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<strong>Revisiting</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dove’s <strong>Dilemma</strong>:
Conventional Arms Transfers and Nuclear Weapons Development
Jennifer L. Erickson
Christopher Way
Assistant Professor
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Department of Government
Boston College
Cornell University
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 Ithaca, NY 14853
jennifer.erickson.2@bc.edu
crw12@cornell.edu
Version 1.0
March 2011
Paper prepared for <strong>the</strong> annual meeting of <strong>the</strong> International Studies Association, Montreal,
Canada, 17-20 March 2011. We thank Anna Nickless for research assistance.

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
Abstract
Do conventional arms exports punish or reward nuclear weapons development? The UN often
issues arms embargoes to deny conventional arms to would-be nuclear states. However,
conventional arms may also decrease <strong>the</strong> appeal of nuclear weapons by bolstering states’
conventional security. In <strong>the</strong> 1970s, experts agonized over this ―dove’s dilemma,‖ asking
whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> risks of instability from conventional arms proliferation had to be accepted in order
to prevent <strong>the</strong> proliferation of unconventional arms. Similar questions are also appropriate today,
as policy-makers struggle to find effective means to address nuclear proliferation. This paper
provides <strong>the</strong> first systematic analysis of <strong>the</strong> relationship between conventional arms and nuclear
weapons development. It examines conventional arms transfers by <strong>the</strong> top nine major
conventional exporters from 1960 to 2001 in order to explore <strong>the</strong> conditions under which nuclear
weapons states use arms sales to deter states from pursuing nuclear weapons. Results show that
<strong>the</strong> pursuit of nuclear weapons increases recipients’ likelihood of receiving conventional
weapons only during <strong>the</strong> Cold War. The prominence of arms embargoes in <strong>the</strong> post-Cold War
era, as well as expectations for more restrictive conventional arms export practices may diffuse
<strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma and limit how policy-makers can use conventional arms supplies as a tool of
foreign policy.
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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
In October 2006, <strong>the</strong> United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemned North Korea
for testing a nuclear weapon by imposing an arms embargo and o<strong>the</strong>r targeted sanctions. 1 It
demanded that North Korea immediately cease <strong>the</strong> testing of all nuclear weapons, abandon
completely its nuclear program, and retract its withdrawal from <strong>the</strong> Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). Also in 2006, <strong>the</strong> UNSC imposed an arms embargo on Iran, to prevent <strong>the</strong> transfer
of technology related to nuclear weapons development and delivery systems, 2 which it expanded
to a full arms embargo in 2007. 3 Yet while some states have raised <strong>the</strong> ire of <strong>the</strong> international
community in <strong>the</strong>ir pursuit of nuclear weapons and had conventional arms sales halted as a
result, o<strong>the</strong>rs have not. India and Pakistan have also developed nuclear weapons in <strong>the</strong> post-Cold
War era, but ra<strong>the</strong>r than being embargoed by <strong>the</strong> UN or its member states, <strong>the</strong>y have received
steady – if not increased – flows of conventional arms from multiple major suppliers. Pakistan
has long been a recipient of US weapons, and, in 2002, India signed its first arms deal with <strong>the</strong>
United States in decades, which has since been followed by o<strong>the</strong>r major arms transfers.
Access to conventional weapons – whe<strong>the</strong>r to grant access or to deny it – has long been
used to alter would-be nuclear powers’ incentives to give up <strong>the</strong>ir weapons programs. In <strong>the</strong>
1970s, policymakers struggled with <strong>the</strong> ―dove’s dilemma;‖ that is, whe<strong>the</strong>r conventional arms
transfers – however destabilizing – were a necessary evil to persuade nuclear weapons
developers to stop <strong>the</strong>ir programs. Alternately, embargoing arms transfers to limit states’ access
to key technologies or delivery systems, or to punish noncompliant behavior, has also been a
common response to nuclear weapons development. Indeed, how to induce or compel states to
stop developing nuclear weapons has been a persistent problem for <strong>the</strong> international community.
1 UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006)
2 UNSC Resolution 1737 (2006)
3 UNSC Resolution 1747 (2007)
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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
Although <strong>the</strong> NPT bars all non-nuclear signatories from developing nuclear weapons, 4 many
states have never<strong>the</strong>less established nuclear weapons programs and only sometimes abandoned
<strong>the</strong>m. Legal obligations aside, <strong>the</strong> incentives to pursue nuclear weapons are strong: Nuclear
weapons are <strong>the</strong> most powerful security measure available to states, as well as a symbol of
international prestige. In an effort to limit proliferation, <strong>the</strong>refore, leading states committed to
stemming proliferation may have to offer rewards and punishments in addition to those provided
by <strong>the</strong> NPT regime. In particular, inducements that address would-be nuclear states’ security
and/or prestige concerns – like <strong>the</strong> transfer or denial of major conventional weapons systems –
may be important tools for controlling nuclear proliferation.
To that end, this paper asks an enduring yet often-overlooked question: Are states seeking
nuclear weapons ―punished‖ by being denied access to conventional arms, or do <strong>the</strong>y get
―rewarded‖ with more conventional arms, in order to reduce <strong>the</strong>ir perception of a need for
nuclear weapons? Anecdotes, of course, exist for both enhanced access to and denial of
conventional arms, but we lack a systematic analysis of <strong>the</strong> relationship between conventional
arms transfers and nuclear weapons development. To fill this gap, this paper examines major
conventional arms transfers from <strong>the</strong> top nine major conventional exporters from 1960 to 2001. 5
We find that, during <strong>the</strong> Cold War, policymakers were willing to trade conventional proliferation
for nuclear non-proliferation. Countries pursuing nuclear weapons received enhanced access to
major conventional weapons systems. However, once a country ―goes nuclear,‖ <strong>the</strong> benefits of
conventional arms sales are withdrawn. Conventional arms transfers do <strong>the</strong>refore serve as a
significant policy tool in <strong>the</strong> politics of nonproliferation but how <strong>the</strong>y are used will depend on a
4 The NPT recognizes only <strong>the</strong> states that had tested nuclear devices by January 1, 1967 as legitimate nuclear
weapons states: China, France, <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom, and <strong>the</strong> United States.
5 Why just <strong>the</strong> top nine? Because we didn’t finish collecting data for <strong>the</strong> top 15 in time for <strong>the</strong> first draft of this
paper. The next version will cover <strong>the</strong> top 15 major arms exporters.
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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
recipient’s progress in developing nuclear weapons, with only uncertain effects on convincing
states to abandon <strong>the</strong>ir nuclear programs regardless. We also find that <strong>the</strong> reward pattern
vanishes in <strong>the</strong> post-Cold War era.
A Dove’s <strong>Dilemma</strong>? Conventional Arms Transfers to Would-Be Nuclear States
How might states use <strong>the</strong> selective provision of conventional arms as a means to
influence o<strong>the</strong>r states’ nuclear ambitions? Assuming <strong>the</strong>y do use conventional arms in this way,
two possible strategies are available. As Leslie Gelb (1976/77) notes, ―What is not wholly clear‖
is whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> US was ―prepared to sell conventional weapons that o<strong>the</strong>rwise would not have
been sold as an inducement for a country to refrain from developing nuclear arms‖ or whe<strong>the</strong>r it
would threaten to restrict access to arms for <strong>the</strong> same reason (11-12). First, arms exporting states
could withdraw <strong>the</strong> provision of conventional arms both to punish recipients who seek to go
nuclear and to deprive <strong>the</strong>m of potentially fungible weapons technology that could be adapted to
enhance nuclear weapons programs or delivery systems. Alternatively, arms exporting states
could explicitly provide conventional arms to would-be nuclear powers to encourage <strong>the</strong>m to
give up <strong>the</strong>ir nuclear ambitions by enhancing <strong>the</strong>ir sense of security or prestige. Doing so would
presumably reduce <strong>the</strong>ir incentives to acquire nuclear weapons by satisfying <strong>the</strong> perceived needs
driving any nuclear aspirations. However, distributing more conventional arms risks fuelling
arms races and making volatile regions even more dangerous. The question may be
straightforward, but <strong>the</strong> qualitative evidence is not clear-cut. Policy-makers and experts disagree
in particular on <strong>the</strong> trade-offs at <strong>the</strong> heart of this decision: Is <strong>the</strong> chance for nuclear
nonproliferation worth <strong>the</strong> price of conventional proliferation?
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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
During <strong>the</strong> Cold War, this trade-off was known as <strong>the</strong> ―dove’s dilemma.‖ Lewis Dunn
(1981) summarizes <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma as ―<strong>the</strong> necessity to choose between efforts to slow
conventional arms transfers abroad and to head off more widespread nuclear weapon
proliferation by using arms transfers as an instrument of nonproliferation policy‖ (181). In
essence, <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma asks policymakers to choose between <strong>the</strong>ir nonproliferation
objectives, noting that although states may value both conventional and nuclear nonproliferation,
<strong>the</strong>y can only realistically pursue one or <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r in practice. The idea behind providing
conventional arms to nuclear weapons aspirants rests on <strong>the</strong> assumption more and better
conventional arms supplies will assuage those states’ security concerns, provide <strong>the</strong>m with
adequate means to defend <strong>the</strong>mselves, and reduce <strong>the</strong>ir incentives or perceived need for nuclear
weapons (Catrina 1988: 126; Kemp and Miller 1979: 57; Pierre 1982: 29-30). ―If anything
alleviates objective security incentives for nuclear weapons,‖ argues Richard Betts (1977), ―an
increase in conventional defense capabilities does‖ (177). And, from <strong>the</strong> exporters’ perspective,
as Nolan (1997) states, <strong>the</strong> United States at least ―has always seen conventional weapons as a
benign alternative to nuclear proliferation‖ (132).
This, of course, assumes that states’ incentives for developing nuclear weapons are purely
related to <strong>the</strong>ir security concerns. And certainly many states do pursue nuclear weapons in search
of greater security. As Singh and Way (2004) observe, ―Participating in enduring rivalries or
taking part in more frequent militarized disputes strongly increase <strong>the</strong> chances a state will pursue
nuclear weapons, but credible support from a great-power ally dampens <strong>the</strong> temptation‖ (861).
T.V. Paul (2000) complements <strong>the</strong>se findings in a qualitative study emphasizing <strong>the</strong> degree of
conflict in a state’s regional environment as a key determinant of pursuit of nuclear weapons.
However, security is not <strong>the</strong> only reason states may have for developing nuclear weapons. Barry
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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
O’Neill (2006) and o<strong>the</strong>rs note that ―several nuclear weapons programs have had prestige as a
significant motive,‖ since possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology can
serve as a symbol of modernity and international status (3,4). In a similar vein, Scott Sagan notes
that nuclear weapons may fulfill a desire to appear modern or technologically advanced (Sagan
2000). By providing sophisticated modern weaponry and weapons technology, conventional
arms exporters may also seek to address not only security concerns, but also recipients’ quest for
prestige and acknowledgement of <strong>the</strong>ir status as among <strong>the</strong> most advanced, modern states in <strong>the</strong>
international system. Eyre and Suchman (1996), for example, observe that not only is ―one of <strong>the</strong>
defining characteristics of <strong>the</strong> nation-state…<strong>the</strong> possession of a modern military‖ (92), but also
that ―highly technological militaries symbolize modernity, efficacy, and independence‖ (86). Of
course, in both security and prestige-motivated nuclear weapons development, conventional arms
do not have <strong>the</strong> absolute military-strategic or symbolic power to match fully those of nuclear
weapons. 6 Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> logic behind resolving <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma in favor of nuclear
nonproliferation assumes that <strong>the</strong> relative gains in security and prestige from providing advanced
conventional weaponry will be sufficient to persuade states from moving forward with <strong>the</strong>ir
nuclear programs.
This is a costly and potentially dangerous trade-off, however. First, some critics argue
that engaging in conventional weapons proliferation can have adverse affects on regional peace
and stability. By encouraging conventional weapons transfers to would-be nuclear powers --
especially those in insecure neighborhoods -- exporters risk setting off regional conventional
arms races (Dunn 1981: 185; Gelb 1976/77: 12). In addition to increasing regional tensions,
small and major conventional arms transfers may enable conflicts to break out or last longer
6 And on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, conventional weapons lack much of <strong>the</strong> stigma that may attach to nuclear weapons
increasingly over time as <strong>the</strong> non-proliferation regime deepens and takes hold as an international norm (Sagan
2000).
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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
(Craft 1999; Craft and Smaldone 2002; Kinsella 1994; Maniruzzaman 1992). The price of such
policies may <strong>the</strong>refore be to instigate conflict, violence, and instability in vulnerable regions.
Second, conventional weapons proliferation may inadvertently bring about what it was
designed to help avoid: nuclear proliferation. This can happen in two ways. In one pathway,
greater provision of conventional arms may fuel regional arms races, rendering states more
insecure and ultimately perceive a need to acquire nuclear weapons to ensure <strong>the</strong>ir security
(Ferguson 2010). In ano<strong>the</strong>r pathway, conventional arms transfers can provide advanced defense
technology that might be applied to nuclear weapons development. For example, conventional
arms transfers may ―increase <strong>the</strong> likelihood of nuclear proliferation by providing delivery
systems for nuclear weapons‖ (Catrina 1988: 126; Dunn 1981: 187). In addition, according to
Andrew Pierre (1982), ―<strong>the</strong> acquisition of new, sophisticated arms might [paradoxically] serve to
whet <strong>the</strong> appetite of military and political leaders for fur<strong>the</strong>r enhancing <strong>the</strong> nation’s defense
forces and its status by acquiring nuclear weapons‖ (30-1).
As a result, resolving <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma in favor of nuclear nonproliferation may
backfire, creating new problems and/or enhancing <strong>the</strong> problems it was meant to resolve. From
this perspective, <strong>the</strong> solution should not be to offer enhanced access to conventional weapons for
would-be nuclear powers, but ra<strong>the</strong>r to restrict or withdraw access to conventional weapons. This
both sends a signal that nuclear weapons development outside <strong>the</strong> context of <strong>the</strong> NPT should be
punished, and is a practical measure to prevent technologies from being converted for
illegitimate weapons programs. For example, <strong>the</strong> Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
was established as a voluntary organization in 1987 in which members commit to ―[tightening]
up <strong>the</strong>ir arms transfer policies with <strong>the</strong> intention of controlling <strong>the</strong> proliferation of missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons‖ (Spear 1990: 183). The UN Security Council has also at
