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COMBAT LAW<br />
jULY-aUGUST, 2008<br />
Editor<br />
Colin Gonsalves<br />
VOLUME 7, ISSUE 4<br />
Managing Editor<br />
Harsh Dobhal<br />
Senior Associate Editors<br />
Suresh Nautiyal<br />
Abid Shah<br />
Associate Editor<br />
Sujata Krishnamurthi<br />
Correspondents<br />
Mallika Iyer (Mumbai)<br />
Sheela Ramanathan (Bangalore)<br />
Geetha D (Chennai)<br />
Special Contribution<br />
Faisal Qadri<br />
Aaliya Anjum<br />
Amrit Dhatt<br />
Photos<br />
Harsh Dobhal<br />
Bilal Bahadur<br />
Layout<br />
Birendra K Gupta<br />
Deputy Manager (Circulation)<br />
Hitendra Chauhan<br />
09899630748<br />
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the above-mentioned address. The<br />
opinions expressed in the articles<br />
are those of the authors.<br />
Vale where justice fails<br />
Earlier this year, hundreds of unidentified graves were discovered in<br />
Kashmir, believed to be containing victims of unlawful killings in a<br />
region which has witnessed gross human rights abuses at a colossal scale.<br />
Forget the government, even the Indian media and civil society did not get<br />
anguished, agitated and provoked at this discovery. This single incident is<br />
an important pointer towards the kind of attention our country pays to<br />
Kashmir. And here lies the irony. Kashmir is an overwritten but also a written<br />
off issue.. Little understood, Kashmir is always in news but Kashmiris<br />
get scant regard. Indeed, the world community looks at troubles in<br />
Kashmir primarily linked to either India or Pakistan, or part of an Islamic<br />
Jihad and global war on terror. Thus, the Kashmiri identity, the glorious<br />
history of thousands of years as also the real issue are completely ignored.<br />
Nearly two decades have elapsed since the Valley has been stalked by<br />
fear and violence and the unending imbroglio has not only ruined the<br />
economy but also turned the 'paradise on earth' into a dreaded zone where<br />
widows and orphans abound. Over 60,000 dead, thousands gone missing<br />
and hundreds brutally tortured. A staggering 50,000 or more have been<br />
orphaned. Thousands of women have been thrust with widowhood, many<br />
do not know the fate of their husbands or young sons who were whisked<br />
away by armed military or militiamen. Women whose husbands could not<br />
be traced have come to be described as ‘half-widows’. Neither they can<br />
marry again, nor can they claim any share in their husbands’ property, simply<br />
because those who whisked such hapless Kashmiris away never disclosed<br />
their fate. A whole generation calls itself children of conflict, those<br />
who have grown under the shadow of guns; conflict has shaped their personality<br />
and conflict decides their identity. There has been a huge trust<br />
deficit between rulers and the ruled in Kashmir.<br />
And, thus a heavy blow has been suffered by rule of law. The law has<br />
actually been getting a short shrift. Far from inspiring those for whom it is<br />
meant, it drives dread and chill in their hearts. On the one hand this itself<br />
has been preparing ground for potential rebels ready to take guns and further<br />
fuel strife, turning it into a vicious cycle called insurgency and counter<br />
insurgency.<br />
Kashmir may signify different things to different people but this journal<br />
has taken it up as a human rights issue where, as put by former chairperson<br />
of Bar Council of India, Dhairyasheel Patil, during a recent visit to<br />
Srinagar, an entire world (of Kashmiris) has crumbled. And so he exhorted<br />
a group of university students to build a new world. A brave new world to<br />
be built by a new generation has to begin with digging one’s feet for his or<br />
her rights. All those who wield gun have to be made accountable before<br />
law before any kind of change can be visualised vis-a-vis Kashmir.<br />
Kashmir is not the only dark spot belying high standards set by the<br />
founding fathers of the idea called India. There are Manipur, Nagaland,<br />
Assam, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and now even Uttarakhand. Nandigram<br />
and Singur in West Bengal, Kalinganagar in Orissa, Santoshpur in<br />
Chhattisgarh, and Khammam in Andhra Pradesh: the political colour of<br />
the governments in these states might be different, but across the political<br />
spectrum the State has come down heavily on people who differed with it<br />
on one count or the other. And mass uprisings become inevitable if the<br />
State does not address the real issues. Forty-year-long crackdown against<br />
Naxals, for example, could not stop them from spreading their influence to<br />
rural hiterland of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and<br />
Orissa which are characterised by high poverty and high proportion of<br />
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes population. Following pages carry<br />
excerpts from a government report brought out recently which strongly<br />
recommends redress of economic and social issues in these regions besides<br />
unconditional talks with Naxals.<br />
Harsh Dobhal
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C O N T E N T S<br />
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 5<br />
GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT<br />
Development challenges in<br />
Naxal-affected areas 6<br />
Forty years of crackdown<br />
against Naxals could not stop<br />
them from spreading their<br />
influence to rural pockets<br />
afflicted by extreme poverty<br />
and blatant discrimination against poor, says<br />
an expert body appointed by government in<br />
its report to the planning commission, writes<br />
Santosh Mehrotra<br />
GENERAL<br />
Deprivation turns people to Naxalism,<br />
says Government report 12<br />
Factors that lead to Naxal uprisings in certain rural pockets<br />
of the country came under Government study, courtesy<br />
Planning Commission. A committee formed by it had former<br />
police and intelligence chiefs<br />
besides bureaucrats and activists.<br />
Together they aver that abysmal<br />
poverty, near destitution, blatant<br />
caste discrimination, misplaced<br />
policing and absence of a redressal<br />
mechanism propel Naxalism.<br />
Exclusive excerpts:<br />
MURDER OF DEMOCRACY<br />
LAND GRAB<br />
Public outrage at activist’s murder 23<br />
Seeking transparent implementation of<br />
Employment Guarantee Act costs Lalit<br />
Mehta his life. His death creates fierce<br />
outrage in Jharkhand. Parvinder Singh<br />
reports from Ranchi<br />
Operation Grab-Back:<br />
Heeding Medha’s Cry 26<br />
In the wake of UP government’s decision to take over<br />
huge chunk of agricultural land in Kushinagar in the<br />
name of developing a Buddhist pilgrimage centre, the<br />
national alliance of people’s movements held a farmers’ meeting in the little<br />
town where Medha Patkar called for land grab whether for manufacturing<br />
or exports or on any other pretext as recolonisation, writes<br />
Elisabeth Abeson from Kushinagar<br />
DISABILITY RIGHTS<br />
UN opens new chapter in<br />
the lives of disabled 25<br />
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons<br />
with Disabilities has come into force from<br />
May 3 with 20 countries ratifying it. India<br />
is also a signatory. This can signal fresh<br />
hope for the disabled. A report by<br />
<strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong> team<br />
LAW AND JUDGEMENT<br />
A voice of conscience 28<br />
A second postmortem in a custody death<br />
was first declined and then acceded by<br />
Delhi High Court and in between the two<br />
positions came judge’s conscience. a<br />
<strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong> report<br />
VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Incarcerated land and people 30<br />
Over half-a-million troops keep Kashmir captive.<br />
This has not only robbed people of<br />
their normal civilian space but also led to<br />
one of the worst stresses that any land or its<br />
people have come under, says award winning<br />
documentary filmmaker Sanjay Kak<br />
KASHMIR<br />
Orphaned souls cry for help 33<br />
Kashmir conflict has turned out to be an orphan factory,<br />
writes AR Hanjura<br />
Enforced disappearances 35<br />
More and more people go out of sight in the wake of<br />
enforced disappearances in Jammu & Kashmir. Their families<br />
want endlessly hoping against the hope, writes Mir Hafizullah<br />
A tale of anguish and courage 38<br />
Sixteen-year-long struggle by a lone woman with eight children<br />
to locate her husband after he was shoved into a police<br />
vehicle. Tanveen Kawoosa visits the extraordinary woman<br />
Impossibility of justice 39<br />
Legal remedies available to protect right to life are crippled by<br />
judicial indifference among other things, writes advocate<br />
Ashok Agrwaal<br />
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COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008
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C O N T E N T S<br />
HEALING TOUCH<br />
VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Try out participatory justice 43<br />
Taking people into confidence and redress<br />
mechanism is the task in Kashmir’s case, writes<br />
Haly Duschinski from Ohio, USA<br />
FOUL ARREST<br />
Poor professor in tears as son rots in Tihar 53<br />
A case of victimisation of youth of minority community<br />
Subhash Gatade<br />
MILITARY VIEW<br />
Military might and human rights 55<br />
Forces have to be accountable for punishing the<br />
innocent along side those who took to guns,<br />
writes SuJata krishnamurthi<br />
Maimed, mauled by military-militia 46<br />
Besides being an issue or problem, Kashmir for<br />
locals is difficult to talk about as fear lurks through<br />
the air, writes Amrit Dhatt<br />
Captive state in a free subcontinent 48<br />
Kashmir’s status of a superior order under British<br />
rule could not last as it was soon caught amidst an<br />
India-Pakistan rivalry, writes Dr Abdul Majid Siraj<br />
Twenty-year-long night of<br />
long knives 57<br />
Former Army Chief<br />
General S Padmanabhan<br />
talks to Sujata<br />
Krishnamurthi in an exclusive<br />
interview about army’s<br />
role in Kashmir<br />
Growing up in a valley of fear 50<br />
The new generation of Kashmiris is growing up as a<br />
string of bad dreams chase them even after they<br />
leave and go far away from the home, writes<br />
Feroz Rather<br />
HURRIYAT VIEW<br />
Taking up arms a compulsion<br />
not choice: Geelani 63<br />
Leader of separatist movement Syed Ali Shah Geelani<br />
in conversation with Aaliya Anjum<br />
‘Dialogue instead of deadlock’: Mirwaiz<br />
Umar Farooq 68<br />
The young moderate among the separatist<br />
leaders talks to Amrit Dhatt<br />
www.combatlaw.org<br />
3
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C O N T E N T S<br />
VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Amarnath row puts communalists back to business 71<br />
Not just chief minister but sanity has also bolted out from<br />
an already embattled zone that got another dose of hate<br />
with the move to hand over a piece of forest land to<br />
Amarnath Shrine Board, writes Praful Bidwai<br />
Inventing a controversy 74<br />
Sectarian positioning by politicos led to<br />
Amarnath controversy, writes Sant Kumar<br />
Sharma from Jammu<br />
International law and Kashmir 87<br />
Right to self-determination is a human right<br />
if viewed in the light of international law,<br />
writes Sheikh Showkat Hussain<br />
A religious rage or more 90<br />
Religion is important but not the only factor<br />
that motivates Kashmiris to a struggle for<br />
what they call as self-determination, writes<br />
Khalid Wasim Hassan<br />
Centuries subjugation kicks off a bitter struggle 76<br />
Chronology of alien rule since Mughal and Afghan days<br />
over Kashmir and its effects on mass psychology are traced<br />
by Farrukh Fahim<br />
Kashmir’s chance for peace 83<br />
Tired of the long trail of violence and bloodshed, the<br />
yearning for peace is too great among Kashmiris. So India<br />
and Pakistan should seize this opportunity,<br />
writes Sajid Iqbal<br />
Press trussed by draconian laws 94<br />
Fourth State face stringent laws, threats and<br />
censorship, yet the Press has been fighting<br />
this valiantly, writes Professor SM Afzal Qadri<br />
Disabled at the mercy of fate 96<br />
As number of disabled rise in embattled<br />
Kashmir, the state and civil society remain<br />
unmoved, writes Sajid Iqbal<br />
WORDS AND IMAGES<br />
Verses beat venom 98<br />
Literature has also been victim of the turmoil that traps Kashmir, driving a wedge among<br />
writers and their work. Yet there have been some sobering voices with universal appeal,<br />
writes Neerja Mattoo<br />
The forgotten voices 101<br />
Voices from valley’s women spin off a book Speaking peace. A review by Amrit Dhatt<br />
To know is to be 104<br />
A new book on RTI is a welcome addition, says review by Suresh Nautiyal<br />
Printed and published by Colin Gonsalves for Socio Legal Information Centre having its office at 576, Masjid Road, Jangpura,<br />
New Delhi 110014 Printed at Shivam Sundaram, E9, Green Park Extension, New Delhi, 110016<br />
Editor: Colin Gonsalves, E-mail: editor@combatlaw.org, combatlaw.editor@gmail.com<br />
Website: www.combatlaw.org<br />
4<br />
COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008
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L E T T E R S<br />
Foul, frivolous,<br />
vicious arrests<br />
Dear All,<br />
I have been to Raipur twice recently.<br />
From June 24-26, I was there to<br />
express solidarity with the 10-day<br />
fast that Sandeep Pandey and three<br />
others had undertaken, demanding<br />
the release of Binayak Sen and Ajay<br />
TG and against the Chhattisgarh<br />
Public Security Act, 2005. On the last<br />
two days of the fast, a national seminar<br />
against State repression and<br />
repressive laws was organised by the<br />
Chhattisgarh PUCL, timing it with<br />
emergency day.<br />
In this period I also met Ajay TG<br />
in Durg Jail and also spent some time<br />
with his wife Shobha (also a film<br />
maker), their 20-month-old son<br />
called Aman and several cousins and<br />
friends of Ajay, including a couple of<br />
lawyers in Durg.<br />
The second time I went was during<br />
the second phase of Binayak's<br />
trial on July 2-3. On this occasion I<br />
also met Shobha and his lawyers.<br />
Both the visits, as usual were undertaken<br />
in solidarity with Chhattisgarh<br />
PUCL whose members are facing the<br />
ire of the State.<br />
June 25 was a Wednesday, the<br />
weekly day for visitors to Ajay so I<br />
accompanied Shobha to Durg jail.<br />
Shobha who had expected a face-toface<br />
meeting with Ajay and had<br />
hoped that their son would get an<br />
opportunity to hug the father was<br />
disappointed when we were all told<br />
that we could only talk to him<br />
through the window. Left with no<br />
choice all of us (including Ajay's<br />
cousins living in Bhilai) talked to him<br />
though the grilled and wire meshed<br />
window. Ajay had lost his younger<br />
brother Anura on June 19 in a tragic<br />
road accident in Kerala and was visibly<br />
upset. He was very keen to talk to<br />
me separately so we took a chance<br />
and I got the permission from the Jail<br />
authorities to meet him inside the<br />
jail. They would not allow Shobha<br />
but agreed to let Aman come into the<br />
Jailer's room, which was our meeting<br />
room. Those 30 minutes spent<br />
together by father and son were<br />
memorable. Ajay said that he was<br />
innocent and his arrest was part of<br />
the agenda to finish the PUCL.<br />
LETTER FROM PUCL<br />
It was shocking to learn from<br />
Ajay that although four remand<br />
hearings had happened, he had been<br />
produced before court only once. He<br />
was not taken on the date of the hearing<br />
under the pretext that there was<br />
not enough security to take a<br />
Naxalite prisoner out to a court and<br />
the times he was produced he was<br />
taken to the Babu (clerk) of the<br />
Magisterial Court and made to sign<br />
and brought back.<br />
Incidentally, on June 27 (after<br />
Shobha and I had brought this to the<br />
notice of all in the national convention)<br />
he was still taken to the Babu of<br />
the remand court where he was<br />
made to sign and brought back. After<br />
all, these hearings are supposed to be<br />
not merely an extension of judicial<br />
remand but also an opportunity to<br />
share any grievance that the detainee<br />
may have. This was also tried in the<br />
case of Binayak Sen, when he was<br />
prevented from reaching the Court<br />
on the same pretext until our protests<br />
and complaints with the Court, DG<br />
and the IG gave a message to the<br />
authorities.<br />
Whenever Ajay was taken to<br />
Court he was handcuffed. Since he<br />
was never produced in front of the<br />
Magistrate he was never able to point<br />
this out to court. Ordinarily the<br />
accused must not be handcuffed.<br />
This is a settled law through various<br />
judgements of the Supreme Court.<br />
Only when the Court is completely<br />
satisfied by the argument of the prosecution<br />
of the likelihood of the<br />
accused escaping from custody will<br />
the court will permit handcuffing.<br />
We raised this issue with the jail<br />
authorities and gave it in writing to<br />
the DGP on the July 2 and 3 when<br />
Shobha and I met the DGP. He has<br />
assured that he would look into it.<br />
Ajay also has no access to books. He<br />
did apply for it in court but he was<br />
refused. Shobha has not been<br />
allowed to give books. This was<br />
another request that we made to the<br />
jail authorities. He is only allowed to<br />
read one of the local newspapers.<br />
Apart from Binayak Sen, Piyush<br />
Guha, and Ajay TG, there are several<br />
others who are languishing in the<br />
various jails of the state. There are<br />
journalists like Sai Reddy and several<br />
of the 53 who were booked under<br />
the CPSA, 2005, a few lucky ones<br />
having got bail. We know how officials<br />
of the state threaten to book all<br />
those who expose the truth about<br />
Salwa Judum or if they support those<br />
who are exposing it. There is this<br />
constant fear that your phone might<br />
be tapped, your emails hacked.<br />
People are trying to keep the right<br />
distance so as not to appear as easy<br />
suspects.<br />
Kavita Srivastava<br />
General Secretary,<br />
People's Union for Civil Liberties<br />
(PUCL), Rajasthan<br />
— This letter was sent in public<br />
interest to many groups and individuals,<br />
including editor, <strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong><br />
www.combatlaw.org 5
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GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT<br />
Development challenges<br />
in Naxal-affected areas<br />
Forty years of crackdown against Naxals could not stop them from spreading their<br />
influence to rural pockets afflicted by extreme poverty and blatant discrimination against<br />
poor, says an expert body appointed by government in its report to the planning<br />
commission while suggesting a strong dose of development and other measures to<br />
overcome the crisis. The member-secretary of the expert group and commission’s senior<br />
adviser on rural development Santosh Mehrotra sums up the report and its<br />
recommendations<br />
This short note summarises the<br />
analysis and recommendations<br />
of the Expert Group’s report to<br />
the Planning Commission. In Section<br />
I it asks the questions: What are the<br />
underlying factors and context for<br />
the support for Naxals? Why has a<br />
dead movement risen again, and<br />
why is it spreading rapidly (71 districts<br />
in 2001 to 212 now)? The<br />
Section 2 goes on to examine the<br />
proximate and specific causes of discontent<br />
in Naxal affected districts,<br />
and discusses in each case the relevant<br />
recommendations of the Expert<br />
Group.<br />
Factors behind Naxalism<br />
There are as many as 300 million<br />
poor in India (2004/5) – 80 percent<br />
are Scheduled Castes, Scheduled<br />
Tribes or belonging to Other<br />
Backward Castes (OBCs). Naxal districts<br />
are concentrated in Bihar, MP,<br />
UP, West Bengal and Orissa – which<br />
are characterisd by high rural poverty<br />
and high proportion of SC and ST<br />
population. As much as 70 percent of<br />
India’s SC poor are in these five<br />
states – but they have only 59 percent<br />
of SC population. Also, 63 percent of<br />
India’s ST poor are in these five states<br />
– but they are only 49 percent of<br />
India’s ST population.<br />
6<br />
COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008
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GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT<br />
But other states too have Dalits<br />
and Adivasis; in other words, the<br />
concentration of Dalits and Adivasis<br />
in a state may be an important condition<br />
for Naxal influence, but that is<br />
not a sufficient condition. Thus, there<br />
are many districts with high proportions<br />
of Adivasis or Dalits but little<br />
Naxalite activity, e.g. in Punjab,<br />
Haryana, Gujarat, Rajasthan and<br />
Madhya Pradesh. Poverty among<br />
Dalits and Adivasis are a factor but<br />
other factors like denial of justice and<br />
human dignity also cause alienation<br />
resulting in the conviction that relief<br />
can be had outside the system by<br />
breaking the current order asunder.<br />
The Expert Group’s Report examines<br />
the sources of denial of justice in<br />
Naxal-affected districts.<br />
There was a combination of<br />
other factors alongwith the overwhelming<br />
presence of Dalits and<br />
Adivasis. Thus,<br />
Naxal-affected districts mostly<br />
belong to zamindari system of<br />
land ownership – exploitation of<br />
peasantry was intense (which<br />
especially affected Dalits);<br />
Naxal-affected districts more<br />
mineral-rich – hence there has<br />
<br />
been a struggle over minerals;<br />
Naxal-affected districts are<br />
also highly forested – with<br />
affected districts in relevant<br />
states more so.<br />
In other words, the causes of<br />
extremism are complex and not<br />
reducible to simple solutions. In fact,<br />
dissent movements, including the<br />
extremist Naxalite movement, are<br />
not confined to difficult hilly and<br />
forested areas but cover large contiguous<br />
tracts in the plains. They are<br />
not limited to dryland areas of recurring<br />
crop failures but extend to irrigated<br />
commands of major irrigation<br />
systems, as in the state of Bihar.<br />
Hence, land rights issues are crucial,<br />
for instance in large areas, inhabited<br />
by Bhils and some other tribals<br />
where the situation is seemingly<br />
peaceful may face this problem with<br />
spread of awareness and consciousness.<br />
The conclusion of the report,<br />
therefore, is that the causes are complex,<br />
and not reducible to simple<br />
development interventions (e.g.<br />
www.combatlaw.org<br />
In fact, dissent movements, including the extremist<br />
Naxalite movement, are not confined to difficult<br />
hilly and forested areas but cover large contiguous<br />
tracts in the plains. They are not limited to dryland<br />
areas of recurring crop failures but extend to<br />
irrigated commands of major irrigation systems, as<br />
in the state of Bihar<br />
build infrastructure in affected districts).<br />
The Report warns that the government<br />
needs to guard against<br />
another perception:<br />
“The more recent development is<br />
in the emergence of CPI (Maoist)<br />
after the merger and consolidation of<br />
two powerful Naxalite streams in<br />
September, 2004. This new formation,<br />
since its inception, is defining<br />
the official understanding of the<br />
extremist phenomenon of the level of<br />
the state as well as the Union<br />
Government. This has appeared in<br />
the public perception as a simplistic<br />
law-and-order face-off between the<br />
official coercive machinery and this<br />
more radical extremist political formation.<br />
This results, then, in undermining<br />
instruments of social and<br />
economic amelioration as well as<br />
processes of democratic exchange to<br />
resolve persisting issues. This is the<br />
crux of the problem.” Hence, the<br />
suggestion for talks of Expert Group<br />
should not be interpreted as merely<br />
talking to CPI (Maoist) alone.<br />
The government has already<br />
taken some good actions recently.<br />
Thus,<br />
Not all blocks of ‘affected districts’<br />
are actually Naxal-infested:<br />
so identification of 33 core districts<br />
is move in right direction,<br />
and it would be appropriate to<br />
“walk on two strong legs together”<br />
in core districts.<br />
Secondly, government has also<br />
taken some good recent actions in<br />
respect of forest rights (Forest Act<br />
2008), Displacement (R&R<br />
Policy), Livelihoods (NREGA),<br />
BRGF (all Naxal districts are<br />
included).<br />
Causes of discontent<br />
The dispossessed forest-dwelling<br />
STs are a major source of support for<br />
the Naxal Movement. Forest<br />
dwellers were dispossessed by the<br />
state’s declaration of “reserve<br />
forests”, without recognising rights<br />
of pre-existing communities. The<br />
main culprit in this regard was the<br />
Forest Conservation Act 1980; prior<br />
to1980, the dispossessed were usually<br />
regularised; but this process was<br />
stopped post-1980 – and in the discontent<br />
that set in as a result, the<br />
Naxal movement stepped in. Since<br />
then ‘forest conservation’ became a<br />
strange companion to industrial<br />
forestry: conservation restricts<br />
Adivasis rights, but industrial needs<br />
are accommodated. Joint Forest<br />
Management (JFM) was seen as a<br />
remedy for this situation. But JFM<br />
merely institutionalised this state of<br />
affairs. Hence there arose the need<br />
for the ST and Other Forest Dwellers<br />
(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 1<br />
Jan 2008.<br />
Expert Group’s (EG) recommendation:<br />
Address conflicts due to forest<br />
dwellers’ rights:<br />
Reports so far of Forest Rights<br />
Act implementation don’t inspire<br />
confidence; urgent action is needed<br />
to improve the institutional<br />
machinery to implement the Act.<br />
Requirement of proof of occupation<br />
(of forest land, as required<br />
under the Forest Rights Act 2008)<br />
as on 13 Dec 2005 should be dealt<br />
with imaginatively<br />
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The focus of the Naxal movement has been<br />
on “land to the tiller”, which is the same<br />
slogan as freedom fighters: trying to provide<br />
land of landlords or government to landless.<br />
But successive State and Central<br />
governments have failed to distribute even<br />
ceiling surplus or Bhoodan land<br />
Action: Ministry of Environment<br />
and Forests and state governments<br />
Land and Naxal movement<br />
The focus of the Naxal movement<br />
has been on “land to the tiller”,<br />
which is the same slogan as freedom<br />
fighters: trying to provide land of<br />
landlords or government to landless.<br />
But successive State and Central governments<br />
have failed to distribute<br />
even ceiling surplus or Bhoodan<br />
land.<br />
The Naxal movement targets<br />
landholders with “sizeable” holdings<br />
or oppressive in conduct (even<br />
if not big) – while normally the<br />
police intervenes on behalf of landlords.<br />
Three kinds of situations have<br />
arisen in this context:<br />
Private land: In Andhra Pradesh,<br />
landlords are willing that state government<br />
assign land to poor identified<br />
by Naxal movement, but government<br />
has resisted taking such<br />
action as it would ‘sanctify violence’.<br />
The result is that thousands of acres<br />
are lying fallow in Warangal,<br />
Karimnagar, Adilabad, while numbers<br />
of landless poor grow.<br />
In Bihar, a rather different situation<br />
prevails. In Bihar, the Naxal<br />
movement evicted landlords, in contrast<br />
to that in Andhra Pradesh, the<br />
landlords are prepared to reoccupy<br />
land, so efforts of Naxal movement<br />
to redistribute land failed – thus<br />
inviting police violence, giving further<br />
impetus to the Naxal movement.<br />
Government land: Naxal movement<br />
has assisted landless Musahars<br />
to take possession of land in Bihar;<br />
the government, however, feels giving<br />
them conditional access would<br />
sanctify law-breaking – exacerbating<br />
conflict.<br />
Forest land: There has been occupation<br />
by Adivasis on extensive scale<br />
in AP, Chhatisgarh, Vidarbha,<br />
Orissa, and Jharkhand – not fresh<br />
occupation, just reassertion of traditional<br />
usufruct with Naxalites’ support,<br />
but this has brought them into<br />
conflict with Forest Department.<br />
EG Recommendation: Land<br />
related:<br />
Land Tribunals or Fast Track<br />
Courts (Art 323B of Constitution)<br />
should be set up for quick disposal<br />
of land ceiling cases; landowners<br />
have had decades to create<br />
false documents, no cut off date<br />
for reopening old cases should be<br />
set.<br />
Tenancy increasing: 40 percent of<br />
land is cultivated by tenants, who<br />
do not have access to institutional<br />
credit. Tenancy laws have failed<br />
to protect tenant interests (except<br />
in Kerala, West Bengal,<br />
Maharashtra). All tenancies<br />
should be recorded.<br />
Ceiling, Bhoodan, government<br />
land assigned to landless has not<br />
delivered; criminal cases should<br />
be filed against those who dispossess<br />
land that has been handed<br />
over to landless; all eligible occupants<br />
of government land should<br />
be regularised.<br />
<strong>Law</strong>s prohibiting transfer of<br />
Adivasi land to non-Adivasis suffer<br />
from many loopholes, besides<br />
tardy implementation. The loopholes<br />
are documented – but laws<br />
survive unamended.<br />
States with Adivasi population<br />
and not included in fifth<br />
Schedule should enact laws for<br />
protection of Adivasis in same<br />
manner as in fifth Schedule.<br />
ACTION: Department of Land<br />
Resources (Ministry of Rural<br />
Development) and State Governments<br />
EG recommendation: GOI should<br />
address Common Property<br />
Resources (CPRs). Fisherfolk, graziers,<br />
honey gatherers had customary<br />
rights over Common Property<br />
Resources; such rights have been<br />
eroded over a period of time, and<br />
should be statutorily protected and<br />
recorded, and user Pattas issued<br />
jointly for husband-wife. The Naxal<br />
movement has tried to ensure protection<br />
of CPR rights of cattleherders,<br />
fisherfolk, toddy tappers<br />
where these resources were appropriated<br />
by dominant groups.<br />
Currently, there is no legislative protection<br />
of traditional rights. Hence,<br />
Planning Commission should<br />
devise a programme for restoration<br />
of CPRs for sustenance of<br />
<br />
<br />
poorest groups<br />
Gram Panchayats (GPs) should<br />
be empowered for management<br />
of CPRs, with requisite autonomy,<br />
legal backing, and resources.<br />
CPR model legislation on CPR<br />
management should be prepared<br />
by the Central government – to<br />
be suitably adapted by States for<br />
their purpose.<br />
Naxals response to displaced<br />
As many as 60 million people<br />
have been displaced (1947-2004) –<br />
this is an unofficial estimate (based<br />
on solid research state-by-state).<br />
Adivasis and landless most affected<br />
– why? Of 25 million hectare of land<br />
acquired for projects, 7 million (28<br />
percent) forestland, and 6 million<br />
hectare (24 percent) is CPR. Further,<br />
Orissa, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh<br />
are rich in minerals – mining projects<br />
have threatened Adivasi existence,<br />
and with further impetus to mining<br />
due to growing demand from a fastgrowing<br />
economy, there is a risk of<br />
further legal and illegal mining<br />
occurring, without any concern for<br />
the displaced.<br />
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Governments both Centre and<br />
states have had no serious<br />
Rehabilitation and Resettlement policy<br />
for 60 years. Since the administration<br />
provided little succour, Naxalite<br />
movement stepped into. One problem<br />
is that internally displaced forest-dwellers<br />
tend to settle down<br />
again in some forest region, which is<br />
prohibited by law – the Naxal movements<br />
assist, inviting the wrath of<br />
state.<br />
Another problem is that there is a<br />
Presidential Order (under Art 342),<br />
which declares the list of STs Statewise.<br />
However, the problem is that a<br />
tribe that migrates involuntarily<br />
from one state to another is not<br />
recognised as ST in new state – so<br />
there is no protection from state, but<br />
receives Naxal protection. When<br />
Orissa’s ST shifted to forests near<br />
Vishakhapatnam, the Andhra government<br />
targeted it for eviction.<br />
When Naxalites intervened, they<br />
were harassed. Similarly, landless<br />
Gothi Koya tribes of Chattisgarh<br />
crossed to AP (Khammam), with<br />
Naxal support – so AP forest and<br />
police departments cracked down on<br />
them. Also, Bihar caste Senas (e.g.<br />
Ranbir Sena) drove Dalits away.<br />
They received Naxal support on the<br />
one hand and police lathis on the<br />
other.<br />
EG Recommendation: Rehabilitation<br />
of displaced. A new R&R<br />
Policy has been notified by the<br />
Government of India, which is good,<br />
but there is now need to pass the<br />
R&R Act in Parliament. States can<br />
ignore GOI Policy on R&R, but not<br />
an Act on R&R. Already our R&R<br />
policy is 60 year old -- India’s R & R<br />
record is far worse by BRIC standards.<br />
Extend Panchayati Raj to SAs<br />
Tribals in India have been historically<br />
self-governing – which brings<br />
them in conflict with the formal state<br />
system. The regulatory and developmental<br />
role of the state post-1947 led<br />
to erosion of authority of traditional<br />
system -- traditional system is now<br />
strongest among Ho (Jharkand);<br />
weak among Santhals and Mundas;<br />
and very weak among Oraons. Selfgovernance<br />
meant management of<br />
natural resources, general economic<br />
matters, use of intoxicants – had<br />
been appropriated by formal system<br />
over 1947-1995. PESA enacted in<br />
1996 was meant to change this erosion.<br />
How? Distinctive feature of<br />
governance at village level in PESA is<br />
creation of space in legal frame for<br />
functioning system of self-governance<br />
of tribal people. All laws relating<br />
to panchayats inconsistent with<br />
PESA ‘are deemed to have lapsed on<br />
December 23, 1997’.<br />
But PESA remains unimplemented.<br />
There is hardly any realisation in<br />
the Union Government that implementation<br />
of PESA has to be a collaborative<br />
effort of almost all Central<br />
ministries. Only two ministries<br />
issued guidelines to States in 1997:<br />
Ministry of Rural Development on<br />
role of Gram Sabhas in land acquisition;<br />
and the role of Gram Sabhas<br />
before granting of leases for minor<br />
minerals by Ministry of Mines. But<br />
there is “…total silence ever since<br />
about the holistic frame of PESA in<br />
the entire government establishment”.<br />
PESA casts direct responsibility<br />
on state legislatures, but being a<br />
central legislation and logical extension<br />
of fifth Schedule, it is duty of<br />
Central Government to see that it is<br />
implemented. Many central laws<br />
need harmonisation with aims of<br />
PESA: Land Acquisition Act 1894;<br />
Mines and Minerals (Development &<br />
Regulation) Act, 1957; Forest Act,<br />
1927, Forest Conservation Act 1980.<br />
Also, national policies: R&R Policy<br />
2007, National Water Policy 2002,<br />
National Minerals Policy 2008,<br />
National Forest Policy 2004 – should<br />
be examined for ensuring compliance<br />
with PESA provisions.<br />
Further, the Indian Constitution<br />
fifth Schedule Article 5 states: (1)<br />
“Notwithstanding anything in the<br />
Constitution, the Governor may by<br />
public notification direct that any<br />
particular Act of Parliament or of the<br />
Legislature of the State shall not<br />
apply to a SA or any part thereof in<br />
the State…” In other words, it is<br />
actually possible for the Governor to<br />
eliminate the inconsistency between<br />
existing laws and PESA.<br />
Given that tribal lands are rich in<br />
minerals, the Expert Group recommends<br />
that mineral rules should be<br />
amended transferring all quarries<br />
with annual leases with annual lease<br />
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GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT<br />
value upto Rs 10 lakhs to Gram<br />
Sahbas and GPs – to cover all minor<br />
minerals.<br />
In addition, the National<br />
Minerals Policy states that exploration<br />
should be carried out in a way<br />
non-intrusive of rights of tribals<br />
under fifth Schedule, and causes<br />
least disturbance to ecology. In any<br />
case, the Supreme Court Samata<br />
judgment (1996) states that tribal<br />
communities through their GSs,<br />
should be fully involved in any decision<br />
to be taken on mining in their<br />
area.<br />
The Expert group concludes:<br />
“Tribes are not opposed to development.<br />
All that they want is to control<br />
its pace and influence, its pattern and<br />
direction so that they are enabled to<br />
prevent its damaging effects and<br />
enjoy some of its benefits. The autonomy<br />
and control over natural<br />
resources which tribal communities<br />
seek is consistent with national<br />
development”.<br />
Finally, the Expert Group expects<br />
the central Ministry of Panchayati<br />
Raj to take the initiative with regard<br />
to PESA. The Ministry has analysed<br />
state laws, and is persuading state<br />
government to implement PESA.<br />
Given that tribal lands<br />
are rich in minerals,<br />
the Expert Group<br />
recommends that<br />
mineral rules should<br />
be amended<br />
transferring all<br />
quarries with annual<br />
leases with annual<br />
lease value upto Rs 10<br />
lakhs to Gram Sahbas<br />
and GPs – to cover all<br />
minor minerals<br />
MOPR should now finalise and issue<br />
guidelines for PESA, suggest Statespecific<br />
guidelines. If any state is not<br />
implementing PESA, GOI should use<br />
its powers to issue directions (Part A<br />
of fifth Schedule) -- implementation<br />
of PESA gives rightful role of governance<br />
to GS and through it to GP –<br />
“it would douse the embers of discontent<br />
and disaffection among the<br />
tribals in the Schedule Areas”.<br />
Economic measures<br />
Forest produce: Naxal movemnet<br />
derives support from rate increases it<br />
secured for picking of tendu (bidi)<br />
leaves in forest areas of AP,<br />
Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Maharashtra,<br />
Jharkhand, which had been major<br />
source of exploitation of Adivasi<br />
labour. Government ignored it, but<br />
the Naxals put an end to it.<br />
EG recommends: forest produce<br />
should be provided a fixed<br />
Minimum Support Price for various<br />
commodities, and asks for<br />
up-gradation of traditional<br />
Adivasi haats.<br />
Action: Ministry of Tribal Affairs<br />
Basic services in tribal belts<br />
Health, schooling, electricity<br />
infrastructure is abysmal in Naxalaffected<br />
districts – a gap Naxal<br />
movement is unable to fill.<br />
In the forested districts,<br />
Electricity is possible to provide<br />
through distributed (initially offgrid,<br />
but grid-connectable in<br />
future) generation using forest<br />
biomass-based gasifiers to generate<br />
electricity for rural households,<br />
and in fact the tribal areas<br />
ideal for the widespread use of<br />
this technology, since wood, a<br />
renewable resource, is plentifully<br />
available. Rajiv Gandhi Grameen<br />
Vidyutikaran Yojana, a Centrally<br />
sponsored scheme which is part<br />
of Bharat Nirman, however,<br />
builds poles and lays lines to BPL<br />
houses – without actual supply of<br />
electricity; hence, poles and wires<br />
both get stolen.<br />
ACTION: MNRE and NTPC<br />
should take action to provide<br />
biomass based gasifiers so that<br />
electricity can be provided at low<br />
cost to poor tribal households in<br />
rural areas.<br />
There is need to provide social<br />
infrastructure in Naxal-affected districts<br />
as per national norms within<br />
11th Plan. Much of Naxal-affected<br />
area has hilly terrain and tribal population<br />
– failure to provide social<br />
infrastructure as per national norms<br />
is a manifestation of discriminatory<br />
of governance.<br />
The Expert Group recommends:<br />
Schooling: fill sanctioned teacher<br />
posts; in Jharkhand the pupilteacher<br />
ratio was 80, still 49:<br />
<br />
Action: MHRD<br />
Health facilities: provide as per<br />
national NRHM norms; use special<br />
allowances to fill para-medic<br />
posts at least, also ASHAs.<br />
Action: Ministry of Health<br />
Nutrition: Anganwadis on<br />
demand for SC/ST hamlets.<br />
Action: Ministry of Women and<br />
child Development<br />
<br />
The Expert group<br />
concludes: “Tribes are<br />
not opposed to<br />
development. All that<br />
they want is to control<br />
its pace and influence,<br />
its pattern and<br />
direction so that they<br />
are enabled to prevent<br />
its damaging effects<br />
and enjoy some of its<br />
benefits<br />
Discontinue commercial vending<br />
of liquor and institutionalised<br />
control of GS over preparation of<br />
traditional drinks<br />
The Expert Group also recommends<br />
talks with the Naxal movement.<br />
The Expert Group asks: why<br />
there is a ban on talks with Naxal<br />
movement? It points to many inconsistencies:<br />
why are there peace talks<br />
with Nagas (NSCN, IM) faction for<br />
10 yrs, even though rebels have not<br />
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GOVT'S NAXAL REPORT<br />
surrendered arms, in fact built up<br />
arsenal, and established a parallel<br />
government. Why are there peace<br />
talks with ULFA – but no insistence<br />
ULFA surrender weapons? Similarly,<br />
in J&K – there is repeated willingness<br />
to talk with any armed group<br />
prepared to come to negotiating<br />
table?<br />
We need to reflect on the irony of<br />
Maoism in Nepal. Like Indian<br />
Maoists, they too were fighting a<br />
bush war for many years, but after<br />
two years of negotiations (2003-<br />
2005), they joined the government,<br />
and participated in elections, and are<br />
now in the process of being mainstreamed.<br />
Recommendation: Door of negotiations<br />
should be kept open with the<br />
Naxals.<br />
Governance<br />
The report cites many striking<br />
examples of poor governance, but<br />
the one related to forest administration<br />
is particularly telling: “The<br />
uncertain existence of Adivasis in the<br />
forests has resulted in tremendous<br />
power of harassment in the hands of<br />
forest department personnel. It is<br />
permissible to pick edible forest produce<br />
but not to undertake cultivation<br />
of the same produce in the forests. It<br />
is permissible to gather dry twigs<br />
and logs of uprooted trees but not to<br />
cut standing timber. It is permissible<br />
to graze cattle in the forests, but it<br />
should be ensured that the cattle do<br />
not nibble at the nurseries of the forest<br />
department…Quite apart from<br />
the injustice of the restrictions, the<br />
dividing line between what can be<br />
done and what cannot is often so<br />
slight that there is considerable<br />
ground for arbitrary action by the<br />
enforcer of restrictions. Wherever<br />
there is a basis for discretion on the<br />
part of government officials, forest<br />
personnel have had to be appeased<br />
to avoid harassment. It was only<br />
after Naxalites entered the picture<br />
that the Adivasis got protection from<br />
harassment”.<br />
“…But after the initial impact on<br />
extortionate practices of the forest<br />
department, the Naxalite movement’s<br />
impact on official corruption<br />
has been slight. The level of corrup-<br />
www.combatlaw.org<br />
tion in the Naxal areas is not noticeably<br />
less than elsewhere…Cooption<br />
of some elements of Naxalite movement<br />
into the corrupt system is a<br />
fact” (p.53)<br />
Recommendation<br />
Writ of the Indian bureaucracy<br />
does not run in at least 95 affected<br />
districts, though does run to a limited<br />
extent in another 137 districts that<br />
are ‘influenced’ by Naxalite movement<br />
– hence, the Expert Group recommends:<br />
Long term objective should be to<br />
make non-accessible bureaucracy<br />
accountable to 3-tier panchayat<br />
system, with level-to-level correspondence<br />
with current administrative<br />
structure<br />
PESA empowers GPs in fifth<br />
Scheduled areas with control<br />
over local plans and resources for<br />
such plans, including the Tribal<br />
Sub-Plan<br />
But District Planning Committees<br />
(under Art 243 ZD) not yet acti-<br />
<br />
Planning Commission is preparing a matrix with<br />
details of Actions Needed Ministry-wise – to be<br />
shared shortly with Task Force Members of the<br />
Ministry of Home Affairs Task Force on Left Wing<br />
Extremism and Ministries<br />
vated in line with PESA.<br />
Preferably 40 percent of State<br />
Plan money should go to district<br />
plans<br />
There is no judicial mechanism in<br />
rural areas to resolve day-to-day<br />
conflicts. The Naxals filled a gap in<br />
resolution of disputes – their justice<br />
too rough and ready. The current<br />
alternative is a judicial system that is<br />
too expensive, dilatory, and complicated<br />
for rural poor – barely 20 percent<br />
of population is able to access it.<br />
SC/STs get involved in the system as<br />
accused and defendants rather than<br />
as seekers of their rights. What is<br />
needed is a simple, inexpensive system,<br />
responsive to needs of poor. A<br />
Nyaya Panchayat <strong>Law</strong> should be<br />
enacted by Centre with enabling provisions<br />
for States to adopt.<br />
Recommendation: 5th/6th Scheduled<br />
Areas GS should act as Nyaya<br />
Panchayat in matters relating to customary<br />
law.<br />
Another area in governance the<br />
Report discusses is that seven<br />
Commissions for disadvantaged<br />
groups exist in India – but there is little<br />
to show for it. The seven<br />
Commissions are for SCs, for STs, for<br />
Minorities, for Women, for Children,<br />
for Safai karmcharis, Tribes Advisory<br />
Council, for Human Rights – plus<br />
counterpart commissions in States.<br />
Unfortunately, they are all toothless,<br />
with no enforcement mechanism,<br />
even Parliament ignores them.<br />
Recommendation: We need a<br />
Rights Commission with appropriate<br />
divisions, with legal power to<br />
enforce its decisions. Anyone<br />
aggrieved with its decisions can go<br />
to Supreme Court -- Legal implications<br />
of proposal should be examined<br />
by <strong>Law</strong> Ministry. A further recommendation<br />
is that implementation<br />
of Protective Legislation must be<br />
ensured, in particular the Protection<br />
of Civil Rights Act, and the SCs and<br />
STs (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.<br />
ACTION: State police forces and<br />
Central Forces, and the judiciary.<br />
Next Steps<br />
Planning Commission is preparing<br />
a matrix with details of<br />
Actions Needed Ministry-wise –<br />
to be shared shortly with Task<br />
Force Members of the Ministry of<br />
Home Affairs Task Force on Left<br />
Wing Extremism and Ministries.<br />
Matrix will enable Monitoring of<br />
actions needed to stem the rising<br />
tide of the Naxal movement.<br />
– The full report is available at<br />
www.planningcommission.nic.in<br />
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Deprivation turns people to<br />
Naxalism, says Government report<br />
A government appointed committee under the aegis of Planning Commission goes into<br />
factors that have made Naxalism popular into some rural pockets spread across a dozen<br />
states and finds that abysmal poverty, near destitution, absence of a creditable legal<br />
redress mechanism, blatant caste discrimination, and misplaced policing fuel radical<br />
politics. The committee that had former police and intelligence bosses like Prakash Singh<br />
and Ajit Doval besides bureaucrat-turned-activist Dr BD Sharma and Sukhdeo Thorat<br />
also avers that Naxalite movement essentially remains a political dissent rather than a<br />
mere law and order issue and so it should be approached through unconditional<br />
negotiations rather than use of force. Exclusive excerpts from the report ‘Development<br />
Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas’ follow<br />
Poverty, inequality breed radicalism<br />
Widespread discontent among the people has plagued<br />
the Indian polity for sometime now. It has often led to<br />
unrest, sometimes of a violent nature. Over the years,<br />
statutory enactments and institutional mechanisms for<br />
addressing the various aspects of deprivation have been<br />
brought into being. But the experience has been that the<br />
discontent and unrest continue to surface notwithstanding<br />
such measures. For a large section of the population,<br />
basic survival is the problem.<br />
…India is today proudly proclaiming an above nine<br />
percent growth rate and striving to achieve double-digit<br />
growth. But it is a matter of common observation that the<br />
inequalities between classes, between town and country,<br />
and between the upper castes and the under-privileged<br />
communities are increasing.<br />
...The Constitutional and statutory agencies entrusted<br />
with the task of safeguarding the entitlements of all<br />
marginalised groups have failed to provide adequate<br />
support.<br />
…In this situation it should not cause surprise that a<br />
large section of the people are angry and feel alienated<br />
from the polity. It is in this context that it has become necessary<br />
to identify the variety of causes of discontent and<br />
to seek ways by which the State could answer them in a<br />
humane, caring and democratic way. If the emphasis of this<br />
exploration is on the Naxalite phenomenon it is not because<br />
other modes and forms of agitation are less important but only<br />
because the method of struggle chosen by the Naxalites has<br />
brought the problem to a head. Radical groups seek the justification<br />
for their methods of violence from structural violence,<br />
which is implicit in the social and economic system.<br />
Unfortunately the underlying and foundational causes<br />
leading to unrest, discontent and extremism have<br />
never been seriously studied or have been the subject<br />
matter of administrative or academic discourses in<br />
India…<br />
...The core of the report comprises the reasons for the<br />
unrest that is associated with the Naxalite movement, and<br />
recommendations for how the Government may itself<br />
respond to these issues…<br />
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Though formulated in general terms, the issue placed<br />
before the group is essentially the causes for the discontent<br />
among the people that has led to the rise and spread<br />
of the Naxalite movement. The Naxalite movement is<br />
almost four decades old now. Beginning in a single State<br />
(West Bengal), it has now spread over a wide area, affecting<br />
and influencing the lives of lakhs of people. The government<br />
has estimated that the movement is now active<br />
in about 125 districts spread over 12 states.<br />
As mentioned earlier there were three central government<br />
committees which looked into the causes of naxalite<br />
movement spreading in the country. Civil Rights groups<br />
have also published a number of reports dealing with the<br />
causes of disaffection with the government leading to<br />
popularity of the Naxalite movement. The Press has also<br />
carried many reports, and books have been written by<br />
various observers. Naxalite publications have also highlighted<br />
the social and economic background to the rise of<br />
the movement...<br />
State anti-tribal and anti-Dalit<br />
The main support for the Naxalite movement comes<br />
from dalits and adivasis. It is thus useful to begin this<br />
chapter with a brief look at the condition of these social<br />
categories.<br />
Dalits and adivasis comprise about one-fourth of<br />
India’s population: Dalits constitute 16 percent and<br />
Adivasis eight percent. Most of them (80 percent of Dalits<br />
and 92 percent of Adivasis) live in rural areas...<br />
Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and<br />
West Bengal are the states with highest rural poverty and<br />
they also account for a high proportion of SC and ST poor.<br />
Seventy percent of the SC poor are in these five states,<br />
whereas only 55.8 percent of the SC population of the<br />
country is in these five states. And 63 percent of the ST<br />
poor are in these five States whereas the proportion of the<br />
country’s ST population in these States is only 49 percent.<br />
In addition, they suffer from multi faceted oppression<br />
and denial of justice, social legal and political rights.<br />
Examination of the respective shares of SCs and STs in<br />
the total population of different districts (from Census<br />
data) indicates that districts with a high proportion of<br />
Dalits are mainly in the northern states as well as in pockets<br />
of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. While<br />
there is no simple correspondence between the areas<br />
under Naxalite influence and the proportion of Dalits and<br />
Adivasis in the population, it is the case that these areas<br />
generally have relatively high Dalit or Adivasi concentration...<br />
…Poverty does create deprivation but other factors<br />
like denial of justice, human dignity, cause alienation<br />
resulting in the conviction that relief can be had outside<br />
the system by breaking the current order asunder. Other<br />
factors are also likely to be involved. For example in large<br />
areas, inhabited by bhils and some other tribals where the<br />
situation is seemingly peaceful may face this problem<br />
with spread of awareness and consciousness.<br />
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Dalits continue to face wide-ranging economic, social<br />
disadvantages, and day-to-day humiliation and degradation,<br />
denial of justice and violent atrocities in India. By<br />
and large the Dalit condition is marked by high incidence of<br />
poverty, low education, limited employment opportunities and<br />
marginalisation in all spheres of public life. These deprivations<br />
are compounded by diverse types of violence that they are subject<br />
to as shown in the section on atrocities…<br />
…most Dalits live in rural areas. The incidence of<br />
landlessness is higher among the SCs than among the<br />
others. Ten percent of SC households are landless and<br />
another 77 percent are near-landless… Nearly half (45.6<br />
percent) of SCs are agricultural labourers. …These facts<br />
indicate that the persistently high poverty of SC households<br />
is closely associated with low levels of ownership of capital<br />
assets like land, low levels of education and considerably lower<br />
diversification of avenues of employment.<br />
The right to vote is an important political right which<br />
has added to the empowerment of the Dalits as well as<br />
added to their status. However, Dalits have often had to<br />
struggle in order to assert this right and struggle again to<br />
demand accountability from the elected representatives…<br />
By and large the Dalit condition is<br />
marked by high incidence of poverty,<br />
low education, limited employment<br />
opportunities and marginalisation in<br />
all spheres of public life. These<br />
deprivations are compounded by<br />
diverse types of violence that they are<br />
subject to as shown in the section on<br />
atrocities…<br />
Dalits continue to face many kinds of social discrimination,<br />
related for instance to residence, food, clothing,<br />
marriage and employment. Even untouchability, the most<br />
blatant form of social discrimination against Dalits, persists<br />
in many forms. A recent study of untouchability in<br />
565 villages in 11 states identified no less than 63 types of<br />
untouchability practiced in many villages of the country. 1<br />
There are 84.3 million tribal people (also known as<br />
Scheduled Tribes) in India according to the census of<br />
2001. They are present in all the States except Punjab,<br />
Haryana, Delhi and the Union Territories of Pondicherry<br />
and Chandigarh, and are located mostly in hilly and forest<br />
areas…<br />
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In the seventies, a serious attempt to focus on the tribal<br />
population in the planning process was made in the<br />
form of a Tribal Sub Plan strategy. The process of bringing<br />
all tribal majority areas under the Fifth Schedule of the<br />
Constitution was also taken up.<br />
…Despite the plethora of development plans, programmes<br />
and activities initiated in the tribal areas, the<br />
majority of Scheduled Tribes still live in conditions of<br />
serious deprivation and poverty. The tribal people have<br />
remained backward in all aspects of human development<br />
including education, health, nutrition etc. Apart from<br />
socio-economic deprivation, there has been a steady erosion<br />
of traditional tribal rights and their command over<br />
resources.<br />
Unrest and discontent are not new to<br />
tribal areas, nor is it just a postindependence<br />
phenomenon. The<br />
earliest uprisings against the British,<br />
in the closing decades of the 18th<br />
century, were triggered by colonial<br />
expansion into the forests…<br />
Unrest and discontent are not new to tribal areas, nor is it<br />
just a post-independence phenomenon. The earliest uprisings<br />
against the British, in the closing decades of the 18th century,<br />
were triggered by colonial expansion into the forests…<br />
In general, the contradiction between the tribal community<br />
and the State itself has become sharper, translating<br />
itself into open conflict in many areas. Almost all over<br />
the tribal areas, including Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura,<br />
Assam, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra,<br />
Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, tribal people seem to feel a<br />
deep sense of exclusion and alienation, which has been<br />
manifesting itself in different forms. The Report of the<br />
Expert Group on Prevention of Alienation of Tribal Land<br />
and its Restoration (October 2004) pointed out that the<br />
socio-economic infrastructure among the tribal people is<br />
inadequate, thereby contributing to their disempowerment<br />
and deprivation. 2<br />
Apart from poverty and deprivation in general, the<br />
causes of the tribal movements are many: the most important<br />
among them are absence of self-governance, forest<br />
policy, excise policy, land related issues, multifaceted<br />
forms of exploitation, cultural humiliation and political<br />
marginalisation. Land alienation, forced evictions from<br />
land, and displacement also added to unrest.<br />
...According to the Forest Survey of India Report 2003,<br />
about 60 percent of the forests cover of the country and<br />
63% of the dense forests lie in 187 tribal districts, ie districts<br />
covered by the Fifth and Sixth Schedules to the<br />
Constitution…<br />
The other consequence is that the inhospitable terrain<br />
of the forests provides ample excuse for the restricted<br />
reach of the administration. The health status of both SCs<br />
and STs are far worse than that of other sections of society.<br />
Women<br />
The subjugation of women is another important<br />
aspect of the deeper maladies that afflict rural India and<br />
contribute to popular unrest…<br />
Even simple demographic indicators bring out the<br />
exceptionally low status of women in Indian society…<br />
…Even the National Rural Employment Guarantee<br />
Act (NREGA), which is a potential source of empowerment<br />
for women (in so far as it gives them independent<br />
income-earning opportunities and equal entitlements visà-vis<br />
men), is yet to overcome traditional patterns of gender<br />
inequality and female subordination.<br />
Forests<br />
The conflict pertaining to forest dwellers’ rights to<br />
land and forest produce is a major source of unrest in<br />
large parts of the country. The very notion of a symbiotic<br />
relation should have implied that no inherent conflict<br />
could be seen between such communities and their habitat,<br />
but no such understanding informs the law concerning<br />
forest conservation…<br />
Land distribution is the key<br />
Even those who know very little about the Naxalite<br />
movement know that its central slogan has been ‘land to<br />
the tiller’ and that attempts to put the poor in possession<br />
of land have defined much of their activity.<br />
…the proportion of the workforce that is engaged in<br />
agriculture is 58%. And it is 64% in the case of the<br />
Scheduled castes…<br />
While the economy is at present growing at a rate of<br />
about eight percent to nine percent, agriculture which<br />
provides employment to 58 percent of the country’s<br />
workforce is growing at less than three percent…<br />
Special economic zones<br />
Land acquisition for Special Economic Zones (SEZ)<br />
has given rise to widespread protest in various parts of<br />
the country. Huge extents of land are being acquired<br />
across the country for this purpose. Already, questions<br />
have been raised on two counts. One is the loss of revenue<br />
in the form of taxes and the other is the effect on agricultural<br />
production.<br />
...Thus, the notion of an SEZ, irrespective of whether it<br />
is established in multi-cropped land or not, is an assault<br />
on a major livelihood resource…<br />
Displacement and rehabilitation<br />
Displacement, which is, in fact, enforced eviction of<br />
people from their lands and natural habitats, has for long<br />
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been a serious problem.<br />
Displacement takes place on<br />
account of development projects<br />
such as large irrigation<br />
projects, industrial and mining<br />
projects, power plants,<br />
declaration of sanctuaries<br />
and national parks, setting<br />
up of field firing and testing<br />
ranges and a myriad other<br />
activities of the State itself...<br />
The displacement caused<br />
by large projects can be<br />
physical, occupational and<br />
even cultural. Unless the<br />
nature and magnitude of<br />
displacement in all its<br />
dimensions are fully analysed<br />
and appropriate safety<br />
nets put in place, well in<br />
advance of the implementation<br />
of the project itself, it<br />
will lead to discontent.<br />
The official database of<br />
the persons displaced/<br />
affected by projects is not available…<br />
As tribal areas are also rich in mineral resources, the<br />
mining projects proposed such as in Orissa, Jharkhand<br />
and Chhattisgarh threaten the very existence of tribal<br />
people. Protest action becomes an inevitable consequence<br />
