />

with Nagas (NSCN, IM) faction for<br />

10 yrs, even though rebels have not<br />

10<br />

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GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT<br />

surrendered arms, in fact built up<br />

arsenal, and established a parallel<br />

government. Why are there peace<br />

talks with ULFA – but no insistence<br />

ULFA surrender weapons? Similarly,<br />

in J&K – there is repeated willingness<br />

to talk with any armed group<br />

prepared to come to negotiating<br />

table?<br />

We need to reflect on the irony of<br />

Maoism in Nepal. Like Indian<br />

Maoists, they too were fighting a<br />

bush war for many years, but after<br />

two years of negotiations (2003-<br />

2005), they joined the government,<br />

and participated in elections, and are<br />

now in the process of being mainstreamed.<br />

Recommendation: Door of negotiations<br />

should be kept open with the<br />

Naxals.<br />

Governance<br />

The report cites many striking<br />

examples of poor governance, but<br />

the one related to forest administration<br />

is particularly telling: “The<br />

uncertain existence of Adivasis in the<br />

forests has resulted in tremendous<br />

power of harassment in the hands of<br />

forest department personnel. It is<br />

permissible to pick edible forest produce<br />

but not to undertake cultivation<br />

of the same produce in the forests. It<br />

is permissible to gather dry twigs<br />

and logs of uprooted trees but not to<br />

cut standing timber. It is permissible<br />

to graze cattle in the forests, but it<br />

should be ensured that the cattle do<br />

not nibble at the nurseries of the forest<br />

department…Quite apart from<br />

the injustice of the restrictions, the<br />

dividing line between what can be<br />

done and what cannot is often so<br />

slight that there is considerable<br />

ground for arbitrary action by the<br />

enforcer of restrictions. Wherever<br />

there is a basis for discretion on the<br />

part of government officials, forest<br />

personnel have had to be appeased<br />

to avoid harassment. It was only<br />

after Naxalites entered the picture<br />

that the Adivasis got protection from<br />

harassment”.<br />

“…But after the initial impact on<br />

extortionate practices of the forest<br />

department, the Naxalite movement’s<br />

impact on official corruption<br />

has been slight. The level of corrup-<br />

www.combatlaw.org<br />

tion in the Naxal areas is not noticeably<br />

less than elsewhere…Cooption<br />

of some elements of Naxalite movement<br />

into the corrupt system is a<br />

fact” (p.53)<br />

Recommendation<br />

Writ of the Indian bureaucracy<br />

does not run in at least 95 affected<br />

districts, though does run to a limited<br />

extent in another 137 districts that<br />

are ‘influenced’ by Naxalite movement<br />

– hence, the Expert Group recommends:<br />

Long term objective should be to<br />

make non-accessible bureaucracy<br />

accountable to 3-tier panchayat<br />

system, with level-to-level correspondence<br />

with current administrative<br />

structure<br />

PESA empowers GPs in fifth<br />

Scheduled areas with control<br />

over local plans and resources for<br />

such plans, including the Tribal<br />

Sub-Plan<br />

But District Planning Committees<br />

(under Art 243 ZD) not yet acti-<br />

<br />

Planning Commission is preparing a matrix with<br />

details of Actions Needed Ministry-wise – to be<br />

shared shortly with Task Force Members of the<br />

Ministry of Home Affairs Task Force on Left Wing<br />

Extremism and Ministries<br />

vated in line with PESA.<br />

Preferably 40 percent of State<br />

Plan money should go to district<br />

plans<br />

There is no judicial mechanism in<br />

rural areas to resolve day-to-day<br />

conflicts. The Naxals filled a gap in<br />

resolution of disputes – their justice<br />

too rough and ready. The current<br />

alternative is a judicial system that is<br />

too expensive, dilatory, and complicated<br />

for rural poor – barely 20 percent<br />

of population is able to access it.<br />

SC/STs get involved in the system as<br />

accused and defendants rather than<br />

as seekers of their rights. What is<br />

needed is a simple, inexpensive system,<br />

responsive to needs of poor. A<br />

Nyaya Panchayat <strong>Law</strong> should be<br />

enacted by Centre with enabling provisions<br />

for States to adopt.<br />

Recommendation: 5th/6th Scheduled<br />

Areas GS should act as Nyaya<br />

Panchayat in matters relating to customary<br />

law.<br />

Another area in governance the<br />

Report discusses is that seven<br />

Commissions for disadvantaged<br />

groups exist in India – but there is little<br />

to show for it. The seven<br />

Commissions are for SCs, for STs, for<br />

Minorities, for Women, for Children,<br />

for Safai karmcharis, Tribes Advisory<br />

Council, for Human Rights – plus<br />

counterpart commissions in States.<br />

Unfortunately, they are all toothless,<br />

with no enforcement mechanism,<br />

even Parliament ignores them.<br />

Recommendation: We need a<br />

Rights Commission with appropriate<br />

divisions, with legal power to<br />

enforce its decisions. Anyone<br />

aggrieved with its decisions can go<br />

to Supreme Court -- Legal implications<br />

of proposal should be examined<br />

by <strong>Law</strong> Ministry. A further recommendation<br />

is that implementation<br />

of Protective Legislation must be<br />

ensured, in particular the Protection<br />

of Civil Rights Act, and the SCs and<br />

STs (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.<br />

ACTION: State police forces and<br />

Central Forces, and the judiciary.<br />

Next Steps<br />

Planning Commission is preparing<br />

a matrix with details of<br />

Actions Needed Ministry-wise –<br />

to be shared shortly with Task<br />

Force Members of the Ministry of<br />

Home Affairs Task Force on Left<br />

Wing Extremism and Ministries.<br />

Matrix will enable Monitoring of<br />

actions needed to stem the rising<br />

tide of the Naxal movement.<br />

– The full report is available at<br />

www.planningcommission.nic.in<br />

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GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT<br />

Deprivation turns people to<br />

Naxalism, says Government report<br />

A government appointed committee under the aegis of Planning Commission goes into<br />

factors that have made Naxalism popular into some rural pockets spread across a dozen<br />

states and finds that abysmal poverty, near destitution, absence of a creditable legal<br />

redress mechanism, blatant caste discrimination, and misplaced policing fuel radical<br />

politics. The committee that had former police and intelligence bosses like Prakash Singh<br />

and Ajit Doval besides bureaucrat-turned-activist Dr BD Sharma and Sukhdeo Thorat<br />

also avers that Naxalite movement essentially remains a political dissent rather than a<br />

mere law and order issue and so it should be approached through unconditional<br />

negotiations rather than use of force. Exclusive excerpts from the report ‘Development<br />

Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas’ follow<br />

Poverty, inequality breed radicalism<br />

Widespread discontent among the people has plagued<br />

the Indian polity for sometime now. It has often led to<br />

unrest, sometimes of a violent nature. Over the years,<br />

statutory enactments and institutional mechanisms for<br />

addressing the various aspects of deprivation have been<br />

brought into being. But the experience has been that the<br />

discontent and unrest continue to surface notwithstanding<br />

such measures. For a large section of the population,<br />

basic survival is the problem.<br />

…India is today proudly proclaiming an above nine<br />

percent growth rate and striving to achieve double-digit<br />

growth. But it is a matter of common observation that the<br />

inequalities between classes, between town and country,<br />

and between the upper castes and the under-privileged<br />

communities are increasing.<br />

...The Constitutional and statutory agencies entrusted<br />

with the task of safeguarding the entitlements of all<br />

marginalised groups have failed to provide adequate<br />

support.<br />

…In this situation it should not cause surprise that a<br />

large section of the people are angry and feel alienated<br />

from the polity. It is in this context that it has become necessary<br />

to identify the variety of causes of discontent and<br />

to seek ways by which the State could answer them in a<br />

humane, caring and democratic way. If the emphasis of this<br />

exploration is on the Naxalite phenomenon it is not because<br />

other modes and forms of agitation are less important but only<br />

because the method of struggle chosen by the Naxalites has<br />

brought the problem to a head. Radical groups seek the justification<br />

for their methods of violence from structural violence,<br />

which is implicit in the social and economic system.<br />

Unfortunately the underlying and foundational causes<br />

leading to unrest, discontent and extremism have<br />

never been seriously studied or have been the subject<br />

matter of administrative or academic discourses in<br />

India…<br />

...The core of the report comprises the reasons for the<br />

unrest that is associated with the Naxalite movement, and<br />

recommendations for how the Government may itself<br />

respond to these issues…<br />

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Though formulated in general terms, the issue placed<br />

before the group is essentially the causes for the discontent<br />

among the people that has led to the rise and spread<br />

of the Naxalite movement. The Naxalite movement is<br />

almost four decades old now. Beginning in a single State<br />

(West Bengal), it has now spread over a wide area, affecting<br />

and influencing the lives of lakhs of people. The government<br />

has estimated that the movement is now active<br />

in about 125 districts spread over 12 states.<br />

As mentioned earlier there were three central government<br />

committees which looked into the causes of naxalite<br />

movement spreading in the country. Civil Rights groups<br />

have also published a number of reports dealing with the<br />

causes of disaffection with the government leading to<br />

popularity of the Naxalite movement. The Press has also<br />

carried many reports, and books have been written by<br />

various observers. Naxalite publications have also highlighted<br />

the social and economic background to the rise of<br />

the movement...<br />

State anti-tribal and anti-Dalit<br />

The main support for the Naxalite movement comes<br />

from dalits and adivasis. It is thus useful to begin this<br />

chapter with a brief look at the condition of these social<br />

categories.<br />

Dalits and adivasis comprise about one-fourth of<br />

India’s population: Dalits constitute 16 percent and<br />

Adivasis eight percent. Most of them (80 percent of Dalits<br />

and 92 percent of Adivasis) live in rural areas...<br />

Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and<br />

West Bengal are the states with highest rural poverty and<br />

they also account for a high proportion of SC and ST poor.<br />

Seventy percent of the SC poor are in these five states,<br />

whereas only 55.8 percent of the SC population of the<br />

country is in these five states. And 63 percent of the ST<br />

poor are in these five States whereas the proportion of the<br />

country’s ST population in these States is only 49 percent.<br />

In addition, they suffer from multi faceted oppression<br />

and denial of justice, social legal and political rights.<br />

Examination of the respective shares of SCs and STs in<br />

the total population of different districts (from Census<br />

data) indicates that districts with a high proportion of<br />

Dalits are mainly in the northern states as well as in pockets<br />

of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. While<br />

there is no simple correspondence between the areas<br />

under Naxalite influence and the proportion of Dalits and<br />

Adivasis in the population, it is the case that these areas<br />

generally have relatively high Dalit or Adivasi concentration...<br />

…Poverty does create deprivation but other factors<br />

like denial of justice, human dignity, cause alienation<br />

resulting in the conviction that relief can be had outside<br />

the system by breaking the current order asunder. Other<br />

factors are also likely to be involved. For example in large<br />

areas, inhabited by bhils and some other tribals where the<br />

situation is seemingly peaceful may face this problem<br />

with spread of awareness and consciousness.<br />

www.combatlaw.org<br />

Dalits continue to face wide-ranging economic, social<br />

disadvantages, and day-to-day humiliation and degradation,<br />

denial of justice and violent atrocities in India. By<br />

and large the Dalit condition is marked by high incidence of<br />

poverty, low education, limited employment opportunities and<br />

marginalisation in all spheres of public life. These deprivations<br />

are compounded by diverse types of violence that they are subject<br />

to as shown in the section on atrocities…<br />

…most Dalits live in rural areas. The incidence of<br />

landlessness is higher among the SCs than among the<br />

others. Ten percent of SC households are landless and<br />

another 77 percent are near-landless… Nearly half (45.6<br />

percent) of SCs are agricultural labourers. …These facts<br />

indicate that the persistently high poverty of SC households<br />

is closely associated with low levels of ownership of capital<br />

assets like land, low levels of education and considerably lower<br />

diversification of avenues of employment.<br />

The right to vote is an important political right which<br />

has added to the empowerment of the Dalits as well as<br />

added to their status. However, Dalits have often had to<br />

struggle in order to assert this right and struggle again to<br />

demand accountability from the elected representatives…<br />

By and large the Dalit condition is<br />

marked by high incidence of poverty,<br />

low education, limited employment<br />

opportunities and marginalisation in<br />

all spheres of public life. These<br />

deprivations are compounded by<br />

diverse types of violence that they are<br />

subject to as shown in the section on<br />

atrocities…<br />

Dalits continue to face many kinds of social discrimination,<br />

related for instance to residence, food, clothing,<br />

marriage and employment. Even untouchability, the most<br />

blatant form of social discrimination against Dalits, persists<br />

in many forms. A recent study of untouchability in<br />

565 villages in 11 states identified no less than 63 types of<br />

untouchability practiced in many villages of the country. 1<br />

There are 84.3 million tribal people (also known as<br />

Scheduled Tribes) in India according to the census of<br />

2001. They are present in all the States except Punjab,<br />

Haryana, Delhi and the Union Territories of Pondicherry<br />

and Chandigarh, and are located mostly in hilly and forest<br />

areas…<br />

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In the seventies, a serious attempt to focus on the tribal<br />

population in the planning process was made in the<br />

form of a Tribal Sub Plan strategy. The process of bringing<br />

all tribal majority areas under the Fifth Schedule of the<br />

Constitution was also taken up.<br />

…Despite the plethora of development plans, programmes<br />

and activities initiated in the tribal areas, the<br />

majority of Scheduled Tribes still live in conditions of<br />

serious deprivation and poverty. The tribal people have<br />

remained backward in all aspects of human development<br />

including education, health, nutrition etc. Apart from<br />

socio-economic deprivation, there has been a steady erosion<br />

of traditional tribal rights and their command over<br />

resources.<br />

Unrest and discontent are not new to<br />

tribal areas, nor is it just a postindependence<br />

phenomenon. The<br />

earliest uprisings against the British,<br />

in the closing decades of the 18th<br />

century, were triggered by colonial<br />

expansion into the forests…<br />

Unrest and discontent are not new to tribal areas, nor is it<br />

just a post-independence phenomenon. The earliest uprisings<br />

against the British, in the closing decades of the 18th century,<br />

were triggered by colonial expansion into the forests…<br />

In general, the contradiction between the tribal community<br />

and the State itself has become sharper, translating<br />

itself into open conflict in many areas. Almost all over<br />

the tribal areas, including Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura,<br />

Assam, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra,<br />

Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, tribal people seem to feel a<br />

deep sense of exclusion and alienation, which has been<br />

manifesting itself in different forms. The Report of the<br />

Expert Group on Prevention of Alienation of Tribal Land<br />

and its Restoration (October 2004) pointed out that the<br />

socio-economic infrastructure among the tribal people is<br />

inadequate, thereby contributing to their disempowerment<br />

and deprivation. 2<br />

Apart from poverty and deprivation in general, the<br />

causes of the tribal movements are many: the most important<br />

among them are absence of self-governance, forest<br />

policy, excise policy, land related issues, multifaceted<br />

forms of exploitation, cultural humiliation and political<br />

marginalisation. Land alienation, forced evictions from<br />

land, and displacement also added to unrest.<br />

...According to the Forest Survey of India Report 2003,<br />

about 60 percent of the forests cover of the country and<br />

63% of the dense forests lie in 187 tribal districts, ie districts<br />

covered by the Fifth and Sixth Schedules to the<br />

Constitution…<br />

The other consequence is that the inhospitable terrain<br />

of the forests provides ample excuse for the restricted<br />

reach of the administration. The health status of both SCs<br />

and STs are far worse than that of other sections of society.<br />

Women<br />

The subjugation of women is another important<br />

aspect of the deeper maladies that afflict rural India and<br />

contribute to popular unrest…<br />

Even simple demographic indicators bring out the<br />

exceptionally low status of women in Indian society…<br />

…Even the National Rural Employment Guarantee<br />

Act (NREGA), which is a potential source of empowerment<br />

for women (in so far as it gives them independent<br />

income-earning opportunities and equal entitlements visà-vis<br />

men), is yet to overcome traditional patterns of gender<br />

inequality and female subordination.<br />

Forests<br />

The conflict pertaining to forest dwellers’ rights to<br />

land and forest produce is a major source of unrest in<br />

large parts of the country. The very notion of a symbiotic<br />

relation should have implied that no inherent conflict<br />

could be seen between such communities and their habitat,<br />

but no such understanding informs the law concerning<br />

forest conservation…<br />

Land distribution is the key<br />

Even those who know very little about the Naxalite<br />

movement know that its central slogan has been ‘land to<br />

the tiller’ and that attempts to put the poor in possession<br />

of land have defined much of their activity.<br />

…the proportion of the workforce that is engaged in<br />

agriculture is 58%. And it is 64% in the case of the<br />

Scheduled castes…<br />

While the economy is at present growing at a rate of<br />

about eight percent to nine percent, agriculture which<br />

provides employment to 58 percent of the country’s<br />

workforce is growing at less than three percent…<br />

Special economic zones<br />

Land acquisition for Special Economic Zones (SEZ)<br />

has given rise to widespread protest in various parts of<br />

the country. Huge extents of land are being acquired<br />

across the country for this purpose. Already, questions<br />

have been raised on two counts. One is the loss of revenue<br />

in the form of taxes and the other is the effect on agricultural<br />

production.<br />

...Thus, the notion of an SEZ, irrespective of whether it<br />

is established in multi-cropped land or not, is an assault<br />

on a major livelihood resource…<br />

Displacement and rehabilitation<br />

Displacement, which is, in fact, enforced eviction of<br />

people from their lands and natural habitats, has for long<br />

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GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT NEPAL<br />

been a serious problem.<br />

Displacement takes place on<br />

account of development projects<br />

such as large irrigation<br />

projects, industrial and mining<br />

projects, power plants,<br />

declaration of sanctuaries<br />

and national parks, setting<br />

up of field firing and testing<br />

ranges and a myriad other<br />

activities of the State itself...<br />

The displacement caused<br />

by large projects can be<br />

physical, occupational and<br />

even cultural. Unless the<br />

nature and magnitude of<br />

displacement in all its<br />

dimensions are fully analysed<br />

and appropriate safety<br />

nets put in place, well in<br />

advance of the implementation<br />

of the project itself, it<br />

will lead to discontent.<br />

The official database of<br />

the persons displaced/<br />

affected by projects is not available…<br />

As tribal areas are also rich in mineral resources, the<br />

mining projects proposed such as in Orissa, Jharkhand<br />

and Chhattisgarh threaten the very existence of tribal<br />

people. Protest action becomes an inevitable consequence<br />

of displacement, such as in Kalinganagar and in Kashipur<br />

people’s movement against Utkal Alumina Rayagada district,<br />

Orissa.<br />

Apart from the physical and occupational displacement<br />

caused by large projects, in the case of the Fifth<br />

Schedule areas, unless the tribals are resettled in the same<br />

scheduled tract, they will face deprivation of the special<br />

rights that have accrued to them by virtue of the schedule.<br />

For example, the tribals in the scheduled areas enjoy presumptive<br />

right of ownership of the land and minerals (Refer SC<br />

judgment in CA Nos. 4601-02 of 1997 on SLP Nos. 17080-81<br />

in Samata vs State of Andhra Pradesh and others). Also, the<br />

Fifth Schedule requires the government to review any law<br />

before it can be extended to the notified areas, so as to ensure<br />

that such a law is appropriately adapted to safeguard the interests<br />

of the tribals…<br />

A policy guiding the Rehabilitation and Resettlement<br />

(R&R) should ensure that none of the displaced be worse<br />

off after the project. They should in fact be better off after<br />

it because they are paying its price. The National<br />

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007 is a significant<br />

departure from the earlier policies in this direction.<br />

Courts in rural areas lack credibility<br />

Of all the things that are known about the Naxalites,<br />

their Peoples Courts are perhaps the most notorious.<br />

While the abuses that have been reported about them are<br />

not all false, taking that to be the whole story would not<br />

be quite correct. The fact is<br />

that such informal, rough and<br />

ready forums of dispute resolution<br />

did in a way respond to<br />

the felt need.<br />

Considerable frustration gets<br />

built up in society when disputes<br />

and conflicts are not settled in<br />

time and in a just and fair manner.<br />

The judicial system we<br />

have is time consuming in<br />

nature…<br />

Environmental<br />

degradation<br />

“Environmental degradation<br />

and social injustice” are<br />

two sides of the same coin.<br />

Environmental degradation<br />

can be caused both by nature<br />

and by human action…<br />

Land is targeted primarily<br />

for mineral extraction.<br />

Geographical distribution of<br />

fossil fuels, and metallic and<br />

non-metallic mineral reserves,<br />

shows a high degree of concentration in central and eastern<br />

India. This implies drastic changes in the existing<br />

land use from agriculture and forestry. Mining is an<br />

unavoidable component of industrial development, but<br />

its full effect on the environment must be taken note of.<br />

Mining is carried out in two ways: open cast and underground.<br />

Either way, the extraction of ore releases extensive<br />

dust which spreads all around and spoils all elements<br />

of the environment – it makes the agricultural<br />

lands barren, pollutes water sources, denudes forests,<br />

defiles the air and degrades the quality of life for people<br />

who live and work in this area.<br />

Environmental degradation resulting from industrial,<br />

mining and other development activities has created serious<br />

health problems for the local population…<br />

Uranium mining and processing near the<br />

Subarnarekha river has even caused radioactive pollution.<br />

In addition to the damage caused to the environment<br />

and its consequential effects, illegal mining and illegal<br />

practices in legal mining compound people’s misery…<br />

Not merely land, water and forests, even bio-diversity<br />

is being exploited for economic growth…<br />

Political marginalisation of SCs and STs<br />

The Constitution has facilitated the political participation<br />

of SCs/STs (dalits and adivasis) through three measures:<br />

Fundamental Right to equality granted to citizens,<br />

abolition of discrimination including untouchability, and<br />

special provision for their representation in legislature.<br />

These rights and entitlements, however, have not<br />

resulted in effective political participation and removal of<br />

their sense of political marginalisation. Though both<br />

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groups face exclusionary practices, dalits and adivasis are<br />

differently placed in respect of their social situation.<br />

Dalits are exposed continuously to the domination of<br />

other castes hostile to them…<br />

Adivasis, by and large, are distanced from dominant<br />

non-tribal communities and have considerable space to<br />

act autonomously.<br />

The political equality in respect of dalits is compromised in<br />

various ways. The exercise of the right to vote without fear or<br />

favour is widely frustrated both by untouchability practices and<br />

exertion of dominance by ‘higher’ caste groups…<br />

The disability that adivasis face in availing political<br />

opportunities is different in character. Lack of financial<br />

resources is a crippling factor in exercising their right to<br />

contest elections…<br />

At the Panchayat level, the ST chiefs of Panchayat,<br />

even in tribal concentration areas, may be manipulated<br />

by non-tribals of the constituencies to spend development<br />

funds suited to their needs and to get contracts for government<br />

schemes…<br />

The position is not very different with the institutions<br />

specifically created for protecting the interests of the<br />

scheduled communities. The status and role assigned to<br />

National Commissions, constituted under Act 338 and<br />

338A of the Constitution, gives them a certain importance<br />

in the Constitutional scheme.<br />

Some statistical pointers<br />

Before summarising the main causes of discontent leading<br />

to the emergence of the Naxalite movement, we may<br />

note the broad correlation between various indicators of<br />

backwardness and the spread of the Naxalite movement.<br />

We have selected five States with a high level of Naxalite<br />

activity: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand<br />

and Orissa. In each of these States, four of the most affected<br />

districts were identified and compared with four districts<br />

that are comparatively more developed.<br />

16<br />

The political equality in respect of<br />

dalits is compromised in various<br />

ways. The exercise of the right to vote<br />

without fear or favour is widely<br />

frustrated both by untouchability<br />

practices and exertion of dominance<br />

by ‘higher’ caste groups…<br />

A careful examination of the data enables us to identify<br />

10 factors that appear to show significant variation<br />

between the affected districts and the developed districts.<br />

They indicate the circumstances underlying rural unrest<br />

and the emergence of Naxalism to a significant extent.<br />

These factors are: (1) high share of SC/ST population; (2)<br />

low levels of literacy; (3) high level of infant mortality; (4)<br />

low level of urbanisation; (5) high share of forest cover;<br />

(6) high share of agricultural labour; (7) low per-capita<br />

food grain production; (8) low level of road length per 100<br />

sq.kms.; (9) high share of rural households which have no<br />

bank account; and (10) high share of rural households<br />

without specified assets.<br />

A summary of the picture is presented in Table 5. The<br />

unweighted averages of the affected and developed districts<br />

clearly indicate significant differences in respect of<br />

all the indicators except in a few cases. The only cases in<br />

which the direction of variation is not along the expected<br />

lines are: (1) the share of agricultural labour in Andhra<br />

Pradesh and Chhattisgarh; (2) urbanisation in Bihar; and<br />

(3) food grain production in Orissa. These, however, are<br />

not difficult to explain.<br />

Governance<br />

Articles 14, 15 and 16 of Indian Constitution provide<br />

the framework for a harmonious conjuncture of equality<br />

as citizens and compensatory discrimination and affirmative<br />

action in favour of SCs/STs and the other backward<br />

sections in certain areas…<br />

The failure of political leadership is typically reflected<br />

in enacting weak laws when it comes to effectuating the<br />

promise to empower the poor and the marginalised or<br />

ensure social/economic justice to them...<br />

Nevertheless, government has not been oblivious of<br />

the governance deficit in the implementation of development<br />

programmes as a whole. The Tenth Five Year Plan<br />

recognised that better governance holds the key to<br />

achieving effective results for the development programmes<br />

initiated by the government. This perception<br />

has led to articulation of a nation-specific paradigm of<br />

governance, different from an international perspective…<br />

The strategy for governance outlined above would<br />

have to be multi-dimensional. It should have elements of<br />

protection, development, participation, effective administration,<br />

accountability, inclusive politics and a paradigm<br />

shift in the approach to violence.<br />

The incidence of atrocities on SCs and STs is on the<br />

increase, and the deterrence envisaged in the laws specially<br />

enacted for this purpose does not operate. This is<br />

because implementation of important criminal laws –<br />

PCR Act and SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (the<br />

Atrocities Act, in short) has been dismal. The Atrocities<br />

Act is not merely a penal law. The Act and Rules contain<br />

fairly elaborate provisions for prevention of atrocities and<br />

protection to the SCs. Their effective implementation is<br />

frustrated by indifference, social bias, routine observance<br />

of procedures and even withdrawal of registered cases.<br />

Conviction rates for crimes against Scheduled Castes and<br />

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Scheduled Tribes are abysmal – less<br />

than one percent.<br />

The implementation of laws abolishing<br />

socially degrading practises<br />

such as manual scavenging, the<br />

devadasi system, trafficking in<br />

women and children, etc is even more<br />

dismal than that of criminal laws…<br />

Indebtedness is the chief cause of<br />

land alienation and forced labour.<br />

Indebtedness among STs is particularly<br />

widespread on account of food<br />

insecurity, non-availability of production<br />

and consumption credit through<br />

public institutions and corruption in<br />

the Public lending agencies…<br />

Reservations in Public<br />

Employment Recruitment and promotion<br />

has proved to be the most successful instrument<br />

of elevating the status and improving the conditions of<br />

SCs/STs/OBCs who have benefited from it. But reservation<br />

policy has been subverted through different ways by<br />

private persons as well as responsible public officials…<br />

The development paradigm pursued since independence<br />

has aggravated the prevailing discontent among<br />

marginalised sections of society. This is because the development<br />

paradigm as conceived by the policy makers has<br />

always been imposed on these communities, and therefore<br />

it has remained insensitive to their needs and concerns,<br />

causing irreparable damage to these sections…<br />

In the case of SCs and also tribes, protection against<br />

social discrimination is the essential condition for the<br />

enjoyment of any development benefits that remain unrealised.<br />

The pattern of development and its implementation<br />

has increased corrupt practices of a rent seeking<br />

bureaucracy and rapacious exploitation by the contractors,<br />

middlemen, traders and the greedy sections of the<br />

larger society intent on grabbing their resources and violating<br />

their dignity.<br />

It is critical for the government to recognise that dissent<br />

or expression of dissatisfaction is a positive feature of<br />

democracy, that unrest is often the only thing that actually<br />

puts pressure on the government to make things work<br />

and for the government to live up to its own promises.<br />

However the right to protest, even peacefully, is often not<br />

recognised by the authorities and even non-violent agitations<br />

are met with severe repression. Greater scope and space for<br />

democratic activity will bring down the scale of unrest, as<br />

it would create confidence in governance and open channels<br />

for expression of popular discontent. What is surprising<br />

is not the fact of unrest, but the failure of the State<br />

to draw right conclusions from it. While the official policy<br />

documents recognise that there is a direct correlation<br />

between what is termed as extremism and poverty, or<br />

take note of the fact that the implementation of all development<br />

schemes is ineffective, or point to the deep relationship<br />

between tribals and forests, or that the tribals<br />

suffer unduly from displacement, the governments have<br />

in practice treated unrest merely as a law and order problem.<br />

It is necessary to change this mindset and bring<br />

about congruence between policy and implementation.<br />

There will be peace, harmony and social progress only if<br />

there is equity, justice and dignity for every one<br />

Panchayati Raj<br />

“The unfortunate confrontation between the tribal<br />

people and the State that has been accentuating ever since<br />

independence will dissipate and disappear once the traditional<br />

system of the tribal people is taken as the foundation<br />

of governance in the tribal areas. The people will be<br />

able to perceive the supra structure of administration as<br />

continuation of their own system with no traces of antagonistic<br />

relationship”. This statement sums up the great<br />

expectation of Bhuria Committee (February 1995) that<br />

had been constituted to recommend such ‘exceptions and<br />

modifications’ as may be deemed necessary while extending<br />

Part IX of the Constitution concerning Panchayats to<br />

the Scheduled Areas (SA). 3<br />

…Even within Jharkhand, for example, the traditional<br />

system is strongest amongst the Ho people; it is comparatively<br />

weak amongst the Santhals and the Mundas and<br />

very weak amongst the Orans….<br />

…While PESA does acknowledge the centrality of the<br />

traditional system, albeit with reference to the community<br />

at the village level in the form of Gram Sabha (GS) or<br />

village council, it makes no provision for or even reference<br />

to the place and role of any of the existing traditional<br />

institutions at the village and higher levels.<br />

According to PESA, there are three partners in governance<br />

at the village level in SA, namely, the community in<br />

the form of GS, Panchayats and the State. In this frame the<br />

position of GS is unique by virtue of the fact that it comprises<br />

‘We, the People of the Village’ themselves, while<br />

other institutions, at best, comprise people’s representatives.<br />

Discontent and radical politics<br />

….The intensity of unrest resulting in extremist methods<br />

and effort to resolve issues through violent means as<br />

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18<br />

The erstwhile landlord himself is in<br />

many cases willing to let the<br />

government of Andhra Pradesh<br />

assign the land to the poor identified<br />

by the Maoists provided some of it is<br />

left to him, but the government has<br />

resisted this resolution of the<br />

problem on the ground that it would<br />

sanctify lawlessness<br />

a challenge to state authority is in response to the gathering<br />

of unresolved social and economic issues for long<br />

durations. It creates the impression that policy making<br />

and administration responds to extreme means. The more<br />

recent development is in the emergence of CPI (Maoist)<br />

after the merger and consolidation two powerful naxalite<br />

streams in September, 2004. This new formation, since its<br />

inception, is defining the official understanding of the<br />

extremist phenomenon of the level of the state as well as<br />

the Union Government. This has appeared in the public<br />

perception as a simplistic law-and-order face-off between<br />

the official coercive machinery and this more radical<br />

extremist political formation. The social consequence<br />

results, then, in undermining instruments of social and<br />

economic amelioration as well as processes of democratic<br />

exchange to resolve persisting issues. This is the crux of<br />

the problem.<br />

Perhaps due to the Union Government’s attention to<br />

the CPI (Maoist) (formed by the merger of CPI M-L<br />

(Peoples War) with Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in<br />

September 2004 and its association to the Naxalite phenomenon,<br />

that party and its method of functioning have<br />

started defining the official understanding of the Naxalite<br />

movement. That is neither factually accurate nor adequate<br />

for discussing the proper governmental response to<br />

it. There is no need to go into the history and genealogy<br />

of the Naxalite movement, but it is necessary to state that<br />

there are a very large number of Naxalite groups/parties,<br />

and their method of functioning differs in regard to the<br />

extent of mobilisation of the people, participation of people<br />

in their actions, role of armed underground cadre,<br />

etc., though all of them owe allegiance to the idea that the<br />

Indian State must be overthrown by force as a precondition<br />

of revolutionary change in our society. Some of them<br />

even have representatives in elected bodies from the panchayats<br />

to the legislatures. The unrest this report is concerned<br />

about is also not reducible to dramatic incidents<br />

such as blowing up or blasting of police stations but<br />

encompasses also mass unrest. Mass participation in militant<br />

protest has always been a characteristic of Naxalite<br />

mobilisation, not only in Bihar, but also elsewhere. The<br />

ban placed by many state governments, and at the national<br />

level by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, on<br />

the Maoist party and its mass organisations, and the formal<br />

and informal prohibition imposed by the police on<br />

such activity in the case of other Naxalite groups, has<br />

often rendered such mass activity virtually impossible.<br />

But that is no reason for ignoring the fact that the unrest<br />

this report is concerned with has often had mass character.<br />

….It is the purpose of this report to see how the<br />

Government may eliminate the causes of unrest by constitutional<br />

and legal means and restore faith of the affected<br />

population in the system of governance established by<br />

the constitution and law.<br />

However, the fact that the naxalites employ methods<br />

of violence in tackling these issues has other consequences,<br />

which include injury, fear and disruption of normal<br />

life. It is also a fact that Naxalite activity is not confined<br />

to solving people’s grievances. They are engaged in<br />

a violent fight against the State for overpowering and<br />

overthrowing it. This fight has its adverse consequences<br />

in terms of the injury and disruption it causes. The link<br />

between what the report deals with, and what it does not,<br />

lies in the fact that it is in the course of providing answers<br />

to the people’s problems and needs that the Naxalite<br />

movement seeks to obtain their support from the masses.<br />

Land related factors<br />

…though aspiration of “land to the tiller” continues to<br />

be given, the focus of the Naxalite movement is on trying<br />

to provide land, whether the land of landlords or government<br />

land, to the landless. In occupying landlords’ land,<br />

the Naxalites have not taken law as their reference point.<br />

It is not the ceiling-surplus land of the landlords that they<br />

have sought to put in the possession of the landless.<br />

Rather, they have targeted landholders whose holding is<br />

sizeable as they see it, or who are otherwise oppressive or<br />

cruel in their conduct, or hostile towards the Naxalite<br />

movement…<br />

...There is no estimate of the total extent of such land<br />

lying fallow in the State, but there is little doubt that it<br />

runs into tens of thousands of acres, especially in<br />

Warangal, Karimnagar and Adilabad districts. 4 The erstwhile<br />

landlord himself is in many cases willing to let the government<br />

of Andhra Pradesh assign the land to the poor identified<br />

by the Maoists provided some of it is left to him, but the<br />

government has resisted this resolution of the problem on the<br />

ground that it would sanctify lawlessness. Thousands of<br />

acres of land thus remain fallow. …<br />

…But all said and done, considering the central place<br />

the slogan of land to the tiller has in Naxalite politics,<br />

their attempt at redistribution of private land has been<br />

meagre. And even that little has been defeated by the<br />

State’s determined opposition to letting lawless means<br />

succeed, even for the beneficial purpose of giving land to<br />

the landless. If the government can get over these unnecessary<br />

qualms, it should be possible to devise legal means<br />

appropriate to each instance to ensure that the landless<br />

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get the land. Some of the land can probably be taken over<br />

under land reform laws and distributed to the poor…<br />

…In Bihar all the Naxalite parties have attempted to<br />

assist, in their respective areas of influence, the landless<br />

Musahars, the lowest among the Dalits, to take possession<br />

of a sizable extent of such land…<br />

…To defuse social tension government may regularise these<br />

occupations if the occupiers are otherwise eligible.<br />

In the case of forestland, occupation by the Adivasis<br />

with the encouragement and assistance of the Naxalites,<br />

has taken place on an extensive scale in Andhra Pradesh,<br />

Chhattisgarh, the Vidarbha region of Maharashtra,<br />

Orissa and Jharkhand. In fact much of it is not fresh occupation<br />

but re-assertion of traditional usufructory rights<br />

declared by the law to be illegal. Properly conducted forest<br />

settlement proceedings should have protected at least<br />

the pre-existing rights, but much of forest settlement proceedings<br />

have taken place behind the back and over the<br />

head of the Adivasi forest dwellers.<br />

The government’s statistics show that 39 percent of<br />

what is called forest encroachment in the whole country<br />

has taken place in the above region. Much of it, as said<br />

above, is not encroachment but occupation that far predates<br />

forest reservation and forest laws. Prior to 1980 the<br />

various State governments would off and on acknowledge<br />

this fact by regularising the occupation, thereby giving<br />

back what has been unilaterally taken away. But the<br />

Forest Conservation Act, 1980 put an end to such regularisation,<br />

and put the forest dwellers perpetually on the<br />

brink of eviction from their own habitat. This enabled the<br />

Naxalites to step into the vacuum to espouse the popular<br />

cause and secure popular support. The fear of Naxalite<br />

armed resistance deterred the repressive and depredatory<br />

moves of the authorities.<br />

…Perhaps a comprehensive registration of sharecroppers<br />

on the lines of the registration of bargadars in West<br />

Bengal would consolidate this gain.<br />

...Considering that mineral resources are largely located<br />

in the predominantly tribal tracts in the country, it is<br />

important that mineral exploration and development<br />

activity is carried out in such a way that (i) it is consistent<br />

with and non-intrusive of the rights and privileges conferred<br />

on the tribals under the Fifth Schedule and (ii) it<br />

causes least disturbance to the ecology that surrounds the<br />

tribal habitats. In this regard, it is necessary to keep in<br />

view the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme<br />

Court in the Samata case (referred earlier). The local tribal<br />

communities, through their Gram Sabhas, should be<br />

fully involved in any decision taken on mining in the first<br />

instance. Even if mining were to be taken up in exceptional<br />

cases, as already referred to, the Constitutional rights<br />

of the tribals with regard to ownership of the land and its<br />

resources should be fully protected.<br />

Eviction, displacement must stop<br />

…. It is well known that 40 people of all the people<br />

displaced by dams in the last 60 years are forest-dwelling<br />

adivasis…<br />

Adivasis displaced by irrigation projects in Orissa<br />

have migrated to the forests of Visakhapatnam district of<br />

Andhra Pradesh in large numbers…<br />

…Unless the law declares that at least insofar as<br />

Central legislation or administrative orders are concerned,<br />

a Scheduled tribe recognised as such in any state<br />

is eligible for the benefits all over the country, internally<br />

displaced Adivasis who have crossed state borders will<br />

remain without any protection in law. Since non-inclusion<br />

of a tribe in a State’s list only means that the tribe is<br />

not found there, and not that it lacks tribal characteristics<br />

in that State, such a prescription would do no harm to the<br />

purpose of identification of Scheduled Tribes under the<br />

Constitution. Indeed there is no reason why the same<br />

rule cannot be adopted for State legislation too. A group<br />

of Adivasis recognised ST in any State should be recognised<br />

all over the country in respect of their legal and<br />

other developmental entitlements.<br />

…through this process of forced migration, many tribals<br />

have left their villages and even State and migrated<br />

into neighbouring states. This involuntary displacement<br />

and migration has caused further distress among the tribals<br />

and created administrative problems for the host<br />

State…<br />

It is, therefore, time to think about a comprehensive<br />

policy frame in which such internal displacement of different<br />

groups of population, whether tribal or Dalit, does<br />

not take place and in case it happens there should be a<br />

government policy to take care of such a situation…<br />

In Bihar there have been many instances where Dalits<br />

suffering social oppression, and in recent times victims of<br />

the massacres perpetrated by the caste Senas such as<br />

Ranbir Sena, have had to flee their hamlets and settle<br />

elsewhere. Indeed, prevention of the depredations of the<br />

caste Senas is the state’s duty in the first instance. It has<br />

failed not only in that but also in providing protection to<br />

the victims so that they are not forced to migrate, or at<br />

least shelter and livelihood at the places where they have<br />

migrated to. The victims have received that help from the<br />

Naxalites. The trauma of displacement for which the<br />

state does not provide succour creates space for violent<br />

movement…<br />

…In Bihar all the Naxalite parties<br />

have attempted to assist, in their<br />

respective areas of influence, the<br />

landless Musahars, the lowest<br />

among the Dalits, to take possession<br />

of a sizable extent of such land…<br />

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Often it is as frustrating an<br />

experience to go to the police station<br />

as a complainant as it is fraught with<br />

danger to go as a suspect. Women<br />

who go to a police station to<br />

complain of sexual abuse or...<br />

Social Oppression<br />

The fight against the social oppression that the Dalits<br />

and the lower among the OBCs have been regularly subjected<br />

to is perhaps the most significant among the issues<br />

used by the Naxalite movement…<br />

…‘Begar’, or forced labour in all its forms is also prohibited<br />

by the Constitution in Article 23…<br />

…A sense of powerlessness is a characteristic of the<br />

psychological make up of oppressed classes. The typical<br />

Naxalite cadre, however, is a confident (most probably<br />

gun-wielding) teenager from those very classes. To see<br />

young boys and girls of their own villages and their own<br />

class/caste active in the Naxalite movement, and wielding<br />

power over the ‘big’ men of the village and the high<br />

and mighty tahsildar has given a sense of empowerment<br />

to the oppressed that has inestimable value…<br />

…The uncertain existence of Adivasis in the forests<br />

has resulted in tremendous power of harassment in the<br />

hands of forest department personnel. It is permissible to<br />

pick edible forest produce but not to undertake cultivation<br />

of the same produce in the forests. It is permissible to<br />

gather dry twigs and logs of uprooted trees but not to cut<br />

standing timber. It is permissible to graze cattle in the<br />

forests, but it should be ensured that the cattle do not nibble<br />

at the nurseries of the forest department. In some<br />

States timber can be gathered for house construction but<br />

not for any other purpose. Quite apart from the injustice<br />

of the restrictions, the dividing line between what can be<br />

done and what cannot is often so slight that there is considerable<br />

ground for arbitrary action by the enforcer of<br />

the restrictions. Wherever there is a basis for discretion<br />

on the part of government officials, forest personnel have<br />

had to be appeased in different ways to avoid harassment.<br />

It was only after the Naxalites entered the picture<br />

that the Adivasis got protection from this harassment,<br />

which was well known to the administration but was normally<br />

ignored.<br />

On some occasions the Naxalites have been able to<br />

put pressure upon lower level administrators to perform<br />

their job effectively. The pressure exerted by the Naxalite<br />

movement has had some effect in ensuring proper attendance<br />

of teachers, doctors etc., in Andhra Pradesh,<br />

Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh, but it is also true that<br />

such employees have made the presence of the Naxalites<br />

an excuse for not attending to their duties properly in the<br />

interior areas…<br />

The fact is that the Naxalites do not see it as their job<br />

to reform the administration, but to supplant it where<br />

possible and debunk it otherwise…<br />

In the matter of resolution of disputes among the people<br />

and finding redressal, the contribution of the Naxalite<br />

movement has been significant. There is in general no<br />

administrative or judicial mechanism in our country for<br />

resolution of day-to-day conflicts and disputes…<br />

The Naxalite movement has provided a mechanism<br />

(usually described as a ‘Peoples Court’) whereby these disputes<br />

are resolved in a rough and ready manner, and generally<br />

in the interests of the weaker party. It has the two<br />

elements of speed and effectiveness. Justice and fairness<br />

are however often disputed. In particular, use of force disproportionate<br />

to the issue involved is fairly common…<br />

Police lack credibility<br />

Efficient and impartial policing is an important<br />

requirement of good administration. But the fact is that<br />

the weaker sections of the people do not have much faith<br />

in the police. They have no faith that justice will be done<br />

to them against the powerful. Nor do they trust that the<br />

police will take interest in doing their duty where the<br />

poor alone are involved, because the poor do not have the<br />

wherewithal to make it worthwhile. Often it is as frustrating<br />

an experience to go to the police station as a complainant as<br />

it is fraught with danger to go as a suspect. Women who go to<br />

a police station to complain of sexual abuse or domestic harassment<br />

are made painfully aware of this fact. Here lies one of<br />

the attractions of the Naxalite movement. The movement<br />

does provide protection to the weak against the powerful,<br />

and takes the security of, and justice for, the weak and<br />

the socially marginal seriously…<br />

Any agitation supported or encouraged by the Naxalites is<br />

brutally suppressed without regard to the justice of its<br />

demands.<br />

...The administration should not have waited for the<br />

Naxalite movement to remind it of its obligations<br />

towards the people in these matters…<br />

…It should be recognised that such a responsibility<br />

would lie upon the Indian State even if the Naxalites<br />

were not there, and even in regions where the Naxalite<br />

movement does not exist.<br />

State’s answer<br />

From early seventies to the middle eighties, the central<br />

government and the planning commission recognised<br />

the basic principles enunciated in the Preamble of<br />

the Constitution and the major points under the Directive<br />

Principles of State Policy. The Plan documents used to<br />

reiterate the commitment to reduction in inequality of<br />

income and wealth among and within different sections<br />

of the community.<br />

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)‘s Annual<br />

Report for the year 2006-2007 mentions the spread of<br />

Naxal movement across 12 states of the Union. The pro-<br />

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file of violence during the last few years has been as follows:<br />

Government policy<br />

The salient features of government policy to deal<br />

with the Naxal problem, as outlined in the Ministry of<br />

Home Affairs Status Paper brought out in May 2006, are<br />

summarised below:<br />

i) deal sternly with the Naxalites indulging in violence;<br />

ii) address the problem simultaneously on political, security<br />

and development fronts in a holistic manner;<br />

iii) ensure inter-state coordination in dealing with the<br />

problem;<br />

iv) accord priority to faster socio-economic development<br />

in the Naxal affected or prone areas;<br />

v) supplement the efforts and resources of the affected<br />

states on both security and development fronts;<br />

vi) promote local resistance groups against the Naxalites;<br />

vii) use mass media to highlight the futility of Naxal violence<br />

and the loss of life and property caused by it;<br />

viii) have a proper surrender and rehabilitation policy for<br />

the Naxalites; and<br />

ix) affected states will not have any peace dialogue with<br />

the Naxal groups, unless the latter agree to give up<br />

violence and arms;<br />

All these constitute ingredients of internal security<br />

which the State should address by appropriate sectoral<br />

ameliorative measures. The removal of other insecurities<br />

like land insecurity, livelihood insecurity, food insecurity<br />

and security against economic and social oppression<br />

were not being properly addressed. These issues have to<br />

be responded to fairly and justly…<br />

The Naxal problem has to be tackled in a multipronged<br />

approach. Some of the ameliorative measures<br />

like National Rural Employment Guarantee Act<br />

(NREGA), 2005, The Scheduled Tribes and Other<br />

Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest<br />

Rights) Act, 2006, National Rehabilitation & Resettlement<br />

Policy, 2007 have been introduced and mentioned elsewhere<br />

in the report.<br />

…the Forest Dwellers Rights Act, on 19th June, 2007,<br />

clarified certain difficult points, for instance, “other traditional<br />

rights”, “primarily reside in and dependent on forest<br />

or forest land”, “Rights to minor forest produce” etc.<br />

to remove any ambiguity or ambivalent nuances and for<br />

easy implementation for benefit of the target groups. But<br />

they were summarily deleted in the final notification of<br />

the Rules published on January 01, 2008. Unless the original<br />

clarifications as contained in the draft Rules of 19th<br />

June, 2007 are restored fully, the Act would fail to achieve<br />

its objective of removing “historical injustice to forest<br />

dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest<br />

dwellers who are integral to the very survival and sustainability<br />

of the forest ecosystem”. Moreover, disaffection<br />

and dissatisfaction among them would grow, thereby<br />

aggravating social dissension and unrest….<br />

The NREGA is an important element in providing<br />

livelihood support and protection to the poorest of the<br />

poor. However, the experience so far suggests that in<br />

backward and remote districts with poor administrative<br />

structures the implementation is not at all satisfactory.<br />

There has been inadequate focus on systems, mechanisms<br />

and capacity in these areas, which need to be<br />

strengthened so that NREGA fulfils its promise to<br />

enhance livelihood support. Evidence from the backward<br />

and tribal areas of Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhatisgarh<br />

demonstrates that greater focus on better administrative<br />

support is required to extend the reach of these programmes.<br />

So far the evidence indicates that militants<br />

have not interfered with the implementation of this programme<br />

in these areas…<br />

Transparency in the functioning of the government is<br />

an essential requirement of good governance…<br />

Naxalism is a political tendency<br />

…Naxalite movement has to be recognised as a political<br />

movement with a strong base among the landless and poor<br />

peasantry and adivasis. Its emergence and growth need to be<br />

contextualised in the social conditions and experience of people<br />

who form a part of it…<br />

Since the goals of the movement are political it has to be<br />

addressed politically…<br />

...This approach is used the world over to tackle insurgencies<br />

democratically.<br />

The government’s Status Paper on the Naxal problem<br />

appropriately mentions a holistic approach and lays<br />

emphasis on accelerated socio-economic development of<br />

the backward areas. However, clause 4 (v) of the Status<br />

Paper states that “there will be no peace dialogue by the<br />

affected states with the Naxal groups unless the latter<br />

agree to give up violence and arms”. This is incomprehensible<br />

and is inconsistent with the government’s stand<br />

vis-à-vis other militant groups in the country.<br />

The government has been conducting peace talks<br />

with the Naga rebels of the NSCN (IM) faction for the last<br />

nearly ten years, even though the rebels have not only not<br />

surrendered their weapons but continue to build up their<br />

arsenal. What is worse, the NSCN (IM) have taken advantage<br />

of the peaceful conditions to consolidate their hold<br />

and establish what could be called almost a parallel government.<br />

In relation to ULFA also, the government is prepared<br />

to have a dialogue without insisting on the insurgents<br />

surrendering their weapons. In J&K, the government<br />

has more than once conveyed its willingness to<br />

hold talks with any group, which is prepared to come to<br />

the negotiating table. Why a different approach to the<br />

Naxals? The doors of negotiations should be kept open.<br />

Various aspects and roots of popular discontent were<br />

discussed in the preceding pages. The Naxalite movement<br />

is principally a political action for armed conquest<br />

of State power. It functions to this end through various<br />

organisations and by various means. There are also<br />

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armed cadres, usually organised as<br />

squads (Dalams). Violence or the<br />

threat of violence by the armed cadre<br />

invariably accompanies the solutions<br />

the Naxalite movement offers to<br />

popular grievances.<br />

When the State undertakes its<br />

response it cannot replicate this process.<br />

It is required to function<br />

through the law. Therefore recommendations<br />

are in terms of modifications<br />

to the law or effective implementation<br />

of the law, and State interventions<br />

to remove the basic causes<br />

of discontent, disaffection and<br />

unrest. It cannot be denied that<br />

Naxalite movement does have popular<br />

support in many areas.<br />

Scrap all debts<br />

The affected groups experience<br />

violence in their daily lives — SCs<br />

due to the caste based social order<br />

and STs due to cultural dominance of<br />

the larger society…<br />

Usury and indebtedness are the<br />

chief causes of acute distress and<br />

exploitation, like land alienation and<br />

bonded labour. …<br />

…All debt liabilities of weaker sections<br />

should be liquidated…<br />

The Scheduled Tribes and Other<br />

Traditional Forest Dwellers<br />

(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act<br />

2006 is a very significant step in<br />

recognising and vesting the forest<br />

rights and occupation in forest land,<br />

in forest dwelling, scheduled tribes<br />

and other traditional forest dwellers<br />

who have been residing in such forest<br />

for generations but whose rights<br />

cannot be recorded…<br />

All petty cases registered under forest<br />

related legislations against the Tribal<br />

people and other poor persons should be<br />

withdrawn.<br />

Land related steps<br />

…So there is an urgent need to<br />

review tenancy laws to protect the<br />

interests of tenants cultivating land of<br />

land owners on oral leases by providing<br />

them security of tenure and fare share of<br />

produce etc…<br />

...All types of agricultural tenancies<br />

should be recorded and<br />

rights of tenants should be<br />

secured and the rights of such tenants<br />

should be fully secured through<br />

enforced land to the tiller policy and<br />

ensure accessibility of tenants to<br />

non-land inputs…<br />

In many cases where land has<br />

been assigned to the landless poor<br />

under ceiling and bhoodan (land<br />

donation) laws and government<br />

lands, possession over this land has<br />

not been delivered. Where possession<br />

was delivered, many beneficiaries<br />

have been dispossessed from<br />

their land. Where dispossession has<br />

taken place after possession was<br />

delivered, land should be restored to<br />

the allotees and proper entry made<br />

in the land records.<br />

Landless poor in occupation of<br />

government land should not be treated<br />

as encroachers and should not be<br />

evicted ordinarily. All eligible occupants<br />

should be regularised. In case of<br />

eviction alternative sites should be<br />

provided. Such provisions should be<br />

given statutory force. Often land<br />

assigned to the poor is illegally<br />

grabbed by the powerful. The government<br />

should restore possession to<br />

the poor. If there are lacunae in the<br />

law, these should be removed.<br />

Comprehensive record of rights<br />

showing possession, ownership, etc.<br />

of all lands under cultivation should<br />

be prepared and made accessible to<br />

the people.<br />

<strong>Law</strong>s prohibiting transfer of<br />

Adivasi lands to non-Adivasis and<br />

acquisition of land by non-Adivasis<br />

in Fifth Schedule areas, where such<br />

laws exist, suffer from numerous<br />

loopholes besides tardy implementation…<br />

The entire Tribal Sub Plan area<br />

should be brought under the Fifth<br />

Schedule. A policy decision in this<br />

regard taken as far back as 1976<br />

should be implemented without any<br />

further delay.<br />

Whenever government assigns land<br />

to the landless, or when pattas are given<br />

under some settlement regulations, such<br />

assignment deeds and patta shall be<br />

jointly given in the name of the husband<br />

and wife, in order to effectively protect<br />

land rights of women.<br />

Land acquisition<br />

Acquisition of land has emerged<br />

as the single largest cause of involuntary<br />

displacement of tribals and<br />

turning them landless.<br />

Indiscriminate land acquisition<br />

should be stopped and land acquisition<br />

for public purpose should be<br />

confined to public welfare activities<br />

and matters of national security…<br />

‘Public purpose’ as defined in the<br />

amended Land Acquisition Act<br />

(amendment currently with<br />

Parliament) should be revised further<br />

and restricted to projects taken<br />

up for national security and public<br />

welfare implemented directly by the<br />

government ‘Public purpose’ should<br />

not be stretched to acquisition for companies,<br />

cooperative and registered societies…<br />

The areas in Central India where<br />

unrest is prevailing covers several<br />

States (like Andhra Pradesh, Orissa,<br />

Chhatisgarh, Madhya Pradesh,<br />

Jharkhand and part of Maharashtra)<br />

are minimally administered. State<br />

interventions both for development<br />

and for law and order had been fairly<br />

low. In fact there is a kind of vacuum<br />

of administration in these areas<br />

which is being exploited by the<br />

armed movement, giving some illusory<br />

protection and justice to the<br />

local population. The basic steps<br />

required in this direction include<br />

establishment of credibility and confidence<br />

of government; keeping a<br />

continuous vigil for fulfilment of<br />

people’s vision; effective protection,<br />

peace and good governance; rejuvenating<br />

tribal economy including<br />

social services; sustainable development<br />

with equity in tribal areas;<br />

holistic planning from below in<br />

scheduled areas; and negotiating<br />

crises by focussing on ending of confrontation.<br />

Endnotes<br />

1 Shah et al (2006), pp. 103-105.<br />

2 Government of India (2004), Report of the<br />

Expert Group on Prevention of Alienation of<br />

Tribal Land and its Restoration (New Delhi:<br />

Ministry of Rural Development).<br />

3 The Fifth Schedule of the Constitution refers<br />

to eight States which have a large tribal population<br />

– AP, Bihar, Gujarat, HP, MP,<br />

Maharashtra, Orissa and Rajasthan. The<br />

Sixth Schedule refers to the north-eastern<br />

States, which also have a large tribal population.<br />

4 Committee of Concerned Citizens (2002).<br />

22<br />

COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008


1 general:general.qxd 8/1/2008 8:03 PM Page 23<br />

MURDER OF DEMOCRACY<br />

Public outrage at<br />

activist’s murder<br />

Seeking transparent implementation of National Rural Employment Guarantee Act<br />

cost Lalit Mehta his life. This sad reality haunts poor and those who fight for their<br />

cause all over Jharkhand where Lalit’s death has created a fierce outrage, writes<br />