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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
times sought to punish nuclear weapons developers by imposing arms embargoes, such as in <strong>the</strong>
cases of Iran and North Korea. Recent research has found that, on average, nuclear weapons
developers are significantly more likely to become targets of unilateral or multilateral arms
embargoes than o<strong>the</strong>r states (Erickson 2010). This suggests that states may not always resolve
<strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma at <strong>the</strong> cost of conventional nonproliferation. Yet a systematic analysis of
how nuclear weapon states (NWS) or o<strong>the</strong>r major arms exporters in particular have chosen to
resolve <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma over time is an open question, which this paper seeks to explore. The
<strong>the</strong>oretical arguments point both ways, and how policy makers resolve this debate on average is
ultimately an empirical question.
We <strong>the</strong>refore hypo<strong>the</strong>size that <strong>the</strong>re is a significant relationship between major
conventional arms transfers and nuclear weapons development. However, <strong>the</strong> nature of that
relationship could fall into one of two camps: First, <strong>the</strong>re may be a negative relationship between
arms transfers and nuclear weapons development, in which states are unwilling to incur <strong>the</strong>
security costs associated with conventional arms proliferation in order to stave off nuclear
proliferation. In fact, states may even punish nuclear weapons developers by withdrawing <strong>the</strong>ir
access to conventional arms. Second, <strong>the</strong>re may be a positive relationship between arms transfers
and nuclear weapons development, in which states use access to conventional weapons as
incentives to would-be nuclear powers to abandon <strong>the</strong>ir nuclear programs. As Nolan (1997)
contends, ―transfers of conventional weapons remain <strong>the</strong> most common instrument of dissuasion
in <strong>the</strong> efforts to stop new states from going <strong>the</strong> nuclear route‖ (132). In this case, exporters would
use conventional arms to attempt to assuage recipients’ security concerns or build-up <strong>the</strong>ir
international prestige.
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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
Although we primarily analyze exporters’ aggregate behavior, we also consider <strong>the</strong>
possibility that <strong>the</strong>re may be differences between <strong>the</strong> US and o<strong>the</strong>r exporters, and across all
exporters over time. For example, exporters with more explicit economic motivations behind
<strong>the</strong>ir arms sales – like European producers during <strong>the</strong> Cold War and <strong>the</strong> early 1990s – might be
less willing to engage in more restrictive practices and less concerned about conventional arms
proliferation. This leaves open <strong>the</strong> possibility that not all states will resolve <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma
similarly. Certainly, it possible that practices will change over time. Dunn (1981), for example,
suggests that early US nuclear nonproliferation efforts were more willing to sacrifice
conventional nonproliferation, but when <strong>the</strong>se efforts later proved less successful, it sought
alternate means (189). In addition, norms of conventional weapons sales have changed over time
and become more restrictive in <strong>the</strong> post-Cold War era (Erickson 2009).
Understanding how states resolve <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma – and how <strong>the</strong>ir resolutions might
vary between states and over time – might in turn provide insights into larger <strong>the</strong>oretical
questions. In particular, this is a case in which we can observe states making difficult trade-offs
between policy objectives, nonproliferation norms, and security concerns. How states resolve
<strong>the</strong>se trade-offs over time can suggest changes in states’ policy priorities, international normative
pressures, and perceived threats to international and regional peace and stability. Especially as
multilateral initiatives to restrict conventional arms transfers for unstable regions, conflict zones,
and human rights violators have gained increasingly wide acceptance since <strong>the</strong> late 1990s,
resolutions for <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma may become more and point to <strong>the</strong> growing importance of
conventional nonproliferation. In addition, <strong>the</strong> results may indicate to one way (conventional
arms transfers) states purposefully enforce and reinforce international treaty law, normative
taboos and traditions of nuclear nonuse, and expectations of nuclear nonproliferation through
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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
material means. States may not be content, especially early on in <strong>the</strong> nuclear nonproliferation
regime, to leave o<strong>the</strong>rs to change <strong>the</strong>ir practices in response to social or legal pressure from
international institutions. The dove’s dilemma is not only an important and difficult choice, but
also an instructive one.
Research Design and Data
To assess whe<strong>the</strong>r countries pursuing nuclear weapons enjoy increased access to major
conventional arms transfers, we estimate a series of statistical models of conventional arms
imports from 1960 to 2001. At present, we have data covering <strong>the</strong> nine largest arms exporters
and 182 importers. 7 The following sections describe our dependent, independent, and control
variables, as well as expected relationships among <strong>the</strong>m.
Dependent Variable: Major Conventional Weapons Transfers
Major conventional weapons (MCW) are defined as large weapons with a military
purpose, falling into one of nine categories: aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, sensors, air
defense systems, missiles, ships, engines or an ―o<strong>the</strong>r‖ fulfilling specified qualifications (SIPRI
2007: 428-29). We focus on major conventional weapons, ra<strong>the</strong>r than small and major
conventional weapons, because MCW have historically been tools of major power foreign
policy, symbols of prestige, and <strong>the</strong> stuff of conventional arms races. In comparison, small arms
are lower-tech and were less politically important to importers and exporters until <strong>the</strong> advent of
multilateral control processes in <strong>the</strong> late-1990s and beyond.
7 We are in <strong>the</strong> process of expanding this to cover <strong>the</strong> top 15 exporters. The current nine exporters are (in no
particular order): United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Spain, (West) Germany, Czechoslovakia/Czech
Republic, Italy, and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union/Russia.
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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
We use annual, dyadic MCW transfer data collected and standardized by <strong>the</strong> Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI’s database extends back to 1950 and
presents <strong>the</strong> most up-to-date and comprehensive multi-country source available on MCW
transfers. 8 Its export-import records are compiled from public sources, including government
documents, news reports, reference works, and books and journals, and past years are continually
updated as new information becomes declassified (430). As Brzoska and Pearson (1994) note,
SIPRI ―provides <strong>the</strong> most painstakingly researched database available‖ (20) and is an established
source for researchers exploring cross-national arms transfer trends over time. 9 We begin <strong>the</strong>
analysis in 1960; prior to that year, global arms market was still distorted by post-war
reconstruction and colonial relations. 10
To standardize data values across country, time, sophistication of equipment, and mode
of payment, SIPRI codes its records as continuous ―trend-indicator values‖ (TIVs) for each dyadyear.
A TIV represents <strong>the</strong> quantity and technological quality of weapons transfers between an
exporter and importer every year and is assigned from ―an index that reflects [<strong>the</strong> weapon’s]
8 The US State Department also collects global arms trade data through its World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers (WMEAT) project, formerly with <strong>the</strong> Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. However, WMEAT’s
dyadic data are only publicly available for US transfers, rarely updated or standardized across years, and combine
small and major conventional arms transfers in a single figure. US data on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are also
limited to US transfers and do not consider gifts, aid, or direct commercial sales approved by <strong>the</strong> State Department.
Since our research question requires us to consider exporters o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> US and all forms of major conventional
arms transfers that can be used as inducements to encourage/reward NPT membership (not just sales), SIPRI data
serves <strong>the</strong> project better than sources restricted to US sales.
9 Quantitative analyses on conventional arms transfers are few and typically limited to exports from <strong>the</strong> United
States (Blanton 2000, 2005). However, SIPRI data is standard for researchers wishing to illustrate worldwide trends
in conventional arms transfers over time. For post-Cold War examples of research using SIPRI data, see: Durch
(2000); Golde and Tishler (2004); Harkavy (1994); Kinsella (1994); Sanchez-Andres (2004); Sanjian (1991, 1998);
Wulf (1993).
10 There are a number of important differences between <strong>the</strong> pre- and post-1960 arms market. In <strong>the</strong> early post-World
War II period, <strong>the</strong> arms market was more strongly shaped by colonial relations but began to open up to competition
across blocs as empires collapsed and new groups came to power in <strong>the</strong> developing world (SIPRI 1971: 3). In
addition, during <strong>the</strong> 1950s, some major European exporters, like West Germany and Italy, were still rebuilding <strong>the</strong>ir
postwar arms industries. Substantial arms transfers outside of <strong>the</strong> NATO and Warsaw pact countries to <strong>the</strong>
developing world – apart from cleaning obsolete and vintage technologies out of suppliers’ inventories to make
room for new and better equipment – did not get underway until <strong>the</strong> 1960s (Pierre 1982: 10, 12).
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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
value as a military resource in relation to o<strong>the</strong>r weapons,‖ factoring core weapons prices into its
scale wherever possible (SIPRI 2007: 429). 11 Because arms transfers can come in <strong>the</strong> form of
sales, gifts, or aid, can include new or used equipment, and can be financed through a number of
means, such as gifts, discounts, cash, credit, and bartering, <strong>the</strong> TIV is much more representative
of a transfer’s value in both qualitative and quantitative terms than export sales figures.
Importantly for our purposes, <strong>the</strong> standardized value also allows scholars to compare data across
time and space (Brzoska 2004).
Variable of Interest and Controls
Nuclear Weapons Status
Our independent variable of interest is potential arms recipients’ nuclear weapons status:
Is an importing country pursuing nuclear weapons, and does it acquire <strong>the</strong>m? To record nuclear
weapons status, we use similar, but slightly different, codings from two prominent papers. Singh
and Way (2004) and Jo and Gartzke (2006) independently code dates for initiation of nuclear
weapons programs and of weapons acquisition. 12 Although <strong>the</strong>ir dates are broadly similar, <strong>the</strong>y
do differ. For example, whereas Singh and Way code South Africa as beginning its program in
1974, Jo and Gartzke record a date of 1971. Moreover, Singh and Way are a bit more expansive
with <strong>the</strong>ir codings, recording Egypt and Libya, for example, as pursing weapons for some years
whereas as Jo and Gartzke do not. We <strong>the</strong>refore use both sets of dates to assess <strong>the</strong> sensitivity of
our findings to differing evaluations of program dates. We record each importer-country year as
11 See SIPRI (2007) for a complete description of its method for calculating TIVs (429-30).
12 We use an updated version of <strong>the</strong> Singh and Way dates, based on new information available after <strong>the</strong> publication
of <strong>the</strong>ir original paper. Most significantly, <strong>the</strong>y now code Egypt as having pursued nuclear weapons from 1965 to
1974.
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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
one if <strong>the</strong>y are listed as pursuing nuclear weapons in a given year, and zero o<strong>the</strong>rwise; <strong>the</strong> same
procedure is followed for nuclear weapons possession.
Control Variables
If pursuit of nuclear weapons were assigned to states by a random process, we could stop
here with outcome of interest and variable of interest in hand. We could simply compare arms
imports in country-years of nuclear weapons pursuit with country-years of no nuclear weapons
pursuit and draw valid inferences from <strong>the</strong> results. Unfortunately for social scientists, countries
select <strong>the</strong>mselves into pursuit of nuclear weapons by a highly non-random process. As a result,
<strong>the</strong> average country-year of nuclear weapons pursuit differs systematically from <strong>the</strong> average
country-year of no nuclear weapons pursuit on several important observable variables. We
<strong>the</strong>refore include control variables chosen because of <strong>the</strong>ir potential effect on both <strong>the</strong> amount of
major conventional arms imports and recipients’ pursuit in nuclear weapons. In doing so, this
approach avoids <strong>the</strong> ―garbage can‖ or ―kitchen sink‖ models against which methodologists have
recently warned. Such models rely not only on fragile and highly contingent specifications, but
also risk masking nuances in <strong>the</strong> relationship of interest. 13 In order to concentrate on <strong>the</strong> potential
link between nuclear weapons status and <strong>the</strong> receipt of major conventional arms, we <strong>the</strong>refore
strictly limit our control variables to potentially confounding variables.
Specifically, country-years of nuclear weapons pursuit differ, on average, from nonpursuit
country-years in <strong>the</strong>ir security and economic circumstances. With regard to security,
countries facing challenging security environment are more likely to pursue both conventional
and nuclear weapons. We use three variables to proxy for security environment: involvement in
13 See, for example, Achen (2002, 2005); Berk (2004); Ray (2003, 2005).
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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
enduring rivalries, participation in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), and defense pact with a
great power. 14 Unlike those facing severe security threats, countries outside of rivalries and with
low rates of dispute involvement are both less likely to pursue nuclear weapons and less likely to
have a high demand for conventional weapons. Countries enjoying a defense pact with a great
power may have increased access to conventional arms, as well as a security guarantee that
elides <strong>the</strong>ir potential desire for nuclear weapons.
In terms of states’ economic situations, annual GDP per capita provides an indicator of
level of economic development. Since arms are a normal good (Murdoch and Sandler 1982),
richer countries tend to import more of <strong>the</strong>m. Richer countries are also better positioned to
pursue nuclear weapons, since <strong>the</strong> technological barriers and opportunity costs will be lower.
Richer countries are thus more likely to pursue nuclear weapons and to have higher demand for
conventional arms.
Finally, to tap <strong>the</strong> obvious time trends in exports, we include dummies splitting <strong>the</strong>
observations into four time periods (<strong>the</strong> pre-nonproliferation regime period of 1960-68, <strong>the</strong>
period of export growth, 1969-1982; <strong>the</strong> period of gradual decline, 1983-90; and <strong>the</strong> post-Cold
War years of falling exports, 1991-2001). In addition, to explore possible changes over time in
<strong>the</strong> relationship between nuclear weapons status and access to conventional arms, we estimate
moving windows versions of all models.
14 Enduring rivalry memberships is a dichotomous variable taking on a value of one if a country is involved in one
or more enduring rivalries in a given year and zero o<strong>the</strong>rwise. Enduring rivalry participation is coded from (Bennett
1997, 1998), and we also use codings of rivalries by Goertz and Diehl, Thompson, and Hewitt as alternatives.
Recent rate of MID involvement is calculated as <strong>the</strong> five year moving average of <strong>the</strong> number of disputes per year in
which a state is involved according to version 3.1 of <strong>the</strong> MID dataset (Ghosn and Palmer 2003).
14