of displacement, such as in Kalinganagar and in Kashipur<br />
people’s movement against Utkal Alumina Rayagada district,<br />
Orissa.<br />
Apart from the physical and occupational displacement<br />
caused by large projects, in the case of the Fifth<br />
Schedule areas, unless the tribals are resettled in the same<br />
scheduled tract, they will face deprivation of the special<br />
rights that have accrued to them by virtue of the schedule.<br />
For example, the tribals in the scheduled areas enjoy presumptive<br />
right of ownership of the land and minerals (Refer SC<br />
judgment in CA Nos. 4601-02 of 1997 on SLP Nos. 17080-81<br />
in Samata vs State of Andhra Pradesh and others). Also, the<br />
Fifth Schedule requires the government to review any law<br />
before it can be extended to the notified areas, so as to ensure<br />
that such a law is appropriately adapted to safeguard the interests<br />
of the tribals…<br />
A policy guiding the Rehabilitation and Resettlement<br />
(R&R) should ensure that none of the displaced be worse<br />
off after the project. They should in fact be better off after<br />
it because they are paying its price. The National<br />
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007 is a significant<br />
departure from the earlier policies in this direction.<br />
Courts in rural areas lack credibility<br />
Of all the things that are known about the Naxalites,<br />
their Peoples Courts are perhaps the most notorious.<br />
While the abuses that have been reported about them are<br />
not all false, taking that to be the whole story would not<br />
be quite correct. The fact is<br />
that such informal, rough and<br />
ready forums of dispute resolution<br />
did in a way respond to<br />
the felt need.<br />
Considerable frustration gets<br />
built up in society when disputes<br />
and conflicts are not settled in<br />
time and in a just and fair manner.<br />
The judicial system we<br />
have is time consuming in<br />
nature…<br />
Environmental<br />
degradation<br />
“Environmental degradation<br />
and social injustice” are<br />
two sides of the same coin.<br />
Environmental degradation<br />
can be caused both by nature<br />
and by human action…<br />
Land is targeted primarily<br />
for mineral extraction.<br />
Geographical distribution of<br />
fossil fuels, and metallic and<br />
non-metallic mineral reserves,<br />
shows a high degree of concentration in central and eastern<br />
India. This implies drastic changes in the existing<br />
land use from agriculture and forestry. Mining is an<br />
unavoidable component of industrial development, but<br />
its full effect on the environment must be taken note of.<br />
Mining is carried out in two ways: open cast and underground.<br />
Either way, the extraction of ore releases extensive<br />
dust which spreads all around and spoils all elements<br />
of the environment – it makes the agricultural<br />
lands barren, pollutes water sources, denudes forests,<br />
defiles the air and degrades the quality of life for people<br />
who live and work in this area.<br />
Environmental degradation resulting from industrial,<br />
mining and other development activities has created serious<br />
health problems for the local population…<br />
Uranium mining and processing near the<br />
Subarnarekha river has even caused radioactive pollution.<br />
In addition to the damage caused to the environment<br />
and its consequential effects, illegal mining and illegal<br />
practices in legal mining compound people’s misery…<br />
Not merely land, water and forests, even bio-diversity<br />
is being exploited for economic growth…<br />
Political marginalisation of SCs and STs<br />
The Constitution has facilitated the political participation<br />
of SCs/STs (dalits and adivasis) through three measures:<br />
Fundamental Right to equality granted to citizens,<br />
abolition of discrimination including untouchability, and<br />
special provision for their representation in legislature.<br />
These rights and entitlements, however, have not<br />
resulted in effective political participation and removal of<br />
their sense of political marginalisation. Though both<br />
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groups face exclusionary practices, dalits and adivasis are<br />
differently placed in respect of their social situation.<br />
Dalits are exposed continuously to the domination of<br />
other castes hostile to them…<br />
Adivasis, by and large, are distanced from dominant<br />
non-tribal communities and have considerable space to<br />
act autonomously.<br />
The political equality in respect of dalits is compromised in<br />
various ways. The exercise of the right to vote without fear or<br />
favour is widely frustrated both by untouchability practices and<br />
exertion of dominance by ‘higher’ caste groups…<br />
The disability that adivasis face in availing political<br />
opportunities is different in character. Lack of financial<br />
resources is a crippling factor in exercising their right to<br />
contest elections…<br />
At the Panchayat level, the ST chiefs of Panchayat,<br />
even in tribal concentration areas, may be manipulated<br />
by non-tribals of the constituencies to spend development<br />
funds suited to their needs and to get contracts for government<br />
schemes…<br />
The position is not very different with the institutions<br />
specifically created for protecting the interests of the<br />
scheduled communities. The status and role assigned to<br />
National Commissions, constituted under Act 338 and<br />
338A of the Constitution, gives them a certain importance<br />
in the Constitutional scheme.<br />
Some statistical pointers<br />
Before summarising the main causes of discontent leading<br />
to the emergence of the Naxalite movement, we may<br />
note the broad correlation between various indicators of<br />
backwardness and the spread of the Naxalite movement.<br />
We have selected five States with a high level of Naxalite<br />
activity: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand<br />
and Orissa. In each of these States, four of the most affected<br />
districts were identified and compared with four districts<br />
that are comparatively more developed.<br />
16<br />
The political equality in respect of<br />
dalits is compromised in various<br />
ways. The exercise of the right to vote<br />
without fear or favour is widely<br />
frustrated both by untouchability<br />
practices and exertion of dominance<br />
by ‘higher’ caste groups…<br />
A careful examination of the data enables us to identify<br />
10 factors that appear to show significant variation<br />
between the affected districts and the developed districts.<br />
They indicate the circumstances underlying rural unrest<br />
and the emergence of Naxalism to a significant extent.<br />
These factors are: (1) high share of SC/ST population; (2)<br />
low levels of literacy; (3) high level of infant mortality; (4)<br />
low level of urbanisation; (5) high share of forest cover;<br />
(6) high share of agricultural labour; (7) low per-capita<br />
food grain production; (8) low level of road length per 100<br />
sq.kms.; (9) high share of rural households which have no<br />
bank account; and (10) high share of rural households<br />
without specified assets.<br />
A summary of the picture is presented in Table 5. The<br />
unweighted averages of the affected and developed districts<br />
clearly indicate significant differences in respect of<br />
all the indicators except in a few cases. The only cases in<br />
which the direction of variation is not along the expected<br />
lines are: (1) the share of agricultural labour in Andhra<br />
Pradesh and Chhattisgarh; (2) urbanisation in Bihar; and<br />
(3) food grain production in Orissa. These, however, are<br />
not difficult to explain.<br />
Governance<br />
Articles 14, 15 and 16 of Indian Constitution provide<br />
the framework for a harmonious conjuncture of equality<br />
as citizens and compensatory discrimination and affirmative<br />
action in favour of SCs/STs and the other backward<br />
sections in certain areas…<br />
The failure of political leadership is typically reflected<br />
in enacting weak laws when it comes to effectuating the<br />
promise to empower the poor and the marginalised or<br />
ensure social/economic justice to them...<br />
Nevertheless, government has not been oblivious of<br />
the governance deficit in the implementation of development<br />
programmes as a whole. The Tenth Five Year Plan<br />
recognised that better governance holds the key to<br />
achieving effective results for the development programmes<br />
initiated by the government. This perception<br />
has led to articulation of a nation-specific paradigm of<br />
governance, different from an international perspective…<br />
The strategy for governance outlined above would<br />
have to be multi-dimensional. It should have elements of<br />
protection, development, participation, effective administration,<br />
accountability, inclusive politics and a paradigm<br />
shift in the approach to violence.<br />
The incidence of atrocities on SCs and STs is on the<br />
increase, and the deterrence envisaged in the laws specially<br />
enacted for this purpose does not operate. This is<br />
because implementation of important criminal laws –<br />
PCR Act and SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (the<br />
Atrocities Act, in short) has been dismal. The Atrocities<br />
Act is not merely a penal law. The Act and Rules contain<br />
fairly elaborate provisions for prevention of atrocities and<br />
protection to the SCs. Their effective implementation is<br />
frustrated by indifference, social bias, routine observance<br />
of procedures and even withdrawal of registered cases.<br />
Conviction rates for crimes against Scheduled Castes and<br />
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Scheduled Tribes are abysmal – less<br />
than one percent.<br />
The implementation of laws abolishing<br />
socially degrading practises<br />
such as manual scavenging, the<br />
devadasi system, trafficking in<br />
women and children, etc is even more<br />
dismal than that of criminal laws…<br />
Indebtedness is the chief cause of<br />
land alienation and forced labour.<br />
Indebtedness among STs is particularly<br />
widespread on account of food<br />
insecurity, non-availability of production<br />
and consumption credit through<br />
public institutions and corruption in<br />
the Public lending agencies…<br />
Reservations in Public<br />
Employment Recruitment and promotion<br />
has proved to be the most successful instrument<br />
of elevating the status and improving the conditions of<br />
SCs/STs/OBCs who have benefited from it. But reservation<br />
policy has been subverted through different ways by<br />
private persons as well as responsible public officials…<br />
The development paradigm pursued since independence<br />
has aggravated the prevailing discontent among<br />
marginalised sections of society. This is because the development<br />
paradigm as conceived by the policy makers has<br />
always been imposed on these communities, and therefore<br />
it has remained insensitive to their needs and concerns,<br />
causing irreparable damage to these sections…<br />
In the case of SCs and also tribes, protection against<br />
social discrimination is the essential condition for the<br />
enjoyment of any development benefits that remain unrealised.<br />
The pattern of development and its implementation<br />
has increased corrupt practices of a rent seeking<br />
bureaucracy and rapacious exploitation by the contractors,<br />
middlemen, traders and the greedy sections of the<br />
larger society intent on grabbing their resources and violating<br />
their dignity.<br />
It is critical for the government to recognise that dissent<br />
or expression of dissatisfaction is a positive feature of<br />
democracy, that unrest is often the only thing that actually<br />
puts pressure on the government to make things work<br />
and for the government to live up to its own promises.<br />
However the right to protest, even peacefully, is often not<br />
recognised by the authorities and even non-violent agitations<br />
are met with severe repression. Greater scope and space for<br />
democratic activity will bring down the scale of unrest, as<br />
it would create confidence in governance and open channels<br />
for expression of popular discontent. What is surprising<br />
is not the fact of unrest, but the failure of the State<br />
to draw right conclusions from it. While the official policy<br />
documents recognise that there is a direct correlation<br />
between what is termed as extremism and poverty, or<br />
take note of the fact that the implementation of all development<br />
schemes is ineffective, or point to the deep relationship<br />
between tribals and forests, or that the tribals<br />
suffer unduly from displacement, the governments have<br />
in practice treated unrest merely as a law and order problem.<br />
It is necessary to change this mindset and bring<br />
about congruence between policy and implementation.<br />
There will be peace, harmony and social progress only if<br />
there is equity, justice and dignity for every one<br />
Panchayati Raj<br />
“The unfortunate confrontation between the tribal<br />
people and the State that has been accentuating ever since<br />
independence will dissipate and disappear once the traditional<br />
system of the tribal people is taken as the foundation<br />
of governance in the tribal areas. The people will be<br />
able to perceive the supra structure of administration as<br />
continuation of their own system with no traces of antagonistic<br />
relationship”. This statement sums up the great<br />
expectation of Bhuria Committee (February 1995) that<br />
had been constituted to recommend such ‘exceptions and<br />
modifications’ as may be deemed necessary while extending<br />
Part IX of the Constitution concerning Panchayats to<br />
the Scheduled Areas (SA). 3<br />
…Even within Jharkhand, for example, the traditional<br />
system is strongest amongst the Ho people; it is comparatively<br />
weak amongst the Santhals and the Mundas and<br />
very weak amongst the Orans….<br />
…While PESA does acknowledge the centrality of the<br />
traditional system, albeit with reference to the community<br />
at the village level in the form of Gram Sabha (GS) or<br />
village council, it makes no provision for or even reference<br />
to the place and role of any of the existing traditional<br />
institutions at the village and higher levels.<br />
According to PESA, there are three partners in governance<br />
at the village level in SA, namely, the community in<br />
the form of GS, Panchayats and the State. In this frame the<br />
position of GS is unique by virtue of the fact that it comprises<br />
‘We, the People of the Village’ themselves, while<br />
other institutions, at best, comprise people’s representatives.<br />
Discontent and radical politics<br />
….The intensity of unrest resulting in extremist methods<br />
and effort to resolve issues through violent means as<br />
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18<br />
The erstwhile landlord himself is in<br />
many cases willing to let the<br />
government of Andhra Pradesh<br />
assign the land to the poor identified<br />
by the Maoists provided some of it is<br />
left to him, but the government has<br />
resisted this resolution of the<br />
problem on the ground that it would<br />
sanctify lawlessness<br />
a challenge to state authority is in response to the gathering<br />
of unresolved social and economic issues for long<br />
durations. It creates the impression that policy making<br />
and administration responds to extreme means. The more<br />
recent development is in the emergence of CPI (Maoist)<br />
after the merger and consolidation two powerful naxalite<br />
streams in September, 2004. This new formation, since its<br />
inception, is defining the official understanding of the<br />
extremist phenomenon of the level of the state as well as<br />
the Union Government. This has appeared in the public<br />
perception as a simplistic law-and-order face-off between<br />
the official coercive machinery and this more radical<br />
extremist political formation. The social consequence<br />
results, then, in undermining instruments of social and<br />
economic amelioration as well as processes of democratic<br />
exchange to resolve persisting issues. This is the crux of<br />
the problem.<br />
Perhaps due to the Union Government’s attention to<br />
the CPI (Maoist) (formed by the merger of CPI M-L<br />
(Peoples War) with Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in<br />
September 2004 and its association to the Naxalite phenomenon,<br />
that party and its method of functioning have<br />
started defining the official understanding of the Naxalite<br />
movement. That is neither factually accurate nor adequate<br />
for discussing the proper governmental response to<br />
it. There is no need to go into the history and genealogy<br />
of the Naxalite movement, but it is necessary to state that<br />
there are a very large number of Naxalite groups/parties,<br />
and their method of functioning differs in regard to the<br />
extent of mobilisation of the people, participation of people<br />
in their actions, role of armed underground cadre,<br />
etc., though all of them owe allegiance to the idea that the<br />
Indian State must be overthrown by force as a precondition<br />
of revolutionary change in our society. Some of them<br />
even have representatives in elected bodies from the panchayats<br />
to the legislatures. The unrest this report is concerned<br />
about is also not reducible to dramatic incidents<br />
such as blowing up or blasting of police stations but<br />
encompasses also mass unrest. Mass participation in militant<br />
protest has always been a characteristic of Naxalite<br />
mobilisation, not only in Bihar, but also elsewhere. The<br />
ban placed by many state governments, and at the national<br />
level by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, on<br />
the Maoist party and its mass organisations, and the formal<br />
and informal prohibition imposed by the police on<br />
such activity in the case of other Naxalite groups, has<br />
often rendered such mass activity virtually impossible.<br />
But that is no reason for ignoring the fact that the unrest<br />
this report is concerned with has often had mass character.<br />
….It is the purpose of this report to see how the<br />
Government may eliminate the causes of unrest by constitutional<br />
and legal means and restore faith of the affected<br />
population in the system of governance established by<br />
the constitution and law.<br />
However, the fact that the naxalites employ methods<br />
of violence in tackling these issues has other consequences,<br />
which include injury, fear and disruption of normal<br />
life. It is also a fact that Naxalite activity is not confined<br />
to solving people’s grievances. They are engaged in<br />
a violent fight against the State for overpowering and<br />
overthrowing it. This fight has its adverse consequences<br />
in terms of the injury and disruption it causes. The link<br />
between what the report deals with, and what it does not,<br />
lies in the fact that it is in the course of providing answers<br />
to the people’s problems and needs that the Naxalite<br />
movement seeks to obtain their support from the masses.<br />
Land related factors<br />
…though aspiration of “land to the tiller” continues to<br />
be given, the focus of the Naxalite movement is on trying<br />
to provide land, whether the land of landlords or government<br />
land, to the landless. In occupying landlords’ land,<br />
the Naxalites have not taken law as their reference point.<br />
It is not the ceiling-surplus land of the landlords that they<br />
have sought to put in the possession of the landless.<br />
Rather, they have targeted landholders whose holding is<br />
sizeable as they see it, or who are otherwise oppressive or<br />
cruel in their conduct, or hostile towards the Naxalite<br />
movement…<br />
...There is no estimate of the total extent of such land<br />
lying fallow in the State, but there is little doubt that it<br />
runs into tens of thousands of acres, especially in<br />
Warangal, Karimnagar and Adilabad districts. 4 The erstwhile<br />
landlord himself is in many cases willing to let the government<br />
of Andhra Pradesh assign the land to the poor identified<br />
by the Maoists provided some of it is left to him, but the<br />
government has resisted this resolution of the problem on the<br />
ground that it would sanctify lawlessness. Thousands of<br />
acres of land thus remain fallow. …<br />
…But all said and done, considering the central place<br />
the slogan of land to the tiller has in Naxalite politics,<br />
their attempt at redistribution of private land has been<br />
meagre. And even that little has been defeated by the<br />
State’s determined opposition to letting lawless means<br />
succeed, even for the beneficial purpose of giving land to<br />
the landless. If the government can get over these unnecessary<br />
qualms, it should be possible to devise legal means<br />
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get the land. Some of the land can probably be taken over<br />
under land reform laws and distributed to the poor…<br />
…In Bihar all the Naxalite parties have attempted to<br />
assist, in their respective areas of influence, the landless<br />
Musahars, the lowest among the Dalits, to take possession<br />
of a sizable extent of such land…<br />
…To defuse social tension government may regularise these<br />
occupations if the occupiers are otherwise eligible.<br />
In the case of forestland, occupation by the Adivasis<br />
with the encouragement and assistance of the Naxalites,<br />
has taken place on an extensive scale in Andhra Pradesh,<br />
Chhattisgarh, the Vidarbha region of Maharashtra,<br />
Orissa and Jharkhand. In fact much of it is not fresh occupation<br />
but re-assertion of traditional usufructory rights<br />
declared by the law to be illegal. Properly conducted forest<br />
settlement proceedings should have protected at least<br />
the pre-existing rights, but much of forest settlement proceedings<br />
have taken place behind the back and over the<br />
head of the Adivasi forest dwellers.<br />
The government’s statistics show that 39 percent of<br />
what is called forest encroachment in the whole country<br />
has taken place in the above region. Much of it, as said<br />
above, is not encroachment but occupation that far predates<br />
forest reservation and forest laws. Prior to 1980 the<br />
various State governments would off and on acknowledge<br />
this fact by regularising the occupation, thereby giving<br />
back what has been unilaterally taken away. But the<br />
Forest Conservation Act, 1980 put an end to such regularisation,<br />
and put the forest dwellers perpetually on the<br />
brink of eviction from their own habitat. This enabled the<br />
Naxalites to step into the vacuum to espouse the popular<br />
cause and secure popular support. The fear of Naxalite<br />
armed resistance deterred the repressive and depredatory<br />
moves of the authorities.<br />
…Perhaps a comprehensive registration of sharecroppers<br />
on the lines of the registration of bargadars in West<br />
Bengal would consolidate this gain.<br />
...Considering that mineral resources are largely located<br />
in the predominantly tribal tracts in the country, it is<br />
important that mineral exploration and development<br />
activity is carried out in such a way that (i) it is consistent<br />
with and non-intrusive of the rights and privileges conferred<br />
on the tribals under the Fifth Schedule and (ii) it<br />
causes least disturbance to the ecology that surrounds the<br />
tribal habitats. In this regard, it is necessary to keep in<br />
view the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme<br />
Court in the Samata case (referred earlier). The local tribal<br />
communities, through their Gram Sabhas, should be<br />
fully involved in any decision taken on mining in the first<br />
instance. Even if mining were to be taken up in exceptional<br />
cases, as already referred to, the Constitutional rights<br />
of the tribals with regard to ownership of the land and its<br />
resources should be fully protected.<br />
Eviction, displacement must stop<br />
…. It is well known that 40 people of all the people<br />
displaced by dams in the last 60 years are forest-dwelling<br />
adivasis…<br />
Adivasis displaced by irrigation projects in Orissa<br />
have migrated to the forests of Visakhapatnam district of<br />
Andhra Pradesh in large numbers…<br />
…Unless the law declares that at least insofar as<br />
Central legislation or administrative orders are concerned,<br />
a Scheduled tribe recognised as such in any state<br />
is eligible for the benefits all over the country, internally<br />
displaced Adivasis who have crossed state borders will<br />
remain without any protection in law. Since non-inclusion<br />
of a tribe in a State’s list only means that the tribe is<br />
not found there, and not that it lacks tribal characteristics<br />
in that State, such a prescription would do no harm to the<br />
purpose of identification of Scheduled Tribes under the<br />
Constitution. Indeed there is no reason why the same<br />
rule cannot be adopted for State legislation too. A group<br />
of Adivasis recognised ST in any State should be recognised<br />
all over the country in respect of their legal and<br />
other developmental entitlements.<br />
…through this process of forced migration, many tribals<br />
have left their villages and even State and migrated<br />
into neighbouring states. This involuntary displacement<br />
and migration has caused further distress among the tribals<br />
and created administrative problems for the host<br />
State…<br />
It is, therefore, time to think about a comprehensive<br />
policy frame in which such internal displacement of different<br />
groups of population, whether tribal or Dalit, does<br />
not take place and in case it happens there should be a<br />
government policy to take care of such a situation…<br />
In Bihar there have been many instances where Dalits<br />
suffering social oppression, and in recent times victims of<br />
the massacres perpetrated by the caste Senas such as<br />
Ranbir Sena, have had to flee their hamlets and settle<br />
elsewhere. Indeed, prevention of the depredations of the<br />
caste Senas is the state’s duty in the first instance. It has<br />
failed not only in that but also in providing protection to<br />
the victims so that they are not forced to migrate, or at<br />
least shelter and livelihood at the places where they have<br />
migrated to. The victims have received that help from the<br />
Naxalites. The trauma of displacement for which the<br />
state does not provide succour creates space for violent<br />
movement…<br />
…In Bihar all the Naxalite parties<br />
have attempted to assist, in their<br />
respective areas of influence, the<br />
landless Musahars, the lowest<br />
among the Dalits, to take possession<br />
of a sizable extent of such land…<br />
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Often it is as frustrating an<br />
experience to go to the police station<br />
as a complainant as it is fraught with<br />
danger to go as a suspect. Women<br />
who go to a police station to<br />
complain of sexual abuse or...<br />
Social Oppression<br />
The fight against the social oppression that the Dalits<br />
and the lower among the OBCs have been regularly subjected<br />
to is perhaps the most significant among the issues<br />
used by the Naxalite movement…<br />
…‘Begar’, or forced labour in all its forms is also prohibited<br />
by the Constitution in Article 23…<br />
…A sense of powerlessness is a characteristic of the<br />
psychological make up of oppressed classes. The typical<br />
Naxalite cadre, however, is a confident (most probably<br />
gun-wielding) teenager from those very classes. To see<br />
young boys and girls of their own villages and their own<br />
class/caste active in the Naxalite movement, and wielding<br />
power over the ‘big’ men of the village and the high<br />
and mighty tahsildar has given a sense of empowerment<br />
to the oppressed that has inestimable value…<br />
…The uncertain existence of Adivasis in the forests<br />
has resulted in tremendous power of harassment in the<br />
hands of forest department personnel. It is permissible to<br />
pick edible forest produce but not to undertake cultivation<br />
of the same produce in the forests. It is permissible to<br />
gather dry twigs and logs of uprooted trees but not to cut<br />
standing timber. It is permissible to graze cattle in the<br />
forests, but it should be ensured that the cattle do not nibble<br />
at the nurseries of the forest department. In some<br />
States timber can be gathered for house construction but<br />
not for any other purpose. Quite apart from the injustice<br />
of the restrictions, the dividing line between what can be<br />
done and what cannot is often so slight that there is considerable<br />
ground for arbitrary action by the enforcer of<br />
the restrictions. Wherever there is a basis for discretion<br />
on the part of government officials, forest personnel have<br />
had to be appeased in different ways to avoid harassment.<br />
It was only after the Naxalites entered the picture<br />
that the Adivasis got protection from this harassment,<br />
which was well known to the administration but was normally<br />
ignored.<br />
On some occasions the Naxalites have been able to<br />
put pressure upon lower level administrators to perform<br />
their job effectively. The pressure exerted by the Naxalite<br />
movement has had some effect in ensuring proper attendance<br />
of teachers, doctors etc., in Andhra Pradesh,<br />
Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh, but it is also true that<br />
such employees have made the presence of the Naxalites<br />
an excuse for not attending to their duties properly in the<br />
interior areas…<br />
The fact is that the Naxalites do not see it as their job<br />
to reform the administration, but to supplant it where<br />
possible and debunk it otherwise…<br />
In the matter of resolution of disputes among the people<br />
and finding redressal, the contribution of the Naxalite<br />
movement has been significant. There is in general no<br />
administrative or judicial mechanism in our country for<br />
resolution of day-to-day conflicts and disputes…<br />
The Naxalite movement has provided a mechanism<br />
(usually described as a ‘Peoples Court’) whereby these disputes<br />
are resolved in a rough and ready manner, and generally<br />
in the interests of the weaker party. It has the two<br />
elements of speed and effectiveness. Justice and fairness<br />
are however often disputed. In particular, use of force disproportionate<br />
to the issue involved is fairly common…<br />
Police lack credibility<br />
Efficient and impartial policing is an important<br />
requirement of good administration. But the fact is that<br />
the weaker sections of the people do not have much faith<br />
in the police. They have no faith that justice will be done<br />
to them against the powerful. Nor do they trust that the<br />
police will take interest in doing their duty where the<br />
poor alone are involved, because the poor do not have the<br />
wherewithal to make it worthwhile. Often it is as frustrating<br />
an experience to go to the police station as a complainant as<br />
it is fraught with danger to go as a suspect. Women who go to<br />
a police station to complain of sexual abuse or domestic harassment<br />
are made painfully aware of this fact. Here lies one of<br />
the attractions of the Naxalite movement. The movement<br />
does provide protection to the weak against the powerful,<br />
and takes the security of, and justice for, the weak and<br />
the socially marginal seriously…<br />
Any agitation supported or encouraged by the Naxalites is<br />
brutally suppressed without regard to the justice of its<br />
demands.<br />
...The administration should not have waited for the<br />
Naxalite movement to remind it of its obligations<br />
towards the people in these matters…<br />
…It should be recognised that such a responsibility<br />
would lie upon the Indian State even if the Naxalites<br />
were not there, and even in regions where the Naxalite<br />
movement does not exist.<br />
State’s answer<br />
From early seventies to the middle eighties, the central<br />
government and the planning commission recognised<br />
the basic principles enunciated in the Preamble of<br />
the Constitution and the major points under the Directive<br />
Principles of State Policy. The Plan documents used to<br />
reiterate the commitment to reduction in inequality of<br />
income and wealth among and within different sections<br />
of the community.<br />
The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)‘s Annual<br />
Report for the year 2006-2007 mentions the spread of<br />
Naxal movement across 12 states of the Union. The pro-<br />
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file of violence during the last few years has been as follows:<br />
Government policy<br />
The salient features of government policy to deal<br />
with the Naxal problem, as outlined in the Ministry of<br />
Home Affairs Status Paper brought out in May 2006, are<br />
summarised below:<br />
i) deal sternly with the Naxalites indulging in violence;<br />
ii) address the problem simultaneously on political, security<br />
and development fronts in a holistic manner;<br />
iii) ensure inter-state coordination in dealing with the<br />
problem;<br />
iv) accord priority to faster socio-economic development<br />
in the Naxal affected or prone areas;<br />
v) supplement the efforts and resources of the affected<br />
states on both security and development fronts;<br />
vi) promote local resistance groups against the Naxalites;<br />
vii) use mass media to highlight the futility of Naxal violence<br />
and the loss of life and property caused by it;<br />
viii) have a proper surrender and rehabilitation policy for<br />
the Naxalites; and<br />
ix) affected states will not have any peace dialogue with<br />
the Naxal groups, unless the latter agree to give up<br />
violence and arms;<br />
All these constitute ingredients of internal security<br />
which the State should address by appropriate sectoral<br />
ameliorative measures. The removal of other insecurities<br />
like land insecurity, livelihood insecurity, food insecurity<br />
and security against economic and social oppression<br />
were not being properly addressed. These issues have to<br />
be responded to fairly and justly…<br />
The Naxal problem has to be tackled in a multipronged<br />
approach. Some of the ameliorative measures<br />
like National Rural Employment Guarantee Act<br />
(NREGA), 2005, The Scheduled Tribes and Other<br />
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest<br />
Rights) Act, 2006, National Rehabilitation & Resettlement<br />
Policy, 2007 have been introduced and mentioned elsewhere<br />
in the report.<br />
…the Forest Dwellers Rights Act, on 19th June, 2007,<br />
clarified certain difficult points, for instance, “other traditional<br />
rights”, “primarily reside in and dependent on forest<br />
or forest land”, “Rights to minor forest produce” etc.<br />
to remove any ambiguity or ambivalent nuances and for<br />
easy implementation for benefit of the target groups. But<br />
they were summarily deleted in the final notification of<br />
the Rules published on January 01, 2008. Unless the original<br />
clarifications as contained in the draft Rules of 19th<br />
June, 2007 are restored fully, the Act would fail to achieve<br />
its objective of removing “historical injustice to forest<br />
dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest<br />
dwellers who are integral to the very survival and sustainability<br />
of the forest ecosystem”. Moreover, disaffection<br />
and dissatisfaction among them would grow, thereby<br />
aggravating social dissension and unrest….<br />
The NREGA is an important element in providing<br />
livelihood support and protection to the poorest of the<br />
poor. However, the experience so far suggests that in<br />
backward and remote districts with poor administrative<br />
structures the implementation is not at all satisfactory.<br />
There has been inadequate focus on systems, mechanisms<br />
and capacity in these areas, which need to be<br />
strengthened so that NREGA fulfils its promise to<br />
enhance livelihood support. Evidence from the backward<br />
and tribal areas of Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhatisgarh<br />
demonstrates that greater focus on better administrative<br />
support is required to extend the reach of these programmes.<br />
So far the evidence indicates that militants<br />
have not interfered with the implementation of this programme<br />
in these areas…<br />
Transparency in the functioning of the government is<br />
an essential requirement of good governance…<br />
Naxalism is a political tendency<br />
…Naxalite movement has to be recognised as a political<br />
movement with a strong base among the landless and poor<br />
peasantry and adivasis. Its emergence and growth need to be<br />
contextualised in the social conditions and experience of people<br />
who form a part of it…<br />
Since the goals of the movement are political it has to be<br />
addressed politically…<br />
...This approach is used the world over to tackle insurgencies<br />
democratically.<br />
The government’s Status Paper on the Naxal problem<br />
appropriately mentions a holistic approach and lays<br />
emphasis on accelerated socio-economic development of<br />
the backward areas. However, clause 4 (v) of the Status<br />
Paper states that “there will be no peace dialogue by the<br />
affected states with the Naxal groups unless the latter<br />
agree to give up violence and arms”. This is incomprehensible<br />
and is inconsistent with the government’s stand<br />
vis-à-vis other militant groups in the country.<br />
The government has been conducting peace talks<br />
with the Naga rebels of the NSCN (IM) faction for the last<br />
nearly ten years, even though the rebels have not only not<br />
surrendered their weapons but continue to build up their<br />
arsenal. What is worse, the NSCN (IM) have taken advantage<br />
of the peaceful conditions to consolidate their hold<br />
and establish what could be called almost a parallel government.<br />
In relation to ULFA also, the government is prepared<br />
to have a dialogue without insisting on the insurgents<br />
surrendering their weapons. In J&K, the government<br />
has more than once conveyed its willingness to<br />
hold talks with any group, which is prepared to come to<br />
the negotiating table. Why a different approach to the<br />
Naxals? The doors of negotiations should be kept open.<br />
Various aspects and roots of popular discontent were<br />
discussed in the preceding pages. The Naxalite movement<br />
is principally a political action for armed conquest<br />
of State power. It functions to this end through various<br />
organisations and by various means. There are also<br />
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armed cadres, usually organised as<br />
squads (Dalams). Violence or the<br />
threat of violence by the armed cadre<br />
invariably accompanies the solutions<br />
the Naxalite movement offers to<br />
popular grievances.<br />
When the State undertakes its<br />
response it cannot replicate this process.<br />
It is required to function<br />
through the law. Therefore recommendations<br />
are in terms of modifications<br />
to the law or effective implementation<br />
of the law, and State interventions<br />
to remove the basic causes<br />
of discontent, disaffection and<br />
unrest. It cannot be denied that<br />
Naxalite movement does have popular<br />
support in many areas.<br />
Scrap all debts<br />
The affected groups experience<br />
violence in their daily lives — SCs<br />
due to the caste based social order<br />
and STs due to cultural dominance of<br />
the larger society…<br />
Usury and indebtedness are the<br />
chief causes of acute distress and<br />
exploitation, like land alienation and<br />
bonded labour. …<br />
…All debt liabilities of weaker sections<br />
should be liquidated…<br />
The Scheduled Tribes and Other<br />
Traditional Forest Dwellers<br />
(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act<br />
2006 is a very significant step in<br />
recognising and vesting the forest<br />
rights and occupation in forest land,<br />
in forest dwelling, scheduled tribes<br />
and other traditional forest dwellers<br />
who have been residing in such forest<br />
for generations but whose rights<br />
cannot be recorded…<br />
All petty cases registered under forest<br />
related legislations against the Tribal<br />
people and other poor persons should be<br />
withdrawn.<br />
Land related steps<br />
…So there is an urgent need to<br />
review tenancy laws to protect the<br />
interests of tenants cultivating land of<br />
land owners on oral leases by providing<br />
them security of tenure and fare share of<br />
produce etc…<br />
...All types of agricultural tenancies<br />
should be recorded and<br />
rights of tenants should be<br />
secured and the rights of such tenants<br />
should be fully secured through<br />
enforced land to the tiller policy and<br />
ensure accessibility of tenants to<br />
non-land inputs…<br />
In many cases where land has<br />
been assigned to the landless poor<br />
under ceiling and bhoodan (land<br />
donation) laws and government<br />
lands, possession over this land has<br />
not been delivered. Where possession<br />
was delivered, many beneficiaries<br />
have been dispossessed from<br />
their land. Where dispossession has<br />
taken place after possession was<br />
delivered, land should be restored to<br />
the allotees and proper entry made<br />
in the land records.<br />
Landless poor in occupation of<br />
government land should not be treated<br />
as encroachers and should not be<br />
evicted ordinarily. All eligible occupants<br />
should be regularised. In case of<br />
eviction alternative sites should be<br />
provided. Such provisions should be<br />
given statutory force. Often land<br />
assigned to the poor is illegally<br />
grabbed by the powerful. The government<br />
should restore possession to<br />
the poor. If there are lacunae in the<br />
law, these should be removed.<br />
Comprehensive record of rights<br />
showing possession, ownership, etc.<br />
of all lands under cultivation should<br />
be prepared and made accessible to<br />
the people.<br />
<strong>Law</strong>s prohibiting transfer of<br />
Adivasi lands to non-Adivasis and<br />
acquisition of land by non-Adivasis<br />
in Fifth Schedule areas, where such<br />
laws exist, suffer from numerous<br />
loopholes besides tardy implementation…<br />
The entire Tribal Sub Plan area<br />
should be brought under the Fifth<br />
Schedule. A policy decision in this<br />
regard taken as far back as 1976<br />
should be implemented without any<br />
further delay.<br />
Whenever government assigns land<br />
to the landless, or when pattas are given<br />
under some settlement regulations, such<br />
assignment deeds and patta shall be<br />
jointly given in the name of the husband<br />
and wife, in order to effectively protect<br />
land rights of women.<br />
Land acquisition<br />
Acquisition of land has emerged<br />
as the single largest cause of involuntary<br />
displacement of tribals and<br />
turning them landless.<br />
Indiscriminate land acquisition<br />
should be stopped and land acquisition<br />
for public purpose should be<br />
confined to public welfare activities<br />
and matters of national security…<br />
‘Public purpose’ as defined in the<br />
amended Land Acquisition Act<br />
(amendment currently with<br />
Parliament) should be revised further<br />
and restricted to projects taken<br />
up for national security and public<br />
welfare implemented directly by the<br />
government ‘Public purpose’ should<br />
not be stretched to acquisition for companies,<br />
cooperative and registered societies…<br />
The areas in Central India where<br />
unrest is prevailing covers several<br />
States (like Andhra Pradesh, Orissa,<br />
Chhatisgarh, Madhya Pradesh,<br />
Jharkhand and part of Maharashtra)<br />
are minimally administered. State<br />
interventions both for development<br />
and for law and order had been fairly<br />
low. In fact there is a kind of vacuum<br />
of administration in these areas<br />
which is being exploited by the<br />
armed movement, giving some illusory<br />
protection and justice to the<br />
local population. The basic steps<br />
required in this direction include<br />
establishment of credibility and confidence<br />
of government; keeping a<br />
continuous vigil for fulfilment of<br />
people’s vision; effective protection,<br />
peace and good governance; rejuvenating<br />
tribal economy including<br />
social services; sustainable development<br />
with equity in tribal areas;<br />
holistic planning from below in<br />
scheduled areas; and negotiating<br />
crises by focussing on ending of confrontation.<br />
Endnotes<br />
1 Shah et al (2006), pp. 103-105.<br />
2 Government of India (2004), Report of the<br />
Expert Group on Prevention of Alienation of<br />
Tribal Land and its Restoration (New Delhi:<br />
Ministry of Rural Development).<br />
3 The Fifth Schedule of the Constitution refers<br />
to eight States which have a large tribal population<br />
– AP, Bihar, Gujarat, HP, MP,<br />
Maharashtra, Orissa and Rajasthan. The<br />
Sixth Schedule refers to the north-eastern<br />
States, which also have a large tribal population.<br />
4 Committee of Concerned Citizens (2002).<br />
22<br />
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MURDER OF DEMOCRACY<br />
Public outrage at<br />
activist’s murder<br />
Seeking transparent implementation of National Rural Employment Guarantee Act<br />
cost Lalit Mehta his life. This sad reality haunts poor and those who fight for their<br />
cause all over Jharkhand where Lalit’s death has created a fierce outrage, writes<br />
Parvinder Singh from Ranchi<br />
The murder of food rights<br />
activist Lalit Mehta, who was<br />
campaigning to make the<br />
national rural employment guarantee<br />
scheme more effective in<br />
Jharkhand, has spurred a larger civil<br />
society campaign against corruption<br />
and non-implementation of the<br />
scheme that guarantees 100 days of<br />
work to every poor rural household.<br />
Even as eminent social activists,<br />
including Swami Agnivesh,<br />
Magsaysay award winner Aruna<br />
Roy, Nikhil Dey and CPI politburo<br />
www.combatlaw.org<br />
member D Raja, gathered in the<br />
Jharkhand capital on June 10 to<br />
demand a CBI probe, a sense of outrage<br />
is giving way to a resolve to dig<br />
deep for a fight for accountability<br />
and implementation of entitlements<br />
meant for the poor.<br />
This mood was palpable during<br />
the mass rally held in the state<br />
capital Ranchi as marginalised<br />
people and concerned citizens,<br />
activists and organisations<br />
expressed their solidarity.<br />
The rally was preceded by a candlelight<br />
procession at Albert Ekka<br />
Chowk on the evening of June 7, and<br />
a two-day protest began. Senior journalist<br />
Prabhash Joshi and a host of<br />
Left leaders took to fast in protest.<br />
A statewide platform ‘Daman<br />
Evam Bhrashtachar Virodhi Sangharsh<br />
Samiti’ (Campaign committee<br />
against repression and corruption) --<br />
launched after Lalit’s killing – has<br />
been leading the agitation to continue<br />
the struggle for National Rural<br />
Employment Guarantee Act<br />
23
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MURDER OF DEMOCRACY<br />
(NREGA) in the tribal dominated<br />
state and carry forward the spirit that<br />
the slain engineering graduate represented.<br />
Death for asking food for poor<br />
Food is a life and death issue for<br />
millions in India and so is the struggle<br />
for securing it. This came to the<br />
fore when Lalit was murdered in<br />
cold blood on the night of May 14th<br />
at Kandaghati in Chhatarpur, about<br />
30-km from Ranchi.<br />
Lalit was campaigning to make<br />
the National Rural Employment<br />
Guarantee Act (NREGA) scheme<br />
work. This guarantees 100 days of<br />
employment, in Chhatarpur and<br />
Chainpur blocks that are among<br />
world’s most impoverished pockets.<br />
Two days after the engineerturned<br />
activist went missing; his<br />
body was exhumed by police from<br />
grave and identified on May 17.<br />
As many as 17 activists have been<br />
killed in the recent past in Jharkhand<br />
alone. Lalit’s death has sparked<br />
demands for state level action<br />
against corruption in the implementation<br />
of rural employment scheme<br />
in this tribal-dominated state.<br />
“No State operates in this area.<br />
The cost of resisting the power of<br />
landlords can well be loss of life,” is<br />
how Lalit, a member of Vikas Sahyog<br />
Kendra (VSK), a long-term partner of<br />
ActionAid, once described his work<br />
mainly based on rallying communities<br />
who had been pushed to the<br />
margins through debt, loss of land,<br />
crop failure and decades of discrimination.<br />
He knew the dangers involved in<br />
acting against the wishes of powerful<br />
local moneylenders, petty contractors<br />
and government officials.<br />
At the time of his death, he was<br />
helping a team of volunteers to conduct<br />
a social audit in a bid to get government<br />
anti-poverty schemes providing<br />
food, work and nutrition<br />
implemented in Chainpur and<br />
Chhattarpur blocks of Palamau district.<br />
Attempts had been made to dissuade<br />
the team from conducting<br />
their work, particularly in Chainpur<br />
Block. Lalit was killed just a day after<br />
the investigation began.<br />
24<br />
Putting life in the line of<br />
poor's service<br />
Lalit Mehta is not alone who has been slain for raising uncomfortable<br />
questions from the side of poor before well to do, moneyed sections<br />
who rob weak of their due but a host of other activists too are being<br />
done to death in similar murder. They are:<br />
AD Babu, convener of Karnataka unit of National Alliance of People's<br />
Movement (NAPM) and anti-liquor activist was attacked with swords and<br />
knives on July 21 in Karnataka while going to address an anti-liquor rally<br />
in the state. He soon succumbed to injuries inflected.<br />
Shiv Babu has been fighting for mine workers' rights in Allahabad district<br />
for years. A few months ago he was returning after attending a workers<br />
meeting at Shankargarh, about 40 kms away from Allahabad, when his<br />
motorcycle was hit by a truck. He succumbed to injuries brought through<br />
the accident. Colleagues and workers see the hand of local mafia in his<br />
death brought through a clever plot.<br />
Kameshwar Yadav was a CPI-ML (Liberation) activist, who took up<br />
NREGA related issues for the poor people of his Jharkhand state. He was<br />
killed and left on road near Giridih on June 7. His bullet riddled body was<br />
spotted after a few local people insisted and made him to accompany<br />
them to market. His family, friends and colleagues think his death to be an<br />
act of vendetta.<br />
Tapas Soren has been organising work for poor neighbours and his own<br />
family members under NREGA in his native Hazaribagh district of<br />
Jharkhand. All the workers have been victims of delayed payment for the<br />
work they have been doing and they had to pay cuts to the local government<br />
officials from their meagre earnings. On July 2 , Tapas went to bank<br />
and on finding no money having been transferred to his account, he went<br />
to see local block development officer (BDO). Locals say soon after this<br />
meeting Tapas doused himself with kerosene and set himself afire. He<br />
committed this act and gave up his life, according to his elder brother<br />
Dilip Soren, out of disgust born of officials' apathy.<br />
— With inputs from Elisabeth Abeson, Vijay Pratap, Anup Srivastava<br />
Local contractors and officials<br />
were unhappy with his work of<br />
exposing corruption and mobilising<br />
people to demand their rights.<br />
In the last year the VSK team<br />
had made great strides. They sensitised<br />
gram panchayat members.<br />
The quality of leaders improved.<br />
Corruption was exposed and<br />
even money recovered.<br />
Programmes for employment,<br />
pensions, and ration cards, mid-day<br />
meals for children and mother and<br />
infant nutrition centres were all<br />
given a kick start. School enrolment<br />
increased and mortgaged land was<br />
returned from moneylenders.<br />
One of the goals of VSK is to<br />
make accessible 100 days of employment<br />
for 16,000 families in 40 villages<br />
in the district.<br />
Rampant corruption<br />
Cases reported by the social audit<br />
exposed serious corruption. The<br />
muster roll for a community pond<br />
dug under the project listed 108<br />
names for receiving employment but<br />
the investigation reveals that in reality<br />
only 18 villagers had been working.<br />
In Cheeru village of Chhattarpur<br />
block, several names in the muster<br />
rolls were found to be fictitious.<br />
Since this region has high level of<br />
illiteracy, most people use thumb<br />
impressions as signatures. Villagers<br />
were surprised to find their handwritten<br />
signatures on muster rolls.<br />
“We have formally appraised the<br />
matter to NREGA commissioner and<br />
advised him to take corrective measures<br />
to ensure proper implementa-<br />
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MURDER OF DEMOCRACY<br />
tion of the act,” Jean Drèze who was<br />
the prime mover of the employment<br />
guarantee scheme said.<br />
Emerging consciousness<br />
For two weeks after Lalit’s murder,<br />
the public hearing at the government<br />
high school, Chhattarpur<br />
brought dozens of men and women<br />
from some of the poorest communities<br />
on this planet to the stage narrating<br />
tales of mismanagement that<br />
have made the employment scheme<br />
defunct in their areas.<br />
Thousands of tribal, Dalit and<br />
landless people, from the<br />
Chhatarpur and Chainpur blocks,<br />
looked on at officials with questioning<br />
eyes, as testimonies of corruption<br />
were shared, like fake muster rolls,<br />
forged signatures and fraudulent job<br />
applications.<br />
A message from chairperson<br />
of the ruling United Progressive<br />
Alliance Sonia Gandhi was read<br />
out, stating that: “Mehta worked<br />
in the region for the right to food.<br />
I also have learnt he had been<br />
carrying out social audit on the<br />
NREGA implementation. Maybe<br />
his work became a threat for<br />
those involved in the irregularities,<br />
which ultimately led to his<br />
killing.”<br />
“This is one of the most painful<br />
incidents in our recent history. The<br />
murder was brutal, pre-meditated<br />
and was an act of terror to attempt to<br />
silence the voice of peaceful fighters<br />
for justice,” said Babu Mathew, country<br />
director, ActionAid.<br />
“If our work was not relevant we<br />
would not have been attacked in this<br />
manner,” Mathew added.<br />
– The writer is associated with<br />
ActionAid<br />
DISABILITY RIGHTS<br />
UN opens new chapter<br />
in lives of the disabled<br />
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has come into force from 3rd<br />
May 3, 2008 with 20 countries ratifying this. India too is a signatory and thus committed<br />
to follow the convention. This can signal fresh hope for the disabled.<br />
A report by Cambat <strong>Law</strong> team<br />
The January-February 2008 edition<br />
of the <strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong> was a<br />
Disability Special and covered several<br />
issues related to persons with disabilities.<br />
Some of the articles touched<br />
upon the subject of the United<br />
Nations Convention on the Rights of<br />
Persons with Disabilities that had<br />
been adopted by the General<br />
Assembly of the United Nations in<br />
December 2006. It was further mentioned<br />
that India had signed the<br />
Convention excluding the Optional<br />
Protocol (which contained provisions<br />
for the monitoring and enforcement<br />
of the provisions of the<br />
Convention) in March 2007 and ratified<br />
it in October 2007. The<br />
Convention was however not in force<br />
then as it would have become operational<br />
only upon 20 countries ratifying it.<br />
Twenty countries including India<br />
have now ratified the UN<br />
Convention on the Rights of Persons<br />
with Disabilities. Jamaica was the<br />
www.combatlaw.org<br />
first nation to ratify the Convention<br />
and Ecuador the 20th. The<br />
Convention entered into force on 3rd<br />
May 2008. India and the other states<br />
that have ratified the Convention<br />
have undertaken to enact laws and<br />
take measures to provide for and<br />
improve the rights of persons with<br />
disabilities as also prevent discrimination<br />
against persons with disabilities.<br />
This Convention, which is the<br />
first human rights treaty of the 21st<br />
century, is also the fastest negotiated<br />
and the fastest one to enter into force<br />
as per a UN Press Release dated 2nd<br />
May 2008. It is estimated that the<br />
provisions of the Convention will<br />
seek to benefit about 650 million people<br />
worldwide forming about 10 per<br />
cent of the global population including<br />
about 70 million people in India.<br />
Countries that have ratified the<br />
UN Convention on Rights of Persons<br />
with Disabilities and the date of ratification<br />
Bangladesh - 30 November 2007<br />
Croatia - 15 August 2007<br />
Cuba - 6 September 2007<br />
Ecuador - 3 April 2008<br />
Egypt - 14 April 2008<br />
El Salvador - 14 December 2007<br />
Gabon - 1 October 2007<br />
Guinea - 8 February 2008<br />
Honduras - 14 April 2008<br />
Hungary - 20 July 2007<br />
India - 1 October 2007<br />
Jamaica - 30 March 2007<br />
Jordan - 31 March 2008<br />
Kenya - 19 May 2008<br />
Mali - 7 April 2008<br />
Mexico - 17 December 2007<br />
Namibia - 4 December 2007<br />
Nicaragua - 7 December 2007<br />
Panama - 7 August 2007<br />
Peru - 30 January 2008<br />
Philippines - 15 April 2008<br />
Qatar - 13 May 2008<br />
San Marino - 22 February 2008<br />
Slovenia - 24 April 2008<br />
South Africa - 30 November 2007<br />
Spain - 3 December 2007<br />
Tunisia - 2 April 2008<br />
<br />
25
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LAND GRAB<br />
Operation Grab-Back:<br />
Heeding Medha’s Cry<br />
In the wake of UP government’s decision to<br />
seize agricultural land in Kushinagar for the<br />
development of a Buddhist pilgrimage centre,<br />
the National Alliance of People’s Movements<br />
(NAPM) held its seventh biannual<br />
convention. Addressing activists from across<br />
the country, Medha Patkar identified landgrabs<br />
as the root-cause of some of India’s<br />
most pressing problems. Elisabeth Abeson<br />
interviewed Medha for further insight and<br />
recommended action<br />
Gathering thousands of people<br />
from India’s struggle movements<br />
is no small task.<br />
Battling agenda could conceivably<br />
result in organised defiance gone<br />
amuck. Yet, this did not happen at<br />
the seventh biannual convention of<br />
the National Alliance of People’s<br />
Movements (NAPM).<br />
A common theme emerged which<br />
linked the voices and reinforced their<br />
tenor. From farmers’ testimonies citing<br />
the injustice of the local landgrab<br />
for the creation of a “special<br />
religious zone” to the ousting of<br />
thrice-displaced slum-dwellers to<br />
make way for yet another urban<br />
mall, it became clear that many<br />
struggles shared the same root cause.<br />
The inaugural speech by NAPM<br />
convenor, Medha Patkar, identified<br />
special economic zones (SEZ) as the<br />
people’s foremost problem which<br />
requires immediate attention. This<br />
was due to the associated injustice<br />
and suffering caused as a result of<br />
such grabs.<br />
Post-convention Medha-ji clarified<br />
her mention of SEZs: “(Our)<br />
strategies are actually not limited to<br />
SEZs. We are questioning the taking<br />
away of land which is used for agriculture,<br />
horticulture and pisciculture<br />
to make way for manufacturing<br />
areas…The basic thing is that land<br />
that is a source of livelihood should<br />
not be grabbed and destroyed in the<br />
name of public purpose.”<br />
As Kushinagar’s “special religious<br />
zone” implies, the government<br />
has no scruples in terms of how it<br />
chooses to justify land-seizure. From<br />
coastal special tourism zones to the<br />
repeal of urban Ceiling Acts, there<br />
are endless ways to amputate people<br />
from their land, livelihood and cultural<br />
heritage – the wee bit of Bharat<br />
they call “home”.<br />
What concerns Medha the most is<br />
the degree to which, “big chunks of<br />
land are getting diverted...this is really<br />
a new phenomenon for India. And,<br />
the number, scale and pace at which<br />
SEZs have grown suggest that it is<br />
unprecedented even in the world.”<br />
Indeed, India Inc. seems to be<br />
running a clinical trial for testing the<br />
impact of widespread land-grabs on<br />
society with no precedent, guidelines<br />
or monitoring authority (unless the<br />
profiteers who shepherd the Acts<br />
through to implementation qualify<br />
as self-proclaimed auditors).<br />
Since land-grabs are colonising<br />
India and Medha Patkar identifies<br />
them as the root – cause of many ills,<br />
it seems prudent to identify the<br />
impact of land-grabs as a basis for<br />
collective action. This is not to diminish<br />
the importance of each struggle,<br />
but to call attention to an underlying<br />
issue which needs to be addressed<br />
across movements.<br />
Put simply, “Since land means<br />
land and everything attached to land,<br />
everything is affected by the (SEZ<br />
land acquisition) process.” It corporatises<br />
India’s natural resources, creates<br />
disparity, and worsens food<br />
security, unemployment, livelihood<br />
and housing crises. As if this was not<br />
enough, NAPM’s convener added<br />
that land-grabs change the priorities<br />
and the main participants in the<br />
planning process. They encourage<br />
corruption and erode the constitution<br />
as well as the governing powers<br />
of local authorities. Indeed, the<br />
impacts of land-grabs read like the<br />
“top 10” ills facing India today.<br />
Conversation excerpts follow:<br />
Medha highlighted the corporatisation<br />
of natural resources in the context<br />
of Foreign Direct Investment<br />
26<br />
COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008
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LAND GRAB<br />
(FDI) – underscoring the degree to<br />
which outside players are driving<br />
India's development process. “It is<br />
very, very clear that this kind of planning<br />
is corporate planning which is<br />
favouring private investors by transferring<br />
all concessions from farmers<br />
to corporates which have the global<br />
power of lending agency support<br />
with them.”<br />
This brought us to the food security,<br />
unemployment and livelihood<br />
crises – all of which are exasperated<br />
by the corporatisation of resources.<br />
“We have a very serious food security<br />
situation”, warned Medha-ji who<br />
questioned the government’s logic of<br />
seizing self-sustaining agricultural<br />