Parvinder Singh from Ranchi<br />

The murder of food rights<br />

activist Lalit Mehta, who was<br />

campaigning to make the<br />

national rural employment guarantee<br />

scheme more effective in<br />

Jharkhand, has spurred a larger civil<br />

society campaign against corruption<br />

and non-implementation of the<br />

scheme that guarantees 100 days of<br />

work to every poor rural household.<br />

Even as eminent social activists,<br />

including Swami Agnivesh,<br />

Magsaysay award winner Aruna<br />

Roy, Nikhil Dey and CPI politburo<br />

www.combatlaw.org<br />

member D Raja, gathered in the<br />

Jharkhand capital on June 10 to<br />

demand a CBI probe, a sense of outrage<br />

is giving way to a resolve to dig<br />

deep for a fight for accountability<br />

and implementation of entitlements<br />

meant for the poor.<br />

This mood was palpable during<br />

the mass rally held in the state<br />

capital Ranchi as marginalised<br />

people and concerned citizens,<br />

activists and organisations<br />

expressed their solidarity.<br />

The rally was preceded by a candlelight<br />

procession at Albert Ekka<br />

Chowk on the evening of June 7, and<br />

a two-day protest began. Senior journalist<br />

Prabhash Joshi and a host of<br />

Left leaders took to fast in protest.<br />

A statewide platform ‘Daman<br />

Evam Bhrashtachar Virodhi Sangharsh<br />

Samiti’ (Campaign committee<br />

against repression and corruption) --<br />

launched after Lalit’s killing – has<br />

been leading the agitation to continue<br />

the struggle for National Rural<br />

Employment Guarantee Act<br />

23


1 general:general.qxd 8/1/2008 8:03 PM Page 24<br />

MURDER OF DEMOCRACY<br />

(NREGA) in the tribal dominated<br />

state and carry forward the spirit that<br />

the slain engineering graduate represented.<br />

Death for asking food for poor<br />

Food is a life and death issue for<br />

millions in India and so is the struggle<br />

for securing it. This came to the<br />

fore when Lalit was murdered in<br />

cold blood on the night of May 14th<br />

at Kandaghati in Chhatarpur, about<br />

30-km from Ranchi.<br />

Lalit was campaigning to make<br />

the National Rural Employment<br />

Guarantee Act (NREGA) scheme<br />

work. This guarantees 100 days of<br />

employment, in Chhatarpur and<br />

Chainpur blocks that are among<br />

world’s most impoverished pockets.<br />

Two days after the engineerturned<br />

activist went missing; his<br />

body was exhumed by police from<br />

grave and identified on May 17.<br />

As many as 17 activists have been<br />

killed in the recent past in Jharkhand<br />

alone. Lalit’s death has sparked<br />

demands for state level action<br />

against corruption in the implementation<br />

of rural employment scheme<br />

in this tribal-dominated state.<br />

“No State operates in this area.<br />

The cost of resisting the power of<br />

landlords can well be loss of life,” is<br />

how Lalit, a member of Vikas Sahyog<br />

Kendra (VSK), a long-term partner of<br />

ActionAid, once described his work<br />

mainly based on rallying communities<br />

who had been pushed to the<br />

margins through debt, loss of land,<br />

crop failure and decades of discrimination.<br />

He knew the dangers involved in<br />

acting against the wishes of powerful<br />

local moneylenders, petty contractors<br />

and government officials.<br />

At the time of his death, he was<br />

helping a team of volunteers to conduct<br />

a social audit in a bid to get government<br />

anti-poverty schemes providing<br />

food, work and nutrition<br />

implemented in Chainpur and<br />

Chhattarpur blocks of Palamau district.<br />

Attempts had been made to dissuade<br />

the team from conducting<br />

their work, particularly in Chainpur<br />

Block. Lalit was killed just a day after<br />

the investigation began.<br />

24<br />

Putting life in the line of<br />

poor's service<br />

Lalit Mehta is not alone who has been slain for raising uncomfortable<br />

questions from the side of poor before well to do, moneyed sections<br />

who rob weak of their due but a host of other activists too are being<br />

done to death in similar murder. They are:<br />

AD Babu, convener of Karnataka unit of National Alliance of People's<br />

Movement (NAPM) and anti-liquor activist was attacked with swords and<br />

knives on July 21 in Karnataka while going to address an anti-liquor rally<br />

in the state. He soon succumbed to injuries inflected.<br />

Shiv Babu has been fighting for mine workers' rights in Allahabad district<br />

for years. A few months ago he was returning after attending a workers<br />

meeting at Shankargarh, about 40 kms away from Allahabad, when his<br />

motorcycle was hit by a truck. He succumbed to injuries brought through<br />

the accident. Colleagues and workers see the hand of local mafia in his<br />

death brought through a clever plot.<br />

Kameshwar Yadav was a CPI-ML (Liberation) activist, who took up<br />

NREGA related issues for the poor people of his Jharkhand state. He was<br />

killed and left on road near Giridih on June 7. His bullet riddled body was<br />

spotted after a few local people insisted and made him to accompany<br />

them to market. His family, friends and colleagues think his death to be an<br />

act of vendetta.<br />

Tapas Soren has been organising work for poor neighbours and his own<br />

family members under NREGA in his native Hazaribagh district of<br />

Jharkhand. All the workers have been victims of delayed payment for the<br />

work they have been doing and they had to pay cuts to the local government<br />

officials from their meagre earnings. On July 2 , Tapas went to bank<br />

and on finding no money having been transferred to his account, he went<br />

to see local block development officer (BDO). Locals say soon after this<br />

meeting Tapas doused himself with kerosene and set himself afire. He<br />

committed this act and gave up his life, according to his elder brother<br />

Dilip Soren, out of disgust born of officials' apathy.<br />

— With inputs from Elisabeth Abeson, Vijay Pratap, Anup Srivastava<br />

Local contractors and officials<br />

were unhappy with his work of<br />

exposing corruption and mobilising<br />

people to demand their rights.<br />

In the last year the VSK team<br />

had made great strides. They sensitised<br />

gram panchayat members.<br />

The quality of leaders improved.<br />

Corruption was exposed and<br />

even money recovered.<br />

Programmes for employment,<br />

pensions, and ration cards, mid-day<br />

meals for children and mother and<br />

infant nutrition centres were all<br />

given a kick start. School enrolment<br />

increased and mortgaged land was<br />

returned from moneylenders.<br />

One of the goals of VSK is to<br />

make accessible 100 days of employment<br />

for 16,000 families in 40 villages<br />

in the district.<br />

Rampant corruption<br />

Cases reported by the social audit<br />

exposed serious corruption. The<br />

muster roll for a community pond<br />

dug under the project listed 108<br />

names for receiving employment but<br />

the investigation reveals that in reality<br />

only 18 villagers had been working.<br />

In Cheeru village of Chhattarpur<br />

block, several names in the muster<br />

rolls were found to be fictitious.<br />

Since this region has high level of<br />

illiteracy, most people use thumb<br />

impressions as signatures. Villagers<br />

were surprised to find their handwritten<br />

signatures on muster rolls.<br />

“We have formally appraised the<br />

matter to NREGA commissioner and<br />

advised him to take corrective measures<br />

to ensure proper implementa-<br />

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MURDER OF DEMOCRACY<br />

tion of the act,” Jean Drèze who was<br />

the prime mover of the employment<br />

guarantee scheme said.<br />

Emerging consciousness<br />

For two weeks after Lalit’s murder,<br />

the public hearing at the government<br />

high school, Chhattarpur<br />

brought dozens of men and women<br />

from some of the poorest communities<br />

on this planet to the stage narrating<br />

tales of mismanagement that<br />

have made the employment scheme<br />

defunct in their areas.<br />

Thousands of tribal, Dalit and<br />

landless people, from the<br />

Chhatarpur and Chainpur blocks,<br />

looked on at officials with questioning<br />

eyes, as testimonies of corruption<br />

were shared, like fake muster rolls,<br />

forged signatures and fraudulent job<br />

applications.<br />

A message from chairperson<br />

of the ruling United Progressive<br />

Alliance Sonia Gandhi was read<br />

out, stating that: “Mehta worked<br />

in the region for the right to food.<br />

I also have learnt he had been<br />

carrying out social audit on the<br />

NREGA implementation. Maybe<br />

his work became a threat for<br />

those involved in the irregularities,<br />

which ultimately led to his<br />

killing.”<br />

“This is one of the most painful<br />

incidents in our recent history. The<br />

murder was brutal, pre-meditated<br />

and was an act of terror to attempt to<br />

silence the voice of peaceful fighters<br />

for justice,” said Babu Mathew, country<br />

director, ActionAid.<br />

“If our work was not relevant we<br />

would not have been attacked in this<br />

manner,” Mathew added.<br />

– The writer is associated with<br />

ActionAid<br />

DISABILITY RIGHTS<br />

UN opens new chapter<br />

in lives of the disabled<br />

UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has come into force from 3rd<br />

May 3, 2008 with 20 countries ratifying this. India too is a signatory and thus committed<br />

to follow the convention. This can signal fresh hope for the disabled.<br />

A report by Cambat <strong>Law</strong> team<br />

The January-February 2008 edition<br />

of the <strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong> was a<br />

Disability Special and covered several<br />

issues related to persons with disabilities.<br />

Some of the articles touched<br />

upon the subject of the United<br />

Nations Convention on the Rights of<br />

Persons with Disabilities that had<br />

been adopted by the General<br />

Assembly of the United Nations in<br />

December 2006. It was further mentioned<br />

that India had signed the<br />

Convention excluding the Optional<br />

Protocol (which contained provisions<br />

for the monitoring and enforcement<br />

of the provisions of the<br />

Convention) in March 2007 and ratified<br />

it in October 2007. The<br />

Convention was however not in force<br />

then as it would have become operational<br />

only upon 20 countries ratifying it.<br />

Twenty countries including India<br />

have now ratified the UN<br />

Convention on the Rights of Persons<br />

with Disabilities. Jamaica was the<br />

www.combatlaw.org<br />

first nation to ratify the Convention<br />

and Ecuador the 20th. The<br />

Convention entered into force on 3rd<br />

May 2008. India and the other states<br />

that have ratified the Convention<br />

have undertaken to enact laws and<br />

take measures to provide for and<br />

improve the rights of persons with<br />

disabilities as also prevent discrimination<br />

against persons with disabilities.<br />

This Convention, which is the<br />

first human rights treaty of the 21st<br />

century, is also the fastest negotiated<br />

and the fastest one to enter into force<br />

as per a UN Press Release dated 2nd<br />

May 2008. It is estimated that the<br />

provisions of the Convention will<br />

seek to benefit about 650 million people<br />

worldwide forming about 10 per<br />

cent of the global population including<br />

about 70 million people in India.<br />

Countries that have ratified the<br />

UN Convention on Rights of Persons<br />

with Disabilities and the date of ratification<br />

Bangladesh - 30 November 2007<br />

Croatia - 15 August 2007<br />

Cuba - 6 September 2007<br />

Ecuador - 3 April 2008<br />

Egypt - 14 April 2008<br />

El Salvador - 14 December 2007<br />

Gabon - 1 October 2007<br />

Guinea - 8 February 2008<br />

Honduras - 14 April 2008<br />

Hungary - 20 July 2007<br />

India - 1 October 2007<br />

Jamaica - 30 March 2007<br />

Jordan - 31 March 2008<br />

Kenya - 19 May 2008<br />

Mali - 7 April 2008<br />

Mexico - 17 December 2007<br />

Namibia - 4 December 2007<br />

Nicaragua - 7 December 2007<br />

Panama - 7 August 2007<br />

Peru - 30 January 2008<br />

Philippines - 15 April 2008<br />

Qatar - 13 May 2008<br />

San Marino - 22 February 2008<br />

Slovenia - 24 April 2008<br />

South Africa - 30 November 2007<br />

Spain - 3 December 2007<br />

Tunisia - 2 April 2008<br />

<br />

25


1 general:general.qxd 8/1/2008 8:03 PM Page 26<br />

LAND GRAB<br />

Operation Grab-Back:<br />

Heeding Medha’s Cry<br />

In the wake of UP government’s decision to<br />

seize agricultural land in Kushinagar for the<br />

development of a Buddhist pilgrimage centre,<br />

the National Alliance of People’s Movements<br />

(NAPM) held its seventh biannual<br />

convention. Addressing activists from across<br />

the country, Medha Patkar identified landgrabs<br />

as the root-cause of some of India’s<br />

most pressing problems. Elisabeth Abeson<br />

interviewed Medha for further insight and<br />

recommended action<br />

Gathering thousands of people<br />

from India’s struggle movements<br />

is no small task.<br />

Battling agenda could conceivably<br />

result in organised defiance gone<br />

amuck. Yet, this did not happen at<br />

the seventh biannual convention of<br />

the National Alliance of People’s<br />

Movements (NAPM).<br />

A common theme emerged which<br />

linked the voices and reinforced their<br />

tenor. From farmers’ testimonies citing<br />

the injustice of the local landgrab<br />

for the creation of a “special<br />

religious zone” to the ousting of<br />

thrice-displaced slum-dwellers to<br />

make way for yet another urban<br />

mall, it became clear that many<br />

struggles shared the same root cause.<br />

The inaugural speech by NAPM<br />

convenor, Medha Patkar, identified<br />

special economic zones (SEZ) as the<br />

people’s foremost problem which<br />

requires immediate attention. This<br />

was due to the associated injustice<br />

and suffering caused as a result of<br />

such grabs.<br />

Post-convention Medha-ji clarified<br />

her mention of SEZs: “(Our)<br />

strategies are actually not limited to<br />

SEZs. We are questioning the taking<br />

away of land which is used for agriculture,<br />

horticulture and pisciculture<br />

to make way for manufacturing<br />

areas…The basic thing is that land<br />

that is a source of livelihood should<br />

not be grabbed and destroyed in the<br />

name of public purpose.”<br />

As Kushinagar’s “special religious<br />

zone” implies, the government<br />

has no scruples in terms of how it<br />

chooses to justify land-seizure. From<br />

coastal special tourism zones to the<br />

repeal of urban Ceiling Acts, there<br />

are endless ways to amputate people<br />

from their land, livelihood and cultural<br />

heritage – the wee bit of Bharat<br />

they call “home”.<br />

What concerns Medha the most is<br />

the degree to which, “big chunks of<br />

land are getting diverted...this is really<br />

a new phenomenon for India. And,<br />

the number, scale and pace at which<br />

SEZs have grown suggest that it is<br />

unprecedented even in the world.”<br />

Indeed, India Inc. seems to be<br />

running a clinical trial for testing the<br />

impact of widespread land-grabs on<br />

society with no precedent, guidelines<br />

or monitoring authority (unless the<br />

profiteers who shepherd the Acts<br />

through to implementation qualify<br />

as self-proclaimed auditors).<br />

Since land-grabs are colonising<br />

India and Medha Patkar identifies<br />

them as the root – cause of many ills,<br />

it seems prudent to identify the<br />

impact of land-grabs as a basis for<br />

collective action. This is not to diminish<br />

the importance of each struggle,<br />

but to call attention to an underlying<br />

issue which needs to be addressed<br />

across movements.<br />

Put simply, “Since land means<br />

land and everything attached to land,<br />

everything is affected by the (SEZ<br />

land acquisition) process.” It corporatises<br />

India’s natural resources, creates<br />

disparity, and worsens food<br />

security, unemployment, livelihood<br />

and housing crises. As if this was not<br />

enough, NAPM’s convener added<br />

that land-grabs change the priorities<br />

and the main participants in the<br />

planning process. They encourage<br />

corruption and erode the constitution<br />

as well as the governing powers<br />

of local authorities. Indeed, the<br />

impacts of land-grabs read like the<br />

“top 10” ills facing India today.<br />

Conversation excerpts follow:<br />

Medha highlighted the corporatisation<br />

of natural resources in the context<br />

of Foreign Direct Investment<br />

26<br />

COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008


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LAND GRAB<br />

(FDI) – underscoring the degree to<br />

which outside players are driving<br />

India's development process. “It is<br />

very, very clear that this kind of planning<br />

is corporate planning which is<br />

favouring private investors by transferring<br />

all concessions from farmers<br />

to corporates which have the global<br />

power of lending agency support<br />

with them.”<br />

This brought us to the food security,<br />

unemployment and livelihood<br />

crises – all of which are exasperated<br />

by the corporatisation of resources.<br />

“We have a very serious food security<br />

situation”, warned Medha-ji who<br />

questioned the government’s logic of<br />

seizing self-sustaining agricultural<br />

communities. “They are destroying<br />

the livelihoods of fishermen, of<br />

labourers, of everyone. And they are<br />

not creating as many jobs (as they are<br />

destroying).”<br />

From Nandigram to POSCO,<br />

Medha lamented that, “they are<br />

killing one kind of manufacturing<br />

and bringing in another kind of manufacturing<br />

(for which the local community<br />

is not skilled).” So, is there<br />

any reason to wonder why India is<br />

facing an unemployment and livelihood<br />

crisis?<br />

Here, Medha-ji made a point that<br />

India’s focus on rural displacement<br />

often overshadows the equally devastating<br />

effect of urban population<br />

displacement. “In the urban areas,<br />

the land is going to the Corporates<br />

and big builders because of the<br />

(repeal of the) Urban Land Ceiling<br />

Act. In Maharashtra, this is creating<br />

housing, unemployment and livelihood<br />

crises. There is also an expectation<br />

that industrialisation will absorb<br />

all those who are displaced, but that<br />

is not happening.”<br />

If seizure continues willy-nilly<br />

sans judicial interference, then before<br />

we know it the government will<br />

institutionalise land-grabs as an<br />

acceptable way of ‘doing business’.<br />

According to Medha, “The current<br />

development planning process<br />

increases the areas in which corporates<br />

have influence – policy making,<br />

planning, and so on – all of which<br />

will permanently affect the future of<br />

India.” She then cited the Mumbai<br />

Plan which was crafted in part by<br />

McKinsey, an American consulting<br />

firm. So much for ‘swaraj’ – guess it<br />

only had a shelf-life of 60 years.<br />

“As the government is handing<br />

over more and more land to the corporates,<br />

the priorities, actors, forces<br />

and the main participants in the<br />

planning process are changing.”<br />

Wouldn’t it be eerie if a people-centred<br />

notion of development became a<br />

thing of the past? Something that<br />

existed before the SEZ-sponsored<br />

cricket teams replaced the statebased<br />

system? If we don’t do something<br />

about it soon, then the next<br />

generation will be cheering for<br />

Reliance rather than Rajasthan by the<br />

time they turn five.<br />

As this scenario is clearly unacceptable,<br />

it seems peaceful agitation<br />

is in order. While I generally avoid<br />

military metaphors, “Operation<br />

Grab-Back” seems a fitting title for<br />

the people’s offensive since Medha<br />

regards the anti-SEZ movement as a<br />

struggle to prevent “the killing of<br />

communities”. According to the<br />

points raised in our discussion, this<br />

‘manoeuvre’ consists of a fourpronged<br />

plan: supporting local<br />

struggles, educating intellectuals and<br />

common people, protesting the existing<br />

land acquisition acts and creating<br />

a draft policy which advocates a people-centred<br />

development approach.<br />

In fact, on 18 June, NAPM presented,<br />

“a draft policy to the<br />

Planning Committee before<br />

Parliament which outlined the need<br />

for a Development Planning Act. It<br />

challenged new bills which are giving<br />

more and more land to the corporates<br />

and rallied for communities (to<br />

have) first rights to the resources<br />

within their boundaries...The proposed<br />

Act created a framework<br />

whereby, only after a community<br />

made a plan would the larger territory<br />

go through a democratic development<br />

procedure with minimum displacement.”<br />

Hopefully, the government’s selfsabotaging<br />

behaviour will end and<br />

the above logic will prevail.<br />

Otherwise, India will not be able to<br />

sustain the impact of its so-called<br />

‘development’. As the POSCO struggle<br />

indicates, people can only take so<br />

much — even satyagrahis submit to<br />

force. For example, anti and pro<br />

POSCO families are fighting each<br />

other with arms stored by local<br />

police in the schools of anti-POSCO<br />

villages they seized. If the government<br />

wants its people to survive long<br />

enough to reap the benefits of ‘development’,<br />

it seems prudent to re-visit<br />

existing bills and collectively address<br />

India’s plans. This process must be<br />

driven by locals rather than bribed<br />

Delhiites. Otherwise, a percentage of<br />

India may become extinct even<br />

before the Commonwealth games<br />

begin 1 .<br />

In closing, Medha stressed that,<br />

“It is very, very clear that this is not<br />

an acceptable form of development<br />

planning…It is changing the economic<br />

and political culture of the<br />

country,...and if it continues, it will<br />

become irreversible. People need to<br />

start questioning land grabs and supporting<br />

the battles and the decentralised<br />

planning process (in order to<br />

restore local communities with primary<br />

control over their own<br />

resources).”<br />

The bottom-line is that people<br />

need to either join ‘Operation Grab-<br />

Back’ or resign themselves to living<br />

in a nation officially ruled by CEOs<br />

and World Bank economists. Are<br />

people really keen to institutionalise<br />

corporate colonisation in a country<br />

that has already had more than its<br />

political share? Thankfully, you don’t<br />

have to wait until the Annual<br />

Meeting to cast your vote. If you<br />

want to retain your rights as a citizen<br />

(rather than a corporate shareholder)<br />

and safeguard a modicum of peace,<br />

then it is time to start grabbing back.<br />

— The writer is a Business and<br />

Human Rights specialist who is documenting<br />

the negative ramifications of<br />

corporate-led globalization in India.<br />

1 The Indian Government is investing $ 17.5<br />

billion to ‘modernise’ Delhi in time for the<br />

2010 Commonwealth Games. Modernisation<br />

includes a host of excuses to turn Delhi into<br />

a ‘showcase city’ through sterilisation campaigns<br />

ranging from displacing<br />

slum-dwellers for the creation of ‘Games<br />

Village’ to doing away with cycle rickshaws<br />

lest they leave visitors with the impression<br />

that India is more tarnished than ‘shining’.<br />

www.combatlaw.org<br />

27


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LAW AND JUDGEMENT<br />

A voice of conscience<br />

A second postmortem in a custody death was first<br />

declined and then acceded by Delhi High Court and in<br />

between two positions came judge’s conscience. <strong>Combat</strong><br />

<strong>Law</strong> Bureau presents the report about the unusual turn of<br />

events during the hearing of a Writ of Mandamus filed by<br />

two human rights lawyers<br />

In a landmark order, Delhi High<br />

Court ensured a second postmortem<br />

on the body of Hasib<br />

Qureshi, a victim of death in custody<br />

in Bareilly District Jail. Justice Vipin<br />

Sanghi had first declined to order<br />

another postmortem on the body as<br />

he felt that the matter fell under the<br />

jurisdiction of Allahabad High<br />

Court. Yet, the very next day he<br />

called parties and reversed his own<br />

order on May 24. He observed that<br />

his earlier order weighed on his conscience<br />

and so he spent sleepless<br />

night. He ordered a second postmortem<br />

to ward off and avert what<br />

he called a miscarriage of justice as<br />

time could be wasted in approaching<br />

Allahabad High Court, causing several<br />

days old body further harm and<br />

decay.<br />

Hasib’s relatives had pleaded<br />

before Justice Sanghi for another<br />

autopsy as they suspected him to<br />

have succumbed to injuries inflicted<br />

in Bareilly District Jail where he was<br />

lodged as undertrial. The jail authorities<br />

are accused by Hasib’s elder<br />

brother Anis of beating Hasib mercilessly<br />

and playing truant after his<br />

death in order to hush up a clear case<br />

of death due to inhuman torture in<br />

jail.<br />

Anis too had spent a few days in<br />

the same jail as a co-accused with<br />

Hasib. This was after Hasib’s wife<br />

filed a case against them under section<br />

498 A/506 Indian Penal Code<br />

and Section 314 of Dowry Protection<br />

Act at Faridpur police station in district<br />

Bareilly. Police arrived from<br />

Faridpur on May 9 to take the two<br />

brothers in custody from their west<br />

Delhi home. They were taken to<br />

Nangloi Police Station in Delhi by UP<br />

Police, produced before a<br />

Metropolitan Court in Delhi before<br />

being moved to Faridpur. The two<br />

brothers were remanded to Bareilly<br />

District Jail on being produced<br />

before a magistrate in Bareilly.<br />

Anis eventually was released on<br />

bail and rushed to Delhi where his<br />

sister was awaiting her wedding.<br />

However, the marriage was broken<br />

since Anis and his brother lost their<br />

He observed that his<br />

earlier order weighed<br />

on his conscience and<br />

so he spent sleepless<br />

night. He ordered a<br />

second postmortem to<br />

ward off and avert<br />

what he called a<br />

miscarriage of justice<br />

Justice Vipin Sanghi<br />

reputation by virtue of being sent to<br />

jail. Anis got busy in finding another<br />

match for his sister. In the meantime<br />

his Bareilly-based cousin Nasir was<br />

instructed by him to visit and take<br />

care of Hasib whose bail-plea was<br />

turned down by Bareilly court.<br />

Anis got a telephone call from<br />

jailer in Bareilly early afternoon on<br />

May 18, saying that Hasib was<br />

unwell and so the phone number of<br />

the prisoner’s local contact was needed.<br />

Anis not only promptly gave the<br />

phone number of Nasir but also<br />

offered to come to the jail to see<br />

Hasib. The jailer assured that the<br />

prisoner was not as serious as to warrant<br />

Anis to visit him.<br />

Soon Anis rang up Nasir to tell<br />

him to find out about Hasib. The<br />

phone was picked up by Nasir’s sister<br />

Nasrin. She told Anis that Nasir<br />

was already at Bareilly Jail, trying to<br />

meet Hasib for days. The jailer again<br />

rang up Anis to say that Nasir’s<br />

phone number given to him was<br />

wrong. Anis told the jailer about the<br />

talk he had had with Nasir’s sister<br />

through the same number.<br />

Anis left for Bareilly along with<br />

friends and family on May 18. The<br />

28<br />

COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008


1 general:general.qxd 8/1/2008 8:03 PM Page 29<br />

LAW AND JUDGEMENT<br />

next evening he was told by jail<br />

authorities of death of his brother<br />

Hasib. At the mortuary, they were<br />

not allowed to see the body. A friend<br />

who was able to peep in to find<br />

Hasib’s face to be bruised, forehead<br />

swollen, blood stains on teeth, stiffed<br />

raised arms, feet limping and sole<br />

twisted. The body was naked but for<br />

an underwear. A lone doctor conducted<br />

the postmortem. The body<br />

was sealed and handed over to Anis.<br />

It was brought to Delhi and taken<br />

to Nangloi police station by Haisb’s<br />

incensed relatives. They held a dharna<br />

asking for a second postmortem<br />

by a team of doctors in Delhi. The<br />

Deputy Commissioner of Police<br />

arrived at the police station and the<br />

body was taken in custody. It was<br />

kept at nearby Sanjay Gandhi<br />

Memorial Hospital. The family<br />

moved a Metropolitan Court for a<br />

suitable order in the wake of bizarre<br />

circumstances of Hasib’s death. It<br />

was declined for lack of court’s jurisdiction.<br />

The family contacted human<br />

rights lawyers Vipin Benjamin<br />

Mathew and Jayshree Satpute who<br />

moved a writ of mandamus before<br />

the Delhi High Court. Justice Sanghi<br />

heard the plea but declined to order a<br />

second post mortem on May 23 since<br />

the incident pertained to the jurisdiction<br />

of Allahabad High Court. The<br />

next day, however, his lordship<br />

revised his earlier order and issued<br />

directions to<br />

The Medical Superintendent of<br />

Sanjay Gandhi Memorial<br />

Hospital to preserve the body in<br />

the best possible manner and to<br />

trasport the same to AIIMS on<br />

May 26, 2008 latest by 11.00 am.<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Constitute the medical board of at<br />

least three doctors to conduct the<br />

second postmortem of the<br />

deceased Hashib Qureshi.<br />

The postmortem report should<br />

specifically indicate external/<br />

internal injuries, if any, on the<br />

body of the deceased suffered by<br />

him post or ante mortem<br />

The postmortem has to be conducted<br />

on May 26, 2008 at 4 pm.<br />

The postmortem proceedings be<br />

video-graphed<br />

The original of the postmortam<br />

report and vido-graph shall be<br />

preserved in a sealed cover by<br />

AIIMS till further directions from<br />

the competent court looking into<br />

the death of Hashib Qureshi<br />

The copy of the second post<br />

mortem should be given to the<br />

petitioner<br />

<br />

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∑apple§fl‹ ∑§ÊÚê’Ò≈U ‹ÊÚ (<strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong>) ∑apple§ ¬ˇÊ ◊apple¥ ÷apple¡apple¥–<br />

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www.combatlaw.org<br />

29


2 Kashmir:general.qxd 8/1/2008 8:05 PM Page 30<br />

VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Over half-a-million troops hold Kashmir<br />

captive. This has not only robbed people<br />

of their normal civilian space but also<br />

led to one of the worst traps that any<br />

land or its people have ever<br />

come under, says award<br />

winning documentary film<br />

maker Sanjay Kak<br />

Incarcerated<br />

land and people<br />

Kashmir remains one of the<br />

most underreported stories in<br />

the world. This is not because<br />

of just neglect, or a natural silence.<br />

It’s very carefully constructed. And<br />

the silence is paradoxically constructed<br />

out of a lot of noise. Kashmir is an<br />

issue that is perpetually in the news<br />

in India -- in print, in public life, on<br />

television. Yet, when one looks at the<br />

output of the huge machinery, there<br />

is very little in-depth analysis, showing<br />

very little understanding. So this<br />

will remain one of the paradoxes of<br />

our time; that while Kashmir is<br />

always in the news in India, it has<br />

never been understood.<br />

Of course, with the international<br />

media and India’s growing stature –<br />

whether real or imaginary -- as a<br />

world power, or a world power in the<br />

making, India is suddenly a very<br />

attractive commodity. Many countries<br />

that would have traditionally<br />

been very quick to pay attention to<br />

what is happening in Kashmir and<br />

comment on it, or take a position, are<br />

a bit reluctant, because they have<br />

vested interests here in India. They<br />

see it as a market.<br />

The way the Indian State has successfully<br />

projected Kashmir, first to<br />

the Indian people, and then to the<br />

world at large, is as follows. That<br />

1947 marks the partition of British<br />

India into India and Pakistan;<br />

Kashmir was a disputed zone, and<br />

that Pakistan has illegally grabbed a<br />

part of it, and the rest of it has rightfully<br />

fallen within India. Hence, the<br />

current situation is really a dispute<br />

between India and Pakistan.<br />

30<br />

COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008


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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Such a characterisation completely<br />

ignores the fact that for long there<br />

has been—as it continues to be – an<br />

issue of self-determination of the<br />

people of Kashmir. This is a demand<br />

that predates Partition by at least a<br />

decade and it has been a part of public<br />

discourse in Kashmir ever since or<br />

even before. However, somehow that<br />

political demand for freedom, or<br />

azadi, or some form of self-determination,<br />

has completely been buried<br />

by its over simplification as an India-<br />

Pakistan dispute.<br />

The Indian State has managed to<br />

curtain off Kashmir from intelligent<br />

scrutiny by three rather deft curtains.<br />

The first, obviously, is Pakistan.<br />

Whenever you speak of Kashmir in<br />

India or anywhere else, the Indian<br />

position always is that this is a movement<br />

that is supported by Pakistan.<br />

Since Pakistan as a State is presented<br />

as inimical to India, how can one<br />

possibly have any kind of sympathy<br />

or space or understanding for such a<br />

movement? If one makes it past this<br />

first layer of obfuscation, then, of<br />

course, we are presented with the<br />

idea that what we are seeing in<br />

Kashmir is part of an Islamic movement,<br />

a jihad; and this is something<br />

that none of us are in a position to be<br />

able to sympathise with. Therefore,<br />

once again a curtain is drawn over<br />

Kashmir. And thirdly, the issue of the<br />

treatment of religious minorities in<br />

Kashmir by the pro-independence<br />

whatever the ideology<br />

one swears by — pro-<br />

Independence, pro-<br />

Pakistan, even pro-<br />

India — people are<br />

collectively asking for<br />

the withdrawal of the<br />

Indian army. On that<br />

there will be<br />

consensus<br />

movement, by the separatists, which<br />

specifically refers to the fact that the<br />

Kashmiri Pandits had to leave<br />

Kashmir in the early 1990s in very<br />

large numbers. Conservative estimates<br />

of the number of Pandits who<br />

had to flee are approximately<br />

200,000, and there are perhaps less<br />

than 10,000 who continue to live in<br />

the Valley. This was seen as a sign of<br />

a movement which was exceedingly<br />

intolerant, was communal, and<br />

therefore, once again, undeserving of<br />

our sympathy and understanding.<br />

Collectively then, these three curtains<br />

are employed to obscure the<br />

issue at hand, this kind of rhetoric<br />

completely puts a blanket over the<br />

issue, in a way which encourages<br />

most Indians to look away from<br />

Kashmir.<br />

What do people want? What is<br />

the demand for azadi, freedom? This<br />

idea crops up in Kashmir with such<br />

frequency, that we must question<br />

what this word encompasses. This is<br />

not easy, so let us start by defining<br />

what everybody is likely to agree on.<br />

It would be fair to say that in principle,<br />

whatever the ideology one<br />

swears by -- pro-Independence, pro-<br />

Pakistan, even pro-India – people are<br />

collectively asking for the withdrawal<br />

of the Indian army. On that there<br />

will be consensus. Beyond that, in<br />

order to get a real answer to that<br />

question of what people want when<br />

they ask for azadi, there must be a<br />

democratic space in which to hear<br />

what people are saying. Kashmir is<br />

under far too much stress. Is it not<br />

unreasonable to have 600,000 soldiers<br />

sitting on a tiny population and<br />

then expect to hear genuine democratic<br />

voices talking about what people<br />

really want? The complexities of<br />

the mixed answers that we hear,<br />

which sound like confusion to the<br />

outside world, are in fact a byproduct<br />

of the extreme militarisation of<br />

the Valley.<br />

Along with militarisation comes<br />

the occupation of valuable land,<br />

water and even human labour. For<br />

instance, in every village in India<br />

there is always a scarcity of water,<br />

and of course it is accompanied by<br />

disputes. But traditionally a kind of<br />

when the soldiers are<br />

kept in one place for<br />

too long in the midst<br />

of a civilian<br />

population, they will<br />

begin to exploit that<br />

area in new ways.<br />

They will begin to call<br />

upon the civilian<br />

population to do<br />

unpaid labor<br />

mechanism is worked out. But<br />

Kashmiri villagers can’t argue with<br />

security forces, especially since they<br />

have all the weapons and the civilians<br />

don’t. The appropriation of<br />

resources and land begins with public<br />

facilities: school buildings being<br />

taken over to house troops, water<br />

towers made into watch towers, and<br />

indiscriminate use of water drawn<br />

out in huge quantities by the army<br />

for their own needs.<br />

More importantly, when the soldiers<br />

are kept in one place for too<br />

long in the midst of a civilian population,<br />

they will begin to exploit that<br />

area in new ways. They will begin to<br />

call upon the civilian population to<br />

do unpaid labour, because these are<br />

very remote areas and these are areas<br />

that have traditionally been neglected<br />

by the civilian governments too.<br />

These are people with no access to an<br />

arena in which they can voice their<br />

concerns. They don’t have access to<br />

the media; there are no human rights<br />

groups that are able to get to them.<br />

So if you travel into the interior of<br />

Kashmir, that’s what you begin to<br />

hear: A more brutal, in-your-face<br />

kind of oppression. It is not simply<br />

the continuous checking and crosschecking<br />

at a check post every half-akilometre.<br />

This is the kind of tribulation<br />

that urban Kashmiris feel. In the<br />

countryside, it is a much more<br />

medieval kind of oppression that<br />

www.combatlaw.org 31


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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

people face. It accumulates into a<br />

feeling of grave resentment and hostility.<br />

It is not a question whether the<br />

army was better behaved or had<br />

more discipline. Armies are<br />

machineries of war. That’s what<br />

they’re trained for. Armies are meant<br />

to fight wars, and when you place<br />

them in the middle of civil positions,<br />

they behave like armies, which is<br />

what they are. At the end of it, you<br />

have deep resentment, you have<br />

gross violations of human rights, and<br />

you create a situation that far surpasses<br />

any predictions of the effect of<br />

militarisation on Kashmiris.<br />

The issue of the use of rape (and<br />

even more routinised sexual<br />

exploitation) in Kashmir is also a<br />

pressing human rights concern. It is<br />

also principally a traditional Muslim<br />

society, and that also makes it that<br />

much more difficult for people to<br />

speak about it. The civilian administration,<br />

especially in the countryside<br />

of Kashmir, is completely emasculated.<br />

They do not have any powers to<br />

restrain the security forces from<br />

doing anything. It is an archetypal<br />

conflict zone situation: There is one<br />

side with incredible powers right in<br />

the middle of a dispersed civilian<br />

population. There is a long history to<br />

this form of exploitation. There was<br />

the infamous incident of Kunan<br />

Poshpora, where an army unit had<br />

gone into a village and raped many<br />

women. In this case, the women actually<br />

came out and wanted to testify.<br />

However, the whole thing was just<br />

brushed aside. This remains a sore<br />

point. What are the women going to<br />

get if they are brave enough to come<br />

out and take on the shame and<br />

ignominy in a conservative society<br />

after admitting to having been<br />

raped? And then if no action is taken,<br />

the next time around they are not<br />

going to come out, because it is not<br />

going to bring them anything. It is<br />

the failure to provide justice that puts<br />

a kind of silence on women who suffer<br />

such huge abominations.<br />

There are also other forms of cultural<br />

humiliation that are occurring<br />

in Kashmir. There are two ways of<br />

looking at this cultural imperialism:<br />

32<br />

There are two ways of looking — one is that it is<br />

inadvertent and the other that it is intentional. The<br />

presumption is that Kashmir is an integral part of<br />

India. So it is kind of presumed that it is perfectly all<br />

right to have milestones that tell you distances in<br />

English and Hindi in a population where most<br />

people understand only Urdu<br />

one is that it is inadvertent and the<br />

other that it is intentional. Either way,<br />

it is reprehensible. But the presumption<br />

is that Kashmir is an integral<br />

part of India. So it is kind of presumed<br />

that it is perfectly alright to<br />

have milestones that tell you distances<br />

in English and Hindi in a population<br />

where most people understand<br />

only Urdu. So as far as the local<br />

people are concerned, the road itself,<br />

traffic on the roads. as well as the<br />

milestones are clearly meant only for<br />

the army soldiers, because they are<br />

the ones who read them in Hindi.<br />

There are, however, interesting<br />

ways in which civilians deal with the<br />

aftermath of oppression. For<br />

instance, how come when there is a<br />

funeral for a militant commander<br />

that 5,000 people turn out? It is not<br />

only that they are turning out to honour<br />

the memory of the militant commander;<br />

they are also turning out to<br />

express their rage at the hundred<br />

everyday humiliations that they suffer.<br />

Essentially, before we get stuck in<br />

looking at the conflict as some kind<br />

of human rights problem in Kashmir<br />

alone, what we have to acknowledge<br />

is that there is an equally massive<br />

failure of democracy in India that is<br />

going on. It is very important to<br />

locate it firmly in this context. It is<br />

not simply a question of whether or<br />

not we could discipline the army a<br />

bit or if we could improve our<br />

human rights record. As long as<br />

there is a set of legislations in place<br />

that are anti-democratic and only<br />

serve to silence people, these kinds of<br />

excesses will continue to go on.<br />

—This article is based on Sanjay<br />

Kak’s conversation on Kashmir with<br />

David Barsamian for Alternative Radio,<br />

Colorado, US<br />

www.alternativeradio.org<br />

COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008


2 Kashmir:general.qxd 8/1/2008 8:05 PM Page 33<br />

VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Orphaned souls<br />

cry for help<br />

Kashmir conflict has<br />

turned out to be a<br />

virtual orphan factory.<br />

Eighty thousand<br />

children have been<br />

rendered orphan in 18<br />

years. Yet there is no<br />

mechanism in place in<br />

the entire state to look<br />

after children who<br />

become victim of<br />

grown ups’ battle,<br />

writes AR Hanjura<br />

For past 18 years, Kashmir is in a<br />

state of armed conflict and<br />

unrest. And this has inflicted a<br />

devastating impact upon the civilian<br />

population, particularly women and<br />

children as they get both directly and<br />

indirectly affected. Numerous crackdowns,<br />

search operations, bomb<br />

blasts, cordon offs, crossfire, armed<br />

showdowns and killings have not<br />

only worsened the human rights situation<br />

in Kashmir, but also shattered<br />

its economy. Around one lakh people<br />

have been killed in the conflict and as<br />

a result 80,000 children have been<br />

orphaned who lead a miserable life.<br />

The sheer conditions of their lives<br />

put them under depression and<br />

extreme mental trauma and agony.<br />

In a report, it has been revealed<br />

that 15,308 orphans are children of<br />

deceased militants and therefore<br />

they have as a matter of routine been<br />

ignored by the government. The<br />

Indian government as well as state<br />

government has a policy whereby<br />

the widows and children of militants<br />

are not eligible to get any relief or<br />

financial assistance. As a result, these<br />

orphans are not being rehabilitated<br />

either by the State through institutional<br />

care or at the community level.<br />

One fails to understand as to what is<br />

the fault of these children, some of<br />

whom were not even born when<br />

their fathers got involved in the<br />

armed movement?<br />

Children constitute 38 percent of<br />

the population of Jammu & Kashmir,<br />

out of which two to three percent are<br />

orphans who need special attention.<br />

Presently, only 1,600 orphans are<br />

staying in orphanages and Bal<br />

Ashrams as well as Nari Nikatans run<br />

by the state government. Only 17<br />

orphanages are being run by different<br />

voluntary organisations in the<br />

Kashmir Valley wherein some hundred<br />

orphan children are being<br />

looked after and educated. Although<br />

there is an ever growing need for<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

institutional care of orphans in<br />

Kashmir, but as one lakh orphans<br />

cannot practicably be housed in<br />

orphanages alone, community level<br />

rehabilitation is a must. Moreso,<br />

when the state of J&K does not have<br />

a regulatory authority or legislation<br />

available for the monitoring and regulation<br />

of orphanages. Generally run<br />

by unprofessional and inadequately<br />

qualified persons, the orphanages<br />

are not maintaining the minimum<br />

standards for child protection and<br />

development, whether physical or<br />

mental. Because of the fact that<br />

orphans are special children with<br />

special needs and attention, the<br />

managers of these orphanages<br />

need training in child rights and<br />

child psychology in order to<br />

understand their needs and rehabilitate<br />

the child accordingly.<br />

There is also a need for the enactment<br />

of legislation for regulation of<br />

these childcare centres and orphanages.<br />

This will ensure transparency,<br />

accountability and child protection.<br />

India being a signatory to the UN<br />

convention on child rights, has an<br />

obligation to ensure the protection of<br />

child rights in the state of Jammu &<br />

Kashmir where there is practically no<br />

infrastructure available for the welfare<br />

and rehabilitation of orphans. It<br />

is the need of the hour that the state<br />

should have a child protection commission<br />

or council for destitute children<br />

to ensure the protection of child<br />

rights, the welfare of children and<br />

their rehabilitation. This commission<br />

or council may suggest recommendations<br />

for future strategies and policies<br />

to be adopted by the state. It may<br />

consist of social activists, NGO representatives,<br />

educationists, health<br />

experts and government officials. It<br />

should be headed by a person who<br />

has been associated with child relief<br />

and rehabilitation progammes in the<br />

state and has knowledge of the problems<br />

faced by children in the state.<br />

Some years back the state government<br />

had established a council for<br />

militancy affected persons. But this<br />

council did not have sufficient funds<br />

and only the interest accrued money<br />

of the corpus fund was allowed to be<br />

utilised on certain measures. This<br />

resulted in quite poor performance of<br />

34<br />

There is also a need for the enactment of legislation<br />

for regulation of these childcare centers and<br />

orphanages to ensure transparency, accountability<br />

and child protection. India being a signatory to the<br />

UN Convention On Child Rights, has an obligation to<br />

ensure the protection of child rights in the state of<br />

Jammu & Kashmir<br />

the scheme. Similarly, the state social<br />

welfare department lacks sufficient<br />

funds for child relief and rehabilitation.<br />

national foundation for communal<br />

harmony run by central government<br />

provides Rs 600 monthly financial<br />

assistance to the orphans studying<br />

in schools. This facility too is not<br />

available to orphans of militants.<br />

Moreover, the task of identification<br />

and processing the applications<br />

under the scheme has been given to<br />

the deputy commissioners of the<br />

respective districts who are already<br />

overburdened with work. As a result,<br />

there is a delay in payments and<br />

many deserving children do not get<br />

the aid.<br />

Unfortunately, there is a dearth of<br />

efficient NGOs in Kashmir who<br />

could have made significant contribution<br />

in the field of child rights.<br />

Although there are almost 5000 registered<br />

NGOs in the state but most of<br />

them are defunct. The planning commission<br />

has adopted a national policy<br />

of voluntary sector for strengthening<br />

the civil society and ensuring<br />

transparent and accountable voluntary<br />

organisations. The policy was<br />

approved by the central cabinet in<br />

May 2007. But this policy also<br />

remains unimplemented in J&K.<br />

Qualified people who are willing to<br />

establish voluntary organisations in<br />

the states face hardships in registering<br />

their organisations. Reason being<br />

that one has to obtain a non-involvement<br />

certificate (NIC) from the district<br />

magistrate to prove that one had<br />

no links with militancy or separatist<br />

movement. Although there is no<br />

such provision in the Societies<br />

Registration Act, a circular issued in<br />

this regard by the then governor in<br />

1990 still stands. Since the verification<br />

is not time bound, many applications<br />

are still pending.<br />

As far as the scenario of juvenile<br />

justice in Kashmir is concerned, it<br />

also continues to be grim. In the<br />

state, the Juvenile Justice Act was<br />

passed on the pattern of the central<br />

law in 1995. But the legislation still<br />

remains unimplemented in the state<br />

as the rules have not been framed<br />

and approved so far. With the result,<br />

children below the age of 16 years are<br />

tried in regular courts and are being<br />

kept in regular jails just like adult<br />

criminals. No juvenile boards or<br />

homes exist in the state. Also, many<br />

children have been disabled due to<br />

the conflict, but no school exists for<br />

disabled children in Kashmir. There<br />

is no rehabilitation centre for mentally<br />

retarded or drug addicts.<br />

India despite being a signatory to<br />

the UN convention on child rights,<br />

remains wanting in terms of awareness,<br />

and sensitisation and seriousness.<br />

This is more so on the part of its<br />

government and institutions vis-àvis<br />

these provisions. Legislations are<br />

useless until and unless they are<br />

properly implemented. My over two<br />

decades of experience as a child<br />

rights activist has driven home the<br />

point that the government is not<br />

ready to pay attention towards the<br />

problems of Kashmiri children. And,<br />

thus, it has failed to address the<br />

problem, leaving children to their<br />

fate.<br />

— The writer is advocate, J&K High<br />

Court and also chairman of the J&K<br />

Yateem (Orphans) Foundation<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Enforced disappearances<br />