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
Statistical Results
Our findings reveal a strong, positive relationship between pursuit of nuclear weapons
and major conventional weapons imports. We start our analysis by looking at total major
conventional arms transfers received by each importing state. Here our unit of observation is <strong>the</strong>
importer country-year. We <strong>the</strong>n move to <strong>the</strong> exporter-importer dyad in order to explore <strong>the</strong>
patterns of transfers that are providing more weapons to states pursuing nuclear weapons states.
This allows us to explore possible differences in behavior across <strong>the</strong> major exporting states. For
<strong>the</strong> dyadic analysis, we have data pairing <strong>the</strong> top arms exporters with 182 potential arms
importers for years spanning 1960 to 2001.
Let us start by comparing <strong>the</strong> average total major conventional arms imports received per
country-year by countries pursuing nuclear weapons with <strong>the</strong> amount of arms received by o<strong>the</strong>r
countries. Figure 1 shows that <strong>the</strong> average total value of arms received per year by states pursing
nuclear weapons is much greater than that received by o<strong>the</strong>r states. On average, states pursuing
nuclear weapons received just over $694 million TIV of arms imports per year, whereas states
not pursuing nuclear weapons received a little less than $103 million TIV on average. 15
[Figure 1 about here]
However, potential confounding relationships between pursuit of nuclear arms and access
to conventional arms, as described above, provide compelling reasons to take <strong>the</strong> strong
relationship depicted in Figure 2 with more than a few grains of salt. 16
Most importantly,
15 All dollar values are for 1990 US dollars.
16 We point out that <strong>the</strong> variables we now introduce are ―good controls,‖ in <strong>the</strong> language of Angrist and Pischke
(2009), since <strong>the</strong>y almost surely influence pursuit of nuclear weapons but are not <strong>the</strong>mselves plausibly caused by <strong>the</strong>
regressor of interest. For example, it is implausible to think of pursuit of nuclear weapons as causing more rapid
increases in GDP per capita. More plausibly, pursuit of nuclear weapons might harm <strong>the</strong> security environment by
15