communities. “They are destroying<br />
the livelihoods of fishermen, of<br />
labourers, of everyone. And they are<br />
not creating as many jobs (as they are<br />
destroying).”<br />
From Nandigram to POSCO,<br />
Medha lamented that, “they are<br />
killing one kind of manufacturing<br />
and bringing in another kind of manufacturing<br />
(for which the local community<br />
is not skilled).” So, is there<br />
any reason to wonder why India is<br />
facing an unemployment and livelihood<br />
crisis?<br />
Here, Medha-ji made a point that<br />
India’s focus on rural displacement<br />
often overshadows the equally devastating<br />
effect of urban population<br />
displacement. “In the urban areas,<br />
the land is going to the Corporates<br />
and big builders because of the<br />
(repeal of the) Urban Land Ceiling<br />
Act. In Maharashtra, this is creating<br />
housing, unemployment and livelihood<br />
crises. There is also an expectation<br />
that industrialisation will absorb<br />
all those who are displaced, but that<br />
is not happening.”<br />
If seizure continues willy-nilly<br />
sans judicial interference, then before<br />
we know it the government will<br />
institutionalise land-grabs as an<br />
acceptable way of ‘doing business’.<br />
According to Medha, “The current<br />
development planning process<br />
increases the areas in which corporates<br />
have influence – policy making,<br />
planning, and so on – all of which<br />
will permanently affect the future of<br />
India.” She then cited the Mumbai<br />
Plan which was crafted in part by<br />
McKinsey, an American consulting<br />
firm. So much for ‘swaraj’ – guess it<br />
only had a shelf-life of 60 years.<br />
“As the government is handing<br />
over more and more land to the corporates,<br />
the priorities, actors, forces<br />
and the main participants in the<br />
planning process are changing.”<br />
Wouldn’t it be eerie if a people-centred<br />
notion of development became a<br />
thing of the past? Something that<br />
existed before the SEZ-sponsored<br />
cricket teams replaced the statebased<br />
system? If we don’t do something<br />
about it soon, then the next<br />
generation will be cheering for<br />
Reliance rather than Rajasthan by the<br />
time they turn five.<br />
As this scenario is clearly unacceptable,<br />
it seems peaceful agitation<br />
is in order. While I generally avoid<br />
military metaphors, “Operation<br />
Grab-Back” seems a fitting title for<br />
the people’s offensive since Medha<br />
regards the anti-SEZ movement as a<br />
struggle to prevent “the killing of<br />
communities”. According to the<br />
points raised in our discussion, this<br />
‘manoeuvre’ consists of a fourpronged<br />
plan: supporting local<br />
struggles, educating intellectuals and<br />
common people, protesting the existing<br />
land acquisition acts and creating<br />
a draft policy which advocates a people-centred<br />
development approach.<br />
In fact, on 18 June, NAPM presented,<br />
“a draft policy to the<br />
Planning Committee before<br />
Parliament which outlined the need<br />
for a Development Planning Act. It<br />
challenged new bills which are giving<br />
more and more land to the corporates<br />
and rallied for communities (to<br />
have) first rights to the resources<br />
within their boundaries...The proposed<br />
Act created a framework<br />
whereby, only after a community<br />
made a plan would the larger territory<br />
go through a democratic development<br />
procedure with minimum displacement.”<br />
Hopefully, the government’s selfsabotaging<br />
behaviour will end and<br />
the above logic will prevail.<br />
Otherwise, India will not be able to<br />
sustain the impact of its so-called<br />
‘development’. As the POSCO struggle<br />
indicates, people can only take so<br />
much — even satyagrahis submit to<br />
force. For example, anti and pro<br />
POSCO families are fighting each<br />
other with arms stored by local<br />
police in the schools of anti-POSCO<br />
villages they seized. If the government<br />
wants its people to survive long<br />
enough to reap the benefits of ‘development’,<br />
it seems prudent to re-visit<br />
existing bills and collectively address<br />
India’s plans. This process must be<br />
driven by locals rather than bribed<br />
Delhiites. Otherwise, a percentage of<br />
India may become extinct even<br />
before the Commonwealth games<br />
begin 1 .<br />
In closing, Medha stressed that,<br />
“It is very, very clear that this is not<br />
an acceptable form of development<br />
planning…It is changing the economic<br />
and political culture of the<br />
country,...and if it continues, it will<br />
become irreversible. People need to<br />
start questioning land grabs and supporting<br />
the battles and the decentralised<br />
planning process (in order to<br />
restore local communities with primary<br />
control over their own<br />
resources).”<br />
The bottom-line is that people<br />
need to either join ‘Operation Grab-<br />
Back’ or resign themselves to living<br />
in a nation officially ruled by CEOs<br />
and World Bank economists. Are<br />
people really keen to institutionalise<br />
corporate colonisation in a country<br />
that has already had more than its<br />
political share? Thankfully, you don’t<br />
have to wait until the Annual<br />
Meeting to cast your vote. If you<br />
want to retain your rights as a citizen<br />
(rather than a corporate shareholder)<br />
and safeguard a modicum of peace,<br />
then it is time to start grabbing back.<br />
— The writer is a Business and<br />
Human Rights specialist who is documenting<br />
the negative ramifications of<br />
corporate-led globalization in India.<br />
1 The Indian Government is investing $ 17.5<br />
billion to ‘modernise’ Delhi in time for the<br />
2010 Commonwealth Games. Modernisation<br />
includes a host of excuses to turn Delhi into<br />
a ‘showcase city’ through sterilisation campaigns<br />
ranging from displacing<br />
slum-dwellers for the creation of ‘Games<br />
Village’ to doing away with cycle rickshaws<br />
lest they leave visitors with the impression<br />
that India is more tarnished than ‘shining’.<br />
www.combatlaw.org<br />
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LAW AND JUDGEMENT<br />
A voice of conscience<br />
A second postmortem in a custody death was first<br />
declined and then acceded by Delhi High Court and in<br />
between two positions came judge’s conscience. <strong>Combat</strong><br />
<strong>Law</strong> Bureau presents the report about the unusual turn of<br />
events during the hearing of a Writ of Mandamus filed by<br />
two human rights lawyers<br />
In a landmark order, Delhi High<br />
Court ensured a second postmortem<br />
on the body of Hasib<br />
Qureshi, a victim of death in custody<br />
in Bareilly District Jail. Justice Vipin<br />
Sanghi had first declined to order<br />
another postmortem on the body as<br />
he felt that the matter fell under the<br />
jurisdiction of Allahabad High<br />
Court. Yet, the very next day he<br />
called parties and reversed his own<br />
order on May 24. He observed that<br />
his earlier order weighed on his conscience<br />
and so he spent sleepless<br />
night. He ordered a second postmortem<br />
to ward off and avert what<br />
he called a miscarriage of justice as<br />
time could be wasted in approaching<br />
Allahabad High Court, causing several<br />
days old body further harm and<br />
decay.<br />
Hasib’s relatives had pleaded<br />
before Justice Sanghi for another<br />
autopsy as they suspected him to<br />
have succumbed to injuries inflicted<br />
in Bareilly District Jail where he was<br />
lodged as undertrial. The jail authorities<br />
are accused by Hasib’s elder<br />
brother Anis of beating Hasib mercilessly<br />
and playing truant after his<br />
death in order to hush up a clear case<br />
of death due to inhuman torture in<br />
jail.<br />
Anis too had spent a few days in<br />
the same jail as a co-accused with<br />
Hasib. This was after Hasib’s wife<br />
filed a case against them under section<br />
498 A/506 Indian Penal Code<br />
and Section 314 of Dowry Protection<br />
Act at Faridpur police station in district<br />
Bareilly. Police arrived from<br />
Faridpur on May 9 to take the two<br />
brothers in custody from their west<br />
Delhi home. They were taken to<br />
Nangloi Police Station in Delhi by UP<br />
Police, produced before a<br />
Metropolitan Court in Delhi before<br />
being moved to Faridpur. The two<br />
brothers were remanded to Bareilly<br />
District Jail on being produced<br />
before a magistrate in Bareilly.<br />
Anis eventually was released on<br />
bail and rushed to Delhi where his<br />
sister was awaiting her wedding.<br />
However, the marriage was broken<br />
since Anis and his brother lost their<br />
He observed that his<br />
earlier order weighed<br />
on his conscience and<br />
so he spent sleepless<br />
night. He ordered a<br />
second postmortem to<br />
ward off and avert<br />
what he called a<br />
miscarriage of justice<br />
Justice Vipin Sanghi<br />
reputation by virtue of being sent to<br />
jail. Anis got busy in finding another<br />
match for his sister. In the meantime<br />
his Bareilly-based cousin Nasir was<br />
instructed by him to visit and take<br />
care of Hasib whose bail-plea was<br />
turned down by Bareilly court.<br />
Anis got a telephone call from<br />
jailer in Bareilly early afternoon on<br />
May 18, saying that Hasib was<br />
unwell and so the phone number of<br />
the prisoner’s local contact was needed.<br />
Anis not only promptly gave the<br />
phone number of Nasir but also<br />
offered to come to the jail to see<br />
Hasib. The jailer assured that the<br />
prisoner was not as serious as to warrant<br />
Anis to visit him.<br />
Soon Anis rang up Nasir to tell<br />
him to find out about Hasib. The<br />
phone was picked up by Nasir’s sister<br />
Nasrin. She told Anis that Nasir<br />
was already at Bareilly Jail, trying to<br />
meet Hasib for days. The jailer again<br />
rang up Anis to say that Nasir’s<br />
phone number given to him was<br />
wrong. Anis told the jailer about the<br />
talk he had had with Nasir’s sister<br />
through the same number.<br />
Anis left for Bareilly along with<br />
friends and family on May 18. The<br />
28<br />
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LAW AND JUDGEMENT<br />
next evening he was told by jail<br />
authorities of death of his brother<br />
Hasib. At the mortuary, they were<br />
not allowed to see the body. A friend<br />
who was able to peep in to find<br />
Hasib’s face to be bruised, forehead<br />
swollen, blood stains on teeth, stiffed<br />
raised arms, feet limping and sole<br />
twisted. The body was naked but for<br />
an underwear. A lone doctor conducted<br />
the postmortem. The body<br />
was sealed and handed over to Anis.<br />
It was brought to Delhi and taken<br />
to Nangloi police station by Haisb’s<br />
incensed relatives. They held a dharna<br />
asking for a second postmortem<br />
by a team of doctors in Delhi. The<br />
Deputy Commissioner of Police<br />
arrived at the police station and the<br />
body was taken in custody. It was<br />
kept at nearby Sanjay Gandhi<br />
Memorial Hospital. The family<br />
moved a Metropolitan Court for a<br />
suitable order in the wake of bizarre<br />
circumstances of Hasib’s death. It<br />
was declined for lack of court’s jurisdiction.<br />
The family contacted human<br />
rights lawyers Vipin Benjamin<br />
Mathew and Jayshree Satpute who<br />
moved a writ of mandamus before<br />
the Delhi High Court. Justice Sanghi<br />
heard the plea but declined to order a<br />
second post mortem on May 23 since<br />
the incident pertained to the jurisdiction<br />
of Allahabad High Court. The<br />
next day, however, his lordship<br />
revised his earlier order and issued<br />
directions to<br />
The Medical Superintendent of<br />
Sanjay Gandhi Memorial<br />
Hospital to preserve the body in<br />
the best possible manner and to<br />
trasport the same to AIIMS on<br />
May 26, 2008 latest by 11.00 am.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Constitute the medical board of at<br />
least three doctors to conduct the<br />
second postmortem of the<br />
deceased Hashib Qureshi.<br />
The postmortem report should<br />
specifically indicate external/<br />
internal injuries, if any, on the<br />
body of the deceased suffered by<br />
him post or ante mortem<br />
The postmortem has to be conducted<br />
on May 26, 2008 at 4 pm.<br />
The postmortem proceedings be<br />
video-graphed<br />
The original of the postmortam<br />
report and vido-graph shall be<br />
preserved in a sealed cover by<br />
AIIMS till further directions from<br />
the competent court looking into<br />
the death of Hashib Qureshi<br />
The copy of the second post<br />
mortem should be given to the<br />
petitioner<br />
<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Over half-a-million troops hold Kashmir<br />
captive. This has not only robbed people<br />
of their normal civilian space but also<br />
led to one of the worst traps that any<br />
land or its people have ever<br />
come under, says award<br />
winning documentary film<br />
maker Sanjay Kak<br />
Incarcerated<br />
land and people<br />
Kashmir remains one of the<br />
most underreported stories in<br />
the world. This is not because<br />
of just neglect, or a natural silence.<br />
It’s very carefully constructed. And<br />
the silence is paradoxically constructed<br />
out of a lot of noise. Kashmir is an<br />
issue that is perpetually in the news<br />
in India -- in print, in public life, on<br />
television. Yet, when one looks at the<br />
output of the huge machinery, there<br />
is very little in-depth analysis, showing<br />
very little understanding. So this<br />
will remain one of the paradoxes of<br />
our time; that while Kashmir is<br />
always in the news in India, it has<br />
never been understood.<br />
Of course, with the international<br />
media and India’s growing stature –<br />
whether real or imaginary -- as a<br />
world power, or a world power in the<br />
making, India is suddenly a very<br />
attractive commodity. Many countries<br />
that would have traditionally<br />
been very quick to pay attention to<br />
what is happening in Kashmir and<br />
comment on it, or take a position, are<br />
a bit reluctant, because they have<br />
vested interests here in India. They<br />
see it as a market.<br />
The way the Indian State has successfully<br />
projected Kashmir, first to<br />
the Indian people, and then to the<br />
world at large, is as follows. That<br />
1947 marks the partition of British<br />
India into India and Pakistan;<br />
Kashmir was a disputed zone, and<br />
that Pakistan has illegally grabbed a<br />
part of it, and the rest of it has rightfully<br />
fallen within India. Hence, the<br />
current situation is really a dispute<br />
between India and Pakistan.<br />
30<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Such a characterisation completely<br />
ignores the fact that for long there<br />
has been—as it continues to be – an<br />
issue of self-determination of the<br />
people of Kashmir. This is a demand<br />
that predates Partition by at least a<br />
decade and it has been a part of public<br />
discourse in Kashmir ever since or<br />
even before. However, somehow that<br />
political demand for freedom, or<br />
azadi, or some form of self-determination,<br />
has completely been buried<br />
by its over simplification as an India-<br />
Pakistan dispute.<br />
The Indian State has managed to<br />
curtain off Kashmir from intelligent<br />
scrutiny by three rather deft curtains.<br />
The first, obviously, is Pakistan.<br />
Whenever you speak of Kashmir in<br />
India or anywhere else, the Indian<br />
position always is that this is a movement<br />
that is supported by Pakistan.<br />
Since Pakistan as a State is presented<br />
as inimical to India, how can one<br />
possibly have any kind of sympathy<br />
or space or understanding for such a<br />
movement? If one makes it past this<br />
first layer of obfuscation, then, of<br />
course, we are presented with the<br />
idea that what we are seeing in<br />
Kashmir is part of an Islamic movement,<br />
a jihad; and this is something<br />
that none of us are in a position to be<br />
able to sympathise with. Therefore,<br />
once again a curtain is drawn over<br />
Kashmir. And thirdly, the issue of the<br />
treatment of religious minorities in<br />
Kashmir by the pro-independence<br />
whatever the ideology<br />
one swears by — pro-<br />
Independence, pro-<br />
Pakistan, even pro-<br />
India — people are<br />
collectively asking for<br />
the withdrawal of the<br />
Indian army. On that<br />
there will be<br />
consensus<br />
movement, by the separatists, which<br />
specifically refers to the fact that the<br />
Kashmiri Pandits had to leave<br />
Kashmir in the early 1990s in very<br />
large numbers. Conservative estimates<br />
of the number of Pandits who<br />
had to flee are approximately<br />
200,000, and there are perhaps less<br />
than 10,000 who continue to live in<br />
the Valley. This was seen as a sign of<br />
a movement which was exceedingly<br />
intolerant, was communal, and<br />
therefore, once again, undeserving of<br />
our sympathy and understanding.<br />
Collectively then, these three curtains<br />
are employed to obscure the<br />
issue at hand, this kind of rhetoric<br />
completely puts a blanket over the<br />
issue, in a way which encourages<br />
most Indians to look away from<br />
Kashmir.<br />
What do people want? What is<br />
the demand for azadi, freedom? This<br />
idea crops up in Kashmir with such<br />
frequency, that we must question<br />
what this word encompasses. This is<br />
not easy, so let us start by defining<br />
what everybody is likely to agree on.<br />
It would be fair to say that in principle,<br />
whatever the ideology one<br />
swears by -- pro-Independence, pro-<br />
Pakistan, even pro-India – people are<br />
collectively asking for the withdrawal<br />
of the Indian army. On that there<br />
will be consensus. Beyond that, in<br />
order to get a real answer to that<br />
question of what people want when<br />
they ask for azadi, there must be a<br />
democratic space in which to hear<br />
what people are saying. Kashmir is<br />
under far too much stress. Is it not<br />
unreasonable to have 600,000 soldiers<br />
sitting on a tiny population and<br />
then expect to hear genuine democratic<br />
voices talking about what people<br />
really want? The complexities of<br />
the mixed answers that we hear,<br />
which sound like confusion to the<br />
outside world, are in fact a byproduct<br />
of the extreme militarisation of<br />
the Valley.<br />
Along with militarisation comes<br />
the occupation of valuable land,<br />
water and even human labour. For<br />
instance, in every village in India<br />
there is always a scarcity of water,<br />
and of course it is accompanied by<br />
disputes. But traditionally a kind of<br />
when the soldiers are<br />
kept in one place for<br />
too long in the midst<br />
of a civilian<br />
population, they will<br />
begin to exploit that<br />
area in new ways.<br />
They will begin to call<br />
upon the civilian<br />
population to do<br />
unpaid labor<br />
mechanism is worked out. But<br />
Kashmiri villagers can’t argue with<br />
security forces, especially since they<br />
have all the weapons and the civilians<br />
don’t. The appropriation of<br />
resources and land begins with public<br />
facilities: school buildings being<br />
taken over to house troops, water<br />
towers made into watch towers, and<br />
indiscriminate use of water drawn<br />
out in huge quantities by the army<br />
for their own needs.<br />
More importantly, when the soldiers<br />
are kept in one place for too<br />
long in the midst of a civilian population,<br />
they will begin to exploit that<br />
area in new ways. They will begin to<br />
call upon the civilian population to<br />
do unpaid labour, because these are<br />
very remote areas and these are areas<br />
that have traditionally been neglected<br />
by the civilian governments too.<br />
These are people with no access to an<br />
arena in which they can voice their<br />
concerns. They don’t have access to<br />
the media; there are no human rights<br />
groups that are able to get to them.<br />
So if you travel into the interior of<br />
Kashmir, that’s what you begin to<br />
hear: A more brutal, in-your-face<br />
kind of oppression. It is not simply<br />
the continuous checking and crosschecking<br />
at a check post every half-akilometre.<br />
This is the kind of tribulation<br />
that urban Kashmiris feel. In the<br />
countryside, it is a much more<br />
medieval kind of oppression that<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
people face. It accumulates into a<br />
feeling of grave resentment and hostility.<br />
It is not a question whether the<br />
army was better behaved or had<br />
more discipline. Armies are<br />
machineries of war. That’s what<br />
they’re trained for. Armies are meant<br />
to fight wars, and when you place<br />
them in the middle of civil positions,<br />
they behave like armies, which is<br />
what they are. At the end of it, you<br />
have deep resentment, you have<br />
gross violations of human rights, and<br />
you create a situation that far surpasses<br />
any predictions of the effect of<br />
militarisation on Kashmiris.<br />
The issue of the use of rape (and<br />
even more routinised sexual<br />
exploitation) in Kashmir is also a<br />
pressing human rights concern. It is<br />
also principally a traditional Muslim<br />
society, and that also makes it that<br />
much more difficult for people to<br />
speak about it. The civilian administration,<br />
especially in the countryside<br />
of Kashmir, is completely emasculated.<br />
They do not have any powers to<br />
restrain the security forces from<br />
doing anything. It is an archetypal<br />
conflict zone situation: There is one<br />
side with incredible powers right in<br />
the middle of a dispersed civilian<br />
population. There is a long history to<br />
this form of exploitation. There was<br />
the infamous incident of Kunan<br />
Poshpora, where an army unit had<br />
gone into a village and raped many<br />
women. In this case, the women actually<br />
came out and wanted to testify.<br />
However, the whole thing was just<br />
brushed aside. This remains a sore<br />
point. What are the women going to<br />
get if they are brave enough to come<br />
out and take on the shame and<br />
ignominy in a conservative society<br />
after admitting to having been<br />
raped? And then if no action is taken,<br />
the next time around they are not<br />
going to come out, because it is not<br />
going to bring them anything. It is<br />
the failure to provide justice that puts<br />
a kind of silence on women who suffer<br />
such huge abominations.<br />
There are also other forms of cultural<br />
humiliation that are occurring<br />
in Kashmir. There are two ways of<br />
looking at this cultural imperialism:<br />
32<br />
There are two ways of looking — one is that it is<br />
inadvertent and the other that it is intentional. The<br />
presumption is that Kashmir is an integral part of<br />
India. So it is kind of presumed that it is perfectly all<br />
right to have milestones that tell you distances in<br />
English and Hindi in a population where most<br />
people understand only Urdu<br />
one is that it is inadvertent and the<br />
other that it is intentional. Either way,<br />
it is reprehensible. But the presumption<br />
is that Kashmir is an integral<br />
part of India. So it is kind of presumed<br />
that it is perfectly alright to<br />
have milestones that tell you distances<br />
in English and Hindi in a population<br />
where most people understand<br />
only Urdu. So as far as the local<br />
people are concerned, the road itself,<br />
traffic on the roads. as well as the<br />
milestones are clearly meant only for<br />
the army soldiers, because they are<br />
the ones who read them in Hindi.<br />
There are, however, interesting<br />
ways in which civilians deal with the<br />
aftermath of oppression. For<br />
instance, how come when there is a<br />
funeral for a militant commander<br />
that 5,000 people turn out? It is not<br />
only that they are turning out to honour<br />
the memory of the militant commander;<br />
they are also turning out to<br />
express their rage at the hundred<br />
everyday humiliations that they suffer.<br />
Essentially, before we get stuck in<br />
looking at the conflict as some kind<br />
of human rights problem in Kashmir<br />
alone, what we have to acknowledge<br />
is that there is an equally massive<br />
failure of democracy in India that is<br />
going on. It is very important to<br />
locate it firmly in this context. It is<br />
not simply a question of whether or<br />
not we could discipline the army a<br />
bit or if we could improve our<br />
human rights record. As long as<br />
there is a set of legislations in place<br />
that are anti-democratic and only<br />
serve to silence people, these kinds of<br />
excesses will continue to go on.<br />
—This article is based on Sanjay<br />
Kak’s conversation on Kashmir with<br />
David Barsamian for Alternative Radio,<br />
Colorado, US<br />
www.alternativeradio.org<br />
COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Orphaned souls<br />
cry for help<br />
Kashmir conflict has<br />
turned out to be a<br />
virtual orphan factory.<br />
Eighty thousand<br />
children have been<br />
rendered orphan in 18<br />
years. Yet there is no<br />
mechanism in place in<br />
the entire state to look<br />
after children who<br />
become victim of<br />
grown ups’ battle,<br />
writes AR Hanjura<br />
For past 18 years, Kashmir is in a<br />
state of armed conflict and<br />
unrest. And this has inflicted a<br />
devastating impact upon the civilian<br />
population, particularly women and<br />
children as they get both directly and<br />
indirectly affected. Numerous crackdowns,<br />
search operations, bomb<br />
blasts, cordon offs, crossfire, armed<br />
showdowns and killings have not<br />
only worsened the human rights situation<br />
in Kashmir, but also shattered<br />
its economy. Around one lakh people<br />
have been killed in the conflict and as<br />
a result 80,000 children have been<br />
orphaned who lead a miserable life.<br />
The sheer conditions of their lives<br />
put them under depression and<br />
extreme mental trauma and agony.<br />
In a report, it has been revealed<br />
that 15,308 orphans are children of<br />
deceased militants and therefore<br />
they have as a matter of routine been<br />
ignored by the government. The<br />
Indian government as well as state<br />
government has a policy whereby<br />
the widows and children of militants<br />
are not eligible to get any relief or<br />
financial assistance. As a result, these<br />
orphans are not being rehabilitated<br />
either by the State through institutional<br />
care or at the community level.<br />
One fails to understand as to what is<br />
the fault of these children, some of<br />
whom were not even born when<br />
their fathers got involved in the<br />
armed movement?<br />
Children constitute 38 percent of<br />
the population of Jammu & Kashmir,<br />
out of which two to three percent are<br />
orphans who need special attention.<br />
Presently, only 1,600 orphans are<br />
staying in orphanages and Bal<br />
Ashrams as well as Nari Nikatans run<br />
by the state government. Only 17<br />
orphanages are being run by different<br />
voluntary organisations in the<br />
Kashmir Valley wherein some hundred<br />
orphan children are being<br />
looked after and educated. Although<br />
there is an ever growing need for<br />
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institutional care of orphans in<br />
Kashmir, but as one lakh orphans<br />
cannot practicably be housed in<br />
orphanages alone, community level<br />
rehabilitation is a must. Moreso,<br />
when the state of J&K does not have<br />
a regulatory authority or legislation<br />
available for the monitoring and regulation<br />
of orphanages. Generally run<br />
by unprofessional and inadequately<br />
qualified persons, the orphanages<br />
are not maintaining the minimum<br />
standards for child protection and<br />
development, whether physical or<br />
mental. Because of the fact that<br />
orphans are special children with<br />
special needs and attention, the<br />
managers of these orphanages<br />
need training in child rights and<br />
child psychology in order to<br />
understand their needs and rehabilitate<br />
the child accordingly.<br />
There is also a need for the enactment<br />
of legislation for regulation of<br />
these childcare centres and orphanages.<br />
This will ensure transparency,<br />
accountability and child protection.<br />
India being a signatory to the UN<br />
convention on child rights, has an<br />
obligation to ensure the protection of<br />
child rights in the state of Jammu &<br />
Kashmir where there is practically no<br />
infrastructure available for the welfare<br />
and rehabilitation of orphans. It<br />
is the need of the hour that the state<br />
should have a child protection commission<br />
or council for destitute children<br />
to ensure the protection of child<br />
rights, the welfare of children and<br />
their rehabilitation. This commission<br />
or council may suggest recommendations<br />
for future strategies and policies<br />
to be adopted by the state. It may<br />
consist of social activists, NGO representatives,<br />
educationists, health<br />
experts and government officials. It<br />
should be headed by a person who<br />
has been associated with child relief<br />
and rehabilitation progammes in the<br />
state and has knowledge of the problems<br />
faced by children in the state.<br />
Some years back the state government<br />
had established a council for<br />
militancy affected persons. But this<br />
council did not have sufficient funds<br />
and only the interest accrued money<br />
of the corpus fund was allowed to be<br />
utilised on certain measures. This<br />
resulted in quite poor performance of<br />
34<br />
There is also a need for the enactment of legislation<br />
for regulation of these childcare centers and<br />
orphanages to ensure transparency, accountability<br />
and child protection. India being a signatory to the<br />
UN Convention On Child Rights, has an obligation to<br />
ensure the protection of child rights in the state of<br />
Jammu & Kashmir<br />
the scheme. Similarly, the state social<br />
welfare department lacks sufficient<br />
funds for child relief and rehabilitation.<br />
national foundation for communal<br />
harmony run by central government<br />
provides Rs 600 monthly financial<br />
assistance to the orphans studying<br />
in schools. This facility too is not<br />
available to orphans of militants.<br />
Moreover, the task of identification<br />
and processing the applications<br />
under the scheme has been given to<br />
the deputy commissioners of the<br />
respective districts who are already<br />
overburdened with work. As a result,<br />
there is a delay in payments and<br />
many deserving children do not get<br />
the aid.<br />
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of<br />
efficient NGOs in Kashmir who<br />
could have made significant contribution<br />
in the field of child rights.<br />
Although there are almost 5000 registered<br />
NGOs in the state but most of<br />
them are defunct. The planning commission<br />
has adopted a national policy<br />
of voluntary sector for strengthening<br />
the civil society and ensuring<br />
transparent and accountable voluntary<br />
organisations. The policy was<br />
approved by the central cabinet in<br />
May 2007. But this policy also<br />
remains unimplemented in J&K.<br />
Qualified people who are willing to<br />
establish voluntary organisations in<br />
the states face hardships in registering<br />
their organisations. Reason being<br />
that one has to obtain a non-involvement<br />
certificate (NIC) from the district<br />
magistrate to prove that one had<br />
no links with militancy or separatist<br />
movement. Although there is no<br />
such provision in the Societies<br />
Registration Act, a circular issued in<br />
this regard by the then governor in<br />
1990 still stands. Since the verification<br />
is not time bound, many applications<br />
are still pending.<br />
As far as the scenario of juvenile<br />
justice in Kashmir is concerned, it<br />
also continues to be grim. In the<br />
state, the Juvenile Justice Act was<br />
passed on the pattern of the central<br />
law in 1995. But the legislation still<br />
remains unimplemented in the state<br />
as the rules have not been framed<br />
and approved so far. With the result,<br />
children below the age of 16 years are<br />
tried in regular courts and are being<br />
kept in regular jails just like adult<br />
criminals. No juvenile boards or<br />
homes exist in the state. Also, many<br />
children have been disabled due to<br />
the conflict, but no school exists for<br />
disabled children in Kashmir. There<br />
is no rehabilitation centre for mentally<br />
retarded or drug addicts.<br />
India despite being a signatory to<br />
the UN convention on child rights,<br />
remains wanting in terms of awareness,<br />
and sensitisation and seriousness.<br />
This is more so on the part of its<br />
government and institutions vis-àvis<br />
these provisions. Legislations are<br />
useless until and unless they are<br />
properly implemented. My over two<br />
decades of experience as a child<br />
rights activist has driven home the<br />
point that the government is not<br />
ready to pay attention towards the<br />
problems of Kashmiri children. And,<br />
thus, it has failed to address the<br />
problem, leaving children to their<br />
fate.<br />
— The writer is advocate, J&K High<br />
Court and also chairman of the J&K<br />
Yateem (Orphans) Foundation<br />
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Enforced disappearances<br />
The more people go<br />
out of sight in the wake<br />
of enforced<br />
disappearances in<br />
Jammu & Kashmir the<br />
more they agitate the<br />
minds of their family<br />
members. So much so<br />
that the families of<br />
those who disappeared<br />
have formed an<br />
association in the hope<br />
to bring back or at least<br />
know the truth behind<br />
the loss of their near<br />
and dear ones, writes<br />
Mir Hafizullah<br />
In past the Indian army faced<br />
armed insurgency on two occasions<br />
one in 1947 and another in<br />
1965. In the last case too, a sizable<br />
number of armed insurgents infiltrated<br />
in Kashmir and were given<br />
shelter by unsuspecting innocent villagers.<br />
The Indian army was given<br />
charge to flush out the militants from<br />
the areas they have made their hideouts.<br />
While facing the armed insurgents,<br />
some encounters occurred at<br />
different places but no civilian was<br />
harmed nor the people were tortured<br />
or made to disappear or killed in fake<br />
encounters. The simple reason for<br />
this is that the army or paramilitary<br />
forces were not given impunity as<br />
has been happening since 1990.<br />
The armed conflict which has its<br />
routes in the unresolved political dispute<br />
that flared up in 1989 in the<br />
form of mass uprising which forced<br />
the Government of India to bring<br />
huge concentration of troops in<br />
Jammu & Kashmir (the number is<br />
stated to be over half-a-million). The<br />
army and the paramilitary forces<br />
equipped with impunity under draconian<br />
laws like Armed Forces<br />
Special Powers Act (AFSPA),<br />
Disturbed Areas Act, POTA and<br />
Public Safety Act have been committing<br />
all kinds of human rights violations.<br />
AFSPA is responsible for most<br />
of the disappearances committed by<br />
the state security agencies. A large<br />
number of civilians, students, businessmen,<br />
professionals were made to<br />
disappear. All these enforced disappearances<br />
were made under the central<br />
rule and by the so-called elected<br />
governments of the state. The purpose<br />
to use this method of involuntary<br />
disappearances was to terrorise<br />
people from joining the insurgency<br />
or having any sympathy with the<br />
movement.<br />
Formation of Association of<br />
Parents of Disappeared Persons --<br />
APDP for short – took place in the<br />
early 1990s. This brought the relatives<br />
of disappeared persons to the<br />
high court for filing the hebeas corpus<br />
petitions seeking the whereabouts of<br />
their near and dear ones since high<br />
court was the only institution func-<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
tional which could give some kind of<br />
direction to the state functionaries.<br />
Yet most of the court orders were<br />
observed in breach and police stations<br />
were reluctant to register the<br />
missing reports especially where the<br />
army and the paramilitary forces<br />
were involved in the disappearances.<br />
Therefore, the first information<br />
reports or FIRs were registered only<br />
in some cases with the direction of<br />
the court.<br />
The number of enforced disappearances<br />
was swelling with every<br />
passing day and crossed three figures.<br />
Few lawyers, human rights<br />
activists and relatives of disappeared<br />
persons like Parveena Ahangar<br />
whose son too disappeared formed a<br />
group of relatives of disappeared<br />
persons to fight collectively under<br />
the banner of APDP. She is chairperson<br />
of the organisation.<br />
Number of disappearances<br />
The number of enforced disappearances<br />
remained always a major<br />
controversy with the government<br />
who were earlier denying the<br />
enforced disappearances but later on<br />
acknowledged the number of disappearances<br />
as few thousands. This has<br />
sometimes increased or decreased.<br />
The government wanted to create a<br />
confusion and wanted to take the<br />
advantage of the fact that the disappearances<br />
were not reported to the<br />
police stations or to other concerned<br />
agencies. The denial of registering<br />
the missing reports was done under a<br />
policy of the Government of India,<br />
though it was a primary duty of the<br />
state to register the case of disappearances,<br />
including those that were not<br />
even reported by any person as the<br />
state is responsible for the protection<br />
of citizens under the provisions of the<br />
Constitution.<br />
Activities<br />
Members of the APDP are protesting<br />
on streets on every 10th of the<br />
month and also made several<br />
protests at New Delhi with the purpose<br />
of garnering support from country’s<br />
civil society and seek attention<br />
of wider media at the national level.<br />
The demands of the APDP are:<br />
‘Thousands are missing’<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
On July 18, 2002 the then home minister of J&K, Khalid Najeeb<br />
Sahorwardi of National Conference, which was in power, admitted<br />
on the floor of the legislative assembly that 3,084 persons were<br />
missing in J&K since the start of the insurgency.<br />
Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed on February 23 made the<br />
disclosure what the security agencies were doing in 2001 and 2002.<br />
He informed the assembly that 3,744 persons went missing<br />
between 2000 and 2002. One-thousand-five-hundred-fifty-three<br />
persons got disappeared in 2000; 1,586 went missing in 2001; and<br />
605 in 2002.<br />
<strong>Law</strong> minister Muzaffar Hussain Beig of the PDP government stated<br />
on March 25, 2003 that since December 1992, 3,744 were reported<br />
missing of whom 135 have been declared dead by June 2002 and<br />
the number of disappearances could be even more.<br />
Abdul Rehman Veeri, minister of state and parliamentary affairs,<br />
said in the assembly on June 21, 2003 that 393 people have disappeared.<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
<br />
Appointment of an independent/<br />
credible commission to enquire<br />
into the case of the disappearances<br />
as has been done in other<br />
countries like Sri Lanka,<br />
Philippines, Algeria and<br />
Morocco. Even countries that are<br />
not democratic have initiated<br />
such a process in the wake of<br />
large-scale disappearances of<br />
their citizens in strife-ridden<br />
regions.<br />
Punishment for perpetrators<br />
responsible for enforced disappearances,<br />
which cannot be justified<br />
even during a war situation.<br />
Provide justice to the relatives of<br />
disappeared persons as per international<br />
standards. State is bound<br />
to intervene in such cases since<br />
disappearances are crime against<br />
whole humanity.<br />
On the social and the legal side,<br />
the APDP is confronted with a situation<br />
arising out of problems of the<br />
half-widows who are deprived of the<br />
property of their husbands in the<br />
wake of their disappearance. Nor<br />
they can remarry for a period of<br />
seven years as per Muslim law. The<br />
children of the half-widows are facing<br />
problem in school admission as<br />
death certificate of father required at<br />
the time of admission is not given.<br />
Thus, half-widows are struggling for<br />
survival as they are not entitled to get<br />
the property of their husbands in the<br />
wake of their disappearance. Nor are<br />
they entitled to sell the property of<br />
their husbands. A number of petitions<br />
seeking the right of succession<br />
The sanction for<br />
prosecution is barred<br />
under section-6 of the<br />
AFSPA with the result<br />
not a single<br />
perpetrator of a crime<br />
of enforced<br />
disappearances been<br />
brought to justice<br />
of property of their husbands are<br />
pending in the courts for want of<br />
death certificates. On the legal side,<br />
the justice delivery system has<br />
almost failed to deliver the justice in<br />
case of victims of enforced disappearances<br />
and their dependents. In<br />
some cases inquiries were conducted<br />
under the directions of the high court<br />
and accused were identified but challans<br />
could not be filed in courts as the<br />
Government of India has been reluctant<br />
to grant sanction for prosecuting<br />
the persons responsible for the crime.<br />
The sanction for prosecution is<br />
barred under section-6 of the AFSPA<br />
with the result not a single perpetrator<br />
of a crime of enforced disappearances<br />
been brought to justice.<br />
Members of the APDP have no hope<br />
of getting justice in near future but<br />
are determined to continue their<br />
struggle till the end.<br />
The enforced disappearances are<br />
one of the worst crimes on the globe.<br />
It is characterised by gross violation<br />
of the fundamental rights of the<br />
direct victim as also entails severe<br />
consequences for his or her family<br />
and even for the entire communities.<br />
Because of this reason the enforced<br />
disappearances are internationally<br />
defined as a crime against humanity.<br />
This definition is not coincidental<br />
since such cases not only violate the<br />
essence of the individual and affect<br />
his condition as a human being in<br />
different dimensions of his life but<br />
also this aspect of the disappearance<br />
lands up a person into a very complicated<br />
phenomenon. One should not<br />
approach this problem in an emotional<br />
way because the risk will exist<br />
for creating false expectations in the<br />
family of the victims for want of justice<br />
and, thus, ultimately end up in<br />
causing more frustration. No doubt<br />
enforced disappearances are rooted<br />
in social and political disputes.<br />
Despite the fact that each of them<br />
may have their own history, enforced<br />
disappearances speak a common language<br />
of pain and suffering which<br />
keep their families hope alive to continue<br />
their search for justice. As earlier<br />
stated, the disappearances are the<br />
product of unresolved political disputes<br />
or unjust structures of the societies<br />
which in the name of national<br />
The enforced<br />
disappearance of a<br />
family member<br />
whether by State<br />
actors or non-State<br />
actors immediately<br />
touches one’s heart<br />
and mind and raises a<br />
question like “where is<br />
his loved one?” After<br />
this the most painful<br />
and difficult journey<br />
starts for the search<br />
for a relative of a<br />
victim initially in the<br />
police stations, army<br />
camps, paramilitary<br />
camps...<br />
security are causing the involuntary<br />
disappearances. The enforced disappearance<br />
of a family member<br />
whether by State actors or non-State<br />
actors immediately touches one’s<br />
heart and mind and raises a question<br />
like “where is his loved one?” After<br />
this the most painful and difficult<br />
journey starts for the search for a relative<br />
of a victim initially in the police<br />
stations, army camps, paramilitary<br />
camps, interrogation centres, jails<br />
that leads him nowhere. This search<br />
goes for months and years but to no<br />
consequence. The APDP has one<br />
hope that no country has won the<br />
war against the people. The country<br />
may defeat any other country<br />
through war but not the people as<br />
history stands witness to this.<br />
– The writer is legal advisor to the<br />
Association of Parents of Disappeared<br />
persons (APDP)<br />
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A tale of anguish<br />
and courage<br />
Sixteen-year-long struggle by a lone woman with eight<br />
children to locate her husband, who was last seen being<br />
driven away in a CRPF vehicle, has not left her without<br />
warmth for anybody who wants to know what befell on<br />
her, writes Tanveen Kawoosa<br />
The 100-km drive up from<br />
Srinagar to the hill town –Uri<br />
was ridden with anguish and<br />
delight, horror and ecstasy. As we<br />
sped on the rough terrains into the<br />
small hamlet called Chandanwari,<br />
whizzing by was the stunning natural<br />
splendour of dramatic hills, dry<br />
stream beds, and serpentine dusty<br />
rocky trails. It was a dreamland<br />
straight from the pages of fairytales.<br />
As we walked up a narrow<br />
mountainous path to a raised platform,<br />
a newly constructed stone<br />
house stood at the edge of the cliff.<br />
Quiet looking, Anwar Jan, 50, sat<br />
relaxed with her children on the<br />
steps of varandah. There was crease<br />
in her brow but the sparkle in the<br />
eyes could not be overlooked.<br />
She took notice of our arrival,<br />
responded us warmly and invited<br />
inside her home. Indeed mountain<br />
people greet you with unpretentious<br />
grace. We talked about rehabilitation<br />
efforts which made a great starting<br />
point for conversation.<br />
Anwar Jan who lives with her<br />
eight children in this small hamlet<br />
shares the same saga of many halfwidows<br />
whose only breadwinners<br />
were subjected to enforced disappearance.<br />
In 1990, the CRPF men in a<br />
joint operation with police laid siege<br />
to this small hamlet and picked up<br />
Anwar Jan’s husband, a retired soldier.<br />
Anwar Jan says he was forced<br />
on to a CRPF vehicle. To this date his<br />
fate and whereabouts remain<br />
unknown. "I was shocked and left<br />
haunted with a single overwhelming<br />
fear; what will happen to our children,’’<br />
Anwar vividly narrates the<br />
incident of that fateful day.<br />
She struggled immensely to find<br />
her missing husband but all in vein.<br />
Nothing has been heard of him for<br />
nearly 16 years and his disappearance<br />
remains mystery. Unaware of<br />
legal intricacies she did not take legal<br />
recourse. Worse, her relatives left her<br />
on her own out of fear for their own<br />
lives. ‘’My close relatives maintained<br />
distance from me. They did not<br />
extend any helping hand to seek my<br />
husband’s release,’’ Anwar says in a<br />
sickening tone.<br />
Anwar Jan had to play<br />
role beyond that of a<br />
homemaker. On the<br />
one hand she has<br />
been battling to bring<br />
up her eight children<br />
and on the other hand<br />
she had to search for<br />
her missing husband<br />
Her struggle in life tells a story of<br />
what empowerment could mean to<br />
women. Anwar Jan had to play role<br />
beyond that of a homemaker. On the<br />
one hand she has been battling to<br />
bring up her eight children and on<br />
the other hand she had to search for<br />
her missing husband. She did all this<br />
courageously without education,<br />
resources and ex-gratia relief.<br />
The family owns only half kanal<br />
stretch. Anwar toils hard to raise<br />
maize. She holds out her wrinkled<br />
hands and smiles. ‘’I do everything<br />
myself. It is wonderful to see the<br />
maize grow." The smoke billowed<br />
out lazily out of the burning hearth.<br />
Her elder daughter Haseena was<br />
busy with domestic chores. There<br />
was rich aroma of baked maize<br />
dough, sizzling in a frying pan, salt<br />
tea bubbling. The tap-tap of colander<br />
spoons stirring vegetables in cauldron<br />
was pleasing to hear. Hunger<br />
tends to gnaw at once, while trekking<br />
in the mountains.<br />
Although Anwar did not have<br />
education she was determined to<br />
enroll all her children in a school.<br />
Her children who study in the nearby<br />
school find sometimes going<br />
tough when they are pestered for not<br />
paying their fees. ‘’Several times my<br />
teacher scolded me for not bringing<br />
school fees," says her elder daughter<br />
Haseena who studies in ninth standard.<br />
Anwar does not hesitate in doing<br />
menial jobs for her children. She<br />
worked for people who made her<br />
sleep on the bare floor and gave her<br />
stale food in separate utensils. ‘’I<br />
never had a choice; there was no one<br />
to take a stand for me. But I love my<br />
children very much. I will never let<br />
anything happen to them. Each time<br />
my children do well in school it is a<br />
reward for me,’’ Anwar says in her<br />
Pahari dialect. This was the only<br />
beginning of a tale of unimaginable<br />
suffering and courage. We clicked<br />
the pictures of happy scene, savour<br />
the tea and head out. There’s the<br />
story of another courageous women<br />
waiting to be explored.<br />
—The writer is a Srinagar-based<br />
journalist<br />
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Impossibility of justice<br />
Legal remedies available to protect right to life are crippled by judicial indifference among<br />
other things, writes advocate Ashok Agrwaal, arguing that this is more rampant in<br />
Kashmir though other parts of the country too have their share in this. Here is a summary<br />
from his monograph on the inadequacies of legal redress system meant to protect human<br />
life. The monograph is soon to be published by the journal of South Asian Forum for<br />
Human Rights<br />
This article summarises a monograph<br />
by the author, to be published<br />
shortly by the South<br />
Asia Forum for Human Rights<br />
(SAFHR). Deaths in custody/disappearance<br />
from custody are endemic<br />
in India and, have been so throughout<br />
its independent history. The reasons<br />
for this state of affairs are complex<br />
and, it would not be correct to<br />
assign the entire responsibility for it<br />
to any one factor, or pillar of the<br />
nation-state. However, there can be<br />
no gainsaying that the defects in the<br />
approach of the judiciary have<br />
played a pivotal role in the failure of<br />
the guarantee of the right to life.<br />
The report examines some of<br />
these shortcomings, using the aperture<br />
provided by one of the world’s<br />
best known legal remedies, the writ<br />
of habeas corpus, the sole remedy<br />
available in law in case of a violation<br />
of the right to life and liberty, guaranteed<br />
by Article-21 of the<br />
Constitution.<br />
In technical terms, therefore, this<br />
document may be called a report on<br />
the functioning of the constitutional<br />
and legal redress mechanism for the<br />
protection of the right to life, during<br />
the period of insurgency in Kashmir:<br />
1990 to 2004. Though the study was<br />
based upon the court process, we did<br />
not rely solely upon the court<br />
records. The testimony of the survivor<br />
families is crucial to a proper<br />
delineation of an impunity landscape.<br />
The theme of the report, as distinct<br />
from its technical nomenclature,<br />
is to portray the impossibility of justice<br />
for the victims of impunity: particularly<br />
in Kashmir but the principle<br />
being applicable to such victims<br />
everywhere. Though the impossibility<br />
is portrayed through the failure of<br />
the constitutional mechanism for the<br />
protection of the guaranteed right to<br />
life, it is actually far more encompassing.<br />
The main thrust of the study is<br />
based on an examination of 96 cases<br />
of alleged enforced disappearance of<br />
Kashmiris. Eighty seven of these<br />
cases resulted in the filing of a petition<br />
for a writ of habeas corpus before<br />
the Srinagar Bench of the Jammu &<br />
Kashmir High Court. No such petition<br />
was filed in the remaining nine<br />
cases. The only criterion for the nclusion<br />
of each of the 87 cases was that<br />
they had habeas corpus petitions filed<br />
before the Srinagar Bench of the<br />
Jammu & Kashmir High Court. The<br />
numbers limit was imposed by time<br />
and resource constraints, and nothing<br />
else. The nine cases which did<br />
not result in a petition include the<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
case of one of two young men who<br />
were arrested at the same time but<br />
the family of one of them decided not<br />
to file a petition for fear that it might<br />
antagonise the army and lessen the<br />
chances of their son coming home<br />
alive. These nine cases also include<br />
three cases of disappearances of<br />
Kashmiris from Nepal. These three<br />
Kashmiri businessmen were arrested<br />
by the Nepal police at the behest of<br />
the Indian authorities. The Nepal<br />
police informally acknowledged<br />
their arrest and said that the men<br />
were handed over to a team of police<br />
officers from India. Officially however,<br />
they denied the arrests. The<br />
Indian authorities took the stand that<br />
since the men were admittedly<br />
arrested by the Nepali police, they<br />
should be asked to account for them.<br />
Petitions before the high court at<br />
Delhi and the national human rights<br />
commission at Delhi were to no avail.<br />
Till date, the families have not<br />
received any information of their<br />
whereabouts. These three cases illustrate<br />
that the impossibility of justice<br />
crosses the geographic boundaries of<br />
the state of Jammu & Kashmir. There<br />
seems to be no reason for the denial<br />
of redress to these families other than<br />
It goes without saying<br />
that a helpless court is<br />
unlikely to be able to<br />
pass clear and<br />
decisive final orders,<br />
even in cases where<br />
the allegation stood<br />
proved. In over 57<br />
percent of the cases in<br />
which there was a<br />
clear finding against<br />
an identified security<br />
force/unit<br />
the fact that the persons arrested<br />
were Kashmiris.<br />
The single most striking feature<br />
of the habeas corpus proceedings is the<br />
powerlessness of the high court.<br />
Everything else can be derived from<br />
this fact. From the point of time<br />
when the court issued notice of the<br />
petition upon the respondents, it lost<br />
all control over the proceedings. The<br />
pace, the manner in which the case<br />
would proceed, and the outcome of<br />
the case was controlled entirely by<br />
the respondents— the central and the<br />
state governments. Nor did the court<br />
display a significantly better control<br />
over its own establishment. The staff<br />
of the high court has no fear of consequences<br />
for culpably slack and careless<br />
work. The subordinate judiciary,<br />
the district judges (DJ) and the chief<br />
judicial magistrates (CJM), who were<br />
appointed enquiry officers in most<br />
cases, were only marginally more<br />
responsive to the imperatives of justice.<br />
It goes without saying that a helpless<br />
court is unlikely to be able to<br />
pass clear and decisive final orders,<br />
even in cases where the allegation<br />
stood proved. In over 57 percent of<br />
the cases in which there was a clear<br />
finding against an identified security<br />
force/unit, the court found itself<br />
unable to do anything other than<br />
order registration of an FIR, which<br />
ought to have been registered in the<br />
first place, without the court’s intervention.<br />
To fully appreciate the<br />
absurdity of such an order we must<br />
also factor in the number of years<br />
that it took the court to pass such an<br />
order.<br />
What words does one use to<br />
describe a justice system in which the<br />
best order that the family of a disappeared<br />
person can expect – several<br />
years after the event – is a direction<br />
to the police to register an FIR?<br />
There can be no more damning<br />
indictment of the system than this.<br />
But the reality is even worse. We<br />
have records, and recorded<br />
testimony, to show that the registration<br />
of the FIR was seen by all concerned,<br />
the families, the police and,<br />
the judges as a mere formality, the<br />
completion of which would enable<br />
What words does one<br />
use to describe a<br />
justice system in which<br />
the best order that the<br />
family of a<br />
disappeared person<br />
can expect – several<br />
years after the event –<br />
is a direction to the<br />
police to register an<br />
FIR<br />
the system to wash its hands of the<br />
matter. The only real expression of<br />
contrition, howsoever inadequate,<br />
that the system shows for its mistakes,<br />
is in its willingness to consider the<br />
grant of ex-gratia compensation to<br />
the families of the disappeared.<br />
The court was not completely<br />
oblivious of the fact that it was playing<br />
out a farce. For example, it is<br />
repeatedly seen that the court did not<br />
pay attention to its earlier orders, acting<br />
– almost – as if on each date of<br />
hearing the entire matter was being<br />
dealt with afresh, ignoring all that<br />
was said and done in the past; as if<br />
the years of proceedings before that<br />
date never happened. It seems to me<br />
such forgetfulness is essential for<br />
retaining a modicum of sanity in the<br />
schizophrenic environs of the J&K<br />
justice system. Unscrupulous<br />
respondents and their lawyers took<br />
advantage of this amnesiac functioning,<br />
getting away with everything—<br />
from years of delay in filing replies to<br />
inveigling the court to disposing of<br />
petitions (that had been pending for<br />
several years) in the absence of representation<br />
on behalf of the petitioners.<br />
The court’s lack of control over its<br />
establishment, or the courts and officers<br />
subordinate to it resulted in the<br />
staff of the court frequently not carrying<br />
out the directions issued to it<br />
by the judges, with no fear of consequences.<br />
For example, notices/sum-<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
mons were frequently not issued,<br />
despite directions. The result was<br />
years of delay in serving notices<br />
upon agencies who had a 'standing<br />
counsel' in the high court. The performance<br />
of the subordinate judiciary,<br />
the DJs and the CJMs, who were<br />
appointed enquiry officers in most<br />
cases, was mixed. Despite working<br />
under harshly adverse conditions<br />
they often conducted exemplary<br />
enquiries. However in several cases,<br />
the conclusions drawn in the enquiry<br />
reports were patently absurd, or<br />
careless. In none of the cases did the<br />
high court catch the absurdity, or correct<br />
the carelessness.<br />
The conduct of the other players<br />
in the farce is also reflective of their<br />
In over 70 percent of the petitions in which the<br />
accused unit filed a response (41 cases out of 58),<br />
it was a bald denial of arrest. Of the remaining<br />
responses, in 10 cases they admitted the arrest<br />
but claimed that the person concerned had been,<br />
subsequently, released. In three cases (pertaining<br />
to four persons) they claimed that the arrested<br />
persons had escaped from their custody<br />
awareness of the true nature of the<br />
proceedings. In Manzoor Zargar’s<br />
case, the BSF took over five years to<br />
file their response to the petition. In<br />
as many as 17 cases the respondents<br />
took more than two years to file their<br />
replies. In 30 cases, they took<br />
between one year and two years to<br />
file their replies. Coupled with the<br />
fact that the accused unit of the<br />
armed forces did not file any reply at<br />
all in as many as 38 cases, the inference<br />
is clear.<br />
The nature of their responses is<br />
equally revealing. In over 70 percent<br />
of the petitions in which the accused<br />
unit filed a response (41 cases out of<br />
58), it was a bald denial of arrest. Of<br />
the remaining responses, in 10 cases<br />
they admitted the arrest but claimed<br />
that the person concerned had been,<br />
subsequently, released. In three cases<br />
(pertaining to four persons) they<br />
claimed that the arrested persons<br />
had escaped from their custody. In<br />
four cases it was stated that the<br />
arrested persons were held in legally<br />
recorded and, acknowledged, custody<br />
after their arrest.<br />
The conduct of the security forces<br />
even more scornful once the case had<br />
been sent to the enquiry judge. In a<br />
very large number of the 62 cases in<br />
which inquiries were ordered by the<br />
high court, the accused unit did not<br />
participate in the enquiry proceedings.<br />
In several cases the enquiry<br />
judge recorded adverse remarks<br />
about the conduct of the accused<br />
unit, specifically attributing the<br />
delay in completing the enquiry to<br />
their tactics. In none of the enquiries<br />
did the security forces produce the<br />
records pertaining to the deployment<br />
of their troops, or those pertaining to<br />
the crackdowns that are a daily routine<br />
of life in Kashmir, or the records<br />
pertaining to the arrest/detention of<br />
people. Nor did they ever bring<br />
before the court any of the<br />
soldiers/officers responsible for the<br />
impugned actions. In Basharat<br />
Shah’s case, the CRPF made the commandant<br />
and the deputy commandant<br />
of the 53 Bn to retire rather than<br />
produce them before the enquiry<br />
officer appointed by the high court.<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
That they did not file a reply<br />
before the high court or, that they did<br />
not participate in the inquiry proceedings<br />
did not mean that the security<br />
forces were not following the<br />
proceedings. In several cases the<br />
accused unit of the armed forces did<br />
not file a reply before the high court<br />
or cooperate in the judicial enquiry<br />
ordered but chose to file objections to<br />
the enquiry report; which had held<br />
against them. Thus, the picture is one<br />
of watchful disregard for the court<br />
and its processes. Wherever the security<br />
forces felt that they needed to<br />
intervene, they did so.<br />
This position becomes even clearer<br />
when the context is widened to<br />