The more people go<br />

out of sight in the wake<br />

of enforced<br />

disappearances in<br />

Jammu & Kashmir the<br />

more they agitate the<br />

minds of their family<br />

members. So much so<br />

that the families of<br />

those who disappeared<br />

have formed an<br />

association in the hope<br />

to bring back or at least<br />

know the truth behind<br />

the loss of their near<br />

and dear ones, writes<br />

Mir Hafizullah<br />

In past the Indian army faced<br />

armed insurgency on two occasions<br />

one in 1947 and another in<br />

1965. In the last case too, a sizable<br />

number of armed insurgents infiltrated<br />

in Kashmir and were given<br />

shelter by unsuspecting innocent villagers.<br />

The Indian army was given<br />

charge to flush out the militants from<br />

the areas they have made their hideouts.<br />

While facing the armed insurgents,<br />

some encounters occurred at<br />

different places but no civilian was<br />

harmed nor the people were tortured<br />

or made to disappear or killed in fake<br />

encounters. The simple reason for<br />

this is that the army or paramilitary<br />

forces were not given impunity as<br />

has been happening since 1990.<br />

The armed conflict which has its<br />

routes in the unresolved political dispute<br />

that flared up in 1989 in the<br />

form of mass uprising which forced<br />

the Government of India to bring<br />

huge concentration of troops in<br />

Jammu & Kashmir (the number is<br />

stated to be over half-a-million). The<br />

army and the paramilitary forces<br />

equipped with impunity under draconian<br />

laws like Armed Forces<br />

Special Powers Act (AFSPA),<br />

Disturbed Areas Act, POTA and<br />

Public Safety Act have been committing<br />

all kinds of human rights violations.<br />

AFSPA is responsible for most<br />

of the disappearances committed by<br />

the state security agencies. A large<br />

number of civilians, students, businessmen,<br />

professionals were made to<br />

disappear. All these enforced disappearances<br />

were made under the central<br />

rule and by the so-called elected<br />

governments of the state. The purpose<br />

to use this method of involuntary<br />

disappearances was to terrorise<br />

people from joining the insurgency<br />

or having any sympathy with the<br />

movement.<br />

Formation of Association of<br />

Parents of Disappeared Persons --<br />

APDP for short – took place in the<br />

early 1990s. This brought the relatives<br />

of disappeared persons to the<br />

high court for filing the hebeas corpus<br />

petitions seeking the whereabouts of<br />

their near and dear ones since high<br />

court was the only institution func-<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

tional which could give some kind of<br />

direction to the state functionaries.<br />

Yet most of the court orders were<br />

observed in breach and police stations<br />

were reluctant to register the<br />

missing reports especially where the<br />

army and the paramilitary forces<br />

were involved in the disappearances.<br />

Therefore, the first information<br />

reports or FIRs were registered only<br />

in some cases with the direction of<br />

the court.<br />

The number of enforced disappearances<br />

was swelling with every<br />

passing day and crossed three figures.<br />

Few lawyers, human rights<br />

activists and relatives of disappeared<br />

persons like Parveena Ahangar<br />

whose son too disappeared formed a<br />

group of relatives of disappeared<br />

persons to fight collectively under<br />

the banner of APDP. She is chairperson<br />

of the organisation.<br />

Number of disappearances<br />

The number of enforced disappearances<br />

remained always a major<br />

controversy with the government<br />

who were earlier denying the<br />

enforced disappearances but later on<br />

acknowledged the number of disappearances<br />

as few thousands. This has<br />

sometimes increased or decreased.<br />

The government wanted to create a<br />

confusion and wanted to take the<br />

advantage of the fact that the disappearances<br />

were not reported to the<br />

police stations or to other concerned<br />

agencies. The denial of registering<br />

the missing reports was done under a<br />

policy of the Government of India,<br />

though it was a primary duty of the<br />

state to register the case of disappearances,<br />

including those that were not<br />

even reported by any person as the<br />

state is responsible for the protection<br />

of citizens under the provisions of the<br />

Constitution.<br />

Activities<br />

Members of the APDP are protesting<br />

on streets on every 10th of the<br />

month and also made several<br />

protests at New Delhi with the purpose<br />

of garnering support from country’s<br />

civil society and seek attention<br />

of wider media at the national level.<br />

The demands of the APDP are:<br />

‘Thousands are missing’<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

On July 18, 2002 the then home minister of J&K, Khalid Najeeb<br />

Sahorwardi of National Conference, which was in power, admitted<br />

on the floor of the legislative assembly that 3,084 persons were<br />

missing in J&K since the start of the insurgency.<br />

Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed on February 23 made the<br />

disclosure what the security agencies were doing in 2001 and 2002.<br />

He informed the assembly that 3,744 persons went missing<br />

between 2000 and 2002. One-thousand-five-hundred-fifty-three<br />

persons got disappeared in 2000; 1,586 went missing in 2001; and<br />

605 in 2002.<br />

<strong>Law</strong> minister Muzaffar Hussain Beig of the PDP government stated<br />

on March 25, 2003 that since December 1992, 3,744 were reported<br />

missing of whom 135 have been declared dead by June 2002 and<br />

the number of disappearances could be even more.<br />

Abdul Rehman Veeri, minister of state and parliamentary affairs,<br />

said in the assembly on June 21, 2003 that 393 people have disappeared.<br />

36<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

<br />

Appointment of an independent/<br />

credible commission to enquire<br />

into the case of the disappearances<br />

as has been done in other<br />

countries like Sri Lanka,<br />

Philippines, Algeria and<br />

Morocco. Even countries that are<br />

not democratic have initiated<br />

such a process in the wake of<br />

large-scale disappearances of<br />

their citizens in strife-ridden<br />

regions.<br />

Punishment for perpetrators<br />

responsible for enforced disappearances,<br />

which cannot be justified<br />

even during a war situation.<br />

Provide justice to the relatives of<br />

disappeared persons as per international<br />

standards. State is bound<br />

to intervene in such cases since<br />

disappearances are crime against<br />

whole humanity.<br />

On the social and the legal side,<br />

the APDP is confronted with a situation<br />

arising out of problems of the<br />

half-widows who are deprived of the<br />

property of their husbands in the<br />

wake of their disappearance. Nor<br />

they can remarry for a period of<br />

seven years as per Muslim law. The<br />

children of the half-widows are facing<br />

problem in school admission as<br />

death certificate of father required at<br />

the time of admission is not given.<br />

Thus, half-widows are struggling for<br />

survival as they are not entitled to get<br />

the property of their husbands in the<br />

wake of their disappearance. Nor are<br />

they entitled to sell the property of<br />

their husbands. A number of petitions<br />

seeking the right of succession<br />

The sanction for<br />

prosecution is barred<br />

under section-6 of the<br />

AFSPA with the result<br />

not a single<br />

perpetrator of a crime<br />

of enforced<br />

disappearances been<br />

brought to justice<br />

of property of their husbands are<br />

pending in the courts for want of<br />

death certificates. On the legal side,<br />

the justice delivery system has<br />

almost failed to deliver the justice in<br />

case of victims of enforced disappearances<br />

and their dependents. In<br />

some cases inquiries were conducted<br />

under the directions of the high court<br />

and accused were identified but challans<br />

could not be filed in courts as the<br />

Government of India has been reluctant<br />

to grant sanction for prosecuting<br />

the persons responsible for the crime.<br />

The sanction for prosecution is<br />

barred under section-6 of the AFSPA<br />

with the result not a single perpetrator<br />

of a crime of enforced disappearances<br />

been brought to justice.<br />

Members of the APDP have no hope<br />

of getting justice in near future but<br />

are determined to continue their<br />

struggle till the end.<br />

The enforced disappearances are<br />

one of the worst crimes on the globe.<br />

It is characterised by gross violation<br />

of the fundamental rights of the<br />

direct victim as also entails severe<br />

consequences for his or her family<br />

and even for the entire communities.<br />

Because of this reason the enforced<br />

disappearances are internationally<br />

defined as a crime against humanity.<br />

This definition is not coincidental<br />

since such cases not only violate the<br />

essence of the individual and affect<br />

his condition as a human being in<br />

different dimensions of his life but<br />

also this aspect of the disappearance<br />

lands up a person into a very complicated<br />

phenomenon. One should not<br />

approach this problem in an emotional<br />

way because the risk will exist<br />

for creating false expectations in the<br />

family of the victims for want of justice<br />

and, thus, ultimately end up in<br />

causing more frustration. No doubt<br />

enforced disappearances are rooted<br />

in social and political disputes.<br />

Despite the fact that each of them<br />

may have their own history, enforced<br />

disappearances speak a common language<br />

of pain and suffering which<br />

keep their families hope alive to continue<br />

their search for justice. As earlier<br />

stated, the disappearances are the<br />

product of unresolved political disputes<br />

or unjust structures of the societies<br />

which in the name of national<br />

The enforced<br />

disappearance of a<br />

family member<br />

whether by State<br />

actors or non-State<br />

actors immediately<br />

touches one’s heart<br />

and mind and raises a<br />

question like “where is<br />

his loved one?” After<br />

this the most painful<br />

and difficult journey<br />

starts for the search<br />

for a relative of a<br />

victim initially in the<br />

police stations, army<br />

camps, paramilitary<br />

camps...<br />

security are causing the involuntary<br />

disappearances. The enforced disappearance<br />

of a family member<br />

whether by State actors or non-State<br />

actors immediately touches one’s<br />

heart and mind and raises a question<br />

like “where is his loved one?” After<br />

this the most painful and difficult<br />

journey starts for the search for a relative<br />

of a victim initially in the police<br />

stations, army camps, paramilitary<br />

camps, interrogation centres, jails<br />

that leads him nowhere. This search<br />

goes for months and years but to no<br />

consequence. The APDP has one<br />

hope that no country has won the<br />

war against the people. The country<br />

may defeat any other country<br />

through war but not the people as<br />

history stands witness to this.<br />

– The writer is legal advisor to the<br />

Association of Parents of Disappeared<br />

persons (APDP)<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

A tale of anguish<br />

and courage<br />

Sixteen-year-long struggle by a lone woman with eight<br />

children to locate her husband, who was last seen being<br />

driven away in a CRPF vehicle, has not left her without<br />

warmth for anybody who wants to know what befell on<br />

her, writes Tanveen Kawoosa<br />

The 100-km drive up from<br />

Srinagar to the hill town –Uri<br />

was ridden with anguish and<br />

delight, horror and ecstasy. As we<br />

sped on the rough terrains into the<br />

small hamlet called Chandanwari,<br />

whizzing by was the stunning natural<br />

splendour of dramatic hills, dry<br />

stream beds, and serpentine dusty<br />

rocky trails. It was a dreamland<br />

straight from the pages of fairytales.<br />

As we walked up a narrow<br />

mountainous path to a raised platform,<br />

a newly constructed stone<br />

house stood at the edge of the cliff.<br />

Quiet looking, Anwar Jan, 50, sat<br />

relaxed with her children on the<br />

steps of varandah. There was crease<br />

in her brow but the sparkle in the<br />

eyes could not be overlooked.<br />

She took notice of our arrival,<br />

responded us warmly and invited<br />

inside her home. Indeed mountain<br />

people greet you with unpretentious<br />

grace. We talked about rehabilitation<br />

efforts which made a great starting<br />

point for conversation.<br />

Anwar Jan who lives with her<br />

eight children in this small hamlet<br />

shares the same saga of many halfwidows<br />

whose only breadwinners<br />

were subjected to enforced disappearance.<br />

In 1990, the CRPF men in a<br />

joint operation with police laid siege<br />

to this small hamlet and picked up<br />

Anwar Jan’s husband, a retired soldier.<br />

Anwar Jan says he was forced<br />

on to a CRPF vehicle. To this date his<br />

fate and whereabouts remain<br />

unknown. "I was shocked and left<br />

haunted with a single overwhelming<br />

fear; what will happen to our children,’’<br />

Anwar vividly narrates the<br />

incident of that fateful day.<br />

She struggled immensely to find<br />

her missing husband but all in vein.<br />

Nothing has been heard of him for<br />

nearly 16 years and his disappearance<br />

remains mystery. Unaware of<br />

legal intricacies she did not take legal<br />

recourse. Worse, her relatives left her<br />

on her own out of fear for their own<br />

lives. ‘’My close relatives maintained<br />

distance from me. They did not<br />

extend any helping hand to seek my<br />

husband’s release,’’ Anwar says in a<br />

sickening tone.<br />

Anwar Jan had to play<br />

role beyond that of a<br />

homemaker. On the<br />

one hand she has<br />

been battling to bring<br />

up her eight children<br />

and on the other hand<br />

she had to search for<br />

her missing husband<br />

Her struggle in life tells a story of<br />

what empowerment could mean to<br />

women. Anwar Jan had to play role<br />

beyond that of a homemaker. On the<br />

one hand she has been battling to<br />

bring up her eight children and on<br />

the other hand she had to search for<br />

her missing husband. She did all this<br />

courageously without education,<br />

resources and ex-gratia relief.<br />

The family owns only half kanal<br />

stretch. Anwar toils hard to raise<br />

maize. She holds out her wrinkled<br />

hands and smiles. ‘’I do everything<br />

myself. It is wonderful to see the<br />

maize grow." The smoke billowed<br />

out lazily out of the burning hearth.<br />

Her elder daughter Haseena was<br />

busy with domestic chores. There<br />

was rich aroma of baked maize<br />

dough, sizzling in a frying pan, salt<br />

tea bubbling. The tap-tap of colander<br />

spoons stirring vegetables in cauldron<br />

was pleasing to hear. Hunger<br />

tends to gnaw at once, while trekking<br />

in the mountains.<br />

Although Anwar did not have<br />

education she was determined to<br />

enroll all her children in a school.<br />

Her children who study in the nearby<br />

school find sometimes going<br />

tough when they are pestered for not<br />

paying their fees. ‘’Several times my<br />

teacher scolded me for not bringing<br />

school fees," says her elder daughter<br />

Haseena who studies in ninth standard.<br />

Anwar does not hesitate in doing<br />

menial jobs for her children. She<br />

worked for people who made her<br />

sleep on the bare floor and gave her<br />

stale food in separate utensils. ‘’I<br />

never had a choice; there was no one<br />

to take a stand for me. But I love my<br />

children very much. I will never let<br />

anything happen to them. Each time<br />

my children do well in school it is a<br />

reward for me,’’ Anwar says in her<br />

Pahari dialect. This was the only<br />

beginning of a tale of unimaginable<br />

suffering and courage. We clicked<br />

the pictures of happy scene, savour<br />

the tea and head out. There’s the<br />

story of another courageous women<br />

waiting to be explored.<br />

—The writer is a Srinagar-based<br />

journalist<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Impossibility of justice<br />

Legal remedies available to protect right to life are crippled by judicial indifference among<br />

other things, writes advocate Ashok Agrwaal, arguing that this is more rampant in<br />

Kashmir though other parts of the country too have their share in this. Here is a summary<br />

from his monograph on the inadequacies of legal redress system meant to protect human<br />

life. The monograph is soon to be published by the journal of South Asian Forum for<br />

Human Rights<br />

This article summarises a monograph<br />

by the author, to be published<br />

shortly by the South<br />

Asia Forum for Human Rights<br />

(SAFHR). Deaths in custody/disappearance<br />

from custody are endemic<br />

in India and, have been so throughout<br />

its independent history. The reasons<br />

for this state of affairs are complex<br />

and, it would not be correct to<br />

assign the entire responsibility for it<br />

to any one factor, or pillar of the<br />

nation-state. However, there can be<br />

no gainsaying that the defects in the<br />

approach of the judiciary have<br />

played a pivotal role in the failure of<br />

the guarantee of the right to life.<br />

The report examines some of<br />

these shortcomings, using the aperture<br />

provided by one of the world’s<br />

best known legal remedies, the writ<br />

of habeas corpus, the sole remedy<br />

available in law in case of a violation<br />

of the right to life and liberty, guaranteed<br />

by Article-21 of the<br />

Constitution.<br />

In technical terms, therefore, this<br />

document may be called a report on<br />

the functioning of the constitutional<br />

and legal redress mechanism for the<br />

protection of the right to life, during<br />

the period of insurgency in Kashmir:<br />

1990 to 2004. Though the study was<br />

based upon the court process, we did<br />

not rely solely upon the court<br />

records. The testimony of the survivor<br />

families is crucial to a proper<br />

delineation of an impunity landscape.<br />

The theme of the report, as distinct<br />

from its technical nomenclature,<br />

is to portray the impossibility of justice<br />

for the victims of impunity: particularly<br />

in Kashmir but the principle<br />

being applicable to such victims<br />

everywhere. Though the impossibility<br />

is portrayed through the failure of<br />

the constitutional mechanism for the<br />

protection of the guaranteed right to<br />

life, it is actually far more encompassing.<br />

The main thrust of the study is<br />

based on an examination of 96 cases<br />

of alleged enforced disappearance of<br />

Kashmiris. Eighty seven of these<br />

cases resulted in the filing of a petition<br />

for a writ of habeas corpus before<br />

the Srinagar Bench of the Jammu &<br />

Kashmir High Court. No such petition<br />

was filed in the remaining nine<br />

cases. The only criterion for the nclusion<br />

of each of the 87 cases was that<br />

they had habeas corpus petitions filed<br />

before the Srinagar Bench of the<br />

Jammu & Kashmir High Court. The<br />

numbers limit was imposed by time<br />

and resource constraints, and nothing<br />

else. The nine cases which did<br />

not result in a petition include the<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

case of one of two young men who<br />

were arrested at the same time but<br />

the family of one of them decided not<br />

to file a petition for fear that it might<br />

antagonise the army and lessen the<br />

chances of their son coming home<br />

alive. These nine cases also include<br />

three cases of disappearances of<br />

Kashmiris from Nepal. These three<br />

Kashmiri businessmen were arrested<br />

by the Nepal police at the behest of<br />

the Indian authorities. The Nepal<br />

police informally acknowledged<br />

their arrest and said that the men<br />

were handed over to a team of police<br />

officers from India. Officially however,<br />

they denied the arrests. The<br />

Indian authorities took the stand that<br />

since the men were admittedly<br />

arrested by the Nepali police, they<br />

should be asked to account for them.<br />

Petitions before the high court at<br />

Delhi and the national human rights<br />

commission at Delhi were to no avail.<br />

Till date, the families have not<br />

received any information of their<br />

whereabouts. These three cases illustrate<br />

that the impossibility of justice<br />

crosses the geographic boundaries of<br />

the state of Jammu & Kashmir. There<br />

seems to be no reason for the denial<br />

of redress to these families other than<br />

It goes without saying<br />

that a helpless court is<br />

unlikely to be able to<br />

pass clear and<br />

decisive final orders,<br />

even in cases where<br />

the allegation stood<br />

proved. In over 57<br />

percent of the cases in<br />

which there was a<br />

clear finding against<br />

an identified security<br />

force/unit<br />

the fact that the persons arrested<br />

were Kashmiris.<br />

The single most striking feature<br />

of the habeas corpus proceedings is the<br />

powerlessness of the high court.<br />

Everything else can be derived from<br />

this fact. From the point of time<br />

when the court issued notice of the<br />

petition upon the respondents, it lost<br />

all control over the proceedings. The<br />

pace, the manner in which the case<br />

would proceed, and the outcome of<br />

the case was controlled entirely by<br />

the respondents— the central and the<br />

state governments. Nor did the court<br />

display a significantly better control<br />

over its own establishment. The staff<br />

of the high court has no fear of consequences<br />

for culpably slack and careless<br />

work. The subordinate judiciary,<br />

the district judges (DJ) and the chief<br />

judicial magistrates (CJM), who were<br />

appointed enquiry officers in most<br />

cases, were only marginally more<br />

responsive to the imperatives of justice.<br />

It goes without saying that a helpless<br />

court is unlikely to be able to<br />

pass clear and decisive final orders,<br />

even in cases where the allegation<br />

stood proved. In over 57 percent of<br />

the cases in which there was a clear<br />

finding against an identified security<br />

force/unit, the court found itself<br />

unable to do anything other than<br />

order registration of an FIR, which<br />

ought to have been registered in the<br />

first place, without the court’s intervention.<br />

To fully appreciate the<br />

absurdity of such an order we must<br />

also factor in the number of years<br />

that it took the court to pass such an<br />

order.<br />

What words does one use to<br />

describe a justice system in which the<br />

best order that the family of a disappeared<br />

person can expect – several<br />

years after the event – is a direction<br />

to the police to register an FIR?<br />

There can be no more damning<br />

indictment of the system than this.<br />

But the reality is even worse. We<br />

have records, and recorded<br />

testimony, to show that the registration<br />

of the FIR was seen by all concerned,<br />

the families, the police and,<br />

the judges as a mere formality, the<br />

completion of which would enable<br />

What words does one<br />

use to describe a<br />

justice system in which<br />

the best order that the<br />

family of a<br />

disappeared person<br />

can expect – several<br />

years after the event –<br />

is a direction to the<br />

police to register an<br />

FIR<br />

the system to wash its hands of the<br />

matter. The only real expression of<br />

contrition, howsoever inadequate,<br />

that the system shows for its mistakes,<br />

is in its willingness to consider the<br />

grant of ex-gratia compensation to<br />

the families of the disappeared.<br />

The court was not completely<br />

oblivious of the fact that it was playing<br />

out a farce. For example, it is<br />

repeatedly seen that the court did not<br />

pay attention to its earlier orders, acting<br />

– almost – as if on each date of<br />

hearing the entire matter was being<br />

dealt with afresh, ignoring all that<br />

was said and done in the past; as if<br />

the years of proceedings before that<br />

date never happened. It seems to me<br />

such forgetfulness is essential for<br />

retaining a modicum of sanity in the<br />

schizophrenic environs of the J&K<br />

justice system. Unscrupulous<br />

respondents and their lawyers took<br />

advantage of this amnesiac functioning,<br />

getting away with everything—<br />

from years of delay in filing replies to<br />

inveigling the court to disposing of<br />

petitions (that had been pending for<br />

several years) in the absence of representation<br />

on behalf of the petitioners.<br />

The court’s lack of control over its<br />

establishment, or the courts and officers<br />

subordinate to it resulted in the<br />

staff of the court frequently not carrying<br />

out the directions issued to it<br />

by the judges, with no fear of consequences.<br />

For example, notices/sum-<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

mons were frequently not issued,<br />

despite directions. The result was<br />

years of delay in serving notices<br />

upon agencies who had a 'standing<br />

counsel' in the high court. The performance<br />

of the subordinate judiciary,<br />

the DJs and the CJMs, who were<br />

appointed enquiry officers in most<br />

cases, was mixed. Despite working<br />

under harshly adverse conditions<br />

they often conducted exemplary<br />

enquiries. However in several cases,<br />

the conclusions drawn in the enquiry<br />

reports were patently absurd, or<br />

careless. In none of the cases did the<br />

high court catch the absurdity, or correct<br />

the carelessness.<br />

The conduct of the other players<br />

in the farce is also reflective of their<br />

In over 70 percent of the petitions in which the<br />

accused unit filed a response (41 cases out of 58),<br />

it was a bald denial of arrest. Of the remaining<br />

responses, in 10 cases they admitted the arrest<br />

but claimed that the person concerned had been,<br />

subsequently, released. In three cases (pertaining<br />

to four persons) they claimed that the arrested<br />

persons had escaped from their custody<br />

awareness of the true nature of the<br />

proceedings. In Manzoor Zargar’s<br />

case, the BSF took over five years to<br />

file their response to the petition. In<br />

as many as 17 cases the respondents<br />

took more than two years to file their<br />

replies. In 30 cases, they took<br />

between one year and two years to<br />

file their replies. Coupled with the<br />

fact that the accused unit of the<br />

armed forces did not file any reply at<br />

all in as many as 38 cases, the inference<br />

is clear.<br />

The nature of their responses is<br />

equally revealing. In over 70 percent<br />

of the petitions in which the accused<br />

unit filed a response (41 cases out of<br />

58), it was a bald denial of arrest. Of<br />

the remaining responses, in 10 cases<br />

they admitted the arrest but claimed<br />

that the person concerned had been,<br />

subsequently, released. In three cases<br />

(pertaining to four persons) they<br />

claimed that the arrested persons<br />

had escaped from their custody. In<br />

four cases it was stated that the<br />

arrested persons were held in legally<br />

recorded and, acknowledged, custody<br />

after their arrest.<br />

The conduct of the security forces<br />

even more scornful once the case had<br />

been sent to the enquiry judge. In a<br />

very large number of the 62 cases in<br />

which inquiries were ordered by the<br />

high court, the accused unit did not<br />

participate in the enquiry proceedings.<br />

In several cases the enquiry<br />

judge recorded adverse remarks<br />

about the conduct of the accused<br />

unit, specifically attributing the<br />

delay in completing the enquiry to<br />

their tactics. In none of the enquiries<br />

did the security forces produce the<br />

records pertaining to the deployment<br />

of their troops, or those pertaining to<br />

the crackdowns that are a daily routine<br />

of life in Kashmir, or the records<br />

pertaining to the arrest/detention of<br />

people. Nor did they ever bring<br />

before the court any of the<br />

soldiers/officers responsible for the<br />

impugned actions. In Basharat<br />

Shah’s case, the CRPF made the commandant<br />

and the deputy commandant<br />

of the 53 Bn to retire rather than<br />

produce them before the enquiry<br />

officer appointed by the high court.<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

That they did not file a reply<br />

before the high court or, that they did<br />

not participate in the inquiry proceedings<br />

did not mean that the security<br />

forces were not following the<br />

proceedings. In several cases the<br />

accused unit of the armed forces did<br />

not file a reply before the high court<br />

or cooperate in the judicial enquiry<br />

ordered but chose to file objections to<br />

the enquiry report; which had held<br />

against them. Thus, the picture is one<br />

of watchful disregard for the court<br />

and its processes. Wherever the security<br />

forces felt that they needed to<br />

intervene, they did so.<br />

This position becomes even clearer<br />

when the context is widened to<br />

include the response of the central<br />

government in cases where the state<br />

government requested it for grant of<br />

sanction to prosecute officers/ members<br />

of the central security forces<br />

(including the army), who had been<br />

charged with penal offences.<br />

In four petitions, the police are on<br />

record as having completed their<br />

investigation and finalised a<br />

chargesheet against the officers/soldiers<br />

responsible for the arrest/disappearance.<br />

In two of these cases we<br />

have no information except for the<br />

The poor father of<br />

Mohammad Yusuf<br />

Wahloo told the judge<br />

that since his son was<br />

dead, he did not want<br />

to participate in the<br />

proceedings. However,<br />

when apprised of the<br />

facts, the high court<br />

chose to dispose of<br />

the case for want of<br />

instructions from the<br />

petitioner<br />

fact that the police had stated before<br />

the court that their investigation was<br />

complete and the chargesheet ready<br />

for being filed before the competent<br />

court. In two other cases, the high<br />

court involved itself in monitoring<br />

and, to some extent, supervising the<br />

state government in the process of<br />

obtaining sanction from the central<br />

government. In both these cases the<br />

central government rejected the<br />

request for grant of sanction to prosecute<br />

the officers concerned.<br />

These two cases are not the only<br />

ones in which the central government<br />

has refused the request for<br />

sanction. It is our information that<br />

the central government has granted<br />

sanction to prosecute in only two of<br />

the hundreds of cases in which such<br />

sanction was sought. In other words,<br />

it is reasonable to infer that the central<br />

government was/is not inclined<br />

to permit the courts in the state of<br />

Jammu & Kashmir to exercise jurisdiction<br />

and control over forces under<br />

its command. The conduct of the central<br />

security forces in the habeas corpus<br />

petitions examined in this report,<br />

mirrors this attitude and, once this is<br />

factored in, the conduct of these<br />

forces becomes explicable.<br />

The palpable indifference of the<br />

process also led to consequences that<br />

would have been comical, but for the<br />

tragic setting. In as many as 17 of the<br />

85 petitions, the proceedings continued<br />

for several years after the<br />

arrestee had been released by the<br />

security forces. In one case, the<br />

arrestee was booked under the Public<br />

Security Act, served out his period of<br />

detention, was released, and killed<br />

by the army in a fake encounter<br />

before the high court and its staff<br />

reached his home. The abjectly poor<br />

father of Mohammad Yusuf Wahloo<br />

(91/8) told the enquiry judge that<br />

since his son was dead, he did not<br />

want to participate in the proceedings.<br />

However, when apprised of the<br />

facts, the high court chose to dispose<br />

of the case for want of instructions from<br />

the petitioner. The appalling insensitivity<br />

of the court to the plight of the<br />

people whom it is supposed to serve,<br />

in justice, seems to be encapsuled in<br />

this remark.<br />

One can speculate that the abject<br />

surrender of its prerogatives by the<br />

court was, at least, in part a result of<br />

the realisation of its complete helplessness.<br />

It also seems to us that it<br />

took time for the full extent of its<br />

irrelevance to hit the court. With the<br />

passage of years the proceedings<br />

became increasingly formal, with the<br />

court displaying less and less enthusiasm<br />

for playing out or, prolonging<br />

the farce. On the other hand, the<br />

security forces displayed an increasing<br />

mastery of the processes of justice.<br />

The result is clearly visible from<br />

the cases discussed. From 1999<br />

onwards, the court ordered an<br />

enquiry in a very few cases, being<br />

content to simply ask the police to<br />

register an FIR/ complete investigation<br />

in the FIR already lodged.<br />

Every fact we have examined and<br />

analysed inexorably reinforces the<br />

conclusion about the irrelevance of<br />

the habeas corpus proceedings. The<br />

court went through the motions,<br />

without any faith in the effectiveness,<br />

or sanctity of its processes. The result<br />

was not just that the court’s intervention<br />

did not save any lives; these processes<br />

had no impact whatsoever on<br />

the prevailing situation. It was as if<br />

the courts did not exist.<br />

It is not easy to analyse a complete<br />

farce, particularly when the<br />

players of the farce act out with a,<br />

seeming, air of unawareness of it. We<br />

found absurdity, capriciousness, culpable<br />

negligence, callous disregard<br />

and more. We found a court completely<br />

oblivious to its place and<br />

importance in the constitutional<br />

scheme of things. A court unwilling<br />

to acknowledge its linkages to the<br />

society in which it was situated. Yet,<br />

the court functions— judges come<br />

and go in their siren equipped cars,<br />

shielded both by curtains on the car<br />

windows and, by the phalanx of<br />

security personnel who guard them.<br />

Perhaps guarded by the same personnel<br />

(or, at least, their brothers in<br />

arms) who disappear the people on<br />

whose behalf the judges hear habeas<br />

corpus petitions.<br />

— The writer is a Delhi-based<br />

senior advocate<br />

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HEALING TOUCH<br />

Try out<br />

participatory justice<br />

Newer approach to bring back faith in law is not possible in an embattled zone like<br />

Kashmir without taking people into confidence and evolving a redress mechanism<br />

through their participation, writes Haley Duschinski<br />

Since late 2003, India and<br />

Pakistan have been pursuing a<br />

composite dialogue at the high<br />

governmental level to resolve a number<br />

of contentious issues between the<br />

two countries, including the long<br />

standing dispute over Kashmir.<br />

Against the backdrop of this protracted<br />

normalisation process, a variety<br />

of Kashmiri civil society organisations<br />

– of the victims and relatives,<br />

organisations, oral history advocacy<br />

groups, and community-initiated<br />

documentation projects – have<br />

emerged seeking truth and justice for<br />

human rights abuses including extrajudicial<br />

killings, forced disappearances,<br />

torture, rape, and illegal<br />

detention carried out by Indian State<br />

security forces over the last 18 years.<br />

Through their initiatives, these<br />

organisations are documenting State<br />

abuses, collecting victim statements<br />

and testimonials, memorialising<br />

those who have died or disappeared,<br />

and opening up public space to<br />

address concerns about peace and<br />

justice in the Valley. Most recently,<br />

the public commission on human<br />

rights has instituted an international<br />

people’s tribunal to investigate<br />

human rights violations from<br />

November 2003 to 2009 through<br />

examination of evidence, statements,<br />

and testimonials, with the broader<br />

aims of shedding light on patterns of<br />

institutionalised violence and collective<br />

trauma and formulating recommendations<br />

for justice, reparation,<br />

and healing.<br />

Such popular mobilisations for<br />

truth and justice are operating in the<br />

domain of civil society to establish<br />

non-State sanctioned mechanisms –<br />

“Unofficial Truth Projects” – to<br />

achieve justice for the wrongs of the<br />

past (Bickford 2007). This article<br />

seeks to bring together these disparate<br />

initiatives as complementary<br />

components of a participatory justice<br />

movement in Kashmir, one that is<br />

fundamentally founded on the<br />

notion of Kashmiri participation and<br />

engagement in the process of social<br />

reconstruction.<br />

Transitional justice<br />

Transitional justice refers to the<br />

processes of building or rebuilding<br />

institutions in a post-conflict society<br />

to effectively promote the rule of law<br />

while also providing some sort of<br />

accountability and redress for<br />

human rights abuses in the past.<br />

Transitional justice mechanisms may<br />

include trials, truth commissions,<br />

and various victims’ reparations programmes,<br />

as well as other symbolic<br />

practices of rebuilding communities<br />

such as public apologies, commemorations,<br />

and memorials.<br />

These mechanisms may be motivated<br />

by multiple needs and desires,<br />

including: establishing the truth of<br />

past atrocities to set straight the historical<br />

record; ensuring accountability<br />

through the punishment of offenders<br />

to deter abuses in the future;<br />

building institutions to establish the<br />

rule of law in which human rights<br />

and democratic principles are valued;<br />

and addressing the needs of victims<br />

to honour their experiences and<br />

help them heal. Many post-conflict<br />

societies have found it difficult to<br />

address all of these needs at the same<br />

time, and transitional justice realities<br />

are often the result of compromise<br />

and negotiation.<br />

Transitional justice packages are<br />

typically defined as State-sponsored<br />

initiatives that take place in the midst<br />

of or directly following periods of<br />

political transition, whether this transition<br />

is a sudden peace settlement or<br />

a more gradual process of democratisation<br />

and normalisation.<br />

Historically, States attempting to<br />

sponsor their own transitional justice<br />

practices during the continuation of<br />

abuses by government forces have<br />

encountered prohibitive challenges.<br />

For example, the truth commission<br />

established in the Philippines in 1986<br />

stalled after one year when all but<br />

one of the commissioners resigned in<br />

protest of continuing abuses by<br />

Corazon Aquino’s government<br />

(Hayner 1996).<br />

Ongoing conditions of militarisation<br />

and repression in Kashmir<br />

Valley seem to preclude the possibil-<br />

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HEALING TOUCH<br />

ity of a meaningful State-sponsored<br />

justice package at this particular<br />

juncture. These conditions are authorised<br />

by the Armed Forces Special<br />

Powers Act (AFSPA), a particularly<br />

draconian law that has been sharply<br />

criticised by Kashmiri and Indian<br />

human rights organisations, as well<br />

as Amnesty International and<br />

Human Rights Watch, for granting<br />

excessive powers to State security<br />

forces and establishing a regime of<br />

impunity in relation to grave human<br />

rights abuses perpetrated by the<br />

State. Repeal of the AFSPA is a necessary<br />

but not sufficient step for establishing<br />

equitable and sustainable<br />

peace in Kashmir Valley.<br />

Conventional models<br />

Post-conflict societies have<br />

employed different models of transitional<br />

justice to promote the establishment<br />

of an equitable and sustainable<br />

peace. There is clearly no onesize-fits-all<br />

model that can be productively<br />

applied to all social settings.<br />

Indeed, different constellations<br />

of circumstances call for different justice<br />

projects and different arrays of<br />

retributive and restorative approaches<br />

(Minow 1998). It is important to<br />

consider the benefits and limitations<br />

of these different models in order to<br />

determine a justice approach that<br />

makes sense in a particular post-conflict<br />

site.<br />

Trials – criminal justice proceedings<br />

carried out in a court of law to<br />

establish culpability and determine<br />

individual criminal liability and<br />

issue sanctions – were first used as a<br />

strategy for post-war reconstruction<br />

in Nuremburg and Tokyo after<br />

WWII. The United Nations’ ad hoc<br />

tribunals in the former Yugoslavia<br />

(1993) and Rwanda (1994) gave rise<br />

to the establishment of the international<br />

criminal court in 2003, while<br />

special tribunals have been convened<br />

in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, East<br />

Timor, and Lebanon.<br />

Framed as mechanisms for restoring<br />

rule of law, trials are based on the<br />

principle of retributive justice, meaning<br />

that punishment is perceived as a<br />

morally appropriate response to<br />

criminal acts. Trials and tribunals<br />

have the advantage of “setting<br />

The truth commissions<br />

are temporary<br />

commissions of<br />

enquiry sanctioned by<br />

the government to<br />

examine a record of<br />

abuses over a<br />

specified time. They<br />

can be national, as in<br />

Argentina in 1983 and<br />

South Africa in 1995,<br />

or international, as in<br />

El Salvador in 1992<br />

straight” the historical record and<br />

producing a measure of individual<br />

accountability for mass atrocities, but<br />

they are often limited in that they<br />

focus primarily on individual perpetrators<br />

rather than patterns of<br />

oppression and inequality. In this<br />

sense, they may be effective mechanisms<br />

for determining culpability in<br />

some cases, but they never reveal the<br />

whole story about the “truth” of<br />

what actually happened during<br />

extended periods of conflict.<br />

The process of carrying out war<br />

crimes trials or criminal tribunals in a<br />

transparent and above-board manner<br />

can be a tricky proposition for<br />

societies emerging from long protracted<br />

struggles with weak institutions.<br />

For example, in the case of El<br />

Salvador, trials were not an option<br />

after 12 years of bloody civil war<br />

because of widespread and institutionalised<br />

corruption in the judicial<br />

system (Hayner 2001).<br />

Since the 1980s, truth commissions<br />

have become an option for<br />

many post-conflict societies when trials<br />

are not a viable alternative. The<br />

truth commissions are temporary<br />

commissions of enquiry sanctioned<br />

by the government to examine a<br />

record of abuses over a specified<br />

time. They can be national, as in<br />

Argentina in 1983 and South Africa<br />

in 1995, or international, as in El<br />

Salvador in 1992 and Guatemala in<br />

1997.<br />

Modeled on a framework of<br />

restorative justice that privileges<br />

social healing over punishment,<br />

truth commissions can be a powerful<br />

tool for promoting reconciliation<br />

within and between divided communities;<br />

specifying recommendations<br />

for political, military, or judicial<br />

reforms; providing an institutionalised<br />

space for airing grief and pain;<br />

and providing official acknowledgement<br />

of a long-silenced violent past.<br />

In some cases, however, truth commissions<br />

or other comparable modes<br />

of enquiry may not be appropriate,<br />

especially if there has been no radical<br />

change in institutions of power,<br />

authority, and governance.<br />

The truth commissions have been<br />

limited, co-opted, or undermined by<br />

government leaders interested in<br />

preserving their public image, pleasing<br />

international donors, or maintaining<br />

their hold on power, as in the<br />

case of the commission of “whitewash”<br />

enquiry established by Idi<br />

Amin to investigate hundreds of disappearances<br />

occurring under his<br />

own rule in Uganda in 1974. The<br />

South African Truth and reconciliation<br />

commission is considered by<br />

many a model of transitional justice,<br />

although its “truth for amnesty”<br />

arrangement, in which perpetrators<br />

received amnesty for some categories<br />

of crimes if they made full disclosure,<br />

has had a controversial legacy.<br />

Participatory approach<br />

These standard models of transitional<br />

justice have conventionally<br />

been implemented in a top-down<br />

manner, by national and/or international<br />

bodies that do not necessarily<br />

acknowledge or appreciate local conceptions<br />

of rights, local meanings of<br />

justice, and local visions of the<br />

future. To cite a recent example,<br />

negotiations over the Cambodian tribunal<br />

between 1997 and 2004 were<br />

carried out with remarkably little<br />

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HEALING TOUCH<br />

Participatory<br />

strategies emerge out<br />

of a broadly<br />

representative<br />

dialogue within and<br />

among different<br />

segments of society<br />

about political and<br />

moral priorities<br />

including truth telling,<br />

public<br />

acknowledgment,<br />

financial<br />

compensation...<br />

effort to incorporate input from ordinary<br />

Cambodian people, apart from<br />

a limited measure of less-than-transparent<br />

consultation with select civil<br />

society organisation (McGrew 2006).<br />

This top-down approach is problematic<br />

because it can, and often does,<br />

lead to marginalisation of the very<br />

communities that are supposed to be<br />

reconciled and neglect of the very<br />

institutions that are supposed to be<br />

reconstructed (Lundy and McGovern<br />

2008).<br />

For this reason, transitional justice<br />

scholars and practitioners are<br />

beginning to call for second order<br />

approaches, ones that take local perspectives,<br />

opinions, and mobilisations<br />

into account at every stage of<br />

conception and implementation.<br />

Such grassroots efforts are especially<br />

critical in sites such as Kashmir<br />

Valley, where popular protests<br />

against political exclusion, economic<br />

exploitation, and “lack of voice” have<br />

been, and continue to be, issues of<br />

considerable concern for various<br />

communities of stakeholders.<br />

What might a “bottom up”<br />

approach – one founded on principles<br />

of local participation, ownership,<br />

and agency – look like in<br />

Kashmir Valley? This form of participatory<br />

justice is, in fact, already<br />

underway, through a patchwork<br />

array of mechanisms that all contribute<br />

to the project of transition in<br />

the absence of official processes of<br />

judicial redress and/or meaningful<br />

and transparent truth telling at the<br />

state level.<br />

Many different Kashmiri communities<br />

with many different notions of<br />

truth and justice hold stakes in the<br />

project of peace. Participatory strategies<br />

emerge out of a broadly representative<br />

dialogue within and among<br />

different segments of society about<br />

political and moral priorities including<br />

truth telling, public acknowledgment,<br />

financial compensation, social<br />

healing, trust building, retribution,<br />

and strengthening public institutions.<br />

An expansive dialogue process,<br />

initiated at the local level, is<br />

bringing these notions out into the<br />

open.<br />

The international people’s tribunal<br />

is currently the most high profile<br />

of these truth and justice projects.<br />

It is being supplemented by other<br />

types of efforts such as: locally initiated<br />

forums, within and between<br />

communities, for reconciliation and<br />

healing; ceremonial and ritual activities<br />

based on cultural traditions;<br />

memorials and inscriptions as forms<br />

of public commemoration; documentation<br />

and oral history work in written,<br />

audio, and photographic forms;<br />

interpretive work through films,<br />

poetry, songs, and graphic art; and<br />

community integration activities to<br />

promote dialogue and discussion.<br />

These efforts, even those operating<br />

on a small scale, may usefully be<br />

conceptualised and framed as complementary<br />

components of a larger<br />

Kashmiri-initiated project in pursuit<br />

of truth and justice. And they all play<br />

a critical role in resisting and reworking<br />

a State-imposed culture of denial<br />

and omission that obscures injustices<br />

and inequalities in the name of a<br />

superficial and shallow peace.<br />

Ultimately, it is impossible to<br />

imagine that any form of sustainable<br />

and equitable peace could be<br />

obtained in Kashmir without<br />

The international<br />

people’s tribunal is<br />

currently the most high<br />

profile of these truth<br />

and justice projects. It<br />

is being supplemented<br />

by other types of<br />

efforts such as: locally<br />

initiated forums,<br />

within and between<br />

communities, for<br />

reconciliation and<br />

healing...<br />

Kashmiri participation in, and ownership<br />

of, the process of transition.<br />

And it is impossible to imagine that<br />

any form of sustainable and equitable<br />

peace could be obtained in<br />

Kashmir without taking the many<br />

different notions of truth, justice, and<br />

accountability into account.<br />

References<br />

Bickford, Louis. 2007. “Unofficial Truth<br />

Projects.” Human Rights Quarterly 29:<br />

994-1035.<br />

Hayner, Priscilla. 1996. “Commissioning<br />

the Truth: Further Research Questions.”<br />

Third World Quarterly 17(1): 19-29.<br />

Hayner, Priscilla. 2001. Unspeakable<br />

Truths: Confronting State Terror and<br />

Atrocity. New York: Routledge.<br />

Lundy, Patricia and Mark McGovern.<br />

2008. “Whose Justice? Rethinking<br />

Transitional Justice from the Bottom<br />

Up.” Journal of <strong>Law</strong> and Society 35(2):<br />

265-292.<br />

McGrew, Laura. 2006. “Transitional<br />

Justice Approaches in Cambodia.”<br />

Justice Initiative (spring): 139-150.<br />

Minow, Martha. 1998. Between Vengeance<br />

and Forgiveness: Facing Hiustory after<br />

Genocide and Mass Violence. Boston:<br />

Beacon Press.<br />

— The author is assistant professor<br />

of anthropology, department of sociology<br />

and anthropology, Ohio University USA<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Maimed, mauled<br />

by military-militia<br />

Away from the<br />

accepted narrative of<br />

Kashmir as an 'issue'<br />

or a 'problem',<br />

Kashimiris find it<br />

difficult to talk about<br />

their plight as fear of<br />

violence lurks<br />

through the air,<br />

writes Amrit Dhatt<br />

Kashmir Question… Kashmir<br />

Problem… Kashmir Issue.<br />

Political analysts and journalists<br />

have used such phrases with so<br />

much ease and regularity over the<br />

years that they have begun to<br />

become clichés. Yet, the Kashmir conflict<br />

is amongst the most discussed,<br />

debated and deliberated issues in the<br />

world. This was first brought to the<br />

attention of the United Nations<br />

Security Council in 1948, and it is the<br />

longest unresolved dispute on the<br />

agenda. The conflict is beyond the<br />

scope of politics and borders; it has<br />

become a deeply ideological issue<br />

and has kept alive the battleground<br />

that was created with the two-nation<br />

theory. Besides the conflict in Israel<br />

and Palestine, Kashmir has been the<br />

site of the longest territorial dispute<br />

in the post-1945 world. There are a<br />

multitude of voices and opinions on<br />

Kashmir littered all over political<br />

space. Yet, one aspect of the conflict<br />

remains neglected and, thus,<br />

deserves attention: what are the<br />

long-term implications of the conflict<br />

on the people of Kashmir?<br />

While there is an abundance of<br />

literature on the dispute, possible<br />

resolutions, and “human interest”<br />

stories that illustrate the painful lives<br />

of those affected by the violence, little<br />

is understood globally about the<br />

people of the valley. Attempting to<br />

project the voices of the people of the<br />

valley is not an easy task because<br />

they are not a homogenous group<br />

and the issues they raise are multifaceted<br />

and complex.<br />

First encounter<br />

Author of these lines visited<br />

Srinagar recently and was fortunate<br />

enough to have caught a brief but<br />

telling glimpse of the human side of<br />

the conflict, minus the heartrending<br />

stories that simplify the issue and<br />

replace context with emotions.<br />

Immediately after setting foot out of<br />

the aircraft, I was presented with<br />

stark differences that so often characterise<br />

life in Srinagar: a large, colourful<br />

boarding, depicting lakes and<br />

mountains and reading “Paradise on<br />

Earth” and standing directly beneath<br />

it was an airport security guard<br />

cradling a firearm. Outside the airport,<br />

similar signs are strewn<br />

throughout the road. It is dotted with<br />

barbed wire, barricaded checkpoints,<br />

sandbag-lined bastions of security<br />

men. This phenomenon is not<br />

reserved for the airport area alone;<br />

army barracks, gun totting security<br />

forces, and checkpoints stretch over<br />

the entire city.<br />

This easily visible militarisation<br />

of Srinagar is coupled with fear and<br />

apprehension, associated with the<br />

human rights abuses committed by<br />

the military as well as militia. Their<br />

conspicuous presence has become a<br />

permanent feature in people’s day-<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

to-day lives, and its mortal fear is<br />

what people have to endure all the<br />

time. What kind of psychological<br />

effect does growing up in the shadow<br />

of the gun have on a generation<br />

of children? Studies conducted by<br />

psychologists reveal that an alarmingly<br />

large percentage of the population<br />

suffers from deep anxiety and<br />

uncertainty where they are never<br />

sure of their safety and security. This<br />

raises a host of questions, including<br />

the socialisation of violence. This has<br />

even permeated to the children of the<br />

Valley. Its admiration in some cases<br />

has been becoming accepted. For<br />

example, a young boy during a family<br />

picnic in a lush green park smiles<br />

widely, posing for a picture in a faux<br />

turban and proudly holding a plastic<br />

AK47. His father looks on and is<br />

pleased by the sight.<br />

Personal narratives<br />

It is difficult to encounter somebody<br />

in Srinagar who does not have<br />

their own personal narrative about<br />

how the conflict has affected their<br />

lives. The realities of living in an<br />

embattled zone have become standardised.<br />

Even those who are relatively<br />

young and live in far more<br />

peaceful times than the previous<br />

generation have a story to tell. A<br />

young Kashmiri Pundit girl talks<br />

about how her family was forced to<br />

leave Srinagar way back in 1989, and<br />

despite being born there, she does<br />

not feel that she belongs to Srinagar<br />

anymore: “My parents were visiting<br />

Jammu when my grandfather told<br />

my parents not to come back. They<br />

had no choice but to abandon their<br />

home.”<br />

A young man talks about his family’s<br />

loss ever since his cousin disappeared:<br />

“Nobody has helped us,<br />

even though many organisations<br />

have come knocking our door to hear<br />

our woes.” A jeweller, whose clients<br />

consist of tourists as well as locals, is<br />

so grateful while he shares his experiences<br />

from his newly renovated<br />

shop on Residency Road: “I had to<br />

keep the shop closed for 14 years<br />

because of militancy. I tried moving<br />

to various parts of India to practice<br />

my craft and sell my designs, but<br />

nothing is like being able to work<br />

from homestead.”<br />

At a ‘Students for<br />

Human Rights’<br />

meeting called by the<br />

Human Rights <strong>Law</strong><br />

Network, former<br />

chairman of Bar<br />

Council of India<br />

Dhairyasheel Patil<br />

encouraged an<br />

audience of students<br />

by saying, “Don’t worry<br />

if the world is<br />

crumbling, because we<br />

have to build a new<br />

world”<br />

A peaceful day in the Valley is a<br />

great consolation as violence has not<br />

just been a possibility but precondition<br />

for past two decades or so. An<br />

old resident of Srinagar illustrated<br />

this with his attempt to alleviate<br />

some of the apprehension of an outsider<br />

through this exchange:<br />

“When was the last bomb blast?”<br />

“Oh, don’t worry, it wasn’t recent.”<br />

“Not recent?”<br />

“I’m not exactly sure, maybe sixseven<br />

months ago.”<br />

Somehow, six months don’t feel<br />

like history to me. There are signs of<br />

peace returning to Srinagar and thus<br />

expectations too are heightened.<br />

People are making claims that<br />

Kashmir is going back to a state of<br />

normalcy. Vested parties are quick to<br />

maintain that the Valley is slowly<br />

returning to a state of relative peace<br />

but how we are to define peace when<br />

gun wielding security men are all<br />

over? A young man from a rural part<br />

of Kashmir tries to make this point: “<br />

I visited my village after 10 years,<br />

because it was not safe before that.<br />

People are saying that it is much<br />

more peaceful now and that it’s<br />

returning back to normal. I’m not<br />

sure about normalcy for it is yet to be<br />

seen if this sense of normalcy lasts.<br />

People might go to each other’s houses<br />

for dinner or attend a wedding<br />

that drags late into the night…”<br />

Before the young man could finish,<br />

his face slowly fell, making his longing<br />

for peace all the more resounding.<br />

While engaging with youth in<br />

Srinagar, mainly university students,<br />

their frustration and anger became<br />

evident. They are a generation that is<br />

fed up with violence amid din created<br />

by self-determination. They<br />

endure brutality and human rights<br />

violations at all levels. They have had<br />

it with grandiose dialogues with<br />

Delhi and Islamabad and are<br />

demanding change in terms of talks.<br />

However, these demands must be<br />

made quietly, they feel, because students<br />

do not have the liberty to speak<br />

their mind against these formidable<br />

States known for their merciless<br />

ways. “That is the problem, we are<br />

not free,” said one of the students<br />

wryly. Their courage and conscience<br />

have been suppressed and so are<br />

their desire and motivation to stand<br />

for what they feel to be right.<br />

At a ‘Students for Human Rights’<br />

meeting called by the Human Rights<br />

<strong>Law</strong> Network, former chairman of<br />

Bar Council of India Dhairyasheel<br />

Patil encouraged an audience of students<br />

by saying, “Don’t worry if the<br />

world is crumbling, because we have<br />

to build a new world.” He also went<br />

on to stress that disenchantment is<br />

futile unless it leads to something<br />

constructive. Largely, Kashmiri<br />

youth are dogged by a severe human<br />

rights crisis created by high political<br />

stakes where their free will finds<br />

scant regard. This is what that came<br />

out through the deliberations at the<br />

meeting and questions posed by<br />

young participants.<br />

— The writer is a researcher from<br />

Canada<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Captive State<br />

in a free subcontinent<br />

A better status under the British empire could not<br />

last once Kashmir was caught amid rivalry<br />

between free India and Pakistan, despite quite a<br />

few treaties and laws that could have ensured a<br />

better deal for Kashmiris, writes<br />

Dr Abdul Majid Siraj<br />

Atrain of unfortunate legal<br />

signposts marks the political<br />

course taken by Kashmir ever<br />

since the historic decolonisation of<br />

South Asian subcontinent. It started<br />

in 1947 when the British made a precipitous<br />

exit with imperfect decolonisation<br />

of the Princely India. There<br />

are those members of legal fraternity<br />

who do not lock step with the procedures<br />

adopted by the British to<br />

decolonise Kashmir because they<br />

contend that Kashmir was not even a<br />

colony. It was at best a protectorate<br />

in terms of Article 4 of Treaty of<br />

Amritsar. The state enjoyed<br />

sovereignty like no other state in the<br />

British Empire. Towards the end of<br />

World War-II Kashmir was a great<br />

contributor of armed assistance to<br />

the British. In his own aircraft the<br />

Maharaja of Kashmir flew into<br />

Damascus and took a guard of honour<br />

from J&K armed forces to epitomise<br />

status of Kashmir.<br />

British decamped from India taking<br />

away with them the paramount<br />

hold over the princes. If this action is<br />

taken to mean decolonisation, the<br />

process was flawed because they witnessed<br />

fracturing of J&K State, invasions<br />

from outside forces during<br />

which time a non-self-governing<br />

state was dismantled and principle of<br />

uti-possidetis flouted. The fact<br />

remains that Kashmir did not even<br />

come in the category of a colony of<br />

Britain or vassalage of the Empire.<br />

The tenuous relation that bound the<br />

two nations was the defence of northern<br />

borders formalised with treaties.<br />

That was necessary for the Empire’s<br />

own protection from invasions by the<br />

communist powers along northern<br />

borders.<br />

Maharaja of Kashmir signed an<br />

instrument of accession (IOA) with<br />

India on October 26, 1947 that<br />

became the cornerstone of his relations<br />

with India. The IOA has since<br />

been subject to legal scrutiny and<br />

remains contentious. This treaty even<br />

apart from doubts expressed for its<br />

authentic existence also posits other<br />

legal challenges. There was a treaty<br />

with British (Treaty of Amritsar) but<br />

more important the Stand Still agreement<br />

with Pakistan still extant that<br />

would preclude super-imposition of<br />

one more treaty on the same subject.<br />

In the analytical tradition, the treaty<br />

disintegrates by interpreting intertemporal<br />

principle was in relation to<br />

territory. There was an important<br />

caveat in IOA that a plebiscite would<br />

confirm the arrangement and that<br />

this treaty was a provisional arrangement<br />

and did not legalise integration<br />

of Kashmir to the Indian Union. In<br />

critical legal analysis of the IOA<br />

based accession being void, how<br />

would the presence of armed forces<br />

from India have legal authority? In<br />

circumstances where such acts take<br />

place the term aggression has been<br />

used in international law .<br />

Article-370 of the Indian<br />

Constitution was made the anchor of<br />

relationship between India and<br />

Kashmir and became the mainstay of<br />

transport of laws from the Union to<br />

the State that flouted the Article-370<br />

itself. On July 24, 1952 it was agreed<br />

that all laws apart from those related<br />

to defence communication and foreign<br />

affairs would be debated in local<br />

assembly before being adopted. This<br />

was adopted as the Delhi Agreement<br />

encompassing complete internal<br />

autonomy with limited appellate<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of<br />