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
countries interested in nuclear weapons are likely to face challenging security environments,
which are also likely to generate a strong demand for conventional weapons. To explore <strong>the</strong>
relationship between access to conventional arms and pursuit of nuclear weapons, we thus need
to estimate arms transfers conditional on <strong>the</strong>se potentially confounding variables. Countries’
security and economic situations are likely to affect both <strong>the</strong>ir access to conventional weapons
and <strong>the</strong>ir likelihood of pursuing nuclear weapons. Consequently, variables to account for <strong>the</strong>se
circumstances need to be included if we are to gauge properly <strong>the</strong> size and direction of <strong>the</strong>
relationship between pursuit of nuclear weapons and conventional arms transfers. To this end,
we estimate pooled time series models of arms imports by 182 o<strong>the</strong>r states from 1960 to 2001,
limiting our models to include only potential confounding variables as controls. This enables us
to explore <strong>the</strong> relationship of interest between pursuit of nuclear weapons and conventional arms
transfers (as opposed to understanding all <strong>the</strong> determinants of arms transfers).
As is well known, pooled models of this sort are vulnerable to violations of <strong>the</strong>
assumptions underpinning OLS regression models. Specifically, errors are likely to be
heteroskedastic by panel and auto-correlated over time within panel. Diagnostic tests indicate
that we can reject both <strong>the</strong> assumptions of panel-homoskedasticity and non-correlated errors over
time in our data. 17 Following <strong>the</strong> recommendations of Beck and Katz (1995, 1996), we use
panel-corrected standard errors to control for possible bias in <strong>the</strong> standard errors and Prais-
Winsten correction for first-order autocorrelation. 18
The dependent variable, major conventional
exacerbating tensions with o<strong>the</strong>r countries, but even here we find <strong>the</strong> existence of a strong causal effect to be
unlikely. None<strong>the</strong>less, we explore <strong>the</strong>se possibilities later in <strong>the</strong> paper.
17 Following <strong>the</strong> advice of Wilson and Butler (2007), we do not implement <strong>the</strong> ―cure‖ unless we have reason to think
we have <strong>the</strong> ―disease.‖ A test for auto-correlation in panel models (Wooldridge 2009) rejects <strong>the</strong> null of zero
correlation at better than <strong>the</strong> 1% level, and a likelihood ratio test for panel-level heteroskedasticity does <strong>the</strong> same for
<strong>the</strong> null of panel-homoskedasticity.
18 Beck and Katz's recommendation of lagged dependent variables has been more controversial than <strong>the</strong>ir advocacy
of panel-corrected errors; we choose to use <strong>the</strong> Prais-Winsten correction for auto-correlation instead of lags, but this
choice does not influence our findings.
16