include the response of the central<br />
government in cases where the state<br />
government requested it for grant of<br />
sanction to prosecute officers/ members<br />
of the central security forces<br />
(including the army), who had been<br />
charged with penal offences.<br />
In four petitions, the police are on<br />
record as having completed their<br />
investigation and finalised a<br />
chargesheet against the officers/soldiers<br />
responsible for the arrest/disappearance.<br />
In two of these cases we<br />
have no information except for the<br />
The poor father of<br />
Mohammad Yusuf<br />
Wahloo told the judge<br />
that since his son was<br />
dead, he did not want<br />
to participate in the<br />
proceedings. However,<br />
when apprised of the<br />
facts, the high court<br />
chose to dispose of<br />
the case for want of<br />
instructions from the<br />
petitioner<br />
fact that the police had stated before<br />
the court that their investigation was<br />
complete and the chargesheet ready<br />
for being filed before the competent<br />
court. In two other cases, the high<br />
court involved itself in monitoring<br />
and, to some extent, supervising the<br />
state government in the process of<br />
obtaining sanction from the central<br />
government. In both these cases the<br />
central government rejected the<br />
request for grant of sanction to prosecute<br />
the officers concerned.<br />
These two cases are not the only<br />
ones in which the central government<br />
has refused the request for<br />
sanction. It is our information that<br />
the central government has granted<br />
sanction to prosecute in only two of<br />
the hundreds of cases in which such<br />
sanction was sought. In other words,<br />
it is reasonable to infer that the central<br />
government was/is not inclined<br />
to permit the courts in the state of<br />
Jammu & Kashmir to exercise jurisdiction<br />
and control over forces under<br />
its command. The conduct of the central<br />
security forces in the habeas corpus<br />
petitions examined in this report,<br />
mirrors this attitude and, once this is<br />
factored in, the conduct of these<br />
forces becomes explicable.<br />
The palpable indifference of the<br />
process also led to consequences that<br />
would have been comical, but for the<br />
tragic setting. In as many as 17 of the<br />
85 petitions, the proceedings continued<br />
for several years after the<br />
arrestee had been released by the<br />
security forces. In one case, the<br />
arrestee was booked under the Public<br />
Security Act, served out his period of<br />
detention, was released, and killed<br />
by the army in a fake encounter<br />
before the high court and its staff<br />
reached his home. The abjectly poor<br />
father of Mohammad Yusuf Wahloo<br />
(91/8) told the enquiry judge that<br />
since his son was dead, he did not<br />
want to participate in the proceedings.<br />
However, when apprised of the<br />
facts, the high court chose to dispose<br />
of the case for want of instructions from<br />
the petitioner. The appalling insensitivity<br />
of the court to the plight of the<br />
people whom it is supposed to serve,<br />
in justice, seems to be encapsuled in<br />
this remark.<br />
One can speculate that the abject<br />
surrender of its prerogatives by the<br />
court was, at least, in part a result of<br />
the realisation of its complete helplessness.<br />
It also seems to us that it<br />
took time for the full extent of its<br />
irrelevance to hit the court. With the<br />
passage of years the proceedings<br />
became increasingly formal, with the<br />
court displaying less and less enthusiasm<br />
for playing out or, prolonging<br />
the farce. On the other hand, the<br />
security forces displayed an increasing<br />
mastery of the processes of justice.<br />
The result is clearly visible from<br />
the cases discussed. From 1999<br />
onwards, the court ordered an<br />
enquiry in a very few cases, being<br />
content to simply ask the police to<br />
register an FIR/ complete investigation<br />
in the FIR already lodged.<br />
Every fact we have examined and<br />
analysed inexorably reinforces the<br />
conclusion about the irrelevance of<br />
the habeas corpus proceedings. The<br />
court went through the motions,<br />
without any faith in the effectiveness,<br />
or sanctity of its processes. The result<br />
was not just that the court’s intervention<br />
did not save any lives; these processes<br />
had no impact whatsoever on<br />
the prevailing situation. It was as if<br />
the courts did not exist.<br />
It is not easy to analyse a complete<br />
farce, particularly when the<br />
players of the farce act out with a,<br />
seeming, air of unawareness of it. We<br />
found absurdity, capriciousness, culpable<br />
negligence, callous disregard<br />
and more. We found a court completely<br />
oblivious to its place and<br />
importance in the constitutional<br />
scheme of things. A court unwilling<br />
to acknowledge its linkages to the<br />
society in which it was situated. Yet,<br />
the court functions— judges come<br />
and go in their siren equipped cars,<br />
shielded both by curtains on the car<br />
windows and, by the phalanx of<br />
security personnel who guard them.<br />
Perhaps guarded by the same personnel<br />
(or, at least, their brothers in<br />
arms) who disappear the people on<br />
whose behalf the judges hear habeas<br />
corpus petitions.<br />
— The writer is a Delhi-based<br />
senior advocate<br />
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HEALING TOUCH<br />
Try out<br />
participatory justice<br />
Newer approach to bring back faith in law is not possible in an embattled zone like<br />
Kashmir without taking people into confidence and evolving a redress mechanism<br />
through their participation, writes Haley Duschinski<br />
Since late 2003, India and<br />
Pakistan have been pursuing a<br />
composite dialogue at the high<br />
governmental level to resolve a number<br />
of contentious issues between the<br />
two countries, including the long<br />
standing dispute over Kashmir.<br />
Against the backdrop of this protracted<br />
normalisation process, a variety<br />
of Kashmiri civil society organisations<br />
– of the victims and relatives,<br />
organisations, oral history advocacy<br />
groups, and community-initiated<br />
documentation projects – have<br />
emerged seeking truth and justice for<br />
human rights abuses including extrajudicial<br />
killings, forced disappearances,<br />
torture, rape, and illegal<br />
detention carried out by Indian State<br />
security forces over the last 18 years.<br />
Through their initiatives, these<br />
organisations are documenting State<br />
abuses, collecting victim statements<br />
and testimonials, memorialising<br />
those who have died or disappeared,<br />
and opening up public space to<br />
address concerns about peace and<br />
justice in the Valley. Most recently,<br />
the public commission on human<br />
rights has instituted an international<br />
people’s tribunal to investigate<br />
human rights violations from<br />
November 2003 to 2009 through<br />
examination of evidence, statements,<br />
and testimonials, with the broader<br />
aims of shedding light on patterns of<br />
institutionalised violence and collective<br />
trauma and formulating recommendations<br />
for justice, reparation,<br />
and healing.<br />
Such popular mobilisations for<br />
truth and justice are operating in the<br />
domain of civil society to establish<br />
non-State sanctioned mechanisms –<br />
“Unofficial Truth Projects” – to<br />
achieve justice for the wrongs of the<br />
past (Bickford 2007). This article<br />
seeks to bring together these disparate<br />
initiatives as complementary<br />
components of a participatory justice<br />
movement in Kashmir, one that is<br />
fundamentally founded on the<br />
notion of Kashmiri participation and<br />
engagement in the process of social<br />
reconstruction.<br />
Transitional justice<br />
Transitional justice refers to the<br />
processes of building or rebuilding<br />
institutions in a post-conflict society<br />
to effectively promote the rule of law<br />
while also providing some sort of<br />
accountability and redress for<br />
human rights abuses in the past.<br />
Transitional justice mechanisms may<br />
include trials, truth commissions,<br />
and various victims’ reparations programmes,<br />
as well as other symbolic<br />
practices of rebuilding communities<br />
such as public apologies, commemorations,<br />
and memorials.<br />
These mechanisms may be motivated<br />
by multiple needs and desires,<br />
including: establishing the truth of<br />
past atrocities to set straight the historical<br />
record; ensuring accountability<br />
through the punishment of offenders<br />
to deter abuses in the future;<br />
building institutions to establish the<br />
rule of law in which human rights<br />
and democratic principles are valued;<br />
and addressing the needs of victims<br />
to honour their experiences and<br />
help them heal. Many post-conflict<br />
societies have found it difficult to<br />
address all of these needs at the same<br />
time, and transitional justice realities<br />
are often the result of compromise<br />
and negotiation.<br />
Transitional justice packages are<br />
typically defined as State-sponsored<br />
initiatives that take place in the midst<br />
of or directly following periods of<br />
political transition, whether this transition<br />
is a sudden peace settlement or<br />
a more gradual process of democratisation<br />
and normalisation.<br />
Historically, States attempting to<br />
sponsor their own transitional justice<br />
practices during the continuation of<br />
abuses by government forces have<br />
encountered prohibitive challenges.<br />
For example, the truth commission<br />
established in the Philippines in 1986<br />
stalled after one year when all but<br />
one of the commissioners resigned in<br />
protest of continuing abuses by<br />
Corazon Aquino’s government<br />
(Hayner 1996).<br />
Ongoing conditions of militarisation<br />
and repression in Kashmir<br />
Valley seem to preclude the possibil-<br />
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HEALING TOUCH<br />
ity of a meaningful State-sponsored<br />
justice package at this particular<br />
juncture. These conditions are authorised<br />
by the Armed Forces Special<br />
Powers Act (AFSPA), a particularly<br />
draconian law that has been sharply<br />
criticised by Kashmiri and Indian<br />
human rights organisations, as well<br />
as Amnesty International and<br />
Human Rights Watch, for granting<br />
excessive powers to State security<br />
forces and establishing a regime of<br />
impunity in relation to grave human<br />
rights abuses perpetrated by the<br />
State. Repeal of the AFSPA is a necessary<br />
but not sufficient step for establishing<br />
equitable and sustainable<br />
peace in Kashmir Valley.<br />
Conventional models<br />
Post-conflict societies have<br />
employed different models of transitional<br />
justice to promote the establishment<br />
of an equitable and sustainable<br />
peace. There is clearly no onesize-fits-all<br />
model that can be productively<br />
applied to all social settings.<br />
Indeed, different constellations<br />
of circumstances call for different justice<br />
projects and different arrays of<br />
retributive and restorative approaches<br />
(Minow 1998). It is important to<br />
consider the benefits and limitations<br />
of these different models in order to<br />
determine a justice approach that<br />
makes sense in a particular post-conflict<br />
site.<br />
Trials – criminal justice proceedings<br />
carried out in a court of law to<br />
establish culpability and determine<br />
individual criminal liability and<br />
issue sanctions – were first used as a<br />
strategy for post-war reconstruction<br />
in Nuremburg and Tokyo after<br />
WWII. The United Nations’ ad hoc<br />
tribunals in the former Yugoslavia<br />
(1993) and Rwanda (1994) gave rise<br />
to the establishment of the international<br />
criminal court in 2003, while<br />
special tribunals have been convened<br />
in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, East<br />
Timor, and Lebanon.<br />
Framed as mechanisms for restoring<br />
rule of law, trials are based on the<br />
principle of retributive justice, meaning<br />
that punishment is perceived as a<br />
morally appropriate response to<br />
criminal acts. Trials and tribunals<br />
have the advantage of “setting<br />
The truth commissions<br />
are temporary<br />
commissions of<br />
enquiry sanctioned by<br />
the government to<br />
examine a record of<br />
abuses over a<br />
specified time. They<br />
can be national, as in<br />
Argentina in 1983 and<br />
South Africa in 1995,<br />
or international, as in<br />
El Salvador in 1992<br />
straight” the historical record and<br />
producing a measure of individual<br />
accountability for mass atrocities, but<br />
they are often limited in that they<br />
focus primarily on individual perpetrators<br />
rather than patterns of<br />
oppression and inequality. In this<br />
sense, they may be effective mechanisms<br />
for determining culpability in<br />
some cases, but they never reveal the<br />
whole story about the “truth” of<br />
what actually happened during<br />
extended periods of conflict.<br />
The process of carrying out war<br />
crimes trials or criminal tribunals in a<br />
transparent and above-board manner<br />
can be a tricky proposition for<br />
societies emerging from long protracted<br />
struggles with weak institutions.<br />
For example, in the case of El<br />
Salvador, trials were not an option<br />
after 12 years of bloody civil war<br />
because of widespread and institutionalised<br />
corruption in the judicial<br />
system (Hayner 2001).<br />
Since the 1980s, truth commissions<br />
have become an option for<br />
many post-conflict societies when trials<br />
are not a viable alternative. The<br />
truth commissions are temporary<br />
commissions of enquiry sanctioned<br />
by the government to examine a<br />
record of abuses over a specified<br />
time. They can be national, as in<br />
Argentina in 1983 and South Africa<br />
in 1995, or international, as in El<br />
Salvador in 1992 and Guatemala in<br />
1997.<br />
Modeled on a framework of<br />
restorative justice that privileges<br />
social healing over punishment,<br />
truth commissions can be a powerful<br />
tool for promoting reconciliation<br />
within and between divided communities;<br />
specifying recommendations<br />
for political, military, or judicial<br />
reforms; providing an institutionalised<br />
space for airing grief and pain;<br />
and providing official acknowledgement<br />
of a long-silenced violent past.<br />
In some cases, however, truth commissions<br />
or other comparable modes<br />
of enquiry may not be appropriate,<br />
especially if there has been no radical<br />
change in institutions of power,<br />
authority, and governance.<br />
The truth commissions have been<br />
limited, co-opted, or undermined by<br />
government leaders interested in<br />
preserving their public image, pleasing<br />
international donors, or maintaining<br />
their hold on power, as in the<br />
case of the commission of “whitewash”<br />
enquiry established by Idi<br />
Amin to investigate hundreds of disappearances<br />
occurring under his<br />
own rule in Uganda in 1974. The<br />
South African Truth and reconciliation<br />
commission is considered by<br />
many a model of transitional justice,<br />
although its “truth for amnesty”<br />
arrangement, in which perpetrators<br />
received amnesty for some categories<br />
of crimes if they made full disclosure,<br />
has had a controversial legacy.<br />
Participatory approach<br />
These standard models of transitional<br />
justice have conventionally<br />
been implemented in a top-down<br />
manner, by national and/or international<br />
bodies that do not necessarily<br />
acknowledge or appreciate local conceptions<br />
of rights, local meanings of<br />
justice, and local visions of the<br />
future. To cite a recent example,<br />
negotiations over the Cambodian tribunal<br />
between 1997 and 2004 were<br />
carried out with remarkably little<br />
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HEALING TOUCH<br />
Participatory<br />
strategies emerge out<br />
of a broadly<br />
representative<br />
dialogue within and<br />
among different<br />
segments of society<br />
about political and<br />
moral priorities<br />
including truth telling,<br />
public<br />
acknowledgment,<br />
financial<br />
compensation...<br />
effort to incorporate input from ordinary<br />
Cambodian people, apart from<br />
a limited measure of less-than-transparent<br />
consultation with select civil<br />
society organisation (McGrew 2006).<br />
This top-down approach is problematic<br />
because it can, and often does,<br />
lead to marginalisation of the very<br />
communities that are supposed to be<br />
reconciled and neglect of the very<br />
institutions that are supposed to be<br />
reconstructed (Lundy and McGovern<br />
2008).<br />
For this reason, transitional justice<br />
scholars and practitioners are<br />
beginning to call for second order<br />
approaches, ones that take local perspectives,<br />
opinions, and mobilisations<br />
into account at every stage of<br />
conception and implementation.<br />
Such grassroots efforts are especially<br />
critical in sites such as Kashmir<br />
Valley, where popular protests<br />
against political exclusion, economic<br />
exploitation, and “lack of voice” have<br />
been, and continue to be, issues of<br />
considerable concern for various<br />
communities of stakeholders.<br />
What might a “bottom up”<br />
approach – one founded on principles<br />
of local participation, ownership,<br />
and agency – look like in<br />
Kashmir Valley? This form of participatory<br />
justice is, in fact, already<br />
underway, through a patchwork<br />
array of mechanisms that all contribute<br />
to the project of transition in<br />
the absence of official processes of<br />
judicial redress and/or meaningful<br />
and transparent truth telling at the<br />
state level.<br />
Many different Kashmiri communities<br />
with many different notions of<br />
truth and justice hold stakes in the<br />
project of peace. Participatory strategies<br />
emerge out of a broadly representative<br />
dialogue within and among<br />
different segments of society about<br />
political and moral priorities including<br />
truth telling, public acknowledgment,<br />
financial compensation, social<br />
healing, trust building, retribution,<br />
and strengthening public institutions.<br />
An expansive dialogue process,<br />
initiated at the local level, is<br />
bringing these notions out into the<br />
open.<br />
The international people’s tribunal<br />
is currently the most high profile<br />
of these truth and justice projects.<br />
It is being supplemented by other<br />
types of efforts such as: locally initiated<br />
forums, within and between<br />
communities, for reconciliation and<br />
healing; ceremonial and ritual activities<br />
based on cultural traditions;<br />
memorials and inscriptions as forms<br />
of public commemoration; documentation<br />
and oral history work in written,<br />
audio, and photographic forms;<br />
interpretive work through films,<br />
poetry, songs, and graphic art; and<br />
community integration activities to<br />
promote dialogue and discussion.<br />
These efforts, even those operating<br />
on a small scale, may usefully be<br />
conceptualised and framed as complementary<br />
components of a larger<br />
Kashmiri-initiated project in pursuit<br />
of truth and justice. And they all play<br />
a critical role in resisting and reworking<br />
a State-imposed culture of denial<br />
and omission that obscures injustices<br />
and inequalities in the name of a<br />
superficial and shallow peace.<br />
Ultimately, it is impossible to<br />
imagine that any form of sustainable<br />
and equitable peace could be<br />
obtained in Kashmir without<br />
The international<br />
people’s tribunal is<br />
currently the most high<br />
profile of these truth<br />
and justice projects. It<br />
is being supplemented<br />
by other types of<br />
efforts such as: locally<br />
initiated forums,<br />
within and between<br />
communities, for<br />
reconciliation and<br />
healing...<br />
Kashmiri participation in, and ownership<br />
of, the process of transition.<br />
And it is impossible to imagine that<br />
any form of sustainable and equitable<br />
peace could be obtained in<br />
Kashmir without taking the many<br />
different notions of truth, justice, and<br />
accountability into account.<br />
References<br />
Bickford, Louis. 2007. “Unofficial Truth<br />
Projects.” Human Rights Quarterly 29:<br />
994-1035.<br />
Hayner, Priscilla. 1996. “Commissioning<br />
the Truth: Further Research Questions.”<br />
Third World Quarterly 17(1): 19-29.<br />
Hayner, Priscilla. 2001. Unspeakable<br />
Truths: Confronting State Terror and<br />
Atrocity. New York: Routledge.<br />
Lundy, Patricia and Mark McGovern.<br />
2008. “Whose Justice? Rethinking<br />
Transitional Justice from the Bottom<br />
Up.” Journal of <strong>Law</strong> and Society 35(2):<br />
265-292.<br />
McGrew, Laura. 2006. “Transitional<br />
Justice Approaches in Cambodia.”<br />
Justice Initiative (spring): 139-150.<br />
Minow, Martha. 1998. Between Vengeance<br />
and Forgiveness: Facing Hiustory after<br />
Genocide and Mass Violence. Boston:<br />
Beacon Press.<br />
— The author is assistant professor<br />
of anthropology, department of sociology<br />
and anthropology, Ohio University USA<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Maimed, mauled<br />
by military-militia<br />
Away from the<br />
accepted narrative of<br />
Kashmir as an 'issue'<br />
or a 'problem',<br />
Kashimiris find it<br />
difficult to talk about<br />
their plight as fear of<br />
violence lurks<br />
through the air,<br />
writes Amrit Dhatt<br />
Kashmir Question… Kashmir<br />
Problem… Kashmir Issue.<br />
Political analysts and journalists<br />
have used such phrases with so<br />
much ease and regularity over the<br />
years that they have begun to<br />
become clichés. Yet, the Kashmir conflict<br />
is amongst the most discussed,<br />
debated and deliberated issues in the<br />
world. This was first brought to the<br />
attention of the United Nations<br />
Security Council in 1948, and it is the<br />
longest unresolved dispute on the<br />
agenda. The conflict is beyond the<br />
scope of politics and borders; it has<br />
become a deeply ideological issue<br />
and has kept alive the battleground<br />
that was created with the two-nation<br />
theory. Besides the conflict in Israel<br />
and Palestine, Kashmir has been the<br />
site of the longest territorial dispute<br />
in the post-1945 world. There are a<br />
multitude of voices and opinions on<br />
Kashmir littered all over political<br />
space. Yet, one aspect of the conflict<br />
remains neglected and, thus,<br />
deserves attention: what are the<br />
long-term implications of the conflict<br />
on the people of Kashmir?<br />
While there is an abundance of<br />
literature on the dispute, possible<br />
resolutions, and “human interest”<br />
stories that illustrate the painful lives<br />
of those affected by the violence, little<br />
is understood globally about the<br />
people of the valley. Attempting to<br />
project the voices of the people of the<br />
valley is not an easy task because<br />
they are not a homogenous group<br />
and the issues they raise are multifaceted<br />
and complex.<br />
First encounter<br />
Author of these lines visited<br />
Srinagar recently and was fortunate<br />
enough to have caught a brief but<br />
telling glimpse of the human side of<br />
the conflict, minus the heartrending<br />
stories that simplify the issue and<br />
replace context with emotions.<br />
Immediately after setting foot out of<br />
the aircraft, I was presented with<br />
stark differences that so often characterise<br />
life in Srinagar: a large, colourful<br />
boarding, depicting lakes and<br />
mountains and reading “Paradise on<br />
Earth” and standing directly beneath<br />
it was an airport security guard<br />
cradling a firearm. Outside the airport,<br />
similar signs are strewn<br />
throughout the road. It is dotted with<br />
barbed wire, barricaded checkpoints,<br />
sandbag-lined bastions of security<br />
men. This phenomenon is not<br />
reserved for the airport area alone;<br />
army barracks, gun totting security<br />
forces, and checkpoints stretch over<br />
the entire city.<br />
This easily visible militarisation<br />
of Srinagar is coupled with fear and<br />
apprehension, associated with the<br />
human rights abuses committed by<br />
the military as well as militia. Their<br />
conspicuous presence has become a<br />
permanent feature in people’s day-<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
to-day lives, and its mortal fear is<br />
what people have to endure all the<br />
time. What kind of psychological<br />
effect does growing up in the shadow<br />
of the gun have on a generation<br />
of children? Studies conducted by<br />
psychologists reveal that an alarmingly<br />
large percentage of the population<br />
suffers from deep anxiety and<br />
uncertainty where they are never<br />
sure of their safety and security. This<br />
raises a host of questions, including<br />
the socialisation of violence. This has<br />
even permeated to the children of the<br />
Valley. Its admiration in some cases<br />
has been becoming accepted. For<br />
example, a young boy during a family<br />
picnic in a lush green park smiles<br />
widely, posing for a picture in a faux<br />
turban and proudly holding a plastic<br />
AK47. His father looks on and is<br />
pleased by the sight.<br />
Personal narratives<br />
It is difficult to encounter somebody<br />
in Srinagar who does not have<br />
their own personal narrative about<br />
how the conflict has affected their<br />
lives. The realities of living in an<br />
embattled zone have become standardised.<br />
Even those who are relatively<br />
young and live in far more<br />
peaceful times than the previous<br />
generation have a story to tell. A<br />
young Kashmiri Pundit girl talks<br />
about how her family was forced to<br />
leave Srinagar way back in 1989, and<br />
despite being born there, she does<br />
not feel that she belongs to Srinagar<br />
anymore: “My parents were visiting<br />
Jammu when my grandfather told<br />
my parents not to come back. They<br />
had no choice but to abandon their<br />
home.”<br />
A young man talks about his family’s<br />
loss ever since his cousin disappeared:<br />
“Nobody has helped us,<br />
even though many organisations<br />
have come knocking our door to hear<br />
our woes.” A jeweller, whose clients<br />
consist of tourists as well as locals, is<br />
so grateful while he shares his experiences<br />
from his newly renovated<br />
shop on Residency Road: “I had to<br />
keep the shop closed for 14 years<br />
because of militancy. I tried moving<br />
to various parts of India to practice<br />
my craft and sell my designs, but<br />
nothing is like being able to work<br />
from homestead.”<br />
At a ‘Students for<br />
Human Rights’<br />
meeting called by the<br />
Human Rights <strong>Law</strong><br />
Network, former<br />
chairman of Bar<br />
Council of India<br />
Dhairyasheel Patil<br />
encouraged an<br />
audience of students<br />
by saying, “Don’t worry<br />
if the world is<br />
crumbling, because we<br />
have to build a new<br />
world”<br />
A peaceful day in the Valley is a<br />
great consolation as violence has not<br />
just been a possibility but precondition<br />
for past two decades or so. An<br />
old resident of Srinagar illustrated<br />
this with his attempt to alleviate<br />
some of the apprehension of an outsider<br />
through this exchange:<br />
“When was the last bomb blast?”<br />
“Oh, don’t worry, it wasn’t recent.”<br />
“Not recent?”<br />
“I’m not exactly sure, maybe sixseven<br />
months ago.”<br />
Somehow, six months don’t feel<br />
like history to me. There are signs of<br />
peace returning to Srinagar and thus<br />
expectations too are heightened.<br />
People are making claims that<br />
Kashmir is going back to a state of<br />
normalcy. Vested parties are quick to<br />
maintain that the Valley is slowly<br />
returning to a state of relative peace<br />
but how we are to define peace when<br />
gun wielding security men are all<br />
over? A young man from a rural part<br />
of Kashmir tries to make this point: “<br />
I visited my village after 10 years,<br />
because it was not safe before that.<br />
People are saying that it is much<br />
more peaceful now and that it’s<br />
returning back to normal. I’m not<br />
sure about normalcy for it is yet to be<br />
seen if this sense of normalcy lasts.<br />
People might go to each other’s houses<br />
for dinner or attend a wedding<br />
that drags late into the night…”<br />
Before the young man could finish,<br />
his face slowly fell, making his longing<br />
for peace all the more resounding.<br />
While engaging with youth in<br />
Srinagar, mainly university students,<br />
their frustration and anger became<br />
evident. They are a generation that is<br />
fed up with violence amid din created<br />
by self-determination. They<br />
endure brutality and human rights<br />
violations at all levels. They have had<br />
it with grandiose dialogues with<br />
Delhi and Islamabad and are<br />
demanding change in terms of talks.<br />
However, these demands must be<br />
made quietly, they feel, because students<br />
do not have the liberty to speak<br />
their mind against these formidable<br />
States known for their merciless<br />
ways. “That is the problem, we are<br />
not free,” said one of the students<br />
wryly. Their courage and conscience<br />
have been suppressed and so are<br />
their desire and motivation to stand<br />
for what they feel to be right.<br />
At a ‘Students for Human Rights’<br />
meeting called by the Human Rights<br />
<strong>Law</strong> Network, former chairman of<br />
Bar Council of India Dhairyasheel<br />
Patil encouraged an audience of students<br />
by saying, “Don’t worry if the<br />
world is crumbling, because we have<br />
to build a new world.” He also went<br />
on to stress that disenchantment is<br />
futile unless it leads to something<br />
constructive. Largely, Kashmiri<br />
youth are dogged by a severe human<br />
rights crisis created by high political<br />
stakes where their free will finds<br />
scant regard. This is what that came<br />
out through the deliberations at the<br />
meeting and questions posed by<br />
young participants.<br />
— The writer is a researcher from<br />
Canada<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Captive State<br />
in a free subcontinent<br />
A better status under the British empire could not<br />
last once Kashmir was caught amid rivalry<br />
between free India and Pakistan, despite quite a<br />
few treaties and laws that could have ensured a<br />
better deal for Kashmiris, writes<br />
Dr Abdul Majid Siraj<br />
Atrain of unfortunate legal<br />
signposts marks the political<br />
course taken by Kashmir ever<br />
since the historic decolonisation of<br />
South Asian subcontinent. It started<br />
in 1947 when the British made a precipitous<br />
exit with imperfect decolonisation<br />
of the Princely India. There<br />
are those members of legal fraternity<br />
who do not lock step with the procedures<br />
adopted by the British to<br />
decolonise Kashmir because they<br />
contend that Kashmir was not even a<br />
colony. It was at best a protectorate<br />
in terms of Article 4 of Treaty of<br />
Amritsar. The state enjoyed<br />
sovereignty like no other state in the<br />
British Empire. Towards the end of<br />
World War-II Kashmir was a great<br />
contributor of armed assistance to<br />
the British. In his own aircraft the<br />
Maharaja of Kashmir flew into<br />
Damascus and took a guard of honour<br />
from J&K armed forces to epitomise<br />
status of Kashmir.<br />
British decamped from India taking<br />
away with them the paramount<br />
hold over the princes. If this action is<br />
taken to mean decolonisation, the<br />
process was flawed because they witnessed<br />
fracturing of J&K State, invasions<br />
from outside forces during<br />
which time a non-self-governing<br />
state was dismantled and principle of<br />
uti-possidetis flouted. The fact<br />
remains that Kashmir did not even<br />
come in the category of a colony of<br />
Britain or vassalage of the Empire.<br />
The tenuous relation that bound the<br />
two nations was the defence of northern<br />
borders formalised with treaties.<br />
That was necessary for the Empire’s<br />
own protection from invasions by the<br />
communist powers along northern<br />
borders.<br />
Maharaja of Kashmir signed an<br />
instrument of accession (IOA) with<br />
India on October 26, 1947 that<br />
became the cornerstone of his relations<br />
with India. The IOA has since<br />
been subject to legal scrutiny and<br />
remains contentious. This treaty even<br />
apart from doubts expressed for its<br />
authentic existence also posits other<br />
legal challenges. There was a treaty<br />
with British (Treaty of Amritsar) but<br />
more important the Stand Still agreement<br />
with Pakistan still extant that<br />
would preclude super-imposition of<br />
one more treaty on the same subject.<br />
In the analytical tradition, the treaty<br />
disintegrates by interpreting intertemporal<br />
principle was in relation to<br />
territory. There was an important<br />
caveat in IOA that a plebiscite would<br />
confirm the arrangement and that<br />
this treaty was a provisional arrangement<br />
and did not legalise integration<br />
of Kashmir to the Indian Union. In<br />
critical legal analysis of the IOA<br />
based accession being void, how<br />
would the presence of armed forces<br />
from India have legal authority? In<br />
circumstances where such acts take<br />
place the term aggression has been<br />
used in international law .<br />
Article-370 of the Indian<br />
Constitution was made the anchor of<br />
relationship between India and<br />
Kashmir and became the mainstay of<br />
transport of laws from the Union to<br />
the State that flouted the Article-370<br />
itself. On July 24, 1952 it was agreed<br />
that all laws apart from those related<br />
to defence communication and foreign<br />
affairs would be debated in local<br />
assembly before being adopted. This<br />
was adopted as the Delhi Agreement<br />
encompassing complete internal<br />
autonomy with limited appellate<br />
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jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of<br />
India. India made gradual insertion<br />
of laws that wiped out the autonomy<br />
status. This emerged as an additional<br />
factor for demand for self-determination.<br />
The linchpin of self-determination<br />
for the people of J&K was<br />
entrenched in the principle of<br />
plebiscite that has eluded people of<br />
Kashmir ever since. Plebiscite gained<br />
stature as an erga omnes principle by<br />
universal opinion from the international<br />
community and legal policy of<br />
both India and Pakistan. India may<br />
have reneged on its legal policy to<br />
afford people of Kashmir a chance of<br />
a plebiscite but international law will<br />
come strong against that infraction .<br />
Both India and Pakistan are parties to<br />
UN Resolution of August 13, 1948<br />
and January 15, 1949, which call for a<br />
plebiscite and are binding on both.<br />
Kashmiri people have not been<br />
afforded the chance to express their<br />
true will through elections. Elections<br />
that were carried out were fake and<br />
illegally conducted and people were<br />
forced to cast votes.<br />
Kashmiri people in the meantime<br />
kept their struggle for right to such<br />
determination alive for the last 60<br />
years, a dream nurtured by political<br />
conviction to determine the status of<br />
their territory and restore their title.<br />
Kashmir was unfortunately always a<br />
place where there was always uncertainty<br />
in life in a turbulent atmosphere.<br />
There are rampant violations of human<br />
rights perpetrated to curb insurgency<br />
for a claim to self-determination.<br />
Human rights violations externalised<br />
the Kashmir issue and stands out as<br />
one more pillar of claim for self-determination.<br />
The UN takes a robust position<br />
on human rights. Article-55 (c) of<br />
the Charter expresses clearly universal<br />
respect for and observance human<br />
rights and fundamental freedoms for<br />
all. Article-56 obligates all members to<br />
serve allegiance to Article-55. Human<br />
rights and self-determination are<br />
linked in close relationship as envisaged<br />
in ICCPR.<br />
The anchor of the legal framework<br />
in which Kashmir is set is<br />
Armed Forces Special Powers Act AF<br />
(J&K)SPA 1990 a reprehensible legacy<br />
from the British times, including<br />
the 1942 ‘Quit India’ movement<br />
launched with such strength that<br />
British lost nerve. They wanted to<br />
keep India. As a knee jerk response<br />
they framed the Armed Forces<br />
Special Powers Ordinance (AFSPO)<br />
and lashed out at the public, empowering<br />
the armed forces to arrest, kill,<br />
humiliate, torture and burn homes<br />
with impunity. That would not only<br />
crush the rebellion but also start a<br />
ripple effect of terror through the<br />
whole nation. Unfortunately, for<br />
India there was no formal process of<br />
decolonisation adopted because the<br />
British did not consider India as a<br />
colony but an integral part of the<br />
sovereign. Therefore, on August 15,<br />
1947 free India inherited every item<br />
of governance, including laws. The<br />
Ordinance part of AFSPO was<br />
repealed but the Act remained and<br />
was used against the Naga people’s<br />
revolt and in its harsh detail renewed<br />
as AF(J&K)SPA 1990. The coercive<br />
nature of this act has destroyed the<br />
human fabric of a society who are<br />
claimed to be a part of the largest<br />
democracy on earth. Any non-commissioned<br />
officer of the forces can<br />
arrest, torture or kill a citizen if in his<br />
view that person is likely to disturb<br />
peace. Subjugation through such a<br />
law let India take 690 MW power<br />
from Salal (Kashmir) power station<br />
at 65 paise per unit and supply the<br />
same electricity to people of Kashmir<br />
at Re 1.50.<br />
It stands to advancing universal<br />
rationality to create an atmosphere of<br />
synthesis for an end to the conflict in<br />
Kashmir that has plagued the region<br />
for the last 61 years. From the inception<br />
of political and legal infractions<br />
that were the main concern between<br />
India and Pakistan, it will fore-shadow<br />
the end of the water dispute<br />
between India and Pakistan. The<br />
danger is that the battle for water<br />
may supersede any other exigency<br />
the two countries face. India prevents<br />
international agencies to build the<br />
power projects by refusing sovereign<br />
guarantee for the loans, in order to<br />
execute the work and control the<br />
power generated. This practice is<br />
reminiscent of the colonial World<br />
System Theory in which the peripheral<br />
countries or the colonies were sold<br />
goods manufactured with their own<br />
There is a tacit<br />
understanding in all<br />
political circles that<br />
negotiations between<br />
the two countries over<br />
Kashmir will<br />
perpetuate suffering of<br />
people<br />
materials and labour by the core<br />
countries or colonisers at high prices,<br />
draining their resources .<br />
The occupation of Kashmir by<br />
India and Pakistan and its non-recognition<br />
by the international community<br />
is a conditio sine qua non for the<br />
State identity and continuity of<br />
Kashmir. Line of Control (LOC)<br />
between India and Pakistan is a contentious<br />
border that foments dissent.<br />
It is the sharp end of bilateralism that<br />
has many contours in which people<br />
of Kashmir are mired. There is a tacit<br />
understanding in all political circles<br />
that negotiations between the two<br />
countries over Kashmir will perpetuate<br />
suffering of people. The local<br />
regimes have been installed that<br />
remain ultra vires and have changed<br />
hands over the years from parties<br />
that were chosen for their allegiance<br />
to India and clientelism. They have<br />
been construed as sui generis not only<br />
because they lack credible representation<br />
and support from the electorate<br />
but more importantly for the<br />
fact that they cannot offer fundamental<br />
rights to people. The over-arching<br />
laws like the AF(J&K)SPA 1990 render<br />
the local administration powerless<br />
to offer positive rights like protection<br />
of life or negative. In the<br />
event, local governments are considered<br />
as extension of power from the<br />
metropolitan Delhi, then there needs<br />
to be a demonstrable display of State<br />
authority with effective governance<br />
over a long period of time from the<br />
centre.<br />
— The writer is a retired consulting<br />
surgeon and postgraduate in Political<br />
Science from Bradeford University<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Growing up in<br />
a valley of fear<br />
A whole generation has grown up amidst the nearly twodecade-long<br />
turmoil that robbed the paradise called<br />
Kashmir. Feroz Rather belongs to this generation of<br />
Kashmiris as he finds himself adrift even while outside the<br />
Valley. In this moving account of his turbulent quest for<br />
education and knowledge, he tries to figure out what went<br />
wrong that turned youth like him into worst suspects of<br />
their times<br />
About two decades ago, in<br />
1989 to be exact, I was sent to<br />
school in Kashmir. My school<br />
nestled amid willows and springs. It<br />
is precisely the year when a massive<br />
rebellion betook the entire Valley.<br />
And a whole new generation right<br />
from kindergarten hit upon the idea<br />
of self-determination. Thousands of<br />
boys and girls, like me lived the formative<br />
years of their life amid incessant<br />
violence, bloodshed and the<br />
accompanying mistrust. I left<br />
Kashmir in 2003 to pursue BA at<br />
Aligarh Muslim University. Two<br />
years back, I moved to Delhi to do<br />
Masters in English Literature at<br />
Jamia Millia Islamia.<br />
My last five years in two prominent<br />
Indian Muslim Institutions have<br />
brought rather queer experiences.<br />
The subtle realisation of one's existence<br />
as an individual was never<br />
without a sense of a deep permanent<br />
loss informed with abysmal despair,<br />
alienation and insecurity. The pain<br />
seemed always not to flow from the<br />
feeling of being a Muslim in India.<br />
Not from finding oneself in melancholic<br />
morass of decadent Indian<br />
Muslim culture. Not that one has<br />
failed to do good academically. Not<br />
that one has failed to win good<br />
friends in the class. Not that one has<br />
failed to impress good relations with<br />
one's teachers. But from the consciousness<br />
that one was at a precarious<br />
interface with the people and<br />
institutions who essentially shape<br />
society and politics that in turn have<br />
been responsible for all the affliction<br />
and misery that abound Kashmir.<br />
In July 2006, after getting admission<br />
in Jamia Millia, I was looking for<br />
lodging in south Delhi. Thanks to our<br />
peculiar physiognomy that makes<br />
every Kashmiri so easily recognisable<br />
in India (and also has come to<br />
symbolise terror and destruction,<br />
here I thank kitschy Indian media in<br />
all its forms), everybody denied it.<br />
For many weeks I lost myself in the<br />
labyrinths of Delhi, being merely<br />
asked one-worded question --<br />
"Kashmiri?''… followed by moments<br />
of eerie silence so that I get the<br />
answer. Ultimately, I gave some<br />
money to a shopkeeper to feign as<br />
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my old acquaintance. It worked as<br />
one day after getting a call from him<br />
he accompanied me to the landlord. I<br />
promptly paid the advance and<br />
thanked him while holding tears<br />
back to my eyes. It seemed getting a<br />
house in Delhi was more difficult<br />
than the entrance examination.<br />
My house in Delhi was in<br />
Munirka, an unplanned agglomeration<br />
of myriad sized buildings opposite<br />
the main gate of Jawaharlal<br />
Nehru University, a premier institution<br />
known for its standards of excellence<br />
in social sciences throughout<br />
the country. In the new city I felt terribly<br />
nostalgic. One damp July night<br />
while I was sitting in my windowless<br />
new house my homesickness grew<br />
unbearable. It almost bogged me<br />
down as none of my friends was<br />
around. I went to sleep very early<br />
and had a nightmare. I saw bloodied<br />
corpse of my elder brother lying<br />
before me. It was pitch dark and<br />
women sobbed and shrieked bitterly.<br />
I was thrown out of sleep. When I<br />
realised that it was a dream, tears<br />
streamed through my eyes. My<br />
thumping heart seemed to block my<br />
throat. I reached my hand for the bottle<br />
on my bedside. There was no<br />
water in it. I was too frightened to go<br />
out to look for some shopkeeper<br />
unlikely to open by then.<br />
I tried to call one of my classmates<br />
with whom I had developed<br />
some friendly relationship during<br />
the introductory lectures of our<br />
course. She didn't pick up. From next<br />
day she had a great difficulty talking<br />
to me and till today we could not get<br />
to old terms. That night I wanted to<br />
tell her about the nightmare that has<br />
been torturing me for quite some<br />
time. I wanted to tell her what had<br />
happened some years back in my village<br />
in south Kashmir.<br />
My village Bumthan lies off<br />
Jammu-Srinagar highway, some 50<br />
kilometers away from Srinagar. An<br />
uneven stretch of farms and shrubberies<br />
stands between the village and<br />
the bend of the road. The highway is<br />
always busy wafting roar of army<br />
convoys, buses and local cabs and<br />
enters the village through an<br />
unkempt road that takes a sharp perpendicular<br />
turn around the culvert to<br />
open near the mouth of the village. It<br />
was a sultry September day. I had finished<br />
my midterm examination of<br />
the eleventh standard and was relaxing<br />
with my mother in our two-storied<br />
brick house, built at some three<br />
minutes walking distance from the<br />
culvert, in the front face of the village.<br />
Around midday a rumor spread<br />
through the neighbourhood that<br />
some militants happened to be<br />
around. We were about to have our<br />
lunch when we heard that the army<br />
had come. Suddenly the main points<br />
of the exit were sealed by them. An<br />
unheard announcement of death and<br />
disaster pervaded the dusty air, as it<br />
spewed through the nearby stone<br />
crushers to engulf the whole village.<br />
Mother gave me two chickenand-rice-filled<br />
steel lunch boxes with<br />
which to escape. I was supposed to<br />
take them to our sawmills in Mir<br />
Bazar, the busy village bus stop<br />
where the link road meets the highway.<br />
When I came out I found the<br />
whole village thrown into deep trepidation.<br />
Women and children grew<br />
anxious while jawans of the Indian<br />
army took positions at various angles<br />
and distances around the village. I<br />
found three army men, with bedraggled<br />
beard and blood-red eyes<br />
around the culvert, around which<br />
there are only a few houses besides<br />
the stone-crushers overlooking the<br />
green stretch. Wearing bulletproof<br />
jackets, their index fingers were readily<br />
curled around the fully loaded<br />
Kalashnikovs. I customarily showed<br />
my 'identity card' and passed over.<br />
Only a few seconds later, one of them<br />
shrieked with brute fright, yelling,<br />
"He is fleeing, sister fu**er…'' and<br />
then a volley of bullets, after running<br />
a few steps away .The other two took<br />
positions to cover him up. I watched<br />
this from a very close distance of<br />
some five yards. I ran to enter the<br />
nearby house. The women inside<br />
started sobbing and shrieking while<br />
all of us squatted on the ground and<br />
then crawled to the staircase towards<br />
the rear part of the house.<br />
Just a few minutes before, the<br />
army had started the search operation<br />
from the other side of the village.<br />
Taking the local boys as their shields,<br />
they were guided by a captured militant<br />
who was driven along in manacles.<br />
My cousin, who was sent to one<br />
of the houses, which the army suspected<br />
was a militant hideout, later<br />
told me what a dangerously funny<br />
thing had happened. He told me that<br />
after he was sent to a suspected<br />
house with an army man hiding<br />
behind him, one huge copper-pot<br />
tumbled from the top shelf of the<br />
kitchen cupboard and banged on the<br />
ground. The army man had given a<br />
shrill hitch and tried to slap him,<br />
after realising that no one was inside.<br />
My cousin had instantaneously<br />
responded, “Damn you! You have<br />
taken my shirt off and made me your<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
shield. If anybody is inside, he will<br />
shoot at me first… Don't panic".<br />
The seemingly futile military<br />
search operation continued without<br />
any results until the first burst of bullets<br />
was fired in front of my eyes. My<br />
mother and other women who had<br />
gathered around the village school<br />
tried to take refuge there. But they<br />
had been driven out by the teacher<br />
on the pretext of children's 'security'.<br />
A madness which accompanies<br />
impending death permeated everything.<br />
The village was then in an<br />
uproarious lull. The army men started<br />
beating everyone around. They<br />
took the young boys with them until<br />
they found the dead bodies of one<br />
militant lying beside the brook running<br />
under the culvert between the<br />
village and the uneven land stretch.<br />
The bullets shot in my presence,<br />
indeed, hit their target.<br />
Another militant as they rightly<br />
guessed had moved away from the<br />
houses across the brook into the tall<br />
maize fields, surrounded by paddy<br />
farms and thick vegetable shrubberies.<br />
As we lay crippled under the<br />
staircase, amid the roar of army men<br />
a familiar noise hit our ears. All the<br />
boys along with my own elder brother<br />
were beaten and forced to take<br />
their shirts off and become human<br />
shields. From different sides they<br />
were sent forward to zero in on the<br />
maize fields by clearing all the<br />
In one brief interlude,<br />
when bullets seemed<br />
to stop, one of the old<br />
men came kneeling<br />
inside. He said that all<br />
the young boys had<br />
been taken by the<br />
army as shields and it<br />
was difficult that any<br />
of them would come<br />
back alive<br />
shrubs and maize plants with their<br />
bare hands. Anybody who mustered<br />
to get up for a moment was severely<br />
spanked by the gun-butts from<br />
behind. This continued for almost<br />
four hours while army men crawled<br />
forward from a distance and fired<br />
wherever and whenever they<br />
wished. One of my friends fainted<br />
but was not spared to go, but kicked<br />
continuously until he got back into<br />
his senses only to faint again. But<br />
some of them after hours of moving<br />
through thorns and desperation,<br />
beating and bruises and bullets flying<br />
over their shoulders, had started<br />
‘enjoying’ it. The driver of our bandsaw<br />
mill later told me that he ate a<br />
big cucumber in my neighbour’s<br />
shrubbery, because he thought that<br />
in any case, after a few moments, he<br />
was doomed to eat the 'date kernel'.<br />
The transport on the highway<br />
was halted. One of my maternal<br />
cousins who lives in a nearby village<br />
was getting married the next day. He,<br />
along with his parents, had gone for<br />
shopping to the hometown,<br />
Islamabad, was also stuck in the<br />
backseat of a local cab. The next day<br />
while we were preparing the henna<br />
to color his finger, he told me that he<br />
had thought instead of his marriage<br />
he might have to attend our mass<br />
funeral.<br />
While we were still unable to<br />
move from the dark corner that<br />
turned smelly with our profuse<br />
sweating, none of us could gather<br />
courage to walk to kitchen and drink<br />
some water. As I sat jumbled around<br />
some 10 members of that family, our<br />
throats grew dry as sand. The clatter<br />
of bullets hitting the tin roof of the<br />
one-storied house, closest one to the<br />
place of encounter, seemed to crumble<br />
by their sheer vehemence.<br />
In one brief interlude, when bullets<br />
seemed to stop, one of the old<br />
men came kneeling inside. He said<br />
that all the young boys had been<br />
taken by the army as shields and it<br />
was difficult that any of them would<br />
come back alive. I remembered my<br />
brother whom he confirmed was<br />
with them and sagged down in hopeless<br />
despair. He was in late teens and<br />
I had grown much fond of him after<br />
his troubled relationship with our<br />
parents. Every bullet fired after that<br />
brought images of his blood-spattered<br />
body before my eyes. His own<br />
athletic well-formed body lying<br />
among the dead boys of my village,<br />
my own childhood friends and caring<br />
warm cousins. Those hours were,<br />
perhaps, the most difficult time of<br />
my life. I waited and wept crumpling<br />
under the dark suffocating staircase,<br />
while other people wept or wailed<br />
like me.<br />
The encounter was over, finally. I<br />
came out. A strange shiver was traveling<br />
through my legs, when to my<br />
surprise I saw that all the bruised<br />
boys were alive. I thought that my<br />
brother was not with them. I was<br />
about to hit my aching head to a<br />
brick-wall when he called me from<br />
behind. I looked back in desperation<br />
and ran to bury my head in his arms.<br />
A selfish happiness overtook me as<br />
we helped to put the dead militant's<br />
body in the truck. My brother and<br />
cousins told me that the militant did<br />
not retaliate to the army assault<br />
when he saw the advancing Indian<br />
troops putting the naked civilians in<br />
their front as shields.<br />
The operation was a major tactical<br />
success – ‘Operation Fox', as it was<br />
called. After the end of the nerve<br />
wracking operation, all of the army<br />
men gathered in a circle and celebrated<br />
their triumph by shouting and<br />
cheering aloud.<br />
It's perhaps my inability to put<br />
such stories across my good Indian<br />
friends, which made my life an ironical<br />
failure. My Indian friends live in<br />
world that is oblivious and may I<br />
dare to say far removed from and callously<br />
ignorant about the shocking<br />
happenings in Kashmir. They are<br />
absorbed in building their careers,<br />
celebrating their academic successes.<br />
Not surprisingly they did not prod<br />
me enough, nor did they feel the<br />
need to heed me enough to dig and<br />
listen to such stories of which, I am<br />
literally made of. So herein, I have<br />
taken the opportunity to explain<br />
what I could never before share with<br />
anyone—Nor did anybody ever ask<br />
me about any of these things.<br />
<br />
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FOUL ARREST<br />
Poor professor in tears<br />
as son rots in Tihar<br />
Several cases of victimisation of members of minority communities<br />
by police have raised the question of whether the civil society has<br />
accorded legitimacy to these. What we need is to urgently rethink<br />
state-sponsored terrorism, writes Subhash Gatade<br />
Professor Sanaullah Radoo,<br />
Principal of a Degree College<br />
in Sopore still remembers the<br />
day when his youngest son Pervez<br />
had reached the airport in Srinagar in<br />
a hurry to catch the next Spice Jet<br />
flight to Delhi ( September 12, 2006).<br />
The moment the flight landed in<br />
Delhi, he had even made a call to his<br />
Abboo (father) informing him that he<br />
is rushing to get the boarding pass to<br />
the next connecting flight for Pune. It<br />
has been more than 19 months that<br />
Pervez is in detention and right now<br />
lodged in Jail no 01, Ward no 01,<br />
Barrack no. 02, Tihar, Delhi. All his<br />
dreams to undertake research on the<br />
particular rice variety found in<br />
Kashmir stands suspended. Young<br />
Pervez Ahmad Radoo, who had<br />
already finished his post-graduation<br />
in Zoology from Modern College in<br />
Pune, was seeking admission to<br />
Ph.D. for which he was going to<br />
Pune.<br />
The moment Pervez approached<br />
the airline staff to get his boarding<br />
pass at the Delhi airport, security<br />
officers surrounded him, took away<br />
his luggage and escorted him to the<br />
Lodhi Colony Special Cell. In a letter<br />
<strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong>, March-April 2008 he<br />
provides details of the manner in<br />
which he was 'tortured and interrogated<br />
severely' how he was 'beaten<br />
up ruthlessly' and was given 'electric<br />
shocks'.<br />
Professor Sanaullah Radoo<br />
As per the version of Special Cell<br />
of the Delhi Police, Pervez was arrested<br />
on October 15, 2006 from Azadpur<br />
Mandi in the city with "three kgs of<br />
RDX and Rs 10 lakh hawala money<br />
along with other incriminating evidence"<br />
proving him to be a "Jaish-e-<br />
Mohammed terrorist".<br />
Professor Sanaullah has been running<br />
from pillar to post since then so<br />
that his youngest son gets a 'fair trial'<br />
and comes out of jail unscathed and<br />
is able to resume his research work.<br />
The fact is that for around one month<br />
the professor did not know that<br />
Pervez has not landed in Pune and<br />
that he was in detention. He presented<br />
a memorandum to the National<br />
Commission for Minorities ( NCM)<br />
to press harder for their intervention.<br />
Mohammad Shafi Qureshi,<br />
Chairperson of NCM, who has<br />
looked into the case and has also<br />
written to the Delhi Police was candid<br />
enough to share his views on the<br />
subject with a reporter ('Mail Today’,<br />
Delhi, March 6, 2008 - NCM fights for<br />
release of J&K youth in Tihar):<br />
"It is hard to believe the police version<br />
when one sees the clean chits given<br />
by the police superintendent and additional<br />
district magistrate of Sopore, his<br />
native town, and from the local resident<br />
welfare association (RWA). Most importantly,<br />
the certificate given by Spice Jet<br />
for the same day shows him as boarding<br />
the plane for Delhi from Srinagar and<br />
then also bound to travel further to<br />
Pune. These facts have been completely<br />
ignored by the Special Cell.'<br />
Trying to control his tears<br />
Professor Sanaullah Radoo tells the<br />
reporter the manner in which the<br />
police have turned a promising<br />
young scientist into a 'bomb-man'<br />
'He should be completing his<br />
research on a rice species in Kashmir<br />
valley, instead, he is in prison facing<br />
charges of terrorism.' He clearly says<br />
the police 'are lying'. He is also not<br />
sure whether his son would receive a<br />
fair trial or not and whether he has<br />
been provided an able legal practitioner<br />
to defend his case or not.<br />
Pervez's jail diary, which has<br />
appeared in a section of the media,<br />
puts further light on his plight. In his<br />
letter asking to 'Save My Career, As I<br />
Am Innocent' he poignantly asks<br />
'Am I not Indian, if I am Kashmiri.<br />
Why this discrimination. When tall<br />
claims are being made by the<br />
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FOUL ARREST<br />
Government of India, by media, that<br />
before law all citizens are equal.' This<br />
story is not one of its kind. Not a day<br />
passes when one does not hear about<br />
the illegal detention of a youth from<br />
a minority community on some<br />
charges constructed upon false<br />
claims.<br />
Just a day before 'Mail Today' carried<br />
Pervez’s story, it had provided<br />
details of a case involving a 'terrorist'<br />
gutkha manufacturer getting bail<br />
Mail Today, March 5, 2008. According<br />
to the report filed by Piyush<br />
Srivastava, 'Barely six months ago, 35<br />
year old Imran Ismail Memon was<br />
termed as a terrorist, gangster, a<br />
hawala racketeer, a smuggler and a<br />
manufacturer of adulterated Gutkha.'<br />
The Rae Bareli police arrested Imran<br />
Ismail Memon, a resident of Thane in<br />
Maharashtra on August 25, 2007,<br />
saying he was part of a "terrorist<br />
module" and had started an "illegal<br />
and adulterated gutkha factory" as a<br />
cover-up to stay in the district.<br />
Lucknow bench of the Allahabad<br />
High Court granted him bail because<br />
of lack of evidence. It also added that<br />
'the police could not even prove the<br />
power theft charge against him.'<br />
Or take the case of Aftab Alam<br />
Ansari, an employee of the Calcutta<br />
Electricity Supply Corporation, who<br />
was arrested on December 27, 2007<br />
as 'main accused behind the serial<br />
blasts in number of courts in UP',<br />
who was tortured for 22 days in<br />
order to make him confess that he<br />
was Mukhtar alias Raju, resident of<br />
Malda district in West Bengal and<br />
had Rs 6 crores in his bank account,<br />
or, the case of a poor fruit vendor<br />
from Kashmir who was presented<br />
before the media as a 'prize catch'<br />
responsible for blasts on the eve of<br />
Diwali in Delhi two years back: it is<br />
clear to any layperson that with the<br />
ascendance of the Hindu right forces<br />
in the Indian polity and in the ambience<br />
which has been created the<br />
world over post 9/11 such targeting<br />
of innocents from the minority community<br />
has become the norm.<br />
A biggest irony of the whole situation<br />
is that while terrorist acts committed<br />
by Hindutva organisations<br />
are not even reported or all attempts<br />
are done to cover them up, innocents<br />
from the minority community are<br />
apprehended claiming them to be<br />
associates of this or that dreaded terrorist<br />
organisation. The media,<br />
which is supposed to be a watchdog<br />
of democracy, also joins the malicious<br />
campaign where it has no<br />
qualms in calling all such people terrorists<br />
rather than accused awaiting<br />
trial in court. It does not bother them<br />
that such a trial by media is not only<br />
unethical but also violates the basic<br />
ethics of responsible and fair journalism.<br />
No one condones acts of terrorism<br />
if they occur in any part of the<br />
country. One would want that the<br />
law of the land should be equally<br />
applicable in all such cases. They<br />
should not appear to favour or target<br />
a particular community.<br />
It would not be an exaggeration<br />
to say that it is the new trend— 'terrorisation'<br />
and 'stigmatisation' of the<br />
minority community—is reaching<br />
menacing proportions. The pattern<br />
of mindless arrests for the sake of<br />
branding innocent persons as terrorists<br />