India. India made gradual insertion<br />

of laws that wiped out the autonomy<br />

status. This emerged as an additional<br />

factor for demand for self-determination.<br />

The linchpin of self-determination<br />

for the people of J&K was<br />

entrenched in the principle of<br />

plebiscite that has eluded people of<br />

Kashmir ever since. Plebiscite gained<br />

stature as an erga omnes principle by<br />

universal opinion from the international<br />

community and legal policy of<br />

both India and Pakistan. India may<br />

have reneged on its legal policy to<br />

afford people of Kashmir a chance of<br />

a plebiscite but international law will<br />

come strong against that infraction .<br />

Both India and Pakistan are parties to<br />

UN Resolution of August 13, 1948<br />

and January 15, 1949, which call for a<br />

plebiscite and are binding on both.<br />

Kashmiri people have not been<br />

afforded the chance to express their<br />

true will through elections. Elections<br />

that were carried out were fake and<br />

illegally conducted and people were<br />

forced to cast votes.<br />

Kashmiri people in the meantime<br />

kept their struggle for right to such<br />

determination alive for the last 60<br />

years, a dream nurtured by political<br />

conviction to determine the status of<br />

their territory and restore their title.<br />

Kashmir was unfortunately always a<br />

place where there was always uncertainty<br />

in life in a turbulent atmosphere.<br />

There are rampant violations of human<br />

rights perpetrated to curb insurgency<br />

for a claim to self-determination.<br />

Human rights violations externalised<br />

the Kashmir issue and stands out as<br />

one more pillar of claim for self-determination.<br />

The UN takes a robust position<br />

on human rights. Article-55 (c) of<br />

the Charter expresses clearly universal<br />

respect for and observance human<br />

rights and fundamental freedoms for<br />

all. Article-56 obligates all members to<br />

serve allegiance to Article-55. Human<br />

rights and self-determination are<br />

linked in close relationship as envisaged<br />

in ICCPR.<br />

The anchor of the legal framework<br />

in which Kashmir is set is<br />

Armed Forces Special Powers Act AF<br />

(J&K)SPA 1990 a reprehensible legacy<br />

from the British times, including<br />

the 1942 ‘Quit India’ movement<br />

launched with such strength that<br />

British lost nerve. They wanted to<br />

keep India. As a knee jerk response<br />

they framed the Armed Forces<br />

Special Powers Ordinance (AFSPO)<br />

and lashed out at the public, empowering<br />

the armed forces to arrest, kill,<br />

humiliate, torture and burn homes<br />

with impunity. That would not only<br />

crush the rebellion but also start a<br />

ripple effect of terror through the<br />

whole nation. Unfortunately, for<br />

India there was no formal process of<br />

decolonisation adopted because the<br />

British did not consider India as a<br />

colony but an integral part of the<br />

sovereign. Therefore, on August 15,<br />

1947 free India inherited every item<br />

of governance, including laws. The<br />

Ordinance part of AFSPO was<br />

repealed but the Act remained and<br />

was used against the Naga people’s<br />

revolt and in its harsh detail renewed<br />

as AF(J&K)SPA 1990. The coercive<br />

nature of this act has destroyed the<br />

human fabric of a society who are<br />

claimed to be a part of the largest<br />

democracy on earth. Any non-commissioned<br />

officer of the forces can<br />

arrest, torture or kill a citizen if in his<br />

view that person is likely to disturb<br />

peace. Subjugation through such a<br />

law let India take 690 MW power<br />

from Salal (Kashmir) power station<br />

at 65 paise per unit and supply the<br />

same electricity to people of Kashmir<br />

at Re 1.50.<br />

It stands to advancing universal<br />

rationality to create an atmosphere of<br />

synthesis for an end to the conflict in<br />

Kashmir that has plagued the region<br />

for the last 61 years. From the inception<br />

of political and legal infractions<br />

that were the main concern between<br />

India and Pakistan, it will fore-shadow<br />

the end of the water dispute<br />

between India and Pakistan. The<br />

danger is that the battle for water<br />

may supersede any other exigency<br />

the two countries face. India prevents<br />

international agencies to build the<br />

power projects by refusing sovereign<br />

guarantee for the loans, in order to<br />

execute the work and control the<br />

power generated. This practice is<br />

reminiscent of the colonial World<br />

System Theory in which the peripheral<br />

countries or the colonies were sold<br />

goods manufactured with their own<br />

There is a tacit<br />

understanding in all<br />

political circles that<br />

negotiations between<br />

the two countries over<br />

Kashmir will<br />

perpetuate suffering of<br />

people<br />

materials and labour by the core<br />

countries or colonisers at high prices,<br />

draining their resources .<br />

The occupation of Kashmir by<br />

India and Pakistan and its non-recognition<br />

by the international community<br />

is a conditio sine qua non for the<br />

State identity and continuity of<br />

Kashmir. Line of Control (LOC)<br />

between India and Pakistan is a contentious<br />

border that foments dissent.<br />

It is the sharp end of bilateralism that<br />

has many contours in which people<br />

of Kashmir are mired. There is a tacit<br />

understanding in all political circles<br />

that negotiations between the two<br />

countries over Kashmir will perpetuate<br />

suffering of people. The local<br />

regimes have been installed that<br />

remain ultra vires and have changed<br />

hands over the years from parties<br />

that were chosen for their allegiance<br />

to India and clientelism. They have<br />

been construed as sui generis not only<br />

because they lack credible representation<br />

and support from the electorate<br />

but more importantly for the<br />

fact that they cannot offer fundamental<br />

rights to people. The over-arching<br />

laws like the AF(J&K)SPA 1990 render<br />

the local administration powerless<br />

to offer positive rights like protection<br />

of life or negative. In the<br />

event, local governments are considered<br />

as extension of power from the<br />

metropolitan Delhi, then there needs<br />

to be a demonstrable display of State<br />

authority with effective governance<br />

over a long period of time from the<br />

centre.<br />

— The writer is a retired consulting<br />

surgeon and postgraduate in Political<br />

Science from Bradeford University<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Growing up in<br />

a valley of fear<br />

A whole generation has grown up amidst the nearly twodecade-long<br />

turmoil that robbed the paradise called<br />

Kashmir. Feroz Rather belongs to this generation of<br />

Kashmiris as he finds himself adrift even while outside the<br />

Valley. In this moving account of his turbulent quest for<br />

education and knowledge, he tries to figure out what went<br />

wrong that turned youth like him into worst suspects of<br />

their times<br />

About two decades ago, in<br />

1989 to be exact, I was sent to<br />

school in Kashmir. My school<br />

nestled amid willows and springs. It<br />

is precisely the year when a massive<br />

rebellion betook the entire Valley.<br />

And a whole new generation right<br />

from kindergarten hit upon the idea<br />

of self-determination. Thousands of<br />

boys and girls, like me lived the formative<br />

years of their life amid incessant<br />

violence, bloodshed and the<br />

accompanying mistrust. I left<br />

Kashmir in 2003 to pursue BA at<br />

Aligarh Muslim University. Two<br />

years back, I moved to Delhi to do<br />

Masters in English Literature at<br />

Jamia Millia Islamia.<br />

My last five years in two prominent<br />

Indian Muslim Institutions have<br />

brought rather queer experiences.<br />

The subtle realisation of one's existence<br />

as an individual was never<br />

without a sense of a deep permanent<br />

loss informed with abysmal despair,<br />

alienation and insecurity. The pain<br />

seemed always not to flow from the<br />

feeling of being a Muslim in India.<br />

Not from finding oneself in melancholic<br />

morass of decadent Indian<br />

Muslim culture. Not that one has<br />

failed to do good academically. Not<br />

that one has failed to win good<br />

friends in the class. Not that one has<br />

failed to impress good relations with<br />

one's teachers. But from the consciousness<br />

that one was at a precarious<br />

interface with the people and<br />

institutions who essentially shape<br />

society and politics that in turn have<br />

been responsible for all the affliction<br />

and misery that abound Kashmir.<br />

In July 2006, after getting admission<br />

in Jamia Millia, I was looking for<br />

lodging in south Delhi. Thanks to our<br />

peculiar physiognomy that makes<br />

every Kashmiri so easily recognisable<br />

in India (and also has come to<br />

symbolise terror and destruction,<br />

here I thank kitschy Indian media in<br />

all its forms), everybody denied it.<br />

For many weeks I lost myself in the<br />

labyrinths of Delhi, being merely<br />

asked one-worded question --<br />

"Kashmiri?''… followed by moments<br />

of eerie silence so that I get the<br />

answer. Ultimately, I gave some<br />

money to a shopkeeper to feign as<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

my old acquaintance. It worked as<br />

one day after getting a call from him<br />

he accompanied me to the landlord. I<br />

promptly paid the advance and<br />

thanked him while holding tears<br />

back to my eyes. It seemed getting a<br />

house in Delhi was more difficult<br />

than the entrance examination.<br />

My house in Delhi was in<br />

Munirka, an unplanned agglomeration<br />

of myriad sized buildings opposite<br />

the main gate of Jawaharlal<br />

Nehru University, a premier institution<br />

known for its standards of excellence<br />

in social sciences throughout<br />

the country. In the new city I felt terribly<br />

nostalgic. One damp July night<br />

while I was sitting in my windowless<br />

new house my homesickness grew<br />

unbearable. It almost bogged me<br />

down as none of my friends was<br />

around. I went to sleep very early<br />

and had a nightmare. I saw bloodied<br />

corpse of my elder brother lying<br />

before me. It was pitch dark and<br />

women sobbed and shrieked bitterly.<br />

I was thrown out of sleep. When I<br />

realised that it was a dream, tears<br />

streamed through my eyes. My<br />

thumping heart seemed to block my<br />

throat. I reached my hand for the bottle<br />

on my bedside. There was no<br />

water in it. I was too frightened to go<br />

out to look for some shopkeeper<br />

unlikely to open by then.<br />

I tried to call one of my classmates<br />

with whom I had developed<br />

some friendly relationship during<br />

the introductory lectures of our<br />

course. She didn't pick up. From next<br />

day she had a great difficulty talking<br />

to me and till today we could not get<br />

to old terms. That night I wanted to<br />

tell her about the nightmare that has<br />

been torturing me for quite some<br />

time. I wanted to tell her what had<br />

happened some years back in my village<br />

in south Kashmir.<br />

My village Bumthan lies off<br />

Jammu-Srinagar highway, some 50<br />

kilometers away from Srinagar. An<br />

uneven stretch of farms and shrubberies<br />

stands between the village and<br />

the bend of the road. The highway is<br />

always busy wafting roar of army<br />

convoys, buses and local cabs and<br />

enters the village through an<br />

unkempt road that takes a sharp perpendicular<br />

turn around the culvert to<br />

open near the mouth of the village. It<br />

was a sultry September day. I had finished<br />

my midterm examination of<br />

the eleventh standard and was relaxing<br />

with my mother in our two-storied<br />

brick house, built at some three<br />

minutes walking distance from the<br />

culvert, in the front face of the village.<br />

Around midday a rumor spread<br />

through the neighbourhood that<br />

some militants happened to be<br />

around. We were about to have our<br />

lunch when we heard that the army<br />

had come. Suddenly the main points<br />

of the exit were sealed by them. An<br />

unheard announcement of death and<br />

disaster pervaded the dusty air, as it<br />

spewed through the nearby stone<br />

crushers to engulf the whole village.<br />

Mother gave me two chickenand-rice-filled<br />

steel lunch boxes with<br />

which to escape. I was supposed to<br />

take them to our sawmills in Mir<br />

Bazar, the busy village bus stop<br />

where the link road meets the highway.<br />

When I came out I found the<br />

whole village thrown into deep trepidation.<br />

Women and children grew<br />

anxious while jawans of the Indian<br />

army took positions at various angles<br />

and distances around the village. I<br />

found three army men, with bedraggled<br />

beard and blood-red eyes<br />

around the culvert, around which<br />

there are only a few houses besides<br />

the stone-crushers overlooking the<br />

green stretch. Wearing bulletproof<br />

jackets, their index fingers were readily<br />

curled around the fully loaded<br />

Kalashnikovs. I customarily showed<br />

my 'identity card' and passed over.<br />

Only a few seconds later, one of them<br />

shrieked with brute fright, yelling,<br />

"He is fleeing, sister fu**er…'' and<br />

then a volley of bullets, after running<br />

a few steps away .The other two took<br />

positions to cover him up. I watched<br />

this from a very close distance of<br />

some five yards. I ran to enter the<br />

nearby house. The women inside<br />

started sobbing and shrieking while<br />

all of us squatted on the ground and<br />

then crawled to the staircase towards<br />

the rear part of the house.<br />

Just a few minutes before, the<br />

army had started the search operation<br />

from the other side of the village.<br />

Taking the local boys as their shields,<br />

they were guided by a captured militant<br />

who was driven along in manacles.<br />

My cousin, who was sent to one<br />

of the houses, which the army suspected<br />

was a militant hideout, later<br />

told me what a dangerously funny<br />

thing had happened. He told me that<br />

after he was sent to a suspected<br />

house with an army man hiding<br />

behind him, one huge copper-pot<br />

tumbled from the top shelf of the<br />

kitchen cupboard and banged on the<br />

ground. The army man had given a<br />

shrill hitch and tried to slap him,<br />

after realising that no one was inside.<br />

My cousin had instantaneously<br />

responded, “Damn you! You have<br />

taken my shirt off and made me your<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

shield. If anybody is inside, he will<br />

shoot at me first… Don't panic".<br />

The seemingly futile military<br />

search operation continued without<br />

any results until the first burst of bullets<br />

was fired in front of my eyes. My<br />

mother and other women who had<br />

gathered around the village school<br />

tried to take refuge there. But they<br />

had been driven out by the teacher<br />

on the pretext of children's 'security'.<br />

A madness which accompanies<br />

impending death permeated everything.<br />

The village was then in an<br />

uproarious lull. The army men started<br />

beating everyone around. They<br />

took the young boys with them until<br />

they found the dead bodies of one<br />

militant lying beside the brook running<br />

under the culvert between the<br />

village and the uneven land stretch.<br />

The bullets shot in my presence,<br />

indeed, hit their target.<br />

Another militant as they rightly<br />

guessed had moved away from the<br />

houses across the brook into the tall<br />

maize fields, surrounded by paddy<br />

farms and thick vegetable shrubberies.<br />

As we lay crippled under the<br />

staircase, amid the roar of army men<br />

a familiar noise hit our ears. All the<br />

boys along with my own elder brother<br />

were beaten and forced to take<br />

their shirts off and become human<br />

shields. From different sides they<br />

were sent forward to zero in on the<br />

maize fields by clearing all the<br />

In one brief interlude,<br />

when bullets seemed<br />

to stop, one of the old<br />

men came kneeling<br />

inside. He said that all<br />

the young boys had<br />

been taken by the<br />

army as shields and it<br />

was difficult that any<br />

of them would come<br />

back alive<br />

shrubs and maize plants with their<br />

bare hands. Anybody who mustered<br />

to get up for a moment was severely<br />

spanked by the gun-butts from<br />

behind. This continued for almost<br />

four hours while army men crawled<br />

forward from a distance and fired<br />

wherever and whenever they<br />

wished. One of my friends fainted<br />

but was not spared to go, but kicked<br />

continuously until he got back into<br />

his senses only to faint again. But<br />

some of them after hours of moving<br />

through thorns and desperation,<br />

beating and bruises and bullets flying<br />

over their shoulders, had started<br />

‘enjoying’ it. The driver of our bandsaw<br />

mill later told me that he ate a<br />

big cucumber in my neighbour’s<br />

shrubbery, because he thought that<br />

in any case, after a few moments, he<br />

was doomed to eat the 'date kernel'.<br />

The transport on the highway<br />

was halted. One of my maternal<br />

cousins who lives in a nearby village<br />

was getting married the next day. He,<br />

along with his parents, had gone for<br />

shopping to the hometown,<br />

Islamabad, was also stuck in the<br />

backseat of a local cab. The next day<br />

while we were preparing the henna<br />

to color his finger, he told me that he<br />

had thought instead of his marriage<br />

he might have to attend our mass<br />

funeral.<br />

While we were still unable to<br />

move from the dark corner that<br />

turned smelly with our profuse<br />

sweating, none of us could gather<br />

courage to walk to kitchen and drink<br />

some water. As I sat jumbled around<br />

some 10 members of that family, our<br />

throats grew dry as sand. The clatter<br />

of bullets hitting the tin roof of the<br />

one-storied house, closest one to the<br />

place of encounter, seemed to crumble<br />

by their sheer vehemence.<br />

In one brief interlude, when bullets<br />

seemed to stop, one of the old<br />

men came kneeling inside. He said<br />

that all the young boys had been<br />

taken by the army as shields and it<br />

was difficult that any of them would<br />

come back alive. I remembered my<br />

brother whom he confirmed was<br />

with them and sagged down in hopeless<br />

despair. He was in late teens and<br />

I had grown much fond of him after<br />

his troubled relationship with our<br />

parents. Every bullet fired after that<br />

brought images of his blood-spattered<br />

body before my eyes. His own<br />

athletic well-formed body lying<br />

among the dead boys of my village,<br />

my own childhood friends and caring<br />

warm cousins. Those hours were,<br />

perhaps, the most difficult time of<br />

my life. I waited and wept crumpling<br />

under the dark suffocating staircase,<br />

while other people wept or wailed<br />

like me.<br />

The encounter was over, finally. I<br />

came out. A strange shiver was traveling<br />

through my legs, when to my<br />

surprise I saw that all the bruised<br />

boys were alive. I thought that my<br />

brother was not with them. I was<br />

about to hit my aching head to a<br />

brick-wall when he called me from<br />

behind. I looked back in desperation<br />

and ran to bury my head in his arms.<br />

A selfish happiness overtook me as<br />

we helped to put the dead militant's<br />

body in the truck. My brother and<br />

cousins told me that the militant did<br />

not retaliate to the army assault<br />

when he saw the advancing Indian<br />

troops putting the naked civilians in<br />

their front as shields.<br />

The operation was a major tactical<br />

success – ‘Operation Fox', as it was<br />

called. After the end of the nerve<br />

wracking operation, all of the army<br />

men gathered in a circle and celebrated<br />

their triumph by shouting and<br />

cheering aloud.<br />

It's perhaps my inability to put<br />

such stories across my good Indian<br />

friends, which made my life an ironical<br />

failure. My Indian friends live in<br />

world that is oblivious and may I<br />

dare to say far removed from and callously<br />

ignorant about the shocking<br />

happenings in Kashmir. They are<br />

absorbed in building their careers,<br />

celebrating their academic successes.<br />

Not surprisingly they did not prod<br />

me enough, nor did they feel the<br />

need to heed me enough to dig and<br />

listen to such stories of which, I am<br />

literally made of. So herein, I have<br />

taken the opportunity to explain<br />

what I could never before share with<br />

anyone—Nor did anybody ever ask<br />

me about any of these things.<br />

<br />

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FOUL ARREST<br />

Poor professor in tears<br />

as son rots in Tihar<br />

Several cases of victimisation of members of minority communities<br />

by police have raised the question of whether the civil society has<br />

accorded legitimacy to these. What we need is to urgently rethink<br />

state-sponsored terrorism, writes Subhash Gatade<br />

Professor Sanaullah Radoo,<br />

Principal of a Degree College<br />

in Sopore still remembers the<br />

day when his youngest son Pervez<br />

had reached the airport in Srinagar in<br />

a hurry to catch the next Spice Jet<br />

flight to Delhi ( September 12, 2006).<br />

The moment the flight landed in<br />

Delhi, he had even made a call to his<br />

Abboo (father) informing him that he<br />

is rushing to get the boarding pass to<br />

the next connecting flight for Pune. It<br />

has been more than 19 months that<br />

Pervez is in detention and right now<br />

lodged in Jail no 01, Ward no 01,<br />

Barrack no. 02, Tihar, Delhi. All his<br />

dreams to undertake research on the<br />

particular rice variety found in<br />

Kashmir stands suspended. Young<br />

Pervez Ahmad Radoo, who had<br />

already finished his post-graduation<br />

in Zoology from Modern College in<br />

Pune, was seeking admission to<br />

Ph.D. for which he was going to<br />

Pune.<br />

The moment Pervez approached<br />

the airline staff to get his boarding<br />

pass at the Delhi airport, security<br />

officers surrounded him, took away<br />

his luggage and escorted him to the<br />

Lodhi Colony Special Cell. In a letter<br />

<strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong>, March-April 2008 he<br />

provides details of the manner in<br />

which he was 'tortured and interrogated<br />

severely' how he was 'beaten<br />

up ruthlessly' and was given 'electric<br />

shocks'.<br />

Professor Sanaullah Radoo<br />

As per the version of Special Cell<br />

of the Delhi Police, Pervez was arrested<br />

on October 15, 2006 from Azadpur<br />

Mandi in the city with "three kgs of<br />

RDX and Rs 10 lakh hawala money<br />

along with other incriminating evidence"<br />

proving him to be a "Jaish-e-<br />

Mohammed terrorist".<br />

Professor Sanaullah has been running<br />

from pillar to post since then so<br />

that his youngest son gets a 'fair trial'<br />

and comes out of jail unscathed and<br />

is able to resume his research work.<br />

The fact is that for around one month<br />

the professor did not know that<br />

Pervez has not landed in Pune and<br />

that he was in detention. He presented<br />

a memorandum to the National<br />

Commission for Minorities ( NCM)<br />

to press harder for their intervention.<br />

Mohammad Shafi Qureshi,<br />

Chairperson of NCM, who has<br />

looked into the case and has also<br />

written to the Delhi Police was candid<br />

enough to share his views on the<br />

subject with a reporter ('Mail Today’,<br />

Delhi, March 6, 2008 - NCM fights for<br />

release of J&K youth in Tihar):<br />

"It is hard to believe the police version<br />

when one sees the clean chits given<br />

by the police superintendent and additional<br />

district magistrate of Sopore, his<br />

native town, and from the local resident<br />

welfare association (RWA). Most importantly,<br />

the certificate given by Spice Jet<br />

for the same day shows him as boarding<br />

the plane for Delhi from Srinagar and<br />

then also bound to travel further to<br />

Pune. These facts have been completely<br />

ignored by the Special Cell.'<br />

Trying to control his tears<br />

Professor Sanaullah Radoo tells the<br />

reporter the manner in which the<br />

police have turned a promising<br />

young scientist into a 'bomb-man'<br />

'He should be completing his<br />

research on a rice species in Kashmir<br />

valley, instead, he is in prison facing<br />

charges of terrorism.' He clearly says<br />

the police 'are lying'. He is also not<br />

sure whether his son would receive a<br />

fair trial or not and whether he has<br />

been provided an able legal practitioner<br />

to defend his case or not.<br />

Pervez's jail diary, which has<br />

appeared in a section of the media,<br />

puts further light on his plight. In his<br />

letter asking to 'Save My Career, As I<br />

Am Innocent' he poignantly asks<br />

'Am I not Indian, if I am Kashmiri.<br />

Why this discrimination. When tall<br />

claims are being made by the<br />

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FOUL ARREST<br />

Government of India, by media, that<br />

before law all citizens are equal.' This<br />

story is not one of its kind. Not a day<br />

passes when one does not hear about<br />

the illegal detention of a youth from<br />

a minority community on some<br />

charges constructed upon false<br />

claims.<br />

Just a day before 'Mail Today' carried<br />

Pervez’s story, it had provided<br />

details of a case involving a 'terrorist'<br />

gutkha manufacturer getting bail<br />

Mail Today, March 5, 2008. According<br />

to the report filed by Piyush<br />

Srivastava, 'Barely six months ago, 35<br />

year old Imran Ismail Memon was<br />

termed as a terrorist, gangster, a<br />

hawala racketeer, a smuggler and a<br />

manufacturer of adulterated Gutkha.'<br />

The Rae Bareli police arrested Imran<br />

Ismail Memon, a resident of Thane in<br />

Maharashtra on August 25, 2007,<br />

saying he was part of a "terrorist<br />

module" and had started an "illegal<br />

and adulterated gutkha factory" as a<br />

cover-up to stay in the district.<br />

Lucknow bench of the Allahabad<br />

High Court granted him bail because<br />

of lack of evidence. It also added that<br />

'the police could not even prove the<br />

power theft charge against him.'<br />

Or take the case of Aftab Alam<br />

Ansari, an employee of the Calcutta<br />

Electricity Supply Corporation, who<br />

was arrested on December 27, 2007<br />

as 'main accused behind the serial<br />

blasts in number of courts in UP',<br />

who was tortured for 22 days in<br />

order to make him confess that he<br />

was Mukhtar alias Raju, resident of<br />

Malda district in West Bengal and<br />

had Rs 6 crores in his bank account,<br />

or, the case of a poor fruit vendor<br />

from Kashmir who was presented<br />

before the media as a 'prize catch'<br />

responsible for blasts on the eve of<br />

Diwali in Delhi two years back: it is<br />

clear to any layperson that with the<br />

ascendance of the Hindu right forces<br />

in the Indian polity and in the ambience<br />

which has been created the<br />

world over post 9/11 such targeting<br />

of innocents from the minority community<br />

has become the norm.<br />

A biggest irony of the whole situation<br />

is that while terrorist acts committed<br />

by Hindutva organisations<br />

are not even reported or all attempts<br />

are done to cover them up, innocents<br />

from the minority community are<br />

apprehended claiming them to be<br />

associates of this or that dreaded terrorist<br />

organisation. The media,<br />

which is supposed to be a watchdog<br />

of democracy, also joins the malicious<br />

campaign where it has no<br />

qualms in calling all such people terrorists<br />

rather than accused awaiting<br />

trial in court. It does not bother them<br />

that such a trial by media is not only<br />

unethical but also violates the basic<br />

ethics of responsible and fair journalism.<br />

No one condones acts of terrorism<br />

if they occur in any part of the<br />

country. One would want that the<br />

law of the land should be equally<br />

applicable in all such cases. They<br />

should not appear to favour or target<br />

a particular community.<br />

It would not be an exaggeration<br />

to say that it is the new trend— 'terrorisation'<br />

and 'stigmatisation' of the<br />

minority community—is reaching<br />

menacing proportions. The pattern<br />

of mindless arrests for the sake of<br />

branding innocent persons as terrorists<br />

and resorting to relentless torture<br />

is coming under increasing scrutiny.<br />

This is giving rise to perceptible<br />

anger all across the country.<br />

Perhaps the recent decision of the<br />

UP government asking a retired<br />

judge to ascertain whether two persons<br />

arrested for the court blasts in<br />

state are indeed terrorists or not, is<br />

an indicator of the pressure governments<br />

are facing over repeated complaints<br />

that the state police is implicating<br />

Muslims as terrorists. The case<br />

involves the arrest of Khalid Mujahid<br />

and Tariq, claiming them to be members<br />

of Harkat-Ul-Jehadi (HUJI) who<br />

were implicated for executing the<br />

serial blasts that left 14 people dead.<br />

If one searches the record of the<br />

Jamia Tul-Salahat Madarsa in<br />

Jaunpur where Khalid use to teach, it<br />

tells us that not only was he not present<br />

on the day (November 23) in the<br />

Madarsa but had also checked the<br />

copies of the students. The judge has<br />

been asked to cross-check the UP<br />

police story which says that Khalid<br />

landed in Lucknow in a bus on<br />

November 23 morning, met other<br />

accomplices, bought new cycles,<br />

planted bombs on the Lucknow<br />

court premises and returned immediately<br />

to Jaunpur.<br />

The need of the hour is to understand<br />

that ‘terrorism’ cannot be the<br />

monopoly of a particular community.<br />

It is a product of the typical circumstances,<br />

which societies encounter or<br />

find themselves in, and the nature of<br />

the dominant or dominated forces in<br />

operation in those societies and their<br />

larger worldview.<br />

There is no denying the fact that<br />

civil society at large at some level has<br />

accorded legitimacy to all such<br />

actions by the police. If that had not<br />

been the case, there would have been<br />

an uproar at the national level when<br />

it was revealed how, 'intelligence<br />

bureau operatives colluded with<br />

Delhi police to brand two of its own<br />

informers as dreaded terrorists'. It<br />

was sheer coincidence that the matter<br />

reached CBI, which exposed the dark<br />

machinations of the dirty tricks<br />

brigade.<br />

A write-up in the Times of India<br />

'IB, cops in murky frame-up' (By<br />

Sachin Parashar, New Delhi, 13<br />

September 2007) had presented all<br />

relevant details of the case.<br />

New Delhi: The CBI has found that<br />

the Intelligence Bureau operatives colluded<br />

with Delhi Police special cell<br />

sleuths to ‘plant’ RDX on two youths<br />

who were arrested as ‘Al Badr terrorists’,<br />

TOI has learnt. The shocking conclusion<br />

comes a month after the agency told the<br />

Delhi High Court that the special cell’s<br />

probe into the murky affair “didn’t<br />

inspire confidence”.<br />

Top CBI sources told TOI on<br />

Wednesday that the seized RDX<br />

appeared to have been planted on the two<br />

‘terrorists’ Mohd Moarif Qamar and<br />

Irshad Ali. The agency will submit its<br />

report, which indicts officers of IB and<br />

Delhi Police special cell, to the court on<br />

October 24.<br />

While similar episodes in the past<br />

have hurt the credibility of the anti-terror<br />

agencies, this one stands out because it<br />

marks a rare instance where Intelligence<br />

Bureau operatives collaborated in the<br />

plot hatched by Delhi Police’s special<br />

cell.<br />

—The writer is a freelance journalist<br />

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Military might and<br />

human rights<br />

Picking up people on mere suspicion, arresting and<br />

torturing them is the order<br />

of the day in a land where<br />

army and para<br />

military forces<br />

hold<br />

unaccountable<br />

powers. The guilty<br />

men in uniform<br />

should be held<br />

accountable and<br />

brought to books,<br />

writes<br />

Sujata Krishnamurthi<br />

Human right activist, Jalil<br />

Andrabi, was abducted by<br />

the paramilitary and renegades<br />

in March 1996 in the presence<br />

of eyewitnesses and tortured to<br />

death in custody. Despite the initial<br />

denial by government of the army's<br />

culpability, the Special Investigation<br />

Team identified an army Major in<br />

April 1997 as accused. He was<br />

released without punishment : this is<br />

one of many crimes that have<br />

allegedly been committed by the<br />

army in Kashmir. If militancy left<br />

thousands dead, the human rights<br />

record of the Indian army and<br />

paramilitary forces has been equally<br />

abysmal.<br />

India’s decision to accede to<br />

plebiscite and then retract from it,<br />

has proved expensive to India, and<br />

to the Kashmiris, in the form of six<br />

decades of strife and conflict.<br />

Militancy began in 1989 as a spontaneous<br />

movement by the people<br />

towards self-determination.<br />

Militancy has taken on different<br />

hues. Up to 1992-93, it was restricted<br />

to the Kashmiri demand for selfdetermination<br />

and received local<br />

sympathy. It soon transformed into a<br />

brutal blood bath on the part of the<br />

local militants and the outsiders<br />

(mujahideen, ex Pakistani soldiers<br />

and mercenaries).<br />

Central government forces operating<br />

in Kashmir include the Indian<br />

Army, the J&K police, the Central<br />

Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the<br />

Border Security Force (BSF). The<br />

army strength was expanded in 1993<br />

with the introduction of the<br />

Rashtriya Rifles, who have been the<br />

main force in charge of counterinsurgency<br />

operations in Doda, Rajouri<br />

and Poonch. Getting an exact figure<br />

on the army deployment is not possible,<br />

as India does not provide details<br />

of its military and paramilitary<br />

deployments. Pakistani assertions<br />

that the Indian army strength is<br />

above 600,000 are substantially<br />

inflated. Reports estimate that India<br />

deploys approximately 400,000 combined<br />

army and paramilitary forces<br />

in Kashmir, most of which are stationed<br />

in the interior, 80,000 of which<br />

are deployed along the Line of<br />

Control (LOC). Pakistani forces<br />

deployed along the LOC are reported<br />

to number in the 40,000-50,000<br />

range.<br />

State repression<br />

Seventeen-year-old Muhammad Safi<br />

Lone, of village Budbugh, Tehsil<br />

Handwara, was admitted to SMHS hos-<br />

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pital with bullet wounds. On the night of<br />

June 11, 1997 the Jawans of Indian army<br />

and Rashtriya Rifles went to their village<br />

for a search and cordon operation. The<br />

army suspected that militants were hiding<br />

in the nearby forest and forced several<br />

local youth to act as human shield for<br />

the army. They were made to walk in a<br />

kneel-down position towards the forest,<br />

while the army Jawans hid behind them.<br />

In the ensuing exchange of fire, one village<br />

youth Akbar Wani was killed, Safi<br />

Lone was hit by four bullets.<br />

Forces used landmines and other<br />

explosive devices indiscriminately,<br />

showing their callousness toward<br />

civilian life. In their attempts to suppress<br />

militancy in Kashmir, the army,<br />

paramilitary forces and the police<br />

also succumbed to human rights violations.<br />

Human Rights activists have<br />

accused the Indian security forces of<br />

consistently violating humanitarian<br />

laws. These violations stem from<br />

abuse of power under repressive<br />

laws like the National Security Act<br />

and the Armed Forces Special<br />

Powers Act (J&K). There have been<br />

reports of police/army brutality and<br />

repression including arbitrary<br />

arrests, rapes and extra judicial<br />

killings. Stories of media gagging,<br />

beating up of human rights activists,<br />

journalists and medical personnel<br />

and banning entry to organisations<br />

like the International Federation of<br />

Human Rights and Amnesty<br />

International are a dime a dozen. It<br />

has also been alleged that India has<br />

sponsored irregular militias that<br />

operate outside the law to carry out<br />

its counterinsurgency operations.<br />

On 10 May, 2001, 17 journalists<br />

were assaulted by Border Security Force<br />

(BSF) troops while covering a funeral<br />

procession for bomb victims of an attack<br />

that had occurred the previous day near a<br />

security camp at Magam in the Budgam<br />

district of Kashmir, leaving nine people<br />

dead. The journalists were covering the<br />

assault on the demonstrators from a distance<br />

when the leading officer ordered his<br />

troops to attack them.<br />

Most of the violations, including<br />

the more egregious abuses like extra<br />

judicial killings and custodial deaths<br />

remain unpunished. There were<br />

more than 200 incidents of rape in<br />

Doda in January 1994 alone. During<br />

the period 1990-1994, Amnesty<br />

International documented 706 cases<br />

of custodial killings, nearly all after<br />

gruesome torture. The government<br />

responded to 519 out of 706 cases,<br />

dismissing the rest as "encounter<br />

killings" despite eyewitness reports<br />

to the contrary. In 85 other cases, the<br />

government indicated that there was<br />

prima facie evidence of human rights<br />

violations and these were said to be<br />

under investigation.<br />

Repairing a tarnished image<br />

Since 1993, Delhi has embarked<br />

on a campaign to improve its international<br />

image tarnished by the<br />

appalling human rights record of its<br />

police and security forces. The path<br />

has been tough as winning over the<br />

trust of a battle scarred and embittered<br />

Kashmiri citizen is an uphill<br />

task. Few have forgotten the past<br />

brutalities, indiscriminate firings and<br />

atrocities committed by the Indian<br />

forces.<br />

In May 1996, elections were held<br />

in the state for the first time since<br />

1989 with Farooq Abdullah forming<br />

government. Two more elected governments<br />

led by Mufti Mohammed<br />

Sayeed and Azad followed. With the<br />

hope of peace returning to the Valley,<br />

there has been pressure on India to<br />

disarm all irregular militias, carry<br />

out extensive investigations on all<br />

reports of abuse and punish those<br />

responsible, and provide full access<br />

to Kashmir for specialised human<br />

rights bodies like the Special<br />

Rapporteurs on Torture and<br />

Summary and Arbitrary Execution<br />

and the Working Groups on<br />

Disappearances and Arbitrary<br />

Detention and for international<br />

human rights organisations like the<br />

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty<br />

International.<br />

The state’s decision to allow the<br />

International Committee of the Red<br />

Cross to provide its humanitarian<br />

services in Kashmir is significant. A<br />

visit by the International Commission<br />

of Jurists followed. In 2002, the<br />

newly elected Mufti Mohammad<br />

Sayeed’s government took the decision<br />

to give a much-needed “healing<br />

touch” to Kashmir through a comprehensive<br />

31-point Common<br />

Minimum Programme (CMP). This<br />

human rights programme mandated<br />

the assimilation of the Special<br />

Operations Group (SOG), allegedly<br />

responsible for a huge number of<br />

human rights abuses, into the Jammu<br />

& Kashmir Police, the termination of<br />

the POTA (Prevention of Terrorism<br />

Act), review cases of detainees held<br />

without trial for a long time, investigate<br />

all earlier custodial killings and<br />

punish all those responsible. The<br />

programme was also to institute<br />

rehabilitation and supportive measures<br />

for militancy affected families<br />

and finally carry out unconditional<br />

dialogue with terrorist groups: clear<br />

indications of a revision in the government’s<br />

'hard line’ policy on<br />

Kashmir.<br />

Although according to the army’s<br />

assessment, stopping cross border<br />

infiltration, and counter-insurgency<br />

operations in the hinterlands of<br />

Jammu & Kashmir have resulted in<br />

drastic decline in violence in the<br />

state, the government has no intention<br />

of cutting down on the strength<br />

of the Army deployment immediately.<br />

Militancy may have abated but it<br />

is still a reality. They change their<br />

strategy on ground, pushing the<br />

security establishment to the edge.<br />

No doubt the deployment in Jammu<br />

& Kashmir, a point of contention for<br />

many, is huge, but the army, which<br />

sees itself as critical for security and<br />

stability will remain as long as militancy<br />

remains.<br />

With matters under relative control,<br />

there has been a paradigm shift<br />

towards socio economic upliftment.<br />

The basic premise being, that economic<br />

emancipation and good governance<br />

are the key to solving the<br />

problem of militancy and alienation.<br />

The army is a formidable force but in<br />

the long run, it is possible for it to<br />

effectively hold on to the territory<br />

only with the cooperation of the people.<br />

It has to maintain a constant vigil<br />

on the border to check infiltration,<br />

while simultaneously work towards<br />

winning over the locals.<br />

<br />

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MILITARY VIEW<br />

Twenty-year-long<br />

night of long knives<br />

Q&A<br />

General S Padmanabhan<br />

General Sundararajan Padmanabhan assumed charge<br />

of the Indian Army, as the 20th Chief of Army Staff,<br />

on 30 September 2000. He was commander of the 15<br />

Corps in the Kashmir valley from July 1993 to<br />

February 1995. During his tenure, the army made big<br />

gains over militants in Kashmir. He was awarded the<br />

Ati Vishisht Seva Medal (AVSM) for his services. He<br />

takes time off for <strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong> and shares his views<br />

about the army’s role in Kashmir in this exclusive<br />

interview with Sujata Krishnamurthi<br />

QAs commander of the 15<br />

Corps, you were in Kashmir<br />

during the peak of militancy.<br />

I would like to know your<br />

overall assessment of the situation<br />

prevailing there.<br />

A. In the middle of 1993 when I<br />

joined, the situation in my own headquarters<br />

garrison, the Badami Bagh<br />

Cantonment, was grim. The large<br />

number of soldiers and officers with<br />

their families were virtually in a state<br />

of siege. Nobody ever went out.<br />

Movement was impossible because<br />

of the large population of militants,<br />

around 10,000 to 12,000. More than<br />

85 percent were locally trained and<br />

about 2,000 to 3,000 were specialists<br />

who had received training from outside<br />

and come in. Most of the militants<br />

were either Kashmiris who had<br />

gone down to the refugee camps in<br />

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK)<br />

or had ex-filtrated into the other side,<br />

received training and returned. The<br />

quality of their opposition was good.<br />

They were trained well, knew how to<br />

make a bomb or IEDs (Improvised<br />

Explosive Device). Where they could<br />

not manage, there were people like<br />

Ibn-e-Masood, a mercenary from<br />

some African country, probably<br />

Ethiopia to help. He was an explosive<br />

expert, a postgraduate in chemistry.<br />

He was later killed in an<br />

encounter. The specialists were<br />

either Pakistan-trained or trained on<br />

the Afghan border.<br />

Even when we went out for an<br />

operation we went in greater<br />

strength than we do now. By the end<br />

of 1994, the army achieved considerable<br />

control over the militants. Their<br />

activities were basically hit and run<br />

operations against the army or the<br />

police, a very popular target. They<br />

would throw grenades at the police<br />

and police stations were easy targets,<br />

and to give them more target practice,<br />

was the BSF which had built<br />

large bunkers in urban areas or occupied<br />

certain houses as the CRPF did<br />

also. These were easily distinguishable.<br />

Secondly, they would ambush<br />

convoys from time to time. None of<br />

them were very successful but they<br />

did succeed in throwing grenades<br />

inside buses loaded with army people<br />

leading to casualties. There have<br />

been some horrible incidents. There<br />

was an army soldier going on leave.<br />

The grenade fell on his lap, he looked<br />

at it and it blew in his face. The third<br />

manifestation of their activities was<br />

that they would lay Improvised<br />

Explosive Divices (IEDs), the country<br />

equivalent of normal land mines.<br />

They would use innovative ways.<br />

Some specialised in telephone poles.<br />

They would saw off a section off the<br />

pole, push in explosives and fix it<br />

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with an electronic detonator. This<br />

would create a lot of damage. They<br />

made good use of fertilisers to make<br />

explosives. In fact because of them<br />

there was a shortage of urea in the<br />

apple orchards and fields.<br />

Q Will you please comment on<br />

Hazrat Bal incident?<br />

A. The Hazrat Bal incident was<br />

an eye opener for all of us. We had to<br />

take over an operation on the basis of<br />

inaccurate information. The force<br />

which was to hand over the operation<br />

to us was not there. Quite a<br />

number of hard core militants<br />

escaped before we came in. Next day<br />

they set fire to a building to create a<br />

diversion in the shrine complex. In<br />

the process of fire fighting, a number<br />

of militants escaped even on the fire<br />

engine. So we don’t know how many<br />

were actually there. I was given very<br />

clear directions by the Governor and<br />

by the Advisor Security to the<br />

Governor, General MA Zaki, and one<br />

gave a lot of izzat (regard) to what he<br />

said. We were told no shooting. The<br />

militants may have wired the shrine<br />

for explosion. So we stayed around<br />

the shrine in a cordon.<br />

The Hazrat Bal incident came out<br />

as it did thanks to the patience of our<br />

troops. I was very proud of them<br />

because it is awful to sit outside and<br />

watch while the people inside were<br />

getting wazwan kind of meals from<br />

outside by the order of the negotiator.<br />

For three days they ordered food<br />

for 50 people daily while there were<br />

only 25 people inside. Some were<br />

women, some beggars, hardcore militants<br />

were very few. The late lamented<br />

Idris fromJammu & Kashmir<br />

Liberation Front (JKLF) was there.<br />

He told me later that he had me and<br />

the Governor in his sight. Since we<br />

did not fire, they had no provocation<br />

to do so either. I think this is one time<br />

a general has been given a good reputation<br />

for not having fired a single<br />

shot – a very peculiar reputation to<br />

have.<br />

By then the militants had surrendered,<br />

as General DD Saklani had<br />

taken over after General Zaki met<br />

I was horrified that by May we had mishandled the<br />

situation so badly that we lost the Charar-e-Sharief.<br />

If my orders had been carried out implicitly that<br />

there would be no deployment within one kilometre<br />

of the outer periphery of the shrine and that no fire<br />

should be directed towards the shrine at all, this<br />

could have been avoided<br />

with an accident. We discussed their<br />

demands and I told General Saklani<br />

that some of these were unreasonable.<br />

Ultimately we seemed to have<br />

our way and they felt that they had<br />

their way and things worked out. It<br />

was a turning point because the people<br />

realised that they need not be<br />

shot at, bullied and harassed by the<br />

army. The army can keep quiet and<br />

insist on what they think should be<br />

done and what should not be done.<br />

Q Will you please tell your experiences<br />

as commander of<br />

Udhampur-based Northern<br />

Command?<br />

A. During the second half of<br />

1994, we had got things so much<br />

under control that we had reached a<br />

stage where there was contemplation<br />

that there would be elections in late<br />

1994 or early 1995. Meanwhile the<br />

Jehad Council realised that the game<br />

was getting out of their hands so we<br />

saw an influx of foreign mercenaries<br />

in the middle of 1994, trained<br />

Afghans who had fought the war<br />

against Russians and allegedly ex-<br />

Pakistani soldiers. This was a significant<br />

setback in our attempts towards<br />

normalcy because the quality of<br />

opposition went up. The local militant<br />

who had lost morale found himself<br />

bolstered up again.<br />

The Charar-e-Sharief incident<br />

took place next year. I had left by that<br />

time. I was horrified that by May we<br />

had mishandled the situation so<br />

badly that we lost the Charar-e-<br />

Sharief. If my orders had been carried<br />

out implicitly that there would<br />

be no deployment within one kilometre<br />

of the outer periphery of the<br />

shrine and that no fire should be<br />

directed towards the shrine at all,<br />

this could have been avoided. I knew<br />

that it was like a tinderbox that<br />

would catch fire if we threw even a<br />

firecracker at it.<br />

That was a very significant setback<br />

for the Army and for Kashmir.<br />

Let’s face it; many said we had deliberately<br />

set fire to the shrine. This is<br />

nonsense. But the accusation that we<br />

were ham handed is true. This however<br />

should not give rise to the<br />

thought that because of this, human<br />

rights violations increased. No.<br />

Incidents did happen but saying that<br />

there were reprisals against anybody<br />

after this is not true. I am pretty clear<br />

about this as I was able to observe<br />

closely the entire incident sitting at<br />

the vantage point as the Director<br />

General of Military Intelligence.<br />

Q Modern limited wars have their<br />

limitations as the soldier is<br />

relearning to fight a war which<br />

is not open but hidden.<br />

However, collateral casualties<br />

notwithstanding there have<br />

been reports of a number of<br />

instances of deliberate killings<br />

and other atrocities perpetrated<br />

by the Indian army in Kashmir.<br />

Few cases have been dealt while<br />

the rest have been ignored. Can<br />

you comment on this from the<br />

human rights perspective?<br />

A. These are axiomatic statements.<br />

Firstly, today we are fighting<br />

an organised proxy war. The soldier<br />

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cannot say that he is not fighting. He<br />