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
weapons (mctransfer), is highly skewed; it is, however, log-normal and we thus use <strong>the</strong> natural
log of mctransfer as our dependent variable. 19 The independent variable of interest is pursuit of
nuclear weapons, and in some models possession of nuclear weapons as well. For control
variables, as described above, we included proxies for security environment, economic
development, closeness of relations with <strong>the</strong> exporting nation (alliance).
We start our analysis with models of total arms transfers received from major exporters.
The unit of observation is <strong>the</strong> importing country-year. This is, in many ways, <strong>the</strong> bottom-line
question: Do states suffer reduced access to conventional arms when <strong>the</strong>y start to pursue nuclear
arms, or can <strong>the</strong>y perhaps leverage <strong>the</strong>ir interest in nuclear weapons into greater arms flows?
Even if particular countries do reduce access, if o<strong>the</strong>r exporters compensate than <strong>the</strong> nuclear
aspirant may end up with more total arms at <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> day.
[Table 1 about here]
The results reported in Table 1 suggest that nuclear aspirants do get abundant access to
conventional arms, one way or ano<strong>the</strong>r. Here we estimate models for <strong>the</strong> total arms transfers
from <strong>the</strong> top nine exporters of major conventional arms. All variables o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> time period
dummies are significant at better than <strong>the</strong> one percent level. Greater arms imports are strongly
associated with participation in an enduring rivalry, greater MID involvement, and having a
defense pact with a great power. The model in column 2 adds GDP per capita, which is also
significant at better than <strong>the</strong> one percent level (adding it causes <strong>the</strong> loss of eight countries due to
lack of coverage from <strong>the</strong> Penn World Tables data). The period dummies reflect <strong>the</strong> drop-off in
arms transfers which began in <strong>the</strong> early 1980s and accelerated sharply with <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> cold
19 More precisely, we take <strong>the</strong> natural log of mctransfer +1 because many of <strong>the</strong> dyad-years feature zero arms
transfers.
17