and resorting to relentless torture<br />
is coming under increasing scrutiny.<br />
This is giving rise to perceptible<br />
anger all across the country.<br />
Perhaps the recent decision of the<br />
UP government asking a retired<br />
judge to ascertain whether two persons<br />
arrested for the court blasts in<br />
state are indeed terrorists or not, is<br />
an indicator of the pressure governments<br />
are facing over repeated complaints<br />
that the state police is implicating<br />
Muslims as terrorists. The case<br />
involves the arrest of Khalid Mujahid<br />
and Tariq, claiming them to be members<br />
of Harkat-Ul-Jehadi (HUJI) who<br />
were implicated for executing the<br />
serial blasts that left 14 people dead.<br />
If one searches the record of the<br />
Jamia Tul-Salahat Madarsa in<br />
Jaunpur where Khalid use to teach, it<br />
tells us that not only was he not present<br />
on the day (November 23) in the<br />
Madarsa but had also checked the<br />
copies of the students. The judge has<br />
been asked to cross-check the UP<br />
police story which says that Khalid<br />
landed in Lucknow in a bus on<br />
November 23 morning, met other<br />
accomplices, bought new cycles,<br />
planted bombs on the Lucknow<br />
court premises and returned immediately<br />
to Jaunpur.<br />
The need of the hour is to understand<br />
that ‘terrorism’ cannot be the<br />
monopoly of a particular community.<br />
It is a product of the typical circumstances,<br />
which societies encounter or<br />
find themselves in, and the nature of<br />
the dominant or dominated forces in<br />
operation in those societies and their<br />
larger worldview.<br />
There is no denying the fact that<br />
civil society at large at some level has<br />
accorded legitimacy to all such<br />
actions by the police. If that had not<br />
been the case, there would have been<br />
an uproar at the national level when<br />
it was revealed how, 'intelligence<br />
bureau operatives colluded with<br />
Delhi police to brand two of its own<br />
informers as dreaded terrorists'. It<br />
was sheer coincidence that the matter<br />
reached CBI, which exposed the dark<br />
machinations of the dirty tricks<br />
brigade.<br />
A write-up in the Times of India<br />
'IB, cops in murky frame-up' (By<br />
Sachin Parashar, New Delhi, 13<br />
September 2007) had presented all<br />
relevant details of the case.<br />
New Delhi: The CBI has found that<br />
the Intelligence Bureau operatives colluded<br />
with Delhi Police special cell<br />
sleuths to ‘plant’ RDX on two youths<br />
who were arrested as ‘Al Badr terrorists’,<br />
TOI has learnt. The shocking conclusion<br />
comes a month after the agency told the<br />
Delhi High Court that the special cell’s<br />
probe into the murky affair “didn’t<br />
inspire confidence”.<br />
Top CBI sources told TOI on<br />
Wednesday that the seized RDX<br />
appeared to have been planted on the two<br />
‘terrorists’ Mohd Moarif Qamar and<br />
Irshad Ali. The agency will submit its<br />
report, which indicts officers of IB and<br />
Delhi Police special cell, to the court on<br />
October 24.<br />
While similar episodes in the past<br />
have hurt the credibility of the anti-terror<br />
agencies, this one stands out because it<br />
marks a rare instance where Intelligence<br />
Bureau operatives collaborated in the<br />
plot hatched by Delhi Police’s special<br />
cell.<br />
—The writer is a freelance journalist<br />
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Military might and<br />
human rights<br />
Picking up people on mere suspicion, arresting and<br />
torturing them is the order<br />
of the day in a land where<br />
army and para<br />
military forces<br />
hold<br />
unaccountable<br />
powers. The guilty<br />
men in uniform<br />
should be held<br />
accountable and<br />
brought to books,<br />
writes<br />
Sujata Krishnamurthi<br />
Human right activist, Jalil<br />
Andrabi, was abducted by<br />
the paramilitary and renegades<br />
in March 1996 in the presence<br />
of eyewitnesses and tortured to<br />
death in custody. Despite the initial<br />
denial by government of the army's<br />
culpability, the Special Investigation<br />
Team identified an army Major in<br />
April 1997 as accused. He was<br />
released without punishment : this is<br />
one of many crimes that have<br />
allegedly been committed by the<br />
army in Kashmir. If militancy left<br />
thousands dead, the human rights<br />
record of the Indian army and<br />
paramilitary forces has been equally<br />
abysmal.<br />
India’s decision to accede to<br />
plebiscite and then retract from it,<br />
has proved expensive to India, and<br />
to the Kashmiris, in the form of six<br />
decades of strife and conflict.<br />
Militancy began in 1989 as a spontaneous<br />
movement by the people<br />
towards self-determination.<br />
Militancy has taken on different<br />
hues. Up to 1992-93, it was restricted<br />
to the Kashmiri demand for selfdetermination<br />
and received local<br />
sympathy. It soon transformed into a<br />
brutal blood bath on the part of the<br />
local militants and the outsiders<br />
(mujahideen, ex Pakistani soldiers<br />
and mercenaries).<br />
Central government forces operating<br />
in Kashmir include the Indian<br />
Army, the J&K police, the Central<br />
Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the<br />
Border Security Force (BSF). The<br />
army strength was expanded in 1993<br />
with the introduction of the<br />
Rashtriya Rifles, who have been the<br />
main force in charge of counterinsurgency<br />
operations in Doda, Rajouri<br />
and Poonch. Getting an exact figure<br />
on the army deployment is not possible,<br />
as India does not provide details<br />
of its military and paramilitary<br />
deployments. Pakistani assertions<br />
that the Indian army strength is<br />
above 600,000 are substantially<br />
inflated. Reports estimate that India<br />
deploys approximately 400,000 combined<br />
army and paramilitary forces<br />
in Kashmir, most of which are stationed<br />
in the interior, 80,000 of which<br />
are deployed along the Line of<br />
Control (LOC). Pakistani forces<br />
deployed along the LOC are reported<br />
to number in the 40,000-50,000<br />
range.<br />
State repression<br />
Seventeen-year-old Muhammad Safi<br />
Lone, of village Budbugh, Tehsil<br />
Handwara, was admitted to SMHS hos-<br />
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pital with bullet wounds. On the night of<br />
June 11, 1997 the Jawans of Indian army<br />
and Rashtriya Rifles went to their village<br />
for a search and cordon operation. The<br />
army suspected that militants were hiding<br />
in the nearby forest and forced several<br />
local youth to act as human shield for<br />
the army. They were made to walk in a<br />
kneel-down position towards the forest,<br />
while the army Jawans hid behind them.<br />
In the ensuing exchange of fire, one village<br />
youth Akbar Wani was killed, Safi<br />
Lone was hit by four bullets.<br />
Forces used landmines and other<br />
explosive devices indiscriminately,<br />
showing their callousness toward<br />
civilian life. In their attempts to suppress<br />
militancy in Kashmir, the army,<br />
paramilitary forces and the police<br />
also succumbed to human rights violations.<br />
Human Rights activists have<br />
accused the Indian security forces of<br />
consistently violating humanitarian<br />
laws. These violations stem from<br />
abuse of power under repressive<br />
laws like the National Security Act<br />
and the Armed Forces Special<br />
Powers Act (J&K). There have been<br />
reports of police/army brutality and<br />
repression including arbitrary<br />
arrests, rapes and extra judicial<br />
killings. Stories of media gagging,<br />
beating up of human rights activists,<br />
journalists and medical personnel<br />
and banning entry to organisations<br />
like the International Federation of<br />
Human Rights and Amnesty<br />
International are a dime a dozen. It<br />
has also been alleged that India has<br />
sponsored irregular militias that<br />
operate outside the law to carry out<br />
its counterinsurgency operations.<br />
On 10 May, 2001, 17 journalists<br />
were assaulted by Border Security Force<br />
(BSF) troops while covering a funeral<br />
procession for bomb victims of an attack<br />
that had occurred the previous day near a<br />
security camp at Magam in the Budgam<br />
district of Kashmir, leaving nine people<br />
dead. The journalists were covering the<br />
assault on the demonstrators from a distance<br />
when the leading officer ordered his<br />
troops to attack them.<br />
Most of the violations, including<br />
the more egregious abuses like extra<br />
judicial killings and custodial deaths<br />
remain unpunished. There were<br />
more than 200 incidents of rape in<br />
Doda in January 1994 alone. During<br />
the period 1990-1994, Amnesty<br />
International documented 706 cases<br />
of custodial killings, nearly all after<br />
gruesome torture. The government<br />
responded to 519 out of 706 cases,<br />
dismissing the rest as "encounter<br />
killings" despite eyewitness reports<br />
to the contrary. In 85 other cases, the<br />
government indicated that there was<br />
prima facie evidence of human rights<br />
violations and these were said to be<br />
under investigation.<br />
Repairing a tarnished image<br />
Since 1993, Delhi has embarked<br />
on a campaign to improve its international<br />
image tarnished by the<br />
appalling human rights record of its<br />
police and security forces. The path<br />
has been tough as winning over the<br />
trust of a battle scarred and embittered<br />
Kashmiri citizen is an uphill<br />
task. Few have forgotten the past<br />
brutalities, indiscriminate firings and<br />
atrocities committed by the Indian<br />
forces.<br />
In May 1996, elections were held<br />
in the state for the first time since<br />
1989 with Farooq Abdullah forming<br />
government. Two more elected governments<br />
led by Mufti Mohammed<br />
Sayeed and Azad followed. With the<br />
hope of peace returning to the Valley,<br />
there has been pressure on India to<br />
disarm all irregular militias, carry<br />
out extensive investigations on all<br />
reports of abuse and punish those<br />
responsible, and provide full access<br />
to Kashmir for specialised human<br />
rights bodies like the Special<br />
Rapporteurs on Torture and<br />
Summary and Arbitrary Execution<br />
and the Working Groups on<br />
Disappearances and Arbitrary<br />
Detention and for international<br />
human rights organisations like the<br />
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty<br />
International.<br />
The state’s decision to allow the<br />
International Committee of the Red<br />
Cross to provide its humanitarian<br />
services in Kashmir is significant. A<br />
visit by the International Commission<br />
of Jurists followed. In 2002, the<br />
newly elected Mufti Mohammad<br />
Sayeed’s government took the decision<br />
to give a much-needed “healing<br />
touch” to Kashmir through a comprehensive<br />
31-point Common<br />
Minimum Programme (CMP). This<br />
human rights programme mandated<br />
the assimilation of the Special<br />
Operations Group (SOG), allegedly<br />
responsible for a huge number of<br />
human rights abuses, into the Jammu<br />
& Kashmir Police, the termination of<br />
the POTA (Prevention of Terrorism<br />
Act), review cases of detainees held<br />
without trial for a long time, investigate<br />
all earlier custodial killings and<br />
punish all those responsible. The<br />
programme was also to institute<br />
rehabilitation and supportive measures<br />
for militancy affected families<br />
and finally carry out unconditional<br />
dialogue with terrorist groups: clear<br />
indications of a revision in the government’s<br />
'hard line’ policy on<br />
Kashmir.<br />
Although according to the army’s<br />
assessment, stopping cross border<br />
infiltration, and counter-insurgency<br />
operations in the hinterlands of<br />
Jammu & Kashmir have resulted in<br />
drastic decline in violence in the<br />
state, the government has no intention<br />
of cutting down on the strength<br />
of the Army deployment immediately.<br />
Militancy may have abated but it<br />
is still a reality. They change their<br />
strategy on ground, pushing the<br />
security establishment to the edge.<br />
No doubt the deployment in Jammu<br />
& Kashmir, a point of contention for<br />
many, is huge, but the army, which<br />
sees itself as critical for security and<br />
stability will remain as long as militancy<br />
remains.<br />
With matters under relative control,<br />
there has been a paradigm shift<br />
towards socio economic upliftment.<br />
The basic premise being, that economic<br />
emancipation and good governance<br />
are the key to solving the<br />
problem of militancy and alienation.<br />
The army is a formidable force but in<br />
the long run, it is possible for it to<br />
effectively hold on to the territory<br />
only with the cooperation of the people.<br />
It has to maintain a constant vigil<br />
on the border to check infiltration,<br />
while simultaneously work towards<br />
winning over the locals.<br />
<br />
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Twenty-year-long<br />
night of long knives<br />
Q&A<br />
General S Padmanabhan<br />
General Sundararajan Padmanabhan assumed charge<br />
of the Indian Army, as the 20th Chief of Army Staff,<br />
on 30 September 2000. He was commander of the 15<br />
Corps in the Kashmir valley from July 1993 to<br />
February 1995. During his tenure, the army made big<br />
gains over militants in Kashmir. He was awarded the<br />
Ati Vishisht Seva Medal (AVSM) for his services. He<br />
takes time off for <strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong> and shares his views<br />
about the army’s role in Kashmir in this exclusive<br />
interview with Sujata Krishnamurthi<br />
QAs commander of the 15<br />
Corps, you were in Kashmir<br />
during the peak of militancy.<br />
I would like to know your<br />
overall assessment of the situation<br />
prevailing there.<br />
A. In the middle of 1993 when I<br />
joined, the situation in my own headquarters<br />
garrison, the Badami Bagh<br />
Cantonment, was grim. The large<br />
number of soldiers and officers with<br />
their families were virtually in a state<br />
of siege. Nobody ever went out.<br />
Movement was impossible because<br />
of the large population of militants,<br />
around 10,000 to 12,000. More than<br />
85 percent were locally trained and<br />
about 2,000 to 3,000 were specialists<br />
who had received training from outside<br />
and come in. Most of the militants<br />
were either Kashmiris who had<br />
gone down to the refugee camps in<br />
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK)<br />
or had ex-filtrated into the other side,<br />
received training and returned. The<br />
quality of their opposition was good.<br />
They were trained well, knew how to<br />
make a bomb or IEDs (Improvised<br />
Explosive Device). Where they could<br />
not manage, there were people like<br />
Ibn-e-Masood, a mercenary from<br />
some African country, probably<br />
Ethiopia to help. He was an explosive<br />
expert, a postgraduate in chemistry.<br />
He was later killed in an<br />
encounter. The specialists were<br />
either Pakistan-trained or trained on<br />
the Afghan border.<br />
Even when we went out for an<br />
operation we went in greater<br />
strength than we do now. By the end<br />
of 1994, the army achieved considerable<br />
control over the militants. Their<br />
activities were basically hit and run<br />
operations against the army or the<br />
police, a very popular target. They<br />
would throw grenades at the police<br />
and police stations were easy targets,<br />
and to give them more target practice,<br />
was the BSF which had built<br />
large bunkers in urban areas or occupied<br />
certain houses as the CRPF did<br />
also. These were easily distinguishable.<br />
Secondly, they would ambush<br />
convoys from time to time. None of<br />
them were very successful but they<br />
did succeed in throwing grenades<br />
inside buses loaded with army people<br />
leading to casualties. There have<br />
been some horrible incidents. There<br />
was an army soldier going on leave.<br />
The grenade fell on his lap, he looked<br />
at it and it blew in his face. The third<br />
manifestation of their activities was<br />
that they would lay Improvised<br />
Explosive Divices (IEDs), the country<br />
equivalent of normal land mines.<br />
They would use innovative ways.<br />
Some specialised in telephone poles.<br />
They would saw off a section off the<br />
pole, push in explosives and fix it<br />
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with an electronic detonator. This<br />
would create a lot of damage. They<br />
made good use of fertilisers to make<br />
explosives. In fact because of them<br />
there was a shortage of urea in the<br />
apple orchards and fields.<br />
Q Will you please comment on<br />
Hazrat Bal incident?<br />
A. The Hazrat Bal incident was<br />
an eye opener for all of us. We had to<br />
take over an operation on the basis of<br />
inaccurate information. The force<br />
which was to hand over the operation<br />
to us was not there. Quite a<br />
number of hard core militants<br />
escaped before we came in. Next day<br />
they set fire to a building to create a<br />
diversion in the shrine complex. In<br />
the process of fire fighting, a number<br />
of militants escaped even on the fire<br />
engine. So we don’t know how many<br />
were actually there. I was given very<br />
clear directions by the Governor and<br />
by the Advisor Security to the<br />
Governor, General MA Zaki, and one<br />
gave a lot of izzat (regard) to what he<br />
said. We were told no shooting. The<br />
militants may have wired the shrine<br />
for explosion. So we stayed around<br />
the shrine in a cordon.<br />
The Hazrat Bal incident came out<br />
as it did thanks to the patience of our<br />
troops. I was very proud of them<br />
because it is awful to sit outside and<br />
watch while the people inside were<br />
getting wazwan kind of meals from<br />
outside by the order of the negotiator.<br />
For three days they ordered food<br />
for 50 people daily while there were<br />
only 25 people inside. Some were<br />
women, some beggars, hardcore militants<br />
were very few. The late lamented<br />
Idris fromJammu & Kashmir<br />
Liberation Front (JKLF) was there.<br />
He told me later that he had me and<br />
the Governor in his sight. Since we<br />
did not fire, they had no provocation<br />
to do so either. I think this is one time<br />
a general has been given a good reputation<br />
for not having fired a single<br />
shot – a very peculiar reputation to<br />
have.<br />
By then the militants had surrendered,<br />
as General DD Saklani had<br />
taken over after General Zaki met<br />
I was horrified that by May we had mishandled the<br />
situation so badly that we lost the Charar-e-Sharief.<br />
If my orders had been carried out implicitly that<br />
there would be no deployment within one kilometre<br />
of the outer periphery of the shrine and that no fire<br />
should be directed towards the shrine at all, this<br />
could have been avoided<br />
with an accident. We discussed their<br />
demands and I told General Saklani<br />
that some of these were unreasonable.<br />
Ultimately we seemed to have<br />
our way and they felt that they had<br />
their way and things worked out. It<br />
was a turning point because the people<br />
realised that they need not be<br />
shot at, bullied and harassed by the<br />
army. The army can keep quiet and<br />
insist on what they think should be<br />
done and what should not be done.<br />
Q Will you please tell your experiences<br />
as commander of<br />
Udhampur-based Northern<br />
Command?<br />
A. During the second half of<br />
1994, we had got things so much<br />
under control that we had reached a<br />
stage where there was contemplation<br />
that there would be elections in late<br />
1994 or early 1995. Meanwhile the<br />
Jehad Council realised that the game<br />
was getting out of their hands so we<br />
saw an influx of foreign mercenaries<br />
in the middle of 1994, trained<br />
Afghans who had fought the war<br />
against Russians and allegedly ex-<br />
Pakistani soldiers. This was a significant<br />
setback in our attempts towards<br />
normalcy because the quality of<br />
opposition went up. The local militant<br />
who had lost morale found himself<br />
bolstered up again.<br />
The Charar-e-Sharief incident<br />
took place next year. I had left by that<br />
time. I was horrified that by May we<br />
had mishandled the situation so<br />
badly that we lost the Charar-e-<br />
Sharief. If my orders had been carried<br />
out implicitly that there would<br />
be no deployment within one kilometre<br />
of the outer periphery of the<br />
shrine and that no fire should be<br />
directed towards the shrine at all,<br />
this could have been avoided. I knew<br />
that it was like a tinderbox that<br />
would catch fire if we threw even a<br />
firecracker at it.<br />
That was a very significant setback<br />
for the Army and for Kashmir.<br />
Let’s face it; many said we had deliberately<br />
set fire to the shrine. This is<br />
nonsense. But the accusation that we<br />
were ham handed is true. This however<br />
should not give rise to the<br />
thought that because of this, human<br />
rights violations increased. No.<br />
Incidents did happen but saying that<br />
there were reprisals against anybody<br />
after this is not true. I am pretty clear<br />
about this as I was able to observe<br />
closely the entire incident sitting at<br />
the vantage point as the Director<br />
General of Military Intelligence.<br />
Q Modern limited wars have their<br />
limitations as the soldier is<br />
relearning to fight a war which<br />
is not open but hidden.<br />
However, collateral casualties<br />
notwithstanding there have<br />
been reports of a number of<br />
instances of deliberate killings<br />
and other atrocities perpetrated<br />
by the Indian army in Kashmir.<br />
Few cases have been dealt while<br />
the rest have been ignored. Can<br />
you comment on this from the<br />
human rights perspective?<br />
A. These are axiomatic statements.<br />
Firstly, today we are fighting<br />
an organised proxy war. The soldier<br />
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cannot say that he is not fighting. He<br />
is fighting. It is a war by proxy for<br />
somebody else. He is fighting against<br />
a man who has been trained abroad,<br />
who has been manipulated and<br />
receives his directions from there,<br />
and who is getting his hardware,<br />
software and communications equipment<br />
from there which was often better<br />
than ours. It was American equipment<br />
purchased with Saudi money<br />
and brought in through Pakistan.<br />
That is the kind of situation we were<br />
dealing with. During my time as a<br />
Corps Commander we called it militancy<br />
for want of a better word.<br />
Sometimes we referred to it as counterinsurgency<br />
operations. It was<br />
counterinsurgency but in a proxy<br />
war scenario where we are not dealing<br />
with enemies but our very own<br />
people who were being controlled by<br />
outsiders.<br />
Secondly, there have been a large<br />
number of incidents. I will be the last<br />
man to deny it. I was present when<br />
some incidents took place. When it<br />
came to our notice the culprits were<br />
punished severely. In fact I recall one<br />
day I got information from a local<br />
politician about a case of rape somewhere<br />
near the apple orchards in<br />
Pattan. Two Bangladeshi people who<br />
had married locals had been assaulted.<br />
Realising that the assaulters must<br />
have been from the local army outfit<br />
I gave orders to the General Officer<br />
Commanding (GOC) concerned to<br />
have them arrested within six hours.<br />
This he did. I had guessed right.<br />
They were not the combatant category.<br />
One was a washerman and the<br />
other a barber who did this after getting<br />
drunk in the afternoon. They<br />
were put in the quarter guard, the<br />
lock up of ours and from the crime<br />
till the end of a very fair trial where<br />
they were court-martialled, I think<br />
four to five weeks only had passed.<br />
They got 10 or 12 years. I don’t<br />
remember all of them as everything<br />
does not come to the Corps<br />
Commander and is dealt at the<br />
appropriate level. We deal with<br />
everything that comes to our notice –<br />
the battalion commander, the<br />
brigade commander or the divisional<br />
commander deal with these cases.<br />
Q How would you explain the<br />
Amnesty International reports,<br />
the Human Rights Watch reports<br />
and the international and<br />
national media criticism against<br />
army excesses?<br />
A. The barrage of adverse kind of<br />
publicity that we have been subjected<br />
to is rather unfair. The hysteria that<br />
has been whipped up against the<br />
army can be explained in many<br />
ways. None of them entirely satisfactory<br />
and some may not entirely hold<br />
water. Yet these are the explanations<br />
that occur to me. The fact is that any<br />
incident that takes place is immediately<br />
classified as done by the army.<br />
In Jammu & Kashmir, there is much<br />
Sometimes we<br />
referred to it as<br />
counterinsurgency<br />
operations. It was<br />
counterinsurgency<br />
but in a proxy war<br />
scenario where we<br />
are not dealing with<br />
enemies but our very<br />
own people who were<br />
being controlled by<br />
outsiders<br />
more than the army operating. It<br />
could have been done by the army,<br />
the Boarder Security Force (BSF),<br />
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)<br />
or the Kashmir police who were<br />
mostly quiescent but now I think are<br />
more active or any number of the<br />
thousands of militants, who were<br />
bearing arms though they have no<br />
business to bear arms and are fighting<br />
against the State.<br />
On any sample day, if two people<br />
get killed somewhere, they may have<br />
been killed by any of these people. If<br />
the army was responsible, they<br />
would produce the weapon, and so<br />
on and if they had made a mistake<br />
and killed innocent people it would<br />
be out in their report. There have<br />
been such unfortunate cases but on<br />
each occasion the errant commander<br />
has made whatever amends were<br />
possible and apologised for the act.<br />
The killing could have been done by<br />
any of the other security forces or by<br />
the militants and foisted on to the<br />
security forces or the army.<br />
The trend gradually caught on. To<br />
make the maximum amount of noise<br />
you demonise the one force that you<br />
are actually afraid of. As a result systematic<br />
demonisation of the army<br />
took place. Not just in the Valley or<br />
Jammu or wherever. Not just in India<br />
but in the international arena. You<br />
demonise them to the extent that it<br />
de-spirits the army, ties their hands<br />
behind their back so that they cannot<br />
act and then you neutralise them. It is<br />
a devilishly sophisticated way of<br />
doing it. I know who worked this out<br />
on the other side, the Jihad Council.<br />
I met a visitor from Lord<br />
Avesbury’s organisation with whom<br />
we had very close interaction. We<br />
asked him since he had the opportunity<br />
to take a close look at the situation,<br />
what his conclusion was. He<br />
went and made a report and showed<br />
photographs to his principals. The<br />
result was that the Kashmir Watch<br />
Organisation changed its tune. I had<br />
a similar incident with a German<br />
lady journalist who came over to my<br />
house in Srinagar on a Sunday. She<br />
immediately went on the offensive<br />
saying that our people were committing<br />
atrocities. I knew she had the<br />
wrong end of the stick as she was<br />
talking about an incident that happened<br />
inside Srinagar town. When I<br />
asked her about the colour of the uniform<br />
that the chaps were wearing,<br />
she replied khaki. The army wears<br />
khaki only in the desert. We later<br />
found out that there was a rough up<br />
between the police and the locals and<br />
in the process of breaking it up the<br />
police overreached itself and used<br />
greater force than required. The lady<br />
saw all this and clicked some pic-<br />
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Wrong things do take<br />
place no doubt but<br />
most of these are<br />
exaggerated and serve<br />
the kind of publicity<br />
that militants crave. If<br />
you stop the media,<br />
which fortunately we<br />
do not do, you would<br />
have given the<br />
militancy short shrift<br />
tures. After I gave her the facts, she<br />
left quite mollified.<br />
The third thing is that wherever<br />
such incidents are reported it is done<br />
with a big splash. I will give you an<br />
example. There was an incident<br />
where a village had to be evacuated<br />
in broad daylight because militants<br />
who had come in from the jungle<br />
side had taken shelter in some houses<br />
and were shooting at our troops.<br />
We cordoned off that village. I think<br />
the parachute battalion was<br />
involved. They got the villagers out<br />
and took them four kilometres away<br />
from harm’s way and they carried<br />
out the operations against the militants<br />
who lay low there. In the process<br />
some houses were destroyed. I<br />
was then the army commander in<br />
Uddhampur and was very pleased<br />
with the action taken by the people. I<br />
asked them to make sure that the<br />
people were well looked after.<br />
They were put in tents till we<br />
could reconstruct their houses, ran<br />
kitchens and fed them better than<br />
they were used to. As a result they<br />
were very pleased with us. After all<br />
this I got a call in the evening from<br />
my chaps saying that Mr Syed Ali<br />
Shah Geelani, the veteran Jamaat<br />
leader, along with his cohorts arrived<br />
there to draw political mileage of the<br />
army atrocities. They had been told<br />
that an army atrocity was going on.<br />
To their horror nobody was willing<br />
to talk to them or speak against us.<br />
The villagers told them how we had<br />
fed and clothed them and asked<br />
them to leave. He left in a great huff.<br />
This is not an unusual incident<br />
but a matter of routine for the army.<br />
The army usually takes the utmost<br />
care to ensure the safety and well<br />
being of the villagers. Despite all precautions<br />
if they do get hurt then we<br />
are as sorry as anybody else. There<br />
have been occasional cases of wanton<br />
action against someone. Such incidents<br />
have been very strongly dealt<br />
with. I had a case, when at the height<br />
of winter something happened near<br />
about Srinagar. It was snowing and<br />
people were out in the cold as a 24-<br />
hour search went on. There was this<br />
lack of good sense on the part of the<br />
person who had given the orders. He<br />
had lost some people so he subjected<br />
the village to a very detailed search. I<br />
removed that battalion from there<br />
and replaced it with a new battalion.<br />
The old battalion never repeated<br />
their mistake and later won a commendation<br />
from their chief.<br />
Wrong things do take place no<br />
doubt, but most of these are exaggerated<br />
and serve the kind of publicity<br />
that militants crave. If you stop the<br />
media, which fortunately we do not<br />
do, you would have given the militancy<br />
short shrift because media is<br />
like oxygen to the militants. Adverse<br />
publicity to the army and security<br />
forces only furthers their cause.<br />
I will give you an instance of one<br />
of the most awful human rights violation<br />
I have seen and it was not<br />
done by us. It was done by a<br />
Kashmiri militant who was unfortunately<br />
not caught. He had paid a<br />
young boy in Srinagar Rs 10 to throw<br />
a grenade at us. He was shown how<br />
to hold the object and throw it. He<br />
was waiting for the army fellows to<br />
turn up and he felt itchy so he tried<br />
to scratch with one hand. When he<br />
could not, he released his other hand<br />
from the lever and the bomb went off<br />
blowing his hand off. I don’t think<br />
we did anything like this. When my<br />
troops went off for an operation in<br />
Rajwar there was a militant group<br />
which captured five or six of my soldiers,<br />
gouged their eyes out,<br />
chopped off their hands besides<br />
other unspeakable horrors that they<br />
did to them. Isn’t this a human rights<br />
violation? Nobody took reprisal<br />
against these militants.<br />
Q To counter the hostile local and<br />
outside media you initiated a<br />
more open and sophisticated<br />
media management approach.<br />
Could you tell us how you did<br />
that and to what extent you succeeded?<br />
A. When in doubt the media put<br />
the army down there. The media initially<br />
has a tendency to lay the blame<br />
on the army or the security forces. It<br />
is only when one goes through the<br />
entire story that facts emerge.<br />
General Arjun Ray, who was my<br />
Brigadier General Staff, and I took<br />
up handling the media to reduce<br />
their hostility. We tried to manage<br />
the media intelligently. One of the<br />
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biggest problems we realised was the<br />
lack of transparency. The media did<br />
not even know what we were doing.<br />
When we surround a village and cordon<br />
off the area it is not to take over<br />
the houses. Our first step in this<br />
direction was a three-day workshop<br />
to sensitise the media on how the<br />
army operates. We invited the<br />
national, local and vernacular media<br />
to the Badami Bagh Cantonment,<br />
where we would brief them with<br />
drawings and sometimes with<br />
demonstrations to explain what was<br />
happening and why it was happening<br />
and what were the things that<br />
could go wrong. They started appreciating<br />
our work.<br />
The second thing that I did was<br />
start speaking to editors and request<br />
them not to send young cubs to be<br />
blooded. It is an unforgiving battlefield<br />
where the young chap may bite<br />
off more than he can chew by doing<br />
something rash and silly. On the<br />
other he may also cause incalculable<br />
harm to forces who are already<br />
working under acute pressure by<br />
misrepresenting. The people out in<br />
Delhi may not know anything that is<br />
happening on the ground and may<br />
just take the cub’s word for it.<br />
We decided to invite the media to<br />
come along with us and show them<br />
what was happening. There was a<br />
freelance BJP journalist, and there<br />
were these two French journalists<br />
whom we sent off to a battalion in a<br />
very tricky area. Later their article in<br />
a French paper had all praise for the<br />
unit. We began having sessions with<br />
the media where all questions were<br />
made welcome and we also decentralised<br />
media interaction with the<br />
army with certain provisos. Our message<br />
to our media mangers was clear<br />
“Don’t bluff, confine yourselves to<br />
facts and don’t give your own interpretations”.<br />
We are not fighting an<br />
enemy in the conventional sense.<br />
Unfortunately we are fighting a law<br />
and order problem in our own state.<br />
Q Compared to the past deployment<br />
what is the present deployment<br />
of the army? Some say that the<br />
army presence is still very<br />
strong? What do you feel?<br />
A. Whether normalcy returns or<br />
not there is a certain basic deployment<br />
that will always be there in<br />
Kashmir being a border state. We<br />
have people right up to Siachen and<br />
we are not guarding a thin line. It is a<br />
line with a lot of depth. The Line of<br />
Control (LOC) probably has a depth<br />
ranging from 5 to 10 kilometres and<br />
then there are a large number of civilian<br />
habitations that cannot be<br />
ignored. Everything in border zone is<br />
looked after by the army.<br />
In my time the Rashtriya Rifles<br />
had just started coming in. There was<br />
one battalion of Rashtriya Rifles that<br />
was in the Anantnag area. The second<br />
one came in the middle of 1994.<br />
Thereafter the battalions were in<br />
quite a large number. Had the<br />
Pakistani statement that we have<br />
650,000 people in Kashmir been true,<br />
we would have walked into Pakistan.<br />
We never had such numbers.<br />
Probably they are including CRPF,<br />
BSF and so on. Of course, with the<br />
Rashtriya Rifles coming in the numbers<br />
would have increased significantly,<br />
but we have to exclude the<br />
troops in the border area from our<br />
calculations.<br />
Q Army started the Project<br />
Sadhbhawana. What is it all<br />
about? Was it to counter the<br />
alienation of the people<br />
because of the army excesses?<br />
Was this project an image<br />
building exercise of the army?<br />
Has it succeeded?<br />
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A. “Sadhbhawana” means goodwill.<br />
Long time back we had an operation<br />
called Operation “Good<br />
Samaritan” which was run in<br />
Nagaland, Manipur, and so on. This<br />
involved a small force of engineers,<br />
veterinary and medical people<br />
grouped together with some plant<br />
and machinery working in the disturbed<br />
area of North East. When the<br />
locals discovered that the force was<br />
working for their benefit they<br />
pitched in and the army received a<br />
great deal of goodwill.<br />
So “Good Samaritans” is the<br />
father and mother of all<br />
“Sadbhawanas.” Arjun Ray started<br />
the Sadbhawana initially in the<br />
North of Kashmir and Ladakh where<br />
he was commanding the division. He<br />
did that with a gusto that was infectious.<br />
In fact on a visit to Kargil and<br />
certain areas of Siachen Glacier,<br />
where I had met a lot of locals, one of<br />
them said, “Saab if this gentleman<br />
stands for elections here people will<br />
vote in block for him.”<br />
Sadbhawana was nothing new to<br />
Kashmir. We were doing it even<br />
before Arjun came along. This is a<br />
straightforward civic action. When<br />
the administration ceases to be and<br />
the Deputy Commissioners don’t<br />
deliver and projects are restricted to<br />
paper the people are the worst sufferers.<br />
I recall during the 1993-1994 winter,<br />
there was a big blockade on<br />
National Highway 1 (NH1) from<br />
Jammu to Srinagar and beyond.<br />
Normally it should take a few days<br />
but this time it was almost a month.<br />
There was no food and kerosene in<br />
the valley. It was in the Kupwara side<br />
which was fairly militancy ridden.<br />
There was an SOS. We fortunately<br />
had buffer rations and we shared our<br />
rice, kerosene and flour with the<br />
locals. Civic actions do help in boosting<br />
up local morale. It is however<br />
wrong to link Sabhawana with the<br />
alleged army excesses.<br />
Q. How critical is the US role in<br />
Kashmir?<br />
A. First of all the US has no role<br />
to play in Kashmir. Is it any of there<br />
business what we are doing in<br />
Kashmir? We have always said that<br />
Kashmir is a bilateral issue.<br />
According to us there is no Kashmir<br />
problem and according to Pakistan<br />
there is one. That is where the Shimla<br />
agreement comes in. There cannot be<br />
third party involvement in it. Even<br />
the Americans are careful. They are<br />
saying that they will not advise anybody.<br />
Although Bill Clinton was fond<br />
of advising everybody, in our case he<br />
did not. Even Bush came here and<br />
made the statement “in case the<br />
Government asks for our help we<br />
will always be willing to facilitate<br />
affairs.” If we cannot deal with our<br />
own affairs in our own country then<br />
there is no point in taking the help of<br />
a third person who has not done very<br />
well in his own country.<br />
Q. How much are the chances of<br />
normalcy returning to the valley?<br />
Can you give us your<br />
view on what the future holds<br />
for Kashmir?<br />
What Kashmir needs<br />
is a first class<br />
district collector<br />
and police<br />
superintendent<br />
instead of the<br />
average kind of<br />
officers that are<br />
there. A modernised<br />
police set up to<br />
improve efficiency<br />
would go a long way<br />
A. It is a place of such infinite<br />
beauty. People are very friendly, simple<br />
and straightforward and it is a<br />
great pity that they have been subjected<br />
to some form of baptism by<br />
fire. I do not know how the situation<br />
is going to turn. Every time the butter<br />
begins to form on top of the churn<br />
something happens and we are back<br />
to square one. Chara-e-Sharief was a<br />
major setback. Of course we put<br />
through the elections when Farooq<br />
Abdullah came back. I saw the<br />
enthusiasm of the locals about the<br />
elections. A great deal of goodwill<br />
has been generated among the<br />
Kashmiris through medical treatment,<br />
education, rebuilding communications<br />
and bridges.<br />
A lot has been done and people<br />
are well disposed. Perhaps there will<br />
be another election shortly if the current<br />
government is not doing well.<br />
That is as far as the present and<br />
immediate situation is concerned.<br />
What Kashmir needs is a first class<br />
district collector and police superintendent<br />
instead of the average kind<br />
of officers that are there. A modernised<br />
police set up to improve efficiency<br />
would go a long way. I have<br />
seen police stations in Baramullah<br />
area which did not have even a toilet.<br />
Politicians must be made to understand<br />
that Kashmir will live beyond<br />
them. Feathering their pockets on<br />
public money is against the people’s<br />
interests and there should be provisions<br />
to recall such legislators. Good<br />
administration, good policing and<br />
eradication of corruption and the<br />
spirit of service among the political<br />
class – these are required to ensure a<br />
bright future for the state.<br />
Q Until the dispute is resolved is<br />
normalcy possible?<br />
A. It can come back. There is a<br />
bus running and cross border interactions<br />
between people have started.<br />
One must remember that usually<br />
militancy has a life span of 10 years,<br />
and here it is already 20 years - a long<br />
time for militancy to run. There is a<br />
fatigue factor that operates. The two<br />
nations have already fought three<br />
wars over it besides a small one in<br />
Kargil also. If good sense prevails,<br />
they should be able to freeze the situation<br />
as it is. In due course we will<br />
learn to live with each other.<br />
<br />
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‘Taking up arms a compulsion<br />
not choice’ : Geelani<br />
Leader of separatist movement Syed Ali Shah Geelani justifies his stand on Kashmir on the<br />
basis of the two-nation theory opted for in 1947 at the time of partition of India and<br />
Pakistan. He spoke to Aaliya Anjum for this exclusive interview for <strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong> in<br />
Srinagar. Excerpts:<br />
Hurriyat Conference (G)<br />
Chairman, Syed Ali Shah<br />
Geelani, is a prominent<br />
Kashmiri separatist leader. A staunch<br />
advocate of Kashmir’s accession to<br />
Pakistan, his argument has mainly<br />
been based on the division of the<br />
Indian subcontinent on religious<br />
lines and the cultural and religious<br />
affiliations of the people of Kashmir<br />
with Pakistan. Lately though his<br />
statements seem to reflect his willingness<br />
to accommodate the proposition<br />
of an independent Jammu &<br />
Kashmir if the people of the state so<br />
desire. Seen as a hardliner whose<br />
stand on Kashmir has not softened<br />
over the years, the septuagenarian<br />
leader has recently undergone a<br />
surgery for renal malignancy. He has<br />
survived numerous assassination<br />
attempts, spent many years in prison,<br />
besides being off and on under house<br />
arrest. Yet, none of these could deter<br />
him from addressing massive gatherings<br />
all over Kashmir where he is<br />
seen as a firebrand orator. Donning a<br />
spotless white Pathan suit, he waits<br />
to make me and my two other colleagues<br />
to sit before he himself takes<br />
seat. I introduce <strong>Combat</strong> <strong>Law</strong> and we<br />
begin this conversation:<br />
Q. How would you justify your<br />
stand that Kashmir is a disputed<br />
territory?<br />
A. India was divided on the basis<br />
of Two Nation Theory. On July 25,<br />
1947, the then Governor General of<br />
India, gave the option to states that<br />
were not directly under British control<br />
to join either India or Pakistan or<br />
Q&A<br />
to remain independant.While doing<br />
so though, they had to consider three<br />
things. First, they had to consider as<br />
to which dominion their boundaries<br />
were connected. Second, whether the<br />
majority of the population was<br />
Muslim or Non-Muslim. Third, being<br />
cultural and religious affiliations of<br />
their population. Hyderabad declared<br />
independence. But India through<br />
Police action grabbed it. Junagarh<br />
declared accession to Pakistan as its<br />
boundaries were connected with<br />
Pakistan through Sindh and<br />
Rajasthan. India on the pretext that<br />
population of Junagarh did not support<br />
this move by its ruler, occupied<br />
it as well.<br />
If the guidelines I mentioned<br />
would have been taken into consideration<br />
in case of Jammu & Kashmir,<br />
there was no question that Jammu &<br />
Kashmir would have become a part<br />
of India. Seven-hundred-and-fifty<br />
miles of J&K’s boundaries are connected<br />
to Pakistan. In 1947, 85 percent<br />
of the population of J&K was<br />
Muslim. Besides, it also had cultural<br />
and religious affiliations with<br />
Pakistan. As the ruler of Kashmir at<br />
that time was a Dogra Hindu and<br />
was not concerned about the Muslim<br />
majority population of J&K, his inclinations<br />
towards India were obvious.<br />
And Sheikh Abdullah’s friendship<br />
with the late Jawaharlal Nehru also<br />
played a part in Kashmir’s accession<br />
to India. When India eventually sent<br />
its forces to Kashmir, Nehru had<br />
committed to the people of J&K that<br />
the forces would be withdrawn and<br />
the right to self-determination will be<br />
given to them. This is also a matter of<br />
fact that India referred the matter to<br />
the UN and after thorough discussions<br />
18 resolutions were passed. All<br />
of these were accepted and signed by<br />
India and Pakistan. This is an important<br />
legal point. The acceptance of<br />
these resolutions by India is a manifestation<br />
of India’s commitment to<br />
the world that Kashmir is not an integral<br />
part of India. It is a disputed territory<br />
and that India is committed to<br />
give the right to self-determination to<br />
the people of J&K. The struggle of the<br />
people of the state is aimed at achieving<br />
the fulfilment of this pledge that<br />
India had given.<br />
Ever since we have been facing<br />
the brutal and inhuman attitude of<br />
the Indian armed forces. In October<br />
1947 in Jammu, about 5 lakh people<br />
were massacred and 1 million were<br />
forced to migrate to Pakistan. Nehru,<br />
Abdullah and Hari Singh were<br />
responsible for the massacre of<br />
Muslims. Muslims were lured to<br />
migrate to the Muslim majority<br />
dominion of Pakistan. They were<br />
loaded in trucks and mercilessly<br />
massacred on their way to Pakistan.<br />
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Women were abducted, old aged<br />
people and children were killed by<br />
Indian Army, Dogra army and Hindu<br />
extremists. Right from that day,<br />
Indian forces are trying to subdue<br />
the voice of the people of J&K. We<br />
tried peaceful and democratic methods<br />
for the resolution of the dispute<br />
but to no consequence. We even contested<br />
midterm parliamentary elections<br />
in 1971 when Congress was the<br />
ruling party. Widespread rigging<br />
prevented our victory. In 1972 we<br />
contested again and five Jamat-e-<br />
Islami members succeeded. In the<br />
Legislative Assembly, they discussed<br />
the disputed nature of J&K and<br />
India’s commitment to fulfil the<br />
pledge it had given, but no heed was<br />
paid. In 1978 we contested elections<br />
again under the banner of Muslim<br />
United Front (MUF) and there was<br />
clear expectation that we will win 30<br />
seats. But due to the conspiracy of<br />
Indian National Congress and<br />
National Conference, our successful<br />
candidates were declared to have lost<br />
and they were taken to Hiranagar jail<br />
in Jammu province. After losing faith<br />
in the democratic system, and after<br />
India’s rejection of peaceful methods<br />
for achieving right to self-determination,<br />
our youth got frustrated and<br />
resorted to armed resistance. It was<br />
the compulsion for our youth, not<br />
their will.<br />
Therefore since 1988 we are facing<br />
the brutal force of the Indian<br />
Army. They have martyred about 1<br />
lakh people majority of them are<br />
civilians. Since the last 20 years<br />
10,000 people have gone missing<br />
from custody. More than one thousand<br />
unmarked graves have been<br />
discovered. Thousands of Kashmiri<br />
women have been raped by Indian<br />
Forces. A 10-year-old girl and her<br />
mother were gangraped in each<br />
other’s presence. In Badra Payeen village<br />
of Handwara, army entered the<br />
house of one Abdul Rashid. And<br />
when he escaped, they raped his<br />
daughter and wife. Mufti Mohammad<br />
Sayeed, the then chief minister of<br />
J&K and home minister of India<br />
Shivraj Patil were addressing a press<br />
conference. The intelligence agencies<br />
confirmed to Mufti Sayeed at the<br />
press conference that the mother had<br />
been definitely raped but the daughter<br />
is safe. It was clearly wrong information.<br />
Had Mufti Sayeed any dignity<br />
and any love and respect for his<br />
nation, he would have at that very<br />
moment resigned in protest. When<br />
we visited the victims, we could not<br />
stand the pathetic condition of the<br />
daughter. She had been gangraped<br />
first followed by her mother. On<br />
October 6, 2001, 30 Rashtriya Rifles<br />
from Langate camp declared a crackdown<br />
in Jaggerpora village. A villager<br />
Ibrahim Dar was ordered to<br />
arrange tea for 30 RR men. The army<br />
men tried to rape Ibrahim Dar’s<br />
daughter-in-law, the same woman<br />
who had prepared tea for them.<br />
Ibrahim Dar and his son who had<br />
been made to sit in the compound of<br />
the house tried to save the woman<br />
and both were martyred. On the<br />
same day two other persons were<br />
killed in the same village. One 80-<br />
year-old man was grazing his cattle<br />
During Hazratbal<br />
siege a peaceful<br />
demonstration in<br />
Bijbehara was<br />
attacked by BSF<br />
and 44 people were<br />
mercilessly killed<br />
and the other was a trader from a<br />
nearby village.<br />
In Kunan Poshpora village<br />
dozens of our women were gangraped.<br />
In Islamabad district’s Dooru<br />
Shahabad, during a crackdown on<br />
July 2, 2005 army entered a house<br />
asking the family to prepare tea for<br />
them. Zahida, a beautiful 12th class<br />
student in the family was noticed by<br />
sepoy Balvinder Singh of 6 RR who<br />
made up his mind to rape her. And<br />
on the midnight of July 30 and 31, he<br />
locked her father and others in one<br />
room and tried to rape Zahida. But<br />
she resisted fiercely only to be<br />
gunned down. During Hazratbal<br />
siege a peaceful demonstration in<br />
Bijbehara was attacked by BSF and 44<br />
people were mercilessly killed. On<br />
January 6, 1993 in Sopore one youth<br />
snatched the gun from a BSF soldier<br />
and in retaliation 200 shops and<br />
houses were gutted and 44 people<br />
were killed and thrown into the fire.<br />
On January 7, 1994, a peaceful procession<br />
in Handwara was fired at by<br />
the occupying forces and 22 persons<br />
were mercilessly killed.<br />
On January 26 the whole state<br />
particularly the valley observes strike<br />
against the Indian occupation.<br />
Kupwara also observed the strike on<br />
26th. The next day the army stationed<br />
at Kupwara fired bullets at<br />
people in shops and 22 people were<br />
killed. At Moulvi Farooq’s funeral<br />
procession nearly 65 people were<br />
killed. In 1990 at Gowkadal 50 people<br />
were killed mercilessly and countless<br />
houses were gutted and razed to the<br />
ground. In Bandipora, two Mujahideen<br />
had fired at the army outside the village<br />
but in a rage army burnt down<br />
12 houses. I have myself seen those<br />
12 houses. In Nadihal Kunan<br />
Babagund Village, two army men<br />
dressed as civilians tried to rape a<br />
girl. But her neighbors caught hold of<br />
them and brought them to the town<br />
in a procession. The procession got<br />
fired at, cane charged and tear<br />
gassed. Cases such as these are in<br />
hundreds and thousands. This is the<br />
situation the people of Kashmir are<br />
facing under the Indian occupation.<br />
Q. Do you think that demilitaristion<br />
can bring down the human<br />
rights violation levels to a certain<br />
extent?<br />
A. Not only demilitarisation will<br />
help. It has to be accompanied with<br />
India’s acceptance of the disputed<br />
nature of J&K and withdrawal of the<br />
Disturbed Areas Act, Public Safety<br />
Act and Armed Forces Special<br />
Powers Act. All these draconian laws<br />
are being used illegally, inhumanly<br />
and immorally. Indian forces should<br />
be withdrawn from the state because<br />
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they are occupying forces. They have<br />
no moral, legal, human or democratic<br />
legitimacy to be here. Then it is the<br />
responsibility of the UN Security<br />
Council and the so called superpowers<br />
to come forward and prevail<br />
upon the Indian government and<br />
Indian leadership so that the right to<br />
self determination be given to the<br />
people of J&K. We are under extreme<br />
brutal attack of the Indian occupying<br />
forces and the world must awaken to<br />
it. I have read in the newspaper just<br />
now that in Shopian there had been a<br />
crackdown and some youth were<br />
mercilessly beaten by the occupying<br />
forces. This is a reaction to my<br />
addressing nearly five public gatherings<br />
with huge public participation<br />
in Shopian. They (forces) got provoked<br />
by this. They are communal<br />
minded as is evident from the<br />
Gujarat case. Without any hesitation<br />
or exaggeration I can tell you that all<br />
the forces stationed in J&K have a<br />
Narender Modi mind. All of them<br />
and there is no exception in this.<br />
Q The violence levels of the present<br />
as compared to the past few<br />
years are relatively low. Does it<br />
mean that peace has set in? Also<br />
what is your reaction to the<br />
proposition that the people of<br />
Kashmir are fed up with the past<br />
two decades of conflict and they<br />
no longer want to engage themselves<br />
with it?<br />
A. All the Indian Army officers<br />
are themselves admitting that there<br />
are not more than 2,000 Mujahideen<br />
in the whole state. And you can yourself<br />
think, what justifies the presence<br />
of 8 lakh army men in the state if they<br />
are fighting only 2000 Mujahideen. Is<br />
there any ratio? So, their fight against<br />
militants is a lame excuse. Actually,<br />
they are fighting against the masses,<br />
the common people. They are fighting<br />
against the people asking for<br />
right to self-determination. Even in<br />
case of these 2,000 Mujahideen, the<br />
Indian Armed forces claim to be<br />
killing 3-4 daily. Just yesterday I was<br />
in Sopore addressing a gathering of<br />
people and one can easily understand<br />
that majority of the people are<br />
not with India. They are demanding<br />
withdrawal of Indian forces from this<br />
land. And our youth are determined<br />
and loyal to the cause.<br />
Q. There is no consensus amongst<br />
the population of J&K or<br />
amongst the separatist leadership<br />
as to their aspirations on<br />
Kashmir. Do you agree?<br />
A. (Laughs) Majority of the people<br />
of J&K are of the opinion that<br />
they are slaves and must be set free<br />
from Indian occupation. This is an<br />
unquestionable mindset of the people.<br />
There is no need for only one<br />
platform for the expression of this<br />
opinion. Our group, the Mirwaiz<br />
group and JKLF, all are asking for<br />
self-determination. There are certain<br />
ideological differences though that<br />
cannot be resolved. For us, the only<br />
source of inspiration for the struggle<br />
is Islam. We cannot separate the<br />
political aspect from the religious<br />
aspect. This doesn’t matter to other<br />
groups. And if one separates politics<br />
from Islam one is not justified in<br />
holding a Muslim identity because<br />
Islam preaches (quoting a verse from<br />
the Holy Quran) that ‘O believers!<br />
you come into Islam completely’. A<br />
Muslim is not allowed to separate his<br />
aspects of life from Islamic sayings<br />
and guidance. And we cannot compromise<br />
on this. Whatever people<br />
may say but it is impossible for us to<br />
surrender as far as these ideological<br />
differences are concerned.<br />
Some say Kashmir is only a political<br />
problem. But for us, it is an<br />
Islamic problem. Our faith is getting<br />
attacked by the Indian activities. Be it<br />
the educational, social or economic<br />
systems, all of them are under Indian<br />
aggression. So we don’t ask for freedom<br />
alone, but also for the preservation<br />
of the Islamic faith. Others are<br />
not bothered. Liquor shops are being<br />
opened. In the education sector, our<br />
daughters are being taken to different<br />
Indian states where there is no<br />
guarantee of their safeguard. We<br />
have the moral responsibility as<br />
Muslims to take notice of all such<br />
things. However, as far as the plinth<br />
of our and other separatist groups<br />
Council and the so<br />
called superpowers<br />
to come forward<br />
and prevail upon<br />
the Indian<br />
government and<br />
Indian leadership<br />
so that the right to<br />
self determination<br />
be given to the<br />
people of J&K<br />
demands is concerned, it is the same<br />
in as much as our asking for the right<br />
to self-determination. But, if others<br />
try to dilute this basic point, we can<br />
have differences there as well. For<br />
example, others are busy in dialogue<br />
with India on bilateral level. We see it<br />
as futile exercise. Since March 23,<br />
1952, dialogue is continuous. And<br />
more than 130 times dialogue has<br />
happened. Some of the Kashmiri separatists<br />
are also busy in dialogue<br />
since 2002. What have they achieved?<br />
I will tell without any doubt or fear<br />
that until India accepts the disputed<br />
nature of J&K and withdraws its<br />
forces and the special powers of<br />
armed forces and other draconian<br />
laws the dialogue process will yield<br />
nothing. India’s objective is to consume<br />
time by keeping Pakistan and<br />
part of the Kashmiri leadership busy<br />
in dialogue so that they can reflect<br />
before the world that they are busy in<br />
making attempts for resolution of the<br />
Kashmir dispute. Therefore, India<br />
sees no need for international intervention.<br />
India wants to maintain status<br />
quo in Kashmir. Nothing else.<br />
They are using the American and<br />
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European Union support. America’s<br />
influence and pressure on Pakistan is<br />
increasing day by day. India is also<br />
benefiting from Pakistan’s internal<br />
problems. India otherwise is not<br />
interested to resolve the J&K dispute<br />
on the basis of historical facts and<br />
wishes of the people. They don’t<br />
have any respect for the sacrifices<br />
given by our people for a just and<br />
noble cause.<br />
Q. To you what would be an ideal<br />
dialogue process for Kashmir?<br />
A. We demand the implementations<br />
of the UN resolutions on<br />
Kashmir and India’s acceptance of<br />
the disputed nature of J&K. They<br />
should accept that J&K is not an integral<br />
part of India, it is a disputed territory.<br />
And that they are ready to<br />
resolve this dispute according to the<br />
wishes and aspirations of the people<br />
and on the basis of India’s partition.<br />
Then we would be ready to engage in<br />
dialogue. The dialogue should be<br />
maintained on tripartite level<br />
between India, Pakistan and the real<br />
representatives of the people of J&K.<br />
All the aspects including the historical<br />
background of J&K should be<br />
taken into consideration.<br />
India is not<br />
interested to<br />
resolve the J&K<br />
dispute on the basis<br />
of historical facts<br />
and wishes of the<br />
people. They don’t<br />
have any respect for<br />
the sacrifices given<br />
by our people for a<br />
just and noble<br />
cause<br />
Q. But the aspirations of the three<br />
regions of the state are fractured.<br />
How would you address that?<br />
A Whenever we refer to the whole<br />
population which is at this juncture<br />
13 million people, we refer to people<br />
residing in Azad Kashmir, Jammu,<br />
the Kashmir valley and Ladakh.We<br />
are not asking for right to self-determination<br />
only for Muslims but for<br />
the whole population of J&K irrespective<br />
of religion. And we have<br />
time and again declared that if the<br />
majority of the population of J&K<br />
will decide to be with India, we will<br />
accept the decision. If they want to<br />
accede to Pakistan, India should in<br />
other words respect the will of the<br />
people.<br />
Q And if the majority chooses to<br />
remain independent?<br />
A. That will be also taken into<br />
consideration. But we also have to<br />
note that the UN resolutions state the<br />
options of accession either to India or<br />
to Pakistan. However, if by dialogue<br />
all the concerned three parties decide<br />
by consensus that the whole J&K that<br />
existed before the 14th August 1947<br />
should attain independence, we<br />
would accept that. It would not be<br />
according to our wishes though. We<br />
believe J&K is a genuine part of<br />
Pakistan and it should become so.<br />
Q Do you think the judiciary is<br />
doing what is required to<br />
address human rights violations<br />
in Kashmir?<br />
A. Not at all. Even courts are<br />
under pressure. Whenever a detention<br />
is quashed, the person released<br />
is again imprisoned by the forces and<br />
taken to different interrogation centers<br />
and tortured. Thousands of people<br />
have disappeared in custody,<br />
what are courts doing about that?<br />
Nothing at all. See Jalil Andrabi’s<br />
Case. He was a leading advocate. He<br />
was mercilessly killed and martyred.<br />
But his murderer is in Canada. And<br />
Courts are doing nothing.<br />
Q What can be an alternative?<br />
A. There should be a war crimes<br />
tribunal for Kashmir. We have<br />
requested so many times for its establishment<br />
in conformity with the public<br />
demand of holding the violators of<br />
