Revisiting the Dove's Dilemma: - Program on Strategic Stability ...

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
Table 2. Dyadic Arms Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nuclear Weapons
<strong>Program</strong>
.306***
(.079)
.326***
(.086)
.334***
(.081)
.365***
(.087)
USA-specific
intercept
.871***
(.052)
.948***
(.051)
Nuclear Weapons
<strong>Program</strong> – US
Exports
- -.272
(.282)
-.332
(.303)
Rivalry .159***
(.023)
.186***
(.023)
.162***
(.022)
.191***
(.023)
Dispute Involvement .079***
(.016)
.084***
(.017)
.081***
(.016)
.086***
(.016)
Allies .175***
(.024)
.141***
(.025)
.178***
(.024)
.145***
(.024)
GPD per Capita - .00002***
(1.49e-06)
.00002***
(1.43e-06)
1960 - 1968 -.041*
(.023)
-.024
(.028)
-.042*
(023)
-.026
(.028)
1969 – 1982 .012
(.023)
.017
(.027)
.015
(..024)
.019
(.028)
1983 – 1990 -.024
(.028)
-.029
(.032)
-.022
(.026)
-.028
(.032)
1991 – -.065***
(.029)
-.078***
(.033)
-.065***
(.030)
-.078**
(.033)
Constant .316***
(.027)
.189***
(.031)
.216***
(.027)
.079**
(.031)
Wald Chi-Square 227 389 227 389
Exporter-Importer 1,638 1,566 1,638 1,566
Pairs
Observations 55,982 51,194 55,982 51,194
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%
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