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
war. And, most importantly, countries pursuing nuclear weapons received notably greater
conventional arms transfers, even after conditioning on <strong>the</strong>ir security environment.
In <strong>the</strong>se models, our dependent variable is in logs whereas <strong>the</strong> explanatory variables are
not (that is, <strong>the</strong>se are semi-logarithmic equations), meaning <strong>the</strong> coefficients can be read as partial
elasticities: <strong>the</strong> coefficient indicates roughly <strong>the</strong> approximate percentage change in arms transfers
for a one unit change in <strong>the</strong> explanatory variable. For example, <strong>the</strong> model in column one
indicates that countries pursuing nuclear weapons receive roughly 77% more in arms transfers
than those that are not pursuing nukes. 20 Similarly, participation in an enduring rivalry also has a
substantively significant effect: countries in a rivalry receive roughly 83% more arms than o<strong>the</strong>r
countries. Clearly, states that are pursuing nuclear weapons do not, in general, become pariahs of
<strong>the</strong> international arms market. In fact, <strong>the</strong>y receive more than one would expect conditional on
<strong>the</strong>ir general security situation. Interestingly, this ―bonus‖ seems to vanish if <strong>the</strong>y actually cross
<strong>the</strong> nuclear threshold and acquire nuclear weapons. The model in column 3 suggests than when
pursuing weapons, countries import 108% more weapons than would o<strong>the</strong>rwise be expected;
however, once <strong>the</strong>y cross <strong>the</strong> threshold and possess nuclear weapons, <strong>the</strong>ir import propensity
becomes indistinguishable from that of o<strong>the</strong>r states in similar security environments. Yet states
also do not in <strong>the</strong> aggregate get punished – in terms of reduced access to conventional arms – for
pursuing nuclear weapons. We explore <strong>the</strong> reasons for this intriguing pattern in our case studies.
This finding is not sensitive to <strong>the</strong> particular coding of nuclear weapons program. Although <strong>the</strong>
results reported above are based on <strong>the</strong> updated version of <strong>the</strong> Singh and Way codings, results
20 The coefficients in <strong>the</strong> table can be read as a rough approximation of <strong>the</strong> partial elasticity, but as values increase
in size <strong>the</strong> approximation becomes progressively less accurate. The precise proportional change in <strong>the</strong> outcome
variable resulting from a non-infinitesimal change in <strong>the</strong> explanatory variable is calculated as exp(bΔX) – 1 (<strong>the</strong>
percentage change reported in <strong>the</strong> text multiplies this result by 100). Thornton and Innes (Thornton and Innes 1989)
provide a careful explanation of <strong>the</strong> proper interpretation of semi-logarithmic regressions.
18

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
are very similar using <strong>the</strong> Jo and Gartzke dates. Nor do <strong>the</strong> results depend on <strong>the</strong> particular
operationalization of enduring rivalry. 21
In many ways, this is <strong>the</strong> take-home point: countries pursuing nuclear weapons somehow
manage to import even more major conventional weapons than one would expect conditional
upon characteristics of <strong>the</strong>ir security environment. Yet how <strong>the</strong>y are getting those weapons is
also of interest. Are some countries cutting off nuclear aspirants, only to be undercut by o<strong>the</strong>r
exporters? To explore <strong>the</strong>se patterns, we turn to dyad-specific models of arms flows. Here, our
unit of observation is <strong>the</strong> exporter-importer dyad year. For example, we have distinct data for
flows from Italy to Argentina for each year, from Italy to Taiwan, from Italy to South Africa, and
so on for each exporter and importer in each year.
Table 2 presents results for dyadic models. 22 Columns 1 and 2 pool all exporters toge<strong>the</strong>r.
These results show a strong and significant positive effect of nuclear weapons programs on <strong>the</strong>
flow of conventional arms: Countries pursing nuclear arms imported on average about 31% more
arms from specific exporters. Prior to estimating <strong>the</strong> models reported in Table 2, however, we
explored exporter-specific models for all nine major exporters. This produced a surprising result:
Eight of <strong>the</strong> nine major arms exporters had a positive coefficient for pursuit of nuclear arms
(with six of those significant), and only one country featured a negative coefficient: <strong>the</strong> United
States (it was not significant). Differences in export behavior were negligible among eight of <strong>the</strong>
nine countries. We thus created a dummy variable for <strong>the</strong> United States as exporter, and
interacted that with pursuit of nuclear weapons. This allows for both a USA-specific intercept,
and a USA-specific response to nuclear weapons programs. The results of <strong>the</strong>se models are
21 Codings of rivalries do vary substantially. With this in mind, we also used alternative codings by Goertz and
Diehl, Thompson, and Hewitt. However, none of <strong>the</strong> results depend upon <strong>the</strong> particular coding of enduring rivalry.
22 Once again, <strong>the</strong>se results are using <strong>the</strong> Singh and Way dates, but do not depend upon <strong>the</strong>m. With <strong>the</strong> Gartzke and
Jo dates, we find that countries pursuing nuclear weapons receive 47% more. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> same pattern between
pursuit and acquisition appears in <strong>the</strong> dyadic data, and with both sets of dates.
19