human rights in J&K accountable.<br />
Pakistan could have helped with its<br />
establishment but unfortunately it is<br />
under the influence of America and<br />
Britain. The US and Britain are part of<br />
the UN Security Council and therefore<br />
they are in a position to help in<br />
this respect. We personally are helpless.<br />
We can only raise our voices. The<br />
civil society groups and the Kashmiri<br />
Diaspora have a role to play. But<br />
unfortunately they are not taking any<br />
interest as far as the sufferings of the<br />
people of J&K under Indian occupation<br />
are concerned.<br />
Q Why do you think the international<br />
community has kept silent<br />
on Kashmir inspite of its human<br />
rights scene being akin to the<br />
most publicised armed conflicts<br />
in the world?<br />
A. At this juncture, there is no<br />
country at the global level that is<br />
morally conscious. Their politics is<br />
based on their economic and personal<br />
interests. This is an unfortunate<br />
aspect of the whole human civilization<br />
that there is no system based on<br />
morality, based on humanity and<br />
oneness of the people. America,<br />
Britain and the Muslim world, all<br />
have their own interests. They are<br />
not taking a bold stand on J&K. If the<br />
57 Muslim countries stop the supply<br />
of oil to India for one day, India will<br />
submit to the will of the people of<br />
J&K. But nobody is ready to take<br />
these steps. For example, Hamas<br />
gained its position by democratic<br />
means in Palestine and America was<br />
not happy for this as Hamas believes<br />
in Islam. Hamas declared adoption<br />
of Islamic methods for running the<br />
affairs of Palestine. America created a<br />
situation for Hamas where they<br />
could not pay salaries to their servants.<br />
On the other hand in 2006 they<br />
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HURRIYAT VIEW<br />
gave 27 million dollars to Mahmoud<br />
Abbas so that Fatah becomes more<br />
forceful against Hamas. Therefore<br />
Hamas remains imprisoned in Gaza<br />
while Mahmoud Abbas runs the dialogue<br />
with Israel and America. As far<br />
as the American policy is concerned,<br />
it is extremely against Muslims and<br />
the Islamic system. Bush has<br />
declared that he is fighting against Al<br />
Qaeda, Taliban and against all those<br />
people who have ideological affiliations<br />
to the Islamic system.<br />
Q What do you think of Indian<br />
media’s coverage of the<br />
Kashmir conflict?<br />
A. The Indian media are biased<br />
on the Kashmir situation. Their first<br />
priority is the preservation of their<br />
national interest. The have openly<br />
declared that they would not raise<br />
any question that would demoralise<br />
the Indian forces in Kashmir. So they<br />
are not taking any notice of rape<br />
cases, gutting of houses, custodial<br />
killings, and the brutal attitude of<br />
occupying forces in Kashmir. None<br />
of them take any interest. Not even<br />
the Indian newspapers. And even the<br />
language they use for Kashmir is<br />
motivated. They are under the pressure<br />
of national interest and nationalism<br />
which is dangerous for their<br />
human and moral values.<br />
Q What is your argument against<br />
the exercise of elections in J&K.<br />
And there is a difference of opinion<br />
between you and Jamat-e-<br />
Islami with them favoring elections<br />
for the purposes of governance.<br />
How do you react to that?<br />
A. The first argument is that India<br />
is exploiting elections though it<br />
would not have any direct effect on<br />
the Kashmir question at the international<br />
level, particularly because<br />
there is a UN Security Council<br />
Resolution of 1952 that no election<br />
will affect the disputed nature of<br />
J&K. But India exploits this.<br />
Whenever people go to the polling<br />
booths, their pictures are taken and it<br />
is being projected to the world that<br />
people of J&K are voting for India.<br />
We must check this exploitation of<br />
Indian Imperialism. The second<br />
thing is that the people become parties<br />
to the exploitation by supporting<br />
the people who are raping our mothers<br />
and daughters, who are gutting<br />
our houses. There is no moral justification<br />
for casting votes in favour of<br />
the enemies of our people. Those<br />
who are responsible for dehumanising<br />
the people of J&K. Opposing this<br />
is a reflection of our Islamic ideology<br />
and those who say that elections are<br />
alright for development are not considering<br />
these facts. Most members<br />
of the Jamat-e-Islami support us by<br />
attending our public meetings. And<br />
they are also supporting our stance<br />
on boycotting elections.<br />
Q Are there any lessons for Kashmir<br />
one can draw from the cases of<br />
East Timor and Kosovo?<br />
A. The picture is very clear. In<br />
East Timor there was a Christian<br />
majority. They raised their voice for<br />
separation from Indonesia for only<br />
two years and they achieved it. One<br />
can observe the biased attitude of the<br />
world community through this case.<br />
We are Muslims demanding for our<br />
basic rights since 1947 but the world<br />
is blind to our demands. In case of<br />
East Timor, because of the world’s<br />
religious affiliations with the<br />
Christian population, the international<br />
community was very supportive.<br />
Kosovo achieved independence<br />
because of the differences between<br />
Russia and the Western countries.<br />
The west wanted Russia to be let<br />
down. But the major factor is the<br />
courage of the people of Kosovo.<br />
They have given a lot of sacrifices to<br />
achieve independence. That is appreciable.<br />
We pray for their successful<br />
future.<br />
Q What do you have to say about<br />
the J&K government’s decision<br />
to transfer forest land to SASB<br />
(Shri Amarnath Shrine Board)?<br />
Even courts are under<br />
pressure. Whenever a<br />
detention is quashed,<br />
the person released is<br />
again imprisoned by<br />
the forces and taken to<br />
different interrogation<br />
centers and tortured.<br />
Thousands of people<br />
have disappeared in<br />
custody, what are<br />
courts doing about that<br />
A. It is illegal and Immoral. This<br />
is Israeli tactics the government is<br />
trying to use in J&K. Israel adopted<br />
the same policy by purchasing land<br />
in Palestine. And consequently 40<br />
million Palestinians are living as<br />
refugees in different countries. They<br />
are suffering because there is no land<br />
left in Palestine. Eight lakh canals of<br />
land are under Indian occupation.<br />
Wherever they see any free land,<br />
they forcibly occupy that land. It is<br />
the present governor’s idea to grab<br />
the land in the name of the Hindu<br />
religion. The SASB is being used for<br />
this purpose. Another aspect is that<br />
non-state subjects would be taking<br />
custody of the land, which is against<br />
Article 370 and the constitution of J &<br />
K. Their occupation will result in poisoning<br />
of the surrounding environment<br />
by affecting the forestland and<br />
polluting the water of the Lidder<br />
River as thousands of people are<br />
expected to be staying at the residential<br />
quarters and huts they are planning<br />
to construct. Yatra used to run<br />
only for 10 days but the governor has<br />
extended it to 2 months now. Now<br />
one can imagine the extent of negative<br />
impact it can cause to the fragile<br />
environment.<br />
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‘Dialogue instead of deadlock’:<br />
Mirwaiz Umer Farooq<br />
Q&A<br />
For 15 years, Mirwaiz Umer Farooq has<br />
not only held the highest religious title in<br />
Kashmir, but also been active in the state’s<br />
politics. The term Mirwaiz stands for<br />
hereditary religious leader of Muslims in<br />
Kashmir, and Umer Farooq’s family has<br />
held this title since 1947. Remarkably,<br />
young leader entered the choppy waters<br />
of Kashmir politics as a teenager. This was<br />
when his father, Mirwaiz Mohammed<br />
Farooq (also chief of the Awami Action<br />
Committee), was assassinated in 1990.<br />
After taking over as the 12th Mirwaiz,<br />
Umer Farooq became the chairman of the<br />
Hurriyat in 1993. He spoke to Amrit Dhatt<br />
for this exclusive interview for <strong>Combat</strong><br />
<strong>Law</strong>. Excerpts follow:<br />
QWhat do you think is the<br />
ideal solution to the<br />
Kashmir problem? Do you<br />
think the implementation of the<br />
UN resolutions is required?<br />
A. Well I think the basic concept<br />
of the Hurriyat Conference is that the<br />
problem has to be addressed in<br />
accordance with the wishes of the<br />
people. We believe that we have two<br />
mechanisms: one is the implementation<br />
of the UN resolutions and the<br />
other one is a dialogue between the<br />
parties concerned -- India, Pakistan,<br />
and Kashmiris. So, both are acceptable<br />
to us but given the present scenario,<br />
I think it’s a bit unlikely that<br />
the government of India is going to<br />
implement the UN resolutions so we<br />
believe that dialogue, tripartite talks,<br />
should begin. Once the process is initiated,<br />
then we can talk of a solution.<br />
Right now we don’t have a process<br />
where India, Pakistan, Kashmiris are<br />
talking in detail. So let the process<br />
start and after that we can find a<br />
solution.<br />
Q How do you define self-determination<br />
in light of the different<br />
ideological positions that exist<br />
in the three regions of the valley?<br />
A. Well we do believe that there<br />
are different ideologies of the valley<br />
in terms of the people that are living<br />
in Kashmir. When we talk about<br />
Kashmir, we don’t only talk about<br />
the Indian side of Kashmir, we talk<br />
about the other side of Kashmir -- so<br />
we talk about the five regions of<br />
Kashmir. These five areas constitute<br />
the state of Jammu & Kashmir. In<br />
that context, the Hurriyat has supported<br />
the concept of self-determination<br />
or self-rule, or self-governance.<br />
Regional aspirations can also be<br />
taken into consideration but at the<br />
same time, a relationship between<br />
different regions can also be maintained.<br />
So, we are saying that let<br />
India and Pakistan give an opportunity<br />
to people of all the five regions<br />
to sit and interact because right now<br />
we don’t have a mechanism where<br />
we can talk to the other leadership so<br />
we have to depend on India and<br />
Pakistan to provide the travel documents.<br />
Let India and Pakistan start<br />
the process and invite the Kashmiri<br />
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Being a political party,<br />
we do have human<br />
rights rings and we do<br />
have a cell. But, you<br />
know, our reports and<br />
our findings are<br />
rejected by the Indians<br />
because they said we<br />
are a biased political<br />
forum<br />
leadership and let there be an intra-<br />
Kashmir dialogue and then we can<br />
talk in terms of future goals.<br />
Q Do you believe in dividing the<br />
state on communal lines?<br />
A. No. We don’t believe in that.<br />
We believe the state of Jammu &<br />
Kashmir has always depicted unity,<br />
harmony, and tolerance. Although,<br />
yes we agree that there are Muslims,<br />
Hindus, and Sikhs living in Kashmir,<br />
but at the same time we are of the<br />
view that there can be no solution on<br />
religious lines. It will create more<br />
problems.<br />
Q How do you respond to commentators<br />
that your stance has<br />
softened over the years?<br />
A. We believe that the Hurriyat<br />
Conference is a realistic and pragmatic<br />
forum and we believe in realism<br />
and pragmatism. As Kashmiris,<br />
we are the sufferers. India and<br />
Pakistan can afford to wait and they<br />
have waited for 60 years to address<br />
the problem but we are the ones who<br />
are suffering. Kashmiris are getting<br />
killed in Kashmir. Today we are seeing<br />
that there is a ceasefire on the<br />
border and there are no Indians getting<br />
killed or no Pakistanis getting<br />
killed. It is the Kashmiris who are<br />
getting killed and I think it is the<br />
imperative duty of the Kashmiri<br />
leadership to come up with ideas,<br />
suggestions, proposals, and come<br />
onto the negotiating table. It doesn’t<br />
serve our interests to keep the potboiling.<br />
We reject this criticism that<br />
Hurriyat has softened its stance but<br />
yes, as the leadership’s duty is to lead<br />
and find means to address people’s<br />
concerns, we can’t be mute spectators<br />
to the fact that people are dying and<br />
we are just waiting for the UN resolutions<br />
to be implemented and talking<br />
about UN role while the UN is<br />
clearly saying that we are not interested<br />
and that the resolutions have<br />
become obsolete. So that’s why we<br />
believe in a new approach and yes,<br />
through dialogue and negotiations.<br />
We don’t believe in a “sell out” but<br />
we have to find a way out.<br />
Q What is your stance on<br />
demilitarisation?<br />
A. We are in support of demilitarisation.<br />
I think that 80 percent of<br />
the problem would be solved if<br />
Indian troops and Pakistani troops<br />
leave the state of Jammu & Kashmir.<br />
Pakistan has voluntarily said they are<br />
willing to do so if India is willing to<br />
do so. The fact is as you might have<br />
seen, India is not ruling Kashmir on<br />
the basis of its moral position but it’s<br />
clearly on the basis of its military<br />
might. People don’t want the Indian<br />
army to be here. They are the main<br />
cause of irritation, they are the main<br />
cause of human rights violations,<br />
and you can’t justify any peace process<br />
when you have more that<br />
450,000 troops on the ground. So<br />
Kashmir has the world’s highest concentration<br />
of troops where the ratio<br />
of the army to the population is concerned.<br />
Q In what ways is your party<br />
involved in human rights<br />
advocacy?<br />
A. Being a political party, we do<br />
have human rights rings and we do<br />
have a cell. But, you know, our<br />
reports and our findings are rejected<br />
by the Indians because they said we<br />
are a biased political forum. So we<br />
welcome any neutral group, any neutral<br />
agency to come and see the situation<br />
on their own while we condemn<br />
and deplore violations committed<br />
by the Indian forces. The<br />
Hurriyat Conference has also been<br />
condemning the violations committed<br />
by the other non-army people<br />
whether they are the militants or<br />
supporters of the India army (renegades<br />
or other people). So we believe<br />
in human rights, although we are trying<br />
our best, we have given cases to<br />
the Indian Human Rights<br />
Commission and state’s human<br />
rights commission in Srinagar but<br />
unfortunately no heed is paid to our<br />
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HURRIYAT VIEW<br />
cause so we believe that international<br />
NGO’s and Indian civil society<br />
should come forward because<br />
Kashmir is more than a political<br />
problem, it’s a human problem.<br />
Q How is your role as a religious<br />
leader connected to your role as<br />
a political leader?<br />
A. If you look at the society in<br />
Kashmir, I would say that religion<br />
has played a very important role in<br />
the society. And as a Mirwaiz and as<br />
a religious head, I go to the mosque<br />
and give my sermon (on Fridays). I<br />
cannot be a (mute) spectator to what<br />
has happened through the week. It is<br />
my duty to talk about religion but at<br />
the same time it is also my duty to<br />
talk about society too. So that’s why<br />
when you talk of society in Islam, it is<br />
not something, which is different<br />
from religion. We believe in a process<br />
be it religion, politics, social issues,<br />
social interactions -- they are a part of<br />
an overall process. So that’s why I<br />
have to talk about religious issues as<br />
well as about politics. As a mirwaiz<br />
or as a Muslim, I don’t differentiate<br />
between politics and religion. I<br />
believe this leads in the same direction.<br />
So that’s why I have<br />
to talk about<br />
religious issues as<br />
well as about<br />
politics. As a<br />
mirwaiz or as a<br />
Muslim, I don’t<br />
differentiate<br />
between politics<br />
and religion. I<br />
believe this leads in<br />
the same direction<br />
Q What is your stance on the<br />
upcoming elections?<br />
A We are not against elections<br />
but no one-way process can help<br />
address Kashmir. The elections are a<br />
purely administrative problem.<br />
Elections have been held since 1947<br />
until date but no election process has<br />
been a substitute for self-determination.<br />
The problem has not vanished<br />
after elections. So I don’t see elections<br />
as an alternative mechanism to the<br />
issue of Kashmir. And then you have<br />
a clear guideline with the UN vis-àvis<br />
Kashmir that no electoral process<br />
in Kashmir can be a substitute for<br />
self-determination. We are telling<br />
India that yes; we are ready for elections<br />
provided that elections are held<br />
for a cause, for a reason. That reason<br />
should be a political settlement of the<br />
Kashmir issue, not administrative<br />
issues like the chief minister or the<br />
assembly. These things are not related<br />
to Kashmir so we have to differentiate<br />
between the peace process and<br />
the electoral process. It’s purely a<br />
governance issue. It is not related to<br />
the Kashmir issue.<br />
Q What response would you<br />
like to see from the youth of<br />
Jammu & Kashmir?<br />
A. We know that there is a lot of<br />
frustration, there is a lot of anger, a<br />
lot of resentment among the youth<br />
and given the situation, they are<br />
under tremendous pressure. I think<br />
that the youth have shown time and<br />
again, that as far as their commitment<br />
with the movement is concerned<br />
it is absolute. Commitment is<br />
not the only thing we need, we need<br />
a direction, a modus operandi, and<br />
that is what the Hurriyat is working<br />
towards. The dialogue process or<br />
looking for options, looking for solutions<br />
or proposals is something that<br />
is instrumental to the movement.<br />
Whether we go to Pakistan or to<br />
India and talk to anyone is in the<br />
direction of finding an amicable and<br />
lasting solution. So we are telling the<br />
youth that the Hurriyat Conference is<br />
committed to the issues of political<br />
settlement and political future. At the<br />
Commitment is not the<br />
only thing we need, we<br />
need a direction, a<br />
modus operandi, and<br />
that is what the<br />
Hurriyat is working<br />
towards. The dialogue<br />
process or looking for<br />
options, looking for<br />
solutions or proposals<br />
is something that is<br />
instrumental to the<br />
movement<br />
same time, there are other issues like<br />
education, jobs, and other problems,<br />
which unfortunately cannot be<br />
addressed unless and until the political<br />
stability is attained on the<br />
ground. I would say that they<br />
Hurriyat is working on that and we<br />
are looking at the suggestions and<br />
options and other proposals and we<br />
believe that if India and Pakistan also<br />
contribute in the positive sense, India<br />
should not waste its time on issues<br />
like elections and economic packages<br />
and other things because we have<br />
seen in the past that they have not<br />
helped the cause. We should focus on<br />
the political settlement, look at suggestions<br />
and come and discuss with<br />
an open mind and an open heart and<br />
then try to analyse how we can move<br />
forward. We believe that it’s a gradual<br />
and step by step process and that is<br />
what the youth of Kashmir and the<br />
people of Kashmir have to be ready<br />
for.<br />
<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Amarnath row:<br />
Communalists are back to business<br />
A row set off by the move<br />
to hand over a piece of<br />
land to a pilgrimage<br />
centre in Jammu &<br />
Kashmir has revved up<br />
hate mills that spin<br />
sectarian politics. Not just<br />
chief minister but sanity<br />
too bolted out before<br />
another governor could<br />
retrace his predecessor’s<br />
disastrous steps in what<br />
looks like a belated<br />
damage control exercise,<br />
writes Praful Bidwai<br />
As has been famously said, a<br />
week is a long time in politics.<br />
Jammu & Kashmir has<br />
once again proved the validity of this<br />
aphorism with the crisis over the<br />
transfer of land to Shri Amarnath<br />
Shrine Board (SASB). The week-long<br />
protests this triggered not only led to<br />
the dramatic collapse of the<br />
Congress-People's Democratic Party<br />
alliance government, but may have<br />
generated major negative changes in<br />
the political mood in the Valley. This<br />
could help revive the separatist militancy<br />
which has been on the wane for<br />
more than two years. It may also<br />
have strengthened forces in the other<br />
regions of the state, which would like<br />
to divide it along religious lines. All<br />
these are worrisome developments.<br />
To start with, the protests<br />
impelled the PDP to withdraw from<br />
the ruling coalition on June 28.<br />
Jammu & Kashmir Chief Minister<br />
Ghulam Nabi Azad first put a brave<br />
face on the crisis this precipitated but<br />
he soon threw in the towel. Rather<br />
than go through the vote of confidence<br />
he had himself tabled, Mr<br />
Azad submitted his resignation to<br />
Governor N N Vohra.<br />
Evidently, despite his confidence<br />
that he would win the vote, Mr Azad<br />
failed to engineer enough abstentions<br />
in the legislative Assembly by<br />
PDP dissidents and other potential<br />
defectors, which alone could have<br />
enabled the Congress and its allies<br />
(with 42 seats in the 89-member<br />
House) to fight off the 47 seat-strong<br />
opposition and survive in power till<br />
the Assembly elections are held in<br />
October.<br />
Meanwhile, the revocation by<br />
Governor Vohra of the order transferring<br />
land to the SASB set off a conflagration<br />
in the Jammu region,<br />
which soon spread to other parts of<br />
India thanks to the Bharatiya Janata<br />
Party’s eagerness to exploit the situation<br />
to its own narrow ends.<br />
The fall of the Congress-PDP<br />
coalition government, the first of its<br />
kind in J&K, is a setback to the cause<br />
of moderation and political reconciliation<br />
in the long-troubled and restive<br />
state. This is only one of the many<br />
casualties extracted by the crisis over<br />
the transfer of forestland, and the<br />
violent protests this generated.<br />
The crisis has taken an even<br />
greater toll in the form of a collapse<br />
of the political normalisation process<br />
and an eclipse of the internal peace<br />
process in Kashmir. The danger, as<br />
we see below, is that this may lead to<br />
a revival of militant separatism in the<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Valley and a general shift towards<br />
intolerance and assertion of religionbased<br />
or communal identities in all<br />
the regions of J&K.<br />
The gains of the past six years -- a<br />
substantial decline in violence by<br />
jehadi separatists and by the security<br />
forces, a revival of the economy, a<br />
boom in the tourist industry, increasing<br />
isolation of strident extremism,<br />
and a general acceptance of mainstream<br />
political activity and electoral<br />
politics -- could now be in jeopardy.<br />
In Kashmir, the biggest winners<br />
from the crisis are the Hurriyat hardliners<br />
led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani,<br />
who until recently got completely<br />
isolated thanks to his extremist positions.<br />
No less important gainers are<br />
the leaders of the moderate Hurriyat,<br />
led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, who<br />
have moved from near-isolation and<br />
irrelevance to prominence through<br />
their staunch opposition to the land<br />
transfer on the ground that it would<br />
bring about a demographic transformation<br />
of the Valley. The two<br />
Hurriyat factions are now discussing<br />
unification.<br />
Nationally, the greatest gainer is<br />
the Bharatiya Janata Party, which has<br />
cynically exploited the return of the<br />
land to the forest department to<br />
foment violent Hindu-communal<br />
protests in different parts of the<br />
country. The death toll from the<br />
protests has already crossed the double-digit<br />
mark.<br />
There are no heroes, only villains,<br />
in the entire SASB land transfer<br />
drama. The greatest villain is<br />
unquestionably former Governor Lt-<br />
General SK Sinha, a BJP appointee,<br />
who just days before his retirement<br />
on June 4 ordered the state government<br />
to transfer 100 acres of forest<br />
land to the board of which he is the<br />
president. The land was to be used to<br />
provide temporary accommodation<br />
to pilgrims to the Amarnath shrine,<br />
where a stalactite of ice forms in a<br />
cave. The land transfer was manifestly<br />
illegal and violated the Forest<br />
Conservation Act.<br />
General Sinha has over the years<br />
systematically encouraged pilgrimage<br />
to this ecologically fragile area at<br />
an altitude of 10,000 feet, carved out<br />
a new route through the mountains,<br />
promoted all kinds of tourist facilities<br />
including a helicopter service,<br />
and extended the duration of the<br />
yatra from four weeks to eight weeks<br />
every year -- although the ice lingam<br />
lasts for only one month. The result<br />
has been a several fold increase in the<br />
number of pilgrims to 4 lakhs, with<br />
huge environmental destruction and<br />
mounds of polluting waste.<br />
The state forest minister, who<br />
belongs to the PDP, went along with<br />
all this, including the land transfer.<br />
Also complicit was Deputy Chief<br />
Minister Muzaffar Ali Baig, of the<br />
PDP. The PDP falsely claimed that it<br />
had been blackmailed into agreeing<br />
to the transfer by the Congress which<br />
threatened to block the rebuilding of<br />
the old Mughal Road, to connect the<br />
Valley to the Muslim areas of Rajauri<br />
and Poonch. When the news of the<br />
transfer leaked out, and protests<br />
erupted, the PDP took a U-turn and<br />
presented itself as a helpless victim.<br />
The Congress should have<br />
removed General Sinha long ago, but<br />
failed to do so. It succumbed to his<br />
unreasonable pressure while ignoring<br />
the Forest Act, and was guilty of<br />
venality and blatant manipulation of<br />
the state machinery. Such venality<br />
contributed in the past to the alienation<br />
of the Kashmiri people from<br />
the Indian state, and created a<br />
cesspool of grievances and injustices,<br />
which the separatists used to their<br />
own advantage with help from<br />
Pakistan’s secret agencies.<br />
No less culpable was the National<br />
Conference, whose leader, Dr Farooq<br />
Abdullah, established the SASB in<br />
2000, thus taking the pilgrimage’s<br />
charge away from the Muslim family<br />
which had discovered the cave in the<br />
1850s and looked after it ever since.<br />
This was a case of the government<br />
wantonly interfering with what had<br />
been a worthy instance of spontaneous<br />
Hindu-Muslim harmony and<br />
cooperation -- and then messing<br />
things up.<br />
When protests erupted in the<br />
Valley over the land transfer,<br />
Hurriyat leaders jumped into the<br />
fray. They had been marginalised<br />
ever since General Pervez Musharraf<br />
When protests erupted<br />
in the Valley over the<br />
land transfer, Hurriyat<br />
leaders jumped into<br />
the fray. They had been<br />
marginalised ever<br />
since General Pervez<br />
Musharraf moved<br />
away from the azadi<br />
agenda and proposed<br />
autonomy for the<br />
different regions of<br />
J&K<br />
moved away from the azadi agenda<br />
and proposed autonomy for the different<br />
regions of J&K without<br />
redrawing borders. In recent weeks,<br />
they had even come around to a position<br />
of not opposing and boycotting<br />
the coming Assembly elections,<br />
unlike in the past.<br />
Rather than make a gesture of<br />
generosity to religious Hindus, in<br />
keeping with Kashmir’s syncretic<br />
culture, the Hurriyat leadrers and<br />
JKLF chief Yasin Malik falsely depicted<br />
the land transfer as a means of<br />
forcibly settling Hindus in the Valley<br />
and an assault on the Kashmiri identity.<br />
This was patently absurd given<br />
the tiny size of the plot and the<br />
makeshift prefabricated structures<br />
being erected on it.<br />
They gave a religious-communal<br />
colour to the issue by deliberately<br />
organising processions to and from<br />
the Jama Masjid and the Hazratbal<br />
shrine. This falsified their claim to<br />
the “nationalist” mantle. They also<br />
tried to present the protests as spontaneous<br />
eruptions of popular anger<br />
against India’s Kashmir policy and<br />
the heavy presence of security forces.<br />
They maligned the peace process<br />
itself as a way of perpetuating the<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Kashmir status quo. This was the<br />
Hurriyat’s way of regaining its lost<br />
relevance, but this could only happen<br />
at the cost of yielding to the<br />
hardline Geelani faction.<br />
In reality, the protests were driven<br />
by the same narrow-minded and<br />
parochial motives as were evident in<br />
the earlier mob violence over the<br />
“sex scandal” issue, in which vigilante<br />
squads went on the rampage<br />
and burnt down the house of a<br />
woman suspected to be responsible<br />
for it. The protests caused great hardship<br />
to the public by disrupting the<br />
movement of essential supplies,<br />
including food and fuel.<br />
The Valley protests polarised<br />
opinion in J&K and were replicated<br />
like a mirror-image in the Jammu<br />
region under the leadership of the<br />
BJP. The BJP, true to type, has instigated<br />
violent protests in other parts<br />
of India by drumming up its<br />
favourite but utterly fraudulent slogan<br />
of “Muslim appeasement” and<br />
“anti-Hindu prejudice” on the part<br />
the United Progressive Alliance. This<br />
is infusing sectarian divisiveness and<br />
communal poison into religious<br />
beliefs and rituals.<br />
All this can only help the Valley’s<br />
hardline separatists revive the jehadi<br />
militancy which has been on the<br />
wane and lost its popular appeal.<br />
Separatists are no longer able to<br />
recruit cadres. But if the present<br />
polarisation continues, the danger is<br />
that this might change and Kashmir<br />
The Valley protests<br />
polarised opinion in<br />
J&K and were<br />
replicated like a<br />
mirror-image in the<br />
Jammu region under<br />
the leadership of<br />
the BJP<br />
could return to the rule of the gun --<br />
with disastrous consequences for all<br />
of South Asia.<br />
The two Hurriyat factions’ leaders<br />
are now holding talks to work out<br />
the “modalities for Hurriyat unity”<br />
and have set up a six-member committee.<br />
The talks are being held within<br />
a framework which concedes a<br />
great deal to Geelani and seeks to<br />
dilute the basis on which the moderates<br />
under Farooq split away from<br />
Geelani after Musharraf changed his<br />
Kashmir stance and proposed his<br />
famous four-point formula, effectively<br />
turning his back on the separatist<br />
demand. The hardliners insist that<br />
the Hurriyat holds no more talks<br />
with New Delhi, but demands tripartite<br />
negotiations between India,<br />
Pakistan and the Kashmiris.<br />
The Geelani faction also wants<br />
the Hurriyat to launch an active campaign<br />
for the boycott of the coming<br />
assembly elections, which the moderates<br />
had decided not to do. Geelani<br />
wants the old United Nations<br />
Security Council resolutions on<br />
Kashmir to be the starting point for<br />
any solution to the Kashmir issue.<br />
If the Farooq faction concedes<br />
these demands, it stands to erode its<br />
role as a force restraining extremism,<br />
with an ability to play a positive role<br />
in Kashmir and take the peace process<br />
forward.<br />
A special responsibility now<br />
devolves on Governor Vohra to use<br />
all the contacts he has cultivated as<br />
the Centre’s special envoy for the<br />
Kashmir dialogue to help overcome<br />
the sense of alienation from the<br />
Indian State that significant sections<br />
of the Valley people feel. This sense<br />
has been heightened by the protests<br />
on the Amarnath land issue.<br />
Vohra must employ his considerable<br />
experience as a former Home<br />
Secretary and all his skills of persuasion<br />
to pacify and stabilise the situation<br />
in Kashmir by acting transparently<br />
in good faith. He must also<br />
strongly resist the demand for<br />
Jammu & Kashmir’s trifurcation<br />
along religious lines -- a demand that<br />
spells a major departure from the<br />
India must pursue<br />
the new round of<br />
dialogue with<br />
Pakistan, launched<br />
late last month with<br />
the visit of Foreign<br />
Minister Shah<br />
Mahmood Qureshi<br />
to New Delhi<br />
cause of pluralism and secularism. In<br />
particular, he must activate and<br />
accelerate the deliberations of the<br />
five Working Groups set up at Prime<br />
Minister Manmohan Singh’s initiative<br />
in 2006.<br />
These Groups are meant to deal<br />
with improving the Centre's relations<br />
with the state, furthering relations<br />
across the Line of Control<br />
(LoC), giving a boost to J&K’s economic<br />
development, rehabilitating<br />
the destitute families of militants and<br />
reviewing the cases of detainees, and<br />
ensuring good governance.<br />
The Centre, for its part, must pursue<br />
the peace process in Kashmir<br />
with vigour and sincerity. However,<br />
it won't be enough to resume the<br />
domestic peace process alone. India<br />
must pursue the new round of dialogue<br />
with Pakistan, launched late<br />
last month with the visit of Foreign<br />
Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi to<br />
New Delhi.<br />
In particular, the two governments<br />
must quickly resolve the<br />
Siachen and Sir Creek disputes, liberalise<br />
visa regimes and expand economic<br />
cooperation. That's the best<br />
way of bringing Pakistan on board<br />
and neutralising militant separatism<br />
in Kashmir while overcoming popular<br />
alienation.<br />
— The writer is a senior journalist<br />
and political commentator<br />
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Sectarian positioning<br />
with an eye upon votes<br />
fuelled the controversy<br />
over Amarnath land<br />
transfer issue, writes<br />
Sant Kumar Sharma<br />
from Jammu<br />
Inventing a controversy<br />
An ugly controversy on diversion<br />
of land to Shri Amarnath<br />
Shrine Board (SASB) has led<br />
to the ouster of Ghulam Nabi Azad<br />
government in Jammu & Kashmir.<br />
On July 7, Azad made an emotional<br />
speech in state assembly while moving<br />
the motion for a trust vote. He<br />
listed his achievements, praised the<br />
generosity of the central government<br />
in liberally funding various projects<br />
to the state and decried separatists.<br />
But instead of asking for a division of<br />
votes to prove his majority he opted<br />
out and tendered his resignation to<br />
governor Narendra Nath Vohra.<br />
Azad sought to redeem some<br />
moral ground by claiming that he<br />
did not want to stick to his position<br />
amid an ugly Jammu versus Kashmir<br />
battle. Nevertheless, Azad was faced<br />
with a very real threat of losing the<br />
trust vote in the assembly in a highly<br />
surcharged atmosphere. Events leading<br />
to Azad’s dramatic exit were triggered<br />
by the flip-flop of the state<br />
government on the diversion of 800<br />
kanals of land to SASB.<br />
The SASB is entrusted with the<br />
responsibility of conducting the<br />
annual Amarnath yatra. Broadly, its<br />
mandate is to provide facilities to the<br />
pilgrims who visit the holy cave of<br />
Shri Amarnath in south Kashmir. In<br />
fact, it would be more appropriate to<br />
say that it creates and regulates facilities<br />
for the pilgrims.<br />
The cave is located in a snowfall<br />
area far beyond the tree line on higher<br />
reaches and can be accessed only<br />
for about three months in a year. For<br />
the rest of the year it remains under<br />
heavy snow and, thus, is difficult to<br />
reach.<br />
The facilities created for the pilgrims<br />
are temporary in nature and<br />
comprise mainly pre-fabricated huts,<br />
mostly toilets, since it does not make<br />
sense to try to create any permanent<br />
or even semi-permanent structures<br />
on glaciers<br />
So the land was diverted, temporarily,<br />
for the duration of the pilgrimage,<br />
to the SASB by the state<br />
government led by the Azad.<br />
Incidentally, the allotment was made<br />
Azad sought to redeem<br />
some moral ground by<br />
claiming that he did<br />
not want to stick to his<br />
position amid an ugly<br />
Jammu versus Kashmir<br />
battle<br />
by the government on the recommendations<br />
of the forest ministry<br />
headed by Qazi Mohammed Afzal,<br />
his cabinet colleague Tariq Hamid<br />
Qarra and Deputy Chief Minister<br />
Muzaffar Hussein Beigh. All the<br />
three gentlemen belong to the<br />
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), a<br />
coalition partner in Azad-led government.<br />
The three PDP ministers headed<br />
the forest, law and the tourism<br />
ministry, respectively. Besides, Mr<br />
Beigh was the number two in the<br />
state cabinet.<br />
Azad took rather unusual step of<br />
addressing a press conference and<br />
going on record in public that the<br />
inputs of the trio formed the very<br />
basis of land allotment. Speaking to<br />
reporters in summer capital Srinagar<br />
on June 25, he categorically said that<br />
his cabinet colleagues from PDP<br />
were involved in the process of land<br />
allotment, from the very beginning!<br />
His statement came in the wake of<br />
PDP leader Mufti Mohammed Sayeed’s<br />
demand for cancellation of allotment<br />
of land. Earlier, Azad had offered to<br />
convene an all-party meeting to<br />
thrash out the issue. This olive<br />
branch mainly meant for Mufti was<br />
torn to shreds rather unceremoniously.<br />
Mufti first threatened to part ways<br />
with the Congress over what PDP<br />
termed as an ‘anti-Kashmiri move’<br />
and then actually did this.<br />
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Part of the diverted land falls under Ganderbal, the<br />
electoral constituency and virtual fief of the Abdullahs for<br />
decades till Qazi Afzal trounced Omar in 2002 assembly<br />
elections. Farooq sensed an opportunity of nailing down<br />
his bete noire and thus threw the proverbial first stone by<br />
questioning the wisdom of the land allotment to SASB<br />
though initially there was no reaction in the valley against<br />
the move. Farooq Abdullah’s reaction to the land allotment<br />
was not strident or tough. Yet it made news. And<br />
then all hell broke loose after the then chief executive officer<br />
of the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board Arun Kumar made<br />
a statement which communalised the whole situation.<br />
Kumar has ever since been attached to the general<br />
administration department, as punishment for alleged<br />
violation of civil services rules (CSR). In his defence,<br />
Kumar says that he stepped in only when rumours about<br />
Hindu colonisation of Kashmir valley by the SASB<br />
became rather vicious. He also pointed out that it was his<br />
duty as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the SASB to try<br />
to set the records straight. In fact, the timing of the whole<br />
episode also made it very peculiar. It happened when Lt<br />
Gen (retd) S K Sinha, the then governor, was about to<br />
demit office (he did so on June 25) and as chairman of the<br />
SASB he left it to Kumar to speak about.<br />
At that time, rumours were floating in Kashmir that<br />
the SASB was hatching a sinister conspiracy to change the<br />
essentially Muslim demography of the Kashmir valley.<br />
Several local newspapers had written, either directly or<br />
insinuated that large numbers of Hindus would be<br />
brought in from outside and settled on the land diverted<br />
to the SASB. Never mind the fact that it is not possible for<br />
anyone to settle on such heights where not a blade of<br />
grass grows. The newspapers also conveniently glossed<br />
over the fact that under Article 370, no outsider can<br />
become a permanent resident of Jammu & Kashmir.<br />
Separatists fanned these rumours and mobilised large<br />
crowds for protest. This led to death of five persons<br />
across the valley.<br />
The two mainstream political opponents fighting for<br />
the Kashmiri Muslim votes, the NC led by father-son duo<br />
of Farooq and Omar Abdullah, and the PDP led by fatherdaughter<br />
combine of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed and<br />
Mehbooba Mufti, are largely to blame for what happened.<br />
They made no effort whatsoever to counter the<br />
bogey of Hinduisation of Kashmir. Of the two, the PDP<br />
will have to take a large share of the blame as it was a part<br />
of the ruling coalition when it all started.<br />
When contacted for their comments, most of the NC<br />
leaders explained why they kept quiet and looked the<br />
other way: As opposition party, it was not their responsibility<br />
to help the government. Going a step further, they<br />
also accused the government of failing to solicit its support<br />
for normalising the situation. Not that Congress<br />
party, which was leading the government, did not contribute<br />
to vitiate situation by failing to scotch rumours of<br />
Hindu colonisation of Muslim Kashmir.<br />
— The writer is a Jammu-based freelance journalist<br />
Pilgrims’ needs<br />
Treacherous yatra route and inclement<br />
weather should not leave room for petty<br />
politics<br />
Twelve years ago, a raging snowstorm claimed<br />
lives of 250 pilgrims. When the calamity<br />
struck, hundreds of them were stranded without<br />
shelter amid inclement weather on way to the<br />
cave shrine. Fewer people used to undertake the yatra<br />
then, in the year 1996 to be precise, as the total number<br />
of pilgrims seldom touched one lakh.<br />
Stung by all-round criticism, the central government<br />
set up the Nitish Sengupta committee to suggest<br />
remedial measures to prevent recurrence of similar<br />
tragedy. The committee suggested regulation of the<br />
pilgrimage, registration of the pilgrims and creation<br />
of robust temporary shelters for pilgrims during the<br />
yatra.<br />
In 2000, the state government headed by Farooq<br />
Abdullah created the Shri Amarnath Ji Shrine Board<br />
(SASB), mainly to look after the Amarnath pilgrims.<br />
The board became functional from the next year,<br />
beginning February 2001.<br />
It was to follow the pattern of Shri Mata Vaishno<br />
Devi Shrine Board (SMVDSB). The SMVDSB was created<br />
in 1986 when 14 lakh pilgrims used to visit<br />
Vaishno Devi. By 2007, this figure had crossed 70 lakh<br />
and in the near future it is likely to touch one crore per<br />
annum. The similarities between the two boards end<br />
here.<br />
The SMVDSB inherited land, buildings and other<br />
assets from Dharmarth Trust and Vaishno Devi is the<br />
second richest Hindu shrine in India after Shri<br />
Tirupati. In contrast, the SASB does not own land<br />
anywhere on Amarnath yatra route or elsewhere. Yet,<br />
it is supposed to provide facilities matching with<br />
those provided by the Vaishno Devi Shrine Board.<br />
Thus, the SASB was forced to request the government<br />
to identify and allocate land for creation of temporary<br />
facilities for the Amarnath pilgrims. The need<br />
for this can be imagined if one is to consider 51 deaths<br />
of pilgrims – 48 of natural causes and three in accidents<br />
-- until July 15 after this season’s Yatra commenced<br />
on June 17.<br />
A case is also pending before a Division Bench of<br />
the Jammu & Kashmir High Court regarding allocation<br />
of land for pilgrim facilities and other matters<br />
related to Amarnath yatra.<br />
– SKS<br />
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Centuries’ subjugation<br />
kicks off a bitter struggle<br />
Kashmir’s past is marked by worst kind of alien<br />
rules starting from sixteenth century when Mughals<br />
took over the region, followed by Sikhs and Dogras.<br />
Ruled by outsiders time and again, a feeling of<br />
subjugation crept in the hearts of Kashmiris. These<br />
processes have played a role in forming modern-day<br />
Kashmiri consciousness where old perceptions<br />
linger through, forcing leaders from Sheikh<br />
Abdullah to Yasin Malik to cling to the Kashmiris'<br />
right to self-determination. Farrukh Fahim traces<br />
the tumultuous history<br />
The formation of collective consciousness<br />
of a common<br />
Kashmiri has been determined<br />
by number of factors, the most<br />
important being the public perception<br />
of history. Kashmir’s occupation<br />
by Mughals and their successive subjugation<br />
by Pathans, Sikhs and<br />
Dogras, have left in the minds of a<br />
common Kashmiri a memory of continued<br />
suppression and attendant<br />
economic and political oppression. It<br />
was this sentiment that played a role<br />
in mobilisation during the nationalist<br />
movement of 1930s pioneered by<br />
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah.<br />
Mughal and Afghan rule<br />
The incorporation of Kashmir valley<br />
into Mughal India in the year<br />
1586, after the Chak rule is considered<br />
to be the beginning of the end of<br />
Kashmir’s independence. Kashmir<br />
remained the northern most point of<br />
Mughal empire for nearly two centuries.<br />
Mughal rule in Kashmir<br />
transformed it in the context of its<br />
political and economic condition.<br />
This rule introduced Kashmiris to a<br />
pattern of government, where a governor<br />
was sent to administer the<br />
province and demand taxes.<br />
The rapacity of the Afghans after<br />
the Mughal rule marks the end of<br />
Kashmir’s independence. In Kashmiri<br />
folklore, Afghans, owing to their<br />
oppressive rule, came to represent<br />
the greatest ‘other’. Afghan domination<br />
lasted for little over 50 years. The<br />
period is generally regarded as one<br />
of the darkest in Kashmiri history.<br />
Sikhs and Dogras<br />
Sikh army entered Kashmir on<br />
4th July, 1819, starting a new phase of<br />
tyranny and oppression. In the<br />
words of Prem Nath Bazaz, a<br />
Kashmiri historian, this change of<br />
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masters ‘proved but a change of king<br />
log for a king stork’. Describing the<br />
Sikh rule, Moorcraft, an English traveler<br />
reflected, ’Sikhs looked at<br />
Kashmiris ‘a little better than the cattle.<br />
The murder of a native Sikh was<br />
punished with a fine to the government<br />
ranging from 16 to 20 rupees, of<br />
which four were paid to the family of<br />
the deceased if a Hindu, and two if<br />
he was a Mohammedan’. During this<br />
dark phase in Kashmir’s history, people<br />
were in a most abject condition<br />
‘subjected to every kind of extortion<br />
and oppression’. Under Sikh rule<br />
Kashmir was ruled by 10 governors.<br />
Out of these, five were Hindus, three<br />
Sikhs, and two Muslims. Sikhs consistently<br />
followed anti-Muslim policies<br />
in Kashmir, subjecting the majority<br />
population of the Kashmir valley<br />
to severe hardship in relation to the<br />
practice of religion. It was also during<br />
this phase that the central<br />
mosque of Srinagar, the Jama Masjid<br />
was ordered to be closed and<br />
Muslims of Kashmir were not<br />
allowed to say azan (call to prayer).<br />
Sikhs tried to establish a ‘Hindu’<br />
state where cow slaughter was<br />
declared a crime and a complete ban<br />
was passed against cow slaughter,<br />
lands attached to several shrines<br />
were also resumed on state orders.<br />
Their emphasis on ‘setting Hindu<br />
and Sikh beliefs was a part of an<br />
attempt to articulate a Sikh identity<br />
separate from that of the Mughals.<br />
The effect of Sikh rule, according to<br />
Prem Nath Bazaz, dealt a severe<br />
blow to the pride of the local people.<br />
‘The people of the valley came to be<br />
known as zulum parast (the worshipers<br />
of tyranny) as they gradually<br />
forgot their glorious martial traditions<br />
and became timid and cowardly’.<br />
Under Sikh rule<br />
Kashmir was ruled by<br />
10 governors. Out of<br />
these, five were<br />
Hindus, three Sikhs,<br />
and two Muslims.<br />
Sikhs consistently<br />
followed anti-Muslim<br />
policies in Kashmir,<br />
subjecting the majority<br />
population of the<br />
Kashmir valley to<br />
severe hardship<br />
With the battle of Subraon, the<br />
Sikhs lost their independence. The<br />
treaty of Amritsar between British<br />
and Dogras signed on 16th of March<br />
1846, gave way to Dogra rule in<br />
Kashmir.<br />
British while recognising the neutrality<br />
of Gulab Singh in the first<br />
Ango-Sikh war rewarded Gulab<br />
Singh, a vassal of defeated Sikh king<br />
Maharaja Ranjit singh. The Treaty of<br />
Amritsar referred to as ‘sales deed’,<br />
was frequently condemned from ‘different<br />
quarters of Kashmiri society’.<br />
Muhammad Iqbal, while expressing<br />
his anguish wrote:<br />
Each hill, each garden, field, Each<br />
farmer too they sold.<br />
A nation for a price, That makes my<br />
blood ice-cold<br />
With this treaty Gulab Singh’s<br />
estate included besides his native<br />
Jammu, the Himalayan kingdom of<br />
Kashmir, Ladakh and Baltistan. Thus<br />
the newly created entity of Jammu &<br />
Kashmir joined the ranks of princely<br />
states as sovereign entity with British<br />
crown being the sovereign overlord.<br />
Both British and Dogra government’s<br />
respective pursuits for legitimacy,<br />
allowed the latter to pursue a<br />
policy where the state of Jammu &<br />
Kashmir was transformed from a<br />
state ruled over by a Hindu into a<br />
Hindu state. Over the subsequent<br />
years, the overtly Hindu tone of the<br />
political authority and the complete<br />
denial of all rights to the Kashmiri<br />
Muslim community (as Kashmiri<br />
Muslims were largely left out of the<br />
power sharing arrangements of the<br />
Dogra state) resulted in articulation<br />
of political allegiances along communal<br />
lines.<br />
A nucleus of new generation of<br />
political leaders, trained at Aligarh<br />
Muslim University, and headed by a<br />
schoolteacher Sheikh Muhamad<br />
Abdullah, soon established a reading<br />
room association in Srinagar to discuss<br />
questions of social and political<br />
change. A similar group called<br />
Young Men’s Muslim Association<br />
was formed in the southern city of<br />
Jammu. These young political<br />
activists attempted to organise a deputation<br />
to present a list of grievances<br />
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to the Dogra Maharaja. These initiatives<br />
by new generation of Kashmiri<br />
Muslim political activists announced<br />
the arrival of organised political<br />
mobilisation in Kashmir. This initiative<br />
however ended in a riot on the<br />
streets of Srinagar, killing 21 persons<br />
when the Maharaja’s police opened<br />
fire on protesters on July 13, 1931.<br />
This became a turning point in the<br />
history of political mobilisation in<br />
Kashmir. In the words of Mohamad<br />
Ishaq Khan, a Kashmiri historian, it<br />
was for the first time that ‘dumbdriven<br />
cattle’ raised the standard of<br />
revolt.<br />
Soon after this incident, and formally,<br />
immediately after, Kashmir’s<br />
first regional party -- the All Jammu<br />
& Kashmir Muslim Conference was<br />
formed under the leadership of<br />
Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. This<br />
was also an important event in the<br />
history of organised protest in<br />
Kashmir, as it was for the first time<br />
that Kashmiri Muslims sought to<br />
build a wider base of support among<br />
the agricultural and artisan classes of<br />
the valley. Initially starting with the<br />
demand for bigger share in the civil<br />
services for educated Muslim youth,<br />
the proprietorship, and reduction of<br />
land revenue, the Muslim<br />
Conference soon demanded the right<br />
to freedom of speech and expression<br />
and more significantly right to establishment<br />
of a democratic government<br />
with a responsible executive. In the<br />
year 1938, the party decided to redefine<br />
the basis of its politics on secular<br />
lines. Finally in the year 1939, at its<br />
annual convention Muslim<br />
Conference was accordingly<br />
renamed All Jammu & Kashmir<br />
National Conference.<br />
The new party sought to expand<br />
its base through its political programme<br />
called Naya Kashmir (New<br />
Kashmir). The Bill of Rights stipulating<br />
‘equality of the rights of all citizens<br />
irrespective of nationality, religion,<br />
race or birth in all spheres of<br />
life’ reached out to all classes of people<br />
in the state. By incorporating a<br />
peasants charter advocating transfer<br />
of all agricultural land to actual<br />
tillers of the soil, a Workers Charter<br />
ensuring basic rights and better<br />
These initiatives by<br />
new generation of<br />
Kashmiri Muslim<br />
political activists<br />
announced the arrival<br />
of organised political<br />
mobilisation in<br />
Kashmir. This initiative<br />
however ended in a<br />
riot on the streets of<br />
Srinagar, killing 21<br />
persons when the<br />
Maharaja’s police<br />
opened fire on<br />
protesters on July 13,<br />
1931<br />
working conditions, and a Charter of<br />
Women’s Rights in the political, economic,<br />
social, legal, educational and<br />
cultural spheres, a concerted effort<br />
was made to enlist the support of<br />
large sections of the society.<br />
Naya Kashmir was the blueprint<br />
of the political philosophy of the<br />
National Conference, and presented<br />
the agenda of how it would exercise<br />
state power. A scheme of constitutional<br />
reforms based on the democratic<br />
elective principle from local<br />
pachayats to the national assembly<br />
along with a responsible and responsive<br />
executive was envisaged. It<br />
advocated universal adult franchise<br />
with weightage for the minorities,<br />
including Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs<br />
and Harijans during the transitional<br />
period. The national economic plan<br />
envisaged planned development<br />
with safeguards against exploitation,<br />
ensuring that economic power<br />
would not be centralised in any section<br />
of society. Recognising the multilingual<br />
character of Jammu &<br />
Kashmir (Kashmiri being the dominant<br />
language only in the valley and<br />
some parts of Jammu), the Naya<br />
Kashmir manifesto designated Urdu<br />
as the official lingua franca.<br />
With Muslim league movement<br />
for Pakistan gaining momentum,<br />
National conference was aspiring to<br />
steer a different course of action<br />
away from the concept of two-nation<br />
theory. The very proposition of accession<br />
meant losing the hitherto<br />
autonomous status enjoyed by the<br />
state since its creation on the one<br />
hand, and facing the prospects of<br />
division of the state and its people on<br />
religious ground on the other. This<br />
meant a certain death of the secular<br />
dream cultivated by the National<br />
Conference since its birth in 1939. In<br />
order to have its secular pluralist<br />
democratic programme materialsed,<br />
it became imperative for National<br />
Conference to ensure that the ethnoreligious<br />
composition of the state<br />
remains intact and its autonomy and<br />
geographical unity is safeguarded.<br />
For National Conference this was<br />
possible only if the state was transformed<br />
from an autocratic state into<br />
a representative liberal democracy.<br />
The ultimate goal for National<br />
Conference, therefore, was not to<br />
submerge with the secular nationalism<br />
in the mainland India, but to<br />
maintain its own identity and autonomy<br />
albeit supported by its close ally,<br />
the Indian National Congress 1 .<br />
With the introduction of historical<br />
land reforms and complete transformation<br />
of rural Kashmir, hundreds<br />
and thousands of newly<br />
empowered peasant families started<br />
viewing Shiekh Abdullah as the chief<br />
architect of this transformation.<br />
Commenting on what became the<br />
most drastic piece of land reforms in<br />
the subcontinent, Nehru said,<br />
‘I confess that I look with some envy<br />
on the speed and clarity with which they<br />
(Kashmir government) have performed<br />
this task there, considering the enormous<br />
trouble we had have in various states of<br />
India, the difficulties, the obstruction<br />
and the delays that we had to face, and<br />
so, I became a little envious when I saw<br />
this was done in Kashmir.’<br />
Post 1947 Politics<br />
Shiekh Abdullah had heralded<br />
his transformation from vehement<br />
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political activist against Dogra rule in<br />
the Princely State of Jammu &<br />
Kashmir to prime minister, since<br />
1947. He dominated the Kashmiri<br />
political scene for over 30 years<br />
(whether in jail or in office) until his<br />
death in 1982.<br />
The Naya Kashmir manifesto put<br />
forward by National Conference was<br />
clearly based on a Jacobin conception<br />
of popular sovereignty, augmented<br />
by a generous dollop of Bolshevism 2·<br />
in the socio-economic sense of the<br />
programme. In Naya Kashmir proposals<br />
Shiekh Abdullah made a powerful<br />
case for the conversion of Jammu<br />
& Kashmir into an independent state,<br />
which he described as a ‘South Asian<br />
Switzerland’, perhaps in alliance<br />
with an India free from British rule<br />
but not an integral part of it. He<br />
dreamt of an independent Jammu &<br />
Kashmir, a secular polity, rooted in<br />
Kashmiri Islam. Sheikh Abdullah<br />
argued on number of occasions that<br />
the Hindu minority in the state had<br />
more in common with the Muslim<br />
majority than it had with the Hindus<br />
elsewhere in the Indian sub-continent.<br />
Loy Hendrson, the United<br />
States ambassador to India, who visited<br />
Sheikh Abdullah in September<br />
1950, reported:<br />
In discussing future of Kashmir,<br />
Abdullah was vigorous in restating his<br />
opinion that it should be independent;<br />
that overwhelming majority population<br />
desired this independence; and that he<br />
had reason to believe that some Azad<br />
Kashmir leaders (read Pakistan<br />
Occupied Kashmir) desired independence<br />
and would be willing to cooperate<br />
with leaders of National Conference if<br />
there were reasonable chance such cooperation<br />
would result in independence 3 .<br />
Shiekh Abdullah became the<br />
undisputed head, with the title of<br />
prime minister of the popular interim<br />
government in March 1948. His<br />
covert dealings with Azad Kashmir<br />
(read Pakistan Occupied Kashmir)<br />
leaders, and his disclosure to the<br />
United States ambassador to India<br />
(that was repeated in the talks<br />
between American Democrat Adlai<br />
Stevenson and Sheikh Abdullah),<br />
challenged the finality of the accession<br />
of the state of Jammu & Kashmir<br />
to India, something that was the<br />
most disturbing feature for the<br />
Government of India 2 . Sheikh’s disclosures<br />
to the foreign visitors made<br />
India apprehensive about his intentions,<br />
and he came to be regarded as<br />
a ‘loose canon’ in Indian political<br />
annals. With Sheikh Abdullah<br />
becoming the prime minister an<br />
absolute ruler, Indian government<br />
seemed to be in a hurry to devise<br />
some fresh constitutional checks that<br />
would involve not only the structure<br />
of the internal government of the<br />
State but also the state’s formal relationship<br />
with the Indian Union.<br />
The Indian Constitution (creation<br />
of Constituent Assembly) perforce<br />
gave to the state of Jammu &<br />
Kashmir special status enshrined in<br />
Article 370 of the Indian<br />
Constitution, which effectively limited<br />
the powers of the Indian Union<br />
Parliament to the three matters;<br />
Defence, External Affairs and<br />
Communications. Apart from the<br />
three powers reserved to the Indian<br />
Union, everything else was supposed<br />
to be the proper concern of government<br />
of Jammu & Kashmir. Some<br />
interpreters like Alastair Lamb, view<br />
the inclusion of this provision in the<br />
context of Jammu & Kashmir as an<br />
autonomous polity under Indian<br />
protection, with implications that it<br />
might evolve in time to full independence.<br />
The Praja Parishad agitation in<br />
Jammu, Jana Sangh agitation in Delhi<br />
for the complete integration of<br />
Jammu & Kashmir with India, Dr<br />
Shyama Prasad Mukherji’s death in<br />
Srinagar, brought criticism against<br />
Sheikh and his government in<br />
Srinagar, across India. Sheikh<br />
Abdullah in the meantime found<br />
ample support for his own allegations<br />
that India was ‘secular only in<br />
name but basically communal and so<br />
Kashmir can have no honorable<br />
place’ in India. Government of India<br />
soon realised that ‘sheikh was looking<br />
for a semi-independent status<br />
where the Indians would protect him<br />
while he would benefit economically<br />
from the tourist industry and other<br />
sources of Kashmiri wealth, free<br />
from interference from what he<br />
regarded as the Hindu dominated<br />
government in New Delhi.’ By 1953<br />
New Delhi and Abdullah had fallen<br />
apart. So in August 1953 Abdullah<br />
was arrested, and one of his top lieutenants,<br />
Bakshi Ghulam Mohamad<br />
was installed as new Prime Minister.<br />
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Plebiscite front<br />
In the aftermath of the dismissal<br />
and arrest of Sheikh Abduallah,<br />
Mirza Afzal Beg took over the reins<br />
of politics in Kashmir. Patronised by<br />
Shiekh Abdullah, he founded<br />
Plebiscite Front in 1955. With the<br />
arrest of Shiekh Abdullah, introduction<br />
of Jammu & Kashmir<br />
Constitution 4· and growing resentment<br />
of common masses against<br />
New Delhi, Plebiscite Front immediately<br />
gained popularity.<br />
During January 1958, Shiekh<br />
Abdullah was released, with a rousing<br />
welcome by his followers at<br />
Srinagar, Abdullah said:<br />
Pandit Nehru is a great man, a close<br />
associate of mine and I still respect him.<br />
It is in the nature of man that during<br />
adversity the flower thrown by a friend<br />
appears heavier and more injurious than<br />
the stone thrown by an enemy.<br />
Criticising National Conference<br />
(read official) led by Bakshi for its<br />
undemocratic actions, Shiekh<br />
Abdullah challenged the claim of<br />
irrevocability of accession saying:<br />
The present government’s claim of<br />