is fighting. It is a war by proxy for<br />

somebody else. He is fighting against<br />

a man who has been trained abroad,<br />

who has been manipulated and<br />

receives his directions from there,<br />

and who is getting his hardware,<br />

software and communications equipment<br />

from there which was often better<br />

than ours. It was American equipment<br />

purchased with Saudi money<br />

and brought in through Pakistan.<br />

That is the kind of situation we were<br />

dealing with. During my time as a<br />

Corps Commander we called it militancy<br />

for want of a better word.<br />

Sometimes we referred to it as counterinsurgency<br />

operations. It was<br />

counterinsurgency but in a proxy<br />

war scenario where we are not dealing<br />

with enemies but our very own<br />

people who were being controlled by<br />

outsiders.<br />

Secondly, there have been a large<br />

number of incidents. I will be the last<br />

man to deny it. I was present when<br />

some incidents took place. When it<br />

came to our notice the culprits were<br />

punished severely. In fact I recall one<br />

day I got information from a local<br />

politician about a case of rape somewhere<br />

near the apple orchards in<br />

Pattan. Two Bangladeshi people who<br />

had married locals had been assaulted.<br />

Realising that the assaulters must<br />

have been from the local army outfit<br />

I gave orders to the General Officer<br />

Commanding (GOC) concerned to<br />

have them arrested within six hours.<br />

This he did. I had guessed right.<br />

They were not the combatant category.<br />

One was a washerman and the<br />

other a barber who did this after getting<br />

drunk in the afternoon. They<br />

were put in the quarter guard, the<br />

lock up of ours and from the crime<br />

till the end of a very fair trial where<br />

they were court-martialled, I think<br />

four to five weeks only had passed.<br />

They got 10 or 12 years. I don’t<br />

remember all of them as everything<br />

does not come to the Corps<br />

Commander and is dealt at the<br />

appropriate level. We deal with<br />

everything that comes to our notice –<br />

the battalion commander, the<br />

brigade commander or the divisional<br />

commander deal with these cases.<br />

Q How would you explain the<br />

Amnesty International reports,<br />

the Human Rights Watch reports<br />

and the international and<br />

national media criticism against<br />

army excesses?<br />

A. The barrage of adverse kind of<br />

publicity that we have been subjected<br />

to is rather unfair. The hysteria that<br />

has been whipped up against the<br />

army can be explained in many<br />

ways. None of them entirely satisfactory<br />

and some may not entirely hold<br />

water. Yet these are the explanations<br />

that occur to me. The fact is that any<br />

incident that takes place is immediately<br />

classified as done by the army.<br />

In Jammu & Kashmir, there is much<br />

Sometimes we<br />

referred to it as<br />

counterinsurgency<br />

operations. It was<br />

counterinsurgency<br />

but in a proxy war<br />

scenario where we<br />

are not dealing with<br />

enemies but our very<br />

own people who were<br />

being controlled by<br />

outsiders<br />

more than the army operating. It<br />

could have been done by the army,<br />

the Boarder Security Force (BSF),<br />

Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)<br />

or the Kashmir police who were<br />

mostly quiescent but now I think are<br />

more active or any number of the<br />

thousands of militants, who were<br />

bearing arms though they have no<br />

business to bear arms and are fighting<br />

against the State.<br />

On any sample day, if two people<br />

get killed somewhere, they may have<br />

been killed by any of these people. If<br />

the army was responsible, they<br />

would produce the weapon, and so<br />

on and if they had made a mistake<br />

and killed innocent people it would<br />

be out in their report. There have<br />

been such unfortunate cases but on<br />

each occasion the errant commander<br />

has made whatever amends were<br />

possible and apologised for the act.<br />

The killing could have been done by<br />

any of the other security forces or by<br />

the militants and foisted on to the<br />

security forces or the army.<br />

The trend gradually caught on. To<br />

make the maximum amount of noise<br />

you demonise the one force that you<br />

are actually afraid of. As a result systematic<br />

demonisation of the army<br />

took place. Not just in the Valley or<br />

Jammu or wherever. Not just in India<br />

but in the international arena. You<br />

demonise them to the extent that it<br />

de-spirits the army, ties their hands<br />

behind their back so that they cannot<br />

act and then you neutralise them. It is<br />

a devilishly sophisticated way of<br />

doing it. I know who worked this out<br />

on the other side, the Jihad Council.<br />

I met a visitor from Lord<br />

Avesbury’s organisation with whom<br />

we had very close interaction. We<br />

asked him since he had the opportunity<br />

to take a close look at the situation,<br />

what his conclusion was. He<br />

went and made a report and showed<br />

photographs to his principals. The<br />

result was that the Kashmir Watch<br />

Organisation changed its tune. I had<br />

a similar incident with a German<br />

lady journalist who came over to my<br />

house in Srinagar on a Sunday. She<br />

immediately went on the offensive<br />

saying that our people were committing<br />

atrocities. I knew she had the<br />

wrong end of the stick as she was<br />

talking about an incident that happened<br />

inside Srinagar town. When I<br />

asked her about the colour of the uniform<br />

that the chaps were wearing,<br />

she replied khaki. The army wears<br />

khaki only in the desert. We later<br />

found out that there was a rough up<br />

between the police and the locals and<br />

in the process of breaking it up the<br />

police overreached itself and used<br />

greater force than required. The lady<br />

saw all this and clicked some pic-<br />

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Wrong things do take<br />

place no doubt but<br />

most of these are<br />

exaggerated and serve<br />

the kind of publicity<br />

that militants crave. If<br />

you stop the media,<br />

which fortunately we<br />

do not do, you would<br />

have given the<br />

militancy short shrift<br />

tures. After I gave her the facts, she<br />

left quite mollified.<br />

The third thing is that wherever<br />

such incidents are reported it is done<br />

with a big splash. I will give you an<br />

example. There was an incident<br />

where a village had to be evacuated<br />

in broad daylight because militants<br />

who had come in from the jungle<br />

side had taken shelter in some houses<br />

and were shooting at our troops.<br />

We cordoned off that village. I think<br />

the parachute battalion was<br />

involved. They got the villagers out<br />

and took them four kilometres away<br />

from harm’s way and they carried<br />

out the operations against the militants<br />

who lay low there. In the process<br />

some houses were destroyed. I<br />

was then the army commander in<br />

Uddhampur and was very pleased<br />

with the action taken by the people. I<br />

asked them to make sure that the<br />

people were well looked after.<br />

They were put in tents till we<br />

could reconstruct their houses, ran<br />

kitchens and fed them better than<br />

they were used to. As a result they<br />

were very pleased with us. After all<br />

this I got a call in the evening from<br />

my chaps saying that Mr Syed Ali<br />

Shah Geelani, the veteran Jamaat<br />

leader, along with his cohorts arrived<br />

there to draw political mileage of the<br />

army atrocities. They had been told<br />

that an army atrocity was going on.<br />

To their horror nobody was willing<br />

to talk to them or speak against us.<br />

The villagers told them how we had<br />

fed and clothed them and asked<br />

them to leave. He left in a great huff.<br />

This is not an unusual incident<br />

but a matter of routine for the army.<br />

The army usually takes the utmost<br />

care to ensure the safety and well<br />

being of the villagers. Despite all precautions<br />

if they do get hurt then we<br />

are as sorry as anybody else. There<br />

have been occasional cases of wanton<br />

action against someone. Such incidents<br />

have been very strongly dealt<br />

with. I had a case, when at the height<br />

of winter something happened near<br />

about Srinagar. It was snowing and<br />

people were out in the cold as a 24-<br />

hour search went on. There was this<br />

lack of good sense on the part of the<br />

person who had given the orders. He<br />

had lost some people so he subjected<br />

the village to a very detailed search. I<br />

removed that battalion from there<br />

and replaced it with a new battalion.<br />

The old battalion never repeated<br />

their mistake and later won a commendation<br />

from their chief.<br />

Wrong things do take place no<br />

doubt, but most of these are exaggerated<br />

and serve the kind of publicity<br />

that militants crave. If you stop the<br />

media, which fortunately we do not<br />

do, you would have given the militancy<br />

short shrift because media is<br />

like oxygen to the militants. Adverse<br />

publicity to the army and security<br />

forces only furthers their cause.<br />

I will give you an instance of one<br />

of the most awful human rights violation<br />

I have seen and it was not<br />

done by us. It was done by a<br />

Kashmiri militant who was unfortunately<br />

not caught. He had paid a<br />

young boy in Srinagar Rs 10 to throw<br />

a grenade at us. He was shown how<br />

to hold the object and throw it. He<br />

was waiting for the army fellows to<br />

turn up and he felt itchy so he tried<br />

to scratch with one hand. When he<br />

could not, he released his other hand<br />

from the lever and the bomb went off<br />

blowing his hand off. I don’t think<br />

we did anything like this. When my<br />

troops went off for an operation in<br />

Rajwar there was a militant group<br />

which captured five or six of my soldiers,<br />

gouged their eyes out,<br />

chopped off their hands besides<br />

other unspeakable horrors that they<br />

did to them. Isn’t this a human rights<br />

violation? Nobody took reprisal<br />

against these militants.<br />

Q To counter the hostile local and<br />

outside media you initiated a<br />

more open and sophisticated<br />

media management approach.<br />

Could you tell us how you did<br />

that and to what extent you succeeded?<br />

A. When in doubt the media put<br />

the army down there. The media initially<br />

has a tendency to lay the blame<br />

on the army or the security forces. It<br />

is only when one goes through the<br />

entire story that facts emerge.<br />

General Arjun Ray, who was my<br />

Brigadier General Staff, and I took<br />

up handling the media to reduce<br />

their hostility. We tried to manage<br />

the media intelligently. One of the<br />

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MILITARY VIEW<br />

biggest problems we realised was the<br />

lack of transparency. The media did<br />

not even know what we were doing.<br />

When we surround a village and cordon<br />

off the area it is not to take over<br />

the houses. Our first step in this<br />

direction was a three-day workshop<br />

to sensitise the media on how the<br />

army operates. We invited the<br />

national, local and vernacular media<br />

to the Badami Bagh Cantonment,<br />

where we would brief them with<br />

drawings and sometimes with<br />

demonstrations to explain what was<br />

happening and why it was happening<br />

and what were the things that<br />

could go wrong. They started appreciating<br />

our work.<br />

The second thing that I did was<br />

start speaking to editors and request<br />

them not to send young cubs to be<br />

blooded. It is an unforgiving battlefield<br />

where the young chap may bite<br />

off more than he can chew by doing<br />

something rash and silly. On the<br />

other he may also cause incalculable<br />

harm to forces who are already<br />

working under acute pressure by<br />

misrepresenting. The people out in<br />

Delhi may not know anything that is<br />

happening on the ground and may<br />

just take the cub’s word for it.<br />

We decided to invite the media to<br />

come along with us and show them<br />

what was happening. There was a<br />

freelance BJP journalist, and there<br />

were these two French journalists<br />

whom we sent off to a battalion in a<br />

very tricky area. Later their article in<br />

a French paper had all praise for the<br />

unit. We began having sessions with<br />

the media where all questions were<br />

made welcome and we also decentralised<br />

media interaction with the<br />

army with certain provisos. Our message<br />

to our media mangers was clear<br />

“Don’t bluff, confine yourselves to<br />

facts and don’t give your own interpretations”.<br />

We are not fighting an<br />

enemy in the conventional sense.<br />

Unfortunately we are fighting a law<br />

and order problem in our own state.<br />

Q Compared to the past deployment<br />

what is the present deployment<br />

of the army? Some say that the<br />

army presence is still very<br />

strong? What do you feel?<br />

A. Whether normalcy returns or<br />

not there is a certain basic deployment<br />

that will always be there in<br />

Kashmir being a border state. We<br />

have people right up to Siachen and<br />

we are not guarding a thin line. It is a<br />

line with a lot of depth. The Line of<br />

Control (LOC) probably has a depth<br />

ranging from 5 to 10 kilometres and<br />

then there are a large number of civilian<br />

habitations that cannot be<br />

ignored. Everything in border zone is<br />

looked after by the army.<br />

In my time the Rashtriya Rifles<br />

had just started coming in. There was<br />

one battalion of Rashtriya Rifles that<br />

was in the Anantnag area. The second<br />

one came in the middle of 1994.<br />

Thereafter the battalions were in<br />

quite a large number. Had the<br />

Pakistani statement that we have<br />

650,000 people in Kashmir been true,<br />

we would have walked into Pakistan.<br />

We never had such numbers.<br />

Probably they are including CRPF,<br />

BSF and so on. Of course, with the<br />

Rashtriya Rifles coming in the numbers<br />

would have increased significantly,<br />

but we have to exclude the<br />

troops in the border area from our<br />

calculations.<br />

Q Army started the Project<br />

Sadhbhawana. What is it all<br />

about? Was it to counter the<br />

alienation of the people<br />

because of the army excesses?<br />

Was this project an image<br />

building exercise of the army?<br />

Has it succeeded?<br />

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A. “Sadhbhawana” means goodwill.<br />

Long time back we had an operation<br />

called Operation “Good<br />

Samaritan” which was run in<br />

Nagaland, Manipur, and so on. This<br />

involved a small force of engineers,<br />

veterinary and medical people<br />

grouped together with some plant<br />

and machinery working in the disturbed<br />

area of North East. When the<br />

locals discovered that the force was<br />

working for their benefit they<br />

pitched in and the army received a<br />

great deal of goodwill.<br />

So “Good Samaritans” is the<br />

father and mother of all<br />

“Sadbhawanas.” Arjun Ray started<br />

the Sadbhawana initially in the<br />

North of Kashmir and Ladakh where<br />

he was commanding the division. He<br />

did that with a gusto that was infectious.<br />

In fact on a visit to Kargil and<br />

certain areas of Siachen Glacier,<br />

where I had met a lot of locals, one of<br />

them said, “Saab if this gentleman<br />

stands for elections here people will<br />

vote in block for him.”<br />

Sadbhawana was nothing new to<br />

Kashmir. We were doing it even<br />

before Arjun came along. This is a<br />

straightforward civic action. When<br />

the administration ceases to be and<br />

the Deputy Commissioners don’t<br />

deliver and projects are restricted to<br />

paper the people are the worst sufferers.<br />

I recall during the 1993-1994 winter,<br />

there was a big blockade on<br />

National Highway 1 (NH1) from<br />

Jammu to Srinagar and beyond.<br />

Normally it should take a few days<br />

but this time it was almost a month.<br />

There was no food and kerosene in<br />

the valley. It was in the Kupwara side<br />

which was fairly militancy ridden.<br />

There was an SOS. We fortunately<br />

had buffer rations and we shared our<br />

rice, kerosene and flour with the<br />

locals. Civic actions do help in boosting<br />

up local morale. It is however<br />

wrong to link Sabhawana with the<br />

alleged army excesses.<br />

Q. How critical is the US role in<br />

Kashmir?<br />

A. First of all the US has no role<br />

to play in Kashmir. Is it any of there<br />

business what we are doing in<br />

Kashmir? We have always said that<br />

Kashmir is a bilateral issue.<br />

According to us there is no Kashmir<br />

problem and according to Pakistan<br />

there is one. That is where the Shimla<br />

agreement comes in. There cannot be<br />

third party involvement in it. Even<br />

the Americans are careful. They are<br />

saying that they will not advise anybody.<br />

Although Bill Clinton was fond<br />

of advising everybody, in our case he<br />

did not. Even Bush came here and<br />

made the statement “in case the<br />

Government asks for our help we<br />

will always be willing to facilitate<br />

affairs.” If we cannot deal with our<br />

own affairs in our own country then<br />

there is no point in taking the help of<br />

a third person who has not done very<br />

well in his own country.<br />

Q. How much are the chances of<br />

normalcy returning to the valley?<br />

Can you give us your<br />

view on what the future holds<br />

for Kashmir?<br />

What Kashmir needs<br />

is a first class<br />

district collector<br />

and police<br />

superintendent<br />

instead of the<br />

average kind of<br />

officers that are<br />

there. A modernised<br />

police set up to<br />

improve efficiency<br />

would go a long way<br />

A. It is a place of such infinite<br />

beauty. People are very friendly, simple<br />

and straightforward and it is a<br />

great pity that they have been subjected<br />

to some form of baptism by<br />

fire. I do not know how the situation<br />

is going to turn. Every time the butter<br />

begins to form on top of the churn<br />

something happens and we are back<br />

to square one. Chara-e-Sharief was a<br />

major setback. Of course we put<br />

through the elections when Farooq<br />

Abdullah came back. I saw the<br />

enthusiasm of the locals about the<br />

elections. A great deal of goodwill<br />

has been generated among the<br />

Kashmiris through medical treatment,<br />

education, rebuilding communications<br />

and bridges.<br />

A lot has been done and people<br />

are well disposed. Perhaps there will<br />

be another election shortly if the current<br />

government is not doing well.<br />

That is as far as the present and<br />

immediate situation is concerned.<br />

What Kashmir needs is a first class<br />

district collector and police superintendent<br />

instead of the average kind<br />

of officers that are there. A modernised<br />

police set up to improve efficiency<br />

would go a long way. I have<br />

seen police stations in Baramullah<br />

area which did not have even a toilet.<br />

Politicians must be made to understand<br />

that Kashmir will live beyond<br />

them. Feathering their pockets on<br />

public money is against the people’s<br />

interests and there should be provisions<br />

to recall such legislators. Good<br />

administration, good policing and<br />

eradication of corruption and the<br />

spirit of service among the political<br />

class – these are required to ensure a<br />

bright future for the state.<br />

Q Until the dispute is resolved is<br />

normalcy possible?<br />

A. It can come back. There is a<br />

bus running and cross border interactions<br />

between people have started.<br />

One must remember that usually<br />

militancy has a life span of 10 years,<br />

and here it is already 20 years - a long<br />

time for militancy to run. There is a<br />

fatigue factor that operates. The two<br />

nations have already fought three<br />

wars over it besides a small one in<br />

Kargil also. If good sense prevails,<br />

they should be able to freeze the situation<br />

as it is. In due course we will<br />

learn to live with each other.<br />

<br />

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HURRIYAT VIEW<br />

‘Taking up arms a compulsion<br />

not choice’ : Geelani<br />

Leader of separatist movement Syed Ali Shah Geelani justifies his stand on Kashmir on the<br />

basis of the two-nation theory opted for in 1947 at the time of partition of India and<br />

Pakistan. He spoke to Aaliya Anjum for this exclusive interview for <strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong> in<br />

Srinagar. Excerpts:<br />

Hurriyat Conference (G)<br />

Chairman, Syed Ali Shah<br />

Geelani, is a prominent<br />

Kashmiri separatist leader. A staunch<br />

advocate of Kashmir’s accession to<br />

Pakistan, his argument has mainly<br />

been based on the division of the<br />

Indian subcontinent on religious<br />

lines and the cultural and religious<br />

affiliations of the people of Kashmir<br />

with Pakistan. Lately though his<br />

statements seem to reflect his willingness<br />

to accommodate the proposition<br />

of an independent Jammu &<br />

Kashmir if the people of the state so<br />

desire. Seen as a hardliner whose<br />

stand on Kashmir has not softened<br />

over the years, the septuagenarian<br />

leader has recently undergone a<br />

surgery for renal malignancy. He has<br />

survived numerous assassination<br />

attempts, spent many years in prison,<br />

besides being off and on under house<br />

arrest. Yet, none of these could deter<br />

him from addressing massive gatherings<br />

all over Kashmir where he is<br />

seen as a firebrand orator. Donning a<br />

spotless white Pathan suit, he waits<br />

to make me and my two other colleagues<br />

to sit before he himself takes<br />

seat. I introduce <strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong> and we<br />

begin this conversation:<br />

Q. How would you justify your<br />

stand that Kashmir is a disputed<br />

territory?<br />

A. India was divided on the basis<br />

of Two Nation Theory. On July 25,<br />

1947, the then Governor General of<br />

India, gave the option to states that<br />

were not directly under British control<br />

to join either India or Pakistan or<br />

Q&A<br />

to remain independant.While doing<br />

so though, they had to consider three<br />

things. First, they had to consider as<br />

to which dominion their boundaries<br />

were connected. Second, whether the<br />

majority of the population was<br />

Muslim or Non-Muslim. Third, being<br />

cultural and religious affiliations of<br />

their population. Hyderabad declared<br />

independence. But India through<br />

Police action grabbed it. Junagarh<br />

declared accession to Pakistan as its<br />

boundaries were connected with<br />

Pakistan through Sindh and<br />

Rajasthan. India on the pretext that<br />

population of Junagarh did not support<br />

this move by its ruler, occupied<br />

it as well.<br />

If the guidelines I mentioned<br />

would have been taken into consideration<br />

in case of Jammu & Kashmir,<br />

there was no question that Jammu &<br />

Kashmir would have become a part<br />

of India. Seven-hundred-and-fifty<br />

miles of J&K’s boundaries are connected<br />

to Pakistan. In 1947, 85 percent<br />

of the population of J&K was<br />

Muslim. Besides, it also had cultural<br />

and religious affiliations with<br />

Pakistan. As the ruler of Kashmir at<br />

that time was a Dogra Hindu and<br />

was not concerned about the Muslim<br />

majority population of J&K, his inclinations<br />

towards India were obvious.<br />

And Sheikh Abdullah’s friendship<br />

with the late Jawaharlal Nehru also<br />

played a part in Kashmir’s accession<br />

to India. When India eventually sent<br />

its forces to Kashmir, Nehru had<br />

committed to the people of J&K that<br />

the forces would be withdrawn and<br />

the right to self-determination will be<br />

given to them. This is also a matter of<br />

fact that India referred the matter to<br />

the UN and after thorough discussions<br />

18 resolutions were passed. All<br />

of these were accepted and signed by<br />

India and Pakistan. This is an important<br />

legal point. The acceptance of<br />

these resolutions by India is a manifestation<br />

of India’s commitment to<br />

the world that Kashmir is not an integral<br />

part of India. It is a disputed territory<br />

and that India is committed to<br />

give the right to self-determination to<br />

the people of J&K. The struggle of the<br />

people of the state is aimed at achieving<br />

the fulfilment of this pledge that<br />

India had given.<br />

Ever since we have been facing<br />

the brutal and inhuman attitude of<br />

the Indian armed forces. In October<br />

1947 in Jammu, about 5 lakh people<br />

were massacred and 1 million were<br />

forced to migrate to Pakistan. Nehru,<br />

Abdullah and Hari Singh were<br />

responsible for the massacre of<br />

Muslims. Muslims were lured to<br />

migrate to the Muslim majority<br />

dominion of Pakistan. They were<br />

loaded in trucks and mercilessly<br />

massacred on their way to Pakistan.<br />

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HURRIYAT VIEW<br />

Women were abducted, old aged<br />

people and children were killed by<br />

Indian Army, Dogra army and Hindu<br />

extremists. Right from that day,<br />

Indian forces are trying to subdue<br />

the voice of the people of J&K. We<br />

tried peaceful and democratic methods<br />

for the resolution of the dispute<br />

but to no consequence. We even contested<br />

midterm parliamentary elections<br />

in 1971 when Congress was the<br />

ruling party. Widespread rigging<br />

prevented our victory. In 1972 we<br />

contested again and five Jamat-e-<br />

Islami members succeeded. In the<br />

Legislative Assembly, they discussed<br />

the disputed nature of J&K and<br />

India’s commitment to fulfil the<br />

pledge it had given, but no heed was<br />

paid. In 1978 we contested elections<br />

again under the banner of Muslim<br />

United Front (MUF) and there was<br />

clear expectation that we will win 30<br />

seats. But due to the conspiracy of<br />

Indian National Congress and<br />

National Conference, our successful<br />

candidates were declared to have lost<br />

and they were taken to Hiranagar jail<br />

in Jammu province. After losing faith<br />

in the democratic system, and after<br />

India’s rejection of peaceful methods<br />

for achieving right to self-determination,<br />

our youth got frustrated and<br />

resorted to armed resistance. It was<br />

the compulsion for our youth, not<br />

their will.<br />

Therefore since 1988 we are facing<br />

the brutal force of the Indian<br />

Army. They have martyred about 1<br />

lakh people majority of them are<br />

civilians. Since the last 20 years<br />

10,000 people have gone missing<br />

from custody. More than one thousand<br />

unmarked graves have been<br />

discovered. Thousands of Kashmiri<br />

women have been raped by Indian<br />

Forces. A 10-year-old girl and her<br />

mother were gangraped in each<br />

other’s presence. In Badra Payeen village<br />

of Handwara, army entered the<br />

house of one Abdul Rashid. And<br />

when he escaped, they raped his<br />

daughter and wife. Mufti Mohammad<br />

Sayeed, the then chief minister of<br />

J&K and home minister of India<br />

Shivraj Patil were addressing a press<br />

conference. The intelligence agencies<br />

confirmed to Mufti Sayeed at the<br />

press conference that the mother had<br />

been definitely raped but the daughter<br />

is safe. It was clearly wrong information.<br />

Had Mufti Sayeed any dignity<br />

and any love and respect for his<br />

nation, he would have at that very<br />

moment resigned in protest. When<br />

we visited the victims, we could not<br />

stand the pathetic condition of the<br />

daughter. She had been gangraped<br />

first followed by her mother. On<br />

October 6, 2001, 30 Rashtriya Rifles<br />

from Langate camp declared a crackdown<br />

in Jaggerpora village. A villager<br />

Ibrahim Dar was ordered to<br />

arrange tea for 30 RR men. The army<br />

men tried to rape Ibrahim Dar’s<br />

daughter-in-law, the same woman<br />

who had prepared tea for them.<br />

Ibrahim Dar and his son who had<br />

been made to sit in the compound of<br />

the house tried to save the woman<br />

and both were martyred. On the<br />

same day two other persons were<br />

killed in the same village. One 80-<br />

year-old man was grazing his cattle<br />

During Hazratbal<br />

siege a peaceful<br />

demonstration in<br />

Bijbehara was<br />

attacked by BSF<br />

and 44 people were<br />

mercilessly killed<br />

and the other was a trader from a<br />

nearby village.<br />

In Kunan Poshpora village<br />

dozens of our women were gangraped.<br />

In Islamabad district’s Dooru<br />

Shahabad, during a crackdown on<br />

July 2, 2005 army entered a house<br />

asking the family to prepare tea for<br />

them. Zahida, a beautiful 12th class<br />

student in the family was noticed by<br />

sepoy Balvinder Singh of 6 RR who<br />

made up his mind to rape her. And<br />

on the midnight of July 30 and 31, he<br />

locked her father and others in one<br />

room and tried to rape Zahida. But<br />

she resisted fiercely only to be<br />

gunned down. During Hazratbal<br />

siege a peaceful demonstration in<br />

Bijbehara was attacked by BSF and 44<br />

people were mercilessly killed. On<br />

January 6, 1993 in Sopore one youth<br />

snatched the gun from a BSF soldier<br />

and in retaliation 200 shops and<br />

houses were gutted and 44 people<br />

were killed and thrown into the fire.<br />

On January 7, 1994, a peaceful procession<br />

in Handwara was fired at by<br />

the occupying forces and 22 persons<br />

were mercilessly killed.<br />

On January 26 the whole state<br />

particularly the valley observes strike<br />

against the Indian occupation.<br />

Kupwara also observed the strike on<br />

26th. The next day the army stationed<br />

at Kupwara fired bullets at<br />

people in shops and 22 people were<br />

killed. At Moulvi Farooq’s funeral<br />

procession nearly 65 people were<br />

killed. In 1990 at Gowkadal 50 people<br />

were killed mercilessly and countless<br />

houses were gutted and razed to the<br />

ground. In Bandipora, two Mujahideen<br />

had fired at the army outside the village<br />

but in a rage army burnt down<br />

12 houses. I have myself seen those<br />

12 houses. In Nadihal Kunan<br />

Babagund Village, two army men<br />

dressed as civilians tried to rape a<br />

girl. But her neighbors caught hold of<br />

them and brought them to the town<br />

in a procession. The procession got<br />

fired at, cane charged and tear<br />

gassed. Cases such as these are in<br />

hundreds and thousands. This is the<br />

situation the people of Kashmir are<br />

facing under the Indian occupation.<br />

Q. Do you think that demilitaristion<br />

can bring down the human<br />

rights violation levels to a certain<br />

extent?<br />

A. Not only demilitarisation will<br />

help. It has to be accompanied with<br />

India’s acceptance of the disputed<br />

nature of J&K and withdrawal of the<br />

Disturbed Areas Act, Public Safety<br />

Act and Armed Forces Special<br />

Powers Act. All these draconian laws<br />

are being used illegally, inhumanly<br />

and immorally. Indian forces should<br />

be withdrawn from the state because<br />

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they are occupying forces. They have<br />

no moral, legal, human or democratic<br />

legitimacy to be here. Then it is the<br />

responsibility of the UN Security<br />

Council and the so called superpowers<br />

to come forward and prevail<br />

upon the Indian government and<br />

Indian leadership so that the right to<br />

self determination be given to the<br />

people of J&K. We are under extreme<br />

brutal attack of the Indian occupying<br />

forces and the world must awaken to<br />

it. I have read in the newspaper just<br />

now that in Shopian there had been a<br />

crackdown and some youth were<br />

mercilessly beaten by the occupying<br />

forces. This is a reaction to my<br />

addressing nearly five public gatherings<br />

with huge public participation<br />

in Shopian. They (forces) got provoked<br />

by this. They are communal<br />

minded as is evident from the<br />

Gujarat case. Without any hesitation<br />

or exaggeration I can tell you that all<br />

the forces stationed in J&K have a<br />

Narender Modi mind. All of them<br />

and there is no exception in this.<br />

Q The violence levels of the present<br />

as compared to the past few<br />

years are relatively low. Does it<br />

mean that peace has set in? Also<br />

what is your reaction to the<br />

proposition that the people of<br />

Kashmir are fed up with the past<br />

two decades of conflict and they<br />

no longer want to engage themselves<br />

with it?<br />

A. All the Indian Army officers<br />

are themselves admitting that there<br />

are not more than 2,000 Mujahideen<br />

in the whole state. And you can yourself<br />

think, what justifies the presence<br />

of 8 lakh army men in the state if they<br />

are fighting only 2000 Mujahideen. Is<br />

there any ratio? So, their fight against<br />

militants is a lame excuse. Actually,<br />

they are fighting against the masses,<br />

the common people. They are fighting<br />

against the people asking for<br />

right to self-determination. Even in<br />

case of these 2,000 Mujahideen, the<br />

Indian Armed forces claim to be<br />

killing 3-4 daily. Just yesterday I was<br />

in Sopore addressing a gathering of<br />

people and one can easily understand<br />

that majority of the people are<br />

not with India. They are demanding<br />

withdrawal of Indian forces from this<br />

land. And our youth are determined<br />

and loyal to the cause.<br />

Q. There is no consensus amongst<br />

the population of J&K or<br />

amongst the separatist leadership<br />

as to their aspirations on<br />

Kashmir. Do you agree?<br />

A. (Laughs) Majority of the people<br />

of J&K are of the opinion that<br />

they are slaves and must be set free<br />

from Indian occupation. This is an<br />

unquestionable mindset of the people.<br />

There is no need for only one<br />

platform for the expression of this<br />

opinion. Our group, the Mirwaiz<br />

group and JKLF, all are asking for<br />

self-determination. There are certain<br />

ideological differences though that<br />

cannot be resolved. For us, the only<br />

source of inspiration for the struggle<br />

is Islam. We cannot separate the<br />

political aspect from the religious<br />

aspect. This doesn’t matter to other<br />

groups. And if one separates politics<br />

from Islam one is not justified in<br />

holding a Muslim identity because<br />

Islam preaches (quoting a verse from<br />

the Holy Quran) that ‘O believers!<br />

you come into Islam completely’. A<br />

Muslim is not allowed to separate his<br />

aspects of life from Islamic sayings<br />

and guidance. And we cannot compromise<br />

on this. Whatever people<br />

may say but it is impossible for us to<br />

surrender as far as these ideological<br />

differences are concerned.<br />

Some say Kashmir is only a political<br />

problem. But for us, it is an<br />

Islamic problem. Our faith is getting<br />

attacked by the Indian activities. Be it<br />

the educational, social or economic<br />

systems, all of them are under Indian<br />

aggression. So we don’t ask for freedom<br />

alone, but also for the preservation<br />

of the Islamic faith. Others are<br />

not bothered. Liquor shops are being<br />

opened. In the education sector, our<br />

daughters are being taken to different<br />

Indian states where there is no<br />

guarantee of their safeguard. We<br />

have the moral responsibility as<br />

Muslims to take notice of all such<br />

things. However, as far as the plinth<br />

of our and other separatist groups<br />

Council and the so<br />

called superpowers<br />

to come forward<br />

and prevail upon<br />

the Indian<br />

government and<br />

Indian leadership<br />

so that the right to<br />

self determination<br />

be given to the<br />

people of J&K<br />

demands is concerned, it is the same<br />

in as much as our asking for the right<br />

to self-determination. But, if others<br />

try to dilute this basic point, we can<br />

have differences there as well. For<br />

example, others are busy in dialogue<br />

with India on bilateral level. We see it<br />

as futile exercise. Since March 23,<br />

1952, dialogue is continuous. And<br />

more than 130 times dialogue has<br />

happened. Some of the Kashmiri separatists<br />

are also busy in dialogue<br />

since 2002. What have they achieved?<br />

I will tell without any doubt or fear<br />

that until India accepts the disputed<br />

nature of J&K and withdraws its<br />

forces and the special powers of<br />

armed forces and other draconian<br />

laws the dialogue process will yield<br />

nothing. India’s objective is to consume<br />

time by keeping Pakistan and<br />

part of the Kashmiri leadership busy<br />

in dialogue so that they can reflect<br />

before the world that they are busy in<br />

making attempts for resolution of the<br />

Kashmir dispute. Therefore, India<br />

sees no need for international intervention.<br />

India wants to maintain status<br />

quo in Kashmir. Nothing else.<br />

They are using the American and<br />

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European Union support. America’s<br />

influence and pressure on Pakistan is<br />

increasing day by day. India is also<br />

benefiting from Pakistan’s internal<br />

problems. India otherwise is not<br />

interested to resolve the J&K dispute<br />

on the basis of historical facts and<br />

wishes of the people. They don’t<br />

have any respect for the sacrifices<br />

given by our people for a just and<br />

noble cause.<br />

Q. To you what would be an ideal<br />

dialogue process for Kashmir?<br />

A. We demand the implementations<br />

of the UN resolutions on<br />

Kashmir and India’s acceptance of<br />

the disputed nature of J&K. They<br />

should accept that J&K is not an integral<br />

part of India, it is a disputed territory.<br />

And that they are ready to<br />

resolve this dispute according to the<br />

wishes and aspirations of the people<br />

and on the basis of India’s partition.<br />

Then we would be ready to engage in<br />

dialogue. The dialogue should be<br />

maintained on tripartite level<br />

between India, Pakistan and the real<br />

representatives of the people of J&K.<br />

All the aspects including the historical<br />

background of J&K should be<br />

taken into consideration.<br />

India is not<br />

interested to<br />

resolve the J&K<br />

dispute on the basis<br />

of historical facts<br />

and wishes of the<br />

people. They don’t<br />

have any respect for<br />

the sacrifices given<br />

by our people for a<br />

just and noble<br />

cause<br />

Q. But the aspirations of the three<br />

regions of the state are fractured.<br />

How would you address that?<br />

A Whenever we refer to the whole<br />

population which is at this juncture<br />

13 million people, we refer to people<br />

residing in Azad Kashmir, Jammu,<br />

the Kashmir valley and Ladakh.We<br />

are not asking for right to self-determination<br />

only for Muslims but for<br />

the whole population of J&K irrespective<br />

of religion. And we have<br />

time and again declared that if the<br />

majority of the population of J&K<br />

will decide to be with India, we will<br />

accept the decision. If they want to<br />

accede to Pakistan, India should in<br />

other words respect the will of the<br />

people.<br />

Q And if the majority chooses to<br />

remain independent?<br />

A. That will be also taken into<br />

consideration. But we also have to<br />

note that the UN resolutions state the<br />

options of accession either to India or<br />

to Pakistan. However, if by dialogue<br />

all the concerned three parties decide<br />

by consensus that the whole J&K that<br />

existed before the 14th August 1947<br />

should attain independence, we<br />

would accept that. It would not be<br />

according to our wishes though. We<br />

believe J&K is a genuine part of<br />

Pakistan and it should become so.<br />

Q Do you think the judiciary is<br />

doing what is required to<br />

address human rights violations<br />

in Kashmir?<br />

A. Not at all. Even courts are<br />

under pressure. Whenever a detention<br />

is quashed, the person released<br />

is again imprisoned by the forces and<br />

taken to different interrogation centers<br />

and tortured. Thousands of people<br />

have disappeared in custody,<br />

what are courts doing about that?<br />

Nothing at all. See Jalil Andrabi’s<br />

Case. He was a leading advocate. He<br />

was mercilessly killed and martyred.<br />

But his murderer is in Canada. And<br />

Courts are doing nothing.<br />

Q What can be an alternative?<br />

A. There should be a war crimes<br />

tribunal for Kashmir. We have<br />

requested so many times for its establishment<br />

in conformity with the public<br />

demand of holding the violators of<br />

human rights in J&K accountable.<br />

Pakistan could have helped with its<br />

establishment but unfortunately it is<br />

under the influence of America and<br />

Britain. The US and Britain are part of<br />

the UN Security Council and therefore<br />

they are in a position to help in<br />

this respect. We personally are helpless.<br />

We can only raise our voices. The<br />

civil society groups and the Kashmiri<br />

Diaspora have a role to play. But<br />

unfortunately they are not taking any<br />

interest as far as the sufferings of the<br />

people of J&K under Indian occupation<br />

are concerned.<br />

Q Why do you think the international<br />

community has kept silent<br />

on Kashmir inspite of its human<br />

rights scene being akin to the<br />

most publicised armed conflicts<br />

in the world?<br />

A. At this juncture, there is no<br />

country at the global level that is<br />

morally conscious. Their politics is<br />

based on their economic and personal<br />

interests. This is an unfortunate<br />

aspect of the whole human civilization<br />

that there is no system based on<br />

morality, based on humanity and<br />

oneness of the people. America,<br />

Britain and the Muslim world, all<br />

have their own interests. They are<br />

not taking a bold stand on J&K. If the<br />

57 Muslim countries stop the supply<br />

of oil to India for one day, India will<br />

submit to the will of the people of<br />

J&K. But nobody is ready to take<br />

these steps. For example, Hamas<br />

gained its position by democratic<br />

means in Palestine and America was<br />

not happy for this as Hamas believes<br />

in Islam. Hamas declared adoption<br />

of Islamic methods for running the<br />

affairs of Palestine. America created a<br />

situation for Hamas where they<br />

could not pay salaries to their servants.<br />

On the other hand in 2006 they<br />

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HURRIYAT VIEW<br />

gave 27 million dollars to Mahmoud<br />

Abbas so that Fatah becomes more<br />

forceful against Hamas. Therefore<br />

Hamas remains imprisoned in Gaza<br />

while Mahmoud Abbas runs the dialogue<br />

with Israel and America. As far<br />

as the American policy is concerned,<br />

it is extremely against Muslims and<br />

the Islamic system. Bush has<br />

declared that he is fighting against Al<br />

Qaeda, Taliban and against all those<br />

people who have ideological affiliations<br />

to the Islamic system.<br />

Q What do you think of Indian<br />

media’s coverage of the<br />

Kashmir conflict?<br />

A. The Indian media are biased<br />

on the Kashmir situation. Their first<br />

priority is the preservation of their<br />

national interest. The have openly<br />

declared that they would not raise<br />

any question that would demoralise<br />

the Indian forces in Kashmir. So they<br />

are not taking any notice of rape<br />

cases, gutting of houses, custodial<br />

killings, and the brutal attitude of<br />

occupying forces in Kashmir. None<br />

of them take any interest. Not even<br />

the Indian newspapers. And even the<br />

language they use for Kashmir is<br />

motivated. They are under the pressure<br />

of national interest and nationalism<br />

which is dangerous for their<br />

human and moral values.<br />

Q What is your argument against<br />

the exercise of elections in J&K.<br />

And there is a difference of opinion<br />

between you and Jamat-e-<br />

Islami with them favoring elections<br />

for the purposes of governance.<br />

How do you react to that?<br />

A. The first argument is that India<br />

is exploiting elections though it<br />

would not have any direct effect on<br />

the Kashmir question at the international<br />

level, particularly because<br />

there is a UN Security Council<br />

Resolution of 1952 that no election<br />

will affect the disputed nature of<br />

J&K. But India exploits this.<br />

Whenever people go to the polling<br />

booths, their pictures are taken and it<br />

is being projected to the world that<br />

people of J&K are voting for India.<br />

We must check this exploitation of<br />

Indian Imperialism. The second<br />

thing is that the people become parties<br />

to the exploitation by supporting<br />

the people who are raping our mothers<br />

and daughters, who are gutting<br />

our houses. There is no moral justification<br />

for casting votes in favour of<br />

the enemies of our people. Those<br />

who are responsible for dehumanising<br />

the people of J&K. Opposing this<br />

is a reflection of our Islamic ideology<br />

and those who say that elections are<br />

alright for development are not considering<br />

these facts. Most members<br />

of the Jamat-e-Islami support us by<br />

attending our public meetings. And<br />

they are also supporting our stance<br />

on boycotting elections.<br />

Q Are there any lessons for Kashmir<br />

one can draw from the cases of<br />

East Timor and Kosovo?<br />

A. The picture is very clear. In<br />

East Timor there was a Christian<br />

majority. They raised their voice for<br />

separation from Indonesia for only<br />

two years and they achieved it. One<br />

can observe the biased attitude of the<br />

world community through this case.<br />

We are Muslims demanding for our<br />

basic rights since 1947 but the world<br />

is blind to our demands. In case of<br />

East Timor, because of the world’s<br />

religious affiliations with the<br />

Christian population, the international<br />

community was very supportive.<br />

Kosovo achieved independence<br />

because of the differences between<br />

Russia and the Western countries.<br />

The west wanted Russia to be let<br />

down. But the major factor is the<br />

courage of the people of Kosovo.<br />

They have given a lot of sacrifices to<br />

achieve independence. That is appreciable.<br />

We pray for their successful<br />

future.<br />

Q What do you have to say about<br />

the J&K government’s decision<br />

to transfer forest land to SASB<br />

(Shri Amarnath Shrine Board)?<br />

Even courts are under<br />

pressure. Whenever a<br />

detention is quashed,<br />

the person released is<br />

again imprisoned by<br />

the forces and taken to<br />

different interrogation<br />

centers and tortured.<br />

Thousands of people<br />

have disappeared in<br />

custody, what are<br />

courts doing about that<br />

A. It is illegal and Immoral. This<br />

is Israeli tactics the government is<br />

trying to use in J&K. Israel adopted<br />

the same policy by purchasing land<br />

in Palestine. And consequently 40<br />

million Palestinians are living as<br />

refugees in different countries. They<br />

are suffering because there is no land<br />

left in Palestine. Eight lakh canals of<br />

land are under Indian occupation.<br />

Wherever they see any free land,<br />

they forcibly occupy that land. It is<br />

the present governor’s idea to grab<br />

the land in the name of the Hindu<br />

religion. The SASB is being used for<br />

this purpose. Another aspect is that<br />

non-state subjects would be taking<br />

custody of the land, which is against<br />

Article 370 and the constitution of J &<br />

K. Their occupation will result in poisoning<br />

of the surrounding environment<br />

by affecting the forestland and<br />

polluting the water of the Lidder<br />

River as thousands of people are<br />

expected to be staying at the residential<br />

quarters and huts they are planning<br />

to construct. Yatra used to run<br />

only for 10 days but the governor has<br />

extended it to 2 months now. Now<br />

one can imagine the extent of negative<br />

impact it can cause to the fragile<br />

environment.<br />

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‘Dialogue instead of deadlock’:<br />

Mirwaiz Umer Farooq<br />

Q&A<br />

For 15 years, Mirwaiz Umer Farooq has<br />

not only held the highest religious title in<br />

Kashmir, but also been active in the state’s<br />

politics. The term Mirwaiz stands for<br />

hereditary religious leader of Muslims in<br />

Kashmir, and Umer Farooq’s family has<br />

held this title since 1947. Remarkably,<br />

young leader entered the choppy waters<br />

of Kashmir politics as a teenager. This was<br />

when his father, Mirwaiz Mohammed<br />

Farooq (also chief of the Awami Action<br />

Committee), was assassinated in 1990.<br />

After taking over as the 12th Mirwaiz,<br />

Umer Farooq became the chairman of the<br />

Hurriyat in 1993. He spoke to Amrit Dhatt<br />

for this exclusive interview for <strong>Combat</strong><br />

<strong>Law</strong>. Excerpts follow:<br />

QWhat do you think is the<br />

ideal solution to the<br />

Kashmir problem? Do you<br />

think the implementation of the<br />

UN resolutions is required?<br />

A. Well I think the basic concept<br />

of the Hurriyat Conference is that the<br />

problem has to be addressed in<br />

accordance with the wishes of the<br />

people. We believe that we have two<br />

mechanisms: one is the implementation<br />

of the UN resolutions and the<br />

other one is a dialogue between the<br />

parties concerned -- India, Pakistan,<br />

and Kashmiris. So, both are acceptable<br />

to us but given the present scenario,<br />

I think it’s a bit unlikely that<br />

the government of India is going to<br />

implement the UN resolutions so we<br />

believe that dialogue, tripartite talks,<br />

should begin. Once the process is initiated,<br />

then we can talk of a solution.<br />

Right now we don’t have a process<br />

where India, Pakistan, Kashmiris are<br />

talking in detail. So let the process<br />

start and after that we can find a<br />

solution.<br />

Q How do you define self-determination<br />

in light of the different<br />

ideological positions that exist<br />

in the three regions of the valley?<br />

A. Well we do believe that there<br />

are different ideologies of the valley<br />

in terms of the people that are living<br />

in Kashmir. When we talk about<br />

Kashmir, we don’t only talk about<br />

the Indian side of Kashmir, we talk<br />

about the other side of Kashmir -- so<br />

we talk about the five regions of<br />

Kashmir. These five areas constitute<br />

the state of Jammu & Kashmir. In<br />

that context, the Hurriyat has supported<br />

the concept of self-determination<br />

or self-rule, or self-governance.<br />

Regional aspirations can also be<br />

taken into consideration but at the<br />

same time, a relationship between<br />

different regions can also be maintained.<br />

So, we are saying that let<br />

India and Pakistan give an opportunity<br />

to people of all the five regions<br />

to sit and interact because right now<br />

we don’t have a mechanism where<br />

we can talk to the other leadership so<br />

we have to depend on India and<br />

Pakistan to provide the travel documents.<br />

Let India and Pakistan start<br />

the process and invite the Kashmiri<br />

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Being a political party,<br />

we do have human<br />

rights rings and we do<br />

have a cell. But, you<br />

know, our reports and<br />

our findings are<br />

rejected by the Indians<br />

because they said we<br />

are a biased political<br />

forum<br />

leadership and let there be an intra-<br />

Kashmir dialogue and then we can<br />

talk in terms of future goals.<br />

Q Do you believe in dividing the<br />

state on communal lines?<br />

A. No. We don’t believe in that.<br />

We believe the state of Jammu &<br />

Kashmir has always depicted unity,<br />

harmony, and tolerance. Although,<br />

yes we agree that there are Muslims,<br />

Hindus, and Sikhs living in Kashmir,<br />

but at the same time we are of the<br />

view that there can be no solution on<br />

religious lines. It will create more<br />

problems.<br />

Q How do you respond to commentators<br />

that your stance has<br />

softened over the years?<br />

A. We believe that the Hurriyat<br />

Conference is a realistic and pragmatic<br />

forum and we believe in realism<br />

and pragmatism. As Kashmiris,<br />

we are the sufferers. India and<br />

Pakistan can afford to wait and they<br />

have waited for 60 years to address<br />

the problem but we are the ones who<br />

are suffering. Kashmiris are getting<br />

killed in Kashmir. Today we are seeing<br />

that there is a ceasefire on the<br />

border and there are no Indians getting<br />

killed or no Pakistanis getting<br />

killed. It is the Kashmiris who are<br />

getting killed and I think it is the<br />

imperative duty of the Kashmiri<br />

leadership to come up with ideas,<br />

suggestions, proposals, and come<br />

onto the negotiating table. It doesn’t<br />

serve our interests to keep the potboiling.<br />

We reject this criticism that<br />

Hurriyat has softened its stance but<br />

yes, as the leadership’s duty is to lead<br />

and find means to address people’s<br />

concerns, we can’t be mute spectators<br />

to the fact that people are dying and<br />

we are just waiting for the UN resolutions<br />

to be implemented and talking<br />

about UN role while the UN is<br />

clearly saying that we are not interested<br />

and that the resolutions have<br />

become obsolete. So that’s why we<br />

believe in a new approach and yes,<br />

through dialogue and negotiations.<br />

We don’t believe in a “sell out” but<br />

we have to find a way out.<br />

Q What is your stance on<br />

demilitarisation?<br />

A. We are in support of demilitarisation.<br />

I think that 80 percent of<br />

the problem would be solved if<br />

Indian troops and Pakistani troops<br />

leave the state of Jammu & Kashmir.<br />

Pakistan has voluntarily said they are<br />

willing to do so if India is willing to<br />

do so. The fact is as you might have<br />

seen, India is not ruling Kashmir on<br />

the basis of its moral position but it’s<br />

clearly on the basis of its military<br />

might. People don’t want the Indian<br />

army to be here. They are the main<br />

cause of irritation, they are the main<br />

cause of human rights violations,<br />

and you can’t justify any peace process<br />

when you have more that<br />

450,000 troops on the ground. So<br />

Kashmir has the world’s highest concentration<br />

of troops where the ratio<br />

of the army to the population is concerned.<br />

Q In what ways is your party<br />

involved in human rights<br />

advocacy?<br />

A. Being a political party, we do<br />

have human rights rings and we do<br />

have a cell. But, you know, our<br />

reports and our findings are rejected<br />

by the Indians because they said we<br />

are a biased political forum. So we<br />

welcome any neutral group, any neutral<br />

agency to come and see the situation<br />

on their own while we condemn<br />

and deplore violations committed<br />

by the Indian forces. The<br />

Hurriyat Conference has also been<br />

condemning the violations committed<br />

by the other non-army people<br />

whether they are the militants or<br />

supporters of the India army (renegades<br />

or other people). So we believe<br />

in human rights, although we are trying<br />

our best, we have given cases to<br />

the Indian Human Rights<br />

Commission and state’s human<br />

rights commission in Srinagar but<br />

unfortunately no heed is paid to our<br />

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HURRIYAT VIEW<br />

cause so we believe that international<br />

NGO’s and Indian civil society<br />

should come forward because<br />

Kashmir is more than a political<br />

problem, it’s a human problem.<br />

Q How is your role as a religious<br />

leader connected to your role as<br />

a political leader?<br />

A. If you look at the society in<br />

Kashmir, I would say that religion<br />

has played a very important role in<br />

the society. And as a Mirwaiz and as<br />

a religious head, I go to the mosque<br />

and give my sermon (on Fridays). I<br />

cannot be a (mute) spectator to what<br />

has happened through the week. It is<br />

my duty to talk about religion but at<br />

the same time it is also my duty to<br />

talk about society too. So that’s why<br />

when you talk of society in Islam, it is<br />

not something, which is different<br />

from religion. We believe in a process<br />

be it religion, politics, social issues,<br />

social interactions -- they are a part of<br />

an overall process. So that’s why I<br />

have to talk about religious issues as<br />

well as about politics. As a mirwaiz<br />

or as a Muslim, I don’t differentiate<br />

between politics and religion. I<br />

believe this leads in the same direction.<br />

So that’s why I have<br />

to talk about<br />

religious issues as<br />

well as about<br />

politics. As a<br />

mirwaiz or as a<br />

Muslim, I don’t<br />

differentiate<br />

between politics<br />

and religion. I<br />

believe this leads in<br />

the same direction<br />

Q What is your stance on the<br />

upcoming elections?<br />

A We are not against elections<br />

but no one-way process can help<br />

address Kashmir. The elections are a<br />

purely administrative problem.<br />

Elections have been held since 1947<br />

until date but no election process has<br />

been a substitute for self-determination.<br />

The problem has not vanished<br />

after elections. So I don’t see elections<br />

as an alternative mechanism to the<br />

issue of Kashmir. And then you have<br />

a clear guideline with the UN vis-àvis<br />

Kashmir that no electoral process<br />

in Kashmir can be a substitute for<br />

self-determination. We are telling<br />

India that yes; we are ready for elections<br />

provided that elections are held<br />

for a cause, for a reason. That reason<br />

should be a political settlement of the<br />

Kashmir issue, not administrative<br />

issues like the chief minister or the<br />

assembly. These things are not related<br />

to Kashmir so we have to differentiate<br />

between the peace process and<br />

the electoral process. It’s purely a<br />

governance issue. It is not related to<br />

the Kashmir issue.<br />

Q What response would you<br />

like to see from the youth of<br />

Jammu & Kashmir?<br />

A. We know that there is a lot of<br />

frustration, there is a lot of anger, a<br />

lot of resentment among the youth<br />

and given the situation, they are<br />

under tremendous pressure. I think<br />

that the youth have shown time and<br />

again, that as far as their commitment<br />

with the movement is concerned<br />

it is absolute. Commitment is<br />

not the only thing we need, we need<br />

a direction, a modus operandi, and<br />

that is what the Hurriyat is working<br />

towards. The dialogue process or<br />

looking for options, looking for solutions<br />

or proposals is something that<br />

is instrumental to the movement.<br />

Whether we go to Pakistan or to<br />

India and talk to anyone is in the<br />

direction of finding an amicable and<br />

lasting solution. So we are telling the<br />

youth that the Hurriyat Conference is<br />

committed to the issues of political<br />

settlement and political future. At the<br />

Commitment is not the<br />

only thing we need, we<br />

need a direction, a<br />

modus operandi, and<br />

that is what the<br />

Hurriyat is working<br />

towards. The dialogue<br />

process or looking for<br />

options, looking for<br />

solutions or proposals<br />

is something that is<br />

instrumental to the<br />

movement<br />

same time, there are other issues like<br />

education, jobs, and other problems,<br />

which unfortunately cannot be<br />

addressed unless and until the political<br />

stability is attained on the<br />

ground. I would say that they<br />

Hurriyat is working on that and we<br />

are looking at the suggestions and<br />

options and other proposals and we<br />

believe that if India and Pakistan also<br />

contribute in the positive sense, India<br />

should not waste its time on issues<br />

like elections and economic packages<br />

and other things because we have<br />

seen in the past that they have not<br />

helped the cause. We should focus on<br />

the political settlement, look at suggestions<br />

and come and discuss with<br />

an open mind and an open heart and<br />

then try to analyse how we can move<br />

forward. We believe that it’s a gradual<br />

and step by step process and that is<br />

what the youth of Kashmir and the<br />

people of Kashmir have to be ready<br />

for.<br />

<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Amarnath row:<br />

Communalists are back to business<br />

A row set off by the move<br />

to hand over a piece of<br />

land to a pilgrimage<br />

centre in Jammu &<br />

Kashmir has revved up<br />

hate mills that spin<br />

sectarian politics. Not just<br />

chief minister but sanity<br />

too bolted out before<br />

another governor could<br />

retrace his predecessor’s<br />

disastrous steps in what<br />

looks like a belated<br />

damage control exercise,<br />

writes Praful Bidwai<br />

As has been famously said, a<br />

week is a long time in politics.<br />

Jammu & Kashmir has<br />

once again proved the validity of this<br />

aphorism with the crisis over the<br />

transfer of land to Shri Amarnath<br />

Shrine Board (SASB). The week-long<br />

protests this triggered not only led to<br />

the dramatic collapse of the<br />

Congress-People's Democratic Party<br />

alliance government, but may have<br />

generated major negative changes in<br />

the political mood in the Valley. This<br />

could help revive the separatist militancy<br />

which has been on the wane for<br />

more than two years. It may also<br />

have strengthened forces in the other<br />

regions of the state, which would like<br />

to divide it along religious lines. All<br />

these are worrisome developments.<br />

To start with, the protests<br />

impelled the PDP to withdraw from<br />

the ruling coalition on June 28.<br />

Jammu & Kashmir Chief Minister<br />

Ghulam Nabi Azad first put a brave<br />

face on the crisis this precipitated but<br />

he soon threw in the towel. Rather<br />

than go through the vote of confidence<br />

he had himself tabled, Mr<br />

Azad submitted his resignation to<br />

Governor N N Vohra.<br />

Evidently, despite his confidence<br />

that he would win the vote, Mr Azad<br />

failed to engineer enough abstentions<br />

in the legislative Assembly by<br />

PDP dissidents and other potential<br />

defectors, which alone could have<br />

enabled the Congress and its allies<br />

(with 42 seats in the 89-member<br />

House) to fight off the 47 seat-strong<br />

opposition and survive in power till<br />

the Assembly elections are held in<br />

October.<br />

Meanwhile, the revocation by<br />

Governor Vohra of the order transferring<br />

land to the SASB set off a conflagration<br />

in the Jammu region,<br />

which soon spread to other parts of<br />

India thanks to the Bharatiya Janata<br />

Party’s eagerness to exploit the situation<br />

to its own narrow ends.<br />

The fall of the Congress-PDP<br />

coalition government, the first of its<br />

kind in J&K, is a setback to the cause<br />

of moderation and political reconciliation<br />

in the long-troubled and restive<br />

state. This is only one of the many<br />

casualties extracted by the crisis over<br />

the transfer of forestland, and the<br />

violent protests this generated.<br />

The crisis has taken an even<br />

greater toll in the form of a collapse<br />

of the political normalisation process<br />

and an eclipse of the internal peace<br />

process in Kashmir. The danger, as<br />

we see below, is that this may lead to<br />

a revival of militant separatism in the<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Valley and a general shift towards<br />