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
reported in columns 3 and 4. As <strong>the</strong> results show, all exporters respond roughly <strong>the</strong> same way to
<strong>the</strong> pursuit of nuclear weapons, except for <strong>the</strong> United States. On average, according to <strong>the</strong> model
in column 1, an exporter-importer dyad features about 33% more arms flows (<strong>the</strong> average figure
is higher when we separate out <strong>the</strong> atypical behavior of <strong>the</strong> USA) when <strong>the</strong> importer is pursuing
nuclear weapons. However, as <strong>the</strong> model in column 2 shows, for <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>the</strong>re is no
discernable increase. In fact, <strong>the</strong> USA-specific coefficient is negative (indicating a roughly 30%
drop in arms flows), although not discernable from zero.
Our data analysis spans over 40 years – and a lot can change in four decades. The nuclear
non-proliferation regime emerged, <strong>the</strong> first Gulf War revealed <strong>the</strong> porousness of <strong>the</strong> NPT regime,
<strong>the</strong> ideational climate regarding nuclear weapons changed, and states had plenty of time to learn
what works – and what doesn’t. Thus it is very possible that <strong>the</strong> relationship between our
variable of interest and <strong>the</strong> outcome of interest changes over time. To explore this possibility, we
estimated moving windows versions of both <strong>the</strong> total import and dyadic models. By estimating
<strong>the</strong> model sequentially for rolling slices of time, this procedure allows us to see if <strong>the</strong> coefficient
on <strong>the</strong> variable of interest changes over time.
Starting with <strong>the</strong> models for total imports, Figure 2 reports <strong>the</strong> coefficient on pursuit of
nuclear weapons from a moving windows version of <strong>the</strong> model reported in column 1 of Table 1.
(note: moving windows results not ready yet; <strong>the</strong>se are an approximation using period dummies).
The relationship between <strong>the</strong> pursuit of nuclear weapons and access to conventional arms clearly
changes over time. Both before <strong>the</strong> era of <strong>the</strong> non-proliferation regime – roughly from 1969
onwards – and after <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> Cold War <strong>the</strong>re is no discernable relationship between pursuit
of nuclear arms and total imports of conventional weapons. We cannot reject <strong>the</strong> hypo<strong>the</strong>sis that
pursuing nuclear weapons makes no difference for total imports of arms. However during <strong>the</strong>
20

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
years in which <strong>the</strong> non-proliferation regime and <strong>the</strong> Cold War coincided, roughly from 1969 to
1990, states pursuing nuclear weapons were clearly able to import prodigious quantities of
conventional weapons. Exporting states were clearly resolving <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma in favor of
nuclear nonproliferation at <strong>the</strong> expense of conventional proliferation. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> post-Cold
War arms market as a whole changed dramatically at <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> Cold War, when exporters’
economic concerns stemming from <strong>the</strong> ―peace dividend‖ coupled with calls for greater restraint
on humanitarian grounds replaced <strong>the</strong> superpower politics driving arms transfers.
Figure 3 reports similar time-period specific coefficients for <strong>the</strong> exporter-import dyad
models, based on <strong>the</strong> model reported in column 1 from Table 2. As with overall imports, <strong>the</strong>re is
no discernable relationship between pursuit of nuclear arms and access to conventional arms
ei<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong> early to mid-1960s or in <strong>the</strong> decade following <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> Cold War. However,
during <strong>the</strong> intervening 20-plus years, <strong>the</strong> relationship is strong, positive, and highly significant.
Clearly, <strong>the</strong> relationship between our variable of interest and <strong>the</strong> outcome of interest changes
over time. As with all of our results, this pattern does not depend on <strong>the</strong> use of Jo and Gartzke or
Singh and Way’s dates. Whe<strong>the</strong>r this reflects learning that attempts to ―buy off‖ nuclear weapons
aspirants with enhanced access to conventional arms or Cold War-specific dyanmics is an issue
we explore in illustrative cases.
Illustrative Cases
Coming in <strong>the</strong> next version!
21

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
Discussion and Conclusions
Countries that pursue nuclear weapons are, on average, much more likely to receive
major conventional arms. However, countries that acquire nuclear weapons are more likely to
see <strong>the</strong>ir special access to conventional arms disappear – but are also not, on average, punished
for <strong>the</strong>ir legal and normative indiscretions. Overall, ―buying out‖ nuclear aspirants appears to be
significantly more common than punishing <strong>the</strong>m. Yet it is also important to note that not all
states will necessarily resolve <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma in this way. The United States appears to be
<strong>the</strong> only state of <strong>the</strong> nine exporters in <strong>the</strong> analysis that might use reduced access to conventional
weapons to punish would-be nuclear powers (although not significantly so in <strong>the</strong> dyadic model
results). Moreover, exporters may not resolve <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma in <strong>the</strong> same way over time,
ei<strong>the</strong>r. From 1969 to 1990 – <strong>the</strong> years of <strong>the</strong> NPT nonproliferation regime that coincide with <strong>the</strong>
Cold War – states with nuclear weapons programs tended to receive more conventional arms
than those without nuclear weapons programs. However, this relationship disappears in <strong>the</strong> post-
Cold War era.
The laws and norms surrounding conventional arms transfers have traditionally been
weak, especially in comparison to nuclear weapons. Legal/normative reasons to avoid arms
exports to volatile regions or nuclear aspirants have thus been weak, perhaps making it easiest
for states to resolve <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma on <strong>the</strong> ―buy off‖ side. Moreover, during <strong>the</strong> Cold War
especially, <strong>the</strong> political incentives to export conventional arms were generally strong. For <strong>the</strong>
superpowers, conventional weapons transfers were a tool of foreign policy, to keep or win
friends to maintain <strong>the</strong> balance of power or even back favored policy initiatives. 23 For smaller,
23 See Erickson and Way (2011) on major conventional arms transfers and NPT membership.
22