Kashmir being integral part of India is a<br />
worthless claim, adding that the government<br />
which is not true representative of<br />
the people cannot take the finality of<br />
accession to the hearts of the people 5·.<br />
The Kashmir Accord<br />
The Indian government associated<br />
Plebiscite Front with the activities<br />
of the militant group Al-Fatah.<br />
Imposing a blanket ban on Plebiscite<br />
Front, around ‘lakhs of politically<br />
conscious members of the outlawed<br />
Plebiscite Front’ were arrested or<br />
debarred from participating in any<br />
political activity, ‘clearing the path<br />
for a walk-over for the Congress’. In<br />
March 1972, Syed Mir Qasim came to<br />
power by winning with a comfortable<br />
majority. There were protests<br />
against the alleged rigged elections<br />
by opposition leaders, which<br />
although refuted by Mir Qasim initially,<br />
were later confirmed by him in<br />
his memoirs in these words:<br />
‘If the elections were free and fair, the<br />
victory of the Plebiscite Front was a forgone<br />
conclusion. And, as a victorious<br />
party, the Front would certainly talk<br />
form a position of strength that would<br />
irritate Mrs Ghandhi who might give up<br />
her wish to negotiate with Shiekh<br />
Abdullah. That in turn would lead to<br />
confrontation between the centre and the<br />
Jammu & Kashmir’ 9·.<br />
After Mir Qasim’s election, he<br />
began to relax a number of restrictions<br />
on his opponents. In April 1972,<br />
Begum Abdullah was allowed to<br />
return to the state, political prisoners<br />
were released and in June the internment<br />
order on Abdullah and Mirza<br />
Afzal was lifted. The ban on<br />
Plebiscite Front was also lifted, providing<br />
a political platform to Shiekh<br />
Abdullah. With the creation of<br />
Bangladesh, and in the light of<br />
changing circumstances Sheikh<br />
Abdullah started shifting emphasis<br />
from the demand of plebiscite to<br />
greater autonomy within the Indian<br />
Union. In his memoirs Abdullah justifies<br />
this shift and his agreement to<br />
what came to be known as Kashmir<br />
accord in following words:<br />
We only wanted Article 370 to be<br />
maintained in its original form… Our<br />
readiness to come to the negotiating table<br />
did not imply a change in our strategy.<br />
Thus it seems that Abdullah<br />
wanted a pre-1953 status for Jammu<br />
& Kashmir, something that was<br />
never conceded by New Delhi. Syed<br />
Mir Qasim stepped aside as the chief<br />
minister of Jammu & Kashmir to<br />
make way for Abdullah. The Delhidetermined<br />
circumstances of an<br />
emasculated Abdullah’s return to<br />
office amounted to a clever evasion<br />
of the Kashmir conflict rather than a<br />
substantive solution to it. The 1975<br />
elections saw Abdullah sweeping<br />
polls in the valley and winning by a<br />
clear majority. It seemed for time<br />
being that Kashmir issue was about<br />
to reach its logical end, but as soon as<br />
Abdullah realised that his decision to<br />
sign an agreement with government<br />
of India (Kashmir accord) was seen<br />
as a compromise by a common<br />
Kashmiri, Abdullah abandoned it in<br />
a matter of weeks. There was bitterness<br />
among Kashmiris regarding<br />
what they considered as ‘sell out’.<br />
‘A lady (Indira Ghandhi) had<br />
tamed the toothless Lion of Kashmir’<br />
was the lead story in the in Kashmiri<br />
press. In April 1975, Abdullah again<br />
talked about possible merger of his<br />
state with Azad Kashmir. In May<br />
1975 he invited Congress members in<br />
the state assembly to join his<br />
Plebiscite Front, Congress resentment<br />
against this act resulted in<br />
widening rift between the two parties.<br />
The authoritarian streak in<br />
Shiekh Abdullah’s National<br />
Conference became quite evident<br />
from 1976 onwards. National<br />
Conference thus made its own contribution<br />
to the subversion and retardation<br />
of democratic development in<br />
Jammu & Kashmir.<br />
The valley of Kashmir witnessed<br />
an unprecedented increase in the frequency<br />
of demonstrations, many of<br />
which were countered by police violence.<br />
The organisations like Jamiat-e-<br />
Islami, the Jamiat-e-Tuluaba, Mahaz-e-<br />
Azadi and People’s League were<br />
active in these protests. This was also<br />
the period when a shadow underground<br />
organisation carrying systematic<br />
acts of violence and ‘sabotage’<br />
with a name ‘Al- Fatah’ came<br />
into existence. Whatever be the background<br />
of the underground ‘Al-<br />
Fatah’ the fact is that it was used by<br />
Indian State to justify a direct attack<br />
The Indian government<br />
associated Plebiscite<br />
Front with the<br />
activities of the<br />
militant group Al-<br />
Fatah. Imposing a<br />
blanket ban on<br />
Plebiscite Front,<br />
around ‘one million<br />
politically conscious<br />
members of the<br />
outlawed Plebiscite<br />
Front'...<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
on Shiekh Abdullah and the<br />
Plebiscite Front, to prevent the<br />
Front’s participation in the upcoming<br />
elections. Some 350 supporters of the<br />
Plebiscite Front, including Sheikh<br />
Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg were<br />
arrested. The arrests were justified<br />
on the grounds that the Plebiscite<br />
Front was involved in subversive<br />
activities in the state, presumably<br />
associated with ‘Al-Fatah’. In another<br />
major development on January 1971,<br />
some young Kashmiris, who were<br />
apparently armed with a hand<br />
grenade and a pistol, hijacked an<br />
Indian airliner named ‘Ganga’ en<br />
route from Srinagar to Jammu.<br />
Seeking asylum in Pakistan, the airliner<br />
was taken to Lahore. The hijackers<br />
demanded from the Government<br />
of India, to release 36 political prisoners<br />
said to be the members of an<br />
organisation called the Kashmir<br />
National Liberation Front. The<br />
hijacking drama ended with hijackers<br />
setting the aircraft ablaze after<br />
taking out the passengers. Amidst all<br />
drama and confusion, the world<br />
came to know about Kashmir<br />
Liberation Front. Its existence was a<br />
surprise for many. It was supposed to<br />
be the same group calling itself the<br />
‘Plebiscite Front’ (not to be confused<br />
with the Plebiscite Front party<br />
founded by Mirza Afzal Beg of<br />
which, however it was in some ways<br />
an informal offshoot). Al Fatah was<br />
among one of the biggest ‘subversive’<br />
groups in Kashmir during this<br />
period. A guerilla outfit that had over<br />
200 people. The group recruited<br />
youngsters, set up ‘safe houses’ and<br />
embarked on gun-running on a large<br />
scale. Ghulam Rasool Zahegeer and<br />
Abdul Rashid Dar a lawyer from<br />
south Kashmir, Fazle Haq Qureshi<br />
resident of North Kashmir, Muhmad<br />
Yousuf Mir, from downtown<br />
Srinagar, Hamidullah Bhat,<br />
Muhammad Husseien and<br />
Muhammad Salim Gilkar were<br />
among the earliest members of Al<br />
Fatah, who were ‘rehabilitated’ by<br />
National Conference government 3<br />
after it came to power.<br />
A charismatic, but somehow<br />
mysterious figure Maqbool Bhat<br />
from the border district of Handwara<br />
was among the earliest members of<br />
the Front. One time journalist in<br />
Peshawar, he had been regularly<br />
crossing the Kashmir ceasefire line<br />
since 1958. He was arrested in 1966,<br />
and sentenced to death later after his<br />
re-arrest for the alleged murder of an<br />
Indian official during the course of<br />
an armed robbery in the valley of<br />
Kashmir. He was finally hanged in<br />
Delhi’s Tihar Jail exactly a week<br />
before his 46th birthday.<br />
The radicalised generation in<br />
Kashmir valley, flying the Jammu &<br />
Kashmir Liberation Front’s banner of<br />
independence, emerged as a force of<br />
mass uprising. In 1990 it was essentially<br />
the old National Conference-<br />
Plebiscite Front brand of politics that<br />
got radicalised under the new leadership<br />
of a militant younger generation,<br />
rebelling against India.<br />
The front articulated the vision of<br />
an independent state based on a federal,<br />
parliamentary political system.<br />
Each of the five federating units,<br />
namely, Kashmir valley, Jammu<br />
province, Ladakh, Azad (or occupied<br />
Kashmir), and Gilgit and Baltistan<br />
would enjoy autonomy with elected<br />
provincial governments. Each<br />
province can be subdivided into districts<br />
and these districts will have<br />
their own internal arrangements.<br />
The idea of a secular Independent<br />
republic of Jammu & Kashmir put<br />
forward by Jammu & Kashmir<br />
Liberation Front bear a striking<br />
resemblance to the contents of a<br />
working paper submitted by Balraj<br />
Puri to the Jammu & Kashmir State<br />
People’s Convention in 1968, led by<br />
Shiekh Abdullah, which was attended<br />
by practically all popularly-based<br />
political forces in the valley. These<br />
recommendations, according to Bose<br />
are reminiscent of the principle of<br />
‘subsidiarity’, a key part of the political<br />
architecture of the new European<br />
Community (EC). Under this principle,<br />
each level of government<br />
(Brussels, the national capitals, and<br />
sub-state entities like the German<br />
Lander) stays clear of all decisions<br />
that can be taken at a lower level.<br />
In the backdrop of the alleged<br />
rigged elections of 1987 Jammu &<br />
Kashmir Liberation Front resurfaced<br />
after remaining dormant for over 20<br />
years. Jammu & Kashmir Liberation<br />
Front led within the valley by the<br />
core HAJY· (Hamid, Ashfaq, Javed<br />
and Yasin) group emerged as one of<br />
the most prominent radical organisation<br />
in the 1980s campaign of azadi<br />
against the Indian state. Jammu &<br />
Kashmir Liberation Front found spir-<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
itual inspiration in the specific<br />
Islamic traditions rooted in the mystical<br />
piety of Kashmiri Sufi saints.<br />
The Jammu & Kashmir Liberation<br />
Front’s strategy may be divided into<br />
four components: establishing an<br />
organisational base and devising<br />
military strategy; pursuit of international<br />
support; mobilising popular<br />
support.<br />
In 1990 the simmering rebellion<br />
of 1988-89 (aftermath of rigged elections)<br />
came to boil in the form of a<br />
mass resistance to the Indian rule in<br />
Kashmir valley. Starting with a total<br />
boycott of 1989 late-November parliamentary<br />
elections, this phase is<br />
characterised by massive protests<br />
and extensive mass mobilisation,<br />
which was on account of a very<br />
strong wave of alienation doing<br />
rounds in the lives of ordinary<br />
Kashmiris. More or less similar alienation<br />
in a different context was put to<br />
use by Sheikh Abdullah against a different<br />
set of actors and now it was<br />
the turn of Jammu & Kashmir<br />
Liberation Front.<br />
Huge azadi rallies were organised<br />
during this phase and one of<br />
them took place 1 March 1990, where<br />
around 3,000 people gathered in the<br />
town of Charar-e-Sharief, 30 kilometers<br />
from Srinagar, at the shrine and<br />
mausoleum of the valley’s patron<br />
saint, the fourteenth century Sufi<br />
mystic Sheikh Noorudin Noorani,<br />
and took a collective oath, in the<br />
presence of Jammu & Kashmir<br />
Liberation Front leaders to struggle<br />
for ‘Kashmir’s right to self-determination’.<br />
Indian state was finding it<br />
difficult to tackle the uprising owing<br />
to its mass character as workers,<br />
lawyers, engineers, schoolteachers,<br />
and storeowners, doctors former<br />
MLA’s and Jammu & Kashmir Police<br />
joined and supported the movement.<br />
In the absence of any alternative<br />
channels of collective action and<br />
protest the shrines and mosques<br />
emerged as the focal point of popular<br />
mobilisation and resistance.<br />
The collective yearning of people<br />
of Kashmir for independent existence<br />
took a more militant form in<br />
the years that followed the early<br />
uprising of 1990s. Frequently government<br />
installations and offices considered<br />
as symbols of Indian states<br />
authority and ‘occupation’ became<br />
the targets of violence. The guidelines<br />
issued to its members by JKLF<br />
titled ‘Freedom or Martydom’ gave<br />
comprehensive instructions to the<br />
‘freedom fighters’ and exhorted them<br />
to follow such guidelines strictly.<br />
These guidelines/instructions pertaining<br />
to guerilla or underground<br />
activities were by and large the Urdu<br />
translations of Mao’s and Che<br />
Guevara’s formulations or at least<br />
were influenced by them. In these<br />
instructions it was strictly urged that<br />
‘each guerilla or ‘freedom fighter’<br />
must show impeccable moral conduct<br />
and strict self-control and teach<br />
the local population the guerilla<br />
band so that they see the advantage<br />
of aiding the insurgency4.<br />
By 1993, with complete take-over<br />
of the movement by Pakistan’s intelligence<br />
agencies, JKLF almost lost its<br />
military ascendancy to the radical<br />
Jihadist outfits. In the year 1994,<br />
Yasin Malik the leader of JKLF<br />
renounced the armed struggle and<br />
called for unilateral ceasefire.<br />
In the year 2005, when a Bus service<br />
was started between ‘Azad<br />
Kashmir’ and ‘Occupied Kashmir’,<br />
Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front,<br />
under Yasin Malik while supporting<br />
the peace initiative taken by India<br />
and Pakistan, tried to enlist the support<br />
for the cause of independence<br />
by collecting around 15 lakh signatures<br />
across Jammu & Kashmir and<br />
regarded the campaign as a ‘mandate<br />
of trust’ and ‘Kashmiri people’s<br />
verdict for peace and inclusion in<br />
ongoing peace talks between India<br />
and Pakistan’.<br />
Jammu & Kashmir Liberation<br />
Front during the moderate political<br />
phase tried to address its constituency<br />
inside Jammu & Kashmir and was<br />
vigorously involved in improving<br />
diplomatic relations in India,<br />
Pakistan and other countries. JKLF<br />
and its chairman Yasin Malik also<br />
tried to clarify in various forums the<br />
reason for a ‘limited militant struggle’<br />
in his speeches:<br />
‘From 1953 to 1975, Shiekh<br />
Abdullah fought through a non-violent<br />
By 1993, with<br />
complete take-over of<br />
the movement by<br />
Pakistan’s intelligence<br />
agencies, JKLF almost<br />
lost its military<br />
ascendancy to the<br />
radical Jihadist outfits<br />
movement for right to self-determination.<br />
He was a secular and a pure nonviolent<br />
but Indian state did not like<br />
him…..’<br />
The three excruciating incidents,<br />
the imprisonment of Yousuf Shah, by<br />
Mughals, and his subsequent death<br />
in exile, the frequent internment of<br />
Sheikh Abdullah by government of<br />
India, and to a large extent the death<br />
sentence of Maqbool Bhat (Founder<br />
member of JKLF) and his burial in<br />
Delhi’s Tihar Jail, serves as a ready<br />
reference to collective memory of<br />
Kashmiris.<br />
— The writer is a research student<br />
with Delhi University’s school of social<br />
work studying protest movements and<br />
collective action<br />
Endnotes<br />
1 Sumantra Bose,2003, Kashmir: Roots of<br />
Conflict, Paths to Peace<br />
2 Lamb, 1991<br />
2 Ideas inspired by Soviet model.<br />
3 Refer to- United States, Department of State,<br />
Foreign Relations of the United States 1950,<br />
Volume V. The Near East, South Asia and<br />
Africa, Washington, D.C, 1978, pp.1433-35.<br />
4 It declared Jammu & Kashmir as an integral<br />
part of the Union of India and extended for<br />
the first time, the jurisdiction of Indian<br />
Supreme Court to Jammu & Kashmir.<br />
5 Awaz-I-Haq, (Urdu), Collection of speeches,<br />
SM Abdullah, Plebiscite Front, Peoples Press,<br />
Jammu, 1958 p25.<br />
3 Al Fatah Angle India Today, Feb,29,1984<br />
· The Abbreviation HAJY indeed has a very<br />
significant symbolic connotation.<br />
4 Jagmohan, Kashmir Today, Present, Past,<br />
Future 392,Seminar<br />
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Trapped by bruises of<br />
history, the yearning for<br />
peace and desire to come<br />
out of the vicious cycle of<br />
violence has been getting<br />
stronger throughout<br />
Kashmir. It is time the<br />
leadership grabs the<br />
opportunity and ushers<br />
Kashmir into a new era,<br />
writes Sajid Iqbal<br />
Kashmir... Does any other<br />
word conjure up such<br />
extreme emotions? It conveys<br />
beauty, vulnerability, culture and turmoil.<br />
Turmoil supersedes the other<br />
three in peoples' conscience: the<br />
"Kashmir issue" is what everyone<br />
must talk about. It is what everyone<br />
must have an opinion on. But, having<br />
been born in Kashmir, I see the irony<br />
in talking about the "issue", and the<br />
"solution", which is often what no<br />
one has the time or the inclination to<br />
contemplate. Deliberating the issue,<br />
one has the tendency to lose perspective.<br />
It is time to clear the air on<br />
Kashmir. I endeavour to do just that.<br />
Justo Pastor Benitez had<br />
observed, "Peace is preferable to a place<br />
in history." Yet politicians of both<br />
Kashmir’s chance<br />
for peace<br />
India and Pakistan have the unique<br />
opportunity of having both when it<br />
comes to Kashmir. So where is the<br />
political will? There could be many<br />
answers to that. Playing safe could be<br />
one. To politicians on either side of<br />
the border, or even the Line of<br />
Control, status quo is always preferable<br />
to change: they are then dealing<br />
with something they know.<br />
People theorise so much about<br />
the origins of the dispute, its dimensions<br />
and nuances, that they either<br />
don't look for a solution, or they simply<br />
can't. They don't have the foresight.<br />
Also, so many people have so<br />
much at stake that to even think of an<br />
end to this tension is unthinkable.<br />
Vested interests, in terms of, power,<br />
money, influence, all hangs in the<br />
balance. In this regard, India,<br />
Pakistan and the Kashmir issue can<br />
be compared to the United States, the<br />
Soviet Union and the Cold War, right<br />
up to the fall of the Iron Curtain.<br />
Both justified excessive expenditure<br />
on national security, regular hikes in<br />
successive defence budgets, and<br />
both fed a burgeoning defence<br />
industry. The political establishments<br />
of both countries needed to<br />
hang on to the dispute. This holds<br />
true, not only for the mainstream<br />
political leaders of India and<br />
Pakistan, but also for leaders of both<br />
Kashmirs, whether mainstream, separatist<br />
or militant. To them, the<br />
“issue” is a political lifeline.<br />
But should they choose to act, one<br />
wonders what would be the best<br />
time to do so. I say the opportunity<br />
has never been better. General<br />
J.J.Singh, the Chief of Army Staff,<br />
recently said that cross-border infiltration<br />
in the state of Jammu &<br />
Kashmir has reduced drastically in<br />
the past year. This cannot simply be<br />
attributed to the onset of winter in<br />
the Kashmir valley, when infiltration<br />
levels have traditionally been low. It<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
is now a year-round phenomenon.<br />
The atmosphere is relaxed, with no<br />
major incident of violence reported<br />
from Kashmir in the past several<br />
months. Confidence Building<br />
Measures (CBMs) initiated by the<br />
two countries have been wellreceived<br />
by all, especially the common<br />
man in Kashmir. The two<br />
Kashmirs are now connected by the<br />
Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service,<br />
for the first time since independence.<br />
To me, this marked the turning point<br />
towards peace in Kashmir. There are<br />
talks of opening up that same road<br />
for trade between the two sides. Even<br />
the worst doomsday prophet would<br />
have to admit that there prevails a<br />
sense of peace and normalcy in<br />
Kashmir. General Singh, in a recent<br />
interview with a leading national<br />
daily, said, "We (the Army) can consider<br />
relocating troops if the State<br />
Government tells us so. We did withdraw<br />
from Punjab and Mizoram<br />
after the violence levels came down."<br />
Of late, leaders at both the national<br />
and regional levels have reflected<br />
this positive mindset. While the<br />
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), a<br />
regional party part of the present<br />
coalition government in Jammu &<br />
Kashmir, has put forth "self-rule" as a<br />
possible beginning to a lasting resolution<br />
of the Kashmir issue, the<br />
This laudable effort<br />
show that people<br />
are thinking of<br />
conflict-resolution<br />
in the subcontinent.<br />
The<br />
solution to the<br />
Kashmir conflict<br />
can only be a<br />
political one<br />
National Conference, the principle<br />
Opposition, has repeatedly demanded<br />
"autonomy" for the state. While<br />
both these ideas have their merits,<br />
what these parties haven't done is<br />
give details of what exactly they propose.<br />
While autonomy may be construed<br />
as a reversion to the pre-1953<br />
position in Kashmir, wherein the<br />
state had its own President, Prime<br />
Minister, Legislature and Supreme<br />
Court, the concept of self-rule<br />
remains vague on specifics.<br />
This laudable effort show that<br />
people are thinking of conflict-resolution<br />
in the sub-continent. The solution<br />
to the Kashmir conflict can only<br />
be a political one. If history has<br />
taught us anything, it is that there is<br />
no military solution to the issue.<br />
Three wars and a proxy war that has<br />
lasted 18 years should be proof<br />
enough for even the most battlehardened<br />
military man that peace is<br />
the only option. In this background,<br />
let us now move on to discussing<br />
specific solutions to the Kashmir<br />
issue, put forth from various quarters<br />
over the past 60 years.<br />
The plebiscite<br />
One has to start with the<br />
plebiscite. The United Nations<br />
Security Council in its various resolutions<br />
on Kashmir sanctioned this<br />
plebiscite in the late 1940s, after<br />
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru<br />
had taken the Kashmir issue to the<br />
United Nations. This plebiscite, if<br />
held, calls on the Kashmiri people to<br />
vote whether they want to stay with<br />
India or Pakistan. It may be noted<br />
that independence is not an option in<br />
this plebiscite. However, India has<br />
historically been opposed to such a<br />
plebiscite being held in Kashmir. So<br />
that is not an option.<br />
The Dixon plan<br />
Then one can talk about the<br />
Dixon plan. It was proposed by Sir<br />
Owen Dixon, a Judge of the<br />
Australian High Court who came to<br />
the subcontinent as the United<br />
Nations' Representative for India<br />
and Pakistan pursuant to the<br />
Security Council's Resolution of<br />
March 14, 1950. It assigned Ladakh to<br />
India, the Northern Areas and<br />
Three wars and a<br />
proxy war that has<br />
lasted 18 years<br />
should be proof<br />
enough for even the<br />
most battlehardened<br />
military<br />
man that peace is<br />
the only option<br />
Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK)<br />
to Pakistan, split Jammu between the<br />
two, and envisaged a plebiscite in the<br />
Kashmir Valley. India, though initially<br />
warm to the idea, later rejected it.<br />
Besides, it would entail mass exodus<br />
from various parts of the state into<br />
both countries, which would almost<br />
certainly result in a situation similar<br />
to the one that arose during the partition<br />
of India in 1947, with heavy<br />
bloodshed, anarchy and mayhem.<br />
These are the two most talked about<br />
options.<br />
An undivided Kashmir<br />
Then there is alignment of undivided<br />
Kashmir with either India or<br />
Pakistan. The opinion in Kashmir<br />
concerning this option is so fractured<br />
that it is untenable. It would result in<br />
the same eastern-western massmigration<br />
and the same problems<br />
thereafter. The non-Muslims in the<br />
state would almost certainly prefer<br />
staying in India, with the Muslims<br />
being split between the two. But religion<br />
is not the sole yardstick for<br />
understanding whose allegiances lie<br />
where. There is culture to take into<br />
account, along with language, class,<br />
region and all the usual factors. That<br />
makes the political situation in the<br />
state uniquely complex. Besides,<br />
alignment of the state with one<br />
nation would not be acceptable to the<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
other, as both have territorial claims<br />
on Kashmir. The support for independence<br />
within the state is similarly<br />
fractured along religious, cultural,<br />
linguistic, class and regional lines,<br />
besides being unacceptable to the<br />
nation-states of India and Pakistan.<br />
Even in separatist and militant circles<br />
there is no consensus on whether to<br />
align with Pakistan or go independent.<br />
This is aptly demonstrated by<br />
the fact that while Syed Ali Shah<br />
Geelani's hard-line Tehreek-e-<br />
Hurriyat is a pro-Pakistan outfit, the<br />
All Parties Hurriyat Conference<br />
(APHC) is in favour of Kashmiri selfgovernance.<br />
The same applies to militant<br />
groups. There is just no consensus.<br />
What there is consensus on is easing<br />
the strife of the people of undivided<br />
Kashmir. Taking that as the gospel, I<br />
would like to discuss the four-point<br />
solution to the Kashmir issue proposed<br />
by Pakistan President General<br />
Pervez Musharraf late last year.<br />
The four-point solution<br />
It envisions soft or porous borders<br />
in Kashmir with freedom of<br />
movement for the Kashmiris, exceptional<br />
autonomy or "self-governance"<br />
within each region of Kashmir,<br />
phased demilitarisation of all regions<br />
and finally, a "joint supervisory<br />
mechanism," with representatives<br />
from India, Pakistan and all parts of<br />
Kashmir, to oversee the plan's implementation.<br />
At the time of the proposal,<br />
in December last year, there was<br />
no pressure on Musharraf to suggest<br />
it, save moral pressure. But now, his<br />
very survival as President is under<br />
threat, what with the Iftikhar<br />
Chaudhry fiasco, the Lal Masjid<br />
blunder and the controversial deportation<br />
of Nawaz Sharif. He urgently<br />
needs to redeem himself in the eyes<br />
of the public, and what better way<br />
than to deliver on Kashmir. India<br />
needs to seize the opportunity and<br />
engage him over his proposal. This is<br />
one solution that is to everyone's<br />
advantage. With extremists baying<br />
for his head, he may not last much<br />
longer.<br />
The second part of the solution<br />
envisages exceptional self-governance<br />
within Kashmir. The Indian<br />
Constitution, under Article 370<br />
already grants exceptional status to<br />
the state of Jammu & Kashmir. So<br />
what possible problem can there be<br />
in taking that status a step further?<br />
This is especially true in light of the<br />
fact that originally, under the<br />
Instrument of Accession governing<br />
the accession of the state to India,<br />
Kashmir had its own Prime Minister,<br />
President and Supreme Court. POK<br />
continues to have them till this day.<br />
Jammu & Kashmir is<br />
the only state in the<br />
Indian Union that has<br />
its own Constitution:<br />
under Article 370, the<br />
President of India, on<br />
the aid and advice of<br />
the Council of<br />
Ministers of the Union,<br />
has blanket powers to<br />
apply, or to revoke the<br />
application of, any law<br />
to the state, upon<br />
consultation with the<br />
Constituent Assembly<br />
of the state<br />
Jammu & Kashmir is the only state in<br />
the Indian Union that has its own<br />
Constitution: under Article 370, the<br />
President of India, on the aid and<br />
advice of the Council of Ministers of<br />
the Union, has blanket powers to<br />
apply, or to revoke the application of,<br />
any law to the state, upon consultation<br />
with the Constituent Assembly<br />
of the state. There is thus no legal<br />
obstacle to the proposed self-governance.<br />
The third constituent of the proposal<br />
is demilitarisation. This is a<br />
demand that is echoed by every<br />
quarter of political thought in the<br />
state, whether mainstream, seperatist<br />
or militant. The PDP has been<br />
demanding it. The Pakistan-based<br />
militant alliance called the United<br />
Jihad Council (UJC) has been<br />
demanding it. Both factions of the<br />
Hurriyat have been demanding it.<br />
Pakistan has been demanding it too.<br />
So let us try and understand what<br />
demilitarisation actually means. It is<br />
the demand to remove troops from<br />
civilian areas of the state. What possible<br />
problem can there be when the<br />
army chief himself favours it? Syed<br />
Salahuddin, the chairman of the UJC,<br />
in an interview to the Urdu-language<br />
Current News Service (CNS) in<br />
November last year, said that,” We<br />
(the militants) are ready to announce<br />
a truce even today, but for that, India<br />
will have to accept our three conditions,"<br />
the conditions being, “All prisoners<br />
should be released unconditionally,<br />
strength of troops (should)<br />
be cut down to the pre-1989 position,<br />
and human rights violations (should)<br />
be stopped." Demilitarisation is thus<br />
a pre-condition for everyone. This is<br />
understandable since troop presence<br />
only provokes violence, as it is they<br />
who are targeted by extremists, not<br />
civilians. Civilians are only caught in<br />
the cross-fire: the Indian Army has<br />
often been accused of gross violation<br />
of human rights in Kashmir, especially<br />
by Human Rights Watch and<br />
Amnesty International. The situation<br />
worsens because of the blanket<br />
immunity available to security forces<br />
under special laws such as the<br />
Disturbed Areas Act, the Public<br />
Safety Act and the Armed Forces<br />
(Jammu & Kashmir) Special Powers<br />
Act (AFSPA), where they can arrest<br />
and detain at will and on the flimsiest<br />
of grounds. A classic example of<br />
this blatant disregard for civil liberties<br />
is section 4 (c) of the AFSPA<br />
which empowers the armed forces to<br />
"arrest, without warrant, any person<br />
who has committed a cognizable<br />
offence or against whom a reasonable<br />
suspicion exists that he has committed<br />
or is about to commit a cognizable<br />
offence and may use such<br />
force as may be necessary to effect<br />
the arrest". Were the Indian government<br />
to demilitarise civilian areas in<br />
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Kashmir, human rights violations<br />
would automatically nosedive,<br />
bringing relief to an oppressed populace.<br />
Demilitarisation would therefore<br />
be advantageous to everyone,<br />
especially when infiltration is at its<br />
lowest ebb ever.<br />
Finally, there is the joint supervisory<br />
mechanism. This should be<br />
acceptable to both India and<br />
Pakistan, as it would enable them to<br />
exert some form of influence in<br />
Kashmir affairs. At the same time, it<br />
would jointly enable them to oversee<br />
the plan's implementation in its true<br />
spirit, and to keep a check on excesses<br />
made by each other. Only the<br />
details need to be ironed out.<br />
Such a solution would involve no<br />
redrawing of boundaries, no human<br />
rights violations and no secession. It<br />
would facilitate free movement of<br />
Kashmiris to every part of the state<br />
and would also address the Kashmiri<br />
concerns of self-governance and<br />
demilitarisation. It would also enable<br />
the two countries to take forward<br />
other aspects of their bilateral relations,<br />
once they have successfully<br />
removed the thorn of Kashmir from<br />
their common flesh. In short, except<br />
for a few fanatics, it would be acceptable<br />
to everyone.<br />
I believe that the only<br />
workable solution to<br />
the problem is making<br />
the border in the state<br />
irrelevant. After all, is<br />
a border anything but<br />
an imaginary line<br />
between two countries<br />
President Musharraf has said that<br />
history offered only "fleeting<br />
moments" to resolve complex issues<br />
like Kashmir, and the prevailing<br />
international atmosphere, as well as<br />
improved relations between the two<br />
countries, offered the "ideal opportunity"<br />
for him and Prime Minister<br />
Manmohan Singh to resolve it. It is<br />
time for some out-of-the-box thinking<br />
on Kashmir. The clock, as they<br />
say, is ticking...<br />
The Indian response<br />
The Indian establishment has<br />
been making the right kind of noises.<br />
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has<br />
said he welcomes the "new ideas and<br />
thoughts expressed from Pakistan";<br />
they can help "resolve all pending<br />
issues" which must be approached<br />
"with an open and friendly mind."<br />
But the time for such ambiguities is<br />
passé. Both countries need to sit<br />
down and hammer out the particulars<br />
of this option.<br />
I believe that the only workable<br />
solution to the problem is making the<br />
border in the state irrelevant. After<br />
all, is a border anything but an imaginary<br />
line between two countries? If<br />
undivided Kashmir is one state, what<br />
possible harm can come out of letting<br />
its people treat it that way? Imagine<br />
the relief it will bring to people who<br />
have been divided by sixty years of<br />
hatred. Imagine the kind of positive<br />
political impact that the leaders of<br />
India and Pakistan can make on the<br />
hearts and minds of the Kashmiri<br />
people, who will be free to move all<br />
over the state.<br />
— The writer is a law student at<br />
Symbiosis, Pune<br />
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International <strong>Law</strong> and Kashmir<br />
Looking through the prism of international law, Sheikh Showkat Husain traces the<br />
development of the right to self-determination to human rights issue, arguing that<br />
it is for the UN to make India and Pakistan act<br />
Relevance of UN Resolutions on<br />
Kashmir has been subject of<br />
debate for a long time.<br />
Previously it was Indian State that<br />
disputed their applicability. Recent<br />
postures of Pakistani president have<br />
created doubts about commitment of<br />
Pakistan to these. Some Kashmiri<br />
leaders by endorsing General<br />
Musharaff policies have also depicted<br />
their non-seriousness with regard<br />
to United Nations role regarding<br />
Kashmir. This has been done despite<br />
the fact that the UN resolutions are<br />
the only internationally valid instruments,<br />
which provide basis for<br />
recognition of J&K as a disputed territory<br />
under International law.<br />
Role of United Nations<br />
India after securing a deed of<br />
accession from Maharaja Hari Singh<br />
This transformed<br />
Kashmir dispute into a<br />
multilateral problem<br />
involving people of<br />
Kashmir, United<br />
Nations, Pakistan and<br />
India. United Nations<br />
Resolutions also<br />
provided for ceasefire<br />
and withdrawal of<br />
troops<br />
of Kashmir proceeded to United<br />
Nations Security Council alleging<br />
Pakistan of intervention. United<br />
Nations Security Council while<br />
admitting Indian complaint refused<br />
to acknowledge Kashmir as its legitimate<br />
part. It recognised people of<br />
Kashmir as the principal party to this<br />
dispute who should be given a<br />
chance to decide their future through<br />
exercise of the Right of self-determination.<br />
This right was proposed to be<br />
exercised under United Nations<br />
supervision thus making it a legitimate<br />
guarantor of self-determination.<br />
This transformed Kashmir dispute<br />
into a multilateral problem<br />
involving people of Kashmir, United<br />
Nations, Pakistan and India. United<br />
Nations Resolutions also provided<br />
for ceasefire and withdrawal of<br />
troops. For this purpose a military<br />
observers group was deputed to<br />
supervise adherence to the ceasefire.<br />
Although United Nations was<br />
approached under chapter VI of the<br />
UN Charter yet the decision taken by<br />
it reflected that its resolutions were<br />
not exclusively based on this chapter.<br />
While adopting the resolutions it<br />
relied upon chapter I that states the<br />
purpose of the United Nations “To<br />
develop friendly relations among<br />
nations based on respect for the principle<br />
of equal rights and self determination<br />
of peoples (Article 1(2))”.<br />
United Nations Security Council also<br />
kept in view Article 55 of chapter IX<br />
that imposes an obligation upon<br />
member states to pursue for peaceful<br />
and friendly relations among nations<br />
based on respect for principle of<br />
equal rights and self-determination<br />
of peoples. The interim measures<br />
which included ceasefire and deputation<br />
of United Nations Military<br />
Observers Group is based upon<br />
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Article 40 of chapter VII of United<br />
Nations, a view which International<br />
authorities on UN Peacekeeping<br />
Higgins & Roselyn confirm. The fact<br />
that there does not exist any provision<br />
for deputing of United Nations<br />
peacekeeping mission under chapter<br />
VI makes it obvious that the dispute<br />
over J&K although referred to United<br />
Nations under this chapter didn’t get<br />
deliberated exclusively under chapter<br />
VI. The resolutions apart from<br />
Chapter VI are based upon other portions<br />
of the UN Charter including<br />
chapter VII.<br />
Elections<br />
After a short span of cooperating<br />
with the UN, India conducted elections,<br />
facilitating entry of 72 out of 75<br />
members to the Constituent<br />
Assembly of the state unopposed.<br />
These ‘elections’ were portrayed substitutes<br />
for the exercise of right of<br />
self-determination. United Nations<br />
through several resolutions rejected<br />
this contention and made it clear that<br />
creation of Constituent Assembly in<br />
Indian administered part of Kashmir<br />
or conducting of elections will not be<br />
deemed to be exercise of right of selfdetermination<br />
in accordance with<br />
United Nations Resolutions. UN<br />
Security Council declared that “the<br />
convening of a Constituent Assembly as<br />
recommended by the General Council of<br />
the “All Jammu & Kashmir National<br />
Conference” and any action that<br />
Assembly may have taken or might<br />
After Shimla<br />
agreement India<br />
proceeded to United<br />
Nations and asked it<br />
to withdraw its<br />
observer’s mission<br />
from the state. United<br />
Nations refused to<br />
accept the Indian plea<br />
attempt to take to determine the future<br />
shape and affiliation of the entire state or<br />
any part thereof, or action by the parties<br />
concerned in support of any such action<br />
by the Assembly, would not constitute a<br />
disposition of the state in accordance<br />
with the above principle” (UN Security<br />
Council Resolution 24 January 1957).”<br />
Another significant development<br />
was Shimla Agreement (1972) signed<br />
by India and Pakistan wherein the<br />
parties agreed to resolve all the disputes<br />
between them including that of<br />
Kashmir mutually. After this agreement<br />
India proceeded to United<br />
Nations and asked it to withdraw its<br />
observer’s mission from the state.<br />
United Nations refused to accept the<br />
Indian plea. Although United<br />
Nations Charter (Article 52, para 1)<br />
allowed regional arrangements for<br />
dealing with matters relating to<br />
maintenance of international peace<br />
and security these measures however,<br />
have to be consistent with the purposes<br />
and principles of United<br />
Nations Charter. In case there is a<br />
conflict between regional arrangements<br />
and obligations of States<br />
under United Nations Charter, their<br />
duties under United Nations Charter<br />
will prevail. In this case Indian interpretation<br />
of the Shimla Agreement<br />
amounted to denial of the objectives of<br />
United Nations as laid down in Article<br />
1(2) i.e. fostering friendly relations<br />
between nations based on respect for<br />
right of self-determination.<br />
The right of self-determination<br />
The development on the normative<br />
front were more significant and<br />
in favour of right of self-determination.<br />
The right found place within<br />
The Covenant on Civil and Political<br />
Rights (1966) and The Covenant on<br />
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights<br />
(1966). It was enumerated as a<br />
human right in their very first<br />
Articles. Besides these instruments<br />
importance of this right was asserted<br />
in various resolutions of the UN<br />
General Assembly. Among these the<br />
most important ones are 1514 of 14<br />
December 1960, titled as<br />
“Declaration on Granting of<br />
Independence to Colonial Countries<br />
and Peoples” Resolution 2625 of 24th<br />
October 1970 relating to “PRINCI-<br />
Besides these<br />
instruments<br />
importance of this<br />
right was asserted in<br />
various resolutions of<br />
the UN General<br />
Assembly. Among<br />
these the most<br />
important ones are<br />
1514 of 14 December<br />
1960, titled as<br />
“Declaration on<br />
Granting of<br />
Independence to<br />
Colonial Countries and<br />
Peoples”<br />
PLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW<br />
CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELA-<br />
TIONS AND COOPERATION<br />
AMONG STATES”. In both these resolutions<br />
the right of self-determination<br />
was identified with people of<br />
colonised territories, whereas there<br />
was no such mention within The<br />
Covenant on Civil and Political<br />
Rights and The Covenant on<br />
Economic Social and Cultural Rights.<br />
For a long time there was a debate<br />
throughout the world relating to<br />
applicability of this right. The third<br />
world countries were vocal for this<br />
right for the colonies and non-self<br />
governing territories in traditional<br />
sense of the term. They were not<br />
ready to concede it to groups that<br />
wanted to secede from the existing<br />
states. The third world countries<br />
were not ready for fragmentation of<br />
any state on the basis of use of right<br />
of self-determination because people<br />
to them only meant the people of<br />
colonies and non self governing territories.<br />
This reservation has become<br />
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Prof. Gros Espiell<br />
special rapporteur of<br />
the United Nations<br />
Sub-commission on<br />
Minorities have made<br />
it clear that the right of<br />
self-determination has<br />
achieved the status of<br />
jus-cogens i.e. preemptory<br />
norm of<br />
general international<br />
law<br />
obsolete after recognition of this<br />
right for all peoples within the<br />
Covenants. After the end of cold war<br />
applicability of right of self-determination<br />
has been practically extended<br />
to so many areas and territories of<br />
the world, which were not colonies in<br />
traditional sense of the term.<br />
Examples of such territories are<br />
Central Asian Republics, Ukraine,<br />
Baltic States, Czech and Slovakian<br />
Republics, Croatia, Macedonia,<br />
Bosnia, East Timor, Eritrea, Quebec<br />
province of Canada and<br />
Montenegro. People of these areas<br />
were allowed to exercise right of selfdetermination<br />
and given choice of<br />
separation from existing sovereign<br />
states.<br />
India while ratifying The<br />
Covenant on Civil and Political<br />
Rights and Covenant on Economic<br />
Social and Cultural Rights made a<br />
reservation with respect to right of<br />
self-determination. Such a reservation<br />
is of little importance now in<br />
view of the fact that several authorities<br />
including Prof. Gros Espiell special<br />
rapporteur of the United Nations<br />
Sub-commission on Minorities have<br />
made it clear that the right of selfdetermination<br />
has achieved the status<br />
of jus-cogens i.e. pre-emptory<br />
norm of general international law. It<br />
must be remembered that treaties<br />
and reservation to norms of juscogens<br />
are not allowed under international<br />
law.<br />
Self-determination<br />
It is obvious from the preceding<br />
discussion that right of self-determination<br />
is strongly rooted in international<br />
law. Its recognition as human<br />
right does not allow any one to deviate<br />
from this right or use it on behalf<br />
of the people who are entitled to it.<br />
Human rights are inalienable. The<br />
statements to the contrary on the part<br />
of remote controlled politicians do<br />
not carry any weight. These statements<br />
reflect their interests. Any<br />
solution reached after compromising<br />
right of self-determination is destined<br />
to face the same fate, as was<br />
that of Shimla Agreement. Failure of<br />
Kashmiris to secure the right of selfdetermination<br />
is the result of incapability<br />
of those who plead it for them. From<br />
New York to Srinagar role of representation<br />
of Kashmiris has been<br />
assumed by those who are bereft of<br />
any understanding of International<br />
<strong>Law</strong> and commitment to Kashmir<br />
cause. They are unfamiliar with any<br />
appreciation of legal and political<br />
dimensions of the Kashmir problem<br />
and unfit for any serious discourse<br />
and deliberation. Pakistan too has<br />
kept the issue hostage to American<br />
strategic interests.<br />
Problem of minorities has not<br />
been an impediment to exercise of<br />
this right anywhere in the world.<br />
Twenty-two percent dissenters to<br />
independence of East Timor were<br />
made to go along with the majority.<br />
In case of Montenegro, the decision<br />
was taken in favor of secession with<br />
55 percent votes in favor and 44 percent<br />
against. In case of Quebec,<br />
province of Canada, decision for status<br />
quo was taken with a margin of<br />
just one percent votes. Forty-nine<br />
percent voters favored secession<br />
whereas 51 percent supported continuation<br />
of status quo. In Kashmir<br />
the problem can be addressed by<br />
granting minority dominated areas<br />
Kashmir is a human<br />
rights issue. Selfdetermination<br />
is an<br />
inalienable human<br />
right. It can’t be made<br />
hostage to anything<br />
like strategic interests<br />
of regional powers...<br />
right of secession from the entity to<br />
which majority decides to join<br />
through a UN sponsored plebiscite.<br />
Absence of third option is an issue<br />
which relates to modus-operandi<br />
rather than the principle. Once there<br />
is an agreement on the principle even<br />
third option can be accommodated.<br />
Kashmir can be addressed as a<br />
problem concerning real estate<br />
between India and Pakistan or an<br />
issue relating to human rights of a<br />
people. The real estate approach does<br />
admit the propositions of joint management<br />
and self-governance.<br />
Human rights approach to the problem<br />
doesn’t provide an avenue for<br />
such a dispensation. Kashmir is a<br />
human rights issue. Self-determination<br />
is an inalienable human right. It<br />
can’t be made hostage to anything<br />
like strategic interests of regional<br />
powers, integration of Central Asia<br />
with South Asia or American apprehensions<br />
relating to nature of an<br />
emerging entity after exercise of<br />
right of self-determination. The<br />
Kashmir problem has to be<br />
addressed for the sake of Kashmiris<br />
and nothing else. The most important<br />
reason for failure of peace process<br />
is that it is for resolution of<br />
Kashmir for the sake of everything<br />
other than restoration of inalienable<br />
right to self-determination for the<br />
people of Kashmir.<br />
—The writer is a lecturer of law at<br />
University of Kashmir<br />
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A religious rage<br />
or more<br />
The self-determination<br />
movement in Kashmir has<br />
been mobilised along<br />
religious identities. Yet,<br />
religion is just another<br />
aspect of a movement<br />
that is mainly sociopolitical,<br />
writes<br />
Khalid Wasim Hassan<br />
The right to self-determination<br />
is commonly used to justify<br />
the aspirations of an ethnic<br />
group that self-identifies as a nation<br />
towards forming an independent<br />
sovereign state. It is not only territorial<br />
and political aspects but also the<br />
religious and cultural identity of people<br />
that influence the nature of these<br />
movements. Self-determination<br />
movements, which led to national<br />
freedom to erstwhile colonies in Asia<br />
and Africa, now carry connotations<br />
of being regressive and antiquated,<br />
especially if people are mobilised on<br />
the basis of religion.<br />
Similar to many self-determination<br />
movements’ processes, religion<br />
became an important political tool to<br />
advocate and sensitise Kashmiris<br />
about the idea of self-determination<br />
in Kashmir. The Kashmiri self-determination<br />
1 movement, whose roots go<br />
back to the uprising against the<br />
Dogra regime in the 1930s and after<br />
1947 against India’s control saw the<br />
assertion of Muslim identity but the<br />
movement at large, is a political<br />
movement of people to determine their<br />
own political future. The various religio-political<br />
organisations with distinct<br />
and opposing ideologies have<br />
mobilised the card of ‘Kashmiri<br />
Muslim Identity’ at different stages<br />
of the movement.<br />
The roles of Islam and the assertion<br />
of Kashmiri Muslim identity in<br />
the political movement of Kashmir<br />
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have been overemphasised. No<br />
doubt religious symbols played an<br />
important role in the mobilisation<br />
but there has been a presence of a<br />
secular moderate voice in the selfdetermination<br />
movement. It becomes<br />
important to engage with the discourse<br />
of religious identity vis-à-vis<br />
self-determination movement in<br />
Kashmir in the current political scenario<br />
at regional and international<br />
level levels when all political movements<br />
where religious identity<br />
becomes a source of mobilisation, are<br />
seen as terrorist movements.<br />
Pre-1947 period<br />
The process of formation and<br />
assertion of political identity vis-àvis<br />
the question of religion has been a<br />
complex one in Kashmir. The initial<br />
stage of evolution of political consciousness<br />
has been defined by the<br />
assertion of the Muslim identity as a<br />
consequence of socio-economic situation<br />
in which the community was<br />
placed during the Dogra rule 2 . The<br />
objective situation in which Kashmiri<br />
Muslims were placed, in comparison<br />
to the dominant classes which were<br />
mainly Hindus from Kashmir as well<br />
as Jammu led Kashmiris to perceive<br />
their deprivation in terms of their<br />
religious identity. Sufi (1949) notes<br />
that the Dogra regime was totally<br />
unsympathetic towards the aspirations<br />
of the people and in its attitude<br />
towards the valley, it was as foreign<br />
to it as the British were to India. It<br />
was not only economic and political<br />
conditions but also, the nature of the<br />
state vis-à-vis Muslims subjects that<br />
led to demand of rights on religious<br />
terms (Rai, 2004). The political movement<br />
of Kashmiri Muslims against<br />
Dogra regime was looked at as communal<br />
by some sections of the Pandit<br />
community. While the process of<br />
politicisation of the community of<br />
Muslims of Kashmir was a result of<br />
the consciousness of their situation of<br />
deprivation and utter powerlessness,<br />
the politicisation of Hindus was a<br />
step towards maintenance of their<br />
position of dominance.<br />
The articulation of political<br />
demands in specific Muslim context<br />
laid the basis for the political movement<br />
of Kashmir but it could not<br />
define the politics of Kashmir for a<br />
long time. There was an attempt for<br />
the secularisation of the political<br />
identity. It was in this context that the<br />
Muslim Conference was changed<br />
into National Conference whose<br />
membership was open to all irrespective<br />
of caste, creed or religion 3 .<br />
Punjabi (1995) argues that there was<br />
a resistance against this conversion<br />
of Muslim Conference into National<br />
Conference, mainly by leadership<br />
from Jammu and Mirwaiz Yusuf<br />
The objective situation<br />
in which Kashmiri<br />
Muslims were placed,<br />
in comparison to the<br />
dominant classes<br />
which were mainly<br />
Hindus from Kashmir<br />
as well as Jammu led<br />
Kashmiris to perceive<br />
their deprivation in<br />
terms of their religious<br />
identity<br />
Shah from Srinagar, which later led<br />
to revival of the Muslim Conference.<br />
Though there was an ideological difference<br />
between the two parties, but<br />
either of them could not do away<br />
with the idea of ‘Kashmiri Muslim<br />
identity’ and its leaders used<br />
mosques and shrines as their popular<br />
bases.<br />
Although the various attempts of<br />
secularisation of its organisation, the<br />
National Conference could not<br />
attract large number of Hindu masses<br />
either from the valley or from<br />
other parts of the state. It came under<br />
criticism from Praja Parishad (vanguard<br />
of Jan Sangh in J&K) for<br />
regional and religious bias on one<br />
side and from other side by Muslim<br />
Conference for its closeness to Indian<br />
National Congress 4 and its negligence<br />
for the cause of Kashmiri<br />
Muslims. This pre-1947 period<br />
becomes important reference point<br />
for the ongoing self-determination<br />
period because religion and politics<br />
became inextricably intertwined in<br />
defining and expressing the protest<br />
of Kashmiri Muslims against their<br />
rulers, which happens to continue<br />
even now.<br />
Competing nationalism(s)<br />
The post 1947 period saw the politics<br />
around Kashmir conflict as of<br />
competing nationalist visions and<br />
religious identity of Kashmiris once<br />
again came to fore front. Varshney<br />
(1999) recognises that Kashmir problem<br />
at its core is the result of three<br />
forces: religious nationalism represented<br />
by Pakistan, secular nationalism<br />
epitomised by India and ethnic<br />
nationalism embodied in what<br />
Kashmiris call Kashmiryat. The inclusion<br />
of Kashmir into Indian Union<br />
was considered necessary not only<br />
for fighting an older and larger battle<br />
of secular nationalism vis-à-vis<br />
Pakistan’s two nation theory but for<br />
confronting its old ideological adversary<br />
at home – that is Hindu nationalism.<br />
Pakistan, which was formed<br />
on the notion of a ‘nation for<br />
Muslims of sub-continent’, also<br />
claimed for this Muslim majority<br />
state 5 . Rai (2004) argues that both<br />
narratives of nationalism stress on<br />
the Muslim nature of Kashmir and<br />
Kashmiris.<br />
Apart from the broad narratives<br />
of Indian and Pakistani nationalisms<br />
based on secularism and religion<br />
respectively, there was a third narrative,<br />
which defined Kashmiri nationalism<br />
as distinct from the former two.<br />
Kashmiryat as an ideological tool<br />
was used to define ‘Kashmiri nationalism’<br />
first by National Conference<br />
and latter by its offshoot Plebiscite<br />
Front 6 which was in favour of right to<br />
self-determination. The same idea<br />
was carried by the pro-independence<br />
groups like JKLF as an ideological<br />
tool for secular credentials of the selfdetermination<br />
movement in latter<br />
years. The historiography of Kashmir<br />
was explained by Kashmiri<br />
Nationalists not as periods of Hindu<br />
to Muslim to Sikh rulers but from an<br />
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age of Kashmiri rulers to non-<br />
Kashmiris, which include Dogra<br />
rule, as well as Indian State. There<br />
were some religio-political groups<br />
like Awami Action Committee led by<br />
Mirwaiz and Jamat-e-Islami which was<br />
active in rural Kashmir gave more<br />
emphasis to the Muslim character of<br />
Kashmiri nationalism and Pakistani<br />
version of religious nationalism<br />
(Chowdhary 1998). The meaning and<br />
structures associated with Indian<br />
nationalism have become unimportant<br />
in terms of relating itself to the<br />
daily experiences of the Kashmiri<br />
Muslim population.<br />
Reassertion of Muslim identity<br />
The process of reassertion of the<br />
Muslim identity in Kashmir is closely<br />
linked to the politics of separatism<br />
arising mainly out of widely prevailing<br />
deep-rooted discontent against<br />
existing political arrangements. The<br />
period of four decades after 1947 saw<br />
the state sponsored violations of<br />
democratic rights of citizens on the<br />
one hand while on the other there<br />
was an attempt to bring permanent<br />
union of Kashmir with India. There<br />
The Kashmiri selfdetermination<br />
movement became<br />
more vocal in post-<br />
1989 period as it took<br />
the form of armed<br />
insurgency. The<br />
slogans in favour of<br />
Azadi (freedom) in the<br />
rallies organised by<br />
the various political<br />
groups were backed by<br />
some other slogans<br />
with ‘Islamic’<br />
connotations<br />
The migration of<br />
Kashmiri Pandits to<br />
Jammu and other<br />
cities in India made<br />
the self-determination<br />
movement appear<br />
sectarian and<br />
fundamentalist<br />
was interference from the Centre to<br />
the extent that installation of puppet<br />
regimes and election rigging became<br />
a common phenomenon (Manor,<br />
2001; Bose, 2003). The arrest of<br />
Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 followed by<br />
‘Congressisation’ of National Conference<br />
and dilution of Article-370 by<br />
which Indian Constitution recognised<br />
Kashmir's 'special status' 7<br />
resulted in a gradual erosion of mass<br />
base of Kashmir’s politics.<br />
The Kashmiri self-determination<br />
movement became more vocal in<br />
post-1989 period as it took the form<br />
of armed insurgency. The slogans in<br />
favour of Azadi (freedom) in the rallies<br />
organised by the various political<br />
groups were backed by some other<br />
slogans with ‘Islamic’ connotations.<br />
Mosques became the readymade<br />
community centre to organise, agitate,<br />
protest and mobilise. According<br />
to Puri (1990b) and Bose (1997),<br />
mosques and shrines were used, as<br />
there were no democratic spaces for<br />
dissent and protest available.<br />
Besides assertion of ‘Muslim<br />
identity’, the movement came up<br />
with two different ideologies -- one<br />
adhering self-determination movement<br />
as purely secular and political<br />
movement and the second as struggle<br />
of Muslims to safeguard their<br />
religious interests. The ideological<br />
polarisation between the two strands<br />
divided the militant ranks with different<br />
goals of ‘complete independence’<br />
and accession to Pakistan<br />
respectively (Punjabi, 2000). The secular<br />
nationalist strand of the movement<br />
was spearheaded by several<br />
organisations and parties, the foremost<br />
being JKLF which demanded<br />
that the state of Jammu & Kashmir as<br />
it existed prior to 1947 be united as<br />
‘one fully independent and truly<br />
democratic state’ (Malik, 1994; Khan,<br />
1995). On the other hand there were<br />
Islamist groups that gave more<br />
emphasis on the Muslim identity of<br />
Kashmiris in this self-determination<br />
movement. The Islamists lacked<br />
popular support in the valley due to<br />
their strict adherence to Islamic ideology,<br />
which came in conflict with<br />
local traditions. The nationalist<br />
groups who based the self-determination<br />
movement on ethno-cultural<br />
basis could not do away with the<br />
‘Kashmiri Muslim Identity’ while the<br />
strict adherence to Islamic ideology<br />
of Islamist groups was put under<br />
check by local traditions, belief system<br />
and customs.<br />
The migration of Kashmiri<br />
Pandits to Jammu and other cities in<br />
India made the self-determination<br />
movement appear sectarian and fundamentalist.<br />
Teng (1995) and Swami<br />
(2007) view self-determination<br />
movement in Kashmir not as a political<br />
movement but a Jihad for separate<br />
homeland in India which has led<br />
to extermination of Hindu population.<br />
The pro-independence militant<br />
groups claim that attacks on Pandits<br />
were not because of their religious<br />
identity but their positions in the<br />
state agencies. The number of<br />
Muslims killed by militants due to<br />
their anti-movement stand exceeds<br />
than the number of Pandits killed 8 .<br />
The division of “us” and “them” was<br />
more of political reasons than due to<br />
religious ones.<br />
The involvement of Pakistan in<br />
the self-determination movement of<br />
Kashmir has made many scholars to<br />
view it merely as religious movement,<br />
taking its roots to two-Nation<br />
theory. Apart from being involved in<br />
the Kashmir issue right from 1947,<br />
Pakistan is accused of being responsible<br />
of providing military support<br />
and training to Kashmiri militants 9 .<br />
Wirsing’s work (1994) argues that<br />
Pakistan was only interested in those<br />
‘Muslim separatists’ who wanted to<br />
merge Kashmir with Pakistan, and<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
denied all assistance to the pro-independence<br />
militant groups. According<br />
to Noorani (2000) and Bose (2003) the<br />
enormous and unexpected popular<br />
support for pro-independence<br />
groups with Kashmiri secular identity<br />
alarmed Pakistan as much as<br />
India. Shouting pro-Pakistani slogans<br />
and denouncing India do not<br />
necessarily imply a will to integrate<br />
with Pakistan or an Islamic resurgence<br />
among the Muslim population<br />
a stereotypical image of Kashmiri<br />
Muslims.<br />
In brief the political reality can be<br />
perceived with reference to the multiple<br />
political responses available in<br />
Kashmir and of these responses, the<br />
religious dimension is merely one.<br />
There has been sufficient assertion of<br />
the Muslim political identity and the<br />
relative erosion of the secular political<br />
ethos, yet it is difficult to argue<br />
that fundamentalism has completely<br />
overtaken the politics of ‘Kashmiri<br />
Nationalism’. The discourse of post<br />
1989 self-determination movement<br />
saw the growth of religio-political<br />
groups who perceived the political<br />
reality of Kashmir in terms of the<br />
Muslim Identity of its people and<br />
were critical about Kashmiri nationalist<br />
discourse. The basic issues for<br />
the people still remain the right of<br />
self-determination to decide their<br />
political future. The demand of<br />
rights in the language of religion and<br />