intolerance and assertion of religionbased<br />

or communal identities in all<br />

the regions of J&K.<br />

The gains of the past six years -- a<br />

substantial decline in violence by<br />

jehadi separatists and by the security<br />

forces, a revival of the economy, a<br />

boom in the tourist industry, increasing<br />

isolation of strident extremism,<br />

and a general acceptance of mainstream<br />

political activity and electoral<br />

politics -- could now be in jeopardy.<br />

In Kashmir, the biggest winners<br />

from the crisis are the Hurriyat hardliners<br />

led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani,<br />

who until recently got completely<br />

isolated thanks to his extremist positions.<br />

No less important gainers are<br />

the leaders of the moderate Hurriyat,<br />

led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, who<br />

have moved from near-isolation and<br />

irrelevance to prominence through<br />

their staunch opposition to the land<br />

transfer on the ground that it would<br />

bring about a demographic transformation<br />

of the Valley. The two<br />

Hurriyat factions are now discussing<br />

unification.<br />

Nationally, the greatest gainer is<br />

the Bharatiya Janata Party, which has<br />

cynically exploited the return of the<br />

land to the forest department to<br />

foment violent Hindu-communal<br />

protests in different parts of the<br />

country. The death toll from the<br />

protests has already crossed the double-digit<br />

mark.<br />

There are no heroes, only villains,<br />

in the entire SASB land transfer<br />

drama. The greatest villain is<br />

unquestionably former Governor Lt-<br />

General SK Sinha, a BJP appointee,<br />

who just days before his retirement<br />

on June 4 ordered the state government<br />

to transfer 100 acres of forest<br />

land to the board of which he is the<br />

president. The land was to be used to<br />

provide temporary accommodation<br />

to pilgrims to the Amarnath shrine,<br />

where a stalactite of ice forms in a<br />

cave. The land transfer was manifestly<br />

illegal and violated the Forest<br />

Conservation Act.<br />

General Sinha has over the years<br />

systematically encouraged pilgrimage<br />

to this ecologically fragile area at<br />

an altitude of 10,000 feet, carved out<br />

a new route through the mountains,<br />

promoted all kinds of tourist facilities<br />

including a helicopter service,<br />

and extended the duration of the<br />

yatra from four weeks to eight weeks<br />

every year -- although the ice lingam<br />

lasts for only one month. The result<br />

has been a several fold increase in the<br />

number of pilgrims to 4 lakhs, with<br />

huge environmental destruction and<br />

mounds of polluting waste.<br />

The state forest minister, who<br />

belongs to the PDP, went along with<br />

all this, including the land transfer.<br />

Also complicit was Deputy Chief<br />

Minister Muzaffar Ali Baig, of the<br />

PDP. The PDP falsely claimed that it<br />

had been blackmailed into agreeing<br />

to the transfer by the Congress which<br />

threatened to block the rebuilding of<br />

the old Mughal Road, to connect the<br />

Valley to the Muslim areas of Rajauri<br />

and Poonch. When the news of the<br />

transfer leaked out, and protests<br />

erupted, the PDP took a U-turn and<br />

presented itself as a helpless victim.<br />

The Congress should have<br />

removed General Sinha long ago, but<br />

failed to do so. It succumbed to his<br />

unreasonable pressure while ignoring<br />

the Forest Act, and was guilty of<br />

venality and blatant manipulation of<br />

the state machinery. Such venality<br />

contributed in the past to the alienation<br />

of the Kashmiri people from<br />

the Indian state, and created a<br />

cesspool of grievances and injustices,<br />

which the separatists used to their<br />

own advantage with help from<br />

Pakistan’s secret agencies.<br />

No less culpable was the National<br />

Conference, whose leader, Dr Farooq<br />

Abdullah, established the SASB in<br />

2000, thus taking the pilgrimage’s<br />

charge away from the Muslim family<br />

which had discovered the cave in the<br />

1850s and looked after it ever since.<br />

This was a case of the government<br />

wantonly interfering with what had<br />

been a worthy instance of spontaneous<br />

Hindu-Muslim harmony and<br />

cooperation -- and then messing<br />

things up.<br />

When protests erupted in the<br />

Valley over the land transfer,<br />

Hurriyat leaders jumped into the<br />

fray. They had been marginalised<br />

ever since General Pervez Musharraf<br />

When protests erupted<br />

in the Valley over the<br />

land transfer, Hurriyat<br />

leaders jumped into<br />

the fray. They had been<br />

marginalised ever<br />

since General Pervez<br />

Musharraf moved<br />

away from the azadi<br />

agenda and proposed<br />

autonomy for the<br />

different regions of<br />

J&K<br />

moved away from the azadi agenda<br />

and proposed autonomy for the different<br />

regions of J&K without<br />

redrawing borders. In recent weeks,<br />

they had even come around to a position<br />

of not opposing and boycotting<br />

the coming Assembly elections,<br />

unlike in the past.<br />

Rather than make a gesture of<br />

generosity to religious Hindus, in<br />

keeping with Kashmir’s syncretic<br />

culture, the Hurriyat leadrers and<br />

JKLF chief Yasin Malik falsely depicted<br />

the land transfer as a means of<br />

forcibly settling Hindus in the Valley<br />

and an assault on the Kashmiri identity.<br />

This was patently absurd given<br />

the tiny size of the plot and the<br />

makeshift prefabricated structures<br />

being erected on it.<br />

They gave a religious-communal<br />

colour to the issue by deliberately<br />

organising processions to and from<br />

the Jama Masjid and the Hazratbal<br />

shrine. This falsified their claim to<br />

the “nationalist” mantle. They also<br />

tried to present the protests as spontaneous<br />

eruptions of popular anger<br />

against India’s Kashmir policy and<br />

the heavy presence of security forces.<br />

They maligned the peace process<br />

itself as a way of perpetuating the<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Kashmir status quo. This was the<br />

Hurriyat’s way of regaining its lost<br />

relevance, but this could only happen<br />

at the cost of yielding to the<br />

hardline Geelani faction.<br />

In reality, the protests were driven<br />

by the same narrow-minded and<br />

parochial motives as were evident in<br />

the earlier mob violence over the<br />

“sex scandal” issue, in which vigilante<br />

squads went on the rampage<br />

and burnt down the house of a<br />

woman suspected to be responsible<br />

for it. The protests caused great hardship<br />

to the public by disrupting the<br />

movement of essential supplies,<br />

including food and fuel.<br />

The Valley protests polarised<br />

opinion in J&K and were replicated<br />

like a mirror-image in the Jammu<br />

region under the leadership of the<br />

BJP. The BJP, true to type, has instigated<br />

violent protests in other parts<br />

of India by drumming up its<br />

favourite but utterly fraudulent slogan<br />

of “Muslim appeasement” and<br />

“anti-Hindu prejudice” on the part<br />

the United Progressive Alliance. This<br />

is infusing sectarian divisiveness and<br />

communal poison into religious<br />

beliefs and rituals.<br />

All this can only help the Valley’s<br />

hardline separatists revive the jehadi<br />

militancy which has been on the<br />

wane and lost its popular appeal.<br />

Separatists are no longer able to<br />

recruit cadres. But if the present<br />

polarisation continues, the danger is<br />

that this might change and Kashmir<br />

The Valley protests<br />

polarised opinion in<br />

J&K and were<br />

replicated like a<br />

mirror-image in the<br />

Jammu region under<br />

the leadership of<br />

the BJP<br />

could return to the rule of the gun --<br />

with disastrous consequences for all<br />

of South Asia.<br />

The two Hurriyat factions’ leaders<br />

are now holding talks to work out<br />

the “modalities for Hurriyat unity”<br />

and have set up a six-member committee.<br />

The talks are being held within<br />

a framework which concedes a<br />

great deal to Geelani and seeks to<br />

dilute the basis on which the moderates<br />

under Farooq split away from<br />

Geelani after Musharraf changed his<br />

Kashmir stance and proposed his<br />

famous four-point formula, effectively<br />

turning his back on the separatist<br />

demand. The hardliners insist that<br />

the Hurriyat holds no more talks<br />

with New Delhi, but demands tripartite<br />

negotiations between India,<br />

Pakistan and the Kashmiris.<br />

The Geelani faction also wants<br />

the Hurriyat to launch an active campaign<br />

for the boycott of the coming<br />

assembly elections, which the moderates<br />

had decided not to do. Geelani<br />

wants the old United Nations<br />

Security Council resolutions on<br />

Kashmir to be the starting point for<br />

any solution to the Kashmir issue.<br />

If the Farooq faction concedes<br />

these demands, it stands to erode its<br />

role as a force restraining extremism,<br />

with an ability to play a positive role<br />

in Kashmir and take the peace process<br />

forward.<br />

A special responsibility now<br />

devolves on Governor Vohra to use<br />

all the contacts he has cultivated as<br />

the Centre’s special envoy for the<br />

Kashmir dialogue to help overcome<br />

the sense of alienation from the<br />

Indian State that significant sections<br />

of the Valley people feel. This sense<br />

has been heightened by the protests<br />

on the Amarnath land issue.<br />

Vohra must employ his considerable<br />

experience as a former Home<br />

Secretary and all his skills of persuasion<br />

to pacify and stabilise the situation<br />

in Kashmir by acting transparently<br />

in good faith. He must also<br />

strongly resist the demand for<br />

Jammu & Kashmir’s trifurcation<br />

along religious lines -- a demand that<br />

spells a major departure from the<br />

India must pursue<br />

the new round of<br />

dialogue with<br />

Pakistan, launched<br />

late last month with<br />

the visit of Foreign<br />

Minister Shah<br />

Mahmood Qureshi<br />

to New Delhi<br />

cause of pluralism and secularism. In<br />

particular, he must activate and<br />

accelerate the deliberations of the<br />

five Working Groups set up at Prime<br />

Minister Manmohan Singh’s initiative<br />

in 2006.<br />

These Groups are meant to deal<br />

with improving the Centre's relations<br />

with the state, furthering relations<br />

across the Line of Control<br />

(LoC), giving a boost to J&K’s economic<br />

development, rehabilitating<br />

the destitute families of militants and<br />

reviewing the cases of detainees, and<br />

ensuring good governance.<br />

The Centre, for its part, must pursue<br />

the peace process in Kashmir<br />

with vigour and sincerity. However,<br />

it won't be enough to resume the<br />

domestic peace process alone. India<br />

must pursue the new round of dialogue<br />

with Pakistan, launched late<br />

last month with the visit of Foreign<br />

Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi to<br />

New Delhi.<br />

In particular, the two governments<br />

must quickly resolve the<br />

Siachen and Sir Creek disputes, liberalise<br />

visa regimes and expand economic<br />

cooperation. That's the best<br />

way of bringing Pakistan on board<br />

and neutralising militant separatism<br />

in Kashmir while overcoming popular<br />

alienation.<br />

— The writer is a senior journalist<br />

and political commentator<br />

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Sectarian positioning<br />

with an eye upon votes<br />

fuelled the controversy<br />

over Amarnath land<br />

transfer issue, writes<br />

Sant Kumar Sharma<br />

from Jammu<br />

Inventing a controversy<br />

An ugly controversy on diversion<br />

of land to Shri Amarnath<br />

Shrine Board (SASB) has led<br />

to the ouster of Ghulam Nabi Azad<br />

government in Jammu & Kashmir.<br />

On July 7, Azad made an emotional<br />

speech in state assembly while moving<br />

the motion for a trust vote. He<br />

listed his achievements, praised the<br />

generosity of the central government<br />

in liberally funding various projects<br />

to the state and decried separatists.<br />

But instead of asking for a division of<br />

votes to prove his majority he opted<br />

out and tendered his resignation to<br />

governor Narendra Nath Vohra.<br />

Azad sought to redeem some<br />

moral ground by claiming that he<br />

did not want to stick to his position<br />

amid an ugly Jammu versus Kashmir<br />

battle. Nevertheless, Azad was faced<br />

with a very real threat of losing the<br />

trust vote in the assembly in a highly<br />

surcharged atmosphere. Events leading<br />

to Azad’s dramatic exit were triggered<br />

by the flip-flop of the state<br />

government on the diversion of 800<br />

kanals of land to SASB.<br />

The SASB is entrusted with the<br />

responsibility of conducting the<br />

annual Amarnath yatra. Broadly, its<br />

mandate is to provide facilities to the<br />

pilgrims who visit the holy cave of<br />

Shri Amarnath in south Kashmir. In<br />

fact, it would be more appropriate to<br />

say that it creates and regulates facilities<br />

for the pilgrims.<br />

The cave is located in a snowfall<br />

area far beyond the tree line on higher<br />

reaches and can be accessed only<br />

for about three months in a year. For<br />

the rest of the year it remains under<br />

heavy snow and, thus, is difficult to<br />

reach.<br />

The facilities created for the pilgrims<br />

are temporary in nature and<br />

comprise mainly pre-fabricated huts,<br />

mostly toilets, since it does not make<br />

sense to try to create any permanent<br />

or even semi-permanent structures<br />

on glaciers<br />

So the land was diverted, temporarily,<br />

for the duration of the pilgrimage,<br />

to the SASB by the state<br />

government led by the Azad.<br />

Incidentally, the allotment was made<br />

Azad sought to redeem<br />

some moral ground by<br />

claiming that he did<br />

not want to stick to his<br />

position amid an ugly<br />

Jammu versus Kashmir<br />

battle<br />

by the government on the recommendations<br />

of the forest ministry<br />

headed by Qazi Mohammed Afzal,<br />

his cabinet colleague Tariq Hamid<br />

Qarra and Deputy Chief Minister<br />

Muzaffar Hussein Beigh. All the<br />

three gentlemen belong to the<br />

Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), a<br />

coalition partner in Azad-led government.<br />

The three PDP ministers headed<br />

the forest, law and the tourism<br />

ministry, respectively. Besides, Mr<br />

Beigh was the number two in the<br />

state cabinet.<br />

Azad took rather unusual step of<br />

addressing a press conference and<br />

going on record in public that the<br />

inputs of the trio formed the very<br />

basis of land allotment. Speaking to<br />

reporters in summer capital Srinagar<br />

on June 25, he categorically said that<br />

his cabinet colleagues from PDP<br />

were involved in the process of land<br />

allotment, from the very beginning!<br />

His statement came in the wake of<br />

PDP leader Mufti Mohammed Sayeed’s<br />

demand for cancellation of allotment<br />

of land. Earlier, Azad had offered to<br />

convene an all-party meeting to<br />

thrash out the issue. This olive<br />

branch mainly meant for Mufti was<br />

torn to shreds rather unceremoniously.<br />

Mufti first threatened to part ways<br />

with the Congress over what PDP<br />

termed as an ‘anti-Kashmiri move’<br />

and then actually did this.<br />

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Part of the diverted land falls under Ganderbal, the<br />

electoral constituency and virtual fief of the Abdullahs for<br />

decades till Qazi Afzal trounced Omar in 2002 assembly<br />

elections. Farooq sensed an opportunity of nailing down<br />

his bete noire and thus threw the proverbial first stone by<br />

questioning the wisdom of the land allotment to SASB<br />

though initially there was no reaction in the valley against<br />

the move. Farooq Abdullah’s reaction to the land allotment<br />

was not strident or tough. Yet it made news. And<br />

then all hell broke loose after the then chief executive officer<br />

of the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board Arun Kumar made<br />

a statement which communalised the whole situation.<br />

Kumar has ever since been attached to the general<br />

administration department, as punishment for alleged<br />

violation of civil services rules (CSR). In his defence,<br />

Kumar says that he stepped in only when rumours about<br />

Hindu colonisation of Kashmir valley by the SASB<br />

became rather vicious. He also pointed out that it was his<br />

duty as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the SASB to try<br />

to set the records straight. In fact, the timing of the whole<br />

episode also made it very peculiar. It happened when Lt<br />

Gen (retd) S K Sinha, the then governor, was about to<br />

demit office (he did so on June 25) and as chairman of the<br />

SASB he left it to Kumar to speak about.<br />

At that time, rumours were floating in Kashmir that<br />

the SASB was hatching a sinister conspiracy to change the<br />

essentially Muslim demography of the Kashmir valley.<br />

Several local newspapers had written, either directly or<br />

insinuated that large numbers of Hindus would be<br />

brought in from outside and settled on the land diverted<br />

to the SASB. Never mind the fact that it is not possible for<br />

anyone to settle on such heights where not a blade of<br />

grass grows. The newspapers also conveniently glossed<br />

over the fact that under Article 370, no outsider can<br />

become a permanent resident of Jammu & Kashmir.<br />

Separatists fanned these rumours and mobilised large<br />

crowds for protest. This led to death of five persons<br />

across the valley.<br />

The two mainstream political opponents fighting for<br />

the Kashmiri Muslim votes, the NC led by father-son duo<br />

of Farooq and Omar Abdullah, and the PDP led by fatherdaughter<br />

combine of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed and<br />

Mehbooba Mufti, are largely to blame for what happened.<br />

They made no effort whatsoever to counter the<br />

bogey of Hinduisation of Kashmir. Of the two, the PDP<br />

will have to take a large share of the blame as it was a part<br />

of the ruling coalition when it all started.<br />

When contacted for their comments, most of the NC<br />

leaders explained why they kept quiet and looked the<br />

other way: As opposition party, it was not their responsibility<br />

to help the government. Going a step further, they<br />

also accused the government of failing to solicit its support<br />

for normalising the situation. Not that Congress<br />

party, which was leading the government, did not contribute<br />

to vitiate situation by failing to scotch rumours of<br />

Hindu colonisation of Muslim Kashmir.<br />

— The writer is a Jammu-based freelance journalist<br />

Pilgrims’ needs<br />

Treacherous yatra route and inclement<br />

weather should not leave room for petty<br />

politics<br />

Twelve years ago, a raging snowstorm claimed<br />

lives of 250 pilgrims. When the calamity<br />

struck, hundreds of them were stranded without<br />

shelter amid inclement weather on way to the<br />

cave shrine. Fewer people used to undertake the yatra<br />

then, in the year 1996 to be precise, as the total number<br />

of pilgrims seldom touched one lakh.<br />

Stung by all-round criticism, the central government<br />

set up the Nitish Sengupta committee to suggest<br />

remedial measures to prevent recurrence of similar<br />

tragedy. The committee suggested regulation of the<br />

pilgrimage, registration of the pilgrims and creation<br />

of robust temporary shelters for pilgrims during the<br />

yatra.<br />

In 2000, the state government headed by Farooq<br />

Abdullah created the Shri Amarnath Ji Shrine Board<br />

(SASB), mainly to look after the Amarnath pilgrims.<br />

The board became functional from the next year,<br />

beginning February 2001.<br />

It was to follow the pattern of Shri Mata Vaishno<br />

Devi Shrine Board (SMVDSB). The SMVDSB was created<br />

in 1986 when 14 lakh pilgrims used to visit<br />

Vaishno Devi. By 2007, this figure had crossed 70 lakh<br />

and in the near future it is likely to touch one crore per<br />

annum. The similarities between the two boards end<br />

here.<br />

The SMVDSB inherited land, buildings and other<br />

assets from Dharmarth Trust and Vaishno Devi is the<br />

second richest Hindu shrine in India after Shri<br />

Tirupati. In contrast, the SASB does not own land<br />

anywhere on Amarnath yatra route or elsewhere. Yet,<br />

it is supposed to provide facilities matching with<br />

those provided by the Vaishno Devi Shrine Board.<br />

Thus, the SASB was forced to request the government<br />

to identify and allocate land for creation of temporary<br />

facilities for the Amarnath pilgrims. The need<br />

for this can be imagined if one is to consider 51 deaths<br />

of pilgrims – 48 of natural causes and three in accidents<br />

-- until July 15 after this season’s Yatra commenced<br />

on June 17.<br />

A case is also pending before a Division Bench of<br />

the Jammu & Kashmir High Court regarding allocation<br />

of land for pilgrim facilities and other matters<br />

related to Amarnath yatra.<br />

– SKS<br />

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Centuries’ subjugation<br />

kicks off a bitter struggle<br />

Kashmir’s past is marked by worst kind of alien<br />

rules starting from sixteenth century when Mughals<br />

took over the region, followed by Sikhs and Dogras.<br />

Ruled by outsiders time and again, a feeling of<br />

subjugation crept in the hearts of Kashmiris. These<br />

processes have played a role in forming modern-day<br />

Kashmiri consciousness where old perceptions<br />

linger through, forcing leaders from Sheikh<br />

Abdullah to Yasin Malik to cling to the Kashmiris'<br />

right to self-determination. Farrukh Fahim traces<br />

the tumultuous history<br />

The formation of collective consciousness<br />

of a common<br />

Kashmiri has been determined<br />

by number of factors, the most<br />

important being the public perception<br />

of history. Kashmir’s occupation<br />

by Mughals and their successive subjugation<br />

by Pathans, Sikhs and<br />

Dogras, have left in the minds of a<br />

common Kashmiri a memory of continued<br />

suppression and attendant<br />

economic and political oppression. It<br />

was this sentiment that played a role<br />

in mobilisation during the nationalist<br />

movement of 1930s pioneered by<br />

Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah.<br />

Mughal and Afghan rule<br />

The incorporation of Kashmir valley<br />

into Mughal India in the year<br />

1586, after the Chak rule is considered<br />

to be the beginning of the end of<br />

Kashmir’s independence. Kashmir<br />

remained the northern most point of<br />

Mughal empire for nearly two centuries.<br />

Mughal rule in Kashmir<br />

transformed it in the context of its<br />

political and economic condition.<br />

This rule introduced Kashmiris to a<br />

pattern of government, where a governor<br />

was sent to administer the<br />

province and demand taxes.<br />

The rapacity of the Afghans after<br />

the Mughal rule marks the end of<br />

Kashmir’s independence. In Kashmiri<br />

folklore, Afghans, owing to their<br />

oppressive rule, came to represent<br />

the greatest ‘other’. Afghan domination<br />

lasted for little over 50 years. The<br />

period is generally regarded as one<br />

of the darkest in Kashmiri history.<br />

Sikhs and Dogras<br />

Sikh army entered Kashmir on<br />

4th July, 1819, starting a new phase of<br />

tyranny and oppression. In the<br />

words of Prem Nath Bazaz, a<br />

Kashmiri historian, this change of<br />

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masters ‘proved but a change of king<br />

log for a king stork’. Describing the<br />

Sikh rule, Moorcraft, an English traveler<br />

reflected, ’Sikhs looked at<br />

Kashmiris ‘a little better than the cattle.<br />

The murder of a native Sikh was<br />

punished with a fine to the government<br />

ranging from 16 to 20 rupees, of<br />

which four were paid to the family of<br />

the deceased if a Hindu, and two if<br />

he was a Mohammedan’. During this<br />

dark phase in Kashmir’s history, people<br />

were in a most abject condition<br />

‘subjected to every kind of extortion<br />

and oppression’. Under Sikh rule<br />

Kashmir was ruled by 10 governors.<br />

Out of these, five were Hindus, three<br />

Sikhs, and two Muslims. Sikhs consistently<br />

followed anti-Muslim policies<br />

in Kashmir, subjecting the majority<br />

population of the Kashmir valley<br />

to severe hardship in relation to the<br />

practice of religion. It was also during<br />

this phase that the central<br />

mosque of Srinagar, the Jama Masjid<br />

was ordered to be closed and<br />

Muslims of Kashmir were not<br />

allowed to say azan (call to prayer).<br />

Sikhs tried to establish a ‘Hindu’<br />

state where cow slaughter was<br />

declared a crime and a complete ban<br />

was passed against cow slaughter,<br />

lands attached to several shrines<br />

were also resumed on state orders.<br />

Their emphasis on ‘setting Hindu<br />

and Sikh beliefs was a part of an<br />

attempt to articulate a Sikh identity<br />

separate from that of the Mughals.<br />

The effect of Sikh rule, according to<br />

Prem Nath Bazaz, dealt a severe<br />

blow to the pride of the local people.<br />

‘The people of the valley came to be<br />

known as zulum parast (the worshipers<br />

of tyranny) as they gradually<br />

forgot their glorious martial traditions<br />

and became timid and cowardly’.<br />

Under Sikh rule<br />

Kashmir was ruled by<br />

10 governors. Out of<br />

these, five were<br />

Hindus, three Sikhs,<br />

and two Muslims.<br />

Sikhs consistently<br />

followed anti-Muslim<br />

policies in Kashmir,<br />

subjecting the majority<br />

population of the<br />

Kashmir valley to<br />

severe hardship<br />

With the battle of Subraon, the<br />

Sikhs lost their independence. The<br />

treaty of Amritsar between British<br />

and Dogras signed on 16th of March<br />

1846, gave way to Dogra rule in<br />

Kashmir.<br />

British while recognising the neutrality<br />

of Gulab Singh in the first<br />

Ango-Sikh war rewarded Gulab<br />

Singh, a vassal of defeated Sikh king<br />

Maharaja Ranjit singh. The Treaty of<br />

Amritsar referred to as ‘sales deed’,<br />

was frequently condemned from ‘different<br />

quarters of Kashmiri society’.<br />

Muhammad Iqbal, while expressing<br />

his anguish wrote:<br />

Each hill, each garden, field, Each<br />

farmer too they sold.<br />

A nation for a price, That makes my<br />

blood ice-cold<br />

With this treaty Gulab Singh’s<br />

estate included besides his native<br />

Jammu, the Himalayan kingdom of<br />

Kashmir, Ladakh and Baltistan. Thus<br />

the newly created entity of Jammu &<br />

Kashmir joined the ranks of princely<br />

states as sovereign entity with British<br />

crown being the sovereign overlord.<br />

Both British and Dogra government’s<br />

respective pursuits for legitimacy,<br />

allowed the latter to pursue a<br />

policy where the state of Jammu &<br />

Kashmir was transformed from a<br />

state ruled over by a Hindu into a<br />

Hindu state. Over the subsequent<br />

years, the overtly Hindu tone of the<br />

political authority and the complete<br />

denial of all rights to the Kashmiri<br />

Muslim community (as Kashmiri<br />

Muslims were largely left out of the<br />

power sharing arrangements of the<br />

Dogra state) resulted in articulation<br />

of political allegiances along communal<br />

lines.<br />

A nucleus of new generation of<br />

political leaders, trained at Aligarh<br />

Muslim University, and headed by a<br />

schoolteacher Sheikh Muhamad<br />

Abdullah, soon established a reading<br />

room association in Srinagar to discuss<br />

questions of social and political<br />

change. A similar group called<br />

Young Men’s Muslim Association<br />

was formed in the southern city of<br />

Jammu. These young political<br />

activists attempted to organise a deputation<br />

to present a list of grievances<br />

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to the Dogra Maharaja. These initiatives<br />

by new generation of Kashmiri<br />

Muslim political activists announced<br />

the arrival of organised political<br />

mobilisation in Kashmir. This initiative<br />

however ended in a riot on the<br />

streets of Srinagar, killing 21 persons<br />

when the Maharaja’s police opened<br />

fire on protesters on July 13, 1931.<br />

This became a turning point in the<br />

history of political mobilisation in<br />

Kashmir. In the words of Mohamad<br />

Ishaq Khan, a Kashmiri historian, it<br />

was for the first time that ‘dumbdriven<br />

cattle’ raised the standard of<br />

revolt.<br />

Soon after this incident, and formally,<br />

immediately after, Kashmir’s<br />

first regional party -- the All Jammu<br />

& Kashmir Muslim Conference was<br />

formed under the leadership of<br />

Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. This<br />

was also an important event in the<br />

history of organised protest in<br />

Kashmir, as it was for the first time<br />

that Kashmiri Muslims sought to<br />

build a wider base of support among<br />

the agricultural and artisan classes of<br />

the valley. Initially starting with the<br />

demand for bigger share in the civil<br />

services for educated Muslim youth,<br />

the proprietorship, and reduction of<br />

land revenue, the Muslim<br />

Conference soon demanded the right<br />

to freedom of speech and expression<br />

and more significantly right to establishment<br />

of a democratic government<br />

with a responsible executive. In the<br />

year 1938, the party decided to redefine<br />

the basis of its politics on secular<br />

lines. Finally in the year 1939, at its<br />

annual convention Muslim<br />

Conference was accordingly<br />

renamed All Jammu & Kashmir<br />

National Conference.<br />

The new party sought to expand<br />

its base through its political programme<br />

called Naya Kashmir (New<br />

Kashmir). The Bill of Rights stipulating<br />

‘equality of the rights of all citizens<br />

irrespective of nationality, religion,<br />

race or birth in all spheres of<br />

life’ reached out to all classes of people<br />

in the state. By incorporating a<br />

peasants charter advocating transfer<br />

of all agricultural land to actual<br />

tillers of the soil, a Workers Charter<br />

ensuring basic rights and better<br />

These initiatives by<br />

new generation of<br />

Kashmiri Muslim<br />

political activists<br />

announced the arrival<br />

of organised political<br />

mobilisation in<br />

Kashmir. This initiative<br />

however ended in a<br />

riot on the streets of<br />

Srinagar, killing 21<br />

persons when the<br />

Maharaja’s police<br />

opened fire on<br />

protesters on July 13,<br />

1931<br />

working conditions, and a Charter of<br />

Women’s Rights in the political, economic,<br />

social, legal, educational and<br />

cultural spheres, a concerted effort<br />

was made to enlist the support of<br />

large sections of the society.<br />

Naya Kashmir was the blueprint<br />

of the political philosophy of the<br />

National Conference, and presented<br />

the agenda of how it would exercise<br />

state power. A scheme of constitutional<br />

reforms based on the democratic<br />

elective principle from local<br />

pachayats to the national assembly<br />

along with a responsible and responsive<br />

executive was envisaged. It<br />

advocated universal adult franchise<br />

with weightage for the minorities,<br />

including Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs<br />

and Harijans during the transitional<br />

period. The national economic plan<br />

envisaged planned development<br />

with safeguards against exploitation,<br />

ensuring that economic power<br />

would not be centralised in any section<br />

of society. Recognising the multilingual<br />

character of Jammu &<br />

Kashmir (Kashmiri being the dominant<br />

language only in the valley and<br />

some parts of Jammu), the Naya<br />

Kashmir manifesto designated Urdu<br />

as the official lingua franca.<br />

With Muslim league movement<br />

for Pakistan gaining momentum,<br />

National conference was aspiring to<br />

steer a different course of action<br />

away from the concept of two-nation<br />

theory. The very proposition of accession<br />

meant losing the hitherto<br />

autonomous status enjoyed by the<br />

state since its creation on the one<br />

hand, and facing the prospects of<br />

division of the state and its people on<br />

religious ground on the other. This<br />

meant a certain death of the secular<br />

dream cultivated by the National<br />

Conference since its birth in 1939. In<br />

order to have its secular pluralist<br />

democratic programme materialsed,<br />

it became imperative for National<br />

Conference to ensure that the ethnoreligious<br />

composition of the state<br />

remains intact and its autonomy and<br />

geographical unity is safeguarded.<br />

For National Conference this was<br />

possible only if the state was transformed<br />

from an autocratic state into<br />

a representative liberal democracy.<br />

The ultimate goal for National<br />

Conference, therefore, was not to<br />

submerge with the secular nationalism<br />

in the mainland India, but to<br />

maintain its own identity and autonomy<br />

albeit supported by its close ally,<br />

the Indian National Congress 1 .<br />

With the introduction of historical<br />

land reforms and complete transformation<br />

of rural Kashmir, hundreds<br />

and thousands of newly<br />

empowered peasant families started<br />

viewing Shiekh Abdullah as the chief<br />

architect of this transformation.<br />

Commenting on what became the<br />

most drastic piece of land reforms in<br />

the subcontinent, Nehru said,<br />

‘I confess that I look with some envy<br />

on the speed and clarity with which they<br />

(Kashmir government) have performed<br />

this task there, considering the enormous<br />

trouble we had have in various states of<br />

India, the difficulties, the obstruction<br />

and the delays that we had to face, and<br />

so, I became a little envious when I saw<br />

this was done in Kashmir.’<br />

Post 1947 Politics<br />

Shiekh Abdullah had heralded<br />

his transformation from vehement<br />

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political activist against Dogra rule in<br />

the Princely State of Jammu &<br />

Kashmir to prime minister, since<br />

1947. He dominated the Kashmiri<br />

political scene for over 30 years<br />

(whether in jail or in office) until his<br />

death in 1982.<br />

The Naya Kashmir manifesto put<br />

forward by National Conference was<br />

clearly based on a Jacobin conception<br />

of popular sovereignty, augmented<br />

by a generous dollop of Bolshevism 2·<br />

in the socio-economic sense of the<br />

programme. In Naya Kashmir proposals<br />

Shiekh Abdullah made a powerful<br />

case for the conversion of Jammu<br />

& Kashmir into an independent state,<br />

which he described as a ‘South Asian<br />

Switzerland’, perhaps in alliance<br />

with an India free from British rule<br />

but not an integral part of it. He<br />

dreamt of an independent Jammu &<br />

Kashmir, a secular polity, rooted in<br />

Kashmiri Islam. Sheikh Abdullah<br />

argued on number of occasions that<br />

the Hindu minority in the state had<br />

more in common with the Muslim<br />

majority than it had with the Hindus<br />

elsewhere in the Indian sub-continent.<br />

Loy Hendrson, the United<br />

States ambassador to India, who visited<br />

Sheikh Abdullah in September<br />

1950, reported:<br />

In discussing future of Kashmir,<br />

Abdullah was vigorous in restating his<br />

opinion that it should be independent;<br />

that overwhelming majority population<br />

desired this independence; and that he<br />

had reason to believe that some Azad<br />

Kashmir leaders (read Pakistan<br />

Occupied Kashmir) desired independence<br />

and would be willing to cooperate<br />

with leaders of National Conference if<br />

there were reasonable chance such cooperation<br />

would result in independence 3 .<br />

Shiekh Abdullah became the<br />

undisputed head, with the title of<br />

prime minister of the popular interim<br />

government in March 1948. His<br />

covert dealings with Azad Kashmir<br />

(read Pakistan Occupied Kashmir)<br />

leaders, and his disclosure to the<br />

United States ambassador to India<br />

(that was repeated in the talks<br />

between American Democrat Adlai<br />

Stevenson and Sheikh Abdullah),<br />

challenged the finality of the accession<br />

of the state of Jammu & Kashmir<br />

to India, something that was the<br />

most disturbing feature for the<br />

Government of India 2 . Sheikh’s disclosures<br />

to the foreign visitors made<br />

India apprehensive about his intentions,<br />

and he came to be regarded as<br />

a ‘loose canon’ in Indian political<br />

annals. With Sheikh Abdullah<br />

becoming the prime minister an<br />

absolute ruler, Indian government<br />

seemed to be in a hurry to devise<br />

some fresh constitutional checks that<br />

would involve not only the structure<br />

of the internal government of the<br />

State but also the state’s formal relationship<br />

with the Indian Union.<br />

The Indian Constitution (creation<br />

of Constituent Assembly) perforce<br />

gave to the state of Jammu &<br />

Kashmir special status enshrined in<br />

Article 370 of the Indian<br />

Constitution, which effectively limited<br />

the powers of the Indian Union<br />

Parliament to the three matters;<br />

Defence, External Affairs and<br />

Communications. Apart from the<br />

three powers reserved to the Indian<br />

Union, everything else was supposed<br />

to be the proper concern of government<br />

of Jammu & Kashmir. Some<br />

interpreters like Alastair Lamb, view<br />

the inclusion of this provision in the<br />

context of Jammu & Kashmir as an<br />

autonomous polity under Indian<br />

protection, with implications that it<br />

might evolve in time to full independence.<br />

The Praja Parishad agitation in<br />

Jammu, Jana Sangh agitation in Delhi<br />

for the complete integration of<br />

Jammu & Kashmir with India, Dr<br />

Shyama Prasad Mukherji’s death in<br />

Srinagar, brought criticism against<br />

Sheikh and his government in<br />

Srinagar, across India. Sheikh<br />

Abdullah in the meantime found<br />

ample support for his own allegations<br />

that India was ‘secular only in<br />

name but basically communal and so<br />

Kashmir can have no honorable<br />

place’ in India. Government of India<br />

soon realised that ‘sheikh was looking<br />

for a semi-independent status<br />

where the Indians would protect him<br />

while he would benefit economically<br />

from the tourist industry and other<br />

sources of Kashmiri wealth, free<br />

from interference from what he<br />

regarded as the Hindu dominated<br />

government in New Delhi.’ By 1953<br />

New Delhi and Abdullah had fallen<br />

apart. So in August 1953 Abdullah<br />

was arrested, and one of his top lieutenants,<br />

Bakshi Ghulam Mohamad<br />

was installed as new Prime Minister.<br />

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Plebiscite front<br />

In the aftermath of the dismissal<br />

and arrest of Sheikh Abduallah,<br />

Mirza Afzal Beg took over the reins<br />

of politics in Kashmir. Patronised by<br />

Shiekh Abdullah, he founded<br />

Plebiscite Front in 1955. With the<br />

arrest of Shiekh Abdullah, introduction<br />

of Jammu & Kashmir<br />

Constitution 4· and growing resentment<br />

of common masses against<br />

New Delhi, Plebiscite Front immediately<br />

gained popularity.<br />

During January 1958, Shiekh<br />

Abdullah was released, with a rousing<br />

welcome by his followers at<br />

Srinagar, Abdullah said:<br />

Pandit Nehru is a great man, a close<br />

associate of mine and I still respect him.<br />

It is in the nature of man that during<br />

adversity the flower thrown by a friend<br />

appears heavier and more injurious than<br />

the stone thrown by an enemy.<br />

Criticising National Conference<br />

(read official) led by Bakshi for its<br />

undemocratic actions, Shiekh<br />

Abdullah challenged the claim of<br />

irrevocability of accession saying:<br />

The present government’s claim of<br />

Kashmir being integral part of India is a<br />

worthless claim, adding that the government<br />

which is not true representative of<br />

the people cannot take the finality of<br />

accession to the hearts of the people 5·.<br />

The Kashmir Accord<br />

The Indian government associated<br />

Plebiscite Front with the activities<br />

of the militant group Al-Fatah.<br />

Imposing a blanket ban on Plebiscite<br />

Front, around ‘lakhs of politically<br />

conscious members of the outlawed<br />

Plebiscite Front’ were arrested or<br />

debarred from participating in any<br />

political activity, ‘clearing the path<br />

for a walk-over for the Congress’. In<br />

March 1972, Syed Mir Qasim came to<br />

power by winning with a comfortable<br />

majority. There were protests<br />

against the alleged rigged elections<br />

by opposition leaders, which<br />

although refuted by Mir Qasim initially,<br />

were later confirmed by him in<br />

his memoirs in these words:<br />

‘If the elections were free and fair, the<br />

victory of the Plebiscite Front was a forgone<br />

conclusion. And, as a victorious<br />

party, the Front would certainly talk<br />

form a position of strength that would<br />

irritate Mrs Ghandhi who might give up<br />

her wish to negotiate with Shiekh<br />

Abdullah. That in turn would lead to<br />

confrontation between the centre and the<br />

Jammu & Kashmir’ 9·.<br />

After Mir Qasim’s election, he<br />

began to relax a number of restrictions<br />

on his opponents. In April 1972,<br />

Begum Abdullah was allowed to<br />

return to the state, political prisoners<br />

were released and in June the internment<br />

order on Abdullah and Mirza<br />

Afzal was lifted. The ban on<br />

Plebiscite Front was also lifted, providing<br />

a political platform to Shiekh<br />

Abdullah. With the creation of<br />

Bangladesh, and in the light of<br />

changing circumstances Sheikh<br />

Abdullah started shifting emphasis<br />

from the demand of plebiscite to<br />

greater autonomy within the Indian<br />

Union. In his memoirs Abdullah justifies<br />

this shift and his agreement to<br />

what came to be known as Kashmir<br />

accord in following words:<br />

We only wanted Article 370 to be<br />

maintained in its original form… Our<br />

readiness to come to the negotiating table<br />

did not imply a change in our strategy.<br />

Thus it seems that Abdullah<br />

wanted a pre-1953 status for Jammu<br />

& Kashmir, something that was<br />

never conceded by New Delhi. Syed<br />

Mir Qasim stepped aside as the chief<br />

minister of Jammu & Kashmir to<br />

make way for Abdullah. The Delhidetermined<br />

circumstances of an<br />

emasculated Abdullah’s return to<br />

office amounted to a clever evasion<br />

of the Kashmir conflict rather than a<br />

substantive solution to it. The 1975<br />

elections saw Abdullah sweeping<br />

polls in the valley and winning by a<br />

clear majority. It seemed for time<br />

being that Kashmir issue was about<br />

to reach its logical end, but as soon as<br />

Abdullah realised that his decision to<br />

sign an agreement with government<br />

of India (Kashmir accord) was seen<br />

as a compromise by a common<br />

Kashmiri, Abdullah abandoned it in<br />

a matter of weeks. There was bitterness<br />

among Kashmiris regarding<br />

what they considered as ‘sell out’.<br />

‘A lady (Indira Ghandhi) had<br />

tamed the toothless Lion of Kashmir’<br />

was the lead story in the in Kashmiri<br />

press. In April 1975, Abdullah again<br />

talked about possible merger of his<br />

state with Azad Kashmir. In May<br />

1975 he invited Congress members in<br />

the state assembly to join his<br />

Plebiscite Front, Congress resentment<br />

against this act resulted in<br />

widening rift between the two parties.<br />

The authoritarian streak in<br />

Shiekh Abdullah’s National<br />

Conference became quite evident<br />

from 1976 onwards. National<br />

Conference thus made its own contribution<br />

to the subversion and retardation<br />

of democratic development in<br />

Jammu & Kashmir.<br />

The valley of Kashmir witnessed<br />

an unprecedented increase in the frequency<br />

of demonstrations, many of<br />

which were countered by police violence.<br />

The organisations like Jamiat-e-<br />

Islami, the Jamiat-e-Tuluaba, Mahaz-e-<br />

Azadi and People’s League were<br />

active in these protests. This was also<br />

the period when a shadow underground<br />

organisation carrying systematic<br />

acts of violence and ‘sabotage’<br />

with a name ‘Al- Fatah’ came<br />

into existence. Whatever be the background<br />

of the underground ‘Al-<br />

Fatah’ the fact is that it was used by<br />

Indian State to justify a direct attack<br />

The Indian government<br />

associated Plebiscite<br />

Front with the<br />

activities of the<br />

militant group Al-<br />

Fatah. Imposing a<br />

blanket ban on<br />

Plebiscite Front,<br />

around ‘one million<br />

politically conscious<br />

members of the<br />

outlawed Plebiscite<br />

Front'...<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

on Shiekh Abdullah and the<br />

Plebiscite Front, to prevent the<br />

Front’s participation in the upcoming<br />

elections. Some 350 supporters of the<br />

Plebiscite Front, including Sheikh<br />

Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg were<br />

arrested. The arrests were justified<br />

on the grounds that the Plebiscite<br />

Front was involved in subversive<br />

activities in the state, presumably<br />

associated with ‘Al-Fatah’. In another<br />

major development on January 1971,<br />

some young Kashmiris, who were<br />

apparently armed with a hand<br />

grenade and a pistol, hijacked an<br />

Indian airliner named ‘Ganga’ en<br />

route from Srinagar to Jammu.<br />

Seeking asylum in Pakistan, the airliner<br />

was taken to Lahore. The hijackers<br />

demanded from the Government<br />

of India, to release 36 political prisoners<br />

said to be the members of an<br />

organisation called the Kashmir<br />

National Liberation Front. The<br />

hijacking drama ended with hijackers<br />

setting the aircraft ablaze after<br />

taking out the passengers. Amidst all<br />

drama and confusion, the world<br />

came to know about Kashmir<br />

Liberation Front. Its existence was a<br />

surprise for many. It was supposed to<br />

be the same group calling itself the<br />

‘Plebiscite Front’ (not to be confused<br />

with the Plebiscite Front party<br />

founded by Mirza Afzal Beg of<br />

which, however it was in some ways<br />

an informal offshoot). Al Fatah was<br />

among one of the biggest ‘subversive’<br />

groups in Kashmir during this<br />

period. A guerilla outfit that had over<br />

200 people. The group recruited<br />

youngsters, set up ‘safe houses’ and<br />

embarked on gun-running on a large<br />

scale. Ghulam Rasool Zahegeer and<br />

Abdul Rashid Dar a lawyer from<br />

south Kashmir, Fazle Haq Qureshi<br />

resident of North Kashmir, Muhmad<br />

Yousuf Mir, from downtown<br />

Srinagar, Hamidullah Bhat,<br />

Muhammad Husseien and<br />

Muhammad Salim Gilkar were<br />

among the earliest members of Al<br />

Fatah, who were ‘rehabilitated’ by<br />

National Conference government 3<br />

after it came to power.<br />

A charismatic, but somehow<br />

mysterious figure Maqbool Bhat<br />

from the border district of Handwara<br />

was among the earliest members of<br />

the Front. One time journalist in<br />

Peshawar, he had been regularly<br />

crossing the Kashmir ceasefire line<br />

since 1958. He was arrested in 1966,<br />

and sentenced to death later after his<br />

re-arrest for the alleged murder of an<br />

Indian official during the course of<br />

an armed robbery in the valley of<br />

Kashmir. He was finally hanged in<br />

Delhi’s Tihar Jail exactly a week<br />

before his 46th birthday.<br />

The radicalised generation in<br />

Kashmir valley, flying the Jammu &<br />

Kashmir Liberation Front’s banner of<br />

independence, emerged as a force of<br />

mass uprising. In 1990 it was essentially<br />

the old National Conference-<br />

Plebiscite Front brand of politics that<br />

got radicalised under the new leadership<br />

of a militant younger generation,<br />

rebelling against India.<br />

The front articulated the vision of<br />

an independent state based on a federal,<br />

parliamentary political system.<br />

Each of the five federating units,<br />

namely, Kashmir valley, Jammu<br />

province, Ladakh, Azad (or occupied<br />

Kashmir), and Gilgit and Baltistan<br />

would enjoy autonomy with elected<br />

provincial governments. Each<br />

province can be subdivided into districts<br />

and these districts will have<br />

their own internal arrangements.<br />

The idea of a secular Independent<br />

republic of Jammu & Kashmir put<br />

forward by Jammu & Kashmir<br />

Liberation Front bear a striking<br />

resemblance to the contents of a<br />

working paper submitted by Balraj<br />

Puri to the Jammu & Kashmir State<br />

People’s Convention in 1968, led by<br />

Shiekh Abdullah, which was attended<br />

by practically all popularly-based<br />

political forces in the valley. These<br />

recommendations, according to Bose<br />

are reminiscent of the principle of<br />

‘subsidiarity’, a key part of the political<br />

architecture of the new European<br />

Community (EC). Under this principle,<br />

each level of government<br />

(Brussels, the national capitals, and<br />

sub-state entities like the German<br />

Lander) stays clear of all decisions<br />

that can be taken at a lower level.<br />

In the backdrop of the alleged<br />

rigged elections of 1987 Jammu &<br />

Kashmir Liberation Front resurfaced<br />

after remaining dormant for over 20<br />

years. Jammu & Kashmir Liberation<br />

Front led within the valley by the<br />

core HAJY· (Hamid, Ashfaq, Javed<br />

and Yasin) group emerged as one of<br />

the most prominent radical organisation<br />

in the 1980s campaign of azadi<br />

against the Indian state. Jammu &<br />

Kashmir Liberation Front found spir-<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