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
European exporters, arms transfers were promoted as a matter of economic necessity, ra<strong>the</strong>r than
carefully restricted, as <strong>the</strong>y needed to achieve scale for <strong>the</strong>ir arms industries. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong>
results show that nuclear weapons developers got special treatment during <strong>the</strong> Cold War, even
when controlling for enduring rivalries and dispute involvement, where demand might be higher
and <strong>the</strong> temptation to send more conventional arms to support and win allies would be strongest.
Fur<strong>the</strong>r statistical and case study analysis will be necessary to draw more thorough
conclusions about <strong>the</strong> reasons for this variation across time and for US exceptionalism, and to
understand precisely why a ―buy off‖ ra<strong>the</strong>r than a punishment pattern emerged as <strong>the</strong> Cold War
standard. A plausible initial explanation might look to both differences in <strong>the</strong> perceived security
threats posed by conventional and nuclear proliferation, as well as differences in <strong>the</strong> legal and
normative environments associated with <strong>the</strong> two types of weapons. Both security and normative
arguments suggest that states will deem nuclear proliferation much more costly and dangerous
than conventional proliferation, despite <strong>the</strong> low likelihood of nuclear weapons actually being
used, unlike conventional weapons, which are of course central to <strong>the</strong> conduct of war. The
destructive potential for nuclear weapons is simply so much greater than that of conventional
weapons and <strong>the</strong> illegitimacy of nuclear production and use so well established, in contrast to <strong>the</strong>
firm legitimacy of <strong>the</strong> production and use of conventional weapons.
Perhaps, <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma is not so much a dilemma during much of <strong>the</strong> Cold
War after all. Certainly, concerns for conventional proliferation really only surfaced during <strong>the</strong>
Carter administration in <strong>the</strong> United States and were o<strong>the</strong>rwise weak. Aside from very specific
types of conventional weapons bans in <strong>the</strong> post-Cold War era (anti-personnel landmines and
cluster munitions), no international ban exists on <strong>the</strong> import, export, or use of conventional
weapons more broadly – nor is one likely to form any time soon. Indeed, while most states are
23

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
legally barred from developing nuclear weapons by international treaty law and strong norms
persist against <strong>the</strong> use of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons present a very different
picture. The right to possess and use conventional weapons is enshrined in international law as a
part of states’ right to self-defense. During <strong>the</strong> Cold War and often since, states have defended
<strong>the</strong>ir right to trade conventional arms without external interference or scrutiny.
In <strong>the</strong> post-Cold War era, nuclear proliferation remains as significant a concern as ever,
with new threats associated with <strong>the</strong> possibility of non-state actors like terrorist groups acquiring
nuclear capabilities adding to it. However, <strong>the</strong> situation for conventional weapons has changed
during this same period, which may account for <strong>the</strong> changes we find in <strong>the</strong> relationship between
nuclear weapons development and conventional arms access. Since <strong>the</strong> mid-1990s, international
rules and norms have for <strong>the</strong> first time emerged and spread related to <strong>the</strong> restriction of
conventional arms transfers to conflict zones and unstable regions in particular (Erickson 2009).
As a result, major supplier states may have become less willing to exploit importer demand for
conventional arms in some cases. Greater international attention to conventional weapons in <strong>the</strong>
post-Cold War era and <strong>the</strong> resulting multilateral agreements (existing or in <strong>the</strong> works) might
<strong>the</strong>refore mean that resolving <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma with a ―buy out‖ strategy has become much
more difficult for many states. Just as <strong>the</strong> international community is confronting both new and
enduring nuclear security threats, conventional weapons buy-offs have become a much less
legitimate means to address those threats.
24

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
Figures and Tables
25

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
26

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
27

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
Table 1. Total Arms Imports by Recipient
(1) (2) (3)
Nuclear Weapons
<strong>Program</strong>
.773***
(.249)
.759***
(.261)
1.087***
(.252)
Nuclear Weapons
Acquisition
- -.487
(.318)
Rivalry .825***
(.078)
Dispute Involvement .355***
(.061)
Allies .990***
(.101)
.941***
(.078)
.379***
(.063)
.710***
(.102)
.571***
(.066)
.307***
(.056)
.623***
(.107)
GPD per Capita - .00006***
(5.57e-06)
.00006***
(5.56e-06)
1960 - 1968 -.134
(.112)
1969 – 1982 -.018
(.111)
1983 – 1990 -.371***
(.133)
1991 – -.629***
(.141)
Constant 1.92***
(.130)
-.071
(.125)
-.018
(.123)
-.315***
(.142)
-.601***
(.147)
1.32***
(.139)
-.027
(.121)
-.054
(.124)
-.341**
(.140)
-.578***
(.146)
1.51***
(.138)
Wald Chi-Square 439 675 575
Countries 182 174 174
Observations 6,257 5,720 5,720
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%
28

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
Table 2. Dyadic Arms Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nuclear Weapons
<strong>Program</strong>
.306***
(.079)
.326***
(.086)
.334***
(.081)
.365***
(.087)
USA-specific
intercept
.871***
(.052)
.948***
(.051)
Nuclear Weapons
<strong>Program</strong> – US
Exports
- -.272
(.282)
-.332
(.303)
Rivalry .159***
(.023)
.186***
(.023)
.162***
(.022)
.191***
(.023)
Dispute Involvement .079***
(.016)
.084***
(.017)
.081***
(.016)
.086***
(.016)
Allies .175***
(.024)
.141***
(.025)
.178***
(.024)
.145***
(.024)
GPD per Capita - .00002***
(1.49e-06)
.00002***
(1.43e-06)
1960 - 1968 -.041*
(.023)
-.024
(.028)
-.042*
(023)
-.026
(.028)
1969 – 1982 .012
(.023)
.017
(.027)
.015
(..024)
.019
(.028)
1983 – 1990 -.024
(.028)
-.029
(.032)
-.022
(.026)
-.028
(.032)
1991 – -.065***
(.029)
-.078***
(.033)
-.065***
(.030)
-.078**
(.033)
Constant .316***
(.027)
.189***
(.031)
.216***
(.027)
.079**
(.031)
Wald Chi-Square 227 389 227 389
Exporter-Importer 1,638 1,566 1,638 1,566
Pairs
Observations 55,982 51,194 55,982 51,194
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%
29

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
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