articulation of protest through religious<br />
symbols has made this movement<br />
to appear purely as a religious<br />
movement.<br />
—The writer is a research scholar<br />
with the Institute for Social and<br />
Economic Change, Bangalore<br />
References:<br />
Behera, Navnita Chadha (2000), State<br />
Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and<br />
Ladakh, New Delhi, Manohar.<br />
Bose, Sumantra (1997), The Challenge in<br />
Kashmir Democracy, Self-Determination<br />
and a Just Peace, New Delhi, Sage<br />
Publications.<br />
Bose, Sumantra (2003), Kashmir: Roots of<br />
Conflict, Paths to Peace, New Delhi,<br />
Vistaar Publications.<br />
Chandra, Prakash (1985), ‘The National<br />
Question in Kashmir’, Social Scientist,<br />
vol.13, no. 6.<br />
Hassnain, F.M (1988), Freedom Struggle<br />
in Kashmir, New Delhi, Rana<br />
Publishers.<br />
Kannabiran, K.G (1991), ‘Abuses of<br />
Article 370’ in Ashghar Ali Engineer<br />
(ed.), Secular crown on Fire: The Kashmir<br />
Problem, Delhi, Ajanta Publications.<br />
Khan, Ammanullah (1995), ‘Kashmir<br />
Tangle -The only Way Out’, Frontier<br />
Post, December 6.<br />
Lamb, Alastair (1991), Kashmir a<br />
Disputed Legacy: 1840 to 1990, Karachi,<br />
Oxford University Press.<br />
Malik, Yasin (1994), Our Real Crime,<br />
Srinagar, JKLF.<br />
Noorani, A.G (2000), ‘Contours of<br />
Militancy’, Frontline, vol-17, issue 20,<br />
September 30-October 13.<br />
Puri, Balraj (1990), ‘The Challenge of<br />
Kashmir’, Economic and Political Weekly,<br />
January 27.<br />
Puri, Balraj (1990b), ‘KASHMIR<br />
Defending National-Cultural Identity’,<br />
Economic and Political Weekly, March 3.<br />
Rai, Mridu (2004), Hindu Rulers, Muslim<br />
Subjects-Islam, Rights and The History of<br />
Kashmir, New Delhi, Permanent Black.<br />
Sikand, Yoginder (2002), ‘Changing<br />
Course of Kashmiri struggle: From<br />
National liberation to Islamist Jihad?’,<br />
Economic and Political Weekly, January<br />
20.<br />
Sufi, G.M.D (1949), Kashmir: Being a<br />
History of Kashmir (From Earliest Times to<br />
Our Own), Vol.II, Lahore, University of<br />
Punjab.<br />
Swami, Parveen (2007), INDIA PAK-<br />
ISTAN and the SECRET JIHAD The<br />
covert war in Kashmir, 1947-2004,<br />
London, Routledge.<br />
Teng, M.K (1995), ‘Violation of Human<br />
Rights – Whose?’ in Verinder Grover<br />
(ed), The story of Kashmir: Yesterday and<br />
Today, New Delhi, Deep and Deep<br />
Publications.<br />
Tremblay, Reeta Chowdhari (1996-97),<br />
Nation, Identity and the Intervening<br />
Role of the State: A study of Secessionist<br />
Movement in Kashmir, Pacific Affairs,<br />
vol. 69, no.3.<br />
Varshney, Ashutosh (1991), “INDIA,<br />
PAKISTAN, AND KASHMIR<br />
Antinomies of Nationalism” ASIAN<br />
SURVEY, vol. XXXI, no. 11<br />
Wirsing, Robert G (1994), India, Pakistan<br />
and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional<br />
Conflict and Its Resolution, New York: St.<br />
Martin’s Press.<br />
Endnotes<br />
1 The term Self-determination is used here<br />
instead of Separatist or Secessionist because<br />
it is Self-determination (Haq-e-Khud-<br />
Idariyat in Kashmiri language) that is being<br />
used in Kashmir by various political groups<br />
and large sections of people. People who are<br />
entitled to self-determination can be debated.<br />
2 The State of Jammu & Kashmir came under<br />
the Dogra rule when British transferred it by<br />
the Treaty of Amritsar of March 16, 1846 to<br />
Gulab Singh by what amounted to be a sale<br />
deed for the sum of Rs 75,00,000<br />
3 The first political party, All Jammu & Kashmir<br />
Muslim Conference was established in 1932.<br />
The prominent leaders of this party were<br />
Shiekh Abdullah from Kashmir Valley and<br />
Chowdhary Ghulam Abass from Jammu.<br />
The same was renamed as National<br />
Conference. However, Gulam Abass split the<br />
party and named his faction as Muslim<br />
Conference. This came to play a significant<br />
role in Kashmir politics during 1940s.<br />
4 Indian national Congress as well as Muslim<br />
League attempted to influence the political<br />
movement in Kashmir with their respective<br />
ideologies.<br />
5 This claim of Pakistan on the basis of religion<br />
became weak after the creation of<br />
Bangladesh. Even though the Bengalis of<br />
East Pakistan decided to go with Pakistan<br />
because of a common religion – Islam, the<br />
assertion of a separate Bengali identity started<br />
taking shape with the launching of an agitation<br />
for adoption of Bengali as a national<br />
language<br />
6 Plebiscite Front was formed in 1955 by Mirza<br />
Afzal Beg after the dismissal of Shiekh<br />
Abdullah. It was main political group that<br />
was critical about finality of Accession and<br />
made demand for Plebiscite. It was banned<br />
in 1971 under unlawful Activities<br />
(Prevention) Act. The Indra-Shiekh Accord<br />
of 1973 in which Shiekh Abdullah accepted<br />
complete accession of Kashmir to India and<br />
dropped the idea of Self-determination<br />
annoyed its leaders.<br />
7 In accordance with Article 370 as a condition<br />
for Instrument of Accession, the Indian<br />
Parliament could legislate only on three subjects<br />
– defence, foreign affairs and communication,<br />
while all residuary powers were vested<br />
with Jammu & Kashmiri. Now the meaning<br />
of Article 370 remains that people from<br />
outside J&K cannot own immovable property.<br />
However, Article 370 is being challenged<br />
by right wing parties.<br />
8 ‘209Kashmiri Pandits killed since 1989, say<br />
JK cops in First report’-www.Indianexpress.<br />
com/story/3v547.html<br />
9 The US State Departments report (1994) on<br />
global terrorism validates India’s claims that<br />
there was official Pakistani support to<br />
Kashmiri militants. Some support came from<br />
private organisations such as Jamat-i-Islami.<br />
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Press trussed<br />
by draconian laws<br />
The Press in J&K has seen<br />
many instances of<br />
suppression, both by the<br />
state government and those<br />
opposed to the state. But<br />
The Fourth Estate has<br />
valiantly fought<br />
back for the sake of<br />
people’s rights, writes<br />
Professor SM Afzal Qadri<br />
Press all over the world is considered<br />
as the mirror of the<br />
society. History acknowledges<br />
the contribution of the press in the<br />
success of almost all the major struggles<br />
and movements of the world. It<br />
is the primary responsibility of each<br />
member of the press to be unbiased,<br />
impartial, and report every event<br />
objectively. Any lapse on the part of<br />
the press may lead to chaos and confusion<br />
in the society. That is why a<br />
common man trusts and expects that<br />
whatever media projects will be correct<br />
and true. Once they sensationalise<br />
the issue and are biased in their<br />
reporting, their integrity becomes<br />
doubtful. That is why the need arises<br />
to control the press by enacting laws.<br />
But these laws were never meant<br />
to undermine the use of the press in<br />
any manner and the objective of the<br />
laws was never to use the press for<br />
political gains. Its utmost aim was to<br />
apprise the people of the society<br />
about the ongoing events in a particular<br />
society. Which would otherwise<br />
mean that one of its objectives definitely<br />
was to apprise the people<br />
about the ongoing peoples movements<br />
as well. Unfortunately the<br />
press is not allowed to highlight the<br />
events relating to such movements,<br />
because of pressures from government.<br />
As a legitimate way to curb<br />
any such reporting the legislature<br />
has passed many Acts in order to not<br />
allow the press to report the truth<br />
more particularly in the conflict<br />
regions like J&K.<br />
The constitution of India has<br />
given due importance to freedom of<br />
the press. It is one of the fundamental<br />
rights, but this right is not unbridled<br />
and is subject to certain controls.<br />
An honest journalist has to face<br />
a number of odds in performing his<br />
daily duties, which can go to the<br />
extent of losing lives. Role of the<br />
press becomes more difficult when<br />
the journalists have to work in a conflict<br />
situation. The Kashmir valley is<br />
facing a conflict since last many years<br />
and the last 20 years have seen the<br />
worst kinds of human rights violations.<br />
There have been civilian<br />
killings at the hands of security<br />
forces, local police and governmentsponsored<br />
gunmen. Rapes, murders,<br />
custodial violence, disappearance<br />
has become the norm of the day and<br />
all these things need to be reported in<br />
the press in order to highlight the<br />
plight of a Kashimiri who has been<br />
fighting for their rights for decades.<br />
In such a situation it becomes an<br />
imperative for the local and national<br />
media to report all such cases of<br />
human rights violations. In such situations<br />
if a person is honest in his<br />
reporting and news analysis it is a<br />
big achievement. Some times while<br />
in the process of appeasing both warring<br />
factions, truth is undermined.<br />
In order to curb the voice of a suffering<br />
Kashmiri and to restrict news,<br />
the State of J&K has enacted a number<br />
of laws to regulate the working of<br />
press. The anti-Press <strong>Law</strong>s in the<br />
being many, some of them are<br />
referred to as under<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Another threat faced<br />
by press fraternity is<br />
their abduction by<br />
unknown persons. The<br />
recent abduction of a<br />
veteran journalist<br />
Shujat Bukhari is an<br />
example<br />
(a) Rule 34 of the J&K Public<br />
Security Rules, 1946 binds the newsmen<br />
to disclose the sources of their<br />
information and prescribes three<br />
years imprisonment with fine as a<br />
punishment for not doing so. Rule 35<br />
provides five years imprisonment for<br />
contravention of order to public<br />
newspapers after pre-censorship.<br />
Rule 36 prescribes three years imprisonment<br />
for contravening an order<br />
"prohibiting performance of any<br />
drama containing any prejudicial<br />
report". Rule 65 (b) prescribes three<br />
years imprisonment for contravention<br />
of an order requiring shopkeepers<br />
to keep open the shops for conduct<br />
of essential business and not to<br />
observe hartal.<br />
Section 10 of the Press &<br />
Publication Act, 1932 empowers<br />
the government to seize printing<br />
presses used for printing newspapers<br />
containing "any words, signs<br />
or visible representation" which<br />
(a) incite commission of any cognizable<br />
offence, (b) directly or<br />
indirectly expresses, approves, or<br />
admires any such offence and (c)<br />
to bring into hatred or contempt<br />
the government established by<br />
law to excite disaffection towards<br />
the government or make malicious<br />
attacks on the government<br />
or any of its ministers or misinterprets<br />
the policies and activities of<br />
the government."<br />
Section 153 (a) of the Ranbir Penal<br />
Code prescribes seven years<br />
imprisonment for promoting<br />
hatred between different sections<br />
of the people on ground of religion,<br />
region, place of birth, etc<br />
<br />
<br />
besides doing acts prejudicial to<br />
maintenance of harmony.<br />
Sections 190 (a), 296 (a) and 505 of<br />
the code dealing with "statements<br />
conducive to cause fear or public<br />
alarm" and carrying imprisonment<br />
up to three years also take<br />
care of writings aimed at fomenting<br />
communalism.<br />
Section 8 of the Public Safety Act,<br />
1978 provides detention without<br />
trial of persons including journalists<br />
for "acting in any manner<br />
prejudicial to security of state or<br />
maintenance of public order and<br />
maintenance of services and supplies<br />
essential to the community".<br />
The security of the state embodies<br />
most of the genuine fields of a<br />
reporter.<br />
Section 25 & 25 A of the J&K<br />
Customs Act, 1958 empowers the<br />
government to detain any packet,<br />
newspaper, books if it contains<br />
any material which is punishable<br />
under section 121-130, 153 A, 295<br />
of Ranbir Penal Code".<br />
Although the purpose of these<br />
laws ought to have been to control<br />
and regulate the working of the press<br />
but often these laws are misused to<br />
gauge the press in order to stop the<br />
objective reporting of events. The<br />
state’s power to forfeit any printing<br />
press where any paper is published if<br />
that paper contains any material<br />
which incites any act of murder<br />
under or any act of violence Act 1908<br />
can be easily used against journalists.<br />
Similarly the power of a district magistrate<br />
to forfeit the press/newspaper<br />
is the easiest way to deal with the<br />
people who are reporting any kind of<br />
human rights activity, which directly<br />
or indirectly involves the state government<br />
or its functionary. The various<br />
sections of J&K Public Safety Act<br />
1978 can be used to restrict the freedom<br />
of press.<br />
The press in the state especially<br />
in the valley witnessed worse situation<br />
but they performed their duties<br />
boldly; they had to face and convince<br />
both parties without surrendering<br />
there basic norm of objectivety. There<br />
have been times when certain sections<br />
of the press were biased in<br />
favour of militants but the instances<br />
are negligible. There are cases when<br />
newspaper offices were raided, ransacked,<br />
equipments damage, and<br />
pressmen being humiliated and<br />
assaulted while performing their<br />
professional duties. In a recent incident<br />
on 29th of June 2008, security<br />
forces in Srinagar dealing with an<br />
incident of lathicharge beat up two<br />
photojournalists. Gunmen killed a<br />
prominent journalist in his office in<br />
early nineties and culprits are still at<br />
large. The killing of veteran photojournalist<br />
Mushtaq Ali in a parcel<br />
bomb blast is a mystery till date.<br />
Nobody could do any thing except<br />
naming residential colonies of pressmen<br />
after his name. Veteran valley<br />
based journalists like Yousuf Jameel,<br />
Zaffer Mehraj, NDTV cameraman<br />
Zafer Iqbal had a close shave with<br />
death. Parwaiz Sultan became the<br />
victim of bullets of unknown gunmen.<br />
Another threat faced by press fraternity<br />
is their abduction by<br />
unknown persons. The recent abduction<br />
of a veteran journalist Shujat<br />
Bukhari is an example. His abduction<br />
was followed by another abduction<br />
of a correspondent of a local daily.<br />
Those who resort to these tactics<br />
want that press should not report<br />
objectively but they should toe the<br />
line, which suits the parties, whose<br />
news they are supposed to carry.<br />
If we analyse the role of press in<br />
the state especially, the valley we will<br />
find that they have to walk on razor’s<br />
edge. Journalists were killed during<br />
periods of turmoil but no one was<br />
punished by the state for any such<br />
killing. The recent decision of the<br />
state to stop telecasting some<br />
Pakistani channels in the valley is<br />
another example of restricting freedom<br />
of expression in the state of<br />
J&K.<br />
Whether amid such stringent<br />
press laws in J&K the scribes are in a<br />
position to write boldly and objectively<br />
or not can well be imagined.<br />
Yet, the members of this press community<br />
have contributed a lot to the<br />
ongoing movement and have shown<br />
the ultimate professionalism often at<br />
the cost of their lives.<br />
— The writer is a Professor of <strong>Law</strong><br />
at University of Kashmir<br />
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VALLEY OF FEAR<br />
Disabled at the<br />
mercy of fate<br />
Jammu and Kashmir like other conflict zones in the world has a significant number of<br />
disabled individuals. But the state response as well as the larger civil society remains<br />
indifferent, writes Sajid Iqbal<br />
"Democracy is a government of the<br />
people, by the people, for the people."<br />
stated Abraham Lincoln.<br />
"Democracy means simply the bludgeoning<br />
of the people, by the people, for<br />
the people." observed by Oscar Wilde<br />
One the ideal, the other, the<br />
heartbreaking reality...<br />
Compounding the already<br />
abysmal human rights situation in<br />
the state of Jammu and Kashmir is<br />
the gross neglect of persons with disabilities<br />
by society in general and the<br />
state in particular. The existing<br />
approach seems to be to wish away<br />
all forms of disability from fashionable<br />
Kashmiri society. The armed<br />
conflict in the state has led to an<br />
alarming increase in the numbers of<br />
the disabled. There are 302,670 persons<br />
with disabilities, constituting<br />
about three percent of the total population<br />
of the state, as per the Census<br />
of 2001. Unofficial estimates overtake<br />
that figure, as it only takes into<br />
account persons that are registered<br />
as differently-abled. Prior to the year<br />
2001, no census was ever conducted<br />
specific to persons with disabilities,<br />
and even this was done on the directions<br />
of the Supreme Court of India.<br />
Consequently, there are no figures<br />
available that definitively state the<br />
extent of disabilities in the State<br />
before the outbreak of insurgency.<br />
It is common knowledge, however,<br />
that disability in all its forms was<br />
relatively unknown in Kashmir until<br />
the beginning of the turmoil.<br />
Kashmiris were, by and large, a<br />
healthy, able and vibrant people.<br />
Besides, it is telling that the kinds of<br />
disabilities found in Kashmir and<br />
other militancy-affected areas today<br />
are unique to conflict zones around<br />
the world, be it physical or psychological<br />
disabilities. For instance,<br />
limbs lost because of landmine<br />
explosions are typical of any conflict<br />
zone. The same is, unfortunately, an<br />
all too familiar sight on the streets of<br />
Kashmir. Similarly, cases of trauma<br />
consequent to incidents of violence<br />
are found in abundance, though, at<br />
first glance, they may not be easily<br />
discernible. Partial and total paralysis,<br />
resulting from both shrapnel<br />
wounds and bullet injuries, has<br />
reached epidemic proportions.<br />
The Disabilities Act<br />
That the state has turned a blind<br />
eye to the needs of the differentlyabled<br />
would be only partially true.<br />
Token noises have, without doubt,<br />
been made, in that a law, namely, the<br />
Jammu and Kashmir Persons with<br />
Disability in figures<br />
Total population of J&K = 10143700<br />
No of Disabled in Kashmir Region = 5476970<br />
No of Disabled in Jammu Region = 4430191<br />
Ladakh Region = 4430191<br />
Disabled Population = 302670<br />
Disabled Male = 171816<br />
Disabled Females = 130854<br />
Rural Males Disabled = 229718<br />
Urban Males Disabled = 42373<br />
Rural Disabled Females = 100275<br />
Urban disabled Females = 30579<br />
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Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,<br />
Protection of Rights and Full<br />
Participation) Act, 1998 (hereinafter<br />
referred to as the Disabilities Act) has<br />
been enacted. But like so many other<br />
legislations, there exists a wide gap<br />
between its enactment and implementation.<br />
Only 57,474 persons get<br />
pension from the state government,<br />
under sundry schemes such as the<br />
Integrated Social Security Scheme<br />
(ISSS), run by the Jammu and<br />
Kashmir Social Welfare Department,<br />
and the pension scheme run by the<br />
Jammu and Kashmir Council for the<br />
Rehabilitation of Militancy Victims,<br />
both formulated under the<br />
Disabilities Act. Even that pension<br />
varies between a paltry Rs 300-500 a<br />
month.<br />
Another damning indictment of<br />
the political machinery of the state is<br />
that it neither has required educational<br />
facilities for the differentlyabled<br />
people, nor has the mainstream<br />
educational network been<br />
enabled for people with special<br />
needs. Livelihood issues of such persons<br />
have also been swept under the<br />
carpet. The Act also provides for<br />
three percent reservation in employment<br />
for the physically challenged,<br />
which is in proportion to their numbers.<br />
Notwithstanding this, according<br />
to the Census of India, 2001, more<br />
than 80 percent of the adult workforce<br />
among differently-abled persons<br />
cannot find work.<br />
Even such persons as are<br />
employed or such children as who go<br />
to school from among persons with<br />
disabilities, do so only ostensibly, or<br />
for namesake. A barrier-filled environment<br />
ensures that such persons<br />
stay at home. Even when they venture<br />
out, they do so at the cost of<br />
their dignity. The result? Persons<br />
with disabilities are forced to waste<br />
away, doing little or nothing, and<br />
putting an often unwelcome financial<br />
burden on their families. This<br />
compounds problems of psychological<br />
trauma and depression among<br />
these persons, the extent of which we<br />
can only speculate about. An entire<br />
block of the population is thus rendered<br />
useless and severely traumatised.<br />
This story of indifference does not<br />
end here. Under Section 33 of the Act,<br />
The needs of this<br />
section of population<br />
should<br />
compassionately be<br />
assessed and the<br />
necessary investments<br />
made to ensure that<br />
those who can attend<br />
the common school<br />
and health systems<br />
are enabled to get<br />
urestricted access to<br />
such facilities and<br />
persons with special<br />
needs are catered to<br />
separately<br />
the state is responsible for taking<br />
measures to make transport facilities<br />
accessible to persons with disabilities,<br />
by taking steps such as adapting<br />
rail compartments, vessels and waiting<br />
rooms in such a way as to make<br />
them accessible to such persons.<br />
This, however, is most often<br />
observed in breach. The process cannot<br />
even be said to have been set in<br />
motion. Similarly, Section 15(a), read<br />
with Section 19(b) of the Disabilities<br />
Act, provides for the removal of<br />
architectural barriers from schools,<br />
colleges and other institutions<br />
imparting vocational and professional<br />
training. Not one such institution<br />
in the State adheres to this statutory<br />
prerequisite, the result being that differently-abled<br />
children have no<br />
option but to stay away from school.<br />
This is borne out by relevant statistics:<br />
even though Section 15(a) of the<br />
Disabilities Act provides for free education<br />
for children with disabilities<br />
up to the age of 18 years, yet more<br />
than a third of the 36,714 children<br />
with disabilities in the state are out of<br />
school. This particularly distressing<br />
revelation was made in a survey conducted<br />
by the Jammu and Kashmir<br />
Department of Education in 2003-<br />
2004.<br />
Interventions<br />
Short-term measures to tackle this<br />
would include the payment of a substantial<br />
amount as ex-gratia by the<br />
government in all cases of disabilities<br />
attributable to the armed conflict,<br />
along with the continuation and<br />
enhancement of schemes such as the<br />
ISSS where pensions are no more<br />
than a pittance. This would ensure<br />
that persons with disabilities are not<br />
embarrassed with meagre pay checques<br />
of Rs 300 a month, and would<br />
go a long way in bringing them<br />
much-needed succour.<br />
However, such measures cannot<br />
substitute concerted efforts on part of<br />
the state to make them stand on their<br />
own feet, as it were. Stricter implementation<br />
of the reservation policy<br />
for persons with disabilities needs to<br />
be ensured, so that deserving persons<br />
actually get jobs earmarked for<br />
them. The creation of a mechanism at<br />
the government level to earmark jobs<br />
for the differently-abled and vigorous<br />
follow-up to ensure that the staff<br />
selection agencies actually provide<br />
the said jobs to the differently-abled<br />
would go a long way in ameliorating<br />
their lot.<br />
In the longer-term, state policy as<br />
well as non-governmental organisations<br />
have to be influenced to do<br />
more by way of improving educational,<br />
health and livelihood opportunities<br />
for the differently-abled. The<br />
needs of this section of population<br />
should compassionately be assessed<br />
and the necessary investments made<br />
to ensure that those who can attend<br />
the common school and health systems<br />
are enabled to get urestricted<br />
access to such facilities and persons<br />
with special needs are catered to separately.<br />
The state and NGOs must also<br />
explore avenues of self-employment<br />
for such people as the state cannot be<br />
expected to shoulder the entire<br />
responsibility. Only then can the differently-abled<br />
be said to be equal citizens,<br />
and, from that moment on, our<br />
society shall be truly democratic.<br />
Nearer the ideal and farther from the<br />
heart-breaking reality…<br />
<br />
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Verses beat venom<br />
One of the victims of the political turmoil in Kashmir has been Kashmiri literature. While<br />
writers and writings have suffered severely, there remain quite a few sobering voices,<br />
rather verses, writes Neerja Mattoo<br />
“I am in blood stepped in so far that<br />
should I wade no more<br />
Returning were as tedious as go o’er”<br />
The hopelessness of Macbeth’s<br />
words is an apt summing up of<br />
the situation in which most<br />
Kashmiris in the valley found themselves<br />
in the recent past. Writers are<br />
supposed to be the voice of those<br />
who cannot speak for themselves<br />
and thus their work, no matter what<br />
flights of imagination prompt it, mirrors<br />
the dominant mood of the times.<br />
Our writers, however, were neither<br />
the protagonists in the ‘action’, nor<br />
were their voices of much consequence<br />
in the raging debate. What is<br />
known as the ‘ongoing struggle’, in<br />
the journalese of Kashmir, had no<br />
use for literature unless it could be<br />
used to reinforce a certain ideology.<br />
In this scenario, most valleybased<br />
writers preferred silence rather<br />
than made-to-order eloquence.<br />
Today, however, interestingly<br />
enough, the literary scene in<br />
Kashmiri presents a paradox also.<br />
There is fear of speaking, yet the<br />
desire to speak cannot be suppressed.<br />
The suffering and pain have<br />
left no one unaffected, making people<br />
much more articulate, eager to<br />
express themselves in prose and<br />
poetry, and what is more, get published.<br />
Those who sought refuge outside<br />
have also became so voluble that<br />
vast numbers of books are produced,<br />
mostly poetry.<br />
The first thing that strikes one<br />
when looking critically at the literature<br />
of the past two decades in<br />
Kashmiri, is the cleavage between the<br />
valley-based and the Jammu or elsewhere<br />
based writers, not only in their<br />
themes but even in the vocabulary<br />
and diction. For the former the dominant<br />
themes are death and destruction,<br />
suffering on a large scale, a dark<br />
cloud of uncertainty, while for the<br />
latter there are also the loss of<br />
‘Paradise’, which was home, nostalgia<br />
and anguish. A sense of helplessness<br />
broods over a landscape painted<br />
in red and black in most creative literary<br />
works these days. The circumstances<br />
in which the Kashmiris live<br />
have put their faith in humanity<br />
under severe test. One of the most<br />
powerful voices of modern Kashmir<br />
and the prestigious Gyanpith award<br />
winner Rehman Rahi also seems<br />
affected by the malaise as is evident<br />
in his 1995 poem, ‘Khodaya’.<br />
The poem adopts the interrogatory<br />
mode, as though in an atmosphere<br />
of fear all certainties are dead. It goes<br />
like this:<br />
It may not be possible to speak, what<br />
can one do?<br />
But the heart mightn’t bear the burden,<br />
what can one do?<br />
The rose cannot but bloom, can it?<br />
Carry the burning flame of love it<br />
must, what can one do?<br />
Its petals are torn to bits on the thorn,<br />
Head crowned with a turban of blood,<br />
what can one do?<br />
The tone of the poem is one of<br />
despair before a cruel destiny, which<br />
affects all humanity. What is noticeable<br />
is that the poet is not a subject,<br />
but an object, that is, things happen<br />
to him, he does not make them happen.<br />
This sense of powerlessness is a<br />
recurring theme.<br />
These lines from a Ghulam Nabi<br />
Nazir’s ghazal, is yet another example<br />
of this blood imagery.<br />
In couples we placed the stars, with<br />
drops of our blood<br />
And passed the night in phrasing a<br />
love-letter<br />
And adorned the dust with the red of<br />
poppies<br />
As mentioned earlier, thematically,<br />
however, most of them have withdrawn<br />
into a personal sorrow or narrow<br />
communal grooves. They seem<br />
to play a repetitive tune for a particular,<br />
limited audience. It is as though<br />
writers have carved out separate constituencies<br />
for themselves: the heroes<br />
of one group have become the villains<br />
for another. Sadly, the legacy of<br />
shared tradition, coupled with a freeflowing,<br />
uninhibited individual talent,<br />
is in tatters. It seems that a tight<br />
circle has been drawn around these<br />
groupings and most writers are content<br />
to operate within these, forgetting<br />
how restricting to their vision it<br />
is. The works of those who are producing<br />
what they term as ‘literature<br />
in exile’ are full of the theme of displacement<br />
and nostalgia for a lost<br />
home, idyllic in memory. There is<br />
anger, the pain of betrayal, but the<br />
love for the sights and sounds of the<br />
beloved land and its people as they<br />
are in their memory, a longing for a<br />
whole way of life, shines through the<br />
pain.<br />
Says Moti Lal Saqi in his poem,<br />
‘Myon Shahar’ (My Town):<br />
I remember that sweet old town!<br />
The simple and straight, hand-kissing<br />
town,<br />
I could die for it.<br />
The sons of darkness lit a pyre on its<br />
brow<br />
And swept its streets with blood,<br />
And now it twists the neck that once<br />
held the head so high…<br />
Would anyone dare leave a window<br />
open?…<br />
I would go home to my village<br />
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This city has stolen my rest…<br />
My head on a stone in the willowgrove,<br />
I’d sleep and sleep till end of day.<br />
The shade of chinar in these mine eyes<br />
I’d drain the spring and cool myself.<br />
A debilitating feature of present<br />
day Kashmiri poetry is that it is too<br />
burdened with the present. We find a<br />
tendency to almost luxuriate in grief,<br />
a cultivation of emotions of self-pity,<br />
leading to self-absorption, which<br />
saps the vigour of an artistic creation.<br />
Victim hood seems to be the theme of<br />
choice. The ideal of the Keatsian<br />
“Negative capability” through which<br />
the artist’s own self does not constantly<br />
intrude upon the scene is<br />
hardly in evidence. There is no separation<br />
between the one who suffers<br />
and the one who creates something<br />
out of that suffering. Apart from this<br />
tendency to de-universalise the text,<br />
it also leads to a growing cleavage<br />
between the concerns of the poets<br />
based in the valley and those who<br />
have left it. In their diction and<br />
choice of symbol and myth too, a<br />
turning away from each other has<br />
crept in. But there are a few who<br />
refuse to fall in this trap.<br />
Apart from the vaakhs of Bimla<br />
Raina, which, being mystical in content<br />
are far above sectarian concerns<br />
and addressed all humanity, the two<br />
poems quoted below from translation,<br />
are exceptional because though<br />
dealing with the here and now, they<br />
succeed admirably in rising above a<br />
limited constituency. One is the celebrated<br />
painter-poet Ghulam Rasool<br />
Santosh’s ‘Baala Aadan Myon Tohi<br />
Ma Dyunthvon’ (Did You Happen To<br />
See My Lost Childhood?) and the<br />
other is Naseem Shafai’s ‘ Ba, Na<br />
Thsai Na Aks’ (I -- Neither Shadow<br />
Nor Reflection). Santosh consciously<br />
weaves in the Islamic, Saivite and<br />
Sufi symbols and myths into the fabric<br />
of his poem to fashion a garment<br />
of Kashmir’s composite culture. It<br />
reverberates with resonances of a<br />
common heritage, the joy and richness<br />
of the past and the desolation of<br />
the present scene. Thus it beckons<br />
one to a shared human, universal<br />
concern:<br />
The Nagin and Parbat, my history manifest!<br />
Satisar and Nilnag, Eternal Truth!<br />
At Kashyap’s call was revealed the<br />
land.<br />
Even now the Veth flows naked, chanting<br />
his name.<br />
How often she hid underground, at<br />
sight of sin!<br />
Today our heads are buried, weighted<br />
by her curse.<br />
Fortified with faith, how Budshah<br />
sailed the lamps in her stream,<br />
And celebrated her birthday with vermilion<br />
dots.<br />
The world could see its face in it, so<br />
pure and limpid the mirror of my<br />
land!<br />
But what do I see now with eyes motheaten?<br />
Do I pluck out the stars and ask the<br />
It also leads to a<br />
growing cleavage<br />
between the concerns<br />
of the poets based in<br />
the valley and those<br />
who have left it. In<br />
their diction and<br />
choice of symbol and<br />
myth too, a turning<br />
away from each other<br />
has crept in<br />
question—<br />
Did you by chance see my lost childhood?<br />
With our tongue purified the Kalma we<br />
read—a fountain of knowledge!<br />
The many who came, their truths we<br />
fashioned in our way,<br />
Embraced the raging fire of faith,<br />
And drank their wisdom in one deep<br />
draught.<br />
Did you by chance see my lost childhood?<br />
In Naseem Shafai’s poems, we<br />
hear a woman’s voice, strong and<br />
bold, speaking for all womanhood<br />
and transcending, in its sweep, all<br />
sectarian boundaries. Hers is a feminist<br />
discourse, but neither shrill, nor<br />
strident. Her references are to<br />
women whose life and works make<br />
up the stuff of our collective consciousness<br />
and whose words ring in<br />
our collective memory. They suggest<br />
that gender sensitisation would<br />
enrich the whole of humanity.<br />
The first is titled, “The Wail”:<br />
Once upon a time there was a Queen.<br />
At the end of every day, she would wait,<br />
With the doors thrown open,<br />
For her little princes to come home.<br />
Little hesitant, a bit afraid,<br />
She’d ask her neighbours, women like<br />
her,<br />
“Are your children also out, still?<br />
My own have quite forgotten their<br />
home!<br />
God alone knows where they have<br />
strayed,<br />
The grains of rice grow cold in the<br />
plate!”<br />
(B)<br />
She is the one whom one day someone<br />
told something.<br />
And her doors and windows were suddenly<br />
shut.<br />
But in the dead of night, the ocean broke<br />
its bounds,<br />
And the neighbours heard a long,<br />
unending wail—<br />
“Do not die on me, you are so young!<br />
Do not die, your nails but barely<br />
henna-tipped!”<br />
The image of the ocean has traditionally<br />
been used in Kashmiri literature<br />
as a symbol for the material<br />
world, from which the mystics,<br />
whether Islamic or Saivite, have<br />
sought to be ferried away. But here<br />
the poet uses it as a symbol of the<br />
boundless world of suppression,<br />
repressed feelings and constricting<br />
restrains of propriety that women<br />
have always had to live with. Sooner<br />
or later the bounds must give way<br />
and a bereft mother’s wail heard.<br />
This is one way a woman writer,<br />
apart from articulating the grief of<br />
Kashmiri women who have lost their<br />
promising sons to the insurgency, is<br />
also recording a protest against the<br />
long silence imposed on women. The<br />
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image of the ‘henna-tipped nails’ is,<br />
however, a common motif in<br />
Kashmiri romantic poetry. Here<br />
Naseem is, consciously building<br />
upon a tradition to make a modern<br />
statement. The familiarity of the<br />
image, normally associated with celebrations,<br />
makes the situation even<br />
more poignant.<br />
The second poem is titled “I --<br />
Neither Shadow Nor Reflection”:<br />
Like always you came and stood at the<br />
door, saying nothing.<br />
Had I a fistful of words, I would deck<br />
your lips with them,<br />
And hear those flaming words that<br />
you always desire.<br />
Your face alone I could not read, but<br />
the heat of your glance I felt.<br />
Felt it in my blood that you’d come<br />
today, come for me alone<br />
In my mind I knew that now when<br />
you come<br />
It would be to listen to my breaths<br />
alone<br />
You would enter my ravaged breast<br />
like the breath of spring<br />
But you are still there, rooted to the<br />
spot<br />
And the thread of my words is<br />
snapped.<br />
You have no idea of the shapes you cast<br />
me in!<br />
I came like Lal and weeping I rose at<br />
the waning of the night<br />
And woke you up, O mad one, and<br />
you learnt to speak.<br />
I was Habba Khotun and called you<br />
my sky<br />
Called myself the earth and you a<br />
cover over all my secrets!<br />
Became your garden and asked you to<br />
come and taste its wealth.<br />
What rival of mine seduced you and<br />
drew you away from me?<br />
Tarry a while and remember---it was<br />
me that held you in my lap and<br />
sang:<br />
‘I would deck you up under the cherry<br />
trees!’<br />
I kept all the fasts, praying you’d stay<br />
a while<br />
Through the night read all the Koranic<br />
verses for love of you!<br />
Should you come as Krishna, assuming<br />
numerous guises,<br />
I will still be Meera, with you at each<br />
step you take.<br />
Should you pay heed to slander and<br />
ask me to prove myself,<br />
I will stand in the flames and still keep<br />
chanting,’Ram, Ram’!<br />
God commanded me, ‘Go, inhale the<br />
fragrance from that bottle,<br />
To you a Messiah will be born, though<br />
without the ceremonies of henna and<br />
the<br />
nuptial.<br />
As mother of Jesus, as Mary ,how my<br />
value rose!<br />
But the abrasions of calumny trailed<br />
my steps from day one<br />
Did you ever seek my consent? Ah, the<br />
faces you gave me<br />
Was any one of them actually mine?<br />
The subject is that of<br />
the displacement and<br />
consequent endless<br />
pain and suffering of a<br />
Kashmiri pandit family<br />
forced to live in a<br />
refugee camp in the<br />
hot plains of Jammu—<br />
an alien climate, but<br />
the story is given a<br />
universal dimension<br />
When I wept and shed tears, you<br />
said,’You have no forbearance’<br />
When I tried to speak, you stifled me<br />
with a kiss!<br />
No, I am not like you, nor the image of<br />
me in your dreams<br />
You are you—and I have my own<br />
being,<br />
Should you want to race, in me you’ll<br />
find a competitor<br />
I am a separate being ant that is what<br />
you have to know.<br />
Alone as Adam, forgotten you’d be<br />
As each angel bowed to you, exhausted<br />
he’d be<br />
Who would know of you if I hadn’t<br />
tempted you<br />
That apple tree in Eden—it was I who<br />
showed it and you saw.<br />
Come, go down in me and plumb my<br />
depth for a while<br />
And know that I am something beyond<br />
beauty of form and face.<br />
Come on, descend like Krishna from<br />
the skies and worship me<br />
Come on, as Rama come and let me<br />
put you through a trial by fire<br />
Lal saw me in Shiva’s embrace and<br />
told you of it—<br />
It was me, me alone but still you did<br />
not know!<br />
Should you again abandon a Habba in<br />
midway somewhere,<br />
What if she too turned away from you<br />
in disgust, would you put her to<br />
death?<br />
If knowledge dawns on you even<br />
today, then come,<br />
If you find your way. I’ll know you’ve<br />
really come<br />
Today for me alone, to stand by me,<br />
with me, a real Adam!<br />
Then I’ll know that now you know—I<br />
am me, neither shade nor reflection.<br />
The appeal of this poem is universal.<br />
Apart from the powerful<br />
theme, the variety of allusions<br />
throughout weaves a rich tapestry.<br />
This is the voice of a subject, not an<br />
object, so far only found in our mystical/spiritual<br />
poetic tradition. In secular<br />
literature it is an original note,<br />
hence most welcome.<br />
In the field of fiction we once<br />
again come across the tendency to<br />
brood over the present, which leaves<br />
most with only a limited time/space<br />
interest. But in some outstanding<br />
short stories like Rattan Lal Shant’s,<br />
Thsen (Disconnection) this limitation<br />
has been overcome. The subject is<br />
that of the displacement and consequent<br />
endless pain and suffering of a<br />
Kashmiri pandit family forced to live<br />
in a refugee camp in the hot plains of<br />
Jammu— an alien climate, but the<br />
story is given a universal dimension.<br />
The characterisation and concerns<br />
show a fine understanding of human<br />
nature. It could thus be the tragedy<br />
of anyone, anywhere, any time.<br />
Instead of indulging in self-pity, the<br />
author achieves a rare objectivity.<br />
— The writer is former principal<br />
and head of Women’s College, Srinagar<br />
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The forgotten voices<br />
The Kashmir conflict might have brought further fetters on an already constricted world<br />
for the Valley’s women. Yet, some of them not only put up a valiant fight to come through<br />
trying moments, they also have a story to tell, which is so different from those normally<br />
heard from men. Amrit Dhatt reviews Speaking Peace, a collection of narratives of women<br />
in Kashmir<br />
South Asia has played host to a<br />
great deal of violent conflict<br />
predicated on ethno-nationalist<br />
lines. While it has been written about<br />
extensively, women’s voices and<br />
experiences have never been at the<br />
forefront. Kashmir, the most well<br />
known conflict zone, is one of the<br />
longest running conflicts in the<br />
world and has an appallingly large<br />
record of human rights abuses.<br />
Women in the Valley have experienced<br />
war in ways that are distinct<br />
from men’s experiences. The adversity<br />
of women’s experiences needs to<br />
be recognised and understood in a<br />
comprehensive manner. The incidences<br />
of women headed households,<br />
rape and forced veiling highlight<br />
the ways in which women are<br />
structurally disadvantaged and face<br />
an oppression that is two-fold. Not<br />
only are they innocent civilians<br />
caught in the crossfire, they are also<br />
fighting for equality within a context<br />
that does not allow them that freedom.<br />
The oppression of women in<br />
Kashmir is not specific to one religious<br />
group, as war is accompanied<br />
by a culture of misogyny that is experienced<br />
by all groups.<br />
In Speaking Peace: Women’s<br />
Voices from Kashmir, Urvashi<br />
Butalia has compiled women’s<br />
diverse experiences from Kashmir<br />
and, as a result, has contributed significantly<br />
to the dialogue on<br />
Kashmir. Diverse narratives, authors,<br />
stories, perspectives and styles are<br />
used in this collection in an attempt<br />
to unveil the complexities of<br />
women’s experiences. The book is<br />
also a platform for the projection of<br />
women’s voices on the conflict; this is<br />
significant because the public dialogue<br />
on the conflict leaves very little<br />
space for women’s perspectives.<br />
Through this book, Butalia has transformed<br />
the conflict in Kashmir from<br />
a political problem to a human problem.<br />
The book gives the issue human<br />
Book : Speaking Peace:<br />
Women’s Voices<br />
Editor: Butalia, Urvashi)<br />
Publisher: Kali for Women<br />
New Delhi<br />
Price: Rs 300 (paperback)<br />
Page: 618<br />
ISBN: 81-86706-43-7.<br />
faces, emotions, and perceptions.<br />
Speaking Peace allows us to hear what<br />
alternative interpretations of war and<br />
peace sound like.<br />
Butalia, in her introduction, is<br />
clear about the aim of this book: “it<br />
aims to mark a moment in the history<br />
of the conflict, a moment when the<br />
presence of women, whether as victims,<br />
agents, or perpetrators can no<br />
longer be ignored, a moment which<br />
makes it clear that any initiative for<br />
peace and resolution of the conflict<br />
must take women into account and<br />
involve them centrally.” She spells<br />
out the ways in which the conflict has<br />
created a situation of tremendous<br />
trepidation and uncertainty in<br />
women’s lives. She also raises a very<br />
important question that is seldom<br />
heard: “Does the ‘return’ of peace<br />
then mean going back to the conditions<br />
that existed - the status quo -<br />
before conflict broke out, no matter<br />
how terrible those conditions might<br />
be?”<br />
Butalia’s question is significant<br />
and opens up space for more critique<br />
of this unchallenged idea of azadi,<br />
which is presumed to bring peace.<br />
For instance, what does ‘peace’ mean<br />
for women whose levels of violence<br />
have escalated in the home? Does<br />
freedom from violence extend to the<br />
private domain as well as the public?<br />
These are questions that Butalia does<br />
not claim to have answers to but she<br />
asks them in order to show that the<br />
negative repercussions of conflict are<br />
not confined to the public sphere.<br />
Moreover, if women are expected to<br />
fight for azadi or a new status quo,<br />
then these questions are imperative<br />
because it will be a futile fight if<br />
peace does not extend to all spheres<br />
of society. Issues that are presented in<br />
the book have been taken in order to<br />
extract themes and patterns, to produce<br />
a critical analysis on gender and<br />
conflict in Kashmir.<br />
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Violent past<br />
The first chapter is an excerpt<br />
from a book entitled, This Happened<br />
in Kashmir. In this narrative, Krishna<br />
Mehta recounts her struggles after<br />
1947, when she lost her husband and<br />
began fending for herself and her<br />
young family. The book was first<br />
published in 1954 and is a valuable<br />
document of the trials and tribulations<br />
that so many women had to<br />
endure around the time of partition.<br />
Mehta’s experiences are unique to<br />
her; being in a position of power and<br />
affluence before 1947 allowed her to<br />
bring her family to safety in Srinagar.<br />
Conversely, there are certain aspects<br />
of Mehta’s story that hold true for<br />
women all over South Asia during<br />
her time. Many Muslim and Sikh<br />
families tried to help the Mehtas<br />
when they were fleeing from persecution,<br />
however, when their own<br />
lives were put in danger, Mehta and<br />
her children were turned away.<br />
Many families recount tales of kindness<br />
from neighbors from religions<br />
that were being pitted against each<br />
other. There are numerous stories of<br />
Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus showing<br />
acts of kindness and compassion<br />
towards one another while outside<br />
their homes, marauders were massacring<br />
people of rival faith. Tales of<br />
bloodshed are commonplace when<br />
trying to make sense of what happened<br />
in 1947, and they are often<br />
used to teach society the lessons of a<br />
shameful history. The instances of<br />
compassion, however, can also be<br />
valuable history lessons for they<br />
demonstrate tolerance.<br />
Another theme that can be<br />
extracted from Mehta’s narrative is<br />
the idea that a woman’s honour is<br />
worth more than her life. Mehta<br />
describes how she reacts to reports of<br />
the raiders coming after her family:<br />
“I woke up Shiva Dayal and told<br />
him,’ if the raiders come, before anything<br />
happens to them, slay the girls<br />
one after the other with that sword<br />
hanging from the wall.’ The girls did<br />
not seem to be horrified at the<br />
prospect of being slain. The thought<br />
of the raiders worried them more.”<br />
Mehta’s experience of choosing death<br />
for both herself and her daughters<br />
102<br />
over sexual violation by warring religious<br />
groups is not unique. Many<br />
women were killed by their families<br />
when they were faced with the threat<br />
of rape. Mehta’s experience reinforces<br />
the fact that women’s bodies<br />
became targets of violence used to<br />
defeat “enemies”. Rape can be used<br />
as a weapon of war because the rape<br />
of a woman signfies humiliation of<br />
her entire community. A woman’s<br />
sexual purity is seen as a source of<br />
honour for the community, and violation<br />
of that so called purity occurs<br />
at the individual and collective levels<br />
when a woman is raped. This is institutionalised<br />
violence and what is so<br />
disturbing about these events is that<br />
they were justified because a<br />
woman’s honour, a community’s<br />
honour, and sexual purity are all<br />
inextricably linked. The mass rapes<br />
that occurred during partition cannot<br />
be separated from the socio-cultural<br />
factors that enabled them to occur in<br />
the first place. Mehta’s story produced<br />
haunting images and reflections<br />
on what was a gross negligence<br />
of human life.<br />
Shakti Bhan Khanna recalls her<br />
experiences of being forced to flee<br />
Srinagar in 1989 in “Leaving Home.”<br />
The images and voices she depicts<br />
are disturbingly similar to Mehta’s<br />
narrative from 1947. Khanna begins<br />
her narrative with, “We left Kashmir<br />
in 1989. It was a Saturday. An ordinary<br />
day.” Khanna also speaks about<br />
pleading with neighbors to hide her<br />
from impending attacks on her and<br />
her family: “They were Muslims, and<br />
they were very kind. They gave us<br />
shelter but they advised me to leave<br />
Srinagar immediately.” Mehta faced<br />
the same situation in 1947 and this<br />
demonstrates that the lessons of partition<br />
were never fully realised.<br />
Intolerance and religious communalism<br />
never completely subsided and<br />
they have violently resurfaced, following<br />
the same alarming patterns.<br />
Khanna also demonstrates that<br />
women’s honour is still highly<br />
Mehta’s experiences are unique to her; being in a<br />
position of power and affluence before 1947<br />
allowed her to bring her family to safety in<br />
Srinagar. Conversely, there are certain aspects of<br />
Mehta’s story that hold true for women all over<br />
South Asia during her time<br />
revered and women are expected to<br />
guard it, even if that involves suffering.<br />
Another chapter within the book<br />
that produces a poignant account of<br />
women’s experiences in Kashmir is<br />
“Women’s Testimonies from<br />
Kashmir.” This chapter is an extract<br />
taken from the Women’s Initiative’s<br />
report in 1994, an investigation conducted<br />
by a four-member, all women<br />
team. This report raises questions<br />
about the future of raped women,<br />
widows, and half widows and where<br />
they fit into the azadi movement. The<br />
plights of these women have not<br />
gained the support and sympathy of<br />
the leaders. Rather, the leadership<br />
feels that these problems will be<br />
automatically solved when azadi<br />
comes. The lack of support structures<br />
and even understanding on the part<br />
of the leaders forebodes that the<br />
future of these women looks bleak<br />
and it is unreasonable to think that<br />
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these issues will conveniently disappear<br />
when the nation is free. This<br />
ideology is reminiscent of nationalist<br />
rhetoric in the Quit India Movement.<br />
There was always the promise that<br />
women would be emancipated along<br />
with the nation and that promise was<br />
never fulfilled. Is the movement in<br />
Kashmir more egalitarian than separatist<br />
movements in the past? This is<br />
something that will be revealed once<br />
Kashmiris are given their long overdue<br />
right to self-determination.<br />
Dichotomies of war<br />
This piece also adds another<br />
dimension to the dialogue on women<br />
in Kashmir because it deconstructs<br />
the dichotomy of woman as the victim<br />
and man as the perpetrator. One<br />
reason why there is hostility towards<br />
women’s movements is because of<br />
the misconception that men are the<br />
enemy, pitted against women. In<br />
reality, women and men need to<br />
come together in order to fight<br />
repression because women are also<br />
perpetrators of violence. This piece<br />
does an excellent job of stressing this<br />
point by talking about the ideologies<br />
of a particular women’s group in<br />
Kashmir: “The Dukhtaran-E-Milat<br />
has lost ground today mainly<br />
because it attempted to impose the<br />
burqa on Kashmiri women. Their<br />
aggressive campaign to put college<br />
girls in burqas, completely covering<br />
the body and face, went to the extent<br />
of throwing coloured powder on<br />
girls who refused.” Violent conflict<br />
opens up space for negotiating traditional<br />
gender roles and identities.<br />
This means that where men are traditionally<br />
seen as violent and women<br />
as peacekeepers, wartime allows for<br />
a negotiation of such roles. For<br />
instance, there have been instances<br />
where women’s groups in Kashmir<br />
have been willing to pick up arms if<br />
they felt the need. It goes to show<br />
how violence permeates through all<br />
of society and it is not confined to the<br />
male sphere. There are instances<br />
where women as perpetrators of violence<br />
need to be analysed further and<br />
taken into account when there are<br />
discussions about the victimisation<br />
of women in Kashmir. Speaking Peace<br />
does a good job in bringing this issue<br />
to the fore.<br />
In, “A View from Kashmir,”<br />
Hameeda Bano discusses the intricacies<br />
of growing up as a woman<br />
amidst violent conflict. Bano states,<br />
“Fighting for my human rights as a<br />
woman took precedence over the<br />
political struggle, since it directly<br />
Fighting for my human<br />
rights as a woman<br />
took precedence over<br />
the political struggle,<br />
since it directly<br />
concerned my own life,<br />
which was<br />
considerably restricted<br />
by my parent’s<br />
decision to marry me<br />
off at an early age<br />
concerned my own life, which was<br />
considerably restricted by my parent’s<br />
decision to marry me off at an<br />
early age. This was a lonely agonising<br />
struggle that left me wounded,<br />
even though I succeeded, at long last,<br />
in changing the fixed attitudes and<br />
perceptions about women that many<br />
people close to me had, I established<br />
my right to choose.” What is fascinating<br />
about Bano’s revelation is that<br />
she fearlessly expresses the controversial<br />
struggle that so many women<br />
in the valley face. There are women’s<br />
groups in the valley, such as<br />
Dukhtaran-E-Milat, that feel that the<br />
struggle for the nation should take<br />
precedence over any other struggle.<br />
This is a dilemma for the Kashmiri<br />
women, and while it is very personal,<br />
its repercussions extend beyond the<br />
lives of individual people. It is unrealistic<br />
to expect the women’s movement<br />
in Kashmir to have constructed<br />
an all-encompassing plan of action<br />
but it is still important to ask questions<br />
and contemplate alternatives.<br />
Defining the Problem<br />
Anybody who wants to have a<br />
comprehensive understanding of<br />
Kashmir should read this book.<br />
Whereas most literature on Kashmir<br />
attempts to present solutions, Butalia<br />
begins by defining the problem by<br />
presenting a range of women’s experiences<br />
(through interviews, personal<br />
reflection pieces, extracts from official<br />
reports and newspaper articles).<br />
A comprehensive definition of the<br />
problem includes women’s voices--<br />
not just women as victims, but<br />
women as full members of Kashmiri<br />
society, as agents of peace-building,<br />
as perpetrators of violence. While<br />
each and every chapter is valuable,<br />
the few discussed here really get to<br />
the crux of the issue while simultaneously<br />
sparking long overdue critical<br />
debates.<br />
A writer and researcher Cynthia<br />
Enloe comments, “As one learns to<br />
look through feminist eyes, one<br />
learns to ask whether anything that<br />
passes for inevitable, inherent, traditional,<br />
or biological has in fact been<br />
made. 1 ” It is imperative that we question<br />
patriarchal constructions of gender<br />
in order to reveal how their<br />
oppressive nature plays out. Ethnonationalist<br />
conflict zones are especially<br />
precarious, as the demand for<br />
women’s rights often gets silenced in<br />
the face of the nationalist movement.<br />
In every nationalist project in the<br />
world, women have been an integral<br />
component; however, no nationalist<br />
project in the world has treated men<br />
and women as equal members of the<br />
collective. When ethnic relations are<br />
combined with the day-to-day realities<br />
of conflict zones, women’s experiences<br />
can reveal much about a phenomenon<br />
that is not widely understood.<br />
Endnote<br />
1 Enloe, Cynthia. 1990. Bananas, Beaches and<br />
Bases: Making Feminist Sense out of<br />
International Politics. Berkley: University of<br />
California Press.<br />
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To know is to be<br />
Right to Information Act deserves right selucidation to benefit public at large. A<br />
handbook for its use is a welcome addition, writes Suresh Nautiyal in his review<br />
The observation of <strong>Law</strong>rence<br />
Petters that nobody has a more<br />
sacred obligation to obey the law<br />
than those who make the law is enormously<br />
complimentary to the<br />
Abraham Lincoln’s definition that a<br />
democracy is government of the people,<br />
for the people and by the people. To<br />
ensure that such dictums work free<br />
flow of information to the citizens is<br />
necessary. This paves the way for<br />
proper functioning of institutions<br />
and to keep public discourse and<br />
democratic framework on a right<br />
track. The Article-19 (1) (a) of the<br />
Indian Constitution provides for the<br />
freedom of expression because the<br />
government functions must be transparent<br />
and that State should be prevented<br />
from deceiving people. The<br />
Right to Information Act, 2005 – an<br />
unprecedented and special legislation<br />
– by imposing the obligations on<br />
every public authority to provide<br />
information to the person seeking it<br />
is actually graduation of what<br />
Lincoln or Petters observed in the<br />
first place and above all what Article-<br />
19 of the Constitution commits.<br />
The RTI, 2005 embodies statutory<br />
provisions for the implementation of<br />
the informative aspects of democratic<br />
form of governance. In other<br />
words, the right to freedom of speech<br />
and expression that the citizens have<br />
under the Article-19 of the<br />
Constitution, gives automatic right to<br />
information to the citizens. It also<br />
empowers citizens to know how the<br />
government and its organs are functioning<br />
– thus enabling them to seek<br />
any information from the government,<br />
inspect any government documents<br />
and works, records; take<br />
notes, extracts or certified copies of<br />
the documents or records; take certified<br />
samples of material; and obtain<br />
information in form of printouts,<br />
diskettes, floppies, tapes, video films,<br />
cassettes or in any other electronic<br />
mode or through printouts. Some<br />
laws on right to information even<br />
empower citizens to officially inspect<br />
any government work or to take<br />
sample of material used in any work.<br />
Of course, there are certain restrictions<br />
like the State under clause (2) of<br />
Article-19 is entitled to impose reasonable<br />
restrictions inter alia in the<br />
interest of the State. And the very<br />
enactment of the RTI is to provide for<br />
setting out the practical regime of<br />
right to information for citizens to<br />
secure access to information under<br />
the control of public authorities, in<br />
order to promote transparency and<br />
accountability in the working of<br />
Book : Handbook on the<br />
Right to Information<br />
Author: PK Das<br />
Publisher: Universal <strong>Law</strong><br />
Publishing Company,<br />
Delhi<br />
New Delhi<br />
Price: Rs 395 (paperback)<br />
Page: 618<br />
every public authority, the constitution<br />
of a central information commission<br />
and state information commissions.<br />
Universal Publishing Company’s<br />
Handbook on the Right to Information<br />
Act, second edition-2008, has it all.<br />
PK Das – a reputed author of legal<br />
books, who has written books on<br />
subjects ranging from murder trials<br />
to domestic violence and food security<br />
– has compiled and penned this<br />
book, quite authoritatively.<br />
Handbook on the Right to<br />
Information Act is divided into thirteen<br />
parts such as introduction; the<br />
RTI Act, 2005; other related laws;<br />
allied acts and rules; international<br />
conventions and declaration; reports<br />
and guidelines; Supreme Court on<br />
RTI; high courts on RTI; central information<br />
commission decisions; state<br />
laws on the right to information; fee<br />
structure of states; important notifications<br />
and allied information and<br />
specimen forms.<br />
The book also contains the right<br />
to information act, 2005; the RTI (regulation<br />
of fee and cost) rules, 2005;<br />
the central information commission<br />
(appeal procedure) rules, 2005; the<br />
Lok Sabha secretariat RTI (regulation<br />
of fee and cost) rules, 2005; the Rajya<br />
Sabha secretariat RTI (regulation of<br />
fee and cost) rules, 2005; the central<br />
information commission (management)<br />
regulations, 2007; the official<br />
secrets act, 1923; the public records<br />
act, 1993, the public records rules,<br />
1997; the freedom of information act,<br />
2002; relevant provisions of allied<br />
acts and rules; relevant provisions of<br />
reports and guidelines; Supreme<br />
Court judgments on RTI; high court<br />
judgments on RTI; central information<br />
commission decisions, state laws<br />
on RTI; fee structure of states; and,<br />
important notifications and allied<br />
information.<br />
The handbook would be able to<br />
create awareness about the right to<br />
information and can be useful as a<br />
friendly guide for the Bench, Bar,<br />
NGOs, students, journalists,<br />
activists, and anybody interested in<br />
the subject. The Universal <strong>Law</strong><br />
Publishing Company too deserve<br />
credit for bringing out such a work.<br />
<br />
104 COMBAT LAW JULY-AUGUST 2008