itual inspiration in the specific<br />

Islamic traditions rooted in the mystical<br />

piety of Kashmiri Sufi saints.<br />

The Jammu & Kashmir Liberation<br />

Front’s strategy may be divided into<br />

four components: establishing an<br />

organisational base and devising<br />

military strategy; pursuit of international<br />

support; mobilising popular<br />

support.<br />

In 1990 the simmering rebellion<br />

of 1988-89 (aftermath of rigged elections)<br />

came to boil in the form of a<br />

mass resistance to the Indian rule in<br />

Kashmir valley. Starting with a total<br />

boycott of 1989 late-November parliamentary<br />

elections, this phase is<br />

characterised by massive protests<br />

and extensive mass mobilisation,<br />

which was on account of a very<br />

strong wave of alienation doing<br />

rounds in the lives of ordinary<br />

Kashmiris. More or less similar alienation<br />

in a different context was put to<br />

use by Sheikh Abdullah against a different<br />

set of actors and now it was<br />

the turn of Jammu & Kashmir<br />

Liberation Front.<br />

Huge azadi rallies were organised<br />

during this phase and one of<br />

them took place 1 March 1990, where<br />

around 3,000 people gathered in the<br />

town of Charar-e-Sharief, 30 kilometers<br />

from Srinagar, at the shrine and<br />

mausoleum of the valley’s patron<br />

saint, the fourteenth century Sufi<br />

mystic Sheikh Noorudin Noorani,<br />

and took a collective oath, in the<br />

presence of Jammu & Kashmir<br />

Liberation Front leaders to struggle<br />

for ‘Kashmir’s right to self-determination’.<br />

Indian state was finding it<br />

difficult to tackle the uprising owing<br />

to its mass character as workers,<br />

lawyers, engineers, schoolteachers,<br />

and storeowners, doctors former<br />

MLA’s and Jammu & Kashmir Police<br />

joined and supported the movement.<br />

In the absence of any alternative<br />

channels of collective action and<br />

protest the shrines and mosques<br />

emerged as the focal point of popular<br />

mobilisation and resistance.<br />

The collective yearning of people<br />

of Kashmir for independent existence<br />

took a more militant form in<br />

the years that followed the early<br />

uprising of 1990s. Frequently government<br />

installations and offices considered<br />

as symbols of Indian states<br />

authority and ‘occupation’ became<br />

the targets of violence. The guidelines<br />

issued to its members by JKLF<br />

titled ‘Freedom or Martydom’ gave<br />

comprehensive instructions to the<br />

‘freedom fighters’ and exhorted them<br />

to follow such guidelines strictly.<br />

These guidelines/instructions pertaining<br />

to guerilla or underground<br />

activities were by and large the Urdu<br />

translations of Mao’s and Che<br />

Guevara’s formulations or at least<br />

were influenced by them. In these<br />

instructions it was strictly urged that<br />

‘each guerilla or ‘freedom fighter’<br />

must show impeccable moral conduct<br />

and strict self-control and teach<br />

the local population the guerilla<br />

band so that they see the advantage<br />

of aiding the insurgency4.<br />

By 1993, with complete take-over<br />

of the movement by Pakistan’s intelligence<br />

agencies, JKLF almost lost its<br />

military ascendancy to the radical<br />

Jihadist outfits. In the year 1994,<br />

Yasin Malik the leader of JKLF<br />

renounced the armed struggle and<br />

called for unilateral ceasefire.<br />

In the year 2005, when a Bus service<br />

was started between ‘Azad<br />

Kashmir’ and ‘Occupied Kashmir’,<br />

Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front,<br />

under Yasin Malik while supporting<br />

the peace initiative taken by India<br />

and Pakistan, tried to enlist the support<br />

for the cause of independence<br />

by collecting around 15 lakh signatures<br />

across Jammu & Kashmir and<br />

regarded the campaign as a ‘mandate<br />

of trust’ and ‘Kashmiri people’s<br />

verdict for peace and inclusion in<br />

ongoing peace talks between India<br />

and Pakistan’.<br />

Jammu & Kashmir Liberation<br />

Front during the moderate political<br />

phase tried to address its constituency<br />

inside Jammu & Kashmir and was<br />

vigorously involved in improving<br />

diplomatic relations in India,<br />

Pakistan and other countries. JKLF<br />

and its chairman Yasin Malik also<br />

tried to clarify in various forums the<br />

reason for a ‘limited militant struggle’<br />

in his speeches:<br />

‘From 1953 to 1975, Shiekh<br />

Abdullah fought through a non-violent<br />

By 1993, with<br />

complete take-over of<br />

the movement by<br />

Pakistan’s intelligence<br />

agencies, JKLF almost<br />

lost its military<br />

ascendancy to the<br />

radical Jihadist outfits<br />

movement for right to self-determination.<br />

He was a secular and a pure nonviolent<br />

but Indian state did not like<br />

him…..’<br />

The three excruciating incidents,<br />

the imprisonment of Yousuf Shah, by<br />

Mughals, and his subsequent death<br />

in exile, the frequent internment of<br />

Sheikh Abdullah by government of<br />

India, and to a large extent the death<br />

sentence of Maqbool Bhat (Founder<br />

member of JKLF) and his burial in<br />

Delhi’s Tihar Jail, serves as a ready<br />

reference to collective memory of<br />

Kashmiris.<br />

— The writer is a research student<br />

with Delhi University’s school of social<br />

work studying protest movements and<br />

collective action<br />

Endnotes<br />

1 Sumantra Bose,2003, Kashmir: Roots of<br />

Conflict, Paths to Peace<br />

2 Lamb, 1991<br />

2 Ideas inspired by Soviet model.<br />

3 Refer to- United States, Department of State,<br />

Foreign Relations of the United States 1950,<br />

Volume V. The Near East, South Asia and<br />

Africa, Washington, D.C, 1978, pp.1433-35.<br />

4 It declared Jammu & Kashmir as an integral<br />

part of the Union of India and extended for<br />

the first time, the jurisdiction of Indian<br />

Supreme Court to Jammu & Kashmir.<br />

5 Awaz-I-Haq, (Urdu), Collection of speeches,<br />

SM Abdullah, Plebiscite Front, Peoples Press,<br />

Jammu, 1958 p25.<br />

3 Al Fatah Angle India Today, Feb,29,1984<br />

· The Abbreviation HAJY indeed has a very<br />

significant symbolic connotation.<br />

4 Jagmohan, Kashmir Today, Present, Past,<br />

Future 392,Seminar<br />

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Trapped by bruises of<br />

history, the yearning for<br />

peace and desire to come<br />

out of the vicious cycle of<br />

violence has been getting<br />

stronger throughout<br />

Kashmir. It is time the<br />

leadership grabs the<br />

opportunity and ushers<br />

Kashmir into a new era,<br />

writes Sajid Iqbal<br />

Kashmir... Does any other<br />

word conjure up such<br />

extreme emotions? It conveys<br />

beauty, vulnerability, culture and turmoil.<br />

Turmoil supersedes the other<br />

three in peoples' conscience: the<br />

"Kashmir issue" is what everyone<br />

must talk about. It is what everyone<br />

must have an opinion on. But, having<br />

been born in Kashmir, I see the irony<br />

in talking about the "issue", and the<br />

"solution", which is often what no<br />

one has the time or the inclination to<br />

contemplate. Deliberating the issue,<br />

one has the tendency to lose perspective.<br />

It is time to clear the air on<br />

Kashmir. I endeavour to do just that.<br />

Justo Pastor Benitez had<br />

observed, "Peace is preferable to a place<br />

in history." Yet politicians of both<br />

Kashmir’s chance<br />

for peace<br />

India and Pakistan have the unique<br />

opportunity of having both when it<br />

comes to Kashmir. So where is the<br />

political will? There could be many<br />

answers to that. Playing safe could be<br />

one. To politicians on either side of<br />

the border, or even the Line of<br />

Control, status quo is always preferable<br />

to change: they are then dealing<br />

with something they know.<br />

People theorise so much about<br />

the origins of the dispute, its dimensions<br />

and nuances, that they either<br />

don't look for a solution, or they simply<br />

can't. They don't have the foresight.<br />

Also, so many people have so<br />

much at stake that to even think of an<br />

end to this tension is unthinkable.<br />

Vested interests, in terms of, power,<br />

money, influence, all hangs in the<br />

balance. In this regard, India,<br />

Pakistan and the Kashmir issue can<br />

be compared to the United States, the<br />

Soviet Union and the Cold War, right<br />

up to the fall of the Iron Curtain.<br />

Both justified excessive expenditure<br />

on national security, regular hikes in<br />

successive defence budgets, and<br />

both fed a burgeoning defence<br />

industry. The political establishments<br />

of both countries needed to<br />

hang on to the dispute. This holds<br />

true, not only for the mainstream<br />

political leaders of India and<br />

Pakistan, but also for leaders of both<br />

Kashmirs, whether mainstream, separatist<br />

or militant. To them, the<br />

“issue” is a political lifeline.<br />

But should they choose to act, one<br />

wonders what would be the best<br />

time to do so. I say the opportunity<br />

has never been better. General<br />

J.J.Singh, the Chief of Army Staff,<br />

recently said that cross-border infiltration<br />

in the state of Jammu &<br />

Kashmir has reduced drastically in<br />

the past year. This cannot simply be<br />

attributed to the onset of winter in<br />

the Kashmir valley, when infiltration<br />

levels have traditionally been low. It<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

is now a year-round phenomenon.<br />

The atmosphere is relaxed, with no<br />

major incident of violence reported<br />

from Kashmir in the past several<br />

months. Confidence Building<br />

Measures (CBMs) initiated by the<br />

two countries have been wellreceived<br />

by all, especially the common<br />

man in Kashmir. The two<br />

Kashmirs are now connected by the<br />

Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service,<br />

for the first time since independence.<br />

To me, this marked the turning point<br />

towards peace in Kashmir. There are<br />

talks of opening up that same road<br />

for trade between the two sides. Even<br />

the worst doomsday prophet would<br />

have to admit that there prevails a<br />

sense of peace and normalcy in<br />

Kashmir. General Singh, in a recent<br />

interview with a leading national<br />

daily, said, "We (the Army) can consider<br />

relocating troops if the State<br />

Government tells us so. We did withdraw<br />

from Punjab and Mizoram<br />

after the violence levels came down."<br />

Of late, leaders at both the national<br />

and regional levels have reflected<br />

this positive mindset. While the<br />

Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), a<br />

regional party part of the present<br />

coalition government in Jammu &<br />

Kashmir, has put forth "self-rule" as a<br />

possible beginning to a lasting resolution<br />

of the Kashmir issue, the<br />

This laudable effort<br />

show that people<br />

are thinking of<br />

conflict-resolution<br />

in the subcontinent.<br />

The<br />

solution to the<br />

Kashmir conflict<br />

can only be a<br />

political one<br />

National Conference, the principle<br />

Opposition, has repeatedly demanded<br />

"autonomy" for the state. While<br />

both these ideas have their merits,<br />

what these parties haven't done is<br />

give details of what exactly they propose.<br />

While autonomy may be construed<br />

as a reversion to the pre-1953<br />

position in Kashmir, wherein the<br />

state had its own President, Prime<br />

Minister, Legislature and Supreme<br />

Court, the concept of self-rule<br />

remains vague on specifics.<br />

This laudable effort show that<br />

people are thinking of conflict-resolution<br />

in the sub-continent. The solution<br />

to the Kashmir conflict can only<br />

be a political one. If history has<br />

taught us anything, it is that there is<br />

no military solution to the issue.<br />

Three wars and a proxy war that has<br />

lasted 18 years should be proof<br />

enough for even the most battlehardened<br />

military man that peace is<br />

the only option. In this background,<br />

let us now move on to discussing<br />

specific solutions to the Kashmir<br />

issue, put forth from various quarters<br />

over the past 60 years.<br />

The plebiscite<br />

One has to start with the<br />

plebiscite. The United Nations<br />

Security Council in its various resolutions<br />

on Kashmir sanctioned this<br />

plebiscite in the late 1940s, after<br />

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru<br />

had taken the Kashmir issue to the<br />

United Nations. This plebiscite, if<br />

held, calls on the Kashmiri people to<br />

vote whether they want to stay with<br />

India or Pakistan. It may be noted<br />

that independence is not an option in<br />

this plebiscite. However, India has<br />

historically been opposed to such a<br />

plebiscite being held in Kashmir. So<br />

that is not an option.<br />

The Dixon plan<br />

Then one can talk about the<br />

Dixon plan. It was proposed by Sir<br />

Owen Dixon, a Judge of the<br />

Australian High Court who came to<br />

the subcontinent as the United<br />

Nations' Representative for India<br />

and Pakistan pursuant to the<br />

Security Council's Resolution of<br />

March 14, 1950. It assigned Ladakh to<br />

India, the Northern Areas and<br />

Three wars and a<br />

proxy war that has<br />

lasted 18 years<br />

should be proof<br />

enough for even the<br />

most battlehardened<br />

military<br />

man that peace is<br />

the only option<br />

Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK)<br />

to Pakistan, split Jammu between the<br />

two, and envisaged a plebiscite in the<br />

Kashmir Valley. India, though initially<br />

warm to the idea, later rejected it.<br />

Besides, it would entail mass exodus<br />

from various parts of the state into<br />

both countries, which would almost<br />

certainly result in a situation similar<br />

to the one that arose during the partition<br />

of India in 1947, with heavy<br />

bloodshed, anarchy and mayhem.<br />

These are the two most talked about<br />

options.<br />

An undivided Kashmir<br />

Then there is alignment of undivided<br />

Kashmir with either India or<br />

Pakistan. The opinion in Kashmir<br />

concerning this option is so fractured<br />

that it is untenable. It would result in<br />

the same eastern-western massmigration<br />

and the same problems<br />

thereafter. The non-Muslims in the<br />

state would almost certainly prefer<br />

staying in India, with the Muslims<br />

being split between the two. But religion<br />

is not the sole yardstick for<br />

understanding whose allegiances lie<br />

where. There is culture to take into<br />

account, along with language, class,<br />

region and all the usual factors. That<br />

makes the political situation in the<br />

state uniquely complex. Besides,<br />

alignment of the state with one<br />

nation would not be acceptable to the<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

other, as both have territorial claims<br />

on Kashmir. The support for independence<br />

within the state is similarly<br />

fractured along religious, cultural,<br />

linguistic, class and regional lines,<br />

besides being unacceptable to the<br />

nation-states of India and Pakistan.<br />

Even in separatist and militant circles<br />

there is no consensus on whether to<br />

align with Pakistan or go independent.<br />

This is aptly demonstrated by<br />

the fact that while Syed Ali Shah<br />

Geelani's hard-line Tehreek-e-<br />

Hurriyat is a pro-Pakistan outfit, the<br />

All Parties Hurriyat Conference<br />

(APHC) is in favour of Kashmiri selfgovernance.<br />

The same applies to militant<br />

groups. There is just no consensus.<br />

What there is consensus on is easing<br />

the strife of the people of undivided<br />

Kashmir. Taking that as the gospel, I<br />

would like to discuss the four-point<br />

solution to the Kashmir issue proposed<br />

by Pakistan President General<br />

Pervez Musharraf late last year.<br />

The four-point solution<br />

It envisions soft or porous borders<br />

in Kashmir with freedom of<br />

movement for the Kashmiris, exceptional<br />

autonomy or "self-governance"<br />

within each region of Kashmir,<br />

phased demilitarisation of all regions<br />

and finally, a "joint supervisory<br />

mechanism," with representatives<br />

from India, Pakistan and all parts of<br />

Kashmir, to oversee the plan's implementation.<br />

At the time of the proposal,<br />

in December last year, there was<br />

no pressure on Musharraf to suggest<br />

it, save moral pressure. But now, his<br />

very survival as President is under<br />

threat, what with the Iftikhar<br />

Chaudhry fiasco, the Lal Masjid<br />

blunder and the controversial deportation<br />

of Nawaz Sharif. He urgently<br />

needs to redeem himself in the eyes<br />

of the public, and what better way<br />

than to deliver on Kashmir. India<br />

needs to seize the opportunity and<br />

engage him over his proposal. This is<br />

one solution that is to everyone's<br />

advantage. With extremists baying<br />

for his head, he may not last much<br />

longer.<br />

The second part of the solution<br />

envisages exceptional self-governance<br />

within Kashmir. The Indian<br />

Constitution, under Article 370<br />

already grants exceptional status to<br />

the state of Jammu & Kashmir. So<br />

what possible problem can there be<br />

in taking that status a step further?<br />

This is especially true in light of the<br />

fact that originally, under the<br />

Instrument of Accession governing<br />

the accession of the state to India,<br />

Kashmir had its own Prime Minister,<br />

President and Supreme Court. POK<br />

continues to have them till this day.<br />

Jammu & Kashmir is<br />

the only state in the<br />

Indian Union that has<br />

its own Constitution:<br />

under Article 370, the<br />

President of India, on<br />

the aid and advice of<br />

the Council of<br />

Ministers of the Union,<br />

has blanket powers to<br />

apply, or to revoke the<br />

application of, any law<br />

to the state, upon<br />

consultation with the<br />

Constituent Assembly<br />

of the state<br />

Jammu & Kashmir is the only state in<br />

the Indian Union that has its own<br />

Constitution: under Article 370, the<br />

President of India, on the aid and<br />

advice of the Council of Ministers of<br />

the Union, has blanket powers to<br />

apply, or to revoke the application of,<br />

any law to the state, upon consultation<br />

with the Constituent Assembly<br />

of the state. There is thus no legal<br />

obstacle to the proposed self-governance.<br />

The third constituent of the proposal<br />

is demilitarisation. This is a<br />

demand that is echoed by every<br />

quarter of political thought in the<br />

state, whether mainstream, seperatist<br />

or militant. The PDP has been<br />

demanding it. The Pakistan-based<br />

militant alliance called the United<br />

Jihad Council (UJC) has been<br />

demanding it. Both factions of the<br />

Hurriyat have been demanding it.<br />

Pakistan has been demanding it too.<br />

So let us try and understand what<br />

demilitarisation actually means. It is<br />

the demand to remove troops from<br />

civilian areas of the state. What possible<br />

problem can there be when the<br />

army chief himself favours it? Syed<br />

Salahuddin, the chairman of the UJC,<br />

in an interview to the Urdu-language<br />

Current News Service (CNS) in<br />

November last year, said that,” We<br />

(the militants) are ready to announce<br />

a truce even today, but for that, India<br />

will have to accept our three conditions,"<br />

the conditions being, “All prisoners<br />

should be released unconditionally,<br />

strength of troops (should)<br />

be cut down to the pre-1989 position,<br />

and human rights violations (should)<br />

be stopped." Demilitarisation is thus<br />

a pre-condition for everyone. This is<br />

understandable since troop presence<br />

only provokes violence, as it is they<br />

who are targeted by extremists, not<br />

civilians. Civilians are only caught in<br />

the cross-fire: the Indian Army has<br />

often been accused of gross violation<br />

of human rights in Kashmir, especially<br />

by Human Rights Watch and<br />

Amnesty International. The situation<br />

worsens because of the blanket<br />

immunity available to security forces<br />

under special laws such as the<br />

Disturbed Areas Act, the Public<br />

Safety Act and the Armed Forces<br />

(Jammu & Kashmir) Special Powers<br />

Act (AFSPA), where they can arrest<br />

and detain at will and on the flimsiest<br />

of grounds. A classic example of<br />

this blatant disregard for civil liberties<br />

is section 4 (c) of the AFSPA<br />

which empowers the armed forces to<br />

"arrest, without warrant, any person<br />

who has committed a cognizable<br />

offence or against whom a reasonable<br />

suspicion exists that he has committed<br />

or is about to commit a cognizable<br />

offence and may use such<br />

force as may be necessary to effect<br />

the arrest". Were the Indian government<br />

to demilitarise civilian areas in<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Kashmir, human rights violations<br />

would automatically nosedive,<br />

bringing relief to an oppressed populace.<br />

Demilitarisation would therefore<br />

be advantageous to everyone,<br />

especially when infiltration is at its<br />

lowest ebb ever.<br />

Finally, there is the joint supervisory<br />

mechanism. This should be<br />

acceptable to both India and<br />

Pakistan, as it would enable them to<br />

exert some form of influence in<br />

Kashmir affairs. At the same time, it<br />

would jointly enable them to oversee<br />

the plan's implementation in its true<br />

spirit, and to keep a check on excesses<br />

made by each other. Only the<br />

details need to be ironed out.<br />

Such a solution would involve no<br />

redrawing of boundaries, no human<br />

rights violations and no secession. It<br />

would facilitate free movement of<br />

Kashmiris to every part of the state<br />

and would also address the Kashmiri<br />

concerns of self-governance and<br />

demilitarisation. It would also enable<br />

the two countries to take forward<br />

other aspects of their bilateral relations,<br />

once they have successfully<br />

removed the thorn of Kashmir from<br />

their common flesh. In short, except<br />

for a few fanatics, it would be acceptable<br />

to everyone.<br />

I believe that the only<br />

workable solution to<br />

the problem is making<br />

the border in the state<br />

irrelevant. After all, is<br />

a border anything but<br />

an imaginary line<br />

between two countries<br />

President Musharraf has said that<br />

history offered only "fleeting<br />

moments" to resolve complex issues<br />

like Kashmir, and the prevailing<br />

international atmosphere, as well as<br />

improved relations between the two<br />

countries, offered the "ideal opportunity"<br />

for him and Prime Minister<br />

Manmohan Singh to resolve it. It is<br />

time for some out-of-the-box thinking<br />

on Kashmir. The clock, as they<br />

say, is ticking...<br />

The Indian response<br />

The Indian establishment has<br />

been making the right kind of noises.<br />

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has<br />

said he welcomes the "new ideas and<br />

thoughts expressed from Pakistan";<br />

they can help "resolve all pending<br />

issues" which must be approached<br />

"with an open and friendly mind."<br />

But the time for such ambiguities is<br />

passé. Both countries need to sit<br />

down and hammer out the particulars<br />

of this option.<br />

I believe that the only workable<br />

solution to the problem is making the<br />

border in the state irrelevant. After<br />

all, is a border anything but an imaginary<br />

line between two countries? If<br />

undivided Kashmir is one state, what<br />

possible harm can come out of letting<br />

its people treat it that way? Imagine<br />

the relief it will bring to people who<br />

have been divided by sixty years of<br />

hatred. Imagine the kind of positive<br />

political impact that the leaders of<br />

India and Pakistan can make on the<br />

hearts and minds of the Kashmiri<br />

people, who will be free to move all<br />

over the state.<br />

— The writer is a law student at<br />

Symbiosis, Pune<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

International <strong>Law</strong> and Kashmir<br />

Looking through the prism of international law, Sheikh Showkat Husain traces the<br />

development of the right to self-determination to human rights issue, arguing that<br />

it is for the UN to make India and Pakistan act<br />

Relevance of UN Resolutions on<br />

Kashmir has been subject of<br />

debate for a long time.<br />

Previously it was Indian State that<br />

disputed their applicability. Recent<br />

postures of Pakistani president have<br />

created doubts about commitment of<br />

Pakistan to these. Some Kashmiri<br />

leaders by endorsing General<br />

Musharaff policies have also depicted<br />

their non-seriousness with regard<br />

to United Nations role regarding<br />

Kashmir. This has been done despite<br />

the fact that the UN resolutions are<br />

the only internationally valid instruments,<br />

which provide basis for<br />

recognition of J&K as a disputed territory<br />

under International law.<br />

Role of United Nations<br />

India after securing a deed of<br />

accession from Maharaja Hari Singh<br />

This transformed<br />

Kashmir dispute into a<br />

multilateral problem<br />

involving people of<br />

Kashmir, United<br />

Nations, Pakistan and<br />

India. United Nations<br />

Resolutions also<br />

provided for ceasefire<br />

and withdrawal of<br />

troops<br />

of Kashmir proceeded to United<br />

Nations Security Council alleging<br />

Pakistan of intervention. United<br />

Nations Security Council while<br />

admitting Indian complaint refused<br />

to acknowledge Kashmir as its legitimate<br />

part. It recognised people of<br />

Kashmir as the principal party to this<br />

dispute who should be given a<br />

chance to decide their future through<br />

exercise of the Right of self-determination.<br />

This right was proposed to be<br />

exercised under United Nations<br />

supervision thus making it a legitimate<br />

guarantor of self-determination.<br />

This transformed Kashmir dispute<br />

into a multilateral problem<br />

involving people of Kashmir, United<br />

Nations, Pakistan and India. United<br />

Nations Resolutions also provided<br />

for ceasefire and withdrawal of<br />

troops. For this purpose a military<br />

observers group was deputed to<br />

supervise adherence to the ceasefire.<br />

Although United Nations was<br />

approached under chapter VI of the<br />

UN Charter yet the decision taken by<br />

it reflected that its resolutions were<br />

not exclusively based on this chapter.<br />

While adopting the resolutions it<br />

relied upon chapter I that states the<br />

purpose of the United Nations “To<br />

develop friendly relations among<br />

nations based on respect for the principle<br />

of equal rights and self determination<br />

of peoples (Article 1(2))”.<br />

United Nations Security Council also<br />

kept in view Article 55 of chapter IX<br />

that imposes an obligation upon<br />

member states to pursue for peaceful<br />

and friendly relations among nations<br />

based on respect for principle of<br />

equal rights and self-determination<br />

of peoples. The interim measures<br />

which included ceasefire and deputation<br />

of United Nations Military<br />

Observers Group is based upon<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Article 40 of chapter VII of United<br />

Nations, a view which International<br />

authorities on UN Peacekeeping<br />

Higgins & Roselyn confirm. The fact<br />

that there does not exist any provision<br />

for deputing of United Nations<br />

peacekeeping mission under chapter<br />

VI makes it obvious that the dispute<br />

over J&K although referred to United<br />

Nations under this chapter didn’t get<br />

deliberated exclusively under chapter<br />

VI. The resolutions apart from<br />

Chapter VI are based upon other portions<br />

of the UN Charter including<br />

chapter VII.<br />

Elections<br />

After a short span of cooperating<br />

with the UN, India conducted elections,<br />

facilitating entry of 72 out of 75<br />

members to the Constituent<br />

Assembly of the state unopposed.<br />

These ‘elections’ were portrayed substitutes<br />

for the exercise of right of<br />

self-determination. United Nations<br />

through several resolutions rejected<br />

this contention and made it clear that<br />

creation of Constituent Assembly in<br />

Indian administered part of Kashmir<br />

or conducting of elections will not be<br />

deemed to be exercise of right of selfdetermination<br />

in accordance with<br />

United Nations Resolutions. UN<br />

Security Council declared that “the<br />

convening of a Constituent Assembly as<br />

recommended by the General Council of<br />

the “All Jammu & Kashmir National<br />

Conference” and any action that<br />

Assembly may have taken or might<br />

After Shimla<br />

agreement India<br />

proceeded to United<br />

Nations and asked it<br />

to withdraw its<br />

observer’s mission<br />

from the state. United<br />

Nations refused to<br />

accept the Indian plea<br />

attempt to take to determine the future<br />

shape and affiliation of the entire state or<br />

any part thereof, or action by the parties<br />

concerned in support of any such action<br />

by the Assembly, would not constitute a<br />

disposition of the state in accordance<br />

with the above principle” (UN Security<br />

Council Resolution 24 January 1957).”<br />

Another significant development<br />

was Shimla Agreement (1972) signed<br />

by India and Pakistan wherein the<br />

parties agreed to resolve all the disputes<br />

between them including that of<br />

Kashmir mutually. After this agreement<br />

India proceeded to United<br />

Nations and asked it to withdraw its<br />

observer’s mission from the state.<br />

United Nations refused to accept the<br />

Indian plea. Although United<br />

Nations Charter (Article 52, para 1)<br />

allowed regional arrangements for<br />

dealing with matters relating to<br />

maintenance of international peace<br />

and security these measures however,<br />

have to be consistent with the purposes<br />

and principles of United<br />

Nations Charter. In case there is a<br />

conflict between regional arrangements<br />

and obligations of States<br />

under United Nations Charter, their<br />

duties under United Nations Charter<br />

will prevail. In this case Indian interpretation<br />

of the Shimla Agreement<br />

amounted to denial of the objectives of<br />

United Nations as laid down in Article<br />

1(2) i.e. fostering friendly relations<br />

between nations based on respect for<br />

right of self-determination.<br />

The right of self-determination<br />

The development on the normative<br />

front were more significant and<br />

in favour of right of self-determination.<br />

The right found place within<br />

The Covenant on Civil and Political<br />

Rights (1966) and The Covenant on<br />

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights<br />

(1966). It was enumerated as a<br />

human right in their very first<br />

Articles. Besides these instruments<br />

importance of this right was asserted<br />

in various resolutions of the UN<br />

General Assembly. Among these the<br />

most important ones are 1514 of 14<br />

December 1960, titled as<br />

“Declaration on Granting of<br />

Independence to Colonial Countries<br />

and Peoples” Resolution 2625 of 24th<br />

October 1970 relating to “PRINCI-<br />

Besides these<br />

instruments<br />

importance of this<br />

right was asserted in<br />

various resolutions of<br />

the UN General<br />

Assembly. Among<br />

these the most<br />

important ones are<br />

1514 of 14 December<br />

1960, titled as<br />

“Declaration on<br />

Granting of<br />

Independence to<br />

Colonial Countries and<br />

Peoples”<br />

PLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW<br />

CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELA-<br />

TIONS AND COOPERATION<br />

AMONG STATES”. In both these resolutions<br />

the right of self-determination<br />

was identified with people of<br />

colonised territories, whereas there<br />

was no such mention within The<br />

Covenant on Civil and Political<br />

Rights and The Covenant on<br />

Economic Social and Cultural Rights.<br />

For a long time there was a debate<br />

throughout the world relating to<br />

applicability of this right. The third<br />

world countries were vocal for this<br />

right for the colonies and non-self<br />

governing territories in traditional<br />

sense of the term. They were not<br />

ready to concede it to groups that<br />

wanted to secede from the existing<br />

states. The third world countries<br />

were not ready for fragmentation of<br />

any state on the basis of use of right<br />

of self-determination because people<br />

to them only meant the people of<br />

colonies and non self governing territories.<br />

This reservation has become<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Prof. Gros Espiell<br />

special rapporteur of<br />

the United Nations<br />

Sub-commission on<br />

Minorities have made<br />

it clear that the right of<br />

self-determination has<br />

achieved the status of<br />

jus-cogens i.e. preemptory<br />

norm of<br />

general international<br />

law<br />

obsolete after recognition of this<br />

right for all peoples within the<br />

Covenants. After the end of cold war<br />

applicability of right of self-determination<br />

has been practically extended<br />

to so many areas and territories of<br />

the world, which were not colonies in<br />

traditional sense of the term.<br />

Examples of such territories are<br />

Central Asian Republics, Ukraine,<br />

Baltic States, Czech and Slovakian<br />

Republics, Croatia, Macedonia,<br />

Bosnia, East Timor, Eritrea, Quebec<br />

province of Canada and<br />

Montenegro. People of these areas<br />

were allowed to exercise right of selfdetermination<br />

and given choice of<br />

separation from existing sovereign<br />

states.<br />

India while ratifying The<br />

Covenant on Civil and Political<br />

Rights and Covenant on Economic<br />

Social and Cultural Rights made a<br />

reservation with respect to right of<br />

self-determination. Such a reservation<br />

is of little importance now in<br />

view of the fact that several authorities<br />

including Prof. Gros Espiell special<br />

rapporteur of the United Nations<br />

Sub-commission on Minorities have<br />

made it clear that the right of selfdetermination<br />

has achieved the status<br />

of jus-cogens i.e. pre-emptory<br />

norm of general international law. It<br />

must be remembered that treaties<br />

and reservation to norms of juscogens<br />

are not allowed under international<br />

law.<br />

Self-determination<br />

It is obvious from the preceding<br />

discussion that right of self-determination<br />

is strongly rooted in international<br />

law. Its recognition as human<br />

right does not allow any one to deviate<br />

from this right or use it on behalf<br />

of the people who are entitled to it.<br />

Human rights are inalienable. The<br />

statements to the contrary on the part<br />

of remote controlled politicians do<br />

not carry any weight. These statements<br />

reflect their interests. Any<br />

solution reached after compromising<br />

right of self-determination is destined<br />

to face the same fate, as was<br />

that of Shimla Agreement. Failure of<br />

Kashmiris to secure the right of selfdetermination<br />

is the result of incapability<br />

of those who plead it for them. From<br />

New York to Srinagar role of representation<br />

of Kashmiris has been<br />

assumed by those who are bereft of<br />

any understanding of International<br />

<strong>Law</strong> and commitment to Kashmir<br />

cause. They are unfamiliar with any<br />

appreciation of legal and political<br />

dimensions of the Kashmir problem<br />

and unfit for any serious discourse<br />

and deliberation. Pakistan too has<br />

kept the issue hostage to American<br />

strategic interests.<br />

Problem of minorities has not<br />

been an impediment to exercise of<br />

this right anywhere in the world.<br />

Twenty-two percent dissenters to<br />

independence of East Timor were<br />

made to go along with the majority.<br />

In case of Montenegro, the decision<br />

was taken in favor of secession with<br />

55 percent votes in favor and 44 percent<br />

against. In case of Quebec,<br />

province of Canada, decision for status<br />

quo was taken with a margin of<br />

just one percent votes. Forty-nine<br />

percent voters favored secession<br />

whereas 51 percent supported continuation<br />

of status quo. In Kashmir<br />

the problem can be addressed by<br />

granting minority dominated areas<br />

Kashmir is a human<br />

rights issue. Selfdetermination<br />

is an<br />

inalienable human<br />

right. It can’t be made<br />

hostage to anything<br />

like strategic interests<br />

of regional powers...<br />

right of secession from the entity to<br />

which majority decides to join<br />

through a UN sponsored plebiscite.<br />

Absence of third option is an issue<br />

which relates to modus-operandi<br />

rather than the principle. Once there<br />

is an agreement on the principle even<br />

third option can be accommodated.<br />

Kashmir can be addressed as a<br />

problem concerning real estate<br />

between India and Pakistan or an<br />

issue relating to human rights of a<br />

people. The real estate approach does<br />

admit the propositions of joint management<br />

and self-governance.<br />

Human rights approach to the problem<br />

doesn’t provide an avenue for<br />

such a dispensation. Kashmir is a<br />

human rights issue. Self-determination<br />

is an inalienable human right. It<br />

can’t be made hostage to anything<br />

like strategic interests of regional<br />

powers, integration of Central Asia<br />

with South Asia or American apprehensions<br />

relating to nature of an<br />

emerging entity after exercise of<br />

right of self-determination. The<br />

Kashmir problem has to be<br />

addressed for the sake of Kashmiris<br />

and nothing else. The most important<br />

reason for failure of peace process<br />

is that it is for resolution of<br />

Kashmir for the sake of everything<br />

other than restoration of inalienable<br />

right to self-determination for the<br />

people of Kashmir.<br />

—The writer is a lecturer of law at<br />

University of Kashmir<br />

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A religious rage<br />

or more<br />

The self-determination<br />

movement in Kashmir has<br />

been mobilised along<br />

religious identities. Yet,<br />

religion is just another<br />

aspect of a movement<br />

that is mainly sociopolitical,<br />

writes<br />

Khalid Wasim Hassan<br />

The right to self-determination<br />

is commonly used to justify<br />

the aspirations of an ethnic<br />

group that self-identifies as a nation<br />

towards forming an independent<br />

sovereign state. It is not only territorial<br />

and political aspects but also the<br />

religious and cultural identity of people<br />

that influence the nature of these<br />

movements. Self-determination<br />

movements, which led to national<br />

freedom to erstwhile colonies in Asia<br />

and Africa, now carry connotations<br />

of being regressive and antiquated,<br />

especially if people are mobilised on<br />

the basis of religion.<br />

Similar to many self-determination<br />

movements’ processes, religion<br />

became an important political tool to<br />

advocate and sensitise Kashmiris<br />

about the idea of self-determination<br />

in Kashmir. The Kashmiri self-determination<br />

1 movement, whose roots go<br />

back to the uprising against the<br />

Dogra regime in the 1930s and after<br />

1947 against India’s control saw the<br />

assertion of Muslim identity but the<br />

movement at large, is a political<br />

movement of people to determine their<br />

own political future. The various religio-political<br />

organisations with distinct<br />

and opposing ideologies have<br />

mobilised the card of ‘Kashmiri<br />

Muslim Identity’ at different stages<br />

of the movement.<br />

The roles of Islam and the assertion<br />

of Kashmiri Muslim identity in<br />

the political movement of Kashmir<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

have been overemphasised. No<br />

doubt religious symbols played an<br />

important role in the mobilisation<br />

but there has been a presence of a<br />

secular moderate voice in the selfdetermination<br />

movement. It becomes<br />

important to engage with the discourse<br />

of religious identity vis-à-vis<br />

self-determination movement in<br />

Kashmir in the current political scenario<br />

at regional and international<br />

level levels when all political movements<br />

where religious identity<br />

becomes a source of mobilisation, are<br />

seen as terrorist movements.<br />

Pre-1947 period<br />

The process of formation and<br />

assertion of political identity vis-àvis<br />

the question of religion has been a<br />

complex one in Kashmir. The initial<br />

stage of evolution of political consciousness<br />

has been defined by the<br />

assertion of the Muslim identity as a<br />

consequence of socio-economic situation<br />

in which the community was<br />

placed during the Dogra rule 2 . The<br />

objective situation in which Kashmiri<br />

Muslims were placed, in comparison<br />

to the dominant classes which were<br />

mainly Hindus from Kashmir as well<br />

as Jammu led Kashmiris to perceive<br />

their deprivation in terms of their<br />

religious identity. Sufi (1949) notes<br />

that the Dogra regime was totally<br />

unsympathetic towards the aspirations<br />

of the people and in its attitude<br />

towards the valley, it was as foreign<br />

to it as the British were to India. It<br />

was not only economic and political<br />

conditions but also, the nature of the<br />

state vis-à-vis Muslims subjects that<br />

led to demand of rights on religious<br />

terms (Rai, 2004). The political movement<br />

of Kashmiri Muslims against<br />

Dogra regime was looked at as communal<br />

by some sections of the Pandit<br />

community. While the process of<br />

politicisation of the community of<br />

Muslims of Kashmir was a result of<br />

the consciousness of their situation of<br />

deprivation and utter powerlessness,<br />

the politicisation of Hindus was a<br />

step towards maintenance of their<br />

position of dominance.<br />

The articulation of political<br />

demands in specific Muslim context<br />

laid the basis for the political movement<br />

of Kashmir but it could not<br />

define the politics of Kashmir for a<br />

long time. There was an attempt for<br />

the secularisation of the political<br />

identity. It was in this context that the<br />

Muslim Conference was changed<br />

into National Conference whose<br />

membership was open to all irrespective<br />

of caste, creed or religion 3 .<br />

Punjabi (1995) argues that there was<br />

a resistance against this conversion<br />

of Muslim Conference into National<br />

Conference, mainly by leadership<br />

from Jammu and Mirwaiz Yusuf<br />

The objective situation<br />

in which Kashmiri<br />

Muslims were placed,<br />

in comparison to the<br />

dominant classes<br />

which were mainly<br />

Hindus from Kashmir<br />

as well as Jammu led<br />

Kashmiris to perceive<br />

their deprivation in<br />

terms of their religious<br />

identity<br />

Shah from Srinagar, which later led<br />

to revival of the Muslim Conference.<br />

Though there was an ideological difference<br />

between the two parties, but<br />

either of them could not do away<br />

with the idea of ‘Kashmiri Muslim<br />

identity’ and its leaders used<br />

mosques and shrines as their popular<br />

bases.<br />

Although the various attempts of<br />

secularisation of its organisation, the<br />

National Conference could not<br />

attract large number of Hindu masses<br />

either from the valley or from<br />

other parts of the state. It came under<br />

criticism from Praja Parishad (vanguard<br />

of Jan Sangh in J&K) for<br />

regional and religious bias on one<br />

side and from other side by Muslim<br />

Conference for its closeness to Indian<br />

National Congress 4 and its negligence<br />

for the cause of Kashmiri<br />

Muslims. This pre-1947 period<br />

becomes important reference point<br />

for the ongoing self-determination<br />

period because religion and politics<br />

became inextricably intertwined in<br />

defining and expressing the protest<br />

of Kashmiri Muslims against their<br />

rulers, which happens to continue<br />

even now.<br />

Competing nationalism(s)<br />

The post 1947 period saw the politics<br />

around Kashmir conflict as of<br />

competing nationalist visions and<br />

religious identity of Kashmiris once<br />

again came to fore front. Varshney<br />

(1999) recognises that Kashmir problem<br />

at its core is the result of three<br />

forces: religious nationalism represented<br />

by Pakistan, secular nationalism<br />

epitomised by India and ethnic<br />

nationalism embodied in what<br />

Kashmiris call Kashmiryat. The inclusion<br />

of Kashmir into Indian Union<br />

was considered necessary not only<br />

for fighting an older and larger battle<br />

of secular nationalism vis-à-vis<br />

Pakistan’s two nation theory but for<br />

confronting its old ideological adversary<br />

at home – that is Hindu nationalism.<br />

Pakistan, which was formed<br />

on the notion of a ‘nation for<br />

Muslims of sub-continent’, also<br />

claimed for this Muslim majority<br />

state 5 . Rai (2004) argues that both<br />

narratives of nationalism stress on<br />

the Muslim nature of Kashmir and<br />

Kashmiris.<br />

Apart from the broad narratives<br />

of Indian and Pakistani nationalisms<br />

based on secularism and religion<br />

respectively, there was a third narrative,<br />

which defined Kashmiri nationalism<br />

as distinct from the former two.<br />

Kashmiryat as an ideological tool<br />

was used to define ‘Kashmiri nationalism’<br />

first by National Conference<br />

and latter by its offshoot Plebiscite<br />

Front 6 which was in favour of right to<br />

self-determination. The same idea<br />

was carried by the pro-independence<br />

groups like JKLF as an ideological<br />

tool for secular credentials of the selfdetermination<br />

movement in latter<br />

years. The historiography of Kashmir<br />

was explained by Kashmiri<br />

Nationalists not as periods of Hindu<br />

to Muslim to Sikh rulers but from an<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

age of Kashmiri rulers to non-<br />

Kashmiris, which include Dogra<br />

rule, as well as Indian State. There<br />

were some religio-political groups<br />

like Awami Action Committee led by<br />

Mirwaiz and Jamat-e-Islami which was<br />

active in rural Kashmir gave more<br />

emphasis to the Muslim character of<br />

Kashmiri nationalism and Pakistani<br />

version of religious nationalism<br />

(Chowdhary 1998). The meaning and<br />

structures associated with Indian<br />

nationalism have become unimportant<br />

in terms of relating itself to the<br />

daily experiences of the Kashmiri<br />

Muslim population.<br />

Reassertion of Muslim identity<br />

The process of reassertion of the<br />

Muslim identity in Kashmir is closely<br />

linked to the politics of separatism<br />

arising mainly out of widely prevailing<br />

deep-rooted discontent against<br />

existing political arrangements. The<br />

period of four decades after 1947 saw<br />

the state sponsored violations of<br />

democratic rights of citizens on the<br />

one hand while on the other there<br />

was an attempt to bring permanent<br />

union of Kashmir with India. There<br />

The Kashmiri selfdetermination<br />

movement became<br />

more vocal in post-<br />

1989 period as it took<br />

the form of armed<br />

insurgency. The<br />

slogans in favour of<br />

Azadi (freedom) in the<br />

rallies organised by<br />

the various political<br />

groups were backed by<br />

some other slogans<br />

with ‘Islamic’<br />

connotations<br />

The migration of<br />

Kashmiri Pandits to<br />

Jammu and other<br />

cities in India made<br />

the self-determination<br />

movement appear<br />

sectarian and<br />

fundamentalist<br />

was interference from the Centre to<br />

the extent that installation of puppet<br />

regimes and election rigging became<br />

a common phenomenon (Manor,<br />

2001; Bose, 2003). The arrest of<br />

Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 followed by<br />

‘Congressisation’ of National Conference<br />

and dilution of Article-370 by<br />

which Indian Constitution recognised<br />

Kashmir's 'special status' 7<br />

resulted in a gradual erosion of mass<br />

base of Kashmir’s politics.<br />

The Kashmiri self-determination<br />

movement became more vocal in<br />

post-1989 period as it took the form<br />

of armed insurgency. The slogans in<br />

favour of Azadi (freedom) in the rallies<br />

organised by the various political<br />

groups were backed by some other<br />

slogans with ‘Islamic’ connotations.<br />

Mosques became the readymade<br />

community centre to organise, agitate,<br />

protest and mobilise. According<br />

to Puri (1990b) and Bose (1997),<br />

mosques and shrines were used, as<br />

there were no democratic spaces for<br />

dissent and protest available.<br />

Besides assertion of ‘Muslim<br />

identity’, the movement came up<br />

with two different ideologies -- one<br />

adhering self-determination movement<br />

as purely secular and political<br />

movement and the second as struggle<br />

of Muslims to safeguard their<br />

religious interests. The ideological<br />

polarisation between the two strands<br />

divided the militant ranks with different<br />

goals of ‘complete independence’<br />

and accession to Pakistan<br />

respectively (Punjabi, 2000). The secular<br />

nationalist strand of the movement<br />

was spearheaded by several<br />

organisations and parties, the foremost<br />

being JKLF which demanded<br />

that the state of Jammu & Kashmir as<br />

it existed prior to 1947 be united as<br />

‘one fully independent and truly<br />

democratic state’ (Malik, 1994; Khan,<br />

1995). On the other hand there were<br />

Islamist groups that gave more<br />

emphasis on the Muslim identity of<br />

Kashmiris in this self-determination<br />

movement. The Islamists lacked<br />

popular support in the valley due to<br />

their strict adherence to Islamic ideology,<br />

which came in conflict with<br />

local traditions. The nationalist<br />

groups who based the self-determination<br />

movement on ethno-cultural<br />

basis could not do away with the<br />

‘Kashmiri Muslim Identity’ while the<br />

strict adherence to Islamic ideology<br />

of Islamist groups was put under<br />

check by local traditions, belief system<br />

and customs.<br />

The migration of Kashmiri<br />

Pandits to Jammu and other cities in<br />

India made the self-determination<br />

movement appear sectarian and fundamentalist.<br />

Teng (1995) and Swami<br />

(2007) view self-determination<br />

movement in Kashmir not as a political<br />

movement but a Jihad for separate<br />

homeland in India which has led<br />

to extermination of Hindu population.<br />

The pro-independence militant<br />

groups claim that attacks on Pandits<br />

were not because of their religious<br />

identity but their positions in the<br />

state agencies. The number of<br />

Muslims killed by militants due to<br />

their anti-movement stand exceeds<br />

than the number of Pandits killed 8 .<br />

The division of “us” and “them” was<br />

more of political reasons than due to<br />

religious ones.<br />

The involvement of Pakistan in<br />

the self-determination movement of<br />

Kashmir has made many scholars to<br />

view it merely as religious movement,<br />

taking its roots to two-Nation<br />

theory. Apart from being involved in<br />

the Kashmir issue right from 1947,<br />

Pakistan is accused of being responsible<br />

of providing military support<br />

and training to Kashmiri militants 9 .<br />

Wirsing’s work (1994) argues that<br />

Pakistan was only interested in those<br />

‘Muslim separatists’ who wanted to<br />

merge Kashmir with Pakistan, and<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

denied all assistance to the pro-independence<br />

militant groups. According<br />

to Noorani (2000) and Bose (2003) the<br />

enormous and unexpected popular<br />

support for pro-independence<br />

groups with Kashmiri secular identity<br />

alarmed Pakistan as much as<br />

India. Shouting pro-Pakistani slogans<br />

and denouncing India do not<br />

necessarily imply a will to integrate<br />

with Pakistan or an Islamic resurgence<br />

among the Muslim population<br />

a stereotypical image of Kashmiri<br />

Muslims.<br />

In brief the political reality can be<br />

perceived with reference to the multiple<br />

political responses available in<br />

Kashmir and of these responses, the<br />

religious dimension is merely one.<br />

There has been sufficient assertion of<br />

the Muslim political identity and the<br />

relative erosion of the secular political<br />

ethos, yet it is difficult to argue<br />

that fundamentalism has completely<br />

overtaken the politics of ‘Kashmiri<br />

Nationalism’. The discourse of post<br />

1989 self-determination movement<br />

saw the growth of religio-political<br />

groups who perceived the political<br />

reality of Kashmir in terms of the<br />

Muslim Identity of its people and<br />

were critical about Kashmiri nationalist<br />

discourse. The basic issues for<br />

the people still remain the right of<br />

self-determination to decide their<br />

political future. The demand of<br />

rights in the language of religion and<br />

articulation of protest through religious<br />

symbols has made this movement<br />

to appear purely as a religious<br />

movement.<br />

—The writer is a research scholar<br />

with the Institute for Social and<br />

Economic Change, Bangalore<br />

References:<br />

Behera, Navnita Chadha (2000), State<br />

Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and<br />

Ladakh, New Delhi, Manohar.<br />

Bose, Sumantra (1997), The Challenge in<br />

Kashmir Democracy, Self-Determination<br />

and a Just Peace, New Delhi, Sage<br />

Publications.<br />

Bose, Sumantra (2003), Kashmir: Roots of<br />

Conflict, Paths to Peace, New Delhi,<br />

Vistaar Publications.<br />

Chandra, Prakash (1985), ‘The National<br />

Question in Kashmir’, Social Scientist,<br />

vol.13, no. 6.<br />

Hassnain, F.M (1988), Freedom Struggle<br />

in Kashmir, New Delhi, Rana<br />

Publishers.<br />

Kannabiran, K.G (1991), ‘Abuses of<br />

Article 370’ in Ashghar Ali Engineer<br />

(ed.), Secular crown on Fire: The Kashmir<br />

Problem, Delhi, Ajanta Publications.<br />

Khan, Ammanullah (1995), ‘Kashmir<br />

Tangle -The only Way Out’, Frontier<br />

Post, December 6.<br />

Lamb, Alastair (1991), Kashmir a<br />

Disputed Legacy: 1840 to 1990, Karachi,<br />

Oxford University Press.<br />

Malik, Yasin (1994), Our Real Crime,<br />

Srinagar, JKLF.<br />

Noorani, A.G (2000), ‘Contours of<br />

Militancy’, Frontline, vol-17, issue 20,<br />

September 30-October 13.<br />

Puri, Balraj (1990), ‘The Challenge of<br />

Kashmir’, Economic and Political Weekly,<br />

January 27.<br />

Puri, Balraj (1990b), ‘KASHMIR<br />

Defending National-Cultural Identity’,<br />

Economic and Political Weekly, March 3.<br />

Rai, Mridu (2004), Hindu Rulers, Muslim<br />

Subjects-Islam, Rights and The History of<br />

Kashmir, New Delhi, Permanent Black.<br />

Sikand, Yoginder (2002), ‘Changing<br />

Course of Kashmiri struggle: From<br />

National liberation to Islamist Jihad?’,<br />

Economic and Political Weekly, January<br />

20.<br />

Sufi, G.M.D (1949), Kashmir: Being a<br />

History of Kashmir (From Earliest Times to<br />

Our Own), Vol.II, Lahore, University of<br />

Punjab.<br />

Swami, Parveen (2007), INDIA PAK-<br />

ISTAN and the SECRET JIHAD The<br />

covert war in Kashmir, 1947-2004,<br />

London, Routledge.<br />

Teng, M.K (1995), ‘Violation of Human<br />

Rights – Whose?’ in Verinder Grover<br />

(ed), The story of Kashmir: Yesterday and<br />

Today, New Delhi, Deep and Deep<br />

Publications.<br />

Tremblay, Reeta Chowdhari (1996-97),<br />

Nation, Identity and the Intervening<br />

Role of the State: A study of Secessionist<br />

Movement in Kashmir, Pacific Affairs,<br />

vol. 69, no.3.<br />

Varshney, Ashutosh (1991), “INDIA,<br />

PAKISTAN, AND KASHMIR<br />

Antinomies of Nationalism” ASIAN<br />

SURVEY, vol. XXXI, no. 11<br />

Wirsing, Robert G (1994), India, Pakistan<br />

and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional<br />

Conflict and Its Resolution, New York: St.<br />

Martin’s Press.<br />

Endnotes<br />

1 The term Self-determination is used here<br />

instead of Separatist or Secessionist because<br />

it is Self-determination (Haq-e-Khud-<br />

Idariyat in Kashmiri language) that is being<br />

used in Kashmir by various political groups<br />

and large sections of people. People who are<br />

entitled to self-determination can be debated.<br />

2 The State of Jammu & Kashmir came under<br />

the Dogra rule when British transferred it by<br />

the Treaty of Amritsar of March 16, 1846 to<br />

Gulab Singh by what amounted to be a sale<br />

deed for the sum of Rs 75,00,000<br />

3 The first political party, All Jammu & Kashmir<br />

Muslim Conference was established in 1932.<br />

The prominent leaders of this party were<br />

Shiekh Abdullah from Kashmir Valley and<br />

Chowdhary Ghulam Abass from Jammu.<br />

The same was renamed as National<br />

Conference. However, Gulam Abass split the<br />

party and named his faction as Muslim<br />

Conference. This came to play a significant<br />

role in Kashmir politics during 1940s.<br />

4 Indian national Congress as well as Muslim<br />

League attempted to influence the political<br />

movement in Kashmir with their respective<br />

ideologies.<br />

5 This claim of Pakistan on the basis of religion<br />

became weak after the creation of<br />

Bangladesh. Even though the Bengalis of<br />

East Pakistan decided to go with Pakistan<br />

because of a common religion – Islam, the<br />

assertion of a separate Bengali identity started<br />

taking shape with the launching of an agitation<br />

for adoption of Bengali as a national<br />

language<br />

6 Plebiscite Front was formed in 1955 by Mirza<br />

Afzal Beg after the dismissal of Shiekh<br />

Abdullah. It was main political group that<br />

was critical about finality of Accession and<br />

made demand for Plebiscite. It was banned<br />

in 1971 under unlawful Activities<br />

(Prevention) Act. The Indra-Shiekh Accord<br />

of 1973 in which Shiekh Abdullah accepted<br />

complete accession of Kashmir to India and<br />

dropped the idea of Self-determination<br />

annoyed its leaders.<br />

7 In accordance with Article 370 as a condition<br />

for Instrument of Accession, the Indian<br />

Parliament could legislate only on three subjects<br />

– defence, foreign affairs and communication,<br />

while all residuary powers were vested<br />

with Jammu & Kashmiri. Now the meaning<br />

of Article 370 remains that people from<br />

outside J&K cannot own immovable property.<br />

However, Article 370 is being challenged<br />

by right wing parties.<br />

8 ‘209Kashmiri Pandits killed since 1989, say<br />

JK cops in First report’-www.Indianexpress.<br />

com/story/3v547.html<br />

9 The US State Departments report (1994) on<br />

global terrorism validates India’s claims that<br />

there was official Pakistani support to<br />

Kashmiri militants. Some support came from<br />

private organisations such as Jamat-i-Islami.<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Press trussed<br />

by draconian laws<br />

The Press in J&K has seen<br />

many instances of<br />

suppression, both by the<br />

state government and those<br />

opposed to the state. But<br />

The Fourth Estate has<br />

valiantly fought<br />

back for the sake of<br />

people’s rights, writes<br />

Professor SM Afzal Qadri<br />

Press all over the world is considered<br />

as the mirror of the<br />

society. History acknowledges<br />

the contribution of the press in the<br />

success of almost all the major struggles<br />

and movements of the world. It<br />

is the primary responsibility of each<br />

member of the press to be unbiased,<br />

impartial, and report every event<br />

objectively. Any lapse on the part of<br />

the press may lead to chaos and confusion<br />

in the society. That is why a<br />

common man trusts and expects that<br />

whatever media projects will be correct<br />

and true. Once they sensationalise<br />

the issue and are biased in their<br />

reporting, their integrity becomes<br />

doubtful. That is why the need arises<br />

to control the press by enacting laws.<br />

But these laws were never meant<br />

to undermine the use of the press in<br />

any manner and the objective of the<br />

laws was never to use the press for<br />

political gains. Its utmost aim was to<br />

apprise the people of the society<br />

about the ongoing events in a particular<br />

society. Which would otherwise<br />

mean that one of its objectives definitely<br />

was to apprise the people<br />

about the ongoing peoples movements<br />

as well. Unfortunately the<br />

press is not allowed to highlight the<br />

events relating to such movements,<br />

because of pressures from government.<br />

As a legitimate way to curb<br />

any such reporting the legislature<br />

has passed many Acts in order to not<br />

allow the press to report the truth<br />

more particularly in the conflict<br />

regions like J&K.<br />

The constitution of India has<br />

given due importance to freedom of<br />

the press. It is one of the fundamental<br />

rights, but this right is not unbridled<br />

and is subject to certain controls.<br />

An honest journalist has to face<br />

a number of odds in performing his<br />

daily duties, which can go to the<br />

extent of losing lives. Role of the<br />

press becomes more difficult when<br />

the journalists have to work in a conflict<br />

situation. The Kashmir valley is<br />

facing a conflict since last many years<br />

and the last 20 years have seen the<br />

worst kinds of human rights violations.<br />

There have been civilian<br />

killings at the hands of security<br />

forces, local police and governmentsponsored<br />

gunmen. Rapes, murders,<br />

custodial violence, disappearance<br />

has become the norm of the day and<br />

all these things need to be reported in<br />

the press in order to highlight the<br />

plight of a Kashimiri who has been<br />

fighting for their rights for decades.<br />

In such a situation it becomes an<br />

imperative for the local and national<br />

media to report all such cases of<br />

human rights violations. In such situations<br />

if a person is honest in his<br />

reporting and news analysis it is a<br />

big achievement. Some times while<br />

in the process of appeasing both warring<br />

factions, truth is undermined.<br />

In order to curb the voice of a suffering<br />

Kashmiri and to restrict news,<br />

the State of J&K has enacted a number<br />

of laws to regulate the working of<br />

press. The anti-Press <strong>Law</strong>s in the<br />

being many, some of them are<br />

referred to as under<br />

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Another threat faced<br />

by press fraternity is<br />

their abduction by<br />

unknown persons. The<br />

recent abduction of a<br />

veteran journalist<br />

Shujat Bukhari is an<br />

example<br />

(a) Rule 34 of the J&K Public<br />

Security Rules, 1946 binds the newsmen<br />

to disclose the sources of their<br />

information and prescribes three<br />

years imprisonment with fine as a<br />

punishment for not doing so. Rule 35<br />

provides five years imprisonment for<br />

contravention of order to public<br />

newspapers after pre-censorship.<br />

Rule 36 prescribes three years imprisonment<br />

for contravening an order<br />

"prohibiting performance of any<br />

drama containing any prejudicial<br />

report". Rule 65 (b) prescribes three<br />

years imprisonment for contravention<br />

of an order requiring shopkeepers<br />

to keep open the shops for conduct<br />

of essential business and not to<br />

observe hartal.<br />

Section 10 of the Press &<br />

Publication Act, 1932 empowers<br />

the government to seize printing<br />

presses used for printing newspapers<br />

containing "any words, signs<br />

or visible representation" which<br />

(a) incite commission of any cognizable<br />

offence, (b) directly or<br />

indirectly expresses, approves, or<br />

admires any such offence and (c)<br />

to bring into hatred or contempt<br />

the government established by<br />

law to excite disaffection towards<br />

the government or make malicious<br />

attacks on the government<br />

or any of its ministers or misinterprets<br />

the policies and activities of<br />

the government."<br />

Section 153 (a) of the Ranbir Penal<br />

Code prescribes seven years<br />

imprisonment for promoting<br />

hatred between different sections<br />

of the people on ground of religion,<br />

region, place of birth, etc<br />

<br />

<br />

besides doing acts prejudicial to<br />

maintenance of harmony.<br />

Sections 190 (a), 296 (a) and 505 of<br />

the code dealing with "statements<br />

conducive to cause fear or public<br />

alarm" and carrying imprisonment<br />

up to three years also take<br />

care of writings aimed at fomenting<br />

communalism.<br />

Section 8 of the Public Safety Act,<br />

1978 provides detention without<br />

trial of persons including journalists<br />

for "acting in any manner<br />

prejudicial to security of state or<br />

maintenance of public order and<br />

maintenance of services and supplies<br />

essential to the community".<br />

The security of the state embodies<br />

most of the genuine fields of a<br />

reporter.<br />

Section 25 & 25 A of the J&K<br />

Customs Act, 1958 empowers the<br />

government to detain any packet,<br />

newspaper, books if it contains<br />

any material which is punishable<br />

under section 121-130, 153 A, 295<br />

of Ranbir Penal Code".<br />

Although the purpose of these<br />

laws ought to have been to control<br />

and regulate the working of the press<br />

but often these laws are misused to<br />

gauge the press in order to stop the<br />

objective reporting of events. The<br />

state’s power to forfeit any printing<br />

press where any paper is published if<br />

that paper contains any material<br />

which incites any act of murder<br />

under or any act of violence Act 1908<br />

can be easily used against journalists.<br />

Similarly the power of a district magistrate<br />

to forfeit the press/newspaper<br />

is the easiest way to deal with the<br />

people who are reporting any kind of<br />

human rights activity, which directly<br />

or indirectly involves the state government<br />

or its functionary. The various<br />

sections of J&K Public Safety Act<br />

1978 can be used to restrict the freedom<br />

of press.<br />

The press in the state especially<br />

in the valley witnessed worse situation<br />

but they performed their duties<br />

boldly; they had to face and convince<br />

both parties without surrendering<br />

there basic norm of objectivety. There<br />

have been times when certain sections<br />

of the press were biased in<br />

favour of militants but the instances<br />

are negligible. There are cases when<br />

newspaper offices were raided, ransacked,<br />

equipments damage, and<br />

pressmen being humiliated and<br />

assaulted while performing their<br />

professional duties. In a recent incident<br />

on 29th of June 2008, security<br />

forces in Srinagar dealing with an<br />

incident of lathicharge beat up two<br />

photojournalists. Gunmen killed a<br />

prominent journalist in his office in<br />

early nineties and culprits are still at<br />

large. The killing of veteran photojournalist<br />

Mushtaq Ali in a parcel<br />

bomb blast is a mystery till date.<br />

Nobody could do any thing except<br />

naming residential colonies of pressmen<br />

after his name. Veteran valley<br />

based journalists like Yousuf Jameel,<br />

Zaffer Mehraj, NDTV cameraman<br />

Zafer Iqbal had a close shave with<br />

death. Parwaiz Sultan became the<br />

victim of bullets of unknown gunmen.<br />

Another threat faced by press fraternity<br />

is their abduction by<br />

unknown persons. The recent abduction<br />

of a veteran journalist Shujat<br />

Bukhari is an example. His abduction<br />

was followed by another abduction<br />

of a correspondent of a local daily.<br />

Those who resort to these tactics<br />

want that press should not report<br />

objectively but they should toe the<br />

line, which suits the parties, whose<br />

news they are supposed to carry.<br />

If we analyse the role of press in<br />

the state especially, the valley we will<br />

find that they have to walk on razor’s<br />

edge. Journalists were killed during<br />

periods of turmoil but no one was<br />

punished by the state for any such<br />

killing. The recent decision of the<br />

state to stop telecasting some<br />

Pakistani channels in the valley is<br />

another example of restricting freedom<br />

of expression in the state of<br />

J&K.<br />

Whether amid such stringent<br />

press laws in J&K the scribes are in a<br />

position to write boldly and objectively<br />

or not can well be imagined.<br />

Yet, the members of this press community<br />

have contributed a lot to the<br />

ongoing movement and have shown<br />

the ultimate professionalism often at<br />

the cost of their lives.<br />

— The writer is a Professor of <strong>Law</strong><br />

at University of Kashmir<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Disabled at the<br />

mercy of fate<br />

Jammu and Kashmir like other conflict zones in the world has a significant number of<br />

disabled individuals. But the state response as well as the larger civil society remains<br />

indifferent, writes Sajid Iqbal<br />

"Democracy is a government of the<br />

people, by the people, for the people."<br />

stated Abraham Lincoln.<br />

"Democracy means simply the bludgeoning<br />

of the people, by the people, for<br />

the people." observed by Oscar Wilde<br />

One the ideal, the other, the<br />

heartbreaking reality...<br />

Compounding the already<br />

abysmal human rights situation in<br />

the state of Jammu and Kashmir is<br />

the gross neglect of persons with disabilities<br />

by society in general and the<br />

state in particular. The existing<br />

approach seems to be to wish away<br />

all forms of disability from fashionable<br />

Kashmiri society. The armed<br />

conflict in the state has led to an<br />

alarming increase in the numbers of<br />

the disabled. There are 302,670 persons<br />

with disabilities, constituting<br />

about three percent of the total population<br />

of the state, as per the Census<br />

of 2001. Unofficial estimates overtake<br />

that figure, as it only takes into<br />

account persons that are registered<br />

as differently-abled. Prior to the year<br />

2001, no census was ever conducted<br />

specific to persons with disabilities,<br />

and even this was done on the directions<br />

of the Supreme Court of India.<br />

Consequently, there are no figures<br />

available that definitively state the<br />

extent of disabilities in the State<br />

before the outbreak of insurgency.<br />

It is common knowledge, however,<br />

that disability in all its forms was<br />

relatively unknown in Kashmir until<br />

the beginning of the turmoil.<br />

Kashmiris were, by and large, a<br />

healthy, able and vibrant people.<br />

Besides, it is telling that the kinds of<br />

disabilities found in Kashmir and<br />

other militancy-affected areas today<br />

are unique to conflict zones around<br />

the world, be it physical or psychological<br />

disabilities. For instance,<br />

limbs lost because of landmine<br />

explosions are typical of any conflict<br />

zone. The same is, unfortunately, an<br />

all too familiar sight on the streets of<br />

Kashmir. Similarly, cases of trauma<br />

consequent to incidents of violence<br />

are found in abundance, though, at<br />

first glance, they may not be easily<br />

discernible. Partial and total paralysis,<br />

resulting from both shrapnel<br />

wounds and bullet injuries, has<br />

reached epidemic proportions.<br />

The Disabilities Act<br />

That the state has turned a blind<br />

eye to the needs of the differentlyabled<br />

would be only partially true.<br />

Token noises have, without doubt,<br />

been made, in that a law, namely, the<br />

Jammu and Kashmir Persons with<br />

Disability in figures<br />

Total population of J&K = 10143700<br />

No of Disabled in Kashmir Region = 5476970<br />

No of Disabled in Jammu Region = 4430191<br />

Ladakh Region = 4430191<br />

Disabled Population = 302670<br />

Disabled Male = 171816<br />

Disabled Females = 130854<br />

Rural Males Disabled = 229718<br />

Urban Males Disabled = 42373<br />

Rural Disabled Females = 100275<br />

Urban disabled Females = 30579<br />

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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />

Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,<br />

Protection of Rights and Full<br />

Participation) Act, 1998 (hereinafter<br />

referred to as the Disabilities Act) has<br />

been enacted. But like so many other<br />

legislations, there exists a wide gap<br />

between its enactment and implementation.<br />

Only 57,474 persons get<br />

pension from the state government,<br />

under sundry schemes such as the<br />

Integrated Social Security Scheme<br />

(ISSS), run by the Jammu and<br />

Kashmir Social Welfare Department,<br />

and the pension scheme run by the<br />

Jammu and Kashmir Council for the<br />

Rehabilitation of Militancy Victims,<br />

both formulated under the<br />

Disabilities Act. Even that pension<br />

varies between a paltry Rs 300-500 a<br />

month.<br />

Another damning indictment of<br />

the political machinery of the state is<br />

that it neither has required educational<br />

facilities for the differentlyabled<br />

people, nor has the mainstream<br />

educational network been<br />

enabled for people with special<br />

needs. Livelihood issues of such persons<br />

have also been swept under the<br />

carpet. The Act also provides for<br />

three percent reservation in employment<br />

for the physically challenged,<br />

which is in proportion to their numbers.<br />

Notwithstanding this, according<br />

to the Census of India, 2001, more<br />

than 80 percent of the adult workforce<br />

among differently-abled persons<br />

cannot find work.<br />

Even such persons as are<br />

employed or such children as who go<br />

to school from among persons with<br />

disabilities, do so only ostensibly, or<br />

for namesake. A barrier-filled environment<br />

ensures that such persons<br />

stay at home. Even when they venture<br />

out, they do so at the cost of<br />

their dignity. The result? Persons<br />

with disabilities are forced to waste<br />

away, doing little or nothing, and<br />

putting an often unwelcome financial<br />

burden on their families. This<br />

compounds problems of psychological<br />

trauma and depression among<br />

these persons, the extent of which we<br />

can only speculate about. An entire<br />

block of the population is thus rendered<br />

useless and severely traumatised.<br />

This story of indifference does not<br />

end here. Under Section 33 of the Act,<br />

The needs of this<br />

section of population<br />

should<br />

compassionately be<br />

assessed and the<br />

necessary investments<br />

made to ensure that<br />

those who can attend<br />

the common school<br />

and health systems<br />

are enabled to get<br />

urestricted access to<br />

such facilities and<br />

persons with special<br />

needs are catered to<br />

separately<br />

the state is responsible for taking<br />

measures to make transport facilities<br />

accessible to persons with disabilities,<br />

by taking steps such as adapting<br />

rail compartments, vessels and waiting<br />

rooms in such a way as to make<br />

them accessible to such persons.<br />

This, however, is most often<br />

observed in breach. The process cannot<br />

even be said to have been set in<br />

motion. Similarly, Section 15(a), read<br />

with Section 19(b) of the Disabilities<br />

Act, provides for the removal of<br />

architectural barriers from schools,<br />

colleges and other institutions<br />

imparting vocational and professional<br />

training. Not one such institution<br />

in the State adheres to this statutory<br />

prerequisite, the result being that differently-abled<br />

children have no<br />

option but to stay away from school.<br />

This is borne out by relevant statistics:<br />

even though Section 15(a) of the<br />

Disabilities Act provides for free education<br />

for children with disabilities<br />

up to the age of 18 years, yet more<br />

than a third of the 36,714 children<br />

with disabilities in the state are out of<br />

school. This particularly distressing<br />

revelation was made in a survey conducted<br />

by the Jammu and Kashmir<br />

Department of Education in 2003-<br />

2004.<br />

Interventions<br />

Short-term measures to tackle this<br />

would include the payment of a substantial<br />

amount as ex-gratia by the<br />

government in all cases of disabilities<br />

attributable to the armed conflict,<br />

along with the continuation and<br />

enhancement of schemes such as the<br />

ISSS where pensions are no more<br />

than a pittance. This would ensure<br />

that persons with disabilities are not<br />

embarrassed with meagre pay checques<br />

of Rs 300 a month, and would<br />

go a long way in bringing them<br />

much-needed succour.<br />

However, such measures cannot<br />

substitute concerted efforts on part of<br />

the state to make them stand on their<br />

own feet, as it were. Stricter implementation<br />

of the reservation policy<br />

for persons with disabilities needs to<br />

be ensured, so that deserving persons<br />

actually get jobs earmarked for<br />

them. The creation of a mechanism at<br />

the government level to earmark jobs<br />

for the differently-abled and vigorous<br />

follow-up to ensure that the staff<br />

selection agencies actually provide<br />

the said jobs to the differently-abled<br />

would go a long way in ameliorating<br />

their lot.<br />

In the longer-term, state policy as<br />

well as non-governmental organisations<br />

have to be influenced to do<br />

more by way of improving educational,<br />

health and livelihood opportunities<br />

for the differently-abled. The<br />

needs of this section of population<br />

should compassionately be assessed<br />

and the necessary investments made<br />

to ensure that those who can attend<br />

the common school and health systems<br />

are enabled to get urestricted<br />

access to such facilities and persons<br />

with special needs are catered to separately.<br />

The state and NGOs must also<br />

explore avenues of self-employment<br />

for such people as the state cannot be<br />

expected to shoulder the entire<br />

responsibility. Only then can the differently-abled<br />

be said to be equal citizens,<br />

and, from that moment on, our<br />

society shall be truly democratic.<br />

Nearer the ideal and farther from the<br />

heart-breaking reality…<br />

<br />

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WORDS AND IMAGES<br />

Verses beat venom<br />

One of the victims of the political turmoil in Kashmir has been Kashmiri literature. While<br />

writers and writings have suffered severely, there remain quite a few sobering voices,<br />

rather verses, writes Neerja Mattoo<br />

“I am in blood stepped in so far that<br />

should I wade no more<br />

Returning were as tedious as go o’er”<br />

The hopelessness of Macbeth’s<br />

words is an apt summing up of<br />

the situation in which most<br />

Kashmiris in the valley found themselves<br />

in the recent past. Writers are<br />

supposed to be the voice of those<br />

who cannot speak for themselves<br />

and thus their work, no matter what<br />

flights of imagination prompt it, mirrors<br />

the dominant mood of the times.<br />

Our writers, however, were neither<br />

the protagonists in the ‘action’, nor<br />

were their voices of much consequence<br />

in the raging debate. What is<br />

known as the ‘ongoing struggle’, in<br />

the journalese of Kashmir, had no<br />

use for literature unless it could be<br />

used to reinforce a certain ideology.<br />

In this scenario, most valleybased<br />

writers preferred silence rather<br />

than made-to-order eloquence.<br />

Today, however, interestingly<br />

enough, the literary scene in<br />

Kashmiri presents a paradox also.<br />

There is fear of speaking, yet the<br />

desire to speak cannot be suppressed.<br />

The suffering and pain have<br />

left no one unaffected, making people<br />

much more articulate, eager to<br />

express themselves in prose and<br />

poetry, and what is more, get published.<br />

Those who sought refuge outside<br />

have also became so voluble that<br />

vast numbers of books are produced,<br />

mostly poetry.<br />

The first thing that strikes one<br />

when looking critically at the literature<br />

of the past two decades in<br />

Kashmiri, is the cleavage between the<br />

valley-based and the Jammu or elsewhere<br />

based writers, not only in their<br />

themes but even in the vocabulary<br />

and diction. For the former the dominant<br />

themes are death and destruction,<br />

suffering on a large scale, a dark<br />

cloud of uncertainty, while for the<br />

latter there are also the loss of<br />

‘Paradise’, which was home, nostalgia<br />

and anguish. A sense of helplessness<br />

broods over a landscape painted<br />

in red and black in most creative literary<br />

works these days. The circumstances<br />

in which the Kashmiris live<br />

have put their faith in humanity<br />

under severe test. One of the most<br />

powerful voices of modern Kashmir<br />

and the prestigious Gyanpith award<br />

winner Rehman Rahi also seems<br />

affected by the malaise as is evident<br />

in his 1995 poem, ‘Khodaya’.<br />

The poem adopts the interrogatory<br />

mode, as though in an atmosphere<br />

of fear all certainties are dead. It goes<br />

like this:<br />

It may not be possible to speak, what<br />

can one do?<br />

But the heart mightn’t bear the burden,<br />

what can one do?<br />

The rose cannot but bloom, can it?<br />

Carry the burning flame of love it<br />

must, what can one do?<br />

Its petals are torn to bits on the thorn,<br />

Head crowned with a turban of blood,<br />

what can one do?<br />

The tone of the poem is one of<br />

despair before a cruel destiny, which<br />

affects all humanity. What is noticeable<br />

is that the poet is not a subject,<br />

but an object, that is, things happen<br />

to him, he does not make them happen.<br />

This sense of powerlessness is a<br />

recurring theme.<br />

These lines from a Ghulam Nabi<br />

Nazir’s ghazal, is yet another example<br />

of this blood imagery.<br />

In couples we placed the stars, with<br />

drops of our blood<br />

And passed the night in phrasing a<br />

love-letter<br />

And adorned the dust with the red of<br />

poppies<br />

As mentioned earlier, thematically,<br />

however, most of them have withdrawn<br />

into a personal sorrow or narrow<br />

communal grooves. They seem<br />

to play a repetitive tune for a particular,<br />

limited audience. It is as though<br />

writers have carved out separate constituencies<br />

for themselves: the heroes<br />

of one group have become the villains<br />

for another. Sadly, the legacy of<br />

shared tradition, coupled with a freeflowing,<br />

uninhibited individual talent,<br />

is in tatters. It seems that a tight<br />

circle has been drawn around these<br />

groupings and most writers are content<br />

to operate within these, forgetting<br />

how restricting to their vision it<br />

is. The works of those who are producing<br />

what they term as ‘literature<br />

in exile’ are full of the theme of displacement<br />

and nostalgia for a lost<br />

home, idyllic in memory. There is<br />

anger, the pain of betrayal, but the<br />

love for the sights and sounds of the<br />

beloved land and its people as they<br />

are in their memory, a longing for a<br />

whole way of life, shines through the<br />

pain.<br />

Says Moti Lal Saqi in his poem,<br />

‘Myon Shahar’ (My Town):<br />

I remember that sweet old town!<br />

The simple and straight, hand-kissing<br />

town,<br />

I could die for it.<br />

The sons of darkness lit a pyre on its<br />

brow<br />

And swept its streets with blood,<br />

And now it twists the neck that once<br />

held the head so high…<br />

Would anyone dare leave a window<br />

open?…<br />

I would go home to my village<br />

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This city has stolen my rest…<br />

My head on a stone in the willowgrove,<br />

I’d sleep and sleep till end of day.<br />

The shade of chinar in these mine eyes<br />

I’d drain the spring and cool myself.<br />

A debilitating feature of present<br />

day Kashmiri poetry is that it is too<br />

burdened with the present. We find a<br />

tendency to almost luxuriate in grief,<br />

a cultivation of emotions of self-pity,<br />

leading to self-absorption, which<br />

saps the vigour of an artistic creation.<br />

Victim hood seems to be the theme of<br />

choice. The ideal of the Keatsian<br />

“Negative capability” through which<br />

the artist’s own self does not constantly<br />

intrude upon the scene is<br />

hardly in evidence. There is no separation<br />

between the one who suffers<br />

and the one who creates something<br />

out of that suffering. Apart from this<br />

tendency to de-universalise the text,<br />

it also leads to a growing cleavage<br />

between the concerns of the poets<br />

based in the valley and those who<br />

have left it. In their diction and<br />

choice of symbol and myth too, a<br />

turning away from each other has<br />

crept in. But there are a few who<br />

refuse to fall in this trap.<br />

Apart from the vaakhs of Bimla<br />

Raina, which, being mystical in content<br />

are far above sectarian concerns<br />

and addressed all humanity, the two<br />

poems quoted below from translation,<br />

are exceptional because though<br />

dealing with the here and now, they<br />

succeed admirably in rising above a<br />

limited constituency. One is the celebrated<br />

painter-poet Ghulam Rasool<br />

Santosh’s ‘Baala Aadan Myon Tohi<br />

Ma Dyunthvon’ (Did You Happen To<br />

See My Lost Childhood?) and the<br />

other is Naseem Shafai’s ‘ Ba, Na<br />

Thsai Na Aks’ (I -- Neither Shadow<br />

Nor Reflection). Santosh consciously<br />

weaves in the Islamic, Saivite and<br />

Sufi symbols and myths into the fabric<br />

of his poem to fashion a garment<br />

of Kashmir’s composite culture. It<br />

reverberates with resonances of a<br />

common heritage, the joy and richness<br />

of the past and the desolation of<br />

the present scene. Thus it beckons<br />

one to a shared human, universal<br />

concern:<br />

The Nagin and Parbat, my history manifest!<br />

Satisar and Nilnag, Eternal Truth!<br />

At Kashyap’s call was revealed the<br />

land.<br />

Even now the Veth flows naked, chanting<br />

his name.<br />

How often she hid underground, at<br />

sight of sin!<br />

Today our heads are buried, weighted<br />

by her curse.<br />

Fortified with faith, how Budshah<br />

sailed the lamps in her stream,<br />

And celebrated her birthday with vermilion<br />

dots.<br />

The world could see its face in it, so<br />

pure and limpid the mirror of my<br />

land!<br />

But what do I see now with eyes motheaten?<br />

Do I pluck out the stars and ask the<br />

It also leads to a<br />

growing cleavage<br />

between the concerns<br />

of the poets based in<br />

the valley and those<br />

who have left it. In<br />

their diction and<br />

choice of symbol and<br />

myth too, a turning<br />

away from each other<br />

has crept in<br />

question—<br />

Did you by chance see my lost childhood?<br />

With our tongue purified the Kalma we<br />

read—a fountain of knowledge!<br />

The many who came, their truths we<br />

fashioned in our way,<br />

Embraced the raging fire of faith,<br />

And drank their wisdom in one deep<br />

draught.<br />

Did you by chance see my lost childhood?<br />

In Naseem Shafai’s poems, we<br />

hear a woman’s voice, strong and<br />

bold, speaking for all womanhood<br />

and transcending, in its sweep, all<br />

sectarian boundaries. Hers is a feminist<br />

discourse, but neither shrill, nor<br />

strident. Her references are to<br />

women whose life and works make<br />

up the stuff of our collective consciousness<br />

and whose words ring in<br />

our collective memory. They suggest<br />

that gender sensitisation would<br />

enrich the whole of humanity.<br />

The first is titled, “The Wail”:<br />

Once upon a time there was a Queen.<br />

At the end of every day, she would wait,<br />

With the doors thrown open,<br />

For her little princes to come home.<br />

Little hesitant, a bit afraid,<br />

She’d ask her neighbours, women like<br />

her,<br />

“Are your children also out, still?<br />

My own have quite forgotten their<br />

home!<br />

God alone knows where they have<br />

strayed,<br />

The grains of rice grow cold in the<br />

plate!”<br />

(B)<br />

She is the one whom one day someone<br />

told something.<br />

And her doors and windows were suddenly<br />

shut.<br />

But in the dead of night, the ocean broke<br />

its bounds,<br />

And the neighbours heard a long,<br />

unending wail—<br />

“Do not die on me, you are so young!<br />

Do not die, your nails but barely<br />

henna-tipped!”<br />

The image of the ocean has traditionally<br />

been used in Kashmiri literature<br />

as a symbol for the material<br />

world, from which the mystics,<br />

whether Islamic or Saivite, have<br />

sought to be ferried away. But here<br />

the poet uses it as a symbol of the<br />

boundless world of suppression,<br />

repressed feelings and constricting<br />

restrains of propriety that women<br />

have always had to live with. Sooner<br />

or later the bounds must give way<br />

and a bereft mother’s wail heard.<br />

This is one way a woman writer,<br />

apart from articulating the grief of<br />

Kashmiri women who have lost their<br />

promising sons to the insurgency, is<br />

also recording a protest against the<br />

long silence imposed on women. The<br />

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WORDS AND IMAGES<br />

image of the ‘henna-tipped nails’ is,<br />

however, a common motif in<br />

Kashmiri romantic poetry. Here<br />

Naseem is, consciously building<br />

upon a tradition to make a modern<br />

statement. The familiarity of the<br />

image, normally associated with celebrations,<br />

makes the situation even<br />

more poignant.<br />

The second poem is titled “I --<br />

Neither Shadow Nor Reflection”:<br />

Like always you came and stood at the<br />

door, saying nothing.<br />

Had I a fistful of words, I would deck<br />

your lips with them,<br />

And hear those flaming words that<br />

you always desire.<br />

Your face alone I could not read, but<br />

the heat of your glance I felt.<br />

Felt it in my blood that you’d come<br />

today, come for me alone<br />

In my mind I knew that now when<br />

you come<br />

It would be to listen to my breaths<br />

alone<br />

You would enter my ravaged breast<br />

like the breath of spring<br />

But you are still there, rooted to the<br />

spot<br />

And the thread of my words is<br />

snapped.<br />

You have no idea of the shapes you cast<br />

me in!<br />

I came like Lal and weeping I rose at<br />

the waning of the night<br />

And woke you up, O mad one, and<br />

you learnt to speak.<br />

I was Habba Khotun and called you<br />

my sky<br />

Called myself the earth and you a<br />

cover over all my secrets!<br />

Became your garden and asked you to<br />

come and taste its wealth.<br />

What rival of mine seduced you and<br />

drew you away from me?<br />

Tarry a while and remember---it was<br />

me that held you in my lap and<br />

sang:<br />

‘I would deck you up under the cherry<br />

trees!’<br />

I kept all the fasts, praying you’d stay<br />

a while<br />

Through the night read all the Koranic<br />

verses for love of you!<br />

Should you come as Krishna, assuming<br />

numerous guises,<br />

I will still be Meera, with you at each<br />

step you take.<br />

Should you pay heed to slander and<br />

ask me to prove myself,<br />

I will stand in the flames and still keep<br />

chanting,’Ram, Ram’!<br />

God commanded me, ‘Go, inhale the<br />

fragrance from that bottle,<br />

To you a Messiah will be born, though<br />

without the ceremonies of henna and<br />

the<br />

nuptial.<br />

As mother of Jesus, as Mary ,how my<br />

value rose!<br />

But the abrasions of calumny trailed<br />

my steps from day one<br />

Did you ever seek my consent? Ah, the<br />

faces you gave me<br />

Was any one of them actually mine?<br />

The subject is that of<br />

the displacement and<br />

consequent endless<br />

pain and suffering of a<br />

Kashmiri pandit family<br />

forced to live in a<br />

refugee camp in the<br />

hot plains of Jammu—<br />

an alien climate, but<br />

the story is given a<br />

universal dimension<br />

When I wept and shed tears, you<br />

said,’You have no forbearance’<br />

When I tried to speak, you stifled me<br />

with a kiss!<br />

No, I am not like you, nor the image of<br />

me in your dreams<br />

You are you—and I have my own<br />

being,<br />

Should you want to race, in me you’ll<br />

find a competitor<br />

I am a separate being ant that is what<br />

you have to know.<br />

Alone as Adam, forgotten you’d be<br />

As each angel bowed to you, exhausted<br />

he’d be<br />

Who would know of you if I hadn’t<br />

tempted you<br />

That apple tree in Eden—it was I who<br />

showed it and you saw.<br />

Come, go down in me and plumb my<br />

depth for a while<br />

And know that I am something beyond<br />

beauty of form and face.<br />

Come on, descend like Krishna from<br />

the skies and worship me<br />

Come on, as Rama come and let me<br />

put you through a trial by fire<br />

Lal saw me in Shiva’s embrace and<br />

told you of it—<br />

It was me, me alone but still you did<br />

not know!<br />

Should you again abandon a Habba in<br />

midway somewhere,<br />

What if she too turned away from you<br />

in disgust, would you put her to<br />

death?<br />

If knowledge dawns on you even<br />

today, then come,<br />

If you find your way. I’ll know you’ve<br />

really come<br />

Today for me alone, to stand by me,<br />

with me, a real Adam!<br />

Then I’ll know that now you know—I<br />

am me, neither shade nor reflection.<br />

The appeal of this poem is universal.<br />

Apart from the powerful<br />

theme, the variety of allusions<br />

throughout weaves a rich tapestry.<br />

This is the voice of a subject, not an<br />

object, so far only found in our mystical/spiritual<br />

poetic tradition. In secular<br />

literature it is an original note,<br />

hence most welcome.<br />

In the field of fiction we once<br />

again come across the tendency to<br />

brood over the present, which leaves<br />

most with only a limited time/space<br />

interest. But in some outstanding<br />

short stories like Rattan Lal Shant’s,<br />

Thsen (Disconnection) this limitation<br />

has been overcome. The subject is<br />

that of the displacement and consequent<br />

endless pain and suffering of a<br />

Kashmiri pandit family forced to live<br />

in a refugee camp in the hot plains of<br />

Jammu— an alien climate, but the<br />

story is given a universal dimension.<br />

The characterisation and concerns<br />

show a fine understanding of human<br />

nature. It could thus be the tragedy<br />

of anyone, anywhere, any time.<br />

Instead of indulging in self-pity, the<br />

author achieves a rare objectivity.<br />

— The writer is former principal<br />

and head of Women’s College, Srinagar<br />

100<br />

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WORDS AND IMAGES<br />

The forgotten voices<br />

The Kashmir conflict might have brought further fetters on an already constricted world<br />

for the Valley’s women. Yet, some of them not only put up a valiant fight to come through<br />

trying moments, they also have a story to tell, which is so different from those normally<br />

heard from men. Amrit Dhatt reviews Speaking Peace, a collection of narratives of women<br />

in Kashmir<br />

South Asia has played host to a<br />

great deal of violent conflict<br />

predicated on ethno-nationalist<br />

lines. While it has been written about<br />

extensively, women’s voices and<br />

experiences have never been at the<br />

forefront. Kashmir, the most well<br />

known conflict zone, is one of the<br />

longest running conflicts in the<br />

world and has an appallingly large<br />

record of human rights abuses.<br />

Women in the Valley have experienced<br />

war in ways that are distinct<br />

from men’s experiences. The adversity<br />

of women’s experiences needs to<br />

be recognised and understood in a<br />

comprehensive manner. The incidences<br />

of women headed households,<br />

rape and forced veiling highlight<br />

the ways in which women are<br />

structurally disadvantaged and face<br />

an oppression that is two-fold. Not<br />

only are they innocent civilians<br />

caught in the crossfire, they are also<br />

fighting for equality within a context<br />

that does not allow them that freedom.<br />

The oppression of women in<br />

Kashmir is not specific to one religious<br />

group, as war is accompanied<br />

by a culture of misogyny that is experienced<br />

by all groups.<br />

In Speaking Peace: Women’s<br />

Voices from Kashmir, Urvashi<br />

Butalia has compiled women’s<br />

diverse experiences from Kashmir<br />

and, as a result, has contributed significantly<br />

to the dialogue on<br />

Kashmir. Diverse narratives, authors,<br />

stories, perspectives and styles are<br />

used in this collection in an attempt<br />

to unveil the complexities of<br />

women’s experiences. The book is<br />

also a platform for the projection of<br />

women’s voices on the conflict; this is<br />

significant because the public dialogue<br />

on the conflict leaves very little<br />

space for women’s perspectives.<br />

Through this book, Butalia has transformed<br />

the conflict in Kashmir from<br />

a political problem to a human problem.<br />

The book gives the issue human<br />

Book : Speaking Peace:<br />

Women’s Voices<br />

Editor: Butalia, Urvashi)<br />

Publisher: Kali for Women<br />

New Delhi<br />

Price: Rs 300 (paperback)<br />

Page: 618<br />

ISBN: 81-86706-43-7.<br />

faces, emotions, and perceptions.<br />

Speaking Peace allows us to hear what<br />

alternative interpretations of war and<br />

peace sound like.<br />

Butalia, in her introduction, is<br />

clear about the aim of this book: “it<br />

aims to mark a moment in the history<br />

of the conflict, a moment when the<br />

presence of women, whether as victims,<br />

agents, or perpetrators can no<br />

longer be ignored, a moment which<br />

makes it clear that any initiative for<br />

peace and resolution of the conflict<br />

must take women into account and<br />

involve them centrally.” She spells<br />

out the ways in which the conflict has<br />

created a situation of tremendous<br />

trepidation and uncertainty in<br />

women’s lives. She also raises a very<br />

important question that is seldom<br />

heard: “Does the ‘return’ of peace<br />

then mean going back to the conditions<br />

that existed - the status quo -<br />

before conflict broke out, no matter<br />

how terrible those conditions might<br />

be?”<br />

Butalia’s question is significant<br />

and opens up space for more critique<br />

of this unchallenged idea of azadi,<br />

which is presumed to bring peace.<br />

For instance, what does ‘peace’ mean<br />

for women whose levels of violence<br />

have escalated in the home? Does<br />

freedom from violence extend to the<br />

private domain as well as the public?<br />

These are questions that Butalia does<br />

not claim to have answers to but she<br />

asks them in order to show that the<br />

negative repercussions of conflict are<br />

not confined to the public sphere.<br />

Moreover, if women are expected to<br />

fight for azadi or a new status quo,<br />

then these questions are imperative<br />

because it will be a futile fight if<br />

peace does not extend to all spheres<br />

of society. Issues that are presented in<br />

the book have been taken in order to<br />

extract themes and patterns, to produce<br />

a critical analysis on gender and<br />

conflict in Kashmir.<br />

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Violent past<br />

The first chapter is an excerpt<br />

from a book entitled, This Happened<br />

in Kashmir. In this narrative, Krishna<br />

Mehta recounts her struggles after<br />

1947, when she lost her husband and<br />

began fending for herself and her<br />

young family. The book was first<br />

published in 1954 and is a valuable<br />

document of the trials and tribulations<br />

that so many women had to<br />

endure around the time of partition.<br />

Mehta’s experiences are unique to<br />

her; being in a position of power and<br />

affluence before 1947 allowed her to<br />

bring her family to safety in Srinagar.<br />

Conversely, there are certain aspects<br />

of Mehta’s story that hold true for<br />

women all over South Asia during<br />

her time. Many Muslim and Sikh<br />

families tried to help the Mehtas<br />

when they were fleeing from persecution,<br />

however, when their own<br />

lives were put in danger, Mehta and<br />

her children were turned away.<br />

Many families recount tales of kindness<br />

from neighbors from religions<br />

that were being pitted against each<br />

other. There are numerous stories of<br />

Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus showing<br />

acts of kindness and compassion<br />

towards one another while outside<br />

their homes, marauders were massacring<br />

people of rival faith. Tales of<br />

bloodshed are commonplace when<br />

trying to make sense of what happened<br />

in 1947, and they are often<br />

used to teach society the lessons of a<br />

shameful history. The instances of<br />

compassion, however, can also be<br />

valuable history lessons for they<br />

demonstrate tolerance.<br />

Another theme that can be<br />

extracted from Mehta’s narrative is<br />

the idea that a woman’s honour is<br />

worth more than her life. Mehta<br />

describes how she reacts to reports of<br />

the raiders coming after her family:<br />

“I woke up Shiva Dayal and told<br />

him,’ if the raiders come, before anything<br />

happens to them, slay the girls<br />

one after the other with that sword<br />

hanging from the wall.’ The girls did<br />

not seem to be horrified at the<br />

prospect of being slain. The thought<br />

of the raiders worried them more.”<br />

Mehta’s experience of choosing death<br />

for both herself and her daughters<br />

102<br />

over sexual violation by warring religious<br />

groups is not unique. Many<br />

women were killed by their families<br />

when they were faced with the threat<br />

of rape. Mehta’s experience reinforces<br />

the fact that women’s bodies<br />

became targets of violence used to<br />

defeat “enemies”. Rape can be used<br />

as a weapon of war because the rape<br />

of a woman signfies humiliation of<br />

her entire community. A woman’s<br />

sexual purity is seen as a source of<br />

honour for the community, and violation<br />

of that so called purity occurs<br />

at the individual and collective levels<br />

when a woman is raped. This is institutionalised<br />

violence and what is so<br />

disturbing about these events is that<br />

they were justified because a<br />

woman’s honour, a community’s<br />

honour, and sexual purity are all<br />

inextricably linked. The mass rapes<br />

that occurred during partition cannot<br />

be separated from the socio-cultural<br />

factors that enabled them to occur in<br />

the first place. Mehta’s story produced<br />

haunting images and reflections<br />

on what was a gross negligence<br />

of human life.<br />

Shakti Bhan Khanna recalls her<br />

experiences of being forced to flee<br />

Srinagar in 1989 in “Leaving Home.”<br />

The images and voices she depicts<br />

are disturbingly similar to Mehta’s<br />

narrative from 1947. Khanna begins<br />

her narrative with, “We left Kashmir<br />

in 1989. It was a Saturday. An ordinary<br />

day.” Khanna also speaks about<br />

pleading with neighbors to hide her<br />

from impending attacks on her and<br />

her family: “They were Muslims, and<br />

they were very kind. They gave us<br />

shelter but they advised me to leave<br />

Srinagar immediately.” Mehta faced<br />

the same situation in 1947 and this<br />

demonstrates that the lessons of partition<br />

were never fully realised.<br />

Intolerance and religious communalism<br />

never completely subsided and<br />

they have violently resurfaced, following<br />

the same alarming patterns.<br />

Khanna also demonstrates that<br />

women’s honour is still highly<br />

Mehta’s experiences are unique to her; being in a<br />

position of power and affluence before 1947<br />

allowed her to bring her family to safety in<br />

Srinagar. Conversely, there are certain aspects of<br />

Mehta’s story that hold true for women all over<br />

South Asia during her time<br />

revered and women are expected to<br />

guard it, even if that involves suffering.<br />

Another chapter within the book<br />

that produces a poignant account of<br />

women’s experiences in Kashmir is<br />

“Women’s Testimonies from<br />

Kashmir.” This chapter is an extract<br />

taken from the Women’s Initiative’s<br />

report in 1994, an investigation conducted<br />

by a four-member, all women<br />

team. This report raises questions<br />

about the future of raped women,<br />

widows, and half widows and where<br />

they fit into the azadi movement. The<br />

plights of these women have not<br />

gained the support and sympathy of<br />

the leaders. Rather, the leadership<br />

feels that these problems will be<br />

automatically solved when azadi<br />

comes. The lack of support structures<br />

and even understanding on the part<br />

of the leaders forebodes that the<br />

future of these women looks bleak<br />

and it is unreasonable to think that<br />

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WORDS AND IMAGES<br />

these issues will conveniently disappear<br />

when the nation is free. This<br />

ideology is reminiscent of nationalist<br />

rhetoric in the Quit India Movement.<br />

There was always the promise that<br />

women would be emancipated along<br />

with the nation and that promise was<br />

never fulfilled. Is the movement in<br />

Kashmir more egalitarian than separatist<br />

movements in the past? This is<br />

something that will be revealed once<br />

Kashmiris are given their long overdue<br />

right to self-determination.<br />

Dichotomies of war<br />

This piece also adds another<br />

dimension to the dialogue on women<br />

in Kashmir because it deconstructs<br />

the dichotomy of woman as the victim<br />

and man as the perpetrator. One<br />

reason why there is hostility towards<br />

women’s movements is because of<br />

the misconception that men are the<br />

enemy, pitted against women. In<br />

reality, women and men need to<br />

come together in order to fight<br />

repression because women are also<br />

perpetrators of violence. This piece<br />

does an excellent job of stressing this<br />

point by talking about the ideologies<br />

of a particular women’s group in<br />

Kashmir: “The Dukhtaran-E-Milat<br />

has lost ground today mainly<br />

because it attempted to impose the<br />

burqa on Kashmiri women. Their<br />

aggressive campaign to put college<br />

girls in burqas, completely covering<br />

the body and face, went to the extent<br />

of throwing coloured powder on<br />

girls who refused.” Violent conflict<br />

opens up space for negotiating traditional<br />

gender roles and identities.<br />

This means that where men are traditionally<br />

seen as violent and women<br />

as peacekeepers, wartime allows for<br />

a negotiation of such roles. For<br />

instance, there have been instances<br />

where women’s groups in Kashmir<br />

have been willing to pick up arms if<br />

they felt the need. It goes to show<br />

how violence permeates through all<br />

of society and it is not confined to the<br />

male sphere. There are instances<br />

where women as perpetrators of violence<br />

need to be analysed further and<br />

taken into account when there are<br />

discussions about the victimisation<br />

of women in Kashmir. Speaking Peace<br />

does a good job in bringing this issue<br />

to the fore.<br />

In, “A View from Kashmir,”<br />

Hameeda Bano discusses the intricacies<br />

of growing up as a woman<br />

amidst violent conflict. Bano states,<br />

“Fighting for my human rights as a<br />

woman took precedence over the<br />

political struggle, since it directly<br />

Fighting for my human<br />

rights as a woman<br />

took precedence over<br />

the political struggle,<br />

since it directly<br />

concerned my own life,<br />

which was<br />

considerably restricted<br />

by my parent’s<br />

decision to marry me<br />

off at an early age<br />

concerned my own life, which was<br />

considerably restricted by my parent’s<br />

decision to marry me off at an<br />

early age. This was a lonely agonising<br />

struggle that left me wounded,<br />

even though I succeeded, at long last,<br />

in changing the fixed attitudes and<br />

perceptions about women that many<br />

people close to me had, I established<br />

my right to choose.” What is fascinating<br />

about Bano’s revelation is that<br />

she fearlessly expresses the controversial<br />

struggle that so many women<br />

in the valley face. There are women’s<br />

groups in the valley, such as<br />

Dukhtaran-E-Milat, that feel that the<br />

struggle for the nation should take<br />

precedence over any other struggle.<br />

This is a dilemma for the Kashmiri<br />

women, and while it is very personal,<br />

its repercussions extend beyond the<br />

lives of individual people. It is unrealistic<br />

to expect the women’s movement<br />

in Kashmir to have constructed<br />

an all-encompassing plan of action<br />

but it is still important to ask questions<br />

and contemplate alternatives.<br />

Defining the Problem<br />

Anybody who wants to have a<br />

comprehensive understanding of<br />

Kashmir should read this book.<br />

Whereas most literature on Kashmir<br />

attempts to present solutions, Butalia<br />

begins by defining the problem by<br />

presenting a range of women’s experiences<br />

(through interviews, personal<br />

reflection pieces, extracts from official<br />

reports and newspaper articles).<br />

A comprehensive definition of the<br />

problem includes women’s voices--<br />

not just women as victims, but<br />

women as full members of Kashmiri<br />

society, as agents of peace-building,<br />

as perpetrators of violence. While<br />

each and every chapter is valuable,<br />

the few discussed here really get to<br />

the crux of the issue while simultaneously<br />

sparking long overdue critical<br />

debates.<br />

A writer and researcher Cynthia<br />

Enloe comments, “As one learns to<br />

look through feminist eyes, one<br />

learns to ask whether anything that<br />

passes for inevitable, inherent, traditional,<br />

or biological has in fact been<br />

made. 1 ” It is imperative that we question<br />

patriarchal constructions of gender<br />

in order to reveal how their<br />

oppressive nature plays out. Ethnonationalist<br />

conflict zones are especially<br />

precarious, as the demand for<br />

women’s rights often gets silenced in<br />

the face of the nationalist movement.<br />

In every nationalist project in the<br />

world, women have been an integral<br />

component; however, no nationalist<br />

project in the world has treated men<br />

and women as equal members of the<br />

collective. When ethnic relations are<br />

combined with the day-to-day realities<br />

of conflict zones, women’s experiences<br />

can reveal much about a phenomenon<br />

that is not widely understood.<br />

Endnote<br />

1 Enloe, Cynthia. 1990. Bananas, Beaches and<br />

Bases: Making Feminist Sense out of<br />

International Politics. Berkley: University of<br />

California Press.<br />

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WORDS AND IMAGES<br />

To know is to be<br />

Right to Information Act deserves right selucidation to benefit public at large. A<br />

handbook for its use is a welcome addition, writes Suresh Nautiyal in his review<br />

The observation of <strong>Law</strong>rence<br />

Petters that nobody has a more<br />

sacred obligation to obey the law<br />

than those who make the law is enormously<br />

complimentary to the<br />

Abraham Lincoln’s definition that a<br />

democracy is government of the people,<br />

for the people and by the people. To<br />

ensure that such dictums work free<br />

flow of information to the citizens is<br />

necessary. This paves the way for<br />

proper functioning of institutions<br />

and to keep public discourse and<br />

democratic framework on a right<br />

track. The Article-19 (1) (a) of the<br />

Indian Constitution provides for the<br />

freedom of expression because the<br />

government functions must be transparent<br />

and that State should be prevented<br />

from deceiving people. The<br />

Right to Information Act, 2005 – an<br />

unprecedented and special legislation<br />

– by imposing the obligations on<br />

every public authority to provide<br />

information to the person seeking it<br />

is actually graduation of what<br />

Lincoln or Petters observed in the<br />

first place and above all what Article-<br />

19 of the Constitution commits.<br />

The RTI, 2005 embodies statutory<br />

provisions for the implementation of<br />

the informative aspects of democratic<br />

form of governance. In other<br />

words, the right to freedom of speech<br />

and expression that the citizens have<br />

under the Article-19 of the<br />

Constitution, gives automatic right to<br />

information to the citizens. It also<br />

empowers citizens to know how the<br />

government and its organs are functioning<br />

– thus enabling them to seek<br />

any information from the government,<br />

inspect any government documents<br />

and works, records; take<br />

notes, extracts or certified copies of<br />

the documents or records; take certified<br />

samples of material; and obtain<br />

information in form of printouts,<br />

diskettes, floppies, tapes, video films,<br />

cassettes or in any other electronic<br />

mode or through printouts. Some<br />

laws on right to information even<br />

empower citizens to officially inspect<br />

any government work or to take<br />

sample of material used in any work.<br />

Of course, there are certain restrictions<br />

like the State under clause (2) of<br />

Article-19 is entitled to impose reasonable<br />

restrictions inter alia in the<br />

interest of the State. And the very<br />

enactment of the RTI is to provide for<br />

setting out the practical regime of<br />

right to information for citizens to<br />

secure access to information under<br />

the control of public authorities, in<br />

order to promote transparency and<br />

accountability in the working of<br />

Book : Handbook on the<br />

Right to Information<br />

Author: PK Das<br />

Publisher: Universal <strong>Law</strong><br />

Publishing Company,<br />

Delhi<br />

New Delhi<br />

Price: Rs 395 (paperback)<br />

Page: 618<br />

every public authority, the constitution<br />

of a central information commission<br />

and state information commissions.<br />

Universal Publishing Company’s<br />

Handbook on the Right to Information<br />

Act, second edition-2008, has it all.<br />

PK Das – a reputed author of legal<br />

books, who has written books on<br />

subjects ranging from murder trials<br />

to domestic violence and food security<br />

– has compiled and penned this<br />

book, quite authoritatively.<br />

Handbook on the Right to<br />

Information Act is divided into thirteen<br />

parts such as introduction; the<br />

RTI Act, 2005; other related laws;<br />

allied acts and rules; international<br />

conventions and declaration; reports<br />

and guidelines; Supreme Court on<br />

RTI; high courts on RTI; central information<br />

commission decisions; state<br />

laws on the right to information; fee<br />

structure of states; important notifications<br />

and allied information and<br />

specimen forms.<br />

The book also contains the right<br />

to information act, 2005; the RTI (regulation<br />

of fee and cost) rules, 2005;<br />

the central information commission<br />

(appeal procedure) rules, 2005; the<br />

Lok Sabha secretariat RTI (regulation<br />

of fee and cost) rules, 2005; the Rajya<br />

Sabha secretariat RTI (regulation of<br />

fee and cost) rules, 2005; the central<br />

information commission (management)<br />

regulations, 2007; the official<br />

secrets act, 1923; the public records<br />

act, 1993, the public records rules,<br />

1997; the freedom of information act,<br />

2002; relevant provisions of allied<br />

acts and rules; relevant provisions of<br />

reports and guidelines; Supreme<br />

Court judgments on RTI; high court<br />

judgments on RTI; central information<br />

commission decisions, state laws<br />

on RTI; fee structure of states; and,<br />

important notifications and allied<br />

information.<br />

The handbook would be able to<br />

create awareness about the right to<br />

information and can be useful as a<br />

friendly guide for the Bench, Bar,<br />

NGOs, students, journalists,<br />

activists, and anybody interested in<br />

the subject. The Universal <strong>Law</strong><br />

Publishing Company too deserve<br />

credit for bringing out such a work.<br />

<br />

104 COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